Reply Brief — Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Commission

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SUPREME COURT, U.S pane seahieetenitmiaeaite co]

REPLY BRIEF 3 Swear ;

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-1380

CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Petitioners

V..-

FEDERAL Power Comission, Respondent

No. 73-1666

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners

v.

CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Respondents

No. 73-1667

FEDERAL PowER ComMIssion, Petitioner

v.

CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Respondents

REPLY BRIEF OF

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY. ET AL.

(See list of attorneys on inside cover)

Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INc., WASHINGTON, D. C.

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NORTHCUTT ELY

FREDERICK H. RITTS

ROBERT F. PIETROWSKI, JR.

Law Offices of Northeutt Ely

Watergate 600 Building

Washington, D. C. 20037

’ and

HARRY A. POTH, JR.

PEYTON G. BOWMAN, 3zp

Reid & Priest

40 Wall Street, New York,

New York 10005

1701 K Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for all Petitioners <

NICHOLAS H. POWELL

Snell & Wilmer

400 Security Building

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Atterneys for Arizona Public

Service Company

WILLIAM DUNCAN

Kemp, Smith, White, Duncan &

Hammond

P. O. Box 2800

El] Paso, Texas 79999

Attorneys for El Paso Electric

Company

BURT S. PINES, City Attorney

EDWARD C. FARRELL, Chief

Assistant City Attorney for

Water and Power

RALPH GUY WESSON

Assistant City Attorney

111 North Hope Street

Los Angeles, California 90051

Attorneys for Department of

Water and Power, City of

Los Angeles

M. GENE MATTEUCCI

P. O. Box 230

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorney for Nevada Power

Company

REX E. LEE

2840 Iroquois Drive

Provo, Utah 84601

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon

111 W. Monroe Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Attorneys for Salt River Project

Agricultural Improvement and

Power District

SHERMAN CHICKERING

C. HAYDEN AMES

EDWARD P. NELSEN

ALLAN J. THOMPSON

Chickering & Gregory

111 Sutter Street

San Francisco, California 94104

Attorneys for San Diego Gas

§ Electric Company

JOHN R. BURY

Assistant General Counsel

P. O. Box 800

Rosemead, California 91770

Attorney for Southern California

Edison Company

L. V. ROBERTSON, JR.

General Attorney

Tueson Gas and Electrie Company

220 West Sixth Street

Tueson, Arizona 87503

DONALD E. DICKERMAN

Holesapple, Conner, Jones,

McFall & Johnson

P.O. Box 310

Tueson, Arizona 85702

Attorneys for Tucson Gas &

Electric Company

SIDNEY G. BAUCOM

ROBERT GORDON

P.O. Box 899

Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Attorneys for Utah Power &

Light Company

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..... wed G Seed Gee eee Eo bea eee eee ee enn

I.

II.

The Federal Water Power Act Cannot Be Con-

strued as Including Steam Plants within the

Commission’s Licensing Jurisdiction Unless the

Rationale of the Taum Sauk Decision Is Re-

a ee eee or ee ee

The Argument That in 1920 Congress Intended

To Require Licensing of Steam Plants, Without

Saying So, Is Rebutted by Every Canon of Statu-

tory Construction ........... 6. cece eee ee eee

A. All nine Justices in the Taum Sauk case

looked to the same guides for construction

of the Federal Power Act that we urge here..

B. The ‘‘unadorned,’’ ‘‘plain’’ language of the

Act, which does not mention steam plants,

certainly does not close the door on legislative

history, as our opponents contend ..........

(. The curious argument that the Act includes

steam plants because ‘*Congress was not

thinking about steam plants at all’’ (Opp. Br.

26) collapses of its own weight ............

D. The administrative construction of the Act

as excluding steam plant licensing was re-

peatedly and consistently reported to Con-

gress over a period of a half-century, and is

entitled to great weight .............0.006-

IIT. Subsequent Consistent Refusal by Congress To

IV.

Grant the Commission Licensing Jurisdiction

Over Steam Plants Is Dispositive as to Legisla-

tive Intent ....... 0... cece reece cece tier ethene

The ‘‘Changed Circumstances’? Argument Is

Pierced by Its Own Statistics ..........--+---

il Table of Contents Continued

: .

V. The Question of Whether the ‘‘Surplus Water’’

Licensing Clause Is Generally Applicable To

Steam Plants Does Not Require Decision in

This Colorado River Case ...................

A. A Federal Power Commission license for the

consumptive use of water stored by govern-

ment dams on the Colorado River would be a

nullity; authority to grant such a right is

vested exclusively in the Secretary of the

TOIOPIOY oa 68 5556554 a5ca eww ne bens eeees

Bb. The assertion that this case reveals a dan-

gerous ‘‘gap,’’ through which ‘‘the Colorado

River is flowing unregulated, into the hands

of the power companies’? (Opp. Br. 40), is

pure sophistry ............ i655 ehesaemeee

C. The argument that the FPC must license

steam plants because it is responsible for

planning comprehensive river development

(Opp. Br. 42) is demolished by the Colorado

River statutes ........8. secs eee sceccces :

D. The asserted concern of the Indians about the

effect of these relatively small consumptive

uses on downsteam hydro plants and salinity

could not be litigated in the absence of the

seven States which are parties to the Col-

orado River Compact and the parties to the

decree in Arizona v. California ............

~

©. The environmental statutes do not transfer

the Seeretary’s control of stored water to the

Federal Power Commission ...........000.

VI. There Is No Support for the Notion That. the

Surplus Water Clause Was Intended To Bring

Steam Plants into the FPC?’s Licensing Juris-

diction, Unannounced, by the Back Door ......

VIT. CONCLUSION oo. eee eee ee ees

Page

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16

26

ili

CITATIONS

CASES: Page

Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 570 (1936) ....... 15

Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) .......--- 17,19

California Oregon Power Co. v. I°'PC, 239 F.2d 426

CDC. it. 1996) cso gesscwenernesesesserssreses 25

Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 410-11

(1958) .cscs ssi tieesdwuns covtnwnncdscsseeees 9

Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians, et al. v. FPC, 489 F.2d

1207, 1216-17, and n.43, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 19738) .. 6

Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S, 497

PTB OF oe wee un ede we cose ere enes cea vauny eeaes 5)

IPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965) ...... 2, 3,4

Ford v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369, 374 (1929)

23, 24

Lynch vy. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) ...... +

Maestro Plasti@Corp. v. NERB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) .. 5

Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. United States, 288

1. 260, 213 (1908) ocho oe neon eec serena ces 9

Potomac Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2017,

35 F.C, 680, 661° (1966) 40 0i00.<assckeseenewe 24

Potomac Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2516,

So PP. OG, OT (1966) tye cea cee wecces ess 24

Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union

of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)... 7

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,

QO (IGT2) cece ec ccceaenceeees ene eneeeeneenes 7,8

Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 445-47, n.11 (1967) ...... 6

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) .............. 8

United States v. American Trucking Association, 310

U.S. 564, 0139-46 (1990): sons ees ce eyns ieee sneaes 3, 6

United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S, 377

(TOAD) scan eves cae es ee ees e cena en enes 15

United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50

LS) 5

United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157

CI9GG) Gccee chen hes see ces cena eke ee uesaeews 6

Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946)

icy ea

iv Citations Continued

STATUTES: Page

Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. 617n ......... 16°

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857 2... ee eee eee eee 20

Colorado River Basin Project Act, 48 U.S.C. 1511 .... 17

Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L.

