Opinion — Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad

Supreme Court brief1975

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SL ENS EAI AIEEE AS AR LETC ta

(Slip Opinion)

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-

leased, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time

the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion *

of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for

the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber

Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, *

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT :

‘No. 73-1004. Argued October 17, 1974—Decided March 18, 1975

Petitioner, a promoter of theatrical productions, applied to respond-:

ents, members of a municipal board charged with managing a city

auditorium and a city-leased theater, to present a musical produc-

tion at the theater. Upon the basis of outside ‘reports from which

it concluded that the production would not be “in the best interést

of the community,” respondents rejected the application. Peti-

tioner’s subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction was denied

following a hearing by the District Court, which did not review thé

merits of respondents’ decision but concluded that petitioner had

not met the burden of proving irreparable injury. Petitioner then

sought a permanent injunction permitting it to use the auditorium.

Several months later, respondents filed their first responsive

pleading, and the District Court. after a three-day hearing on the

content of the musical, concluded that the production contained

obscene conduct not entitled'to First Amendment protection and

denied injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals’ affirmed. Held:

1. Respondents’ denial of use of the municipal facilities for the

production, which was based on the board members’ judgment of

the musical’s content, constituted a prior restraint. Shuttlesworth

v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147; Cantwell y. Connecticut, 310 U. S.

296. Pp. 6-11, ;

2. A system of prior restraint “avoids constitutional infirmity

only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to

obviate the dangers of a censorship system,” Freedman v. Mary-

land, 380 U. S. 51,58; viz., (1) the burden of instituting judicial

proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected, must

_ Test on the censor; (2) any restraint before judicial review can be

imposed only for « specified brief period and only to preserve the

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‘

/ Syllabus

status quo; and (3) a prompt judicial determination must’ be

assured. Since those safeguards in several respects were lacking

here, respondents’ action violated petitioner's First Amendment

rights. Pp. 12-16.

486 F. 2d 894, reversed.

BiackmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

BRENNAN, Stewart, MarsHatt, and Powett, JJ., joined. Dove-

as, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Wuire, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which Burcer, C. J., joined; Rennauist, J., filed a

issenting opinion.

OO

LLL LEELA ALAA LEAL

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication

in the preliminary peiet of the United States Keports. Keaders are re-

mented to aot he Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the

inited States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other

‘ormal errors, in order that corrections may be made ore the pre-

liminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions, ; ; ;

Ltd., Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-

43 peals for the Sixth Circuit.

Steve Conrad et al.

{March 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice BLacKMUN delivered the opinion of the

Court. -

The issue in this case is whether First Amendment

rights were abridged when respondents denied petitioner

the use of a municipal facility in Chattanooga, Tennessee,

for the showing of the controversial rock musical “Hair.”

It is established, of course, that the Fourteenth Amend-

ment has made applicable to the States the First Amend-

ment’s guarantee of free speech. Douglas v. City of

Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).

See te

Petitioner Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., is a New

York corporation engaged in the business of promoting.

and presenting theatrical productions for profit. On

October 29, 1971, it applied for the use of the Tivoli, a

privately owned Chattanooga theater under long-term

lease to the City, to present “Hair” there for six days

beginning November 23. This was to be a road com-

pany showing of the musical that had played for three

years on Broadway, and had appeared in over 140 cities

in the United States.’ :

.) Twice previously, petitioner informally had asked permission to

use the Tivoli, and had been refused. In other cities, it had encoun-

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Respondents are the directors of the Chattanooga Me-

morial Auditorium, a municipal theater.? Shortly after

receiving Southeastern’s application, the directors met, —

and, after a brief discussion, voted to reject it. None of

them had seen the play or read the script, but they under-

stood from outside reports that the musical, as produced

elsewhere, involved nudity and obscenity on stage. Al-

though no conflicting engagement was scheduled for the

Tivoli, respondents determined that the production would

not be “in the best interest of the community.” South-

eastern was so notified but no written statement of

reasons was provided.

On November 1 petitioner, alleging that respondents’

action abridged its First Amendment rights, sought a pre-

liminary injunction from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Respondents did

not then file an answer to the complaint.* A hearing was

tered similar resistance and had successfully sought injunctions

ordering local officials to permit use of municipal facilities. See

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F. 2d 340

(CA5 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm

Beach, 457 F. 2d 1016 (CA5 1972): Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.

v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CA10 1972): Southeastern Pro-

motions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345 (WDNC 1971);

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634

(ND Ga. 1971). See also P. B. J. C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp.

757 (Mass. 1970), vacated and remanded for further consideration,

413 U. S. 903 (1973). But see Southeastern Promotions. Lid: v.

City of Oklahoma, Civil Action No. 72-105. (WD Okla. March. 27,

1972), reversed, 459 F. 2d 282, supra.

The musical had been presented if two Tennessee cities, Memphis

and Nashville. ~ .

*Code of the city of Chattanooga, § 2-238. The Board’s mem-

bers are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city’s board

of commissioners. § 2-237. The chairman, respondent Conrad. is

commissioner of public utilities, grounds and buildings. § 2-236.

* Neither did it file at that time a formal motion to dismiss. That

motion was made later, on November 22, some time after the initial

2 Se MS ere a ne CORR RE £ ce TY - a

.-SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 3

held on November 4. The District Court took evidence

as to the play’s content and respondent Conrad gave the

following account of the Board’s decision:

“We use the general terminology in turning down the

request for its use that we felt it was not in the best

interest of the community and I.can’t, speak beyond

that. That was the board’s determination.

Now, I would have to speak for myself, the policy

to which I would refer, as I mentioned, basically in-

dicates that we will, as a board, allow those produc-

tions which are clean and healthful and culturally

uplifting, or words to that effect. They are quoted

in the original dedication booklet of the Memorial

Auditorium.” App. 25.*

The court denied preliminary relief, concluding that peti-

tioner had failed to show that it would be irreparably

harmed pending a firfal judgment since scheduling was

“purely a matter of financial loss or gain” and was

compensable.

hearing. An answer was finally filed, pursuant to court orderon

March 31, 1972.

