Amicus Curiae Brief — Wolff v. McDonnell

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

ARGUMENT . 4

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY . 4

I. MANY OF THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

DEEMED TO BE IMPRACTICAL BY THE

STATE OF NEBRASKA HAVE BEEN

INSTITUTED ATLORTON. ........ 5

Il. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL SHOULD EX-

TEND TO DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS. . ... 6

A. Nature of the Individual’s Interest . . . . .. 7

B. The Governmental Interest . ....... 9

Ill. INMATES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO

CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSERS ....... 12

IV. INMATES SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO

CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES ....... 13

-QONCLUSION ................ «455

APPENDIX (Letters of Consent)

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Davis v. Alaska,

42 U.S.LW. 4295 (U.S. Feb. 26,1974) . . ..... BB

Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S.778(1973) . ........2.2.... dU

Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S.254(1970) . . ... 2... ee es 4,8

Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S.471(1972) ............ 4,8

Pollard v. Washington,

CA No. 2055-71 (D.D.C.1971) . . . . . . 2,3,5,6,7,14

Pointer v. Texas,

MOOUB: OOD... 2. ww wee eh hh hh hh hl CUM

Woodard v. Washington,

CA No. 1659-71 (D.D.C.1971) . . . . .. . . 2,4,9,14

Wright v. Jackson,

CA No. 73-186-A (E.D. Va. 1973) . . .2,3,4,5,6,7, 8, 13,14

Constitution and Statutes:

U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment. . . .... . . 2,4

Miscellaneous:

es OR - | a a a,

Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of

the State of California, AmicusCuriae. . . . . . . 12,14

(iii)

Pager

Deposition of John O. Boone on January 20, 1972,

in Pollard v. Washington, supra . . . . . . 9,10,11,14,15

Deposition of Carl Coleman on July 30, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . ........ 7

Deposition of Thomas P. Gaydos on July 31, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . ..... 6, 10, 13

gp aor rehearsal 1973,

in Wright v. Jackson, supra. . . . -... 7,8

Deposition of Joseph L. Mastin on July 30, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . . . .... =. + #«=‘&T7;,12

Deposition of Clarence Larry Swain on July 31, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . . . . 2 6

Deposition of James Edward —o = 22,

1973 in Wright v. Jackson, supra... . .. . 67,9

District of Columbia Prison Disciplinary Procedures

and Code of Prison Offenses, initially approved

December 7, 1973, approved in final form on

December 27, 1973, and incorporated in final

order on January 11, 1974, in Wright v. Jackson,

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement

and Administration of Justice, Task Force

Report: Corrections(1967) . . . . ....... «dS

-—

OC eee OMe Ce, eee eee on

SNE SE OE LD aE MN Sal, Oey IIE Tae ONE IE Lye EY

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-679

CHARLES WOLFF, JR., et al,

Petitioners,

Vv.

ROBERT O. McDONNELL, et ai,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF OF INMATES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX AT LORTON, VIRGINIA

AMICI CURIAE

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are the representatives in class action litiga-

tion of the 2,000 inmates of the District of Columbia De-

partment of Corrections’ Correctional Complex at Lorton,

Virginia. These inmates have an intense interest in the

7

basic questions concerning prison administration and con-

trol raised by this case. In three actions, Nathaniel Wrighi,

III v. Delbert C. Jackson, Civil Action No. 73-186-A (E.D.

Va. 1973), Pollard v. Washington, Civil Action No. 2055-

71 (D.D.C. 1971), and Woodard v. Washington, Civil Ac-

tion No. 1659-71 (D.D.C. 1971), Lorton inmates have

sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the proce-

dures followed in the disciplinary proceedings at the Com-

plex. In their complaints, plaintiffs asserted that the due

process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution requires that they be accorded, inter

alia, the rights to confront their accusers, to cross-examine

witnesses, and to be represented by counsel.