No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266, 7 U.S. Cope Conc. axp

Apmin. News 1685 (Aug. 15, 1974) .............. 21

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 797(e) ...........0.2.. 2,9

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 803(e) ........-....0.. 24

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817 2.0.2... .......... 2,9

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 35

USA, 1251 0. ccc ccc ccc ccc c ccc ccc cn ec ceces 20

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321... 20

Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C, 1962a ...@.. 18

MISCELLANEOUS:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SOUTHWEST F.NERGY

Stupy, Summary Report (1972) ................ 18

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE CriTicAL WaTER

ProsLEMS FactinG THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES

(1974) (Review Draft) ...............0....0...0. 18

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON WATER FOR

-ENERGY IN THE Upper Covorapo River Basin (July

TOUR) arn on a Goes wont keS £4 4a her aera weeny eee ee 18

Epison Evectric INstirure, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF

THE Exvectric Utiuity [xpustry ror 1973: at 6

S1¢ 3 eee ee eee ee ae ne 10

Epison Evectric Institute, Historica STATISTICS OF

THE Exvectric Urmiry INpustry 4 (1962) ........ 10

EPA, Thermal Charges, 40 C.F.R. ch. 40, Part 122,

39 Fed. Reg. 3617€, Oct. 8, 1974 ...........00000. 20

EPA, Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source

Category: Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40

C.F.R. ch. 1, Part 423, 39 Fed. Reg. 36186, Oct.

BOG nas 5 4 ah he ee eens ees 20, 21

EPA, Steam Electric Power Generating Source Cate-

gory: Proposed Effluent Guidelines and Standards

for Incompatible Pollutants, 39 Fed. Reg. 36210,

Ot, B, TOE oe occa vee s ese eeny sterner ss 21

Citations Continued Vv

Page

EPA, DevELopMENT DocUMENT FOR ProposeD EFFLUENT

Lrmitation GUmELINES AND NEw Source PERFORM-

ANCE STANDARDS FOR THE STEAM KLEcTRIC PowkR

Gexeratinc Porxt Source Catecory (1974) ...... 21

FPC, Stream Exvecrric PLant Arr Anb Water QUALITY

Conxrrot Data: Summary Report 24 (1974) ... 11, 13

Forty-SEconp ANNUAL Report OF THE EDERAL PoweER

Commission, 102-03 (1962) ....-..5--+ee ee eres

Hearings on Power Plant Siting and Environmental

Protection Before the Subcomm, on Communica-

tions and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 411

(1971) (Statement of Chairman Nassikas) ...... 9

Hearings on Interim Nuclear Licensing Before the

Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation

of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries, 92d Cong:, 2d Sess. 249, 261 (1972)

(Statement of Chairman Nassikas) ............- 9

S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1935) ....... 8

Warer Resources Counci., Upper CoLorade “EcIon,

COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK Stupy (1971) ...... 18

Warer Resources Councit, Lower’ Cotorspo REcion,

CoMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK Stupy (1971) ...... 18

51 Conc. Rec. 12336, 12593, 12777 (1914) .....------- 7

53 Cone. Rec. 2640, 10450 (1916) ........--0 2 eee 7

56 Conc. Rec. 8929, 8931, 9112, 9282, 9912-13 (1918)

. » 22, 2d

58 Conc. Rec. 2037, 2221-23 (1919) .......-- ee eee eee 23

59 Conc. Rec. 241, 246, 1101, 1223, 1430, 1473, 6532

(¢ ) |) en 7, 23

79 Cong. Rec. 8431 (1935) 2.0... . eee eee eee eee eee 8

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SOUS SMI PERCE NTH ATT POTTERY

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-1380

CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Petitioners

.

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Regpondent

No. 73-1666

Arizona Pusiic SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners

’ v.

CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS; ET AL., Respondents

No. 73-1667

FEDERAL Power ComMiIssion, Petitioner

v. .

CHEMEHUEVI TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL., Respondents

. REPLY BRIEF OF

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

INTRODUCTION

Parts I-IV of this brief answer our opponents’

argument as to the ‘‘project works”’ licensing juris- -

diction of the Federal Power Commission.

Parts V and VI answer their argument as to the

Commission’s ‘‘surplus water’? licensing jurisdiction.

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| I. THE FEDERAL WATER POWER ACT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED

AS INCLUDING STEAM PLANTS WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S

LICENSING JURISDICTION UNLESS THE RATIONALE OF THE

TAUM SAUK DECISION IS REJECTED.

The majority opinion in the Taum Sauk licensing

case, FPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965),

authored by Mr. Justice White, holding that a pumped-

storage hydro plant required a license, said that ‘‘the

distinction between a hydroelectric project and a steam

plant is obvious and meaningful, although both pro-

duce energy for interstate transmission.” ’

The dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Goldberg, in

‘ which Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart

joined, said that ‘‘. . . the legislative history here,

however, establishes to my satisfaction that it [the Act]

has required licenses of neither steam plants nor the

type of hydroelectric plant here involved... .”’ (/d.

at 115.)

Both authors were answering the argument that if

the test of FPC’s licensing jurisdiction under Sections

4(e) and 23(b) were the effect of a given generating

plant on interstate transmission, rather than its effect

on navigable capacity, there was no distinction between

a pumped-storage plant (involved there) and a steam

plant. If our opponents were right about steam

plants, the ready premise for Mr. Justice White’s

holding that a pumped-storage plant requires a license

would have been to agree that both plants are indeed

in the same situation, hence the pumped-storage plant

requires a license because the steam plant requires

one. Rejecting this, the Justice made the pointed

distinction that pumped-storage plants are subject to

1FPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90, 110 (1965). Our

, Opponents flatly contradict this, saying (Opp. Br. 53), ‘*. . . this

distinction is not obvious and meaningfui :

3

license because ‘‘Part I, the original Federal Water

Power Act, is concerned with the utilization of water

resources aud particularly the power potential in

water,’’ but steam plants are excluded because of ‘‘this

central concern of the Act.’’ Our opponents’ argument

that the Court’s language which made this distinction

should be disregarded now, because the Court was not

then fully informed, needs no answer. And our oppo-

nents are equally at odds with the minority opinion

which, even though it posited that there was no juris-

dictional distinction between steam plants and pumped-

storage plants, concluded that the legislative history

establishes that licenses are required of neither of

them.

Il. THE ARGUMENT THAT IN 1920 CONGRESS INTENDED TO

REQUIRE LICENSING OF STEAM PLANTS, WITHOUT SAY-

ING SO, IS REBUTTED BY EVERY CANON OF STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION.

A. All nine Justices in the Taum Sauk case looked to the same

guides for construction of the Federal Power Act that we

urge here.

The majority examined the history of the predeces-

sor statutes (pp. 98-99). They quoted the title, saving

(p. 99), ‘‘the principal use to be developed and regu-

lated in the Act, as its title indicates, was that of hydro-

electric power ‘0 meet the needs of an expanding

economy.’ They said (p. 100) that ‘‘the provisions of

the Act reflects these objectives,” noting (p. 100) that

‘‘the preface states that beside navigation and the

creation of the Commission, the Act was ‘to provide

for the... development of water power; the use of the

public lands in relation thereto... and for other pur-

poses’.’’ The Court also examined the legislative his-

tory in detail (pp. 101-08) to determine Congress’

intent.

ia) SM

4

The minority, as we have noted, looked to the same

- eriteria, annexing two appendixes detailing the legis-

lative history (pp. 115-23).