*The Memorial Auditorium, completed in 1924, was dedicated to

the memory of Chattanooga citizens who had “offered their lives”

in World War I. The bookiet referred to is entitled “Souvenir of

Dedication of Soldiers & Sailors Auditorium Chattanooga om.

It contains the following:

“It will be [the Board’s] endeavor to make [the Auditorium] in

communit:: eenter of Chattanooga; where civic, educational, religious,

patriotic and charitable organizations and associations may have a

common meeting place to discuss and further the upbuilding and

general welfare of the city and surrounding territory.

“It will not be operated for profit, and no effort to obtain financial

returns above the actual operating expenses will be permitted.

Instead its purpose will be devoted for cultural advancement, and

for clean, healthful, entertainment which will make for the upbuild-

ing of a better citizenship.” Exhibit 2, p. 40.

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4 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

Southeastern some weeks later pressed for a permanent

injunction permitting it to use the larger Auditorium,

rather than the Tivoli, on Sunday, April 9, 1972. The

District Court held three days of hearings beginning

April 3. On the issue of obscenity vel non, presented

to an advisory jury, it took evidence consisting of the full

script and libretto, with production notes and stage in-

structions, a recording of the musical numbers, a souvenir

program, and the testimony of seven witnesses who had

seen the production elsewhere. The jury returned a

verdict that “Hair” was obscene. The District Court

agreed. It concluded that conduct in the production—

group nudity and simulated sex—would violate city ordi-

nances and state statutes® making public nudity and

5 Chattanooga Code:

“Sec. 6-4. Offensive, indecent entertainment.

“Tt shall be unlawful for any person to hold, conduct or carry on,

or to cause or permit to be held, conducted or carried on any motion

picture exhibition or entertainment of any sort which is offensive

to decency, or which is of an obscene, indecent or immoral nature,

or so suggestive as to be offensive to the moral sense, or which is

calculated to incite crime or riot.”

“Sec. 25-28. Indecent exposure and conduct.

“It shall be unlawful for any person in the city to appear in 4

public place in a state of nudity, or to bathe in such state in the

daytime in the river or any bayou or stream within the city within

sight of any street or occupied premises; or to appear in public in

an indecent or lewd dress, or to do any lewd, obscene or indecent

act in any public place.”

Tennessee Code Annotated (1971 Supp.):

39-1013. Sale or loan of material to minor—Indecent exhibits.

“Tt shall be unlawful:

“(a) for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary con-

sideration or otherwise exhibit or make available to a minor:

“(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture

film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion

of the human body, which depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess

violence, or sado-maisochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors;

“(2) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however

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SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD:v. CONRAD 5

obscene acts criminal offenses. This crimina! conduct,

the Court reasoned, was neither speech nor symbolic

speech, and was to be viewed separately from the musi-

reproduced, or sound recording, which contains any matter enumer-

ated in paragraph (1) hereof above, or which contains explicit and

detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excite-

ment, sexual conduct, excess violence or sado-masochistic abuse, and

which is harmful to minors;

“(b) for any person knowingly to exhibit to a minor for a mone-

tary consideration, or knewingly to sell to a minor an admission

ticket or pass or otherwise to admit a minor to premises whereon

there is exhibited a motion picture, show or other presentation

which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess

violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors.

“39-3003. Obscene material—Knowingly selling, distributing or

exhibiting—Penalty.

“Tt shall be a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly sell,

distribute, display, exhibit, possess with the intent to sell, distribute,

display or exhibit; or to publish, produce, or otherwise create with

the intent to sell, distribute, display or exhibit any obscene material.”

Subsequent to our grant of the petition for certiorari in this case,

the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that § 39-3007 of the Tennessee

Code, which defined “obscene material,” as those words were used

‘n § 39-3003 and related sections, was unconstitutional for failure to

satisfy the specificity requirements of Miller v. California, 413 U. S.

15 (1973). Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State, —- Tenn. —, 510

S. W. 2d 258 (1974). Thereafter, a new obscenity statute, Acts

1974 (Adj. S), ¢. 510, was enacted by the Tennessee Legislature;

§ 14 of that act specifically repealed the above quoted § 39-3003.

® Respondents also contended that production of the musical would

violate the standard lease that petitioner would be required to sign.

The relevant provision of that lease reads:

“This agreement is made and entered into upon the following

expressed covenants and conditions, all and everyone. of which the

lessee hereby covenants and agrees to with the lessor to keep and

perform:

“1. That said lessee will comply with all laws of the United States

and of the State of Tennessee, all ordinance of the City of Chata-

nooga. and all rules and requirements of the police and fire depart-

ments or other municipal authorities of the City of Chattanooga.”

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6 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

cal’s speech elements. Being pure conduct, comparable

to rape or mirder, it was not entitled to First Amend-

ment protection. Accordingly, the Court denied the in-

junction. 341 F. Supp. 465 (ED Tenn. 1972).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. 486 F. 2d 894

(1973). The majority relied primarily on the lower

court’s reasoning. Neither the judges of the Court of

Appeals nor the District Court saw the musical per-

formed. Because of the First Amendment overtones, we

granted certiorari. 415 U.S. 912 (1974).

Petitioner urges reversal on the grounds that (1) re-

spondents’ action constituted an unlawful prior restraint,

(2) the courts below applied an incorrect standard for

the determination of the issue of obscenity vel non, and

(3) the record does not support a finding that “Hair” is

obscene. We do not reach the latter two contentions,

for we agree with the first. We hold that respondents’

rejection of petitioner’s application to use this public

forum accomplished a prior restraint under a system lack-

ing in constitutionally required minimal procedural safe-

guards. Accordingly, on this narrow ground, wé reverse.

