Memorandum — Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1975

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

FILE

{

No. 73-1742 en 3

nT AK. JF

IN THE

Suprenve Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES EN-

VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE UNITED

STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CoUNCIL, INC. SAVE

AMERICA’S VITAL ENVIRONMENT, JANEY WEBER, AND

SUSANNE ALLSTROM,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARFTO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS B. STOEL, JR.

eo

—e (Member of the Bar of the

an . Supreme Court)

fie} e

NES RICHARD E. AYRES

OGDEN DOREMUS

Counsel for Respondents

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 78-1742

J

J

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES EN-

VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE UNITED

STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CoUNCIL, INC. SAVE

AMERICA’S VITAL ENVIRONMENT, JANEY WEBER, AND

SUSANNE ALLSTROM,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Respondents Natural Resources Defense Counsel, et al.

(for convenience, ‘““NRDC”), support the granting of a

writ of certiorari, for the purpose of resolving a conflict

among the circuits. In all other respects, the petition is

without merit.

BACKGROUND

In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Con-

gress expressed its strong commitment to the goal of

rapidly restoring the nation’s air to healthful and en-

2

vironmentally beneficial quality. The new statute sub-

stantially altered the previously-prevailing distribution

of responsibility for attacking this major health prob-

lem, markedly enlarging the supervisory role of the fed-

eral government over State and local efforts to abiuie

pollution. This decision was not lightly taken. Through

the 14 previous years, four separate federal statutes ' had

entrusted this task to the lower jurisdietions, without suc-

cess. In 1970, the Congress found that, far from im-

proving, ‘the air pollution problem is more severe, more

pervasive, and growing at a more rapid rate” than be-

fore.*

It was thus obvious to the drafters of the 1970 legis-

lation that a far stronger federal role was needed if the

air was to become clean again. Hence large areas of

regulation were exclusively entrusted to the federal EPA:

for example, establishing emission standards for ‘new

sources” of pollution, based upon the application of the

best available technology ($ 11%);* setting standards for

sources of “hazardous pollutants” ($112); controlling

automotive fuel additives ($ 211): and regulating emis-

sions from new automobiles and other ‘mobile sources”’

($ 202).

With respect to existing stationary sources of pollution,

however, Congress chose not to discard totally the State

and local programs that had developed under the pre-

. . > .

vious legislation. Instead, the legislature undertook a

creative exercise in federalism, building upon the exist-

ing organizational structure and expertise of the State

' Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 872 (1955): Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat.

392 (1963): Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 79 Stat. 996 (1965);

Clean Air Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).

°S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) at 1.

©42 US.C. § 185%-6. Because the United States Code notation

for the statute is quite clumsy. we hereafter adopt the qviginal

notation of the Act.

3

and local agencies, but allocating to EPA certain major

functions to prevent inaction. The State and local agencies

were to prepare and submit “Implementation Plans,”

binding themselves to a specific program oi action de-

signed to meet federally established standards for health-

ful air quality as expeditiously as practibie, but (subject

to the two exceptions discussed below) not later than mid-

1975.' The object was, as the court below correctly noted,

to ensure that ambitious commitments were undertaken

by the States, in order to force the development of tech-

nology and the pace of administrative action. Natural

Resources Defense Council, ct al., V. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, (decision below) Pet. App. at 22a.

In view of the States’ previous failure to commit them-

selves energetically to the needed measures, however, the

legislation sharply curtailed State and local autonomy

even with respect to Implementation Plans, For example,

though the States were to formulate Implementation

Plans, EPA was instructed to exercise a powerful su-

pervisory role. If a State Plan failed in any respect to

meet the detailed statutory blueprint of £$110'a), EPA

was to disapprove it and promulgate binding federal reg-

ulations ‘to replace the offending portion. Consistent with

the new scheme, the statute also sharply curtailed the

States’ power to defer the implementation of their Plans.

Where the States had previously exercised the power to

grant a variance (or its equivalent) from their control

regulations whenever a poiluter could meet vaguely speci-

fied and highly discretionary standards such as “hard-

ship,” the new law substituted two carefully drawn fed-

eral procedures—“extensions” (3 110(e)! and “postpone-

ments” ($110(f'). Consistent with the Congress’ de-

termination that the restoration of healthful air quality

'$110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857¢-5. This section is reprinted, with the

original notation, in Appendix C of Petitioner’s Appendix at page

56a, et seq.

4

Was so urgent it must take precedence over narrow

economic interests, NRDC, ct al., v. EPA, (decision below)

Point V ‘unchallenged in the instant petition for cer-

tiorari), Pet. App. at 48a et seq.; NRDC, et al., v. EPA,

478 F.2d 875, at 888-9 (1st Cir., 1973), these two pro-

visions limited the degree of flexibility and administrative

discretion, while providing relief for genuine cases of in-

ability to comply. Federal ‘‘extensions,”’ of as much as

two years, could be granted to a State or Air Quality

Control Region in those few instances where, even with

the application of all the available means to control pollu-

tion, an area was so polluted that healthful air quality

could not be attained even by 1975. Likewise, in the

unusual situation where a specifit polluter could not meet

the requirements of his State’s Plan, the federal EPA

could grant him immunity from the statute’s penalties

for up to one year at a time through a federal “postpone-

ment.’”’ In order to avoid the abuses associated with the

State variance procedures, however, this federal variance

provision was designed to force a formal demonstration,

in a judicialized federal administrative hearing, that

continued jeopardy of the public heaith was truly un-

avoidable, and that the continued operation of the offend-

ing source without penalty served an important public

interest. Since the standard for obtaining a_postpone-

ment was purposely stricter than that for obtaining State

variances, the federal law pre-empted the existing State

laws.