B. The “unadorned,” “plain.” language of the Act, which does

not mention steam plants, certainly does not close the door

on legislative history, as our opponents contend.

Our opponents say that the legislative history quoted

in our opening brief and its supplement is irrelevant,

because the ‘‘unadorned’”’ language of the Act plainly

gives the Commission licensing jur isdiction over steam

plants (Opp. Br. 10).

The Court in the Taum Sauk case did not dis-

cover this ‘‘plain meaning,’’ notwithstanding its hold-

ing (p. 100) that ‘‘the purposes of the Act are more

fully served if the Commission must, as it held in this

case, consider the impact of the project on the full spec-

trum of commerce interests.”’ ¥et it excluded steam

plants from this ‘‘spectrum,” after an exhaustive

analysis of the language of the Act and its legislative

history, finding no ‘‘unadorned language’’ which in-

cluded steam plants. Nor did the minority, which ex-

cluded them after an equally searching analysis of the

legislative history (p. 115).

All of these factors which were treated as relevant

to the meaning of the Federal Power Act in the Taum

Sauk case should now be ignored, according to the

complainants, in favor of the literalness of the terms

“project works’’ and ‘‘surplus water,’’ even though

‘‘literalness may strangle meaning,’’ Utah Junk Co. v.

Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946), and even though ‘‘this

Court [has] repeatedly warned against the dangers of

an approach to statutory construction which confines

itself to the bare words of a statute.’? Lynch v. Over-

5

holser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962); Church of Holy

Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 ( 1892).

When words such as ‘‘project works’’ or ‘*surplus

water,’’ which are inherently imprecise, are used in a

statute, this Court looks, inter alia, to legislative his-

tory to determine a statute’s meaning. E.g., U.S. v.

American Trucking Association, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44

(1940) (‘‘employees’’); United States v. Rosenblum

Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50 (1942) (‘‘common carrier’’) ;

Maestro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956)

(‘‘any strike’’).

Contrary to the complainant’s views, the proper

method of statutory interpretation has been stated by

this Court as follows:

‘In the interpretation of statutes, the function

of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the

language so as to give effect to the intent of Con-

gress. There is no invariable rule for the discov-

ery of that intention. To take a few words from

their context and with them thus isolated to at-

tempt to determine their meaning, certainly would

not contribute greatly to the discovery of the pur-

pose of the draftsmen of a statute, particularly

in a law drawn to meet many needs of a major

occupation.

‘“‘There is, of course, no more persuasive evi-

dence of the purpose of a statute than the words by

which the legislature undertook. to give expression

to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in

and of themselves to determine the purpose of the

legislation. In such cases we have followed their

plain meaning. When that meaning has led to

absurd or futile results, however, this Court has

looked beyond the words to the purpose of the

act. Frequently, however, even when the plain

meaning did not produce absurd results but merely

an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the

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policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has

followed that purpose, rather tht the literal

words. When aid to construction of the meaning

of words, as used in the statute, is available, there

certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its

use, however clear the words may appear on

‘superficial examination.’’’ .United States v.

American Trucking Association, 310 U.S. 534, 543-

44 (1940).

Construction of the Federal Power Act should be no

exception.

C. The curious argument that the Act includes steam plants

because “Congress was not thinking about steam plants at

all” (Opp. Br. 26) collapses of its own weight.

This is not a case which presents the problem of

whether a statute written in comprehensive terms in-

cludes a business which comes into existence after its

enactment, as argued in the opposing brief, pp. 32-40,

with reference to such instances as cable television.*

radio broadeasting, ete.

By contrast, all sides agree that steam plants were

not only in existence in 1920, but that they accounted

for the greater part of the electrical power production

of this country at that time, as they do now.’ Congress,

?The FCC has ‘‘broad responsibilities for the orderly develop-

ment of an appropriate system of local television broadeasting,’’ °

United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968),

and the Communications Act envisions a ‘‘unified and comprehen-

sive regulatory system for the industry.’’ Jd. at 168. It cannot

be said that the Federal Power Act evinces Congress’ intent to

regulate all sources of electricity, including nuclear plants, fossil-

fuel plants not proximate to navigable waters, geothermal plants,

gas turbines and diesel plants, and the plants involved in this case.

3 Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians, et al. v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207,

1216-17, and n. 43, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Udall v. FPC,

387 U.S. 428, 445-47, n. 11 (1967).

ee ‘te . m . +N EE ie NTN RA MY TE AN aR,

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7

in 1920, knew a great deal about steam plants, which

were mentioned repeatedly in the debates as unlicensed

competitors of the hydro projects intended to be li-

censed.*

D. The administrative construction of the Act as excluding

steam plant licensing was repeatedly and consistently re-

ported to Congress over a period of a half century, and is

entitled to great weight.

The Commission’s first report to Congress in 1921

stated that its jurisdiction was limited to hydro power

projects. The opposing brief points out that the Com-

missioners so reporting did not hold office during the

previous year (Opp. Br. 47), when Congress enacted

the Act. This is quite immaterial. They were the men

charged with responsibility for ‘‘setting its machinery

in motion.’’® Power Reactor Development Co. v. Inter-

national Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396,

408 (1961). This administrative construction was re-

ported consistently in at least 23 annual reports there-

after,° and is entitled to ‘‘great weight.’’ Trafficante

4 E.g., 51 Cone. Rec. 12336, 12593, 12777 (1914) ; 53 Cone. Rec.

2640, 10450 (1916) ; 56 Cong. Rec. 8931, 9282 (1918); 59 Cone.

Rec. 3101, 1430, 1473 (1920). Congress desired to foster water

power development as a means to encourage conservation of coal

and oil. E.g., 56 Cone. Rec. 9112 (1918) ; 59 Cone. Rec. 241, 1223,

6532 (1919).

> As it happened, O. C. Merrill, a principal architect of the

Federal Water Power Act, lauded by our opponents (Opp. Br.

50),.was the Executive Secretary of the Commission at the time

this report was prepared and submitted to Congress.

* See the Commission’s Annual Reports for the following years:

1935, p. 1; 1939, p. 2; 1940, pp. 1-5; 1946, pp. 2-3; 1949, p. 3;

1950, p. 3; 1951, p. 2; 1956, pp. 3, 5; 1957, pp. 3, 4; 1958, p. 4;

1959, p. 4; 1960, p. 5; 1961, p. 7; 1962, pp. 8, 12-13; 1963, p. 7;

1964, pp. 10-11, 13; 1965, p. 10; 1966, pp. 8-9, 18; 1967, p. 25;

1968, p. 29; 1969, p. 25; 1970, p. 31; 1971, p. 22.

Re aE Le a ee

8

v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).

III. SUBSEQUENT CONSISTENT REFUSAL BY CONGRESS TO

GRANT THE COMMISSION LICENSING JURISDICTION

OVER STEAM PLANTS IS DISPOSITIVE AS TO LEGISLA-

TIVE INTENT.

Complainants’ brief ignores the occasions, at least

four in number, on which Congress has declined to

amend the Federal Power Act to grant the Federal

Power Commission jurisdiction to license steam plants.

