Jurisdictional Statement — Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases
Supreme Court brief1974
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OCTOBER TERM, 1974
RICH se rae 4 16 |
C oO. 7 om
NEW YO 66
({ARD JOYCE SMITH, TRUSTEE
\F THE PROPERTY OF THE
RK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD
RAILROAD COMPANY,
UNIT DEBTOR,
CROSS-APPELLANT, ,
Vv.
ON CROSSpp STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
THE L
CROSS-APPELLEES.
EASTE ray SORE
>-ARPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
‘RN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Of Counsel-p rgntCTIONAL STATEMENT
Morris RAK OF CROSS-APPELLA
CHARLES W. ———
SULLIVAN & , JOSEPH AUERBACH >
_ 225 Fran / * 225 Franklin Street
Boston, ' . _ Boston, Massachusetts
O2eR . 02110
Morse, JR.
JAMES WM. MOORE
WORCESTER * ”. 54 Meadow Street
hlin Street New Haven, Connecticut
fassachusetts 06506
10
Pete or A nt
Richar fe mith, Trustee
of the Property of The New
ork, New Haven and Hartford —
Railroad Company, Debtor
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5b TE NNR oP 8 STIL D EL ba Se OPN TO IO. FEE EAE PRE Sv T BAER PTT
In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
No. 74—
RICHARD JOYCE SMITH, TRUSTEE
OF THE PROPERTY OF THE |
NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD
RAILROAD COMPANY,
DEBTOR,
CROSS-APPELLANT,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
CROSS-APPELLEES.
‘ON CROSS-APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
OF CROSS-APPELLANT
This jurisdictional statement is submitted on behalf
of cross-appellant, Richard Joyce Smith, Trustee of the
property of The New York, New Haven and Hartford
Railroad Company, Débtor (the “New Haven Trustee”
and the “New Haven,” respectively). Since July, 1961,
the New Haven has been in reorganization under §77
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §205, before the
Fd
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ie LIND SA ORRIN Nis ME I
2
United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut (Circuit Judge Robert P. Anderson sitting by
designation). On December 31, 1968, the New Haven
Trustee (together with his then co-Trustee) conveyed
substantially all of New Havens assets to Penn Central
Transportation Company (“Penn Central’) in ex-
change for a then-to-be judicially determined con-
sideration comprised of cash. mortgage bonds and
shares of common stock of Penn Central. See New Ha-
ven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970). The New Ha-
ven Trustee’s standing in this case is predicated on
ownership of $34,025,800 of defaulted mortgage
bonds of Penn Centrai (Stip. Fact ffi and 2), which
has been in reorganization under §77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act since June 21, 1970, and is also based on
his claimed equitable lien, temporarily protected by
Order No. 546 of the Penn Central Reorganization
Court (Stip. Fact ]3) to secure the total unpaid portion
($123,809,404) of the purchase price ($174,635,899)
approved in New Haven Inclusion Cases, supra. In terms
of standing, the New Haven Trustee must be deemed
to have the rights of a secured creditor to the full ex-
tent of his claim, based on the “underwriting” imposed
by the New Haven Reorganization Court as to the
value of $87.50 per share relative to the 956,000
shares of Penn Central Company! common stock
which he holds pending adjudication of the New Ha-
ven’s plan of reorganization, based on this Court’s re-
mand, 399 U.S. at 488-89.
‘Penn Central Company is the holding company which owns 100%
of the stock of Penn Central. The 956,000 shares held by the New Ha-
ven Trustee pending final adjudication of New Haven’s plan of re-
organization represent 4% of the outstanding shares.
.. ORE
5
ee
3
THE OPINION BELOW
The New Haven Trustee cross-appeals from so
much of an Order, dated June 25, 1974, of a three-
judge court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2282
and 2284 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the “court below”) as
denied the relief sought by cross-appellant.
The Opinion of the court below pursuant to which
the Order was entered has not yet been officially re-
ported. Copies of the Opinion and Order are sepa-
rately bound in the Joint ‘Appendix hereto, at pp. 9-
a3."
