Reply Brief — Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Commission
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SUPREME COURT, U.S pane seahieetenitmiaeaite co]
REPLY BRIEF 3 Swear ;
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1974
No. 73-1380
CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Petitioners
V..-
FEDERAL Power Comission, Respondent
No. 73-1666
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners
v.
CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Respondents
No. 73-1667
FEDERAL PowER ComMIssion, Petitioner
v.
CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Respondents
REPLY BRIEF OF
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY. ET AL.
(See list of attorneys on inside cover)
Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INc., WASHINGTON, D. C.
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NORTHCUTT ELY
FREDERICK H. RITTS
ROBERT F. PIETROWSKI, JR.
Law Offices of Northeutt Ely
Watergate 600 Building
Washington, D. C. 20037
’ and
HARRY A. POTH, JR.
PEYTON G. BOWMAN, 3zp
Reid & Priest
40 Wall Street, New York,
New York 10005
1701 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Attorneys for all Petitioners <
NICHOLAS H. POWELL
Snell & Wilmer
400 Security Building
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Atterneys for Arizona Public
Service Company
WILLIAM DUNCAN
Kemp, Smith, White, Duncan &
Hammond
P. O. Box 2800
El] Paso, Texas 79999
Attorneys for El Paso Electric
Company
BURT S. PINES, City Attorney
EDWARD C. FARRELL, Chief
Assistant City Attorney for
Water and Power
RALPH GUY WESSON
Assistant City Attorney
111 North Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 90051
Attorneys for Department of
Water and Power, City of
Los Angeles
M. GENE MATTEUCCI
P. O. Box 230
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Nevada Power
Company
REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon
111 W. Monroe Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and
Power District
SHERMAN CHICKERING
C. HAYDEN AMES
EDWARD P. NELSEN
ALLAN J. THOMPSON
Chickering & Gregory
111 Sutter Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Attorneys for San Diego Gas
§ Electric Company
JOHN R. BURY
Assistant General Counsel
P. O. Box 800
Rosemead, California 91770
Attorney for Southern California
Edison Company
L. V. ROBERTSON, JR.
General Attorney
Tueson Gas and Electrie Company
220 West Sixth Street
Tueson, Arizona 87503
DONALD E. DICKERMAN
Holesapple, Conner, Jones,
McFall & Johnson
P.O. Box 310
Tueson, Arizona 85702
Attorneys for Tucson Gas &
Electric Company
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
ROBERT GORDON
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Utah Power &
Light Company
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..... wed G Seed Gee eee Eo bea eee eee ee enn
I.
II.
The Federal Water Power Act Cannot Be Con-
strued as Including Steam Plants within the
Commission’s Licensing Jurisdiction Unless the
Rationale of the Taum Sauk Decision Is Re-
a ee eee or ee ee
The Argument That in 1920 Congress Intended
To Require Licensing of Steam Plants, Without
Saying So, Is Rebutted by Every Canon of Statu-
tory Construction ........... 6. cece eee ee eee
A. All nine Justices in the Taum Sauk case
looked to the same guides for construction
of the Federal Power Act that we urge here..
B. The ‘‘unadorned,’’ ‘‘plain’’ language of the
Act, which does not mention steam plants,
certainly does not close the door on legislative
history, as our opponents contend ..........
(. The curious argument that the Act includes
steam plants because ‘*Congress was not
thinking about steam plants at all’’ (Opp. Br.
26) collapses of its own weight ............
D. The administrative construction of the Act
as excluding steam plant licensing was re-
peatedly and consistently reported to Con-
gress over a period of a half-century, and is
entitled to great weight .............0.006-
IIT. Subsequent Consistent Refusal by Congress To
IV.
Grant the Commission Licensing Jurisdiction
Over Steam Plants Is Dispositive as to Legisla-
tive Intent ....... 0... cece reece cece tier ethene
The ‘‘Changed Circumstances’? Argument Is
Pierced by Its Own Statistics ..........--+---
il Table of Contents Continued
: .
V. The Question of Whether the ‘‘Surplus Water’’
Licensing Clause Is Generally Applicable To
Steam Plants Does Not Require Decision in
This Colorado River Case ...................
A. A Federal Power Commission license for the
consumptive use of water stored by govern-
ment dams on the Colorado River would be a
nullity; authority to grant such a right is
vested exclusively in the Secretary of the
TOIOPIOY oa 68 5556554 a5ca eww ne bens eeees
Bb. The assertion that this case reveals a dan-
gerous ‘‘gap,’’ through which ‘‘the Colorado
River is flowing unregulated, into the hands
of the power companies’? (Opp. Br. 40), is
pure sophistry ............ i655 ehesaemeee
C. The argument that the FPC must license
steam plants because it is responsible for
planning comprehensive river development
(Opp. Br. 42) is demolished by the Colorado
River statutes ........8. secs eee sceccces :
D. The asserted concern of the Indians about the
effect of these relatively small consumptive
uses on downsteam hydro plants and salinity
could not be litigated in the absence of the
seven States which are parties to the Col-
orado River Compact and the parties to the
decree in Arizona v. California ............
~
©. The environmental statutes do not transfer
the Seeretary’s control of stored water to the
Federal Power Commission ...........000.
VI. There Is No Support for the Notion That. the
Surplus Water Clause Was Intended To Bring
Steam Plants into the FPC?’s Licensing Juris-
diction, Unannounced, by the Back Door ......
VIT. CONCLUSION oo. eee eee ee ees
Page
13
13
14
16
26
ili
CITATIONS
CASES: Page
Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 570 (1936) ....... 15
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) .......--- 17,19
California Oregon Power Co. v. I°'PC, 239 F.2d 426
CDC. it. 1996) cso gesscwenernesesesserssreses 25
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 410-11
(1958) .cscs ssi tieesdwuns covtnwnncdscsseeees 9
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians, et al. v. FPC, 489 F.2d
1207, 1216-17, and n.43, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 19738) .. 6
Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S, 497
PTB OF oe wee un ede we cose ere enes cea vauny eeaes 5)
IPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965) ...... 2, 3,4
Ford v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369, 374 (1929)
23, 24
Lynch vy. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) ...... +
Maestro Plasti@Corp. v. NERB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) .. 5
Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. United States, 288
1. 260, 213 (1908) ocho oe neon eec serena ces 9
Potomac Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2017,
35 F.C, 680, 661° (1966) 40 0i00.<assckeseenewe 24
Potomac Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2516,
So PP. OG, OT (1966) tye cea cee wecces ess 24
Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union
of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)... 7
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
QO (IGT2) cece ec ccceaenceeees ene eneeeeneenes 7,8
Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 445-47, n.11 (1967) ...... 6
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) .............. 8
United States v. American Trucking Association, 310
U.S. 564, 0139-46 (1990): sons ees ce eyns ieee sneaes 3, 6
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S, 377
(TOAD) scan eves cae es ee ees e cena en enes 15
United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50
LS) 5
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
CI9GG) Gccee chen hes see ces cena eke ee uesaeews 6
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946)
icy ea
iv Citations Continued
STATUTES: Page
Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. 617n ......... 16°
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857 2... ee eee eee eee 20
Colorado River Basin Project Act, 48 U.S.C. 1511 .... 17
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266, 7 U.S. Cope Conc. axp
Apmin. News 1685 (Aug. 15, 1974) .............. 21
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 797(e) ...........0.2.. 2,9
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 803(e) ........-....0.. 24
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817 2.0.2... .......... 2,9
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 35
USA, 1251 0. ccc ccc ccc ccc c ccc ccc cn ec ceces 20
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321... 20
Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C, 1962a ...@.. 18
MISCELLANEOUS:
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SOUTHWEST F.NERGY
Stupy, Summary Report (1972) ................ 18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE CriTicAL WaTER
ProsLEMS FactinG THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES
(1974) (Review Draft) ...............0....0...0. 18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON WATER FOR
-ENERGY IN THE Upper Covorapo River Basin (July
TOUR) arn on a Goes wont keS £4 4a her aera weeny eee ee 18
Epison Evectric INstirure, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE Exvectric Utiuity [xpustry ror 1973: at 6
S1¢ 3 eee ee eee ee ae ne 10
Epison Evectric Institute, Historica STATISTICS OF
THE Exvectric Urmiry INpustry 4 (1962) ........ 10
EPA, Thermal Charges, 40 C.F.R. ch. 40, Part 122,
39 Fed. Reg. 3617€, Oct. 8, 1974 ...........00000. 20
EPA, Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
Category: Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40
C.F.R. ch. 1, Part 423, 39 Fed. Reg. 36186, Oct.