II

Respondents’ action here is indistinguishable in its

HF Bar effect from the official actions consistently

-identified as prior restraints in a long line of this Court’s

decisions. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S.

147, 150-151 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S.

313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. 8. 290, 293-

294 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161-162

(1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938).

In these cases, the plaintiffs asked the courts to provide

relief where public officials had forbidden the plaintiffs

the use of public places to say what they wanted to say.

The restraints took a variety of forms, with officials

*

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SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 7

exercising control over different kinds of public places

under the authority of particular statutes. All, however,

had this in common: they gave public officials the power

to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression.

Invariably, the Court has felt obliged to condemn sys-

tems in which the exercise of such authority was not

bounded by precise and clear standards. The reasoning

has been, simply, that the danger of censorship and of

abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms

is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over

a forum’s use. Our distaste for censorship—reflecting

the natural distaste of a free people—is deep-written in

our law.

In each of the cited cases the prior restraint was em-

bedded in the licensing system itself, operating without

acceptable standards. In Shuttlesworth the Court held

unconstitutional a Birmingham ordinance which con-

ferred upon the City Commission virtually absolute

power to prohibit any “parade,” “procession,” or “demon-

stration” on streets or public ways. It ruled that “a law

subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to

the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective,

and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is

unconstitutional.” 394 U.S., at 150-151. In Hague v.

CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), a Jersey City ordinance that

forbade public assembly in the streets or parks without

a permit from the local Director of Safety, who was

empowered to refuse the permit upon his opinion that he

would thereby prevent “riots, disturbances or disorderly

assemblage,” was held void on its face. Jd., at 516.

In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), a

unanimous Court held invalid an act which proscribed

the solicitation of money or any valuable thing for “any

alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause” unless

that cause was approved by the secretary of the public

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8 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

welfare council The elements of the prior restraint were

clearly set forth:

“It will be noted, however, that the Act requires

an applicaiion to the secretary of the public welfare

council of :he State; that he is empowered to deter-

mine whetier the cause is a religious one, and that

the issue o/ a certificate depends upon his affirmative

action. If he finds that the cause is not that of

religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime. He is not

to issue a certificate as a matter of course. His

decision to issue or refuse it involves appraisal of

facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation

of an opinon.” IJd., at 305.

The elements of prior restraint identified in Cantwell

and other cases were clearly present in’ the system by

which the Chaitanooga Board regulated the use of its

theaters. One seeking to use a theater was required to

apply to the Boird. The Board was empowered to deter-

mine whether the applicant should be granted permis-

sion—in effect, a license or permit—on the basis of its

review of the content of the proposed production. Ap-

proval of the spplication depended upon the Board’s

affirmative actin. Approval was not a matter of rou-

tine; instead, i: involved the “appraisal of facts, the

exercise of judgnent, and the formation of an opinion”’

by the Board.’

7 With respect t petitioner’s musical, respondents’ determina-

tion was that the jroduction would not be “in the best interest of

the community.” Chat determination may have been guided by

other criteria: (1) tieir own requirement, in the words of respondent

Conrad, that a prduction be “clean and healthful and culturally

uplifting,” App. 25; or (2) the provisions of the statutes and ordi-

nances prohibiting public nudity and obscenity. Whether or not

their exercise of discetion was sufficiently controlled by law, Shuttles-

worth v. Birminghan, supra, there can be no doubt that approval

of an application rquired some judgment as to the content and

quality of the prodution.

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 9

The Board’s .judgment effectively kept the musical

off stage. Respondents did not permit the show to go

on and rely on law enforcement authorities to prosecute

for anything illegal that occurred. Rather, they denied

the application in anticipation that the production would

violate the law. See New York Times Co. v. United

States, 403 U. S. 713, 735-738 (1971) (Wuire, J.,

concurring).

Respondents’ action was no less a prior restraint be-

cause the public facilities under their control happened

to be municipal theaters. The Memorial Auditorium

and the Tivoli were public forums designed for and dedi-

cated to expressive activities. There was no question as

to the usefulness of either facility for petitioner’s produc-

tion. There was no contention by the Board that these

facilities could not accommodate a production of this

size. None of the circumstances qualifying as an estab-

lished exception to the doctrine of prior restraint was

present. Petitioner was not seeking to use a facility

primarily serving a competing use. See, e. g., Cameron

v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968); Adderley v. Florida,

385 U. S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131

(1966). Nor was rejection of the application based on

any regulation of time, place, or manner related to the

nature of the facility or applieations from other users. See

Coz v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Poulos

v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408 (1953). No rights

of individuals in surrounding areas were violated by noise

or any other aspect of the production. See Kovacs v.

Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). There was no captive

audience. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418

U. S. 298, 304, 306-308 (1974) ; Public Utilities Comm’n

v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-468 (1952) (Dove.as, J.,

dissenting).

Whether petitioner might have used some other, pri-

vately owned, theater in the city for the production is

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10 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

of no consequence. There is reason to doubt on this

record whether any other facility would have served as

well as these, since none apparently had the seating

capacity, accoustical features, stage equipment and elec-

trical service that the show required. Even if a pri-

vately owned forum had been available, that fact alone

would not justify an otherwise impermissible prior

restraint. “[OJne is not to have the exercise of his

liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on

the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”

Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U.S., at 163.

Thus, it does not matter for purposes of this case that

the Board’s decision might not have had the effect of

total suppression of the musical in the community.

‘Denying use of the municipal facility under the circum-

stances present here constituted the prior restraint.®

8 Also important, though unessential to our conclusion, are the

classificatory aspects of the Board’s decision. A licensing system

need not effect total suppression in order to create a prior restraint.

In Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U. §. 676, 688 (1968), it was

observed that the evils attendant on prior restraint “are not rendered

less objectionable because the regulation of expression is one of classi-

fication rather than direct suppression.” In that case, the Court

held that a prior restraint was created by a system whereby an

administrative board in Texas classified films as “suitable for young

persons” or “not suitable for young persons.” The “not suitable”

films were not suppressed, but exhibitors were required to have

special licenses and advertise their classification in order to show

them. Similarly, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. &. 58

(1963), the Court held that a ‘system of “informal censorship”

working by exhortation and advice sufficiently inhibited expression

to constitute a prior restraint and warrant injunctive relief. There,

the Court held unconstitutional a system in which a commission was

charged with reviewing material “manifestly tending to the cor-

ruption of the youth”; it did not have direct regulatory or sup-

pressing functions, but operated by persuasion and intimidation,

and these informal methods were found effective.

In the present case, the Board classified the musical as unfit for

showing in municipal facilities. It did not make a point of pub-

ORL AOE PURE WUT i SE ICANN AT Nite OT Bi IME

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 11

That restraint was final. It was no mere temporary

bar while necessary judicial proceedings were under way.’

Only if we were to conclude that live drama was unpro-

tected by the First Amendment—or subject to a totally

different standard than that applied to other forms of

expression—could we possibly find no prior restraint here.

Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed

for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it,

for each may present its own problems. Joseph Burstyn,

Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952); see Red Lion

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). By its

nature, theater usually is the acting out—or singing out—

of the written word, and frequently mixes speech with

live action or conduct. But that is no reason to hold

theater subject to a drastically different standard. For,

as was said in Burstyn, supra, at 503, when the Court

was faced with the question of what First Amendment

standard applies to films,

“the basic principles of freedom of speech and the

press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not

vary. Those principles, as they have frequently

been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of

licizing its finding that “Hair” was not in the “best interest” of the

public, but the classification stood as a warning to all concerned,

private theater owners and general public alike. There is little in

the record to indicate the extent to which the Board’s action may

have affected petitioner’s ability to obtain a theater and attract an

audience. The Board’s classification, whatever the magnitude of its

effect, was not unlike that in /nterstate Circuit and Bantam Books.

® This case is clearly distinguishable from Heller v. New York, 413

U. S. 483 (1973). There, state authorities seized a copy of a film,

temporarily, in order to preserve it as evidence. /d., at 490. The

Court held that there was not “any form of ‘final restraint,’ in the

sense of being enjoined from exhibition or threatened with destruc-

tion.” Jbid. Here, the Board did not merely detain temporarily a

copy of the script or libretto for the musical. Respondents reached

a final decision to bar performance. -

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12 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

expression the rule. There is no justification in this

case for making an exception to that rule.”

III

Labelling respondents’ action a prior restraint does not

end the inquiry. Prior restraints are not unconstitu-

tional per se. Bantam Books, Inc. vy. Sullivan, supra, 372

U.S., at 70 n. 10. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,

716 (1931); Times Film Corp. vy. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43

(1961). We have rejected the contention that the First

Amendment’s protection “includes complete and absolute

freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of

motion picture .. . even if this film contains the basest

type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful

‘overthrow of orderly government... .” Id., at 46-47,

Any system of prior restraint, however, “comes to this

Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-

tional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra,

372 U.S., at 70; New York Times Co. v. United States,

supra, 403 U.S., at 714; Organization for a Better Austin

v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971): Carroll v. Princess

Anne, 393 U. 8. 175, 181 (1968); Near y. Minnesota,

supra, 283 U.S., at 716. The presumption against prior

restraints is heavier—and the degree of protection

broader—than that against limits on expression imposed

by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory

deeply etched in our law: a free socicty prefers to punish —

the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the

law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It

is always difficult to know in advance what an individual

will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitu:iate

speech is often « finely drawn that the risks of freewheel-

ing censorship are formidable. See Sneiser v. Randall,

357 U.S. 513 (1958),

In order to be held lawful. respondents’ action, first,

must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 13

the prohibition against prior restraints, and, second, it

must have been accomplished with procedural safeguards

that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally

protected speech. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra,

372 U. S., at 71. We do not decide whether the per-

formance of “Hair” fits within such an exception or

whether, as a substantive matter, the Board’s standard

for resolving that question was correct, for we conclude

that the standard, whatever it may have been, was not

implemented by the Board under a system with appro-

priate and necessary procedural safeguards,

The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint

“avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place

under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the

dangers of a censorship system.” Freedman v. Maryland,

380 U. S. 51, 58 (1965). See United States v. Thirty-

seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 367 (1971); Blount v.

Rizzi, 40@U. S. 410, 419-421 (1971) ; Teitel Film Corp. v.

Cusack, 390 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1968). See also Heller

v. New York, supra, 413 U.S., at 489-490 ; Bantam Books,

Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, 372 U. S., at 70-71; Kingsley

Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436 (1957). In Freed-

man the Court struck down a state scheme for the li-

censing of motion pictures, holding “that, because only a

judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures

the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a

procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to

impose a valid final restraint.” 380 U. S., at 58. We

he!d in Freedman, and we reaffirm here, that a system of

prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it

lacks certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting

judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material is

unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any re-

straint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a °

specified brief period and only for the purpose of presery-

POA OMIA SO OOH Hsu 4 WP ath Siren

14 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

i.

ing the status quo. T'hird, a prompt final judicial deter-

mination must be assured,

Although most of our cases have pertained to motion

picture licensing or censorship, this Court. has applied

Freedman to the system by which federal customs agents

seize imported materials, United States -v. Thirty-seven

Photographs, supra, and to that by which postal officials

restrict use of the mails, Blount vy. Rizzi, supra. In

Blount we held unconstitutional provisions of the postal

laws designed to control use of the mails for commerce in

obscene materials. The provisions enabled the Post-

master General to halt delivery of mail to an individual

and prevent payment of money orders to him. The ad-

ministrative order became effective without judicial ap-

proval, and the burden of obtaining judicial review was

placed upon the user.

If a scheme that restricts access to the mails must fur-

nish the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman, no

less must be expected of a system that regulates use of a

public forum. Respondents here had the same powers

of licensing and censorship exercised by postal officials in

Blount, and by boards and officials in other cases.