' JURISDICTION
This action was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§1331, 1337, 1651, 2282, 2284 and 2321-2325, to en-
join enforcement of various provisions of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Public Law 93-236,
87 Stat. 985, 45 U:S.C. §§701 et seg. (the “RRRA”) for
repugnance to the Constitution of the United States.
In addition, declaratory relief was sought pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§2201-02.
The principal appellants from the decision of the
court below are the United States of America, United
States Railway Association (“USRA’”’), Claude S.
Brinegar, Secretary of the United States Department
of Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (“ICC”) (herein collectively referred to as the
“governmental appellants”) and Robert W. Blanchette,
Richard C. Bond, and John H. McArthur’, Trustees
2References to documents contained in the Joint Appendix will be
identified by the letters “JA” followed by the appropriate page numbers.
‘Subsequent to commencement of the action, George P. Baker, an
onginal Trustee of Penn Central, resigned and John H. McArthur was
appointed in his stead.
4
of Penn Central, intervening defendants pursuant
to Rule 24, Fed. R. Civ. P. (the “Penn Central
Trustees”).4
Since the Order of the court below enjoined certain
of the governmental appellants from enforcing certain
provisions of the RRRA on grounds of repugnance to
the United States Constitution, the governmental ap-
pellants and the Penn Central Trustees each have a
statutory right of direct appeal to this Court under 28
U.S.C. §1252 and also under 28 U.S.C. §1253.
The New Haven Trustee, as a “party who has re-
ceived notice of appeal under this section” within the
meaning of the penultimate sentence of 28 U.S.C.
§1252, is directed by statute to “take any subsequent
appeal or cross-appeai to the Supreme Court.” 28
U.S.C. §1252.
The New Haven Trustee’s notice of appeal was
filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on July 3
1974, and a copy thereof is printed at JA 385.
The governmental appellants and the Penn Central
Trustees support the constitutionality of the RRRA,
and therefore are the cross-appellees here. It is under-
stood that the cross-appellees do not challange the ju-
risdiction of the Court to hear this cross-appeal.
‘The governmental appellants filed notices of appeal on July 17,
, 1974, (USRA), July 22, 1974 (United States), and July 24, 1974
’ (Brinega “in Smith v. United States (JA 386-88). Defendants Stafford
(Chairman of the ICC), Schultz (formerly Secretary of the Treasury) and
the ICC, named as party defendants in the Connecticut General and/or
Penn Central Co. cases, filed notices of appeal on July 24, 1974 (JA 389-
90). The Penn Central Trustees’ notice of appeal was filed on July 1,
1974 (JA 384). The Ney,Haven Trustee's notice of appeal was filed on
July 3, 1974 (JA 385).
MEMORIES SIDE PIPL Pe
ed GFR EO8 AE AR AI LION, ot IYI BSA El AB Lhe! IMIR LEVEE AER. NIE SEGNE LIAL See Mt 2 ee
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES INVOLVED
The following provisions of the United States Con-
stitution and Statutes are believed to be involved in the
determination of this case:
_- United States Constitution:
~ Article I, Section 8, Clauses 3 and 4
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7
Fifth Amendment
Section 77 of the Banknmiptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§205
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,
Public Law 93-239, 87 Stat. 985, 45 U.S.C.
§§701 et seq.
Extracts of the pertinent constitutional and stat-
utory provisions will be set forth as an Appendix to
Siaiuies:
the New Haven Trustee’s Brief. The complete text of .
the RRRA is printed at JA 391 et seq.
‘QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Was the court below in error in refusing to adju-
dicate whether or not the compulsory conveyance pro-
visions of the RRRA are void on their face as re-
pugnant to the constitutional nights of the New Haven
Trustee and other claimants to the Penn Central
estate?
~-9. Did the New Haven Trustee have standing to
assert that the enforcement of the compulsory con-
veyance- provisions of the RRRA, if not enjoined,
would cause irreparable injury to the New Haven
estate?
