Appendix — Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond
Supreme Court brief1974
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In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1973
No. 72-1322
CAROLYN BRADLEY, et al.,
Petitioners,
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY
OF RICHMOND, et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED MARCH 29, 1971
CERTIORARI GRANTED JUNE 11, 1973
IO CAS Pe PO ee OO ae re - {ee
ME TE EERO LOE OE AEE Te TT aI OT, ee
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1973
No. 72-1322
CAROLYN BRADLEY, et al.,
Petitioners,
—_—vV.——
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY
OF RICHMOND, et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT A
INDEX
PAGE
Chronological List of Docket Entries ................--.--.------ la
Amended Complaint, filed January 4, 1962 .................. 4a
Answer of School Board, filed June 21, 1962 ................ l4a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of March
DO, TG ise bncsiccsecenscacsnsnucieinsyseesicarsnensnmnncaravapeoneencusdenctsense 17a
Resolution of the School Board of the City of Rich-
mond, filed March 30, 1966 ..................-.---seeeeeeeeeeeteeeees 19a
Desegregation Plan for the Richmond Public School
System, filed March 30, 1966 ................-------------- . 20a
a
PAGE
Order, filed March 30, 1966 . 24a
Motion for further Relief, filed March 10, 1970 .......... 25a
Order, filed March 12, 1970 27a
Statement of Defendant Richmond School Board,
filed March 19, 1970 .. 28a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of March
31, 1970 ..... 29a
Transmittal letter for Desegregation Plan from
HEW, dated May 4, 1970 36a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of June 19,
1970 37a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of June 20,
1970 oe. 54a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of June 25,
1970 .... 55a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of June 26,
1970 .............- d7a
Motion for Attorney’s Fees, etc., filed July 2, 1970 .... 66a
Disfrict Court’s Letter to Counsel, dated July 6, 1970 69a
Submission of Interim Plan by Richmond School
Board, filed July 23, 1970 2222... eeeeeeeeee eee 74a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August
( Pe | / (| eee 79a
lil
PAGE
Letter of School Board to District Court, filed No-
vember 16, 1970 .............. ee Serene er 86a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of Novem-
ber 15, 1970 2... ¢ 92a
Letter of Counsel for Plaintiffs, dated January 6, 1971 94a
Submission of Desegregation Plans for 1971-72, filed
Janvary 19, F904 cece einen 96a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of Febru-
O¥y 16. 19Te a spstan posers ese ssosensnene 100a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of March 4,
1971 eee
Letter of Counsel for the School Board, dated March
j Pea Ly & (ener anaes en sree es eer err anny ete ere 102a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of April 16,
BOT) epee
1908 coco
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of May 17,
DT ieee acetates eee es 112a.
= SS
Memorandum Opinion of District Court, filed May 26,
TOT eoigeeee ees
iv
PAGE
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of June 21,
| Lf eee 149a
Order and Memorandum, filed June 22, 1971 .............. 15la
School Board Motion to Amend Pleadings, filed
August 26, 1971 ........ po pects eee tbeenn cv eayee cone anspeaeeeees 154a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, filed
November 29, 1972 160a
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries -
September 5, 1961
March 30, 1966
March 10, 1970
March 12, 1970
March 19, 1970
March 31, 1970
April 1, 1970
May 11, 1970
June 19-20, 1970
June 25-26, 1970
June 26, 1970
July 2, 1970
July 23, 1970
Complaint filed.
School Board’s desegregation plan
and Order approving plan filed.
Motion for Further Relief filed by
Plaintiffs.
Order that School Board advise the
Court within ten days if public schools
being operated in accordance with con-
stitutional requirements.
Statement of School Board filed.
Hearing.
_ Order that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fur-
ther Relief be granted; order of 3-30-
66 is thereby vacated; School Board
to file before 5-11-70 a plan for unitary
system.
Report and Motion of School Board
filed by its attorneys.
Hearing.
Hearing.
Order disapproving plan of School
Board; Board to submit plan and
hearing set for August 7, 1970.
Motion of Plaintiffs for attorneys’
fees, etc.
School Board Interim Plan filed.
° 2a
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries
July 23, 1970
August 7, 1970
August 7, 1970
August 17, 1970
November 18, 1970
December 5, 1970
December 9, 1970
January 15, 1971
January 29, 1971
February 5, 1971
Motion for leave to file third party
complaint against School Board of
Chesterfield County and School Board
of Henrico County filed by City of
Richmond.
Motion by School Board to file
third party complaint against School
Boards of Chesterfield and Henrico
Counties.
Hearing.
Memorandum of the Court filed; Or-
der that School Board’s plan filed
7-23-70 be approved for term com-
mencing 8-31-70; Counsel for Plain-
tiffs and School Board to confer as to
payment of counsel fees and costs and
report to Court within 45 days.
Hearing.
Order directing joinder of parties
needed for just adjudication.
Plaintiffs’ motion for implementation
of Plaintiffs’ plan for second semester
filed.
School Board plans for desegregation
filed.
Memorandum and Order denying
Plaintiffs’ motion for implementation
of Plaintiffs’ plan.
Notice of Appeal from Order of Janu-
ary 29, 1971 filed by Plaintiffs.
3a
Chronological List of ‘Relevant Docket Entries
March 4, 1971
April 5, 1971
April 16, 1971
April 23, 1971
May 17, 1971
May 26, 1971
June 17, 1971
June 18, 1971
June 21, 1971
June 22, 1971
Hearing.
Memorandum and Order of Court ap-
proving School Board Plan III.
Hearing.
Hearing.
Hearing.
Memorandum and Order filed direct-
ing School Board to pay to Plain-
tiffs’ counsel $56,419.65 from 3-10-70
through 1-29-71.
Motion for contempt filed by Plain-
tiffs.
Notice of Appeal from May 26 Order
filed by School Board.
Hearing; Motion for contempt denied.
Order and Memorandum filed direct-
ing payment of counsel fees and deny-
ing Board’s motion for stay.
(Filed January 4, 1962)
I
1. (a) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title
28, United States Code, Section 1331. This action arises
under Article 1, Section 8, and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States, Section 1, and
under the Act of Congress, Revised Statutes, Section 1977,
derived from the Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section
16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 42, United States Code, Section
1981), as hereafter more fully appears. The matter in
controversy, exclusive of interest and cost, exceeds the
sum of Ten-Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).
_ (b) Jurisdiction is further invoked under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 1343. This action is author-
ized by the Act of Congress, revised Statutes, Section 1979,
derived from the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, Section
1, 17 Stat. 13 (Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983),
to be commenced by any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the
deprivation under color of state law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage of rights, privileges and im-
munities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and by the Act of Con-
gress, Revised Statutes, Section 1977, derived from the
Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144
(Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981), providing for
the equal rights of citizens and of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States as hereafter more fully
appears.
II
2. Infant plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and
are residents of and domiciled in the political subdivision
of Virginia for which the defendant school board main-
5a
Amended Complaint
tains and operates public schools. Said infants are within
the age limits of eligibility to attend, and possess all quali-
fications and satisfy all requirements for admission to, said
public schools.
3. Adult plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and
are residents of and domiciled in said political subdivision.
They are parents or guardians or persons standing tm loco
parentis of one or more of the infant plaintiffs.
4. Plaintiffs bring this action in their own behalf and,
there being common questions of law and fact affecting the
rights of all other Negro children attending public schools
in the Commonwealth of Virginia and, particularly, in said
political subdivision, and the parents and guardians of
such children, similarly situated and affected with refer-
ence to the matters here involved, who are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring all before the court,
and a common relief being sought, as will hereinafter more
fully appear, the plaintiffs also bring this action, pursuant
to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, as a
class action on behalf of all other Negro children attending
public schools in the Commonwealth of Virginia and,
particularly, in said political subdivision, and the parents
and guardians of such children, similarly situated and
affected with reference to the matters here involved.
Til
5. The Commonwealth of Virginia has declared public
education a state function. The Constitution of Virginia,
Article IX, Section 129, provides:
‘‘Free schools to be maintained. The General As-
sembly shall establish and maintain an efficient sys-
tem of public free schools throughout the State.”’
Pursuant to this mandate, the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia has established a system of public free schools in
6a
Amended Complaint
the Commonwealth of Virginia according to a plan set out
in Title 22, Chapters 1 to 15, inclusive, of the Code of Vir-
ginia, 1950. The establishment, maintenance and admin-
istration of the public school system of Virginia is vested
in a State Board of Education, a Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Division Superintendents of Schools, and
County, City and Town School Boards (Constitution of
Virginia, Article IX, Sections 130-133; Code of Virginia,
1950, Title 22, Chapter 1, Section 22-2).
IV
6. The defendant school board, the corporate name of
which is stated in the caption, exists pursuant to the Con-
stitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia as an
administrative department of the Commonwealth, dis-
charging governmental functions, and is declared by law to
be a body corporate. Said school board is empowered and
required to establish, maintain, control and supervise an
efficient system of public free schools in said political sub-
division, to provide suitable and proper school buildings,
furniture and equipment, and to maintain, manage and
control the same, to determine the studies to be pursued
and the methods of teaching, to make local regulations for
the conduct of the schools and for the proper discipline of
the students, to employ teachers, to provide for the trans-
portation of pupils, to enforce the school laws, and to per-
form numerous other duties, activities and functions es-
sential to the establishment, maintenance and operation
of the public free schools in said political subdivision.
(Constitution of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133; Code
of Virginia, 1950, as amended, Title 22.)
7. The defendant division superintendent of schools,
whose name as such officer is stated in the caption, holds
office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the Common-
wealth of Virginia as an administrative officer of the public
free school system of Virginia. (Constitution of Virginia,
Article IX, Section 133; Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended,
7a
Amended Complaint
Title 22.) He is under the authority, supervision and con-
trol of, and acts pursuant to the orders, policies, practices,
customs and usages of the defendant school board. He is
made a defendant herein in his official capacity.
8. A Virginia statute, first enacted as Chapter 70 of the
Acts of the 1956 Extra Session of the General Assembly,
viz, Article 1.1 of Chapter 12 of Title 22 (Sections 22-231.1
through 22-232.17) of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as
amended, confers or purports to confer upon the Pupil
Placement Board all powers of enrollment or placement
of pupils in the public schools in Virginia and to charge
said Pupil Placement Board to perform numerous duties,
activities and functions pertaining to the enrollment or
placement of pupils in, and the determination of school
attendance district for, such public schools, except in those
counties, cities or towns which elect to be bound by the
provisions of Article 1.2 of Chapter 12 of Title 22 (Sec-
tions 22-232.18 through 22-232.31) of thé Code of Virginia,
1950, as amended. (Section 22-232.30 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, 1950, as amended.) The names of the individual
members of the Pupil Placement Board are stated in the
caption.
V
9. Notwithstanding the holding and admonitions in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, and 349 U.S.
294, the pre-existing pattern of racial segregation in the
public schools maintained and operated by the defendant
school board continues unaffected except in the few in-
stances, if any there are, in which individual Negroes have
sought and obtained admission to schools other than those
attended exclusively by Negroes. The defendants have
not devoted efforts toward initiating nonsegregation and
bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in
the public school system, neither have they made a reason-
able start to effectuate a transition to a racially non-dis-
criminatory school system, as under paramount law it is
ee
8a
Amended Complaint
their duty to do. Deliberately and purposefully, and
solely because of race, the defendants continue to require
all or virtually all Negro public school children to attend
school where none but Negroes are enrolled and to require
all white public school children to attend school where no
Negroes, or at best few Negroes, are enrolled.