On September 12, 1973, the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia (Judge Albert V. Bryan,

Jr., presiding) preliminarily granted substantially all relief

requested by the Wright plaintiffs, and on December 7,

1973, it initially approved a new “Prison Disciplinary Pro-.

cedures and Code of Prison Offenses,” which it incorpor-

ated in the final order on January 11, 1974. These pro-

cedures required, inter alia, that an inmate called before

the Lorton disciplinary board for other than a “petty”

tule infraction be informed of and accorded the following

procedural rights:

2

(1) written notice of the charges and the time and

place of the hearing,

(2) the right to be personally present before the

disciplinary board,

(3) the right to remain silent,

‘

3

(4) the right to counsel or a lay substitute,'

(5) the right to present written evidence,

(6) the right to call witnesses,

(7) the right to know the names of and confront his

accusers, including correctional officials and inmate

informants, unless the prison officials cari show

that the disclosure of an inmate informant’s name

would pose a threat to his safety,

(8) the right to cross-examine all witnesses appearing

before the board,

(9) the right to be judged by an impartial panel of

persons not engaged in any previous investigation

of the charges against the accused,

(10) the right to examine the written record or taped

recording of the proceedings,

(11) the right to a written appeal, and

(12) the right to receive a copy of the prison discip-

linary procedures and rules, with a clear delinea-

tion of the possible punishments for violations

thereof.

Judge Bryan’s decision has been appealed to the Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and in light of both

this Court’s decision to hear the present case and the ap-

peal of the Wright decision, the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia has stayed the Pollard

1 The court did not reach the question of appointed counsel,

because there has been, at least until the present date, an adequate

number of private attorneys who are willing to be retained by

prisoners without fee, and because of the availability of law students

for the representation of prisoners upon request.

ae ji

4

and Woodard actions. Hence, amici curiae have a substan.

tial interest in the basic due process questions before this

Court. They file this brief with the written consent of

the parties, pursuant to Rule 42(1) of the Rules of this

Court. Copies of the letters of consent are being filed

with the Clerk and are appended to this brief.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In the Wright case the District Court held that the Fifth

Amendment requires prison authorities to conform prison

disciplinary proceedings to some of the elemental standard

of due process of law. The Court ruled in substance that

the inmate’s interest in the accuracy of the fact-finding

process in disciplinary proceedings — an interest that the

prison authorities share — could be protected by the erec

tion of procedural safeguards without infringing improperly

on the governmental interest in maintaining the security

and order of the prison. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970). Among the procedural incidents of the disciplinary

process required by Judge Bryan are the rights to counsel,

to confrontation of accusers, and to cross-examination of

witnesses. Since these three rights lie at the center of the

issues in the present case; the amici curiae in the instant

brief will describe the disciplinary procedures at Lorton

and will then demonstrate, through some of the evidence

considered by Judge Bryan, that granting these procedural

rights would serve the interests of both the government

and the inmate. --

5

I. MANY OF THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS DEEMED

TO BE IMPRACTICAL BY THE STATE OF NE-

BRASKA HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED AT LORTON

Deposition testimony taken in both the Wright and

Pollard actions shows that many of the procedural rights

guaranteed by this Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra,

and by the Eighth Circuit in this case were, in practice,

afforded to Lorton inmates even before Judge Bryan's

judgment in Wright.

The disciplinary process at Lorton was commenced by

a correctional officer writing a disciplinary report concern-

ing his observation of an infraction by an inmate. This

disciplinary report was transmitted to the shift supervisor

who interviewed the inmate as to the substance of the

report after reading the report, including the names of

accusers, to the inmate. After conducting an investigation,

the shift supervisor could transmit the report to a disci

plinary board made up of three employees of the Depart-

ment of Corrections. At the disciplinary hearing before

this board,’ the inmate could make a statement on his

own behalf with the assistance of either counsel or a lay

substitute. If the charges were sustained, and the discipli-

nary board recommended that good time be forfeited or

that the inmate be transferred to maximum security, then

the recommendation would be transmitted to the Super

intendent of the Complex who, in turn, must recommend

punishment to the Director of Operations. Ordinarily, al-

though not invariably, the disciplinary board was composed

of persons who had taken no part in prior investigation

of the charges against the inmate; the inmate would be

advised that anything he tells the investigating officer may

be used against him; the board would telephone witnesses

6

outside the inmate’s presence; and brief summary minutes

of the proceedings would be taken.”