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PEL ILE ELOISE T LE PILE ELT LOTTE TEL REALE EL OMG PN LITRE CE
6
3. Where a railroad in reorganization under §77 of
the Bankruptcy Act is unable to achieve an earnings-
based reorganization by reason of large deficits in net
railway operating income and the lack of any prospect
of earnings, can Congress by enactment deprive
claimants to the railroad’s estate of their right to insist
upon termination of rail operations and the sale of rail
properties subject to their mortgage liens for their
“highest and best-use” value?
4. Considered as an exercise of Congress’ Com-
merce Clause and eminent domain powers, do the
compulsery conveyance provisions of the RRRA in-
volve an intentional uncompensated taking, or a tak-
ing not compensated in money or its perfect equiv-
alent, of the property of Penn Central, and of
claimaiiis to iis estate, in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution?
5. Considered as an exercise of Congress’ Bank-
ruptcy Clause powers, do the compulsory conveyance
provisions of the RRRA, offend substantive due pro-
cess rights of claimants to the Penn Central estate by
divesting such claimants’ liens on valuable rail trans-
portation properties in exchange for common stock
and other securities of uncertain value of a gov-
ernmentally-controlled corporation and an illusory de-
ficiency judgment against such corporation?
6. Do the compulsory provisions of §§303(b)(1)
and (2) of the RRRA, requiring conveyance of rail
properties and divestment of the liens of claimants to
the Penn Central ‘estate, in advance of judicial de-
terminations as to “highest and best use” value of such
properties and tyg equitable equivalent value of the se-
curities and common stock to be exchanged therefor,
offend the procedural due process rights of claimants
to the Penn Central estate?
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7. Are the compulsory conveyance provisions of
§§206, 207, 208, 209, 303 and 304 of the RRRA void
as a law, purportedly on the subject of bankruptcies,
which is not uniform geographically throughout the
United States?
2 SR Ht SOE
: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 2, 1974, the RRRA was signed into. law
by the President. On January 25, 1974, the New Ha-
ven Trustee filed a complaint asserting that the RRRA
was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Penn
Central, naming as defendants the United States,
USRA, and Secretary of Transportation Brinegar. The
action was filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. On the same day, other cred-
itors of Penn Central filed a similar complaint in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (Connecticut General v. USRA, Civil Action
No. 74-189). In order to achieve a single expedited
proceeding, the New Haven Trustee consented to a
motion of the United States and other governmental
defendants to transfer Smith v. United States, et al. to
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1404(a). A ‘third case, Penn Central Co. v.
Brinegar, was also transferred, pursuant to §1404(a),
from the District of Columbia.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2282 and 2284, a three-
judge district court, consisting of Circuit Judge Rug-
gero J. Aldisert- and District Judges John P. Fullam
and Louis C. Bechtle, was constituted to hear all the
cases concerning the constitutionality of the RRRA.
The Penn Central Trustees, who intervened as de-
fendants, answered that the RRRA was constitutional
*Public Law 93-236, codified as 45 U.S.C. §§701 et seg. Section refer-
ences are to the Section numbers in Public Law 93-236, and not to the
codification in 45 U. S.C.
4
- ‘ _ , PSE IG RIPE MMI AE PSE NEE NPCS ET MINIS CENT EET IT # PEI ES EE EIEIO RSE SRE a aa
8
on the assumption of a “Tucker Act remedy” under 28
U.S.C. §1491 to “underwrite” any constitutional de-
ficiency in the RRRA.
After joinder of issue, the New Haven Trustee on
April 29, 1974 filed a motion for summary judgment
as to certain of the legal. issues raised by his com-
plaint.® The United States and the other governmental
defendants, and the Penn Central Trustees, each then
filed counter-motions for summary judgment. The
factual record was then completed by a Stipulation as
to the Record in the Penn Central Reorganization Pro-
ceedings, a Stipulation as to Factual Matters, a Joint
Documentary Submission, and affidavits of two gov-
‘ernment witnesses.” Smith v. United States was then con-
solidated for purposes of oral argument and dis-
position on the merits with the Connecticut General and
Penn Central Company cases, in. which motions for sum-
mary judgment had also been filed.’