10. As matters of routine, every white child entering
school for the first time is initially assigned to and placed
in a school which predominantly, if not exclusively, is at-
tended by white children; or if otherwise assigned, then,
upon request of the parents or guardians, such child is
transferred to a school which, being attended exclusively
or predominantly by white children, is considered as a
school for white children. Upon graduation from ele-
mentary school, every white child is routinely-assigned to
a high school or junior high school which is predominantly,
if not exclusively, attended by white children. Similarly,
and with few if any exceptions, Negro children entering
school for the first time are initially assigned to a school
which none but Negroes attend upon their graduation from
elementary school they are routinely assigned to a high
school or to a junior high school which none but Negroes
attend.
11. To avoid the racially discriminatory result of the
practice described in the paragraph next preceding, the
Negro child, or his parent or guardian for him, is required
to make application fer transfer from the school which
none but Negroes attend to a school specifically named.
In acting upon such application for transfer from the all-
Negro school, the defendants take into consideration cer-
tain criteria which defendants do not consider when making
initial enrollments or placements in any school other than
the initial placement or enrollment of a Negro child in a
school which white children attend. If such criteria are
not met, the application for transfer is denied. For ex-
ample, if the home of the applicant is closer to the school
to which he has been assigned than to the school to which
9a
Amended Complaint
transfer is sought, the application is denied notwithstand-
ing the fact that the latter school is attended by white
children similarly situated with respect to residence. For
further example, if intelligence, achievement or other
standardized test scores or other academic records of the
applicant do not compare favorably with the best or the
better of similar scores or records of children attending
or assigned to the school which the applicant seeks to at-
tend, the application is denied notwithstanding the fact
that many white children attending said school have lower
scores or lower academic records than the applicant has.
VI
12. Timely application was made to the defendants for
the admission of each infant plaintiff to a public school in
said political subdivision heretofore and now attended ex-
clusively or predominantly by white persons. The refusal
of such application was made known to the parent, guard-
ian, of each infant plaintiff by letter from the Pupil Place-
ment Board indicating the placement of the child in a cer-
tain school, which school is one attended exclusively by
Negroes. In the case of each infant plaintiff, a written
protest of such placement was made to the Pupil Place-
ment Board within the time prescribed by statute; where-
upon the Pupil Placement Board scheduled a hearing upon
said protest. In the case of each infant plaintiff, but only
to the extent that such details can now be stated with cer-
tainty, the attached ‘‘Schedule ‘A’ ’’ sets out: (1) the name
of the infant plaintiff, (2) the school assignment to which
is sought, (3) the date of the letter from the Pupil Place-
ment Board and the name of the all-Negro school in which
the infant plaintiff was placed, (4) the reason assigned for
denial of the application, and (5) the date and place of the
hearing on the protest of the placement. Notwithstanding
the said protest and hearing thereon, the Pupil Placement
Board confirmed its placement previously made in the case
of each of the infant plaintiffs.
10a
Amended Complaint
13. But for the deliberate purpose of the defendants to
avoid performance of their duty as hereinabove mentioned
in paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiffs would have had no need
to apply for attendance at certain schools. But for the
fact that the defendants intended to maintain the racially
segregated pattern of public schools through the routine
practices described in paragraph 10 hereof, the applications
made on behalf of the infant plaintiffs would have been
granted. Solely by reason of the practices, customs,
usages and calculated result thereof as mentioned and
complained of in paragraph 11 hereof, the placement of
each infant plaintiff in an all-Negro school was confirmed,
even after protest. Unless and until the defendants, as a
result of injunction or otherwise, will cease and desist from
the practice and usage mentioned in paragraph 11, appli-
cations and protests will be vain and futile when made on
behalf of any Negro child situated as the infant plaintiffs
are with regard to residence or with regard to intelligence,
achievement or other standardized test scores or other
academic records.
VII
14. The refusal of the defendants to grant the requested
assignments, viewed in the light of the refusal of the de-
fendants to bring about the elimination of racial discrimina-
tion in the public school system and to make a reasonable
start to effectuate a transition to a racially non-discrimina-
tory system, constitutes a deprivation of the liberty of the
infant plaintiffs as well as all other Negro public school
children within said political subdivision and a denial of
their right to the equal protection of the laws secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and a denial of rights secured by Title 42,
United States Code, Section 1981.
15. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated and affected
are suffering irreparable injury and are threatened with
irreparable injury in the future by reason of the policy,
At tna hein oN
lla
Amended Complaint
practice, custom and usage and the actions of the defend-
ants herein complained of. They have no plain, adequate
or complete remedy to redress the wrongs and illegal acts
herein complained of other than this complaint for an in-
junction. Any other remedy to which plaintiffs and those
similarly situated could be remitted would be attended by
such uncertainties and delays as would deny substantial
relief, would involve a multiplicity of suits, and would
cause further irreparable injury and occasion damage,
vexation and inconvenience.
vill
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray:
(A) That this Court enter an interlocutory and a perma-
nent injunction restraining and enjoining defendants, and
each of them, their successors in office, and their agents and
employees, forthwith, from denying infant plaintiffs, or
either of them, solely on account of race or color, the right
to be enrolled in, to attend and to be educated in, the public
schools to which they, respectively, have sought admission ;
(B) That this Court enter a permanent injunction re-
straining and enjoining defendants, and each of them, their
successors in office, and their agents and employees from
any and all action that regulates or affects, on the basis of
race or color, the initial assignment, the placement, the
transfer, the admission, the enrollment or the education of
any child to and in any public school ;
(C) That, specifically the defendants and each of them,
their successors in office, and their agents and employees
be permanently enjoined and restrained from denying the
application of any Negro child for assignment in or trans-
fer to any public school attended by white children when
such denial is based solely upon requirements or criteria
which do not operate to exclude white children from said
school ;
12a
Amended Complaint
(D) That the defendants be required to submit to the
Court a plan to achieve a system of determining initial as-
signments, placements or enrollments of children to and
in the public schools on a non-racial basis and be required
to make periodical reports to the Court of their progress
in effectuating a transition to a racially non-discriminatory
school system; and that during the period of such transi-
tion the Court retain jurisdiction of this case ;
(E) That defendants pay to plaintiffs the costs of this
action and attorney’s fees in such amount as to the Court
may appear reasonable and proper; and
(F) That plaintiffs have such other and further relief
as is just.
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13a
Amended Complaint
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14a
Answer of School Board
(Filed June 21, 1962)
Answer of the School Board of the City of Richmond and H. I.
Willett, Division Superintendent of Schools of the City of
Richmond
For their joint and several answers in this case the
defendants, The School Board of the City of Richmond and
H. I. Willett, Division Superintendent of Schools of the
City of Richmond, answer and say:
1. These defendants do not deny the jurisdiction stated
in paragraph 1 of the amended bill of complaint, but they
deny that any action of theirs, or either of them, has de-
prived the plaintiffs, or any of them, under color of state
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or any amendment thereto, or any act
of Congress, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the amended bill
of complaint.
2. These defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs
2,3 and 4 of the amended bill of complaint.
3. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
5 of the amended bill of complaint.
4. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
6 of the amended bill of complaint, except that they say that
while The School Board of the City of Richmond is em-
powered to provide school buildings, title to such property
in the City of Richmond is vested in the City of Richmond
as provided for by § 22-94 of the Code of Virginia, and only
such school buildings are provided, maintained and oper-
ated in the City of Richmond as are authorized by the City
Council to be provided, maintained and operated, and at
such places as are designated and within the limitations
of funds provided by the Council for the purpose in the
exercise of its discretion; and except that the performance
of the other function alleged in paragraph 6 are subject to
appropriation of funds for such purposes by the City Coun-
cil in the exercise of its discretion.
OES NL LE LET SOME LOONIE TIN INN IN STSCI ASR
15a
Answer of School Board
5. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
7 of the amended bill of complaint, except that they say that
the defendant, H. I. Willett, as Division Superintendent of
Schools is under the authority, supervision and control, and
acts pursuant to, the orders, policies, practices, customs
and usages of the defendant, The School Board of the City
of Richmond, only to the extent that there is no conflict with
the provisions of §4 22-36 and 22-97 and with §§ 22-232.1
through 22-232.17 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by
chapter 500 of the Acts of Assembly of 1958, known as the
Pupil Placement Act, or with any other statute of the
Commonwealth of Virginia.
6. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
8 of the amended bill of complaint, except that they say:
(a) that § 22-232.1 of the Code of Virginia, which is a part
of the Pupil Placement Act, has divested these defendants
of all power and authority ‘‘now or at any future time’’ to
determine the school to which the plaintiffs and any other
child shall be admitted; (2) that article 1.2 of Chapter 12
of Title 22 (§§ 22-232.18 through 22-232.31) of the Code of
Virginia is not applicable or operative in the City of Rich-
mond because the defendant, The School Board of the City
of Richmond, has not recommended to the Council or gov-
erning body of the City of Richmond that the provisions of
article 1.2 of chapter 12 of Title 22 of the Code of Virginia
be made applicable or operative in the City of Richmond,
nor has the Council or governing body taken any action
with respect thereto; (c) that it is within the uncontrolled
discretion of the defendant, The School Board of the City
of Richmond, and the Council or governing body of the
City of Richmond whether the provisions of article 1.2 of
chapter 12 of Title 22 of the Code of Virginia shall be
applicable or operative in the City of Richmond; and (d)
i that these defendants are wholly without power to admit
i the plaintiffs and any other child to a public school in the
‘ City of Richmond, except in the sense that they may per-
\ 16a
Answer of School Board
form purely ministerialiacts when clearly authorized by
law so to do.
7. These defendants deny all of the allegations of para-
graphs 9 through 15 of the amended bill of complaint; and
say: (a) that these defendants have been divested of all
power and authority ‘‘now or at any future time’’ to deter-
mine the school to which the plaintiffs and any other child
shall be admitted; (b) that these defendants are wholly
without power to admit the plaintiffs and any other child
to a public school in the City of Richmond, except in the
sense that they may. perform purely ministerial acts when
clearly authorized by law so to do; and (c) that these de-
fendants have done no act that has deprived the plaintiffs,
or any of them, or any other child under color of state law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or any amendment, thereto, or any act of
Congress.
FurrHer ANSWER
Further answering, these defendants jointly and sever-
ally say the purpose of the bill of complaint is to obtain
the entry of an order which will enjoin and restrain the
enforcement, operation and execution of the Pupil Place-
ment Act, by restraining the action of officers of the State
of Virginia in the enforcement and execution of the statute,
and of an order or orders made by an administrative board
or commission acting under such statute, upon the ground
of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Under the pro-
visions of Title 28 U.S.C.A., section 2281, such an injunc-
tion cannot be granted by any district court or judge there-
of unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges under Title 28, U.S.C.A.,
section 2284.
17a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
. of March 30, 1966
THe CierK: Civil Action 3353 Caroline Bradley and
Michael Bradley, et al. v. The School Board of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, et al.
Henry L. Marsh, III represents the plaintiff and Mr.
Henry T. Wickham represents the defendant.
Counsel ready ?
Mr. Marsu: Ready for the plaintiff.
Mr. WICKHAM: Y¢s, sir.
If Your Honor please, at this time I would like to file a
resolution of the School Board, City of Richmond, that was
adopted today, March 30th, attached to which is a desegre-
gation plan for the Richmond Public School System.
I might say that the plaintiffs and the defendants have
agreed to this plan and accordingly would ask permission
to file it now and present to the Court an order permitting
that it be filed and approving the plan as filed.