The theory underlying the requirement of safeguards

is applicable here with equal if not greater force. An

administrative board assigned to screening stage produc-

tions—and keeping off stage anything not deemed cul-

turally uplifting or health ful—may well be less responsive

than a court, an independent branch of government, to

constitutionally protected interests in free expression.’

And if judicial review is made unduly onerous, by reason

of delay or otherwise, the board’s determination in prac-

tice may be final. ; f

————_ : 2 \

*°See Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 Harv._L.

Rev. 518, 522-524 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Re-

straint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648, 656-659 (1955).

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 15

Insistence on rigorous procedural safeguards under

these circumstances is “but a special instance of the

larger principle that freedoms of expressions must be

ringed about with adequate bulwarks.” Bantam Books,

Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, 372 U. S.. at 66. Because the

line between unconditionally guaranteed speech and

speech that may be legitimately regulated is a close one,

the “separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech

calls for . . . sensitive tools.” Speiser v. Randall, supra,

357 U.S., at 525. The perils of prior restraint sre well

illustrated by this case, where neither the Board nor the

lower courts could have known precisely the extent of

nudity or simuleted sex in the musical, or even that either

would appear, before the play was actually performed,”

Procedural safeguards were lacking here in several

respects. The Board’s system did not provide a proce-

dure for prompt judicial review. Although the District

Court commendably held a hearing on petitioner’s motion

for a preliminary injunction within a few days of the

Board’s decision, it did not review the merits of the

decision at that time. The question at the hearing was

whether petitioner should receive preliminary relief, i. e.,

whether there was likelihood of success on the merits and

whether petitioner would suffer irreperable injury pend-

ing full review. Effective review on the merits was not

obtained until more than five months later. . Through-

out, it wes petitioner, not the Board, that bore the burden

of obtaining judicial review. It was petitioner that had

"There was testimony that the musitak as performed differed

“substantially” from the seript, App. 79-80, and that the show was

varied to fit the anticipated tastes of difierent audiences in different

parts of the country. J/d., at 93. The musical’s nude scene, appar-

ently the most controversial portion, was played under varying

conditions. No actor was under contractual obligation to perform it,

and the number doing so changed from one performance to another,

as did the lighting, and the duration of the scene. Jd., at 97-98, 23.

%

‘

.

16 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

the burden of persuasion at the preliminary hearing if

not at the later stages of: the litigation. Respondents

did not file a formal answer to the complaint for five

months after petitioner sought review. During the time

prior to judicial detertiination, the restraint altered the

status quo. Petitioner was forced to forego the initial

dates planned for the engagement and to seek to schedule

the performance at a later date. The delay and uncer-

tainty inevitably discouraged use of the forum.

The procedural shortcomings that form the basis for

our decision are unrelated to the standard that the Board

applied. Whatever the reasons may have been for the

Board’s exclusion of the musical, it could not escape the

obligation to afford appropriate procedural safeguards.

We need not decide whether the standard of obscenity

applied by respondents or the courts below was suffi-

‘ciently precise or substantively correct, or whether the

production is in fact obscene. See Hamling v. United

States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974) ; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S.

153 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130

(1974); Miller v. California, supra; Gooding v. Wilson,

405 U? S. 518 (1972). The standard, whatever it may _

be, must be implemented under a system that assures

prompt judicial: review with a minimal restriction of First

Amendment rights necessary under the circumstances.

Reversed.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions, On Wee of Caton :

Ltd., Petitioner, n Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-

v peals for the Sixth. Circuit.

Steve Conrad et al.

|Mareh 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice DovuG.as, dissenting.

While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the ac-

tions of the respondents constituted an impermissible

prior restraint upon the performance of petitioner’s rock

musical, I am compelled to write separately in. order to

emphasize my view that the injuries inflicted upen peti-

tioner’s First Amendment rights cannot be treated ade-

quately or averted in the future by the simple application

of a few procedural band-aids. The critical flaw in this

case lies not in the absence of procedural safeguards, but

rather in the very nature of the content screening in

which respondents have engaged.

The Court today treads much the same path which it

walked in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965),

and the sentiment which I expressed on that occasion

remains equally relevant: “I do not believe any form of

censorship—no matter how speedy or prolonged it may

be—is permissible.” /d., at 61-62 (concurring opinion).

See also Star v. Preller, —— U. S. —— (1974) (dissenting

opinion); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78

(1961) (dissenting opinion).

A municipal theatre is no less a forum for the expres-

sion of ideas than is a public park, or a sidewalk; the

forms of expression adopted in such a forum may be more

expensive and more.structured than those typically seen

2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

in our parks and streets, but they are surely no less en-

titled to the shelter of-the First Amendment. As soon as

municipal officials aré’ permitted to pick and choose, as

they are in all existing socialist regimes, between those

productions which are “clean and healthful and cultur-

ally uplifting” in content and those which are not, the

path is cleared for a regime of censorship under which full

voice can be given only to those views which meet with

the approval of the powers that be.

There was much testimony in the District Court con-

cerning the pungent social and political commentary

which the musical “Hair” levels against various sacred

cows of our society: the Vietnam War, the draft, and the -

puritanical conventions of the Establishment. This com-

mentary is undoubtedly offensive to some, but its contri-

bution to social ccnsciousness and intellectual ferment is

a positive one. '» this respect, the musical’s often ribalu

humor and trenchant social satire may someday merit

_ comparison to the most highly regarded works of Aristo-

phanes, a fellow debunker of established tastes and re-

ceived wisdom, yet one whose offerings would doubtless

meet with a similarly cold reception at the hands of Estab-

lishment censors. No matter how many procedural safe-

guards may be imposed. any system which permits

governmental officials to inhibit or control the flow cf

disturbing and unwelcome ideas to the public threatens

serious diminution of the breadth and richness of our

cultural offerings.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions, - . .