BOG nas 5 4 ah he ee eens ees 20, 21
EPA, Steam Electric Power Generating Source Cate-
gory: Proposed Effluent Guidelines and Standards
for Incompatible Pollutants, 39 Fed. Reg. 36210,
Ot, B, TOE oe occa vee s ese eeny sterner ss 21
Citations Continued Vv
Page
EPA, DevELopMENT DocUMENT FOR ProposeD EFFLUENT
Lrmitation GUmELINES AND NEw Source PERFORM-
ANCE STANDARDS FOR THE STEAM KLEcTRIC PowkR
Gexeratinc Porxt Source Catecory (1974) ...... 21
FPC, Stream Exvecrric PLant Arr Anb Water QUALITY
Conxrrot Data: Summary Report 24 (1974) ... 11, 13
Forty-SEconp ANNUAL Report OF THE EDERAL PoweER
Commission, 102-03 (1962) ....-..5--+ee ee eres
Hearings on Power Plant Siting and Environmental
Protection Before the Subcomm, on Communica-
tions and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 411
(1971) (Statement of Chairman Nassikas) ...... 9
Hearings on Interim Nuclear Licensing Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 92d Cong:, 2d Sess. 249, 261 (1972)
(Statement of Chairman Nassikas) ............- 9
S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1935) ....... 8
Warer Resources Counci., Upper CoLorade “EcIon,
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK Stupy (1971) ...... 18
Warer Resources Councit, Lower’ Cotorspo REcion,
CoMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK Stupy (1971) ...... 18
51 Conc. Rec. 12336, 12593, 12777 (1914) .....------- 7
53 Cone. Rec. 2640, 10450 (1916) ........--0 2 eee 7
56 Conc. Rec. 8929, 8931, 9112, 9282, 9912-13 (1918)
. » 22, 2d
58 Conc. Rec. 2037, 2221-23 (1919) .......-- ee eee eee 23
59 Conc. Rec. 241, 246, 1101, 1223, 1430, 1473, 6532
(¢ ) |) en 7, 23
79 Cong. Rec. 8431 (1935) 2.0... . eee eee eee eee eee 8
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SOUS SMI PERCE NTH ATT POTTERY
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1974
No. 73-1380
CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Petitioners
.
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Regpondent
No. 73-1666
Arizona Pusiic SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners
’ v.
CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS; ET AL., Respondents
No. 73-1667
FEDERAL Power ComMiIssion, Petitioner
v. .
CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Respondents
. REPLY BRIEF OF
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.
INTRODUCTION
Parts I-IV of this brief answer our opponents’
argument as to the ‘‘project works”’ licensing juris- -
diction of the Federal Power Commission.
Parts V and VI answer their argument as to the
Commission’s ‘‘surplus water’? licensing jurisdiction.
AD I
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Bbwsw. Sei GSD AN RR
2
| I. THE FEDERAL WATER POWER ACT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED
AS INCLUDING STEAM PLANTS WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S
LICENSING JURISDICTION UNLESS THE RATIONALE OF THE
TAUM SAUK DECISION IS REJECTED.
The majority opinion in the Taum Sauk licensing
case, FPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965),
authored by Mr. Justice White, holding that a pumped-
storage hydro plant required a license, said that ‘‘the
distinction between a hydroelectric project and a steam
plant is obvious and meaningful, although both pro-
duce energy for interstate transmission.” ’
The dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Goldberg, in
‘ which Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart
joined, said that ‘‘. . . the legislative history here,
however, establishes to my satisfaction that it [the Act]
has required licenses of neither steam plants nor the
type of hydroelectric plant here involved... .”’ (/d.
at 115.)
Both authors were answering the argument that if
the test of FPC’s licensing jurisdiction under Sections
4(e) and 23(b) were the effect of a given generating
plant on interstate transmission, rather than its effect
on navigable capacity, there was no distinction between
a pumped-storage plant (involved there) and a steam
plant. If our opponents were right about steam
plants, the ready premise for Mr. Justice White’s
holding that a pumped-storage plant requires a license
would have been to agree that both plants are indeed
in the same situation, hence the pumped-storage plant
requires a license because the steam plant requires
one. Rejecting this, the Justice made the pointed
distinction that pumped-storage plants are subject to
1FPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90, 110 (1965). Our
, Opponents flatly contradict this, saying (Opp. Br. 53), ‘*. . . this
distinction is not obvious and meaningfui :
3
license because ‘‘Part I, the original Federal Water
Power Act, is concerned with the utilization of water
resources aud particularly the power potential in
water,’’ but steam plants are excluded because of ‘‘this
central concern of the Act.’’ Our opponents’ argument
that the Court’s language which made this distinction
should be disregarded now, because the Court was not
then fully informed, needs no answer. And our oppo-
nents are equally at odds with the minority opinion
which, even though it posited that there was no juris-
dictional distinction between steam plants and pumped-
storage plants, concluded that the legislative history
establishes that licenses are required of neither of
them.
Il. THE ARGUMENT THAT IN 1920 CONGRESS INTENDED TO
REQUIRE LICENSING OF STEAM PLANTS, WITHOUT SAY-
ING SO, IS REBUTTED BY EVERY CANON OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.
A. All nine Justices in the Taum Sauk case looked to the same
guides for construction of the Federal Power Act that we
urge here.
The majority examined the history of the predeces-
sor statutes (pp. 98-99). They quoted the title, saving
(p. 99), ‘‘the principal use to be developed and regu-
lated in the Act, as its title indicates, was that of hydro-
electric power ‘0 meet the needs of an expanding
economy.’ They said (p. 100) that ‘‘the provisions of
the Act reflects these objectives,” noting (p. 100) that
‘‘the preface states that beside navigation and the
creation of the Commission, the Act was ‘to provide
for the... development of water power; the use of the
public lands in relation thereto... and for other pur-
poses’.’’ The Court also examined the legislative his-
tory in detail (pp. 101-08) to determine Congress’
intent.
ia) SM
4
The minority, as we have noted, looked to the same
- eriteria, annexing two appendixes detailing the legis-
lative history (pp. 115-23).