Tue Court: Is this the same as the draft that was
furnished?
Mr. WickHam: The same as I left with your secretary
on Monday morning, I believe.
Tue Court: Well, I have studied that.
Mr. Marsh, do you wish to be heard on this?
Mr. MarsH: May it please the Court, we participated in
the negotiations with the school board and this plan repre-
sents the agreement that was reached as a result of several
weeks of negotiations and I think that the plaintiffs are
satisfied with this plan and we would like for the Court to
approve it.
18a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of March 30, 1966
Tue Court: You join in the motion?
Mr. Marsa: Yes, sir.
Tue Court: Very well.
Gentlemen, in Bradley v. The School Board 382 U.S. 103
(1965) this action was remanded to this court for hearings
and proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Supreme
Court. The Court set the case down for hearing. In the
meanwhile the parties conferred and as a result of their
conferences the school board has tendered to the Court a
revised plan.
The plaintiffs offered no objection to the plan and state
that it meets with their approval. Accordingly, the parties
being in agreement, the Court will approve the plan.
* * .
19a
Resolution of the School Board of the
City of Richmond
(Filed March 30, 1966)
Be Ir Resotvep by The School Board of the City of
Richmond :
1. That the Desecrecation Puan FoR THE RICHMOND
Pusuic Scnoot System, dated March 30, 1966, a copy of
which is attached hereto, is hereby approved and adopted.
2. That this Plan and a certified copy of this resolution
be submitted to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.
3. That, subject to the approval of the Court, this Plan
shall be in effect for the 1966-67 school year, and each
school year thereafter until changed with the approval
of the Court.
Adopted:
March 30, 1966
A True Copy, Teste:
Clerk of The School Board of the
City of Richmond, Virginia
20a
Desegregation Plan for the
Richmond Public School System
(Filed March 30, 1966)
PRoFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
The School Board of the City of Richmond recognizes
its responsibility to employ, assign, promote and discharge
teachers and other professional personnel of the Richmond
City Public School System without regard to race or color.
It further recognizes its obligation to take all reasonable
steps to eliminate existing racial segregation of faculty
that has resulted from the past operation of a dual system
based upon race or color. In the recruitment, selection and
assignment of staff, the chief obligation is to provide the
best possible education for ali children. The pattern of
assignment of teachers and other professional staff among
the various schools of the system will not be such that
schools are identifiable as intended for students of a par-
ticular race, color or national origin, or such that teachers
or other professional staff of a particular race are con-
centrated in those schools where all, or the majority, of
the students are of that race.
The program to be utilized in carrying out these responsi-
bilities includes the following:
1. The best person will be sought for each position
without regard to race, and Negroes will be sought for
important positions in order to demonstrate that job oppor-
tunities are available for those who meet the necessary
requirements.
2. The School Board will seek to select personnel with-
out regard to race, and will follow the policy of assigning
hew personnel in a manner that will work toward the
desegregation of faculties. This, of course, does not mean
2la
Desegregation Plan for the
Richmond Public School System
intentionally selecting a person of less ability to accomplish
desegregation, but rather it means working toward the
goal of desegregation of faculties in all schools.
3. In the recruitment and employment of teachers and
other professional personnel, all applicants and other pros-
pective employees will be informed that the City of Rich-
mond operates a racially integrated school system and that
the teachers and other professional personnel are subject
to assignment in the best interest of the school system and
without regard to their race or color.
4. The School Board will take affirmative steps to
solicit and encourage teachers presently employed to ac-
cept transfers to schools in which the majority of the
faculty members are of a race different from that of the
teacher to be transferred.
5. In the process of faculty desegregation, consideration
will be given to the assignment of “roving” and “special
teachers”.
6. In filling faculty vacancies which occur prior to the
opening of each school year, preferential consideration
will be given to presently employed teachers of the race
opposite the race that is in the majority in the faculty at
the school where the vacancy exists. In making such trans-
fers account will be taken of the criteria utilized in approv-
ing transfers for other reasons.
Pupits
The Scheol Board of the city of Richmond recognizes its
obligation to eliminate a dual school system in the assign-
22a
Desegregation Plan for the
Richmond Public School System
ment of pupils. In the implementation of its present plan,
the School Board recognizes that it has the responsibility
to create and maintain an environment in which there is
a freedom of choice based on positive information with-
out restrictive pressures. The School Board further recog-
nizes a responsibility to seek reasonable positive steps
that are educationally sound to prevent and/or minimize
the isolation of one ethnic group from contact with other
groups.
The program to be utilized in carrying out these responsi-
bilities includes the following:
1. The School Board’s chief responsibility is to provide
high quality education for all the children of Richmond.
Sound educational goals include opportunities for white
children and Negro children to associate on equal terms in
the public schools as do children of various religions and
national origins.
2. The pattern of assignment of teachers and other pro-
fessional staff among the various schools will not be such
that schools are identifiable as intended for students of
a particular race, color, or national origin; or such that
teachers or other professional staff of a particular race are
concentrated in those schools where all or the majority of
the students are of that race.
3. The School Board recognizes that any plan of deseg-
regation must be evaluated in terms of results and the
Board is taking positive steps to meet its responsibility.
These steps include procedures such as the following:
(a) Where schools in close proximity to each other
have significant inequality in enrollment in relation-
Pe Oe eS ee) Peet
ae ee eh eT
ie a te
23a
Desegregation Plan for the
Richmond Public School System
ship to capacity, the School Board recognizes a respon-
sibility to take positive steps to correct such inequities.
(b) Pupils in all schools will be acquainted with oppor-
tunities in other schools, particularly when pupils are
finishing the last grade in one school and moving to
another school.
(c) City-wide centers are being planned that will serve
pupils from all areas of the city, and student work-
shops and city-wide institutes and seminars have been
conducted and plans are being made for expansion on
a city-wide or city area basis.
4. If the steps taken by the School Board do not produce
significant results during the 1966-67 school year, it is
recognized that the freedom of choice plan will have to be
modified with consideration given to other procedures such
as boundary lines in certain areas.
ConsTRUCTION
The program for construction of new schools or addi-
tions to existing schools will not be designed to perpetuate,
maintain, or support racial segregation.
SpecraL ProGRAMS
The same principles (where applicable) pertaining to
pupils, professional staff, and construction for regular
day schools shall also be applied to all special programs
administered by the School Board such as programs of
adult education, education of the handicapped children,
and education of the economically and culturally disadvan-
taged children.
March 30, 1966
24a
Order
(Filed March 30, 1966)
On motion of the defendants, and with the consent of
the plaintiffs, by counsel, leave is granted the defendants
to file their DEsEGREGATION PLAN FoR THE RICHMOND
Pustic ScHoot System dated March 30, 1966 and a
certified copy of the resolution approving and adopting the
Plan, which resolution was adopted on March 30, 1966,
and said Plan and copy of the résolution are filed.
Upon consideration whereof, it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED
and DECREED:
1. That the DESEGREGATION PLAN FOR THE RICHMOND
Pustic ScHooLt System dated March 30, 1966, is ap-
proved.
2. That the School Board shall put the Plan into effect
for the 1966-67 school year.
3. That the Court retain jurisdiction of this action.
/s/ Joun D. Burzner, Jr.
United States District Judge
March 30, 1966.
4
eae tke see eee
iis iceliati adie Fie Bi cs icles bhin Bhalhcied ee
25a
Motion for Further Relief
(Filed March 10, 1970)
Plaintiffs move that, in light of the opinions of the United
States Supreme Court in Green v. County School Bd. of
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), Alexander v.
Holncs County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) and
Cartc. v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., No. 944 (O.T.
1969, January 14, 1970), and also in the light of recent
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, the Court require the defendant school
board forthwith to put into effect a method of assigning
children to public schools and to take other appropriate steps
which will promptly and realistically convert the public
schools of the City of R: amond into a unitary non-racial
system from which all vestiges of racial segregation will
have been removed; and that the Court award a reasonable
fee to their counsel to be assessed as costs.
/s/ M. Ratru Pace |
/s/ Roxatp D. EALEY
(This page left blank intentionally)
27a
Order
(Filed March 12, 1970)
It appearing to the Court that the plaintiffs have moved
for further relief in this cause, and to the end that the
Court may properly schedule its docket, and deeming it
proper so to do,
It is ORDERED that the defendants shall, within t: days
from this date, advise the Court if it is their position that
the public schools of the City of Richmond, Virginia are
being operated in accordance with the constitutional require-
ments to oy crate unitary schools as enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court.
It is further Ormi.keEp that in the event the defendants
cannot properly assert that the operation of the public
schools of the City of Richmond is in compliance as afore-
said, then they shall advise the Court the amount of time
they deem will be required to submit a plan for the oper::-
tion of the public school system of the City of Richmond
which they feel will bring them in compliance with the re-
quirements of the Constitution.
Let the Clerk send copies of this order to all counsel
of record.
/s/ Robert R. MERHIGE, JR.
United States District Judge
March 12, 1970. ~
28a
Statement of Defendant Richmond School Board
(Filed March 19, 1970)
The defendants aver and state as follows:
1. They have operated the school system and educational
facilities of the City of Richmond to the best of their knowl-
edge and belief in accordance with the decree of this Court
entered on the 30th day of March, 1966.
2. The implementation of the said decree permits any
child to attend any school located within the City so long as
the said school provides instruction in the grade to which
the child wishes to attend.
3. They have been advised that the public schools of the
City of Richmond are not being operated as unitary schools
in accofdance with the most recent enunciations of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
4. They have requested the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare to make a study and recommendation that
will ensure the operation of the unitary school system in
continuing compliance with the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
5. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
has agreed to undertake the aforesaid study and recommen-
dation involving the Richmond Public Schools and that its
findings will be made available on or about May 1, 1970.
6. They will submit a plan for the operation of the public
school system of the City of Richmond not later than May
11, 1970, which they feel will bring them in compliance
with the requirements of the Constitution.
THE SCHOOL BoarD oF THE City
OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, et al.
29a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
[3] The Clerk: Civil Action 3353, Carolyn Bradley, and
Michael Bradley, et al., versus the School Board, City of
Richmond.
Mr. S. W. Tucker represents plaintiffs.
Mr. Henry T. Wickham represents defendant.
The Court: All right, gentlemen.
Yes, Mr. Ely, how are you?
Mr. Ely: May it please the Court, I would like to present
to the Court Mr. Norman J. Chachkin, member of the
Arkansas bar. He has not formally qualified to practice
in this court, but he meets all of the qualifications for such,
and at a later date those qualifications will be memoralized
in writing.
This is Mr. Chachkin.
The Court: Delighted to have you with us, Mr. Chachkin.
Mr. Chachkin: Delighted to make it, Your Honor.
The Court: I asked you to appear here for a pre-trial
conference for the very reasons stated, the order concern-
ing the issue raised by plaintiffs’ motion and defendant’s
statement filed March 19. And I want to set trial dates. I
have got to get this docket straight. It is fairly obvious,
[4] it seems to me without prejudging it now, and I want
to treat this as a pre-trial conference, that any actions to
be taken in reference to any further relief, if the plain-
tiffs are entitled to any further relief, are by virtue of the
Alexandria case and the cases and decisions of the Unite
States Supreme Court and this Circuit in Halifax tha
precludes any delay beyond the beginning of the next
school term if any further relief is granted, which means
that the School Board, if further relief is granted, ought
to know as soon as possible where they are going.
30a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
I would imagine it must be quite a task to make any
rearrangements.