In August, 1971, the EPA Administrator promulgated

regulations which were inconsistent with this provision,

in that they purported to make the application of. the

federal postponement procedure discretionary with fed-

eral and State administrators, rather than mandatory as

Congress had intended. 40 C.F.R. $ 51.32(f) (formerly

42 C.F.R. $ 420.32'f)). Under these regulations, a pol-

luter would be required to seek a postponement rather

5

than a State or local variance only upon a finding by the

State that the requested variance would prevent the at-

tainment or maintenance of a National Air Quality

Standard. When, in May of 1972, acting under this reg-

ulation, the Agency approved State Implementation Plans

that would continue to authorize State variances in vio-

lation of $ 110(f), NRDC, in conjunction with numerous

local citizens and clean air organizations, petitioned for

review of the approvals of a number of State Pians.:

Beginning with the First Circuit, four federal Courts

of Appeals subsequently upheld these petitioners’ conten-

tion that EPA had illegally attempted to .mpute discre-

tion where none had been intended. .All four agueed

wholeheartedly that Congress had intended to pre-empt

State variance procedures. They differed on only one

point: the date on which pre-emption was to occur. The

Fifth Circuit, agreeing with petitioners, held that the

postponement procedure was intended to pre-empt State

variance procedures immediately: that is, once EPA had

approved a State Plan, a polluter could be insulated from

attack for violating a part of it only if he obtained a fed-

eral postponement. The First Circuit, later followed by

the Eighth and Second Crrenits, held that pre-emption

occurred as of the date set for attainment of the National

Primary Standards (mid-1975 or earlier, except in those

few cases where a State had sought and obtained an ex-

tension for attainment pursuant to £ 110(e)).

EPA has since stated its agreement with the First Cir-

cuit position, though it has not, more than a year after

the court’s_decision, rescinded its illegal regulation. Thus

in petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari, the

’ Because the statute’s review provision, $307 of the Clean Air

Amendments, required a petition for review of a Plan approval to

be brought in the “appropriate circuit,” it appeared impossible to

challenge the approvals of all deficient State variance statutes in

one piece of litigation. Hence the same Il gal issue was brought

before several federal Courts of Appeal.

6

Agency has presented the Court with the narrow issue

of whether pre-emption has already occurred, or whether

it will occur only at the attainment date.

THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

Respondents believe the Court should grant the writ,

because it presents a conflict in the circuits that should

be resolved. As noted previously, the Clean Air Amend-

ments represent a major change in governmental policy

towards pollution control, intended to place public ‘health

properly in the fore. The decision to pre-empt State

variance laws, substituting a federal procedure designed

to be more protective of public health, is one of the lynch-

pins of this effort to increase the pressure to restore

healthful air quality as rapidly as possible. On such an

important matter of public policy, this Court should take

the opportunity to resolve the conflict over precisely when

the more protective federal procedure becomes effective.

Furthermore, the conflicting holdings reached by the dif-

ferent circuits, could, in a few instances, result in uneven

treatment of the affected industries.

On the merits, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is incon- ~

testably the more carefully reasoned and correct. It is

grounded securely in the clear language of the statute,

and in extensive legislative history that plainly estab-

lishes the Congressional intent to pre-empt entirely the

State law variances. By contrast, the First Circuit’s

decision, which the petitioners charitably characterize as

“solomonesque,” Pet. for Cert. at 7, represents a compro-

mise between the positions of NRDC and EPA that is

not supported by either the statute or its legislative his-

tory. Obviously, this summary memorandum is not ap-

propriate for a full explication of this point, but it suf-

fices to say that the lower court was fully aware of the

ambiguous snippet of floor debate claimed by the govern-

ment to support its position, Pet. for Cert. at 14, eor-

7

rectly concluding that it was neither powerful nor per-

Suasive when ranged. against the plain language of the

statute and overwhelming legislative history on the other

side.” Likewise, the Fifth Circuit carefully considered,

and repeatedly rejected, the claim that a decision in

NRDC’s favor would disrupt the administration of the

federal program. This same claim was made before the

First Circuit in opposition to the rule the Agency now

says it is willing to embrace. The claim must be seen

for what it is—an appeal to the lawless notion that the

courts and the Congress have no power to redress illegal

conduct undertaken by the executive branch.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing, respondents urge that

the Court grant the petition for certiorari, in order to

resoive the conflict among the circuits. a

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas B. Stoel, Jr.

THOMAS B. Stor., Jr:

(Member of the Bar of the

Supreme Court }

n

s’ Richard E. Ayres

RICHARD E. AYRES

“s’ Ogden Doremus

OGDEN DorREMUS

Counsel for Respondents

July 8, 1974

* The petitioner's suggestion that the quoted statement by Senator

Muskie is the “only relevant legislative history” is simply and woe-

fully in error.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Memorandum — Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · 421 U.S. 60 | Frix