In 1935 Congress enacted the Federal Power Act,

which included, as Part I, the entire text of the Federal

Water Power Act, and added, as Part II, regulatory

provisions relating to utilities’ rates, interconnections,

securities, etc. An amendment was proposed to the

portion of the bill which became Title II, to add a sec-

tion which would grant the Commission authority to

‘‘certificate’’ (license) all forms of ‘‘ production facili-

ties’? and transmission lines. It was rejected in com-

mittee, in the Senate.’ Senator Wheeler, the author

of the pending bill, explained on the Senate floor:

‘“‘Mr. Wheeler: . . . Let me say this further to the

Senator: The bill as it was originally prepared

by the proponents and introduced contained a

provision to the effect that a power company would

have to come to the commission for a certificate

of convenience and necessity before it could con-

struct a power plant, or a transformer, or any-

thing else of that kind, within a State. In the

committee, I insisted that this be stricken out,

because I felt that we should not go so far in this

bill, because it was not necessary.” 79 Cong. Ree.

8431 (1935).

7S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1935).

9

Instead, Congress in 1935 reenacted Section 4(e)

of the Federal Water Power Act (16 U.S.C. 797(e) )

without change as part of Title I of the Federal Power

Act, and added the first sentence of Section 23(b) (16

U.S.C. 817), * well informed of the Commission’s con-

struction that its licensing jurisdiction was limited to

hydro projects. This Court has held that congres-

sional reenactment of a statute, in knowledge of con-

sistent administrative interpretation of it, is signifi-

sant as indicating satisfaction with that interpretation.

Cammarano vy. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510-11

(1958); Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. United

States, 288 U.S. 269, 273 (1933).

The 1935 decision by Congress, in our view, dis-

poses of our opponents’ case.

Congress’ subsequent actions confirmed its 1935 de-

cision. In 1962, 1971, and 1972, Congress considered

the renewed request of the Commission to license steam

plants, and heard its supporting testimony to the effect

that it did not have, but should have, this authority.°

Congress did not grant the request. .

The consistent course followed by Congress for a

half-century was not congressional thaction ; it mani-

8 These are the two sections which contain references to ‘‘sur-_

plus water or water power from any government dam.”’

® Forty-Seconp ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL Power Com-

MISSION, 102-03 (1962); Hearings on Power Plant Siting and

Environmental Protection Before the Subcomm. on Communica-

tions and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 411 (1971) (Statement of Chair-

man Nassikas); Hearings on Interim Nuclear Licensing Be-

fore the Subcomm. on Fisherics and Wildlife Conservation of the

House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d

Sess. 249, 261 (1972) (Statement of Chairman Nassikas).

;

|

;

4

10

fested a continuing and consistent determination to

stay out of the field.

IV. THE “CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES” ARGUMENT

IS PIERCED BY ITS OWN STATISTICS.

It is argued (Opp. Br. 20) that ‘‘Congress did not

cousider whether steam plants needed to be regulated

in 1920 because their operations had no effect on the

hydro potential of navigable streams, but fundamental

changes in their method of operations have now

brought steam plants within the range of evils Con-

gress sought to regulate under the Federal Power Act;

under these circumstances, jurisdiction should be con-

strued expansively.”’

If this were so, it might be thought that Congress,

in this half-century, would have discovered this and

legislated to expand the FPC’s licensing jurisdiction

to include steam plants. The record is to the contrary.

By 1935, when Congress rejected an amendment which

would have done this (supra, p. 8), the capacity of

steam generating plants, which had been 8,920,000 kw

in 1920, had more than doubled, to 24,471,000 kw.'°

By 1962, when it refused to act on FPC’s request for

jurisdiction to license steam plants (supra, n. 9), their

capacity had increased to 149,943, 000 kw,” nearly 16

times the 1920 figure. By 1972, when Congress again

received, but did not act upon, FPC’s renewed request

for licensing jurisdiction over steam plants (supra,

n. 9), their capacity had increased to 322,944,000 kw,”

10 EpIison ELectric INSTITUTE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE

Evectric Utitity INpustry 4 (1962).

11 Epison ELectric INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE

Evectric UnTitity INpusTRY FoR 1973 at 6 (1974).

12 Id.

SSAA ND ATE OED

11

over 35 times the 1920 level. The consistent con-

gressional decision has been to leave the matter of

certification of steam plants with the States in which

the plants are located.

And it is quite misleading to base a claim for expan-

sion of licensing jurisdiction to encompass steam plants

ou assertions that there have been ‘fundamental

changes in their method of operation” (Opp. Br. 26).

The change alleged is that whereas in 1920 ‘“‘they re-

turned virtually all their cooling water to the streams,

so that it could be used again for other purposes, such

as hydro generation’’ (Opp. Br. 29), now they ‘‘per-

manently and substantially diminish the total volume of

the river, and, thus, the hydro-electric power potential

at all downstream water power sites’? (Opp. Br. 31).

But the statistics give an opposite ansyer.

First, on a national scale over 99.2% of the water

diverted for cooling in 1971 (the latest year for which

such data have been published) was returned to: the

stream, and there was thus no great reduction of the

flow."

Second, the argument that consumption of cooling

water in steam plants reduces the quantity available

for downstream hydro generation (Opp. Br. 31) is

subject to a reductio ad absurdum. For example, .the

consumption of an acre-foot of water in the cooling

system of the Navajo steam plant at Lake Powell facili-

tates the production of 504,000 kwh of energy, whereas

the same acre-foot falling from Lake Powell through

Glen Canyon, Hoover, Davis, and Parker hydro plants

18 FPC, Steam Evectric PLANT Arr AND WATER QUALITY Con-

TROL Data: SumMAry Report 24 (1974) (hereinafter ‘“‘“FPC 1974

Summary Report’’). Of 172,391 cubic feet per second diverted, 171,-

142 cubie feet per second were discharged back to the stream.

|

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12

would generate 1,162 kwh—a ratio of 434 to 1 in favor

of use of water in the steam plant.’ Thus, if the com-

plainants’ argument of relative productivity of water

in power generation has any relevance, it works against

them.

Third, our opponents’ comparison of total future re-

quirements for cooling water with total run-off of

streams (Opp. Br. 31), if relevant at all, fails to take

account of the number of fossil-fuel plants that use

salt water for cooling, or the number of iuclear-

powered plants that use either fresh or salt cooling

water, both types of plants being outside the Commis-

sion’s licensing jurisdiction on any construction of

the Act.”

14QOne acre-foot of falling water generates 461 kwh at Glen

Canyon Dam, 492 kwh at Hoover Dam, 130 kwh at Davis Dam,

and 79 kwh at Parker Dam. These values are determined by

multiplying the rated head for each dam by a factor of 1.025.

Thus, one acre-foot of water falling over all four dams generates

(461 + 492 + 130 + 79) = 1,162 kwh.

The energy generation (504,000 kwh) facilitated by the con-

sumption of one acre-foot of water at the Navajo Plant is deter-

mined by multiplying the plant’s total: net capacity (2,310,000

kw) by the plant factor (0.85), multiplying the result by the num-

ber of hours in a year (8,760), and dividing the result by the rate

at which the plant consumes water (34,100 acre-feet per year).

The ratio of energy production at the Navajo Plant facilitated

by one acre-foot of water to the energy generation caused by one

acre-foot of water falling over all four dams is:

504,000 434

1,162 1

Tn 1971, the latest year for which the FPC has published

relevant figures, 125 generating plants with a total generating

capacity of 61,013,000 kw. used saline water for cooling. This com-

pares with 331 plants, with a total generating capacity of 135,332,-

000 kw, using ‘‘onte-through’’ fresh water cooling systems. All other

13

V. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE “SURPLUS

WATER” LICENSING CLAUSE IS GENERALLY APPLI-

CABLE TO STEAM PLANTS DOES NOT REQUIRE DE-

CISION IN THIS COLORADO RIVER CASE.