B. The “unadorned,” “plain.” language of the Act, which does
not mention steam plants, certainly does not close the door
on legislative history, as our opponents contend.
Our opponents say that the legislative history quoted
in our opening brief and its supplement is irrelevant,
because the ‘‘unadorned’”’ language of the Act plainly
gives the Commission licensing jur isdiction over steam
plants (Opp. Br. 10).
The Court in the Taum Sauk case did not dis-
cover this ‘‘plain meaning,’’ notwithstanding its hold-
ing (p. 100) that ‘‘the purposes of the Act are more
fully served if the Commission must, as it held in this
case, consider the impact of the project on the full spec-
trum of commerce interests.”’ ¥et it excluded steam
plants from this ‘‘spectrum,” after an exhaustive
analysis of the language of the Act and its legislative
history, finding no ‘‘unadorned language’’ which in-
cluded steam plants. Nor did the minority, which ex-
cluded them after an equally searching analysis of the
legislative history (p. 115).
All of these factors which were treated as relevant
to the meaning of the Federal Power Act in the Taum
Sauk case should now be ignored, according to the
complainants, in favor of the literalness of the terms
“project works’’ and ‘‘surplus water,’’ even though
‘‘literalness may strangle meaning,’’ Utah Junk Co. v.
Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946), and even though ‘‘this
Court [has] repeatedly warned against the dangers of
an approach to statutory construction which confines
itself to the bare words of a statute.’? Lynch v. Over-
5
holser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962); Church of Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 ( 1892).
When words such as ‘‘project works’’ or ‘*surplus
water,’’ which are inherently imprecise, are used in a
statute, this Court looks, inter alia, to legislative his-
tory to determine a statute’s meaning. E.g., U.S. v.
American Trucking Association, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940) (‘‘employees’’); United States v. Rosenblum
Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50 (1942) (‘‘common carrier’’) ;
Maestro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956)
(‘‘any strike’’).
Contrary to the complainant’s views, the proper
method of statutory interpretation has been stated by
this Court as follows:
‘In the interpretation of statutes, the function
of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the
language so as to give effect to the intent of Con-
gress. There is no invariable rule for the discov-
ery of that intention. To take a few words from
their context and with them thus isolated to at-
tempt to determine their meaning, certainly would
not contribute greatly to the discovery of the pur-
pose of the draftsmen of a statute, particularly
in a law drawn to meet many needs of a major
occupation.
‘“‘There is, of course, no more persuasive evi-
dence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
which the legislature undertook. to give expression
to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in
and of themselves to determine the purpose of the
legislation. In such cases we have followed their
plain meaning. When that meaning has led to
absurd or futile results, however, this Court has
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the
act. Frequently, however, even when the plain
meaning did not produce absurd results but merely
an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the
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policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has
followed that purpose, rather tht the literal
words. When aid to construction of the meaning
of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its
use, however clear the words may appear on
‘superficial examination.’’’ .United States v.
American Trucking Association, 310 U.S. 534, 543-
44 (1940).
Construction of the Federal Power Act should be no
exception.
C. The curious argument that the Act includes steam plants
because “Congress was not thinking about steam plants at
all” (Opp. Br. 26) collapses of its own weight.
This is not a case which presents the problem of
whether a statute written in comprehensive terms in-
cludes a business which comes into existence after its
enactment, as argued in the opposing brief, pp. 32-40,
with reference to such instances as cable television.*
radio broadeasting, ete.
By contrast, all sides agree that steam plants were
not only in existence in 1920, but that they accounted
for the greater part of the electrical power production
of this country at that time, as they do now.’ Congress,
?The FCC has ‘‘broad responsibilities for the orderly develop-
ment of an appropriate system of local television broadeasting,’’ °
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968),
and the Communications Act envisions a ‘‘unified and comprehen-
sive regulatory system for the industry.’’ Jd. at 168. It cannot
be said that the Federal Power Act evinces Congress’ intent to
regulate all sources of electricity, including nuclear plants, fossil-
fuel plants not proximate to navigable waters, geothermal plants,
gas turbines and diesel plants, and the plants involved in this case.
3 Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians, et al. v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207,
1216-17, and n. 43, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Udall v. FPC,
387 U.S. 428, 445-47, n. 11 (1967).
ee ‘te . m . +N EE ie NTN RA MY TE AN aR,
Epa es SS , Fi
7
in 1920, knew a great deal about steam plants, which
were mentioned repeatedly in the debates as unlicensed
competitors of the hydro projects intended to be li-
censed.*
D. The administrative construction of the Act as excluding
steam plant licensing was repeatedly and consistently re-
ported to Congress over a period of a half century, and is
entitled to great weight.
The Commission’s first report to Congress in 1921
stated that its jurisdiction was limited to hydro power
projects. The opposing brief points out that the Com-
missioners so reporting did not hold office during the
previous year (Opp. Br. 47), when Congress enacted
the Act. This is quite immaterial. They were the men
charged with responsibility for ‘‘setting its machinery
in motion.’’® Power Reactor Development Co. v. Inter-
national Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396,
408 (1961). This administrative construction was re-
ported consistently in at least 23 annual reports there-
after,° and is entitled to ‘‘great weight.’’ Trafficante
4 E.g., 51 Cone. Rec. 12336, 12593, 12777 (1914) ; 53 Cone. Rec.
2640, 10450 (1916) ; 56 Cong. Rec. 8931, 9282 (1918); 59 Cone.
Rec. 3101, 1430, 1473 (1920). Congress desired to foster water
power development as a means to encourage conservation of coal
and oil. E.g., 56 Cone. Rec. 9112 (1918) ; 59 Cone. Rec. 241, 1223,
6532 (1919).
> As it happened, O. C. Merrill, a principal architect of the
Federal Water Power Act, lauded by our opponents (Opp. Br.
50),.was the Executive Secretary of the Commission at the time
this report was prepared and submitted to Congress.
* See the Commission’s Annual Reports for the following years:
1935, p. 1; 1939, p. 2; 1940, pp. 1-5; 1946, pp. 2-3; 1949, p. 3;
1950, p. 3; 1951, p. 2; 1956, pp. 3, 5; 1957, pp. 3, 4; 1958, p. 4;
1959, p. 4; 1960, p. 5; 1961, p. 7; 1962, pp. 8, 12-13; 1963, p. 7;
1964, pp. 10-11, 13; 1965, p. 10; 1966, pp. 8-9, 18; 1967, p. 25;
1968, p. 29; 1969, p. 25; 1970, p. 31; 1971, p. 22.
Re aE Le a ee
8
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
III. SUBSEQUENT CONSISTENT REFUSAL BY CONGRESS TO
GRANT THE COMMISSION LICENSING JURISDICTION
OVER STEAM PLANTS IS DISPOSITIVE AS TO LEGISLA-
TIVE INTENT.
Complainants’ brief ignores the occasions, at least
four in number, on which Congress has declined to
amend the Federal Power Act to grant the Federal
Power Commission jurisdiction to license steam plants.