The issue before the court below was whether an
injunction should issue restraining the enforcement of
various sections of che RRRA on grounds of re-
pugnance to the Constitution., The court below
granted, in part, the motion of the New Haven
Trustee for summary judgment, and issued an order
dated June 25, 1974 (“Order”) (JA 82-83) which en-
joined defendant USRA from certifying a final system
plan to the Special Court pursuant to §209(c) of the
RRRA, and enjoined all defendants from taking any
®See New Haven Trustee’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (E.D. Pa. C.A. No. 74-
1107, Doc. No. 4, May 2, 1974; JA 258), pp. 1-8 for listing of issues in-
cluded in the Motion for Summary Judgment.
7Ten copies of the Joint Documentary Submission have been filed
with the Clerk of this Court. One of the government's affidavits is Doc. .
No. 61 in the Joint Documentary Submissicn; the other is reprinted at
JA 226-55. The Stipulation as to Factual Matters is printed at JA 317-24.
— Stipulation as to the Record is identical to that set forth at JA 197-
MAES ALAS AOE ELLE IT, INT IOI NE LE BEE Q OF er ee
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9
action to enforce the provisions of §304(f) of the
RRFA with respect to any abandonment, cessation or
reduction of railroad service which may hereafter be
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
necessary for the preservation of rights guaranteed by
the Constitution (Order, 1, 2; JA 82). In addition,
the court below enjoined all parties “from enforcing or —
taking any action to implement so much of Section
207(b) of the RRRA as purports to require dismissal of
pending proceedings for reorganization [of Penn Cen-
tral] under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act” (Order,
43; JA 82).° Finally, the court below entered a de-
claratory judgment that §303 of the RRRA is null and
void insofar as it fails to provide compensation for in-
terim erosion pending final implementation of the fi-
nal system plan contemplated by the RRRA and that
§304(f) of the RRRA is null and void as violative of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to the extent
it would require continued operation of rail services at
a loss in violation of the constitutional rights of the
owners and creditors of Penn Central (Order, 94a, 4b;
JA 82). The court below also declared a portion of the
third sentence of §207(b) of the RRRA to be null and
void as violative of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the
Constitution in that the RRRA is not uniform geo-
' yraphically throughout the United States and, to the
extent that the RRRA amends §77 of the Bankruptcy
Act, it is a law on the subject of bankruptcies within
the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 (Order,
4c; JA 83).
The court below was not unanimous in every re-
spect. Circuit Judge Aldisert, who wrote the Opinion
of the Court, was joined by District Judge Bechtle in
*This portion of the order was entered sua sponte as none of the
plaintiffs sought this relief.
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10
disposing of “plaintiffs’ threshold contention that the
possible future conveyance of rail properties to Conrail
[Consolidated Rail Corporation] in consideration for
Conrail stock and secunities constitutes a Fifth Anrend-
ment taking without payment of just compensation”
(Opinion of the Court; JA 23) by concluding that “we
do not meet these Fifth Amendment questions be-
cause we are persuaded that these issues are pre-
mature” (Opinion of the Court; JA 23). Judge Fullam
concurred in the rest#t, but took the view that certain
of the constitutional issues presented were ripe for ad-
judication and should not have been deferred (Con-
curring opinion of Fullam, J., Part 1; JA 55-60). The
New Haven Trustee as cross-appellant asserts that the
court below was in error in finding that the issue of
the facial-constitutionality of the compulsory con-
veyance provisions of the RRRA was not required to
be adjudicated on account of alleged prematunty and
lack of npeness.
.
