Brief for Respondent — FPC v. Texaco Inc.

Supreme Court brief1974

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Text

ii Citations

Cases Page

Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931) .............. 12

Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936) .................... 13

Austral v. Federal Power Commission, 428 F. 2d 407

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Associated Gas

Distributors v. Austral, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), (South-

ern Louisiana Area Rate Cases) ......0000000000000..0000... 18-19

Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) 2.000000. 13

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.

eS PRS ARCO E CI REISS |, SOR AN ieee 9

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S.

ARTY pe GE RE Sate Pat NOT Goa) 2 CE GS a RD Tar 9

Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commis-

sion of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932) .............. 8, 24-25

Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,

SO ee Ce aa hh oats en 26

& L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164

po eS RGR REE RUS Sah ck Se ona seme 13

Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline

Si er is Ne CID 5 oscs ic centchcsecolucrcclarsic-ce ies 10

Farms Corporation v. Baldwin, 293 U.S.

BU TN aca ick eaeiclecs tic doiiecsdscoinnnst 13

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ................ 5, 10, 11, 24

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) ..........00.0000.... 12, 13

New England Division Case, 261 U.S. 184 (1923) ............ 13

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ...........0.0.0..- 10

N.L.R.B. v. Jonss and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US.

yf Gea alarecatnts toed CC FA RRC Ferro ent dn 10

Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747

5 | ARLES Sane Ri ting: SOE AEST a Aas 11, 12, 14, 17,22

Citations — (Continued)

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672

RR SERRE AGS ene D1 4

Tagg Bros. and Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.

SE I ids sceasatlincaotensustankacton et rathcigie vesencsVbsoss-orccien 13

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942) 00000. 10

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, 348 U.S.

I ND shia oil bik oer eng hase tad no Pap casncvnod vib ova vive 16, 24

Law Review Articles, Comments, and Notes:

Thompson, “The Texas Market Demand Statute on

Oil and Gas and Its Application,” 39 Texas L.

ort cicarpscarnconsanadeuikeedadaiia 25

Note, “Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-

State Conflict,” 64 Colum. L. Rev. 888 (1964) ............ 26

Setaadiel Dindies end Menge

“Clean Energy Message from The President of the

United States” H.R. Doc. 92-118, 92nd Cong.,

ist Seus., pp. 1 and 4 (June 4, 1971) ............................ 21

Unpublished Scholarly Works:

Hodges, “Natural Gas: Price Regulation v. Supply,”

Unpublished Richard J. Gonzales Lecture, College

Business Administtation, University of Texas (April —

IER ETE SD a Mon, ee a0 El a 23

Magazine and Newspaper Articles:

SO TOISAS SNE 16

iv Citations — (Continued)

Statutes

Federal: ~~

Natural Gas Act of 1938, as amended, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 717, 717a, 717b, 717c, 717d, et seq., 7174r(b),

PN iad, persis ch Dasani ane sadendtioscbelten 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 2

Ss sic nascscnnecdocecscosis 2

Transportation Act of 1920, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 6,

Moosic icsnehenceoveneacceneoces 13

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. 902 ...... 13-14

Regulations

Federal Power Commission:

I rk daw sacs 2, 3, 5,6

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, (Exemption of Small

Producers From Regulation), Docket No. R-393,

gies SE Ae a ri te 4,5

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

eR

No. 72-1490

EI

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

v.

TEXaAcoO, INC., et al,

Respondents.

oe

No. 72-1491

I

DupDLeY T. DouGHERTY, et al., Co-Executors of the

ee ee ee Ae

Petitioners,

v.

TEXAcO, INCc., et al,

Respondents.

a

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

rT —

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

JAMES M. FORGOTSON, SR.

a

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (FPC Pet., pp. 3a-22a)*

is reported at 474 F. 2d 416 (D. C. Cir. 1972). The initial

1 Reference “FPC Pet.” is to the FPC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in

No. 72-1490. Reference “App.” refers to the separately bound joint

Appendix in this Court.

———

2

order (No. 428) of the Federal Power Commission (App. 135-

154), its Order (No. 428-A) of Amendment (App. 159-161),

and its Order (No. 428-B) denying rehearing (App. 238-253)

are reported at 45 FPC 454, 45 FPC 548, and 46 FPC 47,

respectively.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered De-

cember 12, 1972 (FPC Pet., pp. 23a-25a). The Federal Power

Commission’s (hereafter called FPC) Petition for Rehearing

was denied on February 5, 1973 (FPC Pet., pp. 26a-28a). The

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed on May 3, 1973

and was granted on October 9, 1973 (App. 254).? The juris-

diction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and § 1%)

of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED |

Does the FPC have authority to exempt certain independent _

producers* of natural gas from certain filing requirements and

direct rate regulation with respect to interstate wholesale sales‘

of natural gas under provisions of the Natural Gas Act of

1938, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (hereafter called

the Natural Gas Act) by, among other things, shifting the

burden of establishing the justness and reasonableness of rates

2 The Court concurrently granted the Petition in No. 72-1491 — which

sought review of the same Judgment of the Court of Appeals — and

ordered the cases consolidated for oral argument (App. 254).