However, Lorton rules and regulations did not provide

inmates with the following procedural incidents in disci-

plinary hearings, as a matter of right:

(1) the right to receive a copy of an investigatory re

port prepared by a correctional official prior to

the disciplinary hearing;

(2) the right to receive written notice of the charges;

(3) the right to call witnesses in his behalf; and

(4) the right to cross-examine witnesses.?

Lorton officials were unable to explain why these rights |

could not be afforded inmates,‘ and Judge Bryan apparent |

ly believed that these minimal due process guarantees :

could be instituted without impairing any valid state inter

ests.

Il. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

SHOULD EXTEND TO DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

As just stated, one of the rights that was recognized at

Lorton even without any judicial command was the right

2 Deposition of James Edward Swoboda, then Associate Admin-

istrator of Operations, on August 22, 1973, in Wright v. Jackson,

Civil Action No. 73-186-A (E.D. Va. 1973) [hereinafter, Swoboda

deposition] at 19-29, 56-57; deposition of Clarence Larry Swain,

then Acting Superintendent of Adult Services, on July 31, 1973, in

Pollard v. Washington, Civil Action No. 2055-71 (D.D.C. 1972)

[hereinafter, Swain deposition] at 18-24; deposition of Thomas P.

Gaydos, then Acting Shift Captain, on July 31, 1973, in Pollard v.

Washington, supra, [hereinafter, Gaydos deposition] at 26, 32-33.

3 Swoboda deposition at 27, 38; Swain deposition at 19-20, 23.

4 Swain deposition at 30-33.

—

7

to be represented at a disciplinary hearing by counsel or

lay substitute. Experience at Lorton demonstrates that

the presence of counsel or a lay substitute serves the. in-

terests of both the state and the inmate in the adminis-

tration of the correctional process. Balancing government-

al and inmate interests, due process dictates that the in-

mate’s overwhelming interest in an accurate fact-finding

process far outweighs any tenuous interest of prison ad-

ministrators in punishing inmates summarily, and this is

the only interest that is claimed to be advanced by deny-

ing counsel to inmates.

A. Nature of the Individual’s Interest

Prisoners at Lorton have been deprived of statutory

“good time” credit, segregated in maximum security facili-

ties, denied privileges accorded other residents of the in-

mate population, and denied parole* as a result of disci-

plinary hearings conducted by correctional officials.®

5 Deposition of Lt. Joseph L. Mastin, shift supervisor, on July

30, 1973, in Pollard v. Washington, supra, [hereinafter, Mastin de-

position] at 10; Swoboda deposition at 58-62; deposition of Leon

L. Keenan, administrator of maximum security, on August 22,

1973, in Wright v. Jackson, supra, (hereinafter, Keenan deposition]

at 7-15; deposition of Carl Coleman, Chairman of District of Colum-

bia Parole Board, on July 30, 1973, in Pollard v. Washington, supra,

at 21-24.

6 For example, Kenneth O. Pollard, named plaintiff in the Pol-

lard action, alleges that as a result of prison disciplinary hearings,

he was (1) segregated from the general inmate population for a

period of seven months and placed in punitive segregation and soli-

tary confinement, during a large portion of which time he was re-

fused vitally needed medical attention; (2) denied the opportunity

during that entire period to engage in productive work or to parti-

cipate in rehabilitative, recreational, or vocational programs; (3)

(continued)

8

Deposition testimony in Wright shows that Lorton inmate

may be confined to a “control cell,” called the “hole,”

for indefinite periods of time. While so confined, the in.

mate may not leave the “hole” or see other inmates, and

he cannot work, attend educational classes, or receive reaj-

ing materials or visitors. Some inmates have been con-

fined to the Complex’s Maximum Security Facility for up

to five months while being denied the right to work or

attend classes.’