Lid., Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-

= peals for the Sixth Circuit.

Steve ‘Conrad et al.

[March 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice WuHiITe, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE

joins, dissenting.

Although in Part II of its opinion the Court lectures on

the evils of standardless licensing systems, understand-

ably this is not the ultirmate basis for decision. However

broad discretion the Chattanooga authorities may other-

wise have, plainly they are subject to the laws against

obscenity and public nudity, and the standard lease re-

quires that productions such as “Hair” not violate the

law. In this respect, the licensing system is not: without

standards. As might be expected, therefore, the issue

in the case, as defined by the District Court and the

Court of Appeals, was not whether local authorities had

undue discretion but whether they correctly refused to

license “Hair” on the ground that the ‘production would

fail to satisfy “Par. 1 of the standard lease form requiring

the licensee to comply with all state and local laws in its

use of the leased premises,” these laws being the laws

against obscenity, public nudity and display of sexually

oriented materials to minors. In so framing the question,

the courts below reflected the prayer of the complaint,

App. 13-14, which sought a declaration that the musical

was protected expression under the First Amendment,

did not, violate any city ordinance and was not obscene.

An injunction requiring local authorities to make the

municipal facilities available for the production of “Hair”’

was also sought.

2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

The District Court and the Court of Appeals consid-

ered the issue tendered and held that the contemplated

production of “Hair” did not qualify for a lease under

the relevant state and local laws. Here, the majority

does not address this question, but nevertheless reverses

on the ground that the Chattanooga permit system is

“lacking in constitutionally required minimum proce-

dural safeguard.” Ante, p. ——. The Court’s under-

standing of our prior cases is unexceptionable, but reach-

ing decision on this-ground is inappropriate. In the first

place, no such issue appears to have been tendered to the

District Court or to have been decided by either the Dis-

trict Court or the Court of Appeals. As already indi-

cated, the complaint sought a declaration that “Hair”

did not violate the relevant ordinances and statutes as

well as an injunction permitting the use of municipal

facilities for the showing of the musical. Secondly, how-

ever inadequate the Chattanooga system might be under

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), the parties

have now been to court; and, after trial, “Hair” has been

held violative of Tennessee statutes by both the District

Court and the Court of Appeals. This Court does not

now reverse or disapprove these decisions in this respect;

and assuming their correctness, as is therefore appropri-

ate, is it the Court’s intention in reversing the judgment

of the Court of Appeals to order that “Hair,” which has

been held obscene after trial, must be issued a license for

showing in the municipal facilities of Chattanooga? If

this is the case, it is a very odd disposition, one which I

cannot join. On the record before us, it would be error —

to enter any judgment the effect of which is to require

the Chattanooga authorities to permit the showing of

“Hair” in the municipal auditorium.

_ The Court asserts that “Hair” contains a nude scene

and that this is “the most controversial portion of the

musical.’ This almost completely ignores the District

ee A A a A chk RS

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 2

Court's description of the play as involving not only

nudity but repeated “simulated acts of anal intercourse,

frontal intercourse, heterosexual intercourse, homosexual

intercourse and group intercourse ....” *

1 Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465, 472-

474 (ED Tenn. 1972):

“Findings of Fact

“Turning first to the issue\of obscenity, the script, libretto, stage

instructions, musical renditiohs, and the testimony of the witnesses

reflect the following relevant matters (It should be noted that the

script, libretto, and stage instructions do not include but a small

portion of the conduct hereinafter described as occurring in the play):

“The souvenir program as formerly distributed in the lobby (Ex-

hibit No. 1) identified the performers by picture and biographical

information, one female performer identifying herself as follows:

“ ‘Hobbies are picking my nose, fucking, smoking dope, astro projec-

tion. All that I am or ever hope to be, I owe to my mother.’

“It was testified that distribution of this program had now been dis-

continued. Prior to the opening of the play, and to the accompani-

ment of music appropriate to the occasion, a ‘tribe’ of New York

‘street people’ start gathering for the commencement of the per-

formance. In view of the audience the performers station themselves

in various places, some mingling with the audience, with a female

performer taking a seated position on center stage with her legs

spread wide to expose to the audience her genita] area, which is

covered with the design of a cherry. Thus the stage is set for all.

‘that follows. The performance then begins to the words and music

of the song ‘Aquarius,’ the melody of which, if not the words, have

become nationally, if not internationally, popular, according to the

evidence. The theme of the song is the coming of a new age, the

age of love, the age of ‘Aquarius.’ Following this one of the street

people, Burger, introduces himself by various prefixes to his name,

including ‘Up Your Burger,’ accompanied by an anal finger gesture

and ‘Pittsburger,’ accompanied by an underarm gesture. He then

removes his pants and dressed only in jockey shorts identifies his

genitals by the line, ‘What is this God-damned thing? 3,000 pounds

of Navajo jewelry? Ha! Ha! Ha!’ Throwing his pants into the

audience he then proceeds to mingle with the audience and, selecting

a female viewer, exclaims, ‘I’ll bet you’re scared shitless.’

“Burger then sings a song, ‘Looking For My Donna,’ and the

tribe chants a list of drags beginning with ‘hashish’ and ending with

4 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

Given this description of “Hair,” the First Amendment

in my view does not compel municipal authorities to

permit production of the play in municipal facilities.

‘Methadrine, Sex, You, WOW!’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-5) | Another

male character then sings the lyric:

“SODOMY, FELLATIO, CUNNILINGUS, PEDERASTY—FA-

THER, WHY DO THESE WORDS SOUND SO NASTY”

. MASTURBATION CAN BE FUN. JOIN THE HOLY ORGY,

KAMA SUTRA, EVERYONE.’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-5)

“The play then continues with action, songs, chants, and dialogue

making reference by isolated words, broken sentences, rhyme, and

rapid changes to such diverse subjects as love, peace, freedom, war,

racism, air pollution, parents, the drafi, hair, the flag, drugs, and

sex. The story line gradually centers upon the character Claude

and his response and the response of the tribe to his having received

a draft notice. When others suggest he burn his draft card, he can

only bring himself to urinate upon it. The first act ends when all

performers, male and female, appear nude upon the stage, the nude

scene being had without dialogue and without reference to dialogue.