3 Independent producers are natural gas producers not affiliated with an

interstate natural gas transmission pipeline company.

4 Wholesale sales of natural gas for interstate transmission, consump

tion or use.

3

for said sales from said producers to the purchasers* despite the

clear statutory language to the contrary? If there is statutory

authority for the above-described scheme of regulation, does

any and all FPC regulation® of any independent producers of

natural gas with respect to their interstate wholesale sales of

natural gas constitute such invidious discrimination that it vio-

lates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States and negate state conservation laws with respect to

natural gas so that it violates the Tenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States, making the above mentioned

orders or any orders of the FPC affecting independent pro-

ducers of natural gas void?

STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

Sections 4, 5, 7 and 16 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 717c, 717d, 717 and 717o are set forth in FPC Pet., pp.

85a-93a. U. S. Const. Amend. V and Amend. X are set forth

in Addendum A to this brief, infra, p. A-1.

STATEMENT

This case involves judicial review of Orders 428 (App.

135-154) and 428B (App. 238-253) of the FPC, issued

March 18, 1971 (App. 135-154). In summary, said Orders

exempt completely from direct rate regulation by the FPC

under the Natural Gas Act all existing and future interstate

wholesale sales of natural gas by independent producers with

5 Purchasers are interstate natural gas transmission pipeline companies or

other producers who buy natural gas for subsequent resale to the above

mentioned pipeline companies.

* Application of the Natural Gas Act and concomitant FPC regulation,

including rate regulation.

4

less than ten (10) billion cubic feet of interstate wholesale sales

per year.

A. Background

In 1954, this Court in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Wis-

consin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) held that interstate wholesale

sales of natural gas by independent producers of natural gas

were subject to the Natural Gas Act, the Rules and Regula

tions of the FPC promulgated thereunder, and the regulatory

jurisdiction of the FPC. Among other things, that decision

subjected the above-mentioned independent producers with

respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas to rate

regulation and various other limitations on their freedom to

contract, such as restriction of their right to terminate selling

gas under a gas sales contract after said contract had expired

by its own terms.

A relatively complex regulatory program evolved over the

next 16 years to regulate independent producers with respect

to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas. Meanwhile, for

whatever cause, a natural gas shortage developed in the United

States. As part of an overall effort to cope with this shortage

and to attract more natural gas to the interstate market, ic.

sale for transmission into or consumption or use in states

other than the state in which said gas is produced, the FPC

entered into the R-393 Rulemaking Procedure (App. 1-13)

which led to the promulgation of Orders 428 and 428B de-

scribed above.

B. Proceedings Before The Commission

The Orders in question arose from the FPC’s Rulemaking

5

Proceeding, Docket No. R-393, to exempt certain independent

producers from regulation, notice of which was filed on July

23, 1970 (App. 1-13).

James M. Forgotson, Sr. (hereafter called Forgotson) is an

independent producer with production and interstate whole-

sale sales of natural gas in Louisiana and Texas. Within the

deadline set by the FPC for filing written comments on the

‘proposed Rule, Forgotson objected to the proposed rule on the

ground that the FPC lacked jurisdiction to issue all regulatory

orders under the Natural Gas Act affecting any independent

producer of natural gas, because such jurisdiction subjects such

independent producers to inappropriate federally administered

public utility treatment and discriminates against such produc-

ers in a manner which is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States (App. 57-72), See Morey

v. Doud, 354 US. 457 (1957).

Forgotson then, through his attorney, attended the confer-

ence regarding the merits of the proposed rule held by the

FPC on December 8, 1970 (App. 97-134).

The FPC issued Order No. 428 on March 18, 1971 (App.

135-154). On March 31, 1971, Forgotson filed an Application

‘For Rehearing (App. 155-158), protesting against the juris-

diction of the FPC to issue this or any other order affecting

Forgotson sought judicial review, pursuant to Section 19(b)

of the Natural Gas Act of Order No. 428 and Order No.

428B, which denied Applications For Rehearing on Order

428 (App. 238-253).

6

C. The Decision Below

Upon judicial review of the validity of Orders 428 and

428B the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit, with one judge dissenting, set aside the

above-mentioned FPC Orders after concluding that the FPC

in issuing such Orders had exceeded its authority under the

Natural Gas Act (FPC Pet., pp. 3a-22a).