Clearly, such punishment for disciplinary violations in-

flicts “grievous loss,” Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S.

254 (1970); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972,

and gives the inmate a “substantial interest” in the accur-

acy of the fact-finding process by which such a loss is

inflicted. Infliction of such a loss calls for some orderly

process. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 482.

6 (continued) deprived of 100 days of previously eamed statu-

tory good time; (4) deprived of 365 days of meritorious good time

for which he had been recommended by a prison guard; (5) sub-

jected to an investigation resulting from information supplied by

Lorton officials to the United States Attomey for the Eastern Dis-

trict of Virginia upon which an indictment was returned but which

in turn was found so insufficient as to compel dismissal of the

indictment; and (6) subjected to a determination that he had com-

mitted felonious assault on a prison guard, which may jeopardize

his opportunity for parole.

7 Keenan deposition at 7-8, 9, 11, 16.

Bi trike Poet

9

B. The Governmental Interest

The State of Nebraska implies that the presence of coun-

sel would transform informal hearings into formal adver-

sary proceedings which would (1) slow the response of

prison officials in quelling potentially riotous situations,

(2) erode the respect of inmates for the authority of pri-

son officials, (3) increase tensions in the prison, and (4)

disrupt the rehabilitatory function of disciplinary hearings.

These contentions have no merit, as demonstrated by the

deposition testimony of Lorton officials.

Since mid-1973, Lorton inmates charged with rule in-

fractions have had the unqualified right to have counsel

or a lay substitute present at disciplinary hearings*® and

at no time have correctional officials complained that the

presence of counsel has interfered with prison security.

This full-scale legal assistance program resulted princip-

ally from the efforts of Mr. John O. Boone, former Super-

intendent of the Lorton Complex, who in early 1972 is-

sued a proposed order on disciplinary procedures which

provided in part:

“The resident may be represented by counsel,

a staff member, another resident, or a law

student. The resident shall be represented by

counsel if the alleged violation constitutes a

crime for which he could be prosecuted, un-

less he intelligently waived this right.”?

8 Swoboda deposition at 21.

9 Part VII(B), Plaintiff's Exhibit #6 in deposition of John O.

Boone, Superintendent of the Lorton Complex, on January 20,

1972, in Woodard v. Washington, supra, [hereinafter Boone deposi-

tion] at 35.

10

Although this order was never formally adopted, it led to

negotiations between LAWCOR — an American University

Law School sponsored student group — and the Lorton

Superintendent of Operations, which resulted in a Proposal

to allow LAWCOR representation of “all residents charged

with rule violations which are considered serious by the

Institutional Staff.”"© When asked whether he believed

that implementation of the LAWCOR proposal would “be

contrary to your interests in maintaining the health, secu

rity, and order of the prison,” Superintendent Boone

stated:

ka

-

;

%

:

z.

2

$

“A. Let me say that this is a draft which |

will eventually have to look at or the

superintendent to see if this is what we

are going to use as procedures so it

could come out differently. But I say

generally improved procedures is directly

related to the safety and security of

the community.

“Q. And just to make sure I am clear then |

the improvement of procedures will :

help the security, health and safety and

order of the community as you see it.

“A. As I see it, yes.””!!

LAWCOR has represented inmates in more than 300 dis

ciplinary hearings and the program is in full operation to

day.!2

10 Praintiff's Exhibit #3, Item 1, Boone deposition at 14.

11 Boone deposition at 21.

12 1+. Gaydos extensively described the prison disciplinary

procedure at Lorton and described the LAWCOR program. Gaydos

deposition at 17-18.