Now, what I want to know, and I want to know it just
as straight as a die, without any hesitation, and I direct
myself to counsel for the School Board, is the City of Rich-
mond today, the School Board, City of Richmond, today
operating a unitary school system where there are neither
black nor white schools, as required by law? And I don’t
want any answer, please, that tells me they are advised
one way or the other. I want to know whether there is any
issue about it. If there is, they certainly have a right to
make an issue of it, if they can honestly do so. I want to
set it down for hearing.
If there is no issue then I want to know why I can’t rule
that the plaintiff is forthwith entitled to further [5] relief
and enter a mandatory injunction against the defendants
for operating a system contra to the law.
Now, are they or aren’t they? Without “they are advised
or they are not advised.” What is their position? That is
all I want to know. I can’t be plainer than that.
Mr. Wickham: It is the School Board’s position they
are not operating a unitary system.
The Court: Is it your position then that the plaintiffs
under the law, without saying what relief, are entitled to
further relief, Mr. Wickham?
Mr. Wickham: That is correct.
The Court: That saves the necessity of any hearing in
reference to that, gentlemen. And there is no question.
I would now like to diseuss the mechanics, and I think
that is all it is, the mechanics as to whether or not the
Court—well, the Court has now ruled that the plaintiffs
are entitled to farther relief based upon the very frank
representation of the defendants.
Se RL OMe nL Fe Le ee et OT OMG T e
ee Se ee Ee. Oe Freee ee eee Te
I Ey ee ee ey PR CT ee
3la
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
Does that put us in a position where the Court ought to
enter a mandatory injunction, as is usual in this case,
directing that they forthwith file a plan? When I say forth-
with, I mean such time as these gentlemen tell me they
think they need on that. So we can go from there. Isn’t
[6] that the appropriate step, the next step? Is there any
objection to a mandatory injunction enjoining them to do
what they are supposed to do? Doesn’t that really lay it
on the line to them?
Mr. Wickham: It is—we are already under an injunc-
tion, Your Honor.
The Court: Sir?
Mr. Wickham: We are already under an injunction,
Your Honor.
The Court: By whom?
Mr. Wickham: By this Court.
The Court: In what regard? When was it entered?
You mean to operate a freedom of choice?
Mr. Wickham: No.
The Court: You mean by the law?
Mr. Wickham: That is correct, Your Honor.
The Court: But you are not under any specific injunction
so that the responsibility—
Mr. Wickham: It was a general order entered enjoining
the School Board from operating a dual system of schools
or operating a segregated school system back in 1964.
The Court: They have done that innocently, did it under
the erroneous impression that freedom of choice was all
right.
[7] Well, it is all right if it works, but it doesn’t work.
Well, that order is herewith vacated. Freedom of choice.
Of course it is vacated. So there is no misunderstanding.
I think for their protection I best enter a mandatory in-
32a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
junction, as I do in the usual cases, enjoining them from
operating schools in any method other than in a unitary
school system wherein there are no black or white schools.
You all have seen the usual order.
Now, any objection to that order? Of course give them
all the reasonable time, And then wait for you all to
submit your plan.
You tell me how long you think it will take, Mr. Wickham,
So we can set a date down for a hearing on it should there
be any exception. Hopefully there wouldn’t be.
Let me just say this. I think we may get some help from
court decisions in the next 30 days or so. But, you know,
you can’t tell how long the Court of Appeals will take to
decide some of these,
Mr. Wickham: We would like a hearing, if necessary,
some time during the week of May 18, if the Court could
arrange it during that week.
We would hope to file, as we said in our statement to
the Court, our plan no later than May 11.
[8] The Court: All right, sir.
Well, that is fine. I have no trouble with that. The prob-
‘lem at that time, I realize it takes time, although you have
had some time to be working.
Mr. Chachkin: Your Honor, plaintiffs do have some
difficulty in that regard.
I think this is going to get to what the issues are likely
to be when a plan is filed.
Richmond School Board has announced, it has already |
sought the help of HEW in drafting a plan.
The Court: But this Court is not bound by whatever
they draft. But I am delighted they are getting help from
anybody.
POI Ae ee ee ae is
33a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
Mr. Wickham: I might say, we are not bound too, Your
Honor.
The Court: That’s right.
Mr. Chachkin: No one is bound by HEW: We have
particular difficulty in light of the President's statement
in believing that the Department will undertake a thorough
investigation of all possible remedies.
If the Richmond plan is filed on May Ist I doubt that
we could be ready in 18 days to—
Mr. Wickham: 11.
The Court: May 11. As a matter of fact it gets [9]
worse. They don’t anticipate having it before May 11,
Mr. Chachkin.
Let me say this, We will have to set a time now, that is
all. I want to make it as easy as I can on the defendants
because I realize the fantastic job they have to do. On
the other hand I realize it is a job they should have been
at since the New Kent decision.
I want to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard.
I don’t want to rush them with submitting their plan.
What is done is done. What hasn’t been done hasn’t been
done. Nothing is gained by rushing the defendants in
the submission of their plan.
Mr. Chachkin: I am suggesting a later plan, certainly
not an earlier one, if that is possible in convenience to the
Court. We anticipate that we will probably have to have
some fairly detailed alternatives, perhaps we won't. I
share the Court’s enthusiasm that if we don’t have to ob-
ject in any way—
The Court: How much time do you think, based on your
experience with school systems of this size, how much
time do you think you will need after the plan is submitted
34a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
before you can file your exceptions? Never mind the hear-
ing, now. _
Mr. Chachkin: Well, I would say three weeks to [10]
a month. We are going to start working now.
The Court: Let me say this. That is not unreasonable,
but I am really going to expect that the plaintiffs chip in
and work overtime, so to speak, in order to speed up the
process, because the only one that gets hurt if we don’t
do it right are the children.
All right. I am going to order in this order, I will put
it in the same order as the injunction, I am going to
order that the plan be filed by, well, May 11 is a Monday,
Mr. Wickham. Is that all right?
Mr. Wickham: Yes, sir.
The Court: Plan by May 11. That exceptions thereto
be filed by June 8. And in the event there are exceptions,
hearing will be had on June 19, subject to my getting the
docket clear on that day. And if it is not on the 19th, it
will be heard on Saturday the 20th.
I would ask that the exceptions be reasonably detailed,
Mr. Ely and Mr. Chachkin, for this reason. I think if you
do, certainly those portions of the plan that you may not
have any exceptions to, I think the defendants would be
reasonable in going ahead and making their preparation on
the theory it is going to be approved. This is still an ad-
versary system, and while I recognize my responsibility,
if you all agree on something it would shock me that I didn’t
go along.
{11} And if you are reasonably specific on your excep-
tions it helps me as to the issues and it helps the defendants
too because they may wish to file an amended plan. Some-
times they can accept them.
y+
re
35a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 31, 1970
You may do that, incidentally, Mr. Wickham, after the
exceptions are filed if you wish to file an amended one,
quickly.
Any other matters we ought to take up or discuss, gentle-
men? Any other issues? Any complicated issues that may
be besides the word everybody doesn’t want to talk. about?
All right, let’s see what the plan is.
Thank you very much. If the Court can be of any help
I want to do it.
(The hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded
at five o’clock.)
I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct tran-
script.
/s/ Grupert Frank Hatasz
Gilbert Frank Halasz
Official Court Reporter
36a
Transmittal Letter for Desegregation Plan from HEW
to Superintendent L. D. Adams
(Dated May 4, 1970)
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
May 4, 1970
Dr. Lucien D. Adams, Superintendent
Richmond City Schools
312 North 9th Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Dear Dr. Adams:
The staff of the Division of Equal Educational Opportun-
ities is pleased to submit to you a desegregation plan for
the Richmond City Schools. The plan has been prepared in
response to your expressed desire to achieve the goal of
a unitary system of public schools and in accordance with
our interpretation of action which will most soundly achieve
this objective.
We wish to express our appreciation for the excellent
cooperation received from you and your staff.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ BE. H. Cooprr
E. H. Cooper
Program Officer
Equal Educational Opportunities
Title IV
;
4
:
H
4
a
3
;
i Nir Str tan ih
37a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
[36] e* 2 ¢e
The Court: Dr. Little, do you recall any conversa-
tion or any suggestion that perhaps the freedom of
choice plan would have to be changed by virtue of
the United States Supreme Court decision prior to
the [37] acquisition of these sites? Did you hear
anybody say anything about it or do you think that
the assumption was you ought to go on under the
plan that you had because you felt it was a valid
plan?
The Witness: Your Honor, we have discussed it.
We had some serious problems with freedom of
choice, freedom of choice plan. But in dealing with
the Chesterfield County Schools, we did not feel
that freedom of choice or attendance areas either
would alter the basic place where youngsters would
go to school.
[39] ee?
Q. (Mr. Lucas] All right. This is a black area. When
was this school planned? A. [Dr. Little] When was—
Q. Dove Street. When did you start planning this? A.
We have been in one phase or the other of planning a school
to take care of the overcrowded condition in this general
area for about three years.
[40] We have had site acquisition problems, changing
and resegregation of the entire neighborhood. This project
38a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
was—has been in concrete planning for about a year.
Q. Dr. Little, in planning new construction, does the
Board or did your staff, when you were in that part of it,
affirmatively take into account the effect of locating a new
school in terms of whether or not it would be segregated,
would it actually integrate the school system, or did you
just consider proximity and the concentration of pupils?
A. I think I would have to say that we, that the School
Board took into consideration both factors, but condition-
ing it on, in the elementary level, on reasonable walking
distances of boys and girls from the concentration of popu-
lation. ;
But what I am saying, I can recall the location of John
Marshall High School, for example, on the extreme north-
ern section of the city in anticipation of annexation that
would tend in the long run to give us balances.
Location of John F. Kennedy on the extreme, as a matter
of fact, into Chesterfield, into Henrico [41] County in
anticipation of annexation to give us a balance, knowing
that the concentration of blacks were in the core of the
city and the whites were in the suburban area.
So, I think very definitely the School Board and the
Administration has taken this into consideration, not just
immediately but in many years past.
The Court: But, Dr. Little, I don’t want to mis-
interpret your statement. I want to be sure that I
am correct.
You say you felt the Board did consider the de-
segregation problem conditioning it on reasonable
walking distances of students.
The Witness: Elementary students.
39a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
The Court: Elementary students.
The Witness: Elementary students.
The Court: Are you saying that, so far as you
know, that no consideration was given to clustering,
clustering, pairing?
The Witness: In the construction of new schools?
The Court: In the planning for them in their
location, and so forth?
[42] The Witness: No, I don’t recall any instance
where that has occurred.
[50] e¢*?¢6¢
Redirect Examination by Mr. Wickham:
Q. Dr. Little, in selection of the three sites for the ele-
mentary schools in the annexed territory, was any consid-
eration of race given in selection of those sites? A. No,
sir.
Q. How about the one on the North Side? A. No, sir.
{78] ees
Q. (Mr. Lucas] Mr. Sullins, have you testified for School
Boards in support of their plans for desegregation in oppo-
sition to the Plaintiff’s plan of desegregation? A. I have
been called as an expert witness by School Boards too, I
am certain, to support their plans.
Q. Did you testify in support of the Norfolk percentage
Negro plan in the proceedings last October? A. I did.
Q. And you were called as a witness on behalf of the
School Board in that case; is that correct? A. Yes.
Q. Did you prepare plans of desegregation in Missis-
sippit A. Yes.
40a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
Q. What counties were they for? A. Hinds County,
Madison County, and Canton Municipal Separate School
District, I believe.