The court below was also in disagreeinent as to
whether the RRRA was, to the extent it represents a
“law on the subject of bankruptcies,” void for want of
geographical uniformity under Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 4 of
the Constitution. Judges Fullam and Bechtle so held,
but concluded that the only provision in the RRRA
that could not be rationalized as being based on Com-
merce Clause powers was the provision requiring man-
datory dismissal of §77 proceedings,? which they held
to be void for lack of geographical uniformity (Con-
curring. opinion of Fullam, J., Part II; JA 61-65).
Judge Aldisert dissented from this conclusion on the
ground that the RRRA is uniform in its application to
creditors, and that creditor parties lack standing to as-
sert the constitutional defect of the RRRA’s non-appli-
°RRRA, §207(b), third sentence, Clause (2).
1]
cability to a debtor railroad located outside the region
(JA 26-29). The New Haven Trustee, on this appeal,
asscrts that the RRRA.is void for want of geographical
uniformity in a number of respects, including (but not
«limited to) Clause (2) of the third sente:ice of §207(b),
and that, for the reasons set forth in Part II of Judge
Fullam’s concurring opinion (for the majonty of the
court), the New Haven Trustee has standing to assert
this constitutional defect.
SUBSTANTIALITY OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This cross-appeal challenges the constitutional va-
lidity of the compulsory conveyance provisions of the
RRRA, an issue which the majonty of the court below
refused to reach on grounds of alleged prematurity.
While the RRRA was declared unconstitutional in part
by the court below, and the court below enjoined certi-
fication of any “final system plan” by USRA to the
Special Court, this judgment was based solely on the
constitutional defect that the RRRA requires Penn
Central to sustain enormous operating deficits, and
consequent erosion of the estate available to satisfy
Penn Central claimants, during the penod January 2,
1974 to the date when the compulsory conveyances
mandated by the RRRA may occur, without making
provision for payment to the Penn Central estate of
just compensation in respect of these operating deficits
and consequent erosion. While the decision of the
Court below provides an obstacle to the im-
plementation of an unconstitutional taking, the issues
which the court below found to be ripe for adju-
dication represent, in effect, but the up of the iceberg.
The issues which it treated as “premature,” which
went to the constitutional defects, both facial and as
applied to Penn Central, of the compulsory con-
so t er ALAR 5 REAR RRO MUS EUR OEE Soar gp
TK eR MAT SD SSH. BS
12
veyance provisions of the RRRA, are inherently im-
portant issues which require concurrent resolution. If
this Court merely sustains the judgment below without
addressing the constitutionality of the compulsory con-
veyance provisions of the RRRA, a correction by Con-
gress of only the constitutional defects in the RRRA
found by the’’couit below, without remedying the
more basic constitutional defect asserted in this cross-
appeal, would produce senously adverse consequences
to both the Penn Central creditors and the. public in-
terest. This cross-appellant under such circumstances
would be required to commence still another action to
declare such an amended RRRA unconstitutional on
the grounds which are urged on this cross-appeal,
Yhereby resulting in still another round of appeals to
this Court from either the grant or denial of an in-
junction in a subsequent §2282 action attacking the
RRRA. Broad public and pnivate considerations, as
well as objectives of judicial economy, thus favor the
adjudication of this cross-appeal at this time.
13
CONCLUSION
This Gourt has jurisdiction of this cross-appeal, and
substantial questions are presented requiring plenary
consideration. If the Court notes probable jurisdiction
of the related appeals by the governmental appellants
and the Penn Central: Trustees, it should similarly note
probable jurisdiction of this cross-appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
August 23, 1974
Of Counsel: JOSEPH AUERBACH
225 Franklin Street
MORRIS RAKER Boston, Massachusetts
CHARLES W. MORSE, JR. 02110
SULLIVAN & WORCESTER JAMES WM. MOORE
225 Franklin Street 54 Meadow Street
Boston, Massachusetts New Haven, Connecticut
02110 06506
Attorneys for Appellant
Richard Joyce Smith, Trustee
of the Property of The New
York, New Haven and Hartford
Railroad Company, Debtor
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