It is also. without mention in the script. Actors simulating police

then appear in the audience and announce that they are under arrest

for watching this ‘lewd, obscene show.’

“The second act continues with song and dialogue to develop the

story of Claude’s draft status, with reference interspersed to such

diverse topics as interracial love, a drug ‘trip,’ impersonation of

various figures: from American history,’ religion, war, and sex. The

play ends with Claude’s death as a result of the draft and the street

people singing the song, ‘Let the Sunshine In,’ a song the testimony

reflects has likewise become popular over the Nation.

“Interspersed throughout the play, as reflected in the script, is

such ‘street language’ as ‘ass’ (Exhibit No. 4, pp. 1-20, 21 and 2-16),

‘fart’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-26),-and repeated use of the words ‘fuck’ *

“2 Lincoln is regaled with the following lyrics: ‘I’s free now

thanks to you, Massa Lincoln, emancipator of the slave, yeah,

-yeah, yeah! Emanci—mother fucking—pater of the slave, yeah,

yeah, yeah! Emanci—mother fucking—pater of the slave, yeah,

yeah, yeah!’ With Lincoln responding, ‘Bang my ass . . . I ain’t

dying for no white man!’”_~ "6

“3 A woman taking her departure says to the tribe, ‘Fuck off,

kids.’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-35). The following dialogue occurs

as Claude nears his death scene:

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS. LTD. v. CONRAD 5

Whether or not a production as described by the District

Court is obscene and may be forbidden to adult audiences.

it is apparent to me that the State of Tennessee could

constitutionally forbid exhibition of the musical to chil-

and the four letter word for excretion (Exhibit No. 4, pp. 1-7, 9 and

41). In addition, similar Ianguage and posters containing such lan-

guage were used on stage but not reflected in the script.

~ “Also, throughout the play, and not reflected in the seript, are

repeated acts of simulated sexual intercourse. These were testified

to by every witness who had seen the play. Thev are often unre-

lated to any dialogue and accordingly could not be placed with

accuracy in the script. The overwhelming evidence reflects that

simulated acts of anal intercourse, frontal intercourse, heterosexual

intercourse, homosexual intercourse, and group intercourse are com-

mitted throughout the play. often without reference to any dialogue.

song, or story line in the play. Such acts are committed both stand-

ing up and lying down, accompanied by all the bodily movements

included in such acts, all the while the actors and actresses are in

close bodily contact. At one yioint the character Burger performs

a full and complete simulation of masturbation while using a red

microphone placed in his crotch to simulate his genitals. The evi-

dence again refleecs that this is unrelated to anv dialogue then

occurring in the play. The evidence further reflects that repeated

acts of taking hold of other actors’ genitals occur, again without

reference to the dialogue. While three female actresses sing a song

regarding interracial love, three male actors lie on the floor immedi-

ately below them repeatedly thrusting their anaes at the singers.

At another point in the seript (Exhibit No. 4, p. 2-22) the actor

Claude pretends to have lost his penis. The Belen accompanying

this line is to search for it in the mouths of other actors and

actresses.”

““Burger: I hate the fucking world. don’t vou?

“Claude: I hate the fucking world, I hate the fucking winter,

hate these fucking streets.

““Burger: I wish the fuck it would snow at least.

“*Claude: Yeah, I wish the fuck it would snow at least.

““Burger: Yeah. I wish the fuck it would.

““Ciaude: Oh, fuck!

“Burger: Oh, fucky, fuck, fuck!’ (Exhibit No. 4. p. 2-22)”

—

6 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. ». CONRAD

dren,? Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), and

that Chattanooga may reserve its auditorium for produc-

tions suitable for exhibition to all the citizens of the city,

adults and children alike. ‘Hair’ does not qualify in this

respect, and without holding otherwise, it is improvident

for the Court to mandate the showing of “Hair” in the

Chattanooga auditorium.*

2 The producer, director, and president of petitioner, Southeastern

Promotions. Ltd., did not insist in the District Court that petitioner

was entitled to exhibit the play to minors contrary to local law.

His testimony, Tr. 7-8, was that if there was “a standing ordinance

related to the exclusion of minors, we would certainly abide by

es

3 As appears from pp. 16-17 of the transcript of oral argument,

petitioner’s counsel was of the view that the issue of obscenity must

be reached:

“So it would appear that the question of obscenity is not avoided

even if the Court agrees with petitioner that the standards used were

ultimately bad. Since on remand the respondents are going to press

obscenity as the basis for denying access to HAIR and to the lower

courts are going to sustain that position, we therefore urge this

Court to address itself to the question of the appropriate standards,

not only to prevent a waste of resources and judicial economy, but

because of widespread public interest in resolving this issue. There

‘are few plays that can afford the expense of litigation all the way

to this Court.”

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions,

Ltd., Petitioner,

v.

Steve Conrad et ai.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-

_ peals for the Sixth Circuit.

[March 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.

The Court treats this case as if it were on all fours

with Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), which

it is not. Freedman dealt with the efforts of the State

of Maryland to prohibit the petitioner in that case from

showing a film “at his Baltimore theater,” Freedman,

supra, at 52. Petitioner here did not seek to show the

musical production “Hair” at its Chattanvoga theater,

but rather at a Chattanooga theater owned by the city of

Chattanooga.

The Court glosses over this distinction by treating a

community owned theater as if it were the same as a city

park or city street, which it is not. The Court’s decisions

have recognized that city streets and parks are tradition-

ally open to the public, and that permits or licenses to

use them are not ordinarily required. “. .. [O]1ie who

is rightfully on a street which the state has left open

to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the

constitutional right to express his views in an orderly

fashion. This right extends to the communication of

ideas by handbill and literature as well as the spoken

_ word.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1942).