Q. And did you prepare to testify in those cases as to
whether or not those plans could be implemented? [79]
A. Would you repeat that, please, sir? Would you repeat
the question, please?
-Q. Did you prepare to testify in those cases with respect
to whether or not the plan of desegregation which you pre-
pared or which your team prepared could be implemented
in those districts?’ A. Yes.
Q. Did you execute an affidavit as to whether or not
certain plans of desegregation were educationally sound
and whether or not they could be implemented in connec-
tion with the Hinds County case which later became the
Alexander case? A. Yes.
Q. Did you execute an affidavit which indicated that that
plan could be implemented and was educationally sound?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you subsequently execute a second affidavit
indicating that you thought the plan should not be imple-
mented and should be restudied after motions were filed by
the United States in that case? A. I believe I executed
only one affidavit and it was the latter situation.
Q. You have already testified you executed one [80] that
said the plans could be implemented before the policy deci-
sion was made in H.E.W., and did you execute a second
affidavit that indicated—
The Court: Now, he did not testify to that, Mr.
Lucas, in fairness.
4la
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
Now, he said that he had prepared an affidavit that
the plan was sound. He did not say anything about
before the policy.
Mr. Lucas: I believe he also said, Your Honor, it
could be implemented; is that correct?
The Court: That is correct.
Q. It was sound and it could be implemented, is that
right? A. I prepared one affidavit for the Hinds County
situation in which I stated that the plan was educationally
sound, but that it should be—that the implementation of it
should be delayed.
Q. Did you previously make a recommendation that it
could be implemented? A. Yes, over the two-year period
that my plan called for.
Q. Then you subsequently made one that it should be
delayed, is that correct, or you testified [81] that it should
be delayed and restudied? A. In the particular Hinds
County situation I did not recommend that Hinds County
plan be delayed over the two-year period—I beg your par-
don—to correct the statement.
The Court: All right, sir.
A. The affidavit which I submitted in Hinds County called
for a request, I believe, for a delay of the implementation
of the Hinds County plan until the following school year.
The plan itself was a two-year projection. And | think my
affidavit called for a delay until September of the follow-
ing year, or at least a delay. I don’t recall the exact month
of delay.
Q. Had you not previously recommended that the plan
be implemented during that school year, that it not be de-
42a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
layed? Had that not been part of your original recommen-
dation in the case? A. The plan that was originally pre-
pared, we were instructed to prepare plans for implemen-
tation in September.
Q. And you did so prepare plans to be implemented in
September in a two-year stage; is that correct? [82] A.
That is correct.
Q. And then you subsequently executed an affidavit, after
some proceedings, and/or testified, perhaps both, I am not
sure, that the plan should not be implemented in Septem-
ber; it should be delayed? A. That is correct, sir.
Q. And you were appearing as a witness for the United
States at that time? A. That is correct, sir.
Q. And what position did you hold with the United States
Office of Education at that time? A. The same position I
now hold.
Q. You did not receive a promotion sometime during that
period, Doctor? A. I did not, sir, except the usual in-grade
promotion that comes at the end of one year if your ser-
vices have been satisfactory.
Q. And what is your definition of a desegregated school,
Dr. Sullins? A. A desegregated school in my opinion is
one in which children are assigned to a specific school
without regard to race, color or creed.
Q. A school that is 100 percent black is a [83] desegre-
gated school, Dr. Sullins? A. In my opinion, if the fac-
ulty of that school is desegregated, there would be certain
circumstances, I believe, where a school could be—the inter-
pretation of desegregated or unitary could be placed upon
that school system.
' Q. Is it your interpretation, Doctor, as an expert, that
a school with 100 percent black enfollment in a system
43a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
where there are whites in the system is a desegregated
school? A. In my own opinion, yes.
Mr. Lucas: I submit the witness is not qualified,
Your Honor, as an expert in desegregation.
The Court: According to what the witness has
testified, according to the weight of the evidence, I
am not satisfied that the qualifications are sufficient,
I will be frank with you. But I am going to let him
testify as an expert.
Go ahead and examine this witness.
Let me ask you one other question that just
prompts it.
The innuendoes, Dr. Sullins, in fairness, [84] are
that you recommended one thing and then later
changed your mind.
Now, was that based on your own intellectual de-
terminations, or was it based on a policy change by
some Government office?
The Witness: It was based on a policy change,
sir.
The Court: Now, did this plan—I presume that
you had prepared this plan?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: Did you prepare it on a policy basis?
The Witness: As much as we have to operate
under, yes, sir.
The Court: And what you are really doing, you
are testifying to the policy of H.E.W.; is that cor-
rect, as distinguished from your capabilities as an
expert on desegregation?
; . The Witness: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
44a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
The Court: All right. I take you as an expert on
H.E.W. policy and for no other purpose.
[86] * * ¢#
Q. [Mr. Wickham] Dr. Sullins, what was the purpose, or
your purpose, or your team’s purpose in assisting in the
preparation of a desegregation plan for the City of [87]
Richmond? A. To develop a desegregation plan which
would provide for a unitary school system with as much
integration, desegregation as possible.
[89] * 2
Q. [Mr. Wickham] All right. In what ways did the school
authorities help or cooperate with you and your team, Dr.
Sullins? A. [Mr. Sullins] They furnished all the informa-
tion we requested, information that goes on the building
. forms, special programs, the data that I have just men-
tioned.
Q. What guidelines are laid down by H.E.W. for you
to follow in formulating a desegregation plan? A. There
are no specific written guidelines [90] which we follow.
The policies have changed, the unwritten policies have
changed in the last year or two as far as the approach
to desegregation plans are concerned.
There is more emphasis now upon the neighborhood
school concept as the basis for a development of a plan.
[118] #28
Cross-Examination by Mr. Allen:
Q. Dr. Sullins, I would at least like to get, straight on
one thing I did not understand on cross-examination.
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45a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
What specifically is the policy of H.E.W. toward trans-
portation? A. Utilize the transportation that is currently
in the system to desegregate as far as possible, but not to
burden a school system with additional cost of busses and
transportation that wherein the funds might be better
utilized to be spent on an educational program rather than
transporting children from one end of the city or county
to the other.
Q. So this would involve using the present public trans-
portation facilities plus the school system’s existing busses,
but not require them to buy any more busses or not to
make unreasonable requirements upon them to buy any
more busses, which is it? A. As far as my limited ex-
perience is concerned, [119] and I can only speak for
the new plans that I have taken to the ad hoc committee,
there has been no requirement that the school system be
forced to add additional busses to the school system to
desegregate the system. 7
Q. Like none? A. Yes, none.
£121] The Court: Or from anywhere else? From
the School Board, did they tell you, “This is what
we want to do”? |
The Witness [Mr. Sullins]: No, sir.
The Court: What did they tell you to do?
The Witness: The School Board? Nothing. I did
not meet with the School Board, sir, until the plan
had been developed in almost final form.
The Court: Well, I meant school authorities. What
did they tell you? What did they tell you the Board
wanted?
The Witness: They did not tell me what the
Board wanted. I did not inquire as to the in-put.
46a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
The Court: What did they come in and ask you
to do, that they wanted you to do at all?
The Witness: Except to try our best to meet the
directive of the Court Order and they gave me the
Court. Order.
[220] Q. [Mr. Wickham] The plan that has been pre-
sented here this morning and filed as Defendants Exhibit 1,
has this plan been approved and adopted by the School
Board of the city of Richmond? A. [Dr. Adams] It has.
-Q. Will you relate briefly the circumstances leading up
to this approval? A. We received a motion from the
Court on March the 11th, and on the 19th the School Board
instructed me to request H.E.W. to assist us in preparing
a plan that would be in compliance with the law; and I did
so by letter to Mr. Cooper in Charlottesville.
The team came in early in April and presented a plan
to the School Board. on April the 30th.
On May the 6th, the School Board meeting with the Clerk,
attorneys, and myself, unanimously approved this plan as
one to be submitted.
It was submitted on May the 11th to the Court.
Q. How many members do you have on your School
Board in the city of Richmond? A. Five.
(221] Q. Are any of these members of the Negra race?
A. Two of the five are.
Q.“You are familiar with the fact that the Defendants
reported to the Court and stated that the geographic zon-
ing plan for the assignment of pupils, as presented by
H.E.W., had been approved.
47a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
What exceptions to-the school plan, as presented by
H.E.W., were made at that time? A. We asked in the
plan two exceptions.
One was that those seniors who were in our school as
of June of this year, 1970, those juniors who would gradu-
ate next year and be seniors next year and who were
expected to graduate would be allowed to remain in their
schools, since this is a most important function in their
’ lives and they attach great importance to graduating from
the schools they attended, and we asked that written re-
quest on the part of parents that seniors be allowed to
remain in high schools during the 1970-71 school year as
the first exception.
Q. What was the second exception? A. The second ex-
ception was that we asked that in the case of the integra-
tion or desegregation ef the entire staff, the faculties of
schools, that some [222] exception be made.
The School Board approved the idea entirely in prin-
ciple; but felt that this much change during the first year
would work an undue hardship, not only in terms of time,
and the School Board asked that a variance of 20 percent
from the recommended percentage or recommended ratio
be given for the ’70-’71 year only.
Q. What is your ratio, the faculty ratio as to the white
and black teachers? A. When we add the annexed area
teachers to our staff, the faculty will be about 50 percent
white and 50 percent black.
Q. How much integration of the faculties do you have
this current school year? A. We have a total of some—
it is close to 250 counting the part-time people in the
schools who are working in schools of the opposite race.
This is an approximate number. I don’t have the exact
Sees
48a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
number. That includes full-time teachers and part-time
teachers and principals, and so on.
Q. Over the past two or three years, how many teachers
have ben assigned to schools of the opposite race? [223]
A. Approximately 500 since 1966.
Q. Why specifically are you asking the Court for the
coming school year to give you a 20 percent leeway in the
assignment of your teachers? A. Well, I think we have a
number of problems in the assignment of teachers.
Number one is the time to make the necessary arrange-
ments and study the situation. That is the primary con-
sideration because we run into problems of certification of
getting the right teacher in the right place certified for
the right subject.
We also recognize that the faculties of these schools,
many of them have been built up over a long number of
years and are very important to the ongoing and continuity
of programs in schools, and to make a major change in a
short period of time, we feel, would seriously impair the
continuity of programs that exist.
Q. Do you feel that you will actually obtain a fifty-fifty
ratio by September of 1970% A. I think it would be highly
problematical in being able to actually obtain that many,
and that, of course, is one of the reasons we asked for some
variance of these during the first year.
[224] The Court: While we are on that, Mr.
Adams, tell me why.
The Witness: Why we asked for the 20—
The Court: No, no. I know why you asked for
the reduction.
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49a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
Why would you be unable to obtain it? Don’t your
teachers under contract teach where you tell them
to teach?
The Witness: The teachers are under contract;
that is, many of our teachers are. Because of the,
I think the uncertainty this year, we probably have
a number of teachers that have not yet signed their
contracts. I am not sure that those would come back
if they were moved.
I know that you are aware of the fact that when
a teacher has been in a school a long time they
establish a great deal of attachment to that school
and resist moving from it, and this has nothing to
do with race whatever.
The Court: I am fully cognizant of that, Mr.
Adams. This will be the first [225] Order that I
have granted in which I have directed a specific
proportion of teachers.
The Witness: We have many teachers who have
bought homes close to their schools so that they
could be there, and I am just not at all sure that
many of those teachers would move to other schools
if we asked them to.