A. A Federal Power Commission license for the consumptive

use of water stored by government dams on the Colorado

River would be a nullity; authority to grant such a right

is vested exclusively in the Secretary of the Inierior.

If it is decided that the court of appeals was

right in holding that steam plants are not ‘project

works’’ requiring licenses in consequence of their use

of navigable waters of the United States or of govern-

ment lands, this case is finished. The further question

of whether the surplus water clause would be an inde-

pendent source of licensing jurisdiction is not required

to be decided with respect to uses of waters of the Colo-

rado River, because, as shown in our opening brief

(pp. 21-38), Congress, in this basin, has displaced the

surplus water license with the secretarial contract as

the exclusive source of right to consume water sup-

plied from government dams." FPC licensing juris-

diction cannot be founded merely on the fact that a

steam plant is consuming water supplied it from a gov-

ernment dam, exercising a privilege which the Com-

types of cooling (ponds, cooling towers, combined systems) ac-

c .unted for 233 plants with a total generating capacity of 87,063,-

OC) kw. #PC Summary Report, table 6A, p. 21. Sources of

coo..ng water; outside the scope of the Federal Power Act on

any construction, include effluents from sewage treatment and in-

dustrial waste plants, and wells. Dry-air cooling, using no water in

the cooling process, is technologically feasible, although less effi-

cient than water-cooling. oem

‘6 A surplus water license, even for a hydro project on the

Colorado River, would be worthless unless it could command the

Secretary as to the quantities that he must release from the dam,

at what discharge rate, in what months, and at what hours. Of

course the Commission) can do no such thing.

Bec AS Tn Tes

14

mission cannot give, but which can only be granted

(and has been granted in this case) by the Secretary.

A surplus water license, if issued, could neither enlarge

nor diminish the right conferred by the Secretary’s

water contract.

The opposing brief argues that the ‘‘Law of the

River’’ which lodges in the Secretary of the Interior

the exclusive power to grant, by contract, the right to

use water stored by a government dam, is simply analo-

gous to cases in which Congress requires that permits

be obtained from several government agencies before

some kinds of businesses can be conducted (Opp. Br.

76-78). The thought seems to be that a steam plant

consuming water supplied from Hoover Dam, or Glen

Canyon Dam, or Navajo Dam, or Emery County

Project Dam, must obtain both an FPC surplus water

license and an Interior Department water contract.

Not so. The two documents serve the same function,

as we shall see in examining the legislative history and

administrative construction of surplus water licenses

‘for the use by hydro plants of water supplied from

government dams on navigable streams (infra, Part

VI).

B. The assertion that this case reveals a dangerous “gap,”

through which “the Colorado River is flowing, unregulated,

into the hands of the power companies” (Opp. Br. 40), is

pure sophistry.

The Colorado is the most completely regulated river

in the country. Four statutes, the Boulder Canyon

Project Act (1928), the Reclamation Project Act of

1939, the Colorado River Storage Project Act (1954),

and the Colorado River Basin Project Act (1968) give

the Secretary complete control over release of water

sc

SRE FR PRE OA ERS OE PN es,

Pe LOSE A GR IARE

15

from government dams for consumptive use, and re-

quire contracts with the Secretary for that use. The

Federal Power Commission licenses hydroelectric

projects, but no statute directs the Secretary to share

with the Commission his plenary powers over con-

sumptive use of water stored by government dams

(powers which are much greater than those of a state

water allocation officer, contrary to our opponents’

contention, Opp. Br. 77). Complainants seek to stop,

not regulate.” consumptive uses specifically authorized

by the Secretary’s contracts, and, in two instances

(Nayajo ‘tes San Juan), specifically authorized by

Congress:

On the Colorado, neither ‘‘private power interests”’

nor any other interests can ‘“‘appropriate for them- .

selves the public’s valuable resources in the power

potential of navigable streams,”’ thus requiring the

‘‘ourb’’? of the Federal Power Act (Opp. Br. 20).

Here, as elsewhere, no one has a property interest in

running water, United States v. Appalachian Power

Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). Here, uniquely, the United

States itself, by ‘‘econgressional legislation and by acts

of its officers which that legislation authorizes, has un-

dertaken ... to impound, and control the disposition of,

the surplus water in the river not already appropri-

ated.”? Arizona v: California, 298 U.S. 558, 570

(1936). The control is in the form of statutory pro-

hibition of the use of impounded water except by con-

tract with the Secretary of the Interior. (Our opening

brief, pp. 21-38.) 2s

17 Complainants in the present case sought an order to show cause

why the owners of the plants ‘‘should not be required to suspend

all development, planning and construction of the plants in ques-

tion, pending the outcome of these proceedings’’ (App. 11a).

TRE IIIN RERESYS BRS Dt GF pet ale ae aaa i

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16 |

C. The argument that tha FPC must license steam plants be-

cause it is responsible for planning compre ve river

development (Opp. Br. 42) is demolished by Colorado

River statutes.

The opposing brief (p. 42, et seq.) would deduce a

mandate for comprehensive licensing from the compre-

hensive planning responsibility given the Commission

in Sectioa 10(a) of the Federal Power Act. But, on

the Colorado, the Commission’s comprehensive plan-

ning function, like the function of a surplus water

license, has been overtaken and —— by subsequent

legislation.

By law, the Secretary, in concert with the States,

determines what uses of Colorado River water, for

municipal purposes or by industry or by agriculture,

will effectuate optimum use of the resource. Sec-

tion 15 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (43 U.S.C.

617n) directed the Secretary to formulate ‘‘a compre-

hensive scheme of contro] and the improvement and

utilization of the water of the Colorado River and its

tributaries.’’ In so doing, he is made subject to the

Colorado River Compact among the seven basin States

(43 U.S.C. 617g), which Congress approved in the same

Act (43 U.S.C. 6177). The Upper Colorado River

Basin Project Act expanded this in 1956.* The See-

retary was ‘‘directed to continue studies and to make a

report to the Congress and to the States of the Colorado

River Basin on the quality of water of the Colorado

River” (43 U.S.C. 620n). In 1962 Congress intensi-

fied its directive, ordering the Secretary ‘‘to estimate

the effect of additional development involving its stor-

age and use (whether heretofore authorized or con-

templated for authorization) on the remaining water

available for use in the United States, to study all pos-

sible means of improving the quality of such water

17

and of alleviating the ill effects of water of poor

quality, and to report the results of his studies and

estimates to the Eighty-seventh Congress and every two

years thereafter’? (43 U.S.C. 6l5ww). In 1968, in

the Colorado River Basin Project Act, Congress ampli-

fied this to require, inter alia, ‘*full and complete recon-

naissance investigations for the purpose of develop-

ing a general plan to meet the future water needs of the

Western United States’? (43 U.S.C. 1511), and ‘‘eon-

dition all contracts for the delivery of water originating

in the drainage basin of the Colorado River system

upon the availability of water under the Colorado

River Compact’’ (43 U.S.C. 1551), and ordered that

“Rights of the upper basin to the consumptive use of

water available to that basin from the Colorado River

system under the Colorado River Compact shall not

be reduced or prejudiced by any use of such water in

the lower basin” (43 U.S.C. 1553). The last pro-

vision conclusively deprives the Chemehuevi and

Cocopah Tribes, qua water users, of standing to

complain of uses of water by the five Upper Basin

power plants, just as the decree in Arizona v. Cali-

fornia, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), deprives these water users,

like all other water users i») California and Arizona, of

any right to complain of uses by the Mohave Plant in

Nevada.”