That court’s decision turned upon an analysis of specific

provisions of the Natural Gas Act, namely, Sections 4, 5, 7

and 16 (FPC Pet., pp. 85a-93a). The court concluded, in

effect, that the regulation of rates for interstate wholesale

sales of natural gas was mandatory, and not discretionary or

permissive, regardless of the volume of said sales by an inde-

pendent producer in a given time period. In that connection,

the FPC’s Section 16 classification powers would not permit

the exemption of the interstate wholesale sales of natural gas

by certain independent producers from direct rate regulation

under Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act (FPC Pet., pp. 7a-10a).

That being the case, the court held that the FPC’s Order

Nos. 428 and 428B represented a clear-cut abdication of the

FPC’s statutory duty to assure that all regulated rates for inter-

state wholesale sales of natural gas, including those of the inde-

pendent producers whose sales were exempted from direct

rate regulation under Orders 428 and 428B, be “just and

reasonable” (FPC Pet., pp. 10a-16a). This departure from

statutory duty and standards through the so-called “indirect”

mode of regulation at the pipeline or purchaser level was held

to be contrary to the provisions of the Natural Gas Act.

“Nothing at all insures that those levels (of rates allowed

to be passed on to consumers) will be ‘just’ or ‘reasonable.’

7

That is the essential flaw in the Commission’s plan. That

is the point at which the FPC abdicates its regulatory re-

sponsibility in derogation of the purposes and mandatory

terms of the statute. Indirect ‘regulation’ by such novel

‘standards’ is worse than an exemption simpliciter. Such

an approach retains the false illusion that a government

agency is keeping watch over rates, pursuant to the stat-

ute’s mandate, when it is in fact doing no such thing.”

(FPC Pet., pp. 12a-13a).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As will be shown hereafter, the judgment below should be

affirmed because: (1) the decision below is clearly correct as

a matter of statutory interpretation and (2) the decision below

is clearly correct as a matter of constitutional law even if

the court below erred in statutory interpretation in reaching

its decision. The arguments of the other Respondents dealing

with the correctness of the decision below as a matter of

statutory interpretation presented in their briefs are correct

and substantially complete and will not be repeated here. The

only argument to be presented here is the constitutional ar-

gument.

The primary thrust of the constitutional argument is that

any and all FPC regulation of independent producers of nat-

ural gas with respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural

gas, is unconstitutional because:

A. Said application and concomitant regulation, as time

and experience have shown, constitutes invidious, capricious

discrimination against these producers in violation of the

guarantees of equal protection of the law, embodied in the

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-

tution of the United States.

B. The above-mentioned FPC regulation has had an ad-

verse effect on the natural gas conservation policies of the

states, depriving the states of what this Court in Champlin

Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,

286 U.S. 210 (1932) said is an inherent part of the police

power — the prevention of above and below ground waste

of oil and gas — and thereby violates the Tenth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States.

In addition, judicial removal of any and all FPC regula-

tion of independent producers of natural gas with respect to

interstate wholesale sales of natural gas should have no effect

on any actions, sales, regulations or operations of such inde-

pendent producers until after the effective date of said removal.

ARGUMENT

I

THE FPC DOES NOT HAVE ANY JURISDICTION

OVER ANY INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS OF NAT-

URAL GAS WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE

WHOLESALE SALES OF NATURAL GAS BE-

CAUSE ANY AND ALL FPC REGULATION OF

INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS WITH RESPECT TO

INTERSTATE WHOLESALE SALES OF NATURAL

GAS VIOLATES PROVISIONS OF THE FIFTH

AND TENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITU-

TION OF THE UNITED STATES.

A. ANY AND ALL FPC REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRO

DUCERS OF NATURAL GAS WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE WHOLE-

SALE SALES OF NATURAL GAS CONSTITUTES INVIDIOUS DISCRIMF

NATION AGAINST THESE PRODUCERS IN VIOLATION OF THE GUAR-

ANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, EMBODIED IN

9

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED SIATEs.

In light of current and evolving technology and economic

developments in the energy industry, any and all FPC regula-

tion of any interstate wholesale sales cf natural gas by inde-

pendent producers constitutes unconstituticnal, invidious dis-

crimination. This discrimination is against the independent

producer in favor of the gas utility, each being a supplier cf

natural gas. Said discrimination is also against these same

independent producers in favor of producers cf energy-yield-

ing commodities other than natural gas, i.e., crude oil, liquid

petroleum condensates and gas, coal, and nuclear fuels. Be-

cause such discrimination is-invidious, FPC regulation of in-

dependent natural gas producers is a violation cf constitu-

tional guarantees of equal protection of the law, and thereby °

violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution ®f the United

States.