We have used all the means that we know how
during the past four years to get teachers to move
from one school to the other short of making it a
condition of employment.
[243] see
The Court: It is not H.E.W.’s responsibility. It
is the School Board’s responsibility.
Mr. Wickham: We understand that, Your Honor.
50a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
The Court: Nobody else’s.
Mr. Wickham: We have adopted this plan, Your
Honor.
The Court: All right, sir.
* = + - *
[253] * +
Q. [Mr. Lucas] You say this plan was adopted by the
School Board? A. [Dr. Adams] Yes.
Q. Was that adopted at a public meeting or a secret
meeting of the Board? A. It was adopted at the meeting
with their attorneys.
Q. Is there anything in the minutes, in the official minutes
of the Board of Education of the city of Richmond that
indicates this plan was ever adopted by the system? A. Not
in the minutes.
Mr. Wickham: Your Honor please, as Attorney
for the School Board, I am authorized to state to
this Court that the School Board and the school
authorities have [254] adopted the plan that we
here present.
The Court: Your representation is sufficient.
Q. Nothing that appears in the minutes; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. How many alternative plans were considered by the
Board of Education before deciding upon this plan as the
plan it would adopt for presentation to the Court? A. No
alternative plan.
Q. Were there any studies done by the Board or members
of the staff indicating the possibilities of desegregation
using transportation or any other technique? A. Not to
my knowledge in terms of formulating a plan; that is, I
am sure there were discussions of members of the staff of
5la
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
possibilities, and so on, but no plan was adopted or—and
so forth.
Q. Mr. Adams, you were in Court this morning when
Dr. Sullins testified, were you not? A. Yes.
Q. And he testified about a rough plan that he drew up
that would provide for racial balance and [255] he came
up with an estimate of the number of students to be bussed
and the number of busses to be used.
Was this developed in the material and information fur-
nished by the Board of Education to the H.E.W. team?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know anything about his develop-
ment or what he developed it from. I have no knowledge
of that whatever.
Q. Does the Board have its own Research Department?
A. Yes.
Q. Does their Research Department have access to all
of the statistical data in the system? A. Yes.
Q. What type of technological aids does the Department
have to use in school planning? A. (No answer.)
Q. Does it have its own computers? A. The Research
Department, no. 4
Q. Does the School Board have its own computer? A.
Yes.
Q. And how long have you had a computer? A. I don’t
know. For a number of years.
[256] Q. Didn’t you furnish answers to interrogatories
with computer print-out of all the information on the
faculty? A. Yes.
Q. And haven’t you furnished information to the Rich-
mond Redevelopment Housing Authority concerning pupil
enrollment, pupil statistics and their locations within
the system based upon computer print-outs? A. I don’t
know.
52a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
Q. Would that be possible with the existing facilities
that you have? A. I presume it would.
[262] * *# @#
Q. [Mr. Lukas] You say in your contracts at the present
time you do not make the acceptance of assignment to a
school at the election of the School Board as a condition
of employment? A. [Dr. Adams] That we do not sign
contracts for a particular school. That was not quite
what I was referring to.
I said that in transferring teachers from one school to
another one of the opposite race, we had not made that a
condition of the contract. You understand—
The Court: Let me get it straight. Your teacher
contracts call for you to assign them wherever you
decide to assign?
The Witness: That is correct. What I [263] was
referring to, the efforts that we have made to get
teachers to transfer from schools of one race to
one of predominantly the other race, and we have
not forced them to do it under—
The Court: You have not said, “If you don’t go,
don’t sign our contract’?
The Witness: If you don’t, you don’t have a con-
tract. This is what I was referring to.
[267] * 2 @
Q. Has the Board put any sort of similar effort into
desegregating the schools as to be compared to your ef-
fort to reduce the teacher-pupil ratio- A. The schools
53a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 19, 1970
since ’66 have been operating under a freedom of choice
plan in which we had to be quite careful in not insisting
one way or the other in terms of children, and we were
frequently accused anyway of trying to keep people in a
school or not. We had to really be very objective in what
we did.
Q. Do you feel that you as an Administrator and the
Board have an affirmative duty to eliminate [268] the
racial identity of schools in the system? A. Yes.
[304] eee
The Court: In that connection, was any studies
or how many studies were made as to how many of
the students who have exercised their right of free-
dom of choice actually use either public transporta-
tion or private transportation, stationwagons, car
pools?
The Witness [Dr. Adams]: We have not made
that determination, we have not made a study of it.
I don’t know the answer to that.
54a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 20, 1970
[320] [The Court] That is the point that I think
is so very, very material. I am not at all sure that
the defendants, and I would not want to put it on
them if that is not their admitted position. I don’t
know. But it seems to me that that has to be. If
free choice didn’t work, it didn’t work, and if the
defendants admit they have to do something else,
and they admit it didn’t work because they were
operating segregated schools which is constitution-
ally impermissible.
It is also apparent that the Plan that was tendered
was done so in an effort to correct the results of their
conceded segregation, and it is obvious under the
law of this circuit that where a School Board oper-
ates a system which is violative of constitutional
requirements, the burden is on the School Board to
explore every reasonable method of desegregation,
including rezoning, pairing, grouping, clustering,
school consolidation, transportation, including ma-
jority-minority transfer plan.
£321] I am not sure that the plan that is tendered
does not contemplate a free transfer plan for pri-
marily those of the Negro race only. I believe that is
it. I am not sure that’s constitutionally permissible.
In short, the Board is under a duty to utilize all
reasonable means to dismantle the school system to
eliminate racial characteristics.
The evidence before the Court is that all facets
were not considered. If the defendants concede that
the failure of free choice, if they agree that the
Court’s statements are accurate, were created by
something more than just residential patterns, and
it seems to me that it would have to be or they would
not admit that the free choice did not work.
55a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 25, 1970
[1122] * * *
Q. [Mr. Lucas] Dr. Little, assuming transportation of
pupils, is there any way to achieve what you consider to
be, as an educator, an optimum of desegregation in the
Richmond area? A. [Dr. Little] In the Richmond area,
yes.
Q. How would you do that? A. It would involve the
involvement of a larger area than the present city bound-
aries of the city of Richmond.
Q. Are you talking about Henrico County, Chesterfield
County or both? A. Henrico County, Chesterfield County,
and the [1123] possibility of the general metropolitan
area, maybe bordering on, in other counties other than
Henrico and Chesterfield. Basically, the problem could be
solved within the city of Richmond, Henrico and Chester-
field Counties.
* = * eo *
[1126] °° °
Q. [Mr. Lucas] Dr. Little, I notice that the Research
Department has prepared a lot of data, a lot of maps and
exhibits, and so forth.
Do you all have computer processing? A. [Dr. Little]
Yes, sir.
The Court: We have been through this, Mr. Lucas,
I recall.
Mr. Lucas: Your Honor, I have only one question
that I really want to find out, if they have devoted
comparable study to the possibilities of devising or
feasibility of a plan involving transportation.
Q. Has that ever been done? A. Mr. Lucas, I have given
& great deal of consideration personally to the involvement
56a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 25, 1970
of transportation and the logistics, the complications, the
numbers and the cost, yes, sir.
Q. Now, I don’t mean a formal plan, but have you ever
performed written—is it in writing anywhere in the last
couple of years, a study of the comparable skills and
techniques, or the numbers, [1127] how many busses that
will be needed in order to desegregate within Richmond
itself? A. Yes. Sometime ago I asked my staff to give
me an estimate on the number of children that would have
to be moved from our high schools, from our schools as
reflected by the enrollments of last September, how many
would have to be moved out and how many would have to
be moved in to gain a balance directly in proportion with
the racial composition of that level of instruction, ele-
mentary, junior and senior high school.
Q. You said you used the enrollments of this past Sep-
tember? A. The enrollments and school organization of
last September.
Q. Did you figure out how many busses you would need?
A. I made an estimate of the number of busses, yes, sir.
2
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57a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
£1190] The Court: Well, gentlemen, I think it has
been perfectly obvious from the very beginning, as
the case unfolded, that the School Board has not
borne the burden placed upon it by the law. I hope
we will not lose sight of the fact that the burden is
the School Board’s burden, not the Plaintiffs’ burden.
The Court had real fear, so to speak, from the
very first witness, that the School Board’s Plan
could not be approved.
In the first place, it was formulated without re-
gard to what the law of this Circuit requires. The
witness testified, Dr. Sullins, that it was their policy
to just disregard any transportation at all. He also
said that it was, as I understood at one point, it was
his policy, at least, to attempt to desegregate schools
without considering race. How do you ever do that,
I don’t know. To desegregate, you have got to give
consideration to race. Utterly ridiculous.
Now, it is the School Board’s burden in devising
its plan and it is the Court’s [1191] responsibility
in considering whether the plan is adequate, to ex-
plore every reasonable method of desegregation,
including rezoning, pairing, grouping, school con-
solidation, transportation, majority-minority trans-
fer plans, satellite zoning. In short, in this Circuit,
it is necessary to consider any and all reasonable
means to dismantle the dual system and eliminate
the racial characteristics of the schools.
The citations are so obvious, Swan v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg; Green v. School Board of the City of
Roanoke; the Franklin case; the Southampton case;
Brewer v. Norfolk.
58a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
The Swan case, I think, is the, certainly the lead-
ing case in this Circuit, the first one to come down
in which it faced this busing business to some extent.
This Court is bound in determining the use of
transportation or zoning or clustering, or anything
else, to use the rule of reason, which may not appear
to be very definitive, and it is based, I think, upon
the premise that everybody is going to act in good
faith. [1192] Now, the only statement that I can find
with reference to the Swan case considering the
neighborhood school concept is the statements of
Judges Sobeloff and Winter in their concurring
opinion in the Brewer vs. Norfolk case wherein they
say, that the Court should not tolerate any scheme
or principle, however characterized, that is erected
upon or having the effect of preserving the dual
system. This applies to the neighborhood school
concept, a shibboleth decisively rejected by this
Court in Swan as an impediment to the performance
of the duty to desegregate.
Now, that is not a dissenting opinion. That is
part of the majority opinion, talking about the Swan
case.
The School Board’s plan as contemplated fails for
another reason. It fails to do what is required to
~do in reference to the faculty.
Now, with respect to the faculty, teachers in this
Circuit must be assigned so that the ratio of black
teachers to white [1193] teachers in each school will
be approximately the same as the ratio of black
teachers to white teachers in the entire school sys-
tem, which I think Mr. Adams destroys. As a
59a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
practical matter, your hope of the twenty percent
variance.
I will say this, it is this Court’s opinion that, as
binding as that statement appears, I think I can
take it in context with the rule of reason that is
contemplated in the Swan case, that there may be
very, very special exceptional circumstances which
the Court will consider when the plan comes in, but
it cannot be any blanket ten percent or four percent
or three percent, special, special circumstances.
Gentlemen, the Court is going to require in its ulti-
mate requirements, that the dual system here has
been perpetuated by virtue of the fact that segrega-
tion has been sponsored by the local, state and fed-
eral authorities, not—Negroes live where they live
because they have no other choice. The laws have
been such. I don’t think it is a choice now, [1194]
and I would ask you to keep that in mind in prepar-
ing your new plan because it may have an effect as
to how far the School Board has to go.
The proposed plan by HEW, and adopted by the
School Board, according to my calculations, subject
to being corrected, because my mathematics are not
the greatest, it would appear that East End, for
example, out of sixteen schools, they were going to
leave thirteen schools with 93 percent or more Negro.