Nothing in all of this consistent delegation of plan-

ning authority to the Secretary hints any intention to

8 Moreover, as our initial brief pointed out (pp. 40-41), the

Chemehuevis and Cocopahs have present perfected rights fully

protected by the Colorado River Compact and this Court’s decree ~

in Arizona v. California. If they have complaints about water

quantity or salinity. the FPC is not the forum in which to decide

those complaints. This Court reserved jurisdiction in Article IX

of its decree (376 U.S. 340, 353).

NOES RRA SEI

18

subject its exercise to control by the Federal Power

Commission,” and of course the Commission makes no

such contention.

In the meantime, in 1965, in the Water Resources

Planning Act, Congress created the Water Resources

Council (42 U.S.C. 1962a), consisting of the Secre-

taries of the Departments of Interior, Agriculture,

Army, Health, Edueation and Welfare, and the Chair-

man of the Federal Power Gommission. (The Presi-

dent named the Secretary of the Interior Chairman.)

The Council was directed to establish, ‘‘with the ap-

proval of the President, principles, standards, and pro-

cedures for federal participants in the preparation of

cemprehensive regional or river basin plans... .’’ (42

U.S.C. 1962a-2.) The uses which are attacked in this

ease are.included in, or consistent with, the Secretary’s

comprehensive plans,” continuously evolving in con-

sultations among the States and fedenal agencies, in-

cluding FPC, through the clearing house of the Na-

tional Water Resources Council.”" The statutes do not

authorize FPC to supersede these plans with its own,

and the Commission does not contend otherwise.

This planning responsibility has been diligently Sided.

as evidenced by the Secretary’s voluminous reports. Examples are

listed imAppendix A to this brief.

20 E.g., DEPARTMENT OF. THE INTERIOR, SOUTHWEST ENERGY

Stupy, Summary Report (1972); DEPARTMENT OF THE. INTERIOR,

THe CRITICAL WATER PROBLEMS FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN

States (1974) (Review Drarr); Report ON WaTER FoR ENERGY

- IN THE UPPER Covorabo RIver Basin (July 1974):*

*1 E.g., WATER Resources Councit, Upper CoLorapo REGION,

COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK StuDy (1971) (see Appendix XIV,

E.Lectric PowER) ;*WATEeR Resources Counci., LOwER CoLORADO

REGION, COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK Stupy (1971) (see Appendix

XIV, ELectric Power).

= Te as Pat

19

D. The assorted concern of the Indians about the effect of these

relatively small consumptive uses on downstream hydro

plants (Opp. Br. 23, 31) and salinity (Opp. Br. 31, 90) could

not be litigated in the absence of the seven States which

are parties to the Colorado River Compact, and the parties

to the decree in Arizona v. California.

It is said that these six steam plants will use 2% of

the Colorado River water supply, and that uses by

other steam plants on the river and its tributaries may

ultimately increase to 5% (Opp. Br. 23). Putting to

one side the fact that even the larger of these figures

is so small as to be exceeded by the unavoidable per-

centage of errors of hydrologic measurement, the

important point, missed by our opponents, is that it is

for the Secretary and the States, under existing law, to

make the value judgment of whether severak million .

people shall be benefited by the electricity made avail-

able by the use of such small quantities of water for

this purpose, or whether the public interest would be

better served by irrigating a few thousand acres of

land with the same water, as the Colorado River Com-

pact permits to be done.

The States in which these plants are located cannot

be denied the consumptive use of the quantities of

water allocated to them by the compacts and by the

‘decree of this Court in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S.

340 (1964). The quéstion of whether the water ap-

portioned should be used by agriculture or munici-

palities or industry (including steam plants) is

not in the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Com-

mission but in that of the States and the Secre-

tary in collaboration. Our opponents contend that

consumptive use by these plants ‘¢will diminish the

potential for production of power at Federal hydro-

electrie facilities at Boulder, Glen Canyon, and other

SERRA a |

i.

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4

i

oS aes Das Ha a opiwiet ned

downstream government dams by a substantial amount’’

(Opp. Br. 23), ignoring the fact that these depletions

are protected by the apportionments made by the Colo-

rado River Compact and this Court’s decree in Arizona

v. California. This is a rather officious argument in

any event, because it is the Secretary of the Interior

who has responsibility for the power production at

those dams, and that same Secretary executed the

consumptive use water contracts involved in this case.

E. The environmental statutes do not transfer the Secretary's

control of stored srzter to the Federal Power Commission.

It is argued that unnamed ‘‘protections and oppor-

tunities’’ to mitigate environmental impact are avail-

able ‘‘only before the FPC;’’ not the Secretary of the

Interior, and that “there is an obvious disparity in the

remedies available in the event of an unfavorable

decision.’’ (Opp. Br. 90.)

Unless the FPC had licensing authority in the first

place, all this, even if true, would be irrelevant.

But it is“a curiously blindfolded argument. In

plain sight is the whole spectrum of laws for the pro-

tection of the environment,” all applicable equally to

control the actions and decisions of all federal agencies.

The Environmental Protection Agency, for example,

has promulgated regulations on the very subject with

which complainants express their concern, the effect of

steam plant operations on quality of water. See EPA,

‘Thermal Discharges, 40 C.F.R. ch. 40, Part 122,

39 Fed. Reg. 36176, Oct. 8, 1974; EPA, Steam

Electric Power Generating Point Source Category:

22 E.g., the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. 1857; the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1251; the National En-

vironmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321.

2°26 MEME EARS NR

21

Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. eh. 1, »

Part 423, 39 Fed. Reg. 36186, Oct. 8, 1974.” See also

additional regulations proposed by EPA, Steam

Electric Power Generating Source Category: Pro-

posed Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Incom-

patible Pollutants, 39 Fed. Reg. 36210, Oct. 8, 1974.

Congress repeatedly, most recently in the Colorado

River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320,

88 Stat. 266, 7 U.S. Cope Cone. aNp ApMIN. NEWS 1685

(Aug. 15, 1974), has charged the Secretary, not the

Commission, with authority and responsibility for

solving the salinity problem in cooperation with the

Environmental Protection Agency.”

28 See the detailed supporting paper, EPA, DEVELOPMENT Docv-

MENT FOR PRoposED EFFLUENT LIMITATION GUIDELINES AND NEW

Source PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR THE STEAM ELectric POWER

GENERATING Pornt Source CaTecory. This contains useful de-

seriptions of the functions and environmental effects of cooling

water, particularly in the discussions at 255, 275, and 313-451.

It must not be thought that the environmental consequences of

the six plants are not presently regulated. Under the provisions

of the water service contracts for these plants, for example, the

Secretary of the Interior must review and approve the various

systems which have aa impact on the environment. These con-

tracts are on file with the Clerk of the Court.

24'The Environmental Protection Agency, in collaboration with

the Secretary and the States, has formulated and published in the

Federal Register, 39 Fed. Reg. 43721 (Dee. 18, 1974), a ‘‘salinity

control policy and procedures and requirements for establishing

water quality standards for salinity and a plan of implementation

for salinity control in the Colorado River System . . .’, looking

toward adoption of water quality standards by 1975. It provides

that: ‘‘(ii) The salinity problem shall be treated as a basinwide

problem that needs to be solved in order to maintain lower main

stem salinity at or below 1972 levels while the basin States continue

to develop their compact-apportioned waters.