In 1935 Congress enacted the Federal Power Act,
which included, as Part I, the entire text of the Federal
Water Power Act, and added, as Part II, regulatory
provisions relating to utilities’ rates, interconnections,
securities, etc. An amendment was proposed to the
portion of the bill which became Title II, to add a sec-
tion which would grant the Commission authority to
‘‘certificate’’ (license) all forms of ‘‘ production facili-
ties’? and transmission lines. It was rejected in com-
mittee, in the Senate.’ Senator Wheeler, the author
of the pending bill, explained on the Senate floor:
‘“‘Mr. Wheeler: . . . Let me say this further to the
Senator: The bill as it was originally prepared
by the proponents and introduced contained a
provision to the effect that a power company would
have to come to the commission for a certificate
of convenience and necessity before it could con-
struct a power plant, or a transformer, or any-
thing else of that kind, within a State. In the
committee, I insisted that this be stricken out,
because I felt that we should not go so far in this
bill, because it was not necessary.” 79 Cong. Ree.
8431 (1935).
7S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1935).
9
Instead, Congress in 1935 reenacted Section 4(e)
of the Federal Water Power Act (16 U.S.C. 797(e) )
without change as part of Title I of the Federal Power
Act, and added the first sentence of Section 23(b) (16
U.S.C. 817), * well informed of the Commission’s con-
struction that its licensing jurisdiction was limited to
hydro projects. This Court has held that congres-
sional reenactment of a statute, in knowledge of con-
sistent administrative interpretation of it, is signifi-
sant as indicating satisfaction with that interpretation.
Cammarano vy. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510-11
(1958); Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 269, 273 (1933).
The 1935 decision by Congress, in our view, dis-
poses of our opponents’ case.
Congress’ subsequent actions confirmed its 1935 de-
cision. In 1962, 1971, and 1972, Congress considered
the renewed request of the Commission to license steam
plants, and heard its supporting testimony to the effect
that it did not have, but should have, this authority.°
Congress did not grant the request. .
The consistent course followed by Congress for a
half-century was not congressional thaction ; it mani-
8 These are the two sections which contain references to ‘‘sur-_
plus water or water power from any government dam.”’
® Forty-Seconp ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL Power Com-
MISSION, 102-03 (1962); Hearings on Power Plant Siting and
Environmental Protection Before the Subcomm. on Communica-
tions and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 411 (1971) (Statement of Chair-
man Nassikas); Hearings on Interim Nuclear Licensing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Fisherics and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 249, 261 (1972) (Statement of Chairman Nassikas).
;
|
;
4
10
fested a continuing and consistent determination to
stay out of the field.
IV. THE “CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES” ARGUMENT
IS PIERCED BY ITS OWN STATISTICS.
It is argued (Opp. Br. 20) that ‘‘Congress did not
cousider whether steam plants needed to be regulated
in 1920 because their operations had no effect on the
hydro potential of navigable streams, but fundamental
changes in their method of operations have now
brought steam plants within the range of evils Con-
gress sought to regulate under the Federal Power Act;
under these circumstances, jurisdiction should be con-
strued expansively.”’
If this were so, it might be thought that Congress,
in this half-century, would have discovered this and
legislated to expand the FPC’s licensing jurisdiction
to include steam plants. The record is to the contrary.
By 1935, when Congress rejected an amendment which
would have done this (supra, p. 8), the capacity of
steam generating plants, which had been 8,920,000 kw
in 1920, had more than doubled, to 24,471,000 kw.'°
By 1962, when it refused to act on FPC’s request for
jurisdiction to license steam plants (supra, n. 9), their
capacity had increased to 149,943, 000 kw,” nearly 16
times the 1920 figure. By 1972, when Congress again
received, but did not act upon, FPC’s renewed request
for licensing jurisdiction over steam plants (supra,
n. 9), their capacity had increased to 322,944,000 kw,”
10 EpIison ELectric INSTITUTE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
Evectric Utitity INpustry 4 (1962).
11 Epison ELectric INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
Evectric UnTitity INpusTRY FoR 1973 at 6 (1974).
12 Id.
SSAA ND ATE OED
11
over 35 times the 1920 level. The consistent con-
gressional decision has been to leave the matter of
certification of steam plants with the States in which
the plants are located.
And it is quite misleading to base a claim for expan-
sion of licensing jurisdiction to encompass steam plants
ou assertions that there have been ‘fundamental
changes in their method of operation” (Opp. Br. 26).
The change alleged is that whereas in 1920 ‘“‘they re-
turned virtually all their cooling water to the streams,
so that it could be used again for other purposes, such
as hydro generation’’ (Opp. Br. 29), now they ‘‘per-
manently and substantially diminish the total volume of
the river, and, thus, the hydro-electric power potential
at all downstream water power sites’? (Opp. Br. 31).
But the statistics give an opposite ansyer.
First, on a national scale over 99.2% of the water
diverted for cooling in 1971 (the latest year for which
such data have been published) was returned to: the
stream, and there was thus no great reduction of the
flow."
Second, the argument that consumption of cooling
water in steam plants reduces the quantity available
for downstream hydro generation (Opp. Br. 31) is
subject to a reductio ad absurdum. For example, .the
consumption of an acre-foot of water in the cooling
system of the Navajo steam plant at Lake Powell facili-
tates the production of 504,000 kwh of energy, whereas
the same acre-foot falling from Lake Powell through
Glen Canyon, Hoover, Davis, and Parker hydro plants
18 FPC, Steam Evectric PLANT Arr AND WATER QUALITY Con-
TROL Data: SumMAry Report 24 (1974) (hereinafter ‘“‘“FPC 1974
Summary Report’’). Of 172,391 cubic feet per second diverted, 171,-
142 cubie feet per second were discharged back to the stream.
|
2
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a
:
a
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+
4
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4
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ee
(POO ADI AF ETE ADE A ANS ep
12
would generate 1,162 kwh—a ratio of 434 to 1 in favor
of use of water in the steam plant.’ Thus, if the com-
plainants’ argument of relative productivity of water
in power generation has any relevance, it works against
them.
Third, our opponents’ comparison of total future re-
quirements for cooling water with total run-off of
streams (Opp. Br. 31), if relevant at all, fails to take
account of the number of fossil-fuel plants that use
salt water for cooling, or the number of iuclear-
powered plants that use either fresh or salt cooling
water, both types of plants being outside the Commis-
sion’s licensing jurisdiction on any construction of
the Act.”
14QOne acre-foot of falling water generates 461 kwh at Glen
Canyon Dam, 492 kwh at Hoover Dam, 130 kwh at Davis Dam,
and 79 kwh at Parker Dam. These values are determined by
multiplying the rated head for each dam by a factor of 1.025.
Thus, one acre-foot of water falling over all four dams generates
(461 + 492 + 130 + 79) = 1,162 kwh.
The energy generation (504,000 kwh) facilitated by the con-
sumption of one acre-foot of water at the Navajo Plant is deter-
mined by multiplying the plant’s total: net capacity (2,310,000
kw) by the plant factor (0.85), multiplying the result by the num-
ber of hours in a year (8,760), and dividing the result by the rate
at which the plant consumes water (34,100 acre-feet per year).
The ratio of energy production at the Navajo Plant facilitated
by one acre-foot of water to the energy generation caused by one
acre-foot of water falling over all four dams is:
504,000 434
1,162 1
Tn 1971, the latest year for which the FPC has published
relevant figures, 125 generating plants with a total generating
capacity of 61,013,000 kw. used saline water for cooling. This com-
pares with 331 plants, with a total generating capacity of 135,332,-
000 kw, using ‘‘onte-through’’ fresh water cooling systems. All other
13
V. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE “SURPLUS
WATER” LICENSING CLAUSE IS GENERALLY APPLI-
CABLE TO STEAM PLANTS DOES NOT REQUIRE DE-
CISION IN THIS COLORADO RIVER CASE.