The equal protection of the law guarantees contained in

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States are provided against discriminatory acts of the Fed-

eral Government through inclusion of equal protection guar-

antees within the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483

(1954) and 349 U.S. 294 at 298 (1955), which by implication

applied equal protection clause provisions to end racially seg-

regated schools in the District of Columbia, which are gov-

emed by Federal, not state law. This Court in those cases

stated that all provisions of Federal, state or local law re-

quiring or permitting racial disc-imination in public schools

must yield. 349 U.S. 294 at 298 (1955).

10

The most recent decision of this Court applying constitu-

tional equal protection of the law guarantees (of the Four-

teenth Amendment) to invalidate economic regulation was

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Forgotson’s contention

is that any and all FPC regulation of independent producers

with respect to their interstate wholesale sales of natural gas

violates the equal protection of the law guarantees against

discriminatory economic regulation announced in Morey y.

Boud, supra.

This is in spite of (1) the now substantially undisputed power

of Congress to pass nondiscriminatory economic regulatory

legislation under the .commerce clause of the Constitution,

N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);

and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); and (2) the

decisions that such regulation either by the states or the Fed-

eral Government does not constitute a deprivation of property

without due process of law. Federal Power Commission v.

Natural Gas Pipeline Company, 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Nebbia

v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), a ruling was

affirmed, enjoining enforcement of the Illinois Community

Currency Exchange Act of 1943, because the act violated

the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The act in question provided a comprehensive system for

licensing and regulation of community for-fee check cashing

services and issuers of money orders and made operation of

an unlicensed establishment a crime. In order to obtain 4

license, establishments were required to pay both licensing

and investigative fees, furnish information to the Illinois State

11

Auditor’s Office, maintain specified amounts of cash on hand

and possess surety bonds in specified amounts. In addition, each

exchange had to be financed and conducted as a separate busi-

ness entity. Finally, a license could not be issued unless the

State Auditor determined that its issuance would promote a

convenience and advantage to the community. The American

Express Company and its money orders were explicitly exemp-

ted from the provisions of the act.

The majority of this Court made the following points clear

with respect to application of equal protection guarantees

to economic regulatory legislation:

(a) The clause permits the exercise of a wide scope of

discretion in classification and prohibits only those clas-

sifications that are purely arbitrary.

(b) The complainant must carry the burden of show-

ing that the law in question does not rest upon any

reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.

(c) Regulatory legislation to be valid cannot single

out any company or group of companies and create a

closed class with accompanying economic advantages to

the closed class. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.457 (1957).

Morey v Doud, supra, has never been overruled by this

Court.

The wrong in the legislation invalidated in Morey v. Doud,

supra, was that the American Express Company was given

legal preference, particularly in the business of selling money

orders.

The FPC stands on the authority of Permian Basin Area Rate

12

Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), for upholding the constitutionality

of FPC regulation of independent producers with respect to

interstate wholesale sales of natural gas.

This Court in Permian, supra, never considered the equal

protection question raised herein. In addition, former deci-

sions of this Court sustaining the constitutionality of statutory

laws do not preclude bringing subsequent suits to test their

validity in light of later actual experience because statutory

laws, valid when made, may become arbitrary in operation

by reasons of later events. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 US.

765 (1931).

This Court in Permian, supra, relied primarily on the cases, .

discussed immediately below, to determine the legality of the

above-mentioned FPC regulation.

The first of those cases is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113

(1876). That case arose upon an information action, filed

in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, against public

warehousemen for operating without a license. Mr. Chief Justice

Waite dealt with the issues in the following way:

“ ‘There is no doubt that the general principle is favored,

both in law and justice, that every man may fix what price

he pleases upon his own properties or the use of it; but if

for a particular purpose the public have a right to resort

to his premises and make use of them, and he have a

monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the

benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, for

his monopoly perform the duty attached to it on reason-

able terms.

“«* * * Twyhenever the accident of time casts upon @

party the benefit of a legal monopoly of landing goods

* * * he is confined to take the reasonable compensation

J

13

only * * *’” Munn v. [llinois, 94 U.S. 113 at 127 (em-

phasis added)

Two other key decisions relied upon also turn on the neces-

sity for rate regulation when applied to monopolistic situ-

ations. Tagg Bros. and Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.

420 (1924) involved monopolistic practices and price fixing

by brokers at the Omaha, Nebraska stockyards.

The New England Division Case (Akron, C & Y Ry. Co. v.

United States), 261 U.S. 184 (1923), involved a means of

distributing already regulated revenues from railroads, each

of which at that time had a monopoly or a controlled oligopoly

of a service covering a given territory or region. The Inter-

state Commerce Commission under the Transportation Act

of 1920, 15 U.S.C. § 418 was simply allowed to try to assure

an equitable division of profits in a clearly regulated, monopo-

listic or oligopolistic industry. See also Covington and L. Turn-

pike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896) (a turnpike-

transportation monopoly subject to rate regulation); Acker v.