—

The foregoing testimony indicates that the right to

counsel presents no threat to prison security while both

the inmate and the State “have interests in the accurate

| finding of fact and the informed use of discretion — [the

inmate] to insure that his liberty is not [further impinged]

and the State to make certain that it is [not] unnecessarily

) interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation . . . Re

|

11

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).8 Both

the legal representation program at Lorton and the testi-

mony of Mr. Boone indicate that the presence of counsel

at disciplinary hearings will “help the security, health and

safety and order of the [prison] community. . . Ria

13 indeed, the principal state interest in Gagnon which militated

against requiring counsel at every probation revocation hearing — a

more adversary hearing would be “less attuned to the rehabilitative

needs of the individual” — is not prevalent in punitive prison disci-

plinary hearings. “Decisions regarding the withholding or forfeiture

of good time credit generally differ from the parole decision in that

they turn solely on the offender’s behavior during his period of

imprisonment: Good behavior entitles him to early release regard-

less of anyone’s judgment as to his potential for living a law-abiding

life in the community. He should therefore have an opportunity to

challenge charges of misconduct. Where such charges may lead to

a substantial loss of good time and a resultant increase in the actual

length of imprisonment, the prisoner should be given reasonable

notice of the charges, full opportunity to present evidence and to

confront and cross-examine opposing wgtnesses, and the right to repre-

sentation by counsel.” President’s Commission on Law Enforcement

and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 86

(1967).

14 Boone deposition at 21.

12

lll. INMATES SHOULD BE ALLOWED

TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSERS

Although the rights of confrontation and cross-examina

tion are closely related, the right of confrontation in the

prison disciplinary context applies most forcefully to the

prisoner’s right to know the name of his accuser, who is

most often the prison guard who prepared the disciplinary

report initiating the charge. The right of cross-examination

requires that the accused inmate or his retained counsel

be given an opportunity to question and probe both his

accusers and any other witnesses at the disciplinary hear-

ing.

The State of California in its amicus brief contends that

the right to confront one’s accusers would have a volatile

effect on “internal prison control and stability” since a

charged inmate might retaliate against his accuser.'5

However, Lt. Joseph L. Mastin, shift supervisor at Lor

ton and chairman at approximately 50 percent of the disci-

plinary board proceedings, deemphasized this problem by

testifying that in interviewing an inmate against whom a

disciplinary report has been filed, he “sometimes” read to

the inmate the name of the accusing officer. Moreover,

“Ninety percent of the time the inmate knows

_ who the guy was that wrote him up anyway.”

Another shift supervisor, Lt. Thomas P. Gaydos, supported

Lt. Mastin’s observations. In response to the question,

“How frequently is the [disciplinary] process initiated by

a fellow inmate, as opposed to a correctional officer?”,

15 Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of the State of

California, Amicus Curiae, at 10-11.

16 Mastin deposition at 5.

:

*

Je et pe OP tas be a ek PR Ae OA boas

PT te ae ie

13

Lt. Gaydos stated: “In comparison, it would be very in-

frequent.”"7_ In response to a later question as to whether

an inmate was apprised at the disciplinary hearing of the

name of the reporting officer, Lt. Gaydos stated that

“generally he knows who it is, but if he asks, he’s told.””'8

Finally, Lt. Gaydos agreed with the proposition that

“generally” most of the witnesses who are listed on a dis-

ciplinary report are other employees of the Department

of Corrections.!9

The foregoing deposition testimony clearly demonstrates

that granting inmates the right to confront their accusers

will not jeopardize internal prison security since (1) cor-

rectional officers, not‘ inmates, most frequently initiate

the disciplinary process, (2) the accused usually knows

the name of his accuser, and (3) as provided in Judge

Bryan’s final order in Wright, if prison authorities believe

that an inmate accuser’s safety would be threatened if he

were identified, they may deny the accused any opportunity

to confront the informant.