A. A Federal Power Commission license for the consumptive
use of water stored by government dams on the Colorado
River would be a nullity; authority to grant such a right
is vested exclusively in the Secretary of the Inierior.
If it is decided that the court of appeals was
right in holding that steam plants are not ‘project
works’’ requiring licenses in consequence of their use
of navigable waters of the United States or of govern-
ment lands, this case is finished. The further question
of whether the surplus water clause would be an inde-
pendent source of licensing jurisdiction is not required
to be decided with respect to uses of waters of the Colo-
rado River, because, as shown in our opening brief
(pp. 21-38), Congress, in this basin, has displaced the
surplus water license with the secretarial contract as
the exclusive source of right to consume water sup-
plied from government dams." FPC licensing juris-
diction cannot be founded merely on the fact that a
steam plant is consuming water supplied it from a gov-
ernment dam, exercising a privilege which the Com-
types of cooling (ponds, cooling towers, combined systems) ac-
c .unted for 233 plants with a total generating capacity of 87,063,-
OC) kw. #PC Summary Report, table 6A, p. 21. Sources of
coo..ng water; outside the scope of the Federal Power Act on
any construction, include effluents from sewage treatment and in-
dustrial waste plants, and wells. Dry-air cooling, using no water in
the cooling process, is technologically feasible, although less effi-
cient than water-cooling. oem
‘6 A surplus water license, even for a hydro project on the
Colorado River, would be worthless unless it could command the
Secretary as to the quantities that he must release from the dam,
at what discharge rate, in what months, and at what hours. Of
course the Commission) can do no such thing.
Bec AS Tn Tes
14
mission cannot give, but which can only be granted
(and has been granted in this case) by the Secretary.
A surplus water license, if issued, could neither enlarge
nor diminish the right conferred by the Secretary’s
water contract.
The opposing brief argues that the ‘‘Law of the
River’’ which lodges in the Secretary of the Interior
the exclusive power to grant, by contract, the right to
use water stored by a government dam, is simply analo-
gous to cases in which Congress requires that permits
be obtained from several government agencies before
some kinds of businesses can be conducted (Opp. Br.
76-78). The thought seems to be that a steam plant
consuming water supplied from Hoover Dam, or Glen
Canyon Dam, or Navajo Dam, or Emery County
Project Dam, must obtain both an FPC surplus water
license and an Interior Department water contract.
Not so. The two documents serve the same function,
as we shall see in examining the legislative history and
administrative construction of surplus water licenses
‘for the use by hydro plants of water supplied from
government dams on navigable streams (infra, Part
VI).
B. The assertion that this case reveals a dangerous “gap,”
through which “the Colorado River is flowing, unregulated,
into the hands of the power companies” (Opp. Br. 40), is
pure sophistry.
The Colorado is the most completely regulated river
in the country. Four statutes, the Boulder Canyon
Project Act (1928), the Reclamation Project Act of
1939, the Colorado River Storage Project Act (1954),
and the Colorado River Basin Project Act (1968) give
the Secretary complete control over release of water
sc
SRE FR PRE OA ERS OE PN es,
Pe LOSE A GR IARE
15
from government dams for consumptive use, and re-
quire contracts with the Secretary for that use. The
Federal Power Commission licenses hydroelectric
projects, but no statute directs the Secretary to share
with the Commission his plenary powers over con-
sumptive use of water stored by government dams
(powers which are much greater than those of a state
water allocation officer, contrary to our opponents’
contention, Opp. Br. 77). Complainants seek to stop,
not regulate.” consumptive uses specifically authorized
by the Secretary’s contracts, and, in two instances
(Nayajo ‘tes San Juan), specifically authorized by
Congress:
On the Colorado, neither ‘‘private power interests”’
nor any other interests can ‘“‘appropriate for them- .
selves the public’s valuable resources in the power
potential of navigable streams,”’ thus requiring the
‘‘ourb’’? of the Federal Power Act (Opp. Br. 20).
Here, as elsewhere, no one has a property interest in
running water, United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). Here, uniquely, the United
States itself, by ‘‘econgressional legislation and by acts
of its officers which that legislation authorizes, has un-
dertaken ... to impound, and control the disposition of,
the surplus water in the river not already appropri-
ated.”? Arizona v: California, 298 U.S. 558, 570
(1936). The control is in the form of statutory pro-
hibition of the use of impounded water except by con-
tract with the Secretary of the Interior. (Our opening
brief, pp. 21-38.) 2s
17 Complainants in the present case sought an order to show cause
why the owners of the plants ‘‘should not be required to suspend
all development, planning and construction of the plants in ques-
tion, pending the outcome of these proceedings’’ (App. 11a).
TRE IIIN RERESYS BRS Dt GF pet ale ae aaa i
pa DLT
| spies (inane sans
s ,
, AED ALO COMI Ey ALL RLAIP OO
16 |
C. The argument that tha FPC must license steam plants be-
cause it is responsible for planning compre ve river
development (Opp. Br. 42) is demolished by Colorado
River statutes.
The opposing brief (p. 42, et seq.) would deduce a
mandate for comprehensive licensing from the compre-
hensive planning responsibility given the Commission
in Sectioa 10(a) of the Federal Power Act. But, on
the Colorado, the Commission’s comprehensive plan-
ning function, like the function of a surplus water
license, has been overtaken and —— by subsequent
legislation.
By law, the Secretary, in concert with the States,
determines what uses of Colorado River water, for
municipal purposes or by industry or by agriculture,
will effectuate optimum use of the resource. Sec-
tion 15 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (43 U.S.C.
617n) directed the Secretary to formulate ‘‘a compre-
hensive scheme of contro] and the improvement and
utilization of the water of the Colorado River and its
tributaries.’’ In so doing, he is made subject to the
Colorado River Compact among the seven basin States
(43 U.S.C. 617g), which Congress approved in the same
Act (43 U.S.C. 6177). The Upper Colorado River
Basin Project Act expanded this in 1956.* The See-
retary was ‘‘directed to continue studies and to make a
report to the Congress and to the States of the Colorado
River Basin on the quality of water of the Colorado
River” (43 U.S.C. 620n). In 1962 Congress intensi-
fied its directive, ordering the Secretary ‘‘to estimate
the effect of additional development involving its stor-
age and use (whether heretofore authorized or con-
templated for authorization) on the remaining water
available for use in the United States, to study all pos-
sible means of improving the quality of such water
17
and of alleviating the ill effects of water of poor
quality, and to report the results of his studies and
estimates to the Eighty-seventh Congress and every two
years thereafter’? (43 U.S.C. 6l5ww). In 1968, in
the Colorado River Basin Project Act, Congress ampli-
fied this to require, inter alia, ‘*full and complete recon-
naissance investigations for the purpose of develop-
ing a general plan to meet the future water needs of the
Western United States’? (43 U.S.C. 1511), and ‘‘eon-
dition all contracts for the delivery of water originating
in the drainage basin of the Colorado River system
upon the availability of water under the Colorado
River Compact’’ (43 U.S.C. 1551), and ordered that
“Rights of the upper basin to the consumptive use of
water available to that basin from the Colorado River
system under the Colorado River Compact shall not
be reduced or prejudiced by any use of such water in
the lower basin” (43 U.S.C. 1553). The last pro-
vision conclusively deprives the Chemehuevi and
Cocopah Tribes, qua water users, of standing to
complain of uses of water by the five Upper Basin
power plants, just as the decree in Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), deprives these water users,
like all other water users i») California and Arizona, of
any right to complain of uses by the Mohave Plant in
Nevada.”