United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936) (Chicago Stockyards —

substantially similar to Tagg Bros., supra.)

Another decision used to support rate regulation of the type

carried out by the FPC is Hegeman Farms Corporation v.

Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934). That decision really involved

minimum prices or floors on a perishable and unique product,

milk, and gave no consideration to the possible discriminatory

effect of maximum prices.

The last major precedent relied on is Bowles v. Willing-

ham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944). In that decision, the rent con-

trol provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942

14

(passed during the emergency of World War II), 50 U.S.C.A,

Appendix 902, were challenged. This Court’s decision rested

on a point unrelated to the constitutional issues raised herein,

namely that a nation which can demand the lives of its men

and women during the waging of a great war is under no con-

stitutional mandate to provide a system of price controls on

the domestic front which will assure to each landlord a fair

return on his property.

The discussion above clearly shows that this Court in Per-

mian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) did not

consider the discrimination issue raised by Forgotson herein,

but instead looked at the above mentioned FPC regulation,

as an abstract proposition and concluded that it was sup

portable because non discriminatory rate regulation is per-

missible to deal with war emergencies or monopolistic situations

or, where minimum rates are involved, to protect public health.

It is Forgotson’s contention that the above mentioned FPC

regulation is discriminatory and cannot be justified in January,

1974, by the precedents used by this Court in Permian, supra.

It is Forgotson’s contention that FPC regulation of inde

pendent producers of natural gas with respect to interstate

wholesale sales of natural gas creates two closed or economi-

cally favored classes of energy suppliers which classes are

given accompanying economic advantages, namely (1) gas

utilities which can buy a premium fuel at non-competitive

prices and (2) producers of all other energy-yielding commodi-

ties such as crude oil, coal and nuclear fuels who are, except

in emergencies, subject only to state conservation laws and the

market mechanism for determination of their prices. For ths

15 7S

season said application is arbitrary, capricious and cogstitutes

invidious discrimination unless it can be justified otherwise.

This Court in many previous cases has classified parties

to natural gas regulatory litigation, involving independent pro-

ducers with respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural

gas, as producers, consumers and the FPC.

It has classified independent producers as producers, has

equated gas utilities with consumers and has classified the

FPC as the FPC. A better classification would be: Suppliers,

which includes producers, interstate gas pipeline transmis-

sion companies and gas utilities; Regulators, which balance

the interests of consumers and suppliers in the interests of

social and economic justice (which includes the FPC and state

public utility or service commissions and which should in-

clude the conservation commissions of the states); and Con-

sumers, ¢€.g., housewives or industrial enterprises using nat-

ural gas as a fuel.

It is Forgotson’s contention in the case of gas utilities that

equating them and their interests with the consumer and the

consumer interest has resulted in placing a discriminatory bur-

den on another member of the Supplier group, the independent

producer, and given a preference to the gas utility, another

member of that same group on the erroneous grounds that

this is protecting the consumer interest.

The consumer interest is really different from the interest

of the gas utility and it is the gas utility, not the consumer,

that receives the direct benefits that accrue from overall FPC

regulation of said independent producers, e.g., on August 10,

16

1971, the FPC ruled that a natural gas pipeline: company must

pass any refunds from its suppliers (primarily independent

producers) on to its gas utility customers, even if there were

no assurance that such refunds would reach the ultimate con.

sumer. The Commission held that the money must be passed

on to the gas utility, “leaving it to the state and local authori-

ties to order further flow through.” See The Wall Street Jour.

nal, p. 6, Col. 3, dated Wednesday, August 11, 1971.

Any and all FPC regulation of independent producers of

natural gas with respect to interstate wholesale sales of nat-

ural gas results in the independent producers being regulated

in a manner quite similar to gas utilities when in fact such

regulation is inappropriate for said independent producers.

This has resulted in placing the gas utilities in the position of

an economically favored closed class.

What is being done to independent natural gas producers

by FPC regulation of their interstate wholesale sales of nat-

ural gas goes beyond mere lack of wisdom, providence and

harmony with a particular school of thought. Williamson v.

Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). It con-

Stitutes regulation which in light of current conditions is arbi-

trary, invidious and discriminatory. It has created a closed-

class of entrepreneurs within the Supplier group, the gas util

ities, which are subject to risks in no way comparable to

those of the independent natural gas producer. The gas

utilities earn a guaranteed rate of return for their security

holders and have a competitive advantage against other energy

suppliers, because of their being able to buy their raw mate

rial at a controlled maximum price, free from market forces.

17

To meet the test of equal protection, all members of the

group should be treated alike to the greatest extent possible.