One school would have had 88 percent Negro; four
schools would have 100 percent Negro, and it appears
that only two, Fulton and Webster-Davis, appears
to have been reasonably desegregated, and in that
case they would have had 36 percent ——* of
white as to 63, almost 64 percent Negro.
60a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
In the annexed area, their plan contemplated out
of ten schools that there would be ten with 89 percent
or better with the white race, and two with 100 per-
cent white race. The most, highest percentage of
[1195] Negroes in the annexed area, as contem-
plated by the plan submitted, Negro, 5.1 percent
against 94.9 percent white. I think the best way to
describe that, gentlemen, in the situation—let’s finish
—in the West End on the north side there were,
let’s see, one school would have had 2.8 percent
white as against 97.2 percent Negro. There are 1,
2, 3, three schools would have had 100 percent Negro.
Another school, Norrell and Norrell Annex, would
have had 4.4 percent white; Graves Jr., would have
had 7.5 percent white; Maggie Walker, 9.1 percent
white.
The South Side appears to have been one of the
other schools more reasonable in getting closer to
working it out, but even then the whites predom-
inate.
Now, I am not giving a definite ruling because I
think the School Board ought to have its opportunity
to attempt to come up with a plan. I don’t know of
any instances, gentlemen—I wish everybody would
keep this in mind—where the Court has drafted a
plan. [1196] Now it may be. I am certainly reluc-
tant to do it. I don’t want to. I don’t think you all
ought to put it on me.
What has happened, as a practical matter, is that
Courts.in other areas, to my knowledge, where they
cannot find a plan approved by the School Board,
they have arbitrarily taken the Plaintiffs’ plan.
i ee
6la
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
In reference to the Plaintiffs’ plan, the Plaintiffs’
witness very frankly admitted that there could be
improvements made upon it. I don’t care how you
add the figures, there are going to be at least 9,000
children who are going to go by transportation next
year if we were not even in litigation, annexed or
voluntary, or what. I suspect there is not as much
walking as the record might indicate, and I am not
saying that 18,000 people being bussed is a reason-
able number, but it is not as extreme as it would
sound at first blush when you take into consideration
how many are already being transported.
The School Board must realize, and I am [1197]
sure counsel all realize it—oh, I have one other
point—I don’t think without making a definitive rul-
ing that .2 or .3 of one percent white children in a
school with 99.7 Negro children, or .3 of one percent
of the Negro children in a school with 99.7 percent
is an integrated school. That is sprinkling. I-would
think that if that had to come to pass, we would be
better off to have it 100 percent one race.
I have already expressed myself on what the HEW
plan did to Mr. Allen’s clients. Gerrymandering,
just to take 45 white children, that is not integrat-
ing schools. That is sprinkling.
I hope that the School Board now has a better idea
of where they can go. I think they have got some
benefit from all of this testimony here, but we must
bear.in mind it is their responsibility, they are the
ones under the law. HEW, I am afraid we cannot get
any help from them, gentlemen, if their policies are
such that it conflicts with the [1198] constitutional
62a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
requirements, and Dr. Sullins said that it did. I
am sure that the Courts, or, at least my view of the
Courts are that we ought to attempt to cooperate
and follow the Executive Branch as best we can,
but when it conflicts with constitutional requirements,
trial judges have no choice but to follow their appel-
late courts and I intend to do it, as unpopular as it
may be. The public may not understand it but I
think the Bar understands and I do. I am going to
do it. I think we can work it out. I have every hope.
I am perfectly willing to look at alternative plans.
It may be traumatic but we might just as well face
it. It’s got to be done. We have had several years,
and I will not dwell on it, but it has been several
years since the New Kent case and nothing has been
done. Nothing seems to be done until somebody
comes in and creates litigation. So the problems and
the hard work are really things of our own making.
All right, gentlemen, I am going to [1199] reject
the plan as submitted, and I am going to take the
Plaintiffs’ plan under advisement and I am not go-
ing to put that into effect at this stage, and hope-
fully I won’t have to put it in effect at all. But I
will ask the School Board to submit the plan to this
Court on or before July 27, 1970. And you might
look at the order entered by Judge Hoffman, Mr.
Wickham and Mr. Wimbish, in the Norfolk case in
. which he suggests that the plan may be based on
suggestions made by the government’s expert wit-
ness, in that case, Dr. Stoele.
Had I been able to find an expert that I thought
had not been on one side or the other, I don’t mind
LP ger
3a
¢
script of Proceedings
Excerpts from Trai 26, 1970
of Jun:
would have gotten, and I still
telling you the Court it is kind of hard to find an
may, if I have to, bustified for either the School
expert who hasn’t tACP plaintiffs. That doesn’t
Board or for the N/ot perfectly honest, but it is
mean that they are hd if we can, I think.
something to be avoigt you have to do [1200] and
Now, you know wh, exceptions to the plan by the
I will ask you that amorg he filed by August 3rd.
Plaintiffs or Interve exceptions will be conducted
Hearings on any su
on Friday, August Yay that I wanted findings of
Now, I said yesteriings of fact. To some extent
fact, the proposed fit, ult without a plan it looks
geil “prove or without the School
Board’s additional pe but I still think it can be
done before the plat is concluded, though it may
not be necessary to lo it in the eight days that I
have suggeested. miybe that time can better be
spent by Mr. Wickhe”™ and Mr. Wimbish in assist-
ing the School Boaré in conforming to the require-
ments of the law. §) I will ask you to have them
within—what do you think is reasonable, Mr. Wick-
ham?
Mr. Wickham: Ycur Honor please, I suggest a
week prior to submis3ion of the School Board’s next
plan.
The Court: All right, that will be fine.
[1201] Mr. Wickham: July 20th or what date?
The Court: Well, do it on Monday. That’s right,
the 20th. Would you do that, gentlemen, for me?
64a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
I want to thank—I won’t say it to you again, Mr.
Lucas. The last time I told you how appreciative
the Court was, you lost your case completely. I won’t
put that on you this time. I am appreciative of the
help that all counsel have given, including the inter-
venors.
I know it is a lot of work for the School Board,
but I think you can do it. You have to do it. We
have no choice. That’s all there is to it.
All right, gentlemen.
Mr. Gray: Judge, before you stop, would you in-
dulge me a moment before you adjourn court?
The Court: Sure. You are the real expert on
desegregation.
Mr. Gray: Thank you, Your Honor.
The Court: All right.
Now, one other matter, gentlemen. I have [1202]
concluded, after hearing the testimony of Mr. Kiep-
per yesterday, that it is imperative that the members
of the City Council be joined as party defendants
to this action here.
Federal Rule 21 provides that parties may be
dropped or added by order of the Court on motion
of any party that should be initiated at any stage
of the action on such terms as are just.
Whatever members of the School Board have to
do they are going to have to have the cooperation
of the City Council, and that’s all there is to it. And
if nothing else the case will attract their attention,
I think, more vividly if they are party defendants.
So in accordance with Rule 21, I am going to
make them party defendants. See Halladay v. Ver-
schoor, 381 F.2d 100, is my authority for it.
65a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of June 26, 1970
All right, gentlemen, thank you very much. *
The Court will take a brief recess [1203] before
going on with my other docket.
Mr. Lucas: Your Honor, there is one other matter
—in view of some of the testimony about the time
span for acquiring transportation facilities and the
availability of possibly some busses from Chester-
field County, we have not gone through, we would
like to suggest to the Court some sort of order like
Carter or like Medford requiring the Board to be
prepared to perform in terms of providing trans-
portation, whether that requires taking bids—
The Court: Well, thank you, Mr. Lucas, for your
suggestion, but I don’t think I am going to adopt it.
T have already suggested that counsel for the School
Board examine the order entered in the Brewer case,
and in that order, I might add, the School Board
was directed to contract with VTC for the transpor-
tation of students.
I will say this: I do not think the schools in the
City of Richmond can open until a plan that is ac-
ceptable by the Court has been adopted, and the plan
must be in effect [1204] when schools open for the
fall term. :
Mr. Lucas: Thank you, Your Honor.
The Court: Recess the court.
(Recess)
( ADJOURNMENT)
66a
Motion for Attorney’s Fees, etc.
(Filed July 2, 1970)
In tHe Unrrep States District Court
For tHe Eastern District oF VIRGINIA
Ricumonp Division
Civ. Action No. 3353
Carotyn Braptey and Micuar, Brab.ey,
infants, etc., et al.,
vs.
Tue Scnoot Boarp or THE Crry oF
Ricumonp, Vircrn1, et al.
Morton
Plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, respectfully pray
that this Court enter an Order directing the defendants
to take all necessary steps to implement a plan of deseg-
regation which provides for the elimination of the racial
identity of each school in the Richmond public school sys-
tem, effective with the commencement of the 1970-71 school
year, including but not limited to, the provision of adequate
transportation facilities, by contract or purchase, securing
the necessary capability and capacity for the transporta-
tion of all pupils eligible, in accordance with such non-
racial transportation standards as the Board shall adopt,
for such transportation to the schools to which they may
be assigned under such a plan, and the use of route plan-
~
ini sip tne cnt th 4
67a
Motion for Attorney’s Fees, etc.
ning assistance from the state Department of Education ;
Plaintiffs further pray that this Court enter an Order
directing the defendants to take no steps which are incon-
sistent with or which will tend to prejudice or delay a
schedule to implement, effective for the 1970-71 school year,
the desegregation plan proposed by the plaintiffs, which
this Court has taken under advisement;
Plaintiffs further respectfully pray that this Court direct
that all steps necessary to provide adequate funds for the
constitutional operation of the Richmond public schools
effective for the 1970-71 school year be taken, including
but not limited to the transfer of funds from present
capital budget categories for planned construction or other
capital improvements, to operating budget categories, the
securing of additional appropriations to operating budget
categories, the application for assistance from the Virginia
State Department of Education, application for all avail-
able federal funds, including but not limited to transfer
of Title I allotments from other programs to meet trans-
portation requirements, as well as for such assistance as
may be available or as may become available under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964;
Plaintiffs further pray that in light of the burden upon
plaintiffs and the cost and disbursements required in this
action, the Court make an interim award of all out-of-
pocket costs incurred by the plaintiffs since the filing of
the Motion for Further Relief, said costs to be certified
to the Court, as well as attorneys’ fees in an amount to
be determined by the payment made or to be made by the
school board to special counsel retained by it in this cause.
In support of this Motion, plaintiffs respectfully refer
the Court to the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396
68a
Motion for Attorney’s Fees, etc.
U.S. 226 (1969); CF. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Nesbit v. Statesville City
Bd. of Education, No. 13229 (4th Cir., Dec. 2, 1969);
Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist., No. 13,904 (4th
Cir., Jan. 16, 1970); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Education, —— U.S. —— (June 29, 1970), and to the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities previously filed
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Norman J. CHACHKIN
M. Rate Pace
420 North First Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
James R. OLPHIN
214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Jack GREENBERG =
James M. Nasart, IIT 2»
Norman J. CHACHKIN
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Louis R. Lucas
525 Commerce Title Building
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
69a
District Court’s Letter to Counsel
' (Dated July 6, 1970)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District of Virginia
Richmond, Virginia 23219
July 6, 1970
Chambers of
ROBERT R. MERHIGE, Jr.
District Judge
M. Ralph Page, Esquire
420 North Ist Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
James R. Olphin, Esquire _4
214 East Clay Street )
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Re: Carolyn Bradley and Michael Bradley, etc., et al. v.