Nothing in all of this consistent delegation of plan-
ning authority to the Secretary hints any intention to
8 Moreover, as our initial brief pointed out (pp. 40-41), the
Chemehuevis and Cocopahs have present perfected rights fully
protected by the Colorado River Compact and this Court’s decree ~
in Arizona v. California. If they have complaints about water
quantity or salinity. the FPC is not the forum in which to decide
those complaints. This Court reserved jurisdiction in Article IX
of its decree (376 U.S. 340, 353).
NOES RRA SEI
18
subject its exercise to control by the Federal Power
Commission,” and of course the Commission makes no
such contention.
In the meantime, in 1965, in the Water Resources
Planning Act, Congress created the Water Resources
Council (42 U.S.C. 1962a), consisting of the Secre-
taries of the Departments of Interior, Agriculture,
Army, Health, Edueation and Welfare, and the Chair-
man of the Federal Power Gommission. (The Presi-
dent named the Secretary of the Interior Chairman.)
The Council was directed to establish, ‘‘with the ap-
proval of the President, principles, standards, and pro-
cedures for federal participants in the preparation of
cemprehensive regional or river basin plans... .’’ (42
U.S.C. 1962a-2.) The uses which are attacked in this
ease are.included in, or consistent with, the Secretary’s
comprehensive plans,” continuously evolving in con-
sultations among the States and fedenal agencies, in-
cluding FPC, through the clearing house of the Na-
tional Water Resources Council.”" The statutes do not
authorize FPC to supersede these plans with its own,
and the Commission does not contend otherwise.
This planning responsibility has been diligently Sided.
as evidenced by the Secretary’s voluminous reports. Examples are
listed imAppendix A to this brief.
20 E.g., DEPARTMENT OF. THE INTERIOR, SOUTHWEST ENERGY
Stupy, Summary Report (1972); DEPARTMENT OF THE. INTERIOR,
THe CRITICAL WATER PROBLEMS FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN
States (1974) (Review Drarr); Report ON WaTER FoR ENERGY
- IN THE UPPER Covorabo RIver Basin (July 1974):*
*1 E.g., WATER Resources Councit, Upper CoLorapo REGION,
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK StuDy (1971) (see Appendix XIV,
E.Lectric PowER) ;*WATEeR Resources Counci., LOwER CoLORADO
REGION, COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK Stupy (1971) (see Appendix
XIV, ELectric Power).
= Te as Pat
19
D. The assorted concern of the Indians about the effect of these
relatively small consumptive uses on downstream hydro
plants (Opp. Br. 23, 31) and salinity (Opp. Br. 31, 90) could
not be litigated in the absence of the seven States which
are parties to the Colorado River Compact, and the parties
to the decree in Arizona v. California.
It is said that these six steam plants will use 2% of
the Colorado River water supply, and that uses by
other steam plants on the river and its tributaries may
ultimately increase to 5% (Opp. Br. 23). Putting to
one side the fact that even the larger of these figures
is so small as to be exceeded by the unavoidable per-
centage of errors of hydrologic measurement, the
important point, missed by our opponents, is that it is
for the Secretary and the States, under existing law, to
make the value judgment of whether severak million .
people shall be benefited by the electricity made avail-
able by the use of such small quantities of water for
this purpose, or whether the public interest would be
better served by irrigating a few thousand acres of
land with the same water, as the Colorado River Com-
pact permits to be done.
The States in which these plants are located cannot
be denied the consumptive use of the quantities of
water allocated to them by the compacts and by the
‘decree of this Court in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S.
340 (1964). The quéstion of whether the water ap-
portioned should be used by agriculture or munici-
palities or industry (including steam plants) is
not in the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Com-
mission but in that of the States and the Secre-
tary in collaboration. Our opponents contend that
consumptive use by these plants ‘¢will diminish the
potential for production of power at Federal hydro-
electrie facilities at Boulder, Glen Canyon, and other
SERRA a |
i.
%
4
i
oS aes Das Ha a opiwiet ned
downstream government dams by a substantial amount’’
(Opp. Br. 23), ignoring the fact that these depletions
are protected by the apportionments made by the Colo-
rado River Compact and this Court’s decree in Arizona
v. California. This is a rather officious argument in
any event, because it is the Secretary of the Interior
who has responsibility for the power production at
those dams, and that same Secretary executed the
consumptive use water contracts involved in this case.
E. The environmental statutes do not transfer the Secretary's
control of stored srzter to the Federal Power Commission.
It is argued that unnamed ‘‘protections and oppor-
tunities’’ to mitigate environmental impact are avail-
able ‘‘only before the FPC;’’ not the Secretary of the
Interior, and that “there is an obvious disparity in the
remedies available in the event of an unfavorable
decision.’’ (Opp. Br. 90.)
Unless the FPC had licensing authority in the first
place, all this, even if true, would be irrelevant.
But it is“a curiously blindfolded argument. In
plain sight is the whole spectrum of laws for the pro-
tection of the environment,” all applicable equally to
control the actions and decisions of all federal agencies.
The Environmental Protection Agency, for example,
has promulgated regulations on the very subject with
which complainants express their concern, the effect of
steam plant operations on quality of water. See EPA,
‘Thermal Discharges, 40 C.F.R. ch. 40, Part 122,
39 Fed. Reg. 36176, Oct. 8, 1974; EPA, Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category:
22 E.g., the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. 1857; the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1251; the National En-
vironmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321.
2°26 MEME EARS NR
21
Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. eh. 1, »
Part 423, 39 Fed. Reg. 36186, Oct. 8, 1974.” See also
additional regulations proposed by EPA, Steam
Electric Power Generating Source Category: Pro-
posed Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Incom-
patible Pollutants, 39 Fed. Reg. 36210, Oct. 8, 1974.
Congress repeatedly, most recently in the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320,
88 Stat. 266, 7 U.S. Cope Cone. aNp ApMIN. NEWS 1685
(Aug. 15, 1974), has charged the Secretary, not the
Commission, with authority and responsibility for
solving the salinity problem in cooperation with the
Environmental Protection Agency.”
28 See the detailed supporting paper, EPA, DEVELOPMENT Docv-
MENT FOR PRoposED EFFLUENT LIMITATION GUIDELINES AND NEW
Source PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR THE STEAM ELectric POWER
GENERATING Pornt Source CaTecory. This contains useful de-
seriptions of the functions and environmental effects of cooling
water, particularly in the discussions at 255, 275, and 313-451.
It must not be thought that the environmental consequences of
the six plants are not presently regulated. Under the provisions
of the water service contracts for these plants, for example, the
Secretary of the Interior must review and approve the various
systems which have aa impact on the environment. These con-
tracts are on file with the Clerk of the Court.