The test does not require either comprehensiveness of regu-

lation or absolute mathematical equality of treatment. Neither

does it require dealing with all facets of the problem at the

same time, but allows legislative discretion to attack some

evils before attacking others. Nevertheless, equal protection

should not permit one member of a group to be regulated

in order to advance the economic interests of another group

or groups in the same class without cléur justification. In the

current situation interests of the gas utility members of the

Supplier group are advanced at the ultimate expense of the

independent natural gas producer.

It might be argued that the overall FPC regulation of the

interstate natural gas sales of independent producers which

results in their being treated like a gas utility is appropriate

and places no discriminatory burden on said independent pro-

ducers because both independent natural gas producers and

gas utilities are public utilities. This Court dealt with that con-

tention in 1968 when it stated:

“Producers of natural gas cannot usefully be classed

as public utilities. They enjoy no franchises or guaranteed

areas of service. They are intensely competitive vendors

of a wasting commodity they have acquired only by costly

and often unrewarded search.” Permian Basin Area Rate

Cases, 390 U.S. 747 at 756-757 (1968).

A major issue then is whether the result of FPC regulation

of independent producers of natural gas with respect to inter-

state wholesale sales of natural gas must always be public

18

‘di ‘tutional discriminati

Forgotson’s contention is that the answer to this question

is yes for the reasons set out below.

It might be argued that independent producers of natural

gas are not treated like public utilities by the FPC with respect

to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas because the FPC

need abide by no fixed formula and can pragmatically adapt

policies and procedures: to meet changing conditions. For-

gotson’s contention is that as a practical matter, there is and

can only be public utility treatment of said sales by sei

independent producers, because that is all that a regulatory

agency like the FPC can do. It can develop formulas ad

infinitum, but they all have been and perforce will be based

on allowing some “fair” rate of return on capital expendi

tures and operating costs with or without added artificial in

centives to stimulate hoped for exploration and development

of additional gas reserves.

The FPC’s actual performance substantiates this conclusion.

In the major independent producer gas rate cases, the central

controversies have involved what should be allowed as capt

tal costs, what are operating costs, what should be allowed

as a fair return on an investment (including such questions

as whether expenditures for dry holes or gas of less than pipe

line quality constitute capital costs or expenses), should im

centives for exploration be allowed, and if so, how much?

These are all classical public utility regulatory questions. See

e.g-, Austral v. Federal Power Commission, 428 F. 2d 407

19

(Sth Cir., 1970); cert. denied, sub nom. Associated Gas Dis-

tributors v. Austral, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).

Consequently the above mentioned FPC regulation consti-

tutes inappropriate public utility treatment of said independent

producers and unconstitutional discrimination by advancing

the economic interest of another member of the supplier group,

the gas utilities, unless some clear-cut justification for it exists.

In addition, there is another closed class created by the

above mentioned FPC regulation, the producers of other energy-

condensates and gas, and nuclear fuels, who are not treated

like public utilities and who are regulated primarily, except

in emergencies, only by the market mechanism and state con-

servation laws with respect to the interstate or intrastate whole-

sale sales of their products.

It should be emphasized that natural gas like crude oil and

coal, or for that matter nuclear fuels, is simply an energy-

yielding commodity which when consumed yields a given

: amount of energy per unit of mass or volume consumed.

Yet the independent natural gas producer with respect to

interstate wholesale sales of natural gas is, among other things,

subject to rate regulation and cannot terminate sales to pur-

chasers even after the expiration of said purchaser's sales

contract without permission of the FPC. In addition, said

tioned herein are not subjected. Consequently, there is fur-

ther invidi liscriminati inst said ind ; ,

ee

20

gas producers with respect to said sales unless there is some

clear-cut justification.

The question then is, is there any clear-cut justification for

creation of the two favored closed classes, the gas utilities

and the producers of other energy-yielding commodities, there-

by permitting FPC regulation of independent natural gas pro-

ducers with respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas

and the resulting discrimination? Do the following characteristics

of said independent producers, said sales or the product have

any special features which will justify the discrimination, men-

tioned above, resulting from the above mentioned FPC regv-

lation?

4

(1) Transmission or Transportation Characteristics

of the Product.

In this country because of advances in technology related

to transmission of fuels, coal slurries, as well as natural gas,

crude oil and liquefied petroleum condensates and gases can

be transported by pipelines in interstate commerce, either for

use or resale at their remote destination. Coal, crude oil,

liquid petroleum condensates and gases, and heavier so-called

bottle gases (e.g., butane and propane) can also be sold either

at the wellhead, mine shaft, excavation pit, refinery or gas

processing plant to pipelines for interstate transmission and

subsequent resale or sold directly to customers, not for resale,

who then use pipeline facilities to transmit the product o

commodity to other locations in distant states for use as energy

sources. In addition, natural gas itself can be liquefied an

shipped via railroad tank car, truck, barge or ocean-going

vessel rather than by a pipeline to interstate or foreign det

21

tinations either for resale or direct use, just as other hydro-

catbon or fossil fuels or even the nuclear fuel, uranium, can

be shipped. Consequently, the product has no special features,

referred to above, with respect to transmission or transpor-

tation.