‘<(iii) The goal of the plan shall be to achieve compliance with

the adopted standards by July 1, 1983... —

The Sierra Club had objected to paragraph (ii) among others.

Reg RTE SEIT TR RATES ARSE Se EE IO Rig

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22

VI. THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR THE NOTION THAT THE SUR-

PLUS WATER CLAUSE WAS INTENDED TO BRING STEAM

PLANTS INTO THE ‘S LICENSING JURISDICTION, UN-

ANNOUNCED, BY THE BACK DOOR.

As to the ‘‘surplus water’’ clause, considered inde-

pendently of the superseding effect of the Colorado

River legislation:

The opposing argument (Opp. Br. 59) is that all

hydroelectric projects are located on streams deemed

navigable waters of the United States( Opp. Br. 61);

hence require ‘project workers licenses’? anvhow,

whether or not using water from government dams;

therefore ‘‘the surplus water clause can have inde-

pendent significance only if construed to cover facili-

ties other than hydro plants’’* (Opp. Br. 61) ; this, by

subtraction, means steam plants, even though the Act

and its legislative history contain no hint of this, and

complainants believe that ‘‘Congress was not thinking

about steam plants at all’? (Opp. Br. 26).

*° Use of surplus water from government dams was not, as the

complainants imply, a little understood concept, or a jurisdictional

‘catch all’? for non hydroelectric uses of surplus water. Con-

gress’ concern in enacting the Federal Water Power Act was the

encouragement of hydro power development, either by private

interests constructing hydro projects, or utilization of existing

or future government dams. Congressman Sims explained this

situation :

‘It takes time, an’ it takes a long time, to build a tremendous

dam. <A water-power dam in some places, on some water-

courses, is estimated to cost as high as $25,000,000. But

there are a number of Government dams, navigation dams,

dams that have been built on navigable rivers for the purpose

of improving navigation, that are now unavailable simply

because there is no law that permits their utilization. Those

dams, or the water produced by Government nav igation dams,

can be made available immediately ....°’ 56 Cona. Rec. 8929

(1918). (Emphasis added.)

23

There are several answers:

The legislative history shows that the surplus power

or water clause was intended to be equally applicable

to hydro plants located at government dams on navi-

gable and non-navigable streams. Payment for the

privilege of using surplus water created by government

dams (as opposed to power created by private dams)

was a crucial factor underlying the surplus water pro-

vision.” The debates show a logical distinction between

the amounts that a licensee ought to pay the United

States if he built the dam that 2 sates the power head,

and the additional amounts that he ought to pay if he

is allowed to make use of the head (and the flow of

water) made available by construction of a government

dam at federal expense (usually spoken of as a navi-

gation dam, in the debates) .”

As most (but not all) government dams were on

navigable streams, the surplus power or water clause

was of course intended te apply to hydro projects

making use of navigable waters. Ford vy. Little Falls

Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369, 374 (1929), is an illuminating

example.

The Court described the ick as follows:

«|. The petitioner, a private business corpora-

tion, has procured from the Federal Power Com-

mission a license for a hydroelectric power project,

‘ purporting to be granted under the Federal Water

Power Act of June 10, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 1063

26 B.g., 56 Cone. Rec. 9912-13 (1918); 58 Cone. Rec. 2037,

9991-23 (1919); 59 Cone. Rec. 246 (1917).

) 7. + are sil

aii ein ae <soracaia

CE EPPA NOPD LOS

24

[U.S8.C. title 16, § 792]. The license granted per-

mission to use surplus water from the Federal

dam for the development of power at a plant to

be constructed and maintained by petitioner for

that purpose on government land. As the license

also permits, but does not require, petitioner

has placed flashboards on the crest of the dam,

which, under normal conditions, raise the level of

the water in the pool above the dam approxi-

mately 2 feet.’? (Emphasis added.)

The differences in duration and charges in the

‘*project works’’ component and the ‘‘surplus water’’

component of a license or liceises are stated by the

statute itself (Section 10(e)). The Commnission’s

practice accords with the foregoing construction of the

Act. It consistently requires * that a hydro project

using water from a government dam on a navigable

stream either obtain two licenses, or one license eom-

bining two features: (i) a project works license for

50 years at a set uniform nationwide annual charge,

plus (11) a surplus water license for an initial period

of 20 years, renewable, for fees ‘which Vary with the

quantity of water furnished from the government

dam.”

*7 See Appendix B for a list of 17 surplus water licenses issned

by the Commission. All relate to waters now classed as navigable:

waters of the United States, with one possible exception, there

noted.

8 In some instances, as consideration for the use of surplus water

at a government dam, the licensee is required to operate and

maintain the dam and its hydraulic features. E.g., Potomac

Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2517, 35 F.P.C. 680, 681

(1966) ; Potomae Edison Co. of West Virginia, Project No. 2516,

35 F.P.C. 676, 677 (1966).

25

In short, the complainants are quite mistaken in

theiy major premise, that the surplus water clause has

no applicability to hydro projects on navigable streams,

and are thus mistaken in their conclusion that this

clause must have been meaut to apply only to non-

hydro projects on such streams, e.g., steam plants.

As to power plants which do not use the head

developed by a government dam, but are located down-

stream in a reach whose flow is affected by the up-

stream dam, complainants can cite no legislative history

which would support a jurisdictional claim, even with

reference te a hydro plant. The only case which has

considered this question, California Oregon Power Co.

v. FPC, 239 F.2d 426 ( D.C. Cir. 1956), rejected the

Commission’s conclusion that a surplus water license

was required.” Our opponents quote the Commission

put not the Court (Opp. Br. 59).

29 The court held that no just iciable controversy over the mean-

ing of ‘‘surplus water’? was presented, inasmuch as a project

works license was required in any event because of the plants’

locations on a navigable stream. It said (p. 431): ‘‘The Commis-

sion has not ruled with clarity on what it considers ‘surplus water’

to be, or in any event what amount of it will be used by Copco, or

when (if ever) Copeo is to be charged for it, or at what rate.”’

P. 432: ‘‘The record is, in fact, in such a state that we could

hardly hold (if we reached the question) that Copco has been

shown to be a user of surplus water, on any theory.”’

.

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26

CONCLUSION

We submit that:

1. The licensing jurisdiction of the Federal Power

Commission with respect to ‘‘project works’’ is re-

stricted to hydroelectric projects, and excludes steamw-

electric generating plants.

2. The further question of whether the Commission

would -have licensing jurisdiction with respect to the

consumptive use by steam plants of ‘‘surplus water”’’

from a government dam is not required to be decided

in this Colorado River case, because here Congress has

superseded the ‘‘surplus water’’ license with the re-

quirement of a contract with the Secretary of the In-

terior for the use of waters of the Colorado River

System stored by the government dams involved.

3. If, notwithstanding the superseding effect of the

Colorado River statutes, the question were to be reached

as to whether the jurisdiction of the Federal Power

Commission to license the use of surplus water from

a government dam encompasses such water by a

steam-electric generating plant, the answer should be

in the negative.

Respectfully submitted,

SEE ES

NORTHCUTT ELY

FREDERICK H. RITTS

ROBERT F. PIETROWSKI, JR.