24'The Environmental Protection Agency, in collaboration with
the Secretary and the States, has formulated and published in the
Federal Register, 39 Fed. Reg. 43721 (Dee. 18, 1974), a ‘‘salinity
control policy and procedures and requirements for establishing
water quality standards for salinity and a plan of implementation
for salinity control in the Colorado River System . . .’, looking
toward adoption of water quality standards by 1975. It provides
that: ‘‘(ii) The salinity problem shall be treated as a basinwide
problem that needs to be solved in order to maintain lower main
stem salinity at or below 1972 levels while the basin States continue
to develop their compact-apportioned waters.
‘<(iii) The goal of the plan shall be to achieve compliance with
the adopted standards by July 1, 1983... —
The Sierra Club had objected to paragraph (ii) among others.
Reg RTE SEIT TR RATES ARSE Se EE IO Rig
NS am
4
i
3
sd
3
3
3
5
COR Oe
22
VI. THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR THE NOTION THAT THE SUR-
PLUS WATER CLAUSE WAS INTENDED TO BRING STEAM
PLANTS INTO THE ‘S LICENSING JURISDICTION, UN-
ANNOUNCED, BY THE BACK DOOR.
As to the ‘‘surplus water’’ clause, considered inde-
pendently of the superseding effect of the Colorado
River legislation:
The opposing argument (Opp. Br. 59) is that all
hydroelectric projects are located on streams deemed
navigable waters of the United States( Opp. Br. 61);
hence require ‘project workers licenses’? anvhow,
whether or not using water from government dams;
therefore ‘‘the surplus water clause can have inde-
pendent significance only if construed to cover facili-
ties other than hydro plants’’* (Opp. Br. 61) ; this, by
subtraction, means steam plants, even though the Act
and its legislative history contain no hint of this, and
complainants believe that ‘‘Congress was not thinking
about steam plants at all’? (Opp. Br. 26).
*° Use of surplus water from government dams was not, as the
complainants imply, a little understood concept, or a jurisdictional
‘catch all’? for non hydroelectric uses of surplus water. Con-
gress’ concern in enacting the Federal Water Power Act was the
encouragement of hydro power development, either by private
interests constructing hydro projects, or utilization of existing
or future government dams. Congressman Sims explained this
situation :
‘It takes time, an’ it takes a long time, to build a tremendous
dam. <A water-power dam in some places, on some water-
courses, is estimated to cost as high as $25,000,000. But
there are a number of Government dams, navigation dams,
dams that have been built on navigable rivers for the purpose
of improving navigation, that are now unavailable simply
because there is no law that permits their utilization. Those
dams, or the water produced by Government nav igation dams,
can be made available immediately ....°’ 56 Cona. Rec. 8929
(1918). (Emphasis added.)
23
There are several answers:
The legislative history shows that the surplus power
or water clause was intended to be equally applicable
to hydro plants located at government dams on navi-
gable and non-navigable streams. Payment for the
privilege of using surplus water created by government
dams (as opposed to power created by private dams)
was a crucial factor underlying the surplus water pro-
vision.” The debates show a logical distinction between
the amounts that a licensee ought to pay the United
States if he built the dam that 2 sates the power head,
and the additional amounts that he ought to pay if he
is allowed to make use of the head (and the flow of
water) made available by construction of a government
dam at federal expense (usually spoken of as a navi-
gation dam, in the debates) .”
As most (but not all) government dams were on
navigable streams, the surplus power or water clause
was of course intended te apply to hydro projects
making use of navigable waters. Ford vy. Little Falls
Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369, 374 (1929), is an illuminating
example.
The Court described the ick as follows:
«|. The petitioner, a private business corpora-
tion, has procured from the Federal Power Com-
mission a license for a hydroelectric power project,
‘ purporting to be granted under the Federal Water
Power Act of June 10, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 1063
26 B.g., 56 Cone. Rec. 9912-13 (1918); 58 Cone. Rec. 2037,
9991-23 (1919); 59 Cone. Rec. 246 (1917).
) 7. + are sil
aii ein ae <soracaia
CE EPPA NOPD LOS
24
[U.S8.C. title 16, § 792]. The license granted per-
mission to use surplus water from the Federal
dam for the development of power at a plant to
be constructed and maintained by petitioner for
that purpose on government land. As the license
also permits, but does not require, petitioner
has placed flashboards on the crest of the dam,
which, under normal conditions, raise the level of
the water in the pool above the dam approxi-
mately 2 feet.’? (Emphasis added.)
The differences in duration and charges in the
‘*project works’’ component and the ‘‘surplus water’’
component of a license or liceises are stated by the
statute itself (Section 10(e)). The Commnission’s
practice accords with the foregoing construction of the
Act. It consistently requires * that a hydro project
using water from a government dam on a navigable
stream either obtain two licenses, or one license eom-
bining two features: (i) a project works license for
50 years at a set uniform nationwide annual charge,
plus (11) a surplus water license for an initial period
of 20 years, renewable, for fees ‘which Vary with the
quantity of water furnished from the government
dam.”
*7 See Appendix B for a list of 17 surplus water licenses issned
by the Commission. All relate to waters now classed as navigable:
waters of the United States, with one possible exception, there
noted.
8 In some instances, as consideration for the use of surplus water
at a government dam, the licensee is required to operate and
maintain the dam and its hydraulic features. E.g., Potomac
Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2517, 35 F.P.C. 680, 681
(1966) ; Potomae Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2516,
35 F.P.C. 676, 677 (1966).
25
In short, the complainants are quite mistaken in
theiy major premise, that the surplus water clause has
no applicability to hydro projects on navigable streams,
and are thus mistaken in their conclusion that this
clause must have been meaut to apply only to non-
hydro projects on such streams, e.g., steam plants.
As to power plants which do not use the head
developed by a government dam, but are located down-
stream in a reach whose flow is affected by the up-
stream dam, complainants can cite no legislative history
which would support a jurisdictional claim, even with
reference te a hydro plant. The only case which has
considered this question, California Oregon Power Co.
v. FPC, 239 F.2d 426 ( D.C. Cir. 1956), rejected the
Commission’s conclusion that a surplus water license
was required.” Our opponents quote the Commission
put not the Court (Opp. Br. 59).
29 The court held that no just iciable controversy over the mean-
ing of ‘‘surplus water’? was presented, inasmuch as a project
works license was required in any event because of the plants’
locations on a navigable stream. It said (p. 431): ‘‘The Commis-
sion has not ruled with clarity on what it considers ‘surplus water’
to be, or in any event what amount of it will be used by Copco, or
when (if ever) Copeo is to be charged for it, or at what rate.”’
P. 432: ‘‘The record is, in fact, in such a state that we could
hardly hold (if we reached the question) that Copco has been
shown to be a user of surplus water, on any theory.”’
.
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26
CONCLUSION
We submit that:
1. The licensing jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission with respect to ‘‘project works’’ is re-
stricted to hydroelectric projects, and excludes steamw-
electric generating plants.
2. The further question of whether the Commission
would -have licensing jurisdiction with respect to the
consumptive use by steam plants of ‘‘surplus water”’’
from a government dam is not required to be decided
in this Colorado River case, because here Congress has
superseded the ‘‘surplus water’’ license with the re-
quirement of a contract with the Secretary of the In-
terior for the use of waters of the Colorado River
System stored by the government dams involved.
3. If, notwithstanding the superseding effect of the
Colorado River statutes, the question were to be reached
as to whether the jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission to license the use of surplus water from
a government dam encompasses such water by a
steam-electric generating plant, the answer should be
in the negative.