(2) Scarcity of the Product.

It can be assumed that natural gas is in actual short sup-

ply in the United States. So are crude oil, liquid petroleum

condensates and gases.

Even nuclear fuel (uranium), still a fuel of the future, is

scarce. In discussing the uranium supply problem, President

Nixon, on June 4, 1971, stated:

“A major cause of our recent energy problems has

been the sharp increase in demand that began about 1967

* * *. But in the last four years it has been growing at

a faster pace and forecasts of energy demand a decade

from now have been undergoing significant upward re-

visions.

* s *

“* * * Because of its highly efficient use of nuclear

fuel, the breeder reactor could extend the life of our

natural uranium fuel supply from decades to centuries

* * *” (emphasis added). “Clean Energy Message from

The President of the United States.” H.R. Doc. 92-118,

92nd Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 1 and 4 (June 4, 1971).

Consequently, the product has no special features, referred

to above, with respect to its scarcity.

(3) The Ideal Energy-Yielding Commodity Nature

of the Product.

It must be assumed that natural gas is a very excellent energy-

22

yielding commodity in that it has a high BTU value per unit

volume (averaging about 1,000 BTU/cubic foot), and burs

without fly ash sulfur oxides, and many products of incomplete

combustion such as hydrocarbon radicals and carbon monoxide.

However, nuclear fuels produce no fly ash, sulfur oxide or

hydrocarbon combustion air pollution products and have a

much higher BTU content per unit consumed (whether by

weight or volume). Moreover, both refining and combustion

processes are being developed to decrease markedly the pol-

lution problems caused by consumption of crude oil products

and work is proceeding on developing “synthetic” gas by

hydrogenation of coal. Consequently, natural gas is an excel

lent energy-yielding commodity, but is not the ideal energy-

yielding commodity. It clearly is and has been the preferred

commodity because of its artificially low price which has re-

sulted from the discriminatory regulation discussed in this

brief. Consequently, the product has no special features, re-

ferred to above, with respect to its being the ideal energy-

(4) Monopolistic Characteristics of Independent Producers.

Production and interstate wholesale sale of natural gas

by independent natural gas producers as distinguished from

interstate pipeline transportation and distribution to ultimate

consumers, is not and has not been monopolistic, but com-

petitive. See generally “Utility Corporations, Final Report

of the Federal Trade Commission to the Senate of the United

States pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 83,” 70th Cong,

Ist Sess., No. 84-A (1936); see also Permian Basin Area Rate

Cases, 390 U.S. 747 at 756-757 (1968). The competition s

23

as great or greater than among producers of other fuels such

as coal, crude oil, liquefied petroleum condensates and gas

and uranium, in addition to producers in other industries such

as automobiles.

In 1970, according to the FPC itself, there were over 4,600

independent producers engaged in interstate sales of natural

gas for resale and 70 independent producers controlled a total

of approximately 85 percent of the interstate sale for resale

market nationwide (with no measurement of the intrastate

market which is quite sizeable and has been preferred wher-

ever possible by many independent producers because of FPC

regulation of the interstate market). Furthermore, new firms

are entering the interstate sale for resale market. In 1962, 10%

of this particular market was occupied by firms entering after

1960. Hodges, “Natural Gas: Price Regulation v. Supply,”

unpublished Richard J. Gonzales Lecture, April 23, 1970,

College of Business Administration, University of Texas.

If production rather than markets is analyzed, the four

largest independent producers at the national level controlled

32.1% of production and the eight largest independent pro-

ducers controlled 37.6% of production as of 1962. By way

of contrast, the production concentration for the four largest

producers of all products in the United States was 40% with

many basic products such as automobiles, copper, soap, glass,

electric light bulbs, and photography equipment showing of

90% or above among the four largest producers of each

product. Hodges, supra.

By disaggregating the national market on a regional basis,

the top four independent gas producers in 1962 controlled

24

only 24.7% of the Gulf Coast regional market for interstate

sales for resale, and 22.9% of the Mid-Continent-Permian

Basin regional market for interstate sales for resale. Further-

more, the big four in the Mid-Continent-Permian Basin area

are not necessarily the same as the big four in the Texas-Gulf

Coast, Southern Louisiana or Rocky Mountain areas. Hodges,

supra.