Law Offices of Northcutt Ely

Watergate 600 Building

Washington, D. C. 20037

and

HARRY A. POTH, JR.

PEYTON G. BOWMAN, 3RD

Reid & Priest

40 Wall Street, New York,

New York 10005

1701 K Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for all Petitioners

NICHOLAS H. POWELL

Snell & Wilmer

400 Security Building

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Attorneys for Arizona Public

Scrvice Company

WILLIAM DUNCAN

Kemp, Smith, White, Dunean &

Hammond

P. O. Box 2800

FE] Paso, Texas 79999

Attorneys for El Paso Electric

Company

BURT 8. PINES, City Attorney

EDWARD C. FARRELL, Chief

Assistant City Attorney for

Water and Power

RALPH GUY WESSON

Assistant City Attorney

"411 North Hope Street

Los Angeles, California 90051

Attorneys for Department of

Water and Power, City of

Los Angeles

M. GENE MATTEUCCI

P. O. Box 230

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorney for Nevada Power

Company

HR AGL LOCI S LEER PE CNL EDIE IA

BC a Pe FALL LE Po Re Ee EN TD

ff

REX E. LEE

2840 Iroquois Drive

Provo, Utah 84601

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon

111 W. Monroe Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Attorneys for Salt River Project

Agricultural Improvement and

Power District

SHERMAN CHICKERING

C. HAYDEN AMES

EDWARD P. NELSEN

ALLAN J. THOMPSON

Chickering & Gregory

111 Sutter Street

* San Francisco, California 94104

Attorneys for San Diego Gas

§ Electric Company

JOHN R. BURY

Assistant General Counsel

P. O. Box 800

Rosemead, California 91770

Attorney for Southern California

Edison Company

L. V. ROBERTSON, JR.

General Attorney

Tueson Gas and Electric Company

220 West Sixth Street

Tucson, Arizona 87503

DONALD E. DICKERMAN

Holesapple, Conner, Jones,

McFall & Johnson

P.O. Box 310

Tueson, Arizona 85702

Attorneys for Tucson Gas ¢

Electric Company

SIDNEY G. BAUCOM

ROBERT GORDON

P.O. Box 899

Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Attorneys for Utah Power $

Light Company

PESTON SOLES SE

28

APPENDIX A

Reports of the Secretary of the Interior made pur-

suant to congressional authorization for comprehensive

planning for the use of the water and related resources

of the Colorado River Basin.

1. U.S. Department of the Interior, A Report on the

Colorado River Storage Project and Participating

Projects, Providing for the Development and Utiliza-

tion of the Water and Related Resources of the Upper

A Colorado River Basin, Pursuant to the Federal Ree-

lamation Laws (1954).

2. U.S. Departrsent of the Interior, Quality of Water:

on River Basin (1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971,

1973).

3. U.S. Department of the Interior, Pacific Southwest

Water Plan (1964).

4, U.S. Department of the Interior, Upper Colorado River

Basin Cooperative Salinity Control Study (1969).

*

A

¢

:

4

‘4

4

5. Water Resources Council, Lower Colorado Region

Comprehensive Framework Study (1971).

6. Water Resources Council, Upper Colorado Region

Comprehensive 'ramework Study (1971).

U.S. Department of the Interior, Southwest Energy.

Study: An Evaluation of Coal-Fired Electric Power

Generation in the Southwest (1972).

8. U.S. Department of the Interior, Water Quality Im-

provement Program (1972).

~l]

9. U.S. Department of the Interior, Alternative Sources

of Water for Prototype Oil Shale Development: Colo-

rado and Utah (Draft) (1974).

10. U.S. Department of the Interior, Report on Water for

Energy’ in the Upper Colorado River Basin (1974).

11. U.S. Department of the Interior, Westwide Study Re-

port on the Critical Water Problems Facing the Eleven

Western States (Draft) (1974).

>

1

\

29

. APPENDIX B

Examples of Licenses for the Use of Surplus Water from

to

bees |

Government Dams on Navigable Waters of the

; United States

John Hollis Bankhead Dam on the Black Warrior-

River, Project No. 2169, Alabama Power Company,

18 F.P.C. 327 (1957) ; 34 F.P.C. 971 (1965) (order fix-

ing annual charges for use of government dam—

$92,000 annually) ; 26 F.P.C. 658 (1966) (method used

in setting annual charges for use of government dam).

United States Holt Lock and Dam on the Black War-

rior River, Project No. 2203, Alabama Power Com-

pany, 34 F.P.C. 1108 (1965).

United States Dam No. 4 Hydro Station on the ‘Po-

tomac River, Project No. 2516, Potomac Edison Co. of

West Virginia, 35 ¥.P.C. 676 (1966); 41 F.P.C. 194

(1969).

United States Dam No. 5 Hydro Station on the Poto-

mae River, Project No. 2517, Potomac Edison Co. of

West Virginia, 35 ¥.P.C. 680 (1966); 41 F.P.C. 399

(1969).

St. Anthony Falls on the M ississippi River, Project No.

2056, Northern States Power Co., 17 F.P.C.,714, (1957) ;

10 F.P.C. 1322 (1951); 18 F.P.C. 1028 (1954) (order

amending license to fix annual charge for use of gov-

ernment dam) ;.16 F.P.C. 1256 (1956). |

Waterbury Dam, on the Waterbury, River, Project No.

2090, Green Mountain Power Corp., 13 F.P.C. 1211

(1954) ; 13 F.P.C. 1321 (1954).

_ Allegheny River” Reservoir Dam on the Allegheny

River, Project No. 2280, Pennsylvania Electric Co., 34

F.P.C. 1566 (1965). ;

United Siates Lock and Dam No. 7 on the Mississippi

River, Project No. 362, Ford Motor Co., 9 F.P.C. 560

(1950) ; order of May 22, 1974.

United States Lock and Dam at Green Island, on the

Hudson River, Project No. 13, Niagara M ohawk Power

Corp., 42 F.P.C. 56 (1969) ; 40 F.P.C. 1305 (1968).

Ce ee,

30

10.’ Markland Dam, on the Ohio River, Project No. 2211,

Public Service Co. of Indiana, 27 F.P.C, 115 (1957)

(preliminary permit).

11. Winfield Project, on the Kanawha River, Project No.

1290, Kanawha Valley Power Co., 5 F.P.C. 565 (1946).

12. United States Dam No. 7, on the Kentucky River, Proj-

ect No. 539, Kentucky Utilities Company (¥PC order

‘approving license of Nov. 25, 1930); 5 F.P.C. 656

(1946) (amendment of license).

' 13. Englebright Dam and Reservoir, on the Yuba River,

Project No. 2246, Yuba County Water Agency, 40

F.P.C. 1001 (1968); 35 F.P.C. 691 (1966) 29 F.P.C.

1002 (1963). \

14. Pine View Dam, 'Utah Power & Light Company, 31

F.P.C. 958 (1964) (water diverted from government

dam through a 5.5 mile wood-stave flowline) (in liti-.

gation).

4

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15. Marmet and London Development, Project No. 1175,

Kanawha Valley Power Company, 1 ¥F.P.C, 322 (1936).

16. MeAlpine Dam, Project No. 289, Kentucky-Louisville

Gas and Electric Company, license issued on November

11, 1925. 1926 Annual Report of the Federal Power

Commission, 35-37 ; 147-150.

17. Racine River Dam, Project No. 2570, Ohio Power Com-

| pany, license issued on December 27, 1973.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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