IV. INMATES SHOULD BE

PERMITTED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES

Since “[c] ross-examination is the principal means by

which the believability of a witness and the truth of his

testimony are tested,” Davis v. Alaska, 42 U.S.L.W. 4295,

4298 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1974); see Pointer v. Texas, 380 |

U.S. 400, 405 (1965), an inmate who cannot cross-ex-

amine witnesses remains deprived of the most essential of

17 Gaydos deposition at 7, 13-14.

18 Gaydos deposition at 32.

19 Gaydos deposition at 58-59.

14

procedural safeguards accorded the criminally accused.

The State of California claims that cross-examination by

inmates at disciplinary hearings could erode their respect

for the authority of the prison officials who are cross-

examined.” However, deposition testimony by Lorton

officials in the Pollard, Woodward, and Wright cases demon |

strates that granting to inmates the opportunity to cross-

examine will not jeopardize state interests.

For example, Superintendent Boone testified that he

considered valuable the right of an inmate to call witness

es as long as “it does not involve coercion,”*! and in

support of his proposal that “residents shall be permitted

to cross-examine the officer who filed the disciplinary

report and other witnesses,” he testified as follows:

“The officers will have some fears and all of

that. I think it highly desirable, however,

because in fact, I think it would be very,

very important in the correctional process

that the inmate be able to face the person

that charges him with the offenses.””?

il

ee

In other words, Superintendent Boone recognized that of- —

fenders have certain procedural rights not inconsistent

with the goal of rehabilitation since a person who receives

what he considers to be unfair treatment is likely to be-

come a difficult subject of rehabilitation. The only prob

lems Superintendent Boone was able to envision from ac-

cording this right were the “administrative problems” of

20 Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of the State of

California, Amicus Curiae, at 10.

21 Boone deposition at 22.

22 Boone deposition at 37-38.

et ee PE ERS NR re ee ene

15

overtime pay for officers called from another shift.2

These “administrative problems” cannot justify the denial

of a fundamental procedural right.

CONCLUSION

Insofar as the issues in this case relate to the constitu-

tional requirements of counsel, confrontation, and cross-

examination in prison disciplinary proceedings, the judg-

ment below is amply supported by the experience at the

Lorton Complex and should be affirmed.

ee ies

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. ALLEN

MICHAEL A. SCHLANGER

DAVID S. WEISSBRODT

Covington & Burling

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

GEOFFREY J. VITT

Cohen and Rosenblum, Ltd.

320 King Street

Alexandria, Virginia 22313

Attomeys for Amici Curiae

April 5, 1974

23 Boone deposition at 38.

Mr. David S. Weissbrodt

Attorney at Law

Covington & Burling

888 16th Street, N. W. g

Washington, D.C. 20006

la

; APPENDIX

P eanenn

4 Bepartment of Justice ee ee

= 471-2211 So

a LUNCOLN MAROLS woenee

: ——

j March 25, 1974 econo

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3

webh

Re: Wolff, et al. v. McDonnell, et al.

‘736679

inate Mi LIBS!

Dear Mr. Weissbrodt:

Consent of petitioners is hereby given to you on behalf of

the prisoners you represent in Pollard v. Washington, Civil Action No.

2055-71 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

to file an amicus curiae brief herein.

Ba AAP NG kM ed 3 oh a hE

Very truly yours,

CLARENCE A. H. MEYER

Attorney General

f SHttol KE neh

Mel Kammerlohr

Assistant Attorney General

MK:jc

2a

e LAW OFFICES OF

CLINE. WILLIAMS. WRIGHT. JOHNSON 8 OLDFATHER

= LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68508

March 22, 1974

» 8. 20006

Re: Wolff, et al v. McDonnell, et al

73-679

Dear Mr. Weissbrodt:

Your request to file an amicus curiae brief in sxoport

a petition in the above proceeding has

been received

As counsel for respondent, I hereby consent to your

filing an amicus curiae bricf on behalf of prisoners ch

you have been representing in Pollard v. Washinecton, Civil

Action No. 2055-71 in the united States District Court for

the District of Columbia in the United States Supreme Court.

Very truly yours,

wae caus

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