Consequently, said producers have no special features, re-

ferred to above, with respect to monopolistic characteristics

except for their being highly competitive.

Consequently, any and all FPC regulation of said inde

pendent producers with respect to interstate wholesale sales

of natural gas creates invidious discrimination which cannot

be justified and is more than unwise, improvident or out of

harmony with a particular school of thought. Williamson y.

Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Morey

v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).

This is not to say or even imply that the Natural Gas Act

is totally unconstitutional or even that its application to con-

trol field prices of gas charged by producer-affiliates or sub-

sidiaries of interstate gas transmission companies is uncon-

stitutional. It is FPC regulation of any independent natural

gas producers with respect to interstate wholesale sales of nat-

ural gas that is unconstitutional.

B. ANY AND ALL FPC REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRO-

DUCERS WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE WHOLESALE SALES OF

NATURAL GAS HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CONSERVA-

TION POLICIES OF THE STATES, DEPRIVING THE STATES OF WHAT

THIs CourRT IN Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation

25

Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), samp Is AN

INHERENT PART OF THE POLICE POWER — THE PREVENTION OF

ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND WASTE OF OIL AND GAS — AND

THEREBY VIOLATES THE TENTH AMENDMENT TO THE COoN-

STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

This argument is well summed up in an article by the late

Ernest O. Thompson. Thompson, “The Texas Market Demand

Statute on Qil and Gas and its Application,” 39 Tex. L. Rev.

139 (1960). In that article, Thompson, who was at the time

the Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission, in describ-

ing the Texas oil and gas conservation policy which remains

effective today, referred to statutes and court decisions which

enunciate said policy and concluded that said policy is based

on prevention of underground and above ground waste, in-

cluding economic waste.

The real issue for this Court is: Does the above mentioned

FPC regulation negate this state policy by causing waste,

because artificially low prices caused by said application and

regulation might dictate either premature abandonment of

wells or failure to complete wells, both of which can result

in permanent “flooding out or drowning” of geological for-

mations capable of producing gas and/or associated oil and

permanent loss of recoverable oil and gas in place?

In light of the high cost of regulation, even if a special ex-

ception is allowed by the FPC with respect to gas prices from

certain wells to prevent waste, such an exception frequently

will not be sought, and FPC-dictated artificially low gas prices

with respect to said sales by said producers can cause other-

wise premature abandonment or failure to complete in spite

—

26

of an adequate market demand and adequate pipeline capac.

ity to transport the gas to willing and needy buyers.

Although there are no real precedents dealing with th

scope or weight of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States in a situation such as this, a collision be

tween Federal authority and the legitimate exercise of the

states’ police power has occurred which in this case should

be resolved in favor of the states’ police power because with-

out the conservation program of the states working properly,

there will be no supply of natural gas to be sold to consum-

ers at just and reasonable prices or at any price.

See Note, “Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-

State Conflict,” 64 Colum. L. Rev. 888 (1964).

JUDICIAL REMOVAL OF ANY AND ALL FPC

REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS

WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE WHOLESALE

SALES OF NATURAL GAS SHOULD HAVE NO

EFFECT ON ANY ACTIONS, SALES, REGULA-

TIONS OR OPERATIONS OF SUCH INDEPEND-

ENT PRODUCERS UNTIL AFTER THE EFFEC-

TIVE DATE OF SAID REMOVAL.

This point is well supported by the jurisprudence of ths

Court. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State

Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), this Court held that a later hold

ing of unconstitutionality of a Federal Statute would mt

operate retroactively so as to render previous judgments under

‘27 sae

the law later determined to be unconstitutional, null and void.

That decision is still good law today.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Respondent Forgotson respectfully

prays that the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD H. ForGOTSON,

WoRSHAM, ForsYTHE & SAMPELS,

-Twenty-Five Hundred,

2001 Bryan Tower,

Dallas, Texas 75201,

Attorneys for

James M. Forgotson, Sr.

28

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a member of the Bar of this Court, hereby

certifies that a copy of the foregoing Brief has this the

day of January, 1974 been served upon each counsel of reo-

ord for respondents in accordance with Rule 33 of this Court,

by depositing the same in a United States mail box, with

first class postage prepaid, addressed to said counsel at their

post office addresses.

Edward H. Forgotson

AMENDMENT V — CAPITAL CRIMES; DOUBLE

JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION; DUE PROCESS;

JUST COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-

wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment

_ of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

" forces, or in the Militia, when ‘in actual service in time of

~ War or public danger; nor shall| any person be subject for

_ the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

~ gor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

"against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

se

=e

~ without due process of law; nor shall private property be

_ taken for public use, without just compensation.

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_. AMENDMENT X — RESERVED POWERS TO STATES

- The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-

_ stitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to

_ the States respectively, or to the people.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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