Respectfully submitted,
SEE ES
NORTHCUTT ELY
FREDERICK H. RITTS
ROBERT F. PIETROWSKI, JR.
Law Offices of Northcutt Ely
Watergate 600 Building
Washington, D. C. 20037
and
HARRY A. POTH, JR.
PEYTON G. BOWMAN, 3RD
Reid & Priest
40 Wall Street, New York,
New York 10005
1701 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Attorneys for all Petitioners
NICHOLAS H. POWELL
Snell & Wilmer
400 Security Building
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Attorneys for Arizona Public
Scrvice Company
WILLIAM DUNCAN
Kemp, Smith, White, Dunean &
Hammond
P. O. Box 2800
FE] Paso, Texas 79999
Attorneys for El Paso Electric
Company
BURT 8. PINES, City Attorney
EDWARD C. FARRELL, Chief
Assistant City Attorney for
Water and Power
RALPH GUY WESSON
Assistant City Attorney
"411 North Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 90051
Attorneys for Department of
Water and Power, City of
Los Angeles
M. GENE MATTEUCCI
P. O. Box 230
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Nevada Power
Company
HR AGL LOCI S LEER PE CNL EDIE IA
BC a Pe FALL LE Po Re Ee EN TD
ff
REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon
111 W. Monroe Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and
Power District
SHERMAN CHICKERING
C. HAYDEN AMES
EDWARD P. NELSEN
ALLAN J. THOMPSON
Chickering & Gregory
111 Sutter Street
* San Francisco, California 94104
Attorneys for San Diego Gas
§ Electric Company
JOHN R. BURY
Assistant General Counsel
P. O. Box 800
Rosemead, California 91770
Attorney for Southern California
Edison Company
L. V. ROBERTSON, JR.
General Attorney
Tueson Gas and Electric Company
220 West Sixth Street
Tucson, Arizona 87503
DONALD E. DICKERMAN
Holesapple, Conner, Jones,
McFall & Johnson
P.O. Box 310
Tueson, Arizona 85702
Attorneys for Tucson Gas ¢
Electric Company
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
ROBERT GORDON
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Utah Power $
Light Company
PESTON SOLES SE
28
APPENDIX A
Reports of the Secretary of the Interior made pur-
suant to congressional authorization for comprehensive
planning for the use of the water and related resources
of the Colorado River Basin.
1. U.S. Department of the Interior, A Report on the
Colorado River Storage Project and Participating
Projects, Providing for the Development and Utiliza-
tion of the Water and Related Resources of the Upper
A Colorado River Basin, Pursuant to the Federal Ree-
lamation Laws (1954).
2. U.S. Departrsent of the Interior, Quality of Water:
on River Basin (1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971,
1973).
3. U.S. Department of the Interior, Pacific Southwest
Water Plan (1964).
4, U.S. Department of the Interior, Upper Colorado River
Basin Cooperative Salinity Control Study (1969).
*
A
¢
:
4
‘4
4
5. Water Resources Council, Lower Colorado Region
Comprehensive Framework Study (1971).
6. Water Resources Council, Upper Colorado Region
Comprehensive 'ramework Study (1971).
U.S. Department of the Interior, Southwest Energy.
Study: An Evaluation of Coal-Fired Electric Power
Generation in the Southwest (1972).
8. U.S. Department of the Interior, Water Quality Im-
provement Program (1972).
~l]
9. U.S. Department of the Interior, Alternative Sources
of Water for Prototype Oil Shale Development: Colo-
rado and Utah (Draft) (1974).
10. U.S. Department of the Interior, Report on Water for
Energy’ in the Upper Colorado River Basin (1974).
11. U.S. Department of the Interior, Westwide Study Re-
port on the Critical Water Problems Facing the Eleven
Western States (Draft) (1974).
>
1
\
29
. APPENDIX B
Examples of Licenses for the Use of Surplus Water from
to
bees |
Government Dams on Navigable Waters of the
; United States
John Hollis Bankhead Dam on the Black Warrior-
River, Project No. 2169, Alabama Power Company,
18 F.P.C. 327 (1957) ; 34 F.P.C. 971 (1965) (order fix-
ing annual charges for use of government dam—
$92,000 annually) ; 26 F.P.C. 658 (1966) (method used
in setting annual charges for use of government dam).
United States Holt Lock and Dam on the Black War-
rior River, Project No. 2203, Alabama Power Com-
pany, 34 F.P.C. 1108 (1965).
United States Dam No. 4 Hydro Station on the ‘Po-
tomac River, Project No. 2516, Potomac Edison Co. of
West Virginia, 35 ¥.P.C. 676 (1966); 41 F.P.C. 194
(1969).
United States Dam No. 5 Hydro Station on the Poto-
mae River, Project No. 2517, Potomac Edison Co. of
West Virginia, 35 ¥.P.C. 680 (1966); 41 F.P.C. 399
(1969).
St. Anthony Falls on the M ississippi River, Project No.
2056, Northern States Power Co., 17 F.P.C.,714, (1957) ;
10 F.P.C. 1322 (1951); 18 F.P.C. 1028 (1954) (order
amending license to fix annual charge for use of gov-
ernment dam) ;.16 F.P.C. 1256 (1956). |
Waterbury Dam, on the Waterbury, River, Project No.
2090, Green Mountain Power Corp., 13 F.P.C. 1211
(1954) ; 13 F.P.C. 1321 (1954).
_ Allegheny River” Reservoir Dam on the Allegheny
River, Project No. 2280, Pennsylvania Electric Co., 34
F.P.C. 1566 (1965). ;
United Siates Lock and Dam No. 7 on the Mississippi
River, Project No. 362, Ford Motor Co., 9 F.P.C. 560
(1950) ; order of May 22, 1974.
United States Lock and Dam at Green Island, on the
Hudson River, Project No. 13, Niagara M ohawk Power
Corp., 42 F.P.C. 56 (1969) ; 40 F.P.C. 1305 (1968).
Ce ee,
30
10.’ Markland Dam, on the Ohio River, Project No. 2211,
Public Service Co. of Indiana, 27 F.P.C, 115 (1957)
(preliminary permit).
11. Winfield Project, on the Kanawha River, Project No.
1290, Kanawha Valley Power Co., 5 F.P.C. 565 (1946).
12. United States Dam No. 7, on the Kentucky River, Proj-
ect No. 539, Kentucky Utilities Company (¥PC order
‘approving license of Nov. 25, 1930); 5 F.P.C. 656
(1946) (amendment of license).
' 13. Englebright Dam and Reservoir, on the Yuba River,
Project No. 2246, Yuba County Water Agency, 40
F.P.C. 1001 (1968); 35 F.P.C. 691 (1966) 29 F.P.C.
1002 (1963). \
14. Pine View Dam, 'Utah Power & Light Company, 31
F.P.C. 958 (1964) (water diverted from government
dam through a 5.5 mile wood-stave flowline) (in liti-.
gation).
4
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15. Marmet and London Development, Project No. 1175,
Kanawha Valley Power Company, 1 ¥F.P.C, 322 (1936).
16. MeAlpine Dam, Project No. 289, Kentucky-Louisville
Gas and Electric Company, license issued on November
11, 1925. 1926 Annual Report of the Federal Power
Commission, 35-37 ; 147-150.
17. Racine River Dam, Project No. 2570, Ohio Power Com-
| pany, license issued on December 27, 1973.
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.