The Court has therefore held that where municipal au-

thorities have sought to exact a license or permit for those

who wished to use parks or streets for the purpose of

2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

exercising their right of free speech, the standards govern-

ing the licensing authority must be objective, definite,

- and nondiscriminatory. Shuttlesworth v.. Birmingham,

394 U.S. 147 (1969). But until this case the Court has

not equated a public auditorium, which must of neces-

sity schedule performances by a process of inclusion and

exclusion, with public streets and parks.

In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, £68

(1968), the Court recognized that the Government as az

employer was to be viewed differently than the Govern-

ment as a lawmaker for the citizenry in general:

“ . , [I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has

interests as an employer in regulating the speech of.

its employees but differs significantly from those it

possesses in connection with regulation of the speech

of the citizenry in general.”

See, e. g., Communications Association v. Doud, 339

’ U. S. 382, 402-403 (1950); United Public Workers v.

Mitchell, 330 U. 8. 75, 95 (1947); Konigsberg v. State

Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 50-51 (1961). Here we deal with

municipal action by the city of Chattanooga, not j1o-

hibiting or penalizing the expression of views in dramatic

form by citizens at large, but rather managing its munici-

pal auditorium. In Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47

(1966), the Court said:

“The State, no less than a private owner of property,

has power to preserve the property under its con-

trol for the use for .which it is ldwfully dedicated.

For this reason, there. is.no merit to the petitioner’s

argument that they had a Constitutional right to

stay on the property .... /The United States Consti-

tution does not forbid a State-te control the use of its

own property for its own lawful non-discriminatory

purpose.” ~

5

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 3

‘The Court avoids the impact of cases such as Adderley

by insisting that the municipal auditorium and the the-

ater were “public forums designed for and dedicated to

expressive activity,” ante, at 9, and that the rejection of

petitioner’s application was not based on “any regulation

of time, place, or manner related to the nature of the

facility or applications from other users.” Ante, at 9.

But the apparent effect of the Court’s decision is to tell

the managers of municipal auditoriums that they may

_exercise no selective role whatsoever in deciding what

performances may be booked. The auditoriums in ques-

tion here have historically been devoted to “clean, health-

ful entertainment”’’;’ they have accepted only produc-

tions not inappropriate for viewing by children so that

the facilities might serve.as'a place for entertaining thé

whole family. Viewed apart from any cunstitutional lim-

itations, such a policy. would undoubtedly rule out much

worthwhile adult entertainment: But if it is the desire

of the citizens of Chattanooga? who presumably have paid

for and own the facility, that the attractions to be shown

there should not be of the kind which would offend any

substantial yumber of potential theatergoers, I do not

think the poliev can be described as arbitrary or unrea-

sonable.* Whether or not the production of the version

of “Hair” here under consideration is obscene, the find-

ings of fact made by the District Court and affirmed on

'See the Court's opinion. ante. at 3 n. 4

? Limitations on the use’of municipal auditoriums by Government

must be sufficiently reasonable to satisfy the Due Process Clause

and ean not unfairly diseriminate in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. A municipal auditormm which opened itself to Republicans

while closing itself to Democrats would run afoul of the Fourteenth

Amendment. There is no allegation in the instant case that the

auditormmes accepted equally graphie productions while unfairly dis-

criminating against Hair because of its expressions of political and

social belief.

¥

4 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD -”

appeal do indicate that it is not entertainment designed

for the whole family.’

_/ If every municipal theater or auditorium which is “de-

signed for and dedicated to expressive activities” becomes

subject to the rule enunciated by the Court in this case,

consequentes unforeseen and perhaps undesired by the

- Court may well ensue. May an opera house limit its

productions to operas, or must it also show rock musicals?

May a municipal theater devote an entire season to

Shakespeare, or is it required to book any potential pro-

ducer on a first come-first-served basis? These questions

are real ones in the light of the Court’s opinicn, which

by its terms seem to give no constitutionally permissible

role in the way of selection to the municipal authorities.

But these substantive aspects of the Court’s opinion

are no more troubling than tne farrago of procedural

requirements with which it has saddled municipal author-

ities. Relving on Freedman, the Court ho’is that those

charged with the management of the auditorium have the

burden of instituting judicial proceedings, that “restraint”

prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a speci-

fied brief period, and that a prompt final judicial deter-

mination must be assured. Ante, at 13-14.

If these standards are applicable only where a lease

for a production is refused on the grounds that the pro-

duction is putatively obscene, the Court has performe4

the rather novel teat of elevating obscene productions to

a preferred position under the First Amendment. If

these procedures must be invoked every time the man-

agement of a municipal theater declines to lease the fa-

cilities, whether or not because of the putative obscenity

of the performance, other questions are raised. What

‘The findings of fact of the District Court, reported, at 341 F.

Supp. 465, 472-474, were repeated by the Court of Appeals, at 486

F. 2d 894, 895-897.

oA

é

=*SSOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 5

will be the issues to be tried in these proceedings? Is the

Court actually saying that unless the city of Chattanooga

could criminally punish a person for staging a perform-

ance in a theater which he owned, it may not deny a lease

to that same person in order for him to stage that per-

formance in a theater owned by the city?

A municipal theater may not be run by municipal au-

thorities as if it were a private theater, free to judge on

a content basis alone which plays it wished to have per-

formed and which it did not. But, just as surely, that

element of it. which is “theater” ought to be accorded

some constitutional recognition along with that element

of it-which.is “municipal.” I do not believe fidelity to

the First Amendment requires the exaggerated and rigid

procedural safeguards which the Court insists upon in

this case. I think that the findings of the District Court

and the Court of Appeals support the conclusion that

petitioners were denied a lease for constitutionally ade-

quate and nondiscriminatory reasons. I would therefore

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

LOL PLORNLLEE LPG IE ILO MAHER NOE

CON SALAH MANETS

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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