The School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia,
et al. Civil Action No. 3353
Gentlemen:
Your motion filed July 2, 1970, in re the above styled
matter, has been brought to the attention of the Court, and
unless I am requested to do otherwise by counsel for the
defendants, no action will be taken on this motion until the
defendants have been given an opportunity to be heard
thereon.
It may be appropriate, however, for the Court to suggest
to all counsel that heretofore in cases of this nature it has
been the Court’s practice to request counsel to attempt to
come to a understanding in reference to fees prior to the
70a
District Court’s letter to Counsel
Court taking any action thereon. In any event, it would ap-
pear that if the parties cannot agree in reference to that
issue, a ruling on same ought not to be had until after a plan
has been approved.
It also occurs to the Court to suggest that it ought to be
unnecessary for the Court to enter any order as suggested by
Paragraph 2 of your motion, for I am satisfied that counsel
have advised their clients of the law as enunciated by the
Court of Appeals of this Circuit as well as by the United
States Supreme Court in the Alexander case, to the effect
that there can be no further delay in the establishment of a
unitary school system. It would appear inappropriate, in
any event, for the Court to direct the manner in which the
defendants are to comply with the constitutional require-
ments.
I am sure that all counsel are aware of the fact that
this Court has not to date prepared any plan of desegrega-
tion, and does not intend to do so in this instance. That bur-
den rests upon the school board. Obviously if the school
board cannot file a plan which is constitutionally viable, and
another plan has been filed by either the plaintiffs or inter-
venors which is constitutionally viable, the Court has little
choice but to approve that which is required under the law.
Paragraph 3 of your pending motion suggests that the Court
enter certain orders directing the defendants, in essence, in
the manner in which they are to approach the immediate
problem. I do not think this is necessary, although it is cer-
tainly appropriate for the Court to make suggestions.
It appears to me that the Court’s findings from the bench
were sufficient to suggest to all counsel, and to the defendants
in particular, that they explore all reasonable means to the
end that their proposed plan conforms to the requirements
of law. I know of no stronger language than that stated by
7la
District Court’s letter to Counsel
the United States Supreme Court in the New Kent case,
wherein the Court stated that the burden is upon the school
board to take “whatever steps are necessary.”
I am sure all parties recognize that the burden upon the
school board in the submission of any plan is such that any
plan which cannot be shown to be one which furthers con-
version to a unitary, non-racial, non-discriminatory system
must be held inacceptable.
The Court, of its own knowledge, recognizes that we are
rapidly approaching a state-wide system of school districts
which conform to the requirefhents of law.
I am hopeful and confident that the defendants are ex-
ploring every reasonable method to reach the ultimate goal.
I am sure all recognize that the manner in which desegre-
gation is to be achieved is subordinate to the effectiveness of
any particular method or methods of achieving it. It is ob-
vious that the United States Supreme Court tests the plans
by their effectiveness.
This Court is not so insulated as not to be cognizant of
some of the problems the school board is facing, including
perhaps community opposition. As the Court stated from the
bench, as traumatic as it may be, it must be done. No oppo-
sition can serve to prevent vindication of constitutional
rights.
I am sure that all counsel are appreciative of the fact that
the Court stands ready to assist in any manner consistent
with its obligations, to the end that a plan constitutionally
acceptable is formulated.
I feel confident that the defendants will utilize any assist-
ance they may deem appropriate, including help from the
Health, Education and Welfare and the State Board of Edu-
cation.
It may be that it would be appropriate for the defendant
J
/
‘A
72a
District Court’s letter to Counsel
school board to discuss with the appropriate officers of the
contiguous counties as to the feasibility or possibility of con-
. solidation of school districts, all of which may tend to assist
them in their obligation. They may well determine to look
at the prospects of a “feeder” system, consolidation, pairing,
zoning, etc.
In spite of the guidelines afforded by our Circuit Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, there are
still many practical problems left open, as heretofore stated,
including to what extent school districts and zones may or
must be altered as a constitutional matter. A study of the
cases shows almost limitless facets of study engaged in by
the various school authorities throughout the country in at-
tempting to achieve the necessary results. I have the utmost
confidence and hope that the instant defendants will study
all reasonable methods prior to their submission of a plan.
This letter is not to be construed as a formal ruling in any
manner whatsoever on your pending motion. I realize there
are cases in which the Courts have granted the interim re-
lief requested by you in your motion; cases by which this
Court may well be bound. You may be assured that every
consideration will be given to your motion at such time as
the Court deems it appropriate.
I felt, however, that this might be an appropriate time
for the Court, consistent with its obligations, to weigh the
ultimate suggestions in light of any alternatives which may
appear as feasible and more promising in effectiveness, to
remind all parties that the Court did not intend its state-
ments from the bench to be limiting in any manner what-
soever as to the methods to be studied by the defendant
school board. _ :
It may be appropriate at this time to advise all counsel
that there has been at least one informal motion for leave to
73a
District Court’s letter to Counsel
file a brief amicus curiae, and since the Court cannot at this
time conceive of any reason why any additional intervenors
would be permitted, I likewise can see no reason why the
Court should not be most liberal in granting permission to
file briefs amicus curiae and an order so stating will be this
day ‘entered.
Thanking you, I am
Very truly yours,
(s) Robert R. Merhige, Jr.,
Robert R. Merhige, Jr.
United States District Judge
cc: All counsel of record
74a 2
Submission of Interim Plan by Richmond School Board
(Filed July 23, 1970)
Pursuant to the Court’s order of June 26, 1970, the School
Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, has adopted and
herewith submits its plan for the operation of unitary
schools for the school year 1970-71. Such plan has been pre-
pared so as to conform to the requirements of law as here-
tofore enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.
75a
Submission of Interim Plan by Richmond School Board
Wuenrerore, the defendants move the Court to ‘approve
the attached plan.
Tue ScnHoor Boarp OF THE City
or RicHMOND
* * *
PLAN FOR THE OPERATION OF UNITARY ScHOOLs For THE
ScHoot Year 1970-71 sy tHE ScHoot Boarp oF THE
City or RicHMoND
SUMMARY OF PLAN
1. All high schools are désegregated.
2. All middle schools are desegregated.
3. Wherever possible, all elementary schools are de-
segregated. Since black residential areas are so large that
not all elementary schools can be integrated, the School
Board will make available to pupils in the black schools
special classes, functions and programs on an integrated
basis.
4. The majority of the school careers of all students
will be at integrated schools.
5. The School Board will allow majority to minority
transfers and will provide free thansportation by common
carrier for those pupils requesting such transfers.
6. The racial ratio of the faculties in each school will
be approximately the same as the ratio throughout the
system. The Board will make exceptions only for specialized
faculty positions. :
7. Upon written request/ the School Board will permit
those students who will enter the twelfth grade in Sep-
‘
76a
Submission of Interim Plan by Richmond School Board
tember, 1970, and who reasonably expect to graduate in
June, 1971, to remain in the schools which such students
attended in June, 1970.
Basic DETAILS oF PLAN
The basic organization pattern proposed by the School
Board of the City of Richmond provides for the pre-annex-
ation area of the city as follows:
Primary-elementary schools to house K through grade 5
Middle schools to house grades 6 through 8
Senior high schools to house grades 9 through 12
and in the newly annexed areas of the city
Primafy-elementary schools to house grades K through 6
Middle schools to house grades 7 through 9
Senior high schools to house grades 10 through 12
The basic organization structure of the senior high
schools includes grades 9 through 12. Where consideration
of space necessitated, exceptions are made: namely, in the
newly annexed area Huguenot High School will house
grades 10 through 12 and Elkhardt and Thompson Middle
Schools will house grade 9. The boundaries of the senior
high schools are drawn so as to be contiguous, with one
exception, this being Kennedy High School. Here satellite
zones are used. Every high school building is filled to or
above capacity. Portable classrooms will be used in some
instances.
The senior high school plan will be implemented through
the use of Virginia Transit Company regular busline trans-
portation accompanied by a staggered opening and closing
of school. On the advice of the Virginia Transit Company,
77a
Submission of Interim I
lan by Richmond School Board
the Company will be able t
load but it will be necessa:o accommodate the transportation
schedule at approximately to open schools on a staggered
to close school at two, y eight, nine and ten o'clock and
respective pupils involved. three and four o'clock for the
The middle school plan
marily to accommodate s, of organization is designed pri-
eight. Exceptions to this tudents in grades six, seven and
middle schools in the nevpasic plan were required for the
restrictions and the arranyly annexed area due to housing
for the exchange of StUsements with Chesterfield County
Elkhardt Middle Schools \aents. Here the Thompson and
nine until the School B ill house grades seven, eight and
acmume contre and reShrd of the City of Richmond can
wnepaotence aie a bSonsibility for its pupils in the
eee veg educated by Chesterfield County
tendance areas with varia CXation decree. the middle school
ing space dictates. In the ilar to the senior high school at-
school buildings have beettions only where available build-
tion of middle school atte ™4Jority of instances, clusters of
attendance areas were de: used to house the pupil popula-
senior high school attend£mdance areas. The middle school
facilitate transporation. ‘Signed to be co-terminal with the
regular busline Virginia 22Ce areas where possible so as to
will be utilized. LikewiseAs with the senior high schools,
hours are necessitated. T} Transit Company transportation
advised the School Board®, staggered opening and closing
date this additional voluhe Virginia Transit Company has
conditions set forth above! that the Company can accommo-
The attendance areas ime of transportation under the
have been drawn to accom.
through rezoning, pairing for primary-elementary schools
iplish a maximum of desegregation
g, grouping, school consolidation
78a
Submission of Interim Plan by Richmond School Board
and transportation, with the Virginia Transit Company
maintaining its special elementary school buslines to ac-
commodate elementary pupils who live beyond a reasonable
walking distance from school. The assignment of small
minority groups to certain schools is due to existing housing
patterns of a limited racial mix.
Where primary-elementary or middle schools could not
be integrated because of large black residential areas, the
School Board is establishing social studies learning centers.
These learning centers will be used to supplement such
existing learning centers as the Virginia Museum of Fine
Arts, the Valentine Museum, Maymont Wildlife Center,
the Richmond Area Math-Science Center, Richmond Tech-
nical Center and the Richmond Trades Training Center so
as to provide more desegregated learning experiences. For
example, where the minority race is 10% or less in a par-
ticular school, individual classrooms of pupils in such
schools will be paired with individual classrooms of pupils
of the opposite race for the school year in order to provide
an integrated educational rience in one of the learning
centers or by inter-school visitation. The upper elementary
and middle school pupils will be scheduled on at least'a
weekly basis and the pupils in grades K through three will
be scheduled at least once every two weeks. Transportation
-will be provided through School Board owned equipment
during the middle of the day. In addition, excursions and
field trips for the same pupils will be provided.
79a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of August 7, 1970
[18] The Court: Well, the main difference is the
School Board, who has known since May 27, 1968,
that freedom of choice was not constitutionally viable
unless it works, wait for two years to come into
court. After they are brought into court they stand
up and admit it did not work.
Mr. Mattox: The School Board was operating a
system under the direction of this Court.
The Court: But they knew that that was no longer
valid.
Mr. Mattox: But it was still operating, Your
Honor, as—
The Court: You mean they were using the tech-
nical aspect; is that it?
Mr. Mattox: No, sir, they were following the di-
rective of this Court.
The Court: In spite of the fact that they knew
that that was no longer the law, Mr. Mattox, really?
Mr. Mattox: Your Honor, the law—any School
Board apply this as the law under the order that
was issued in this case. Whether [19] the law had
changed or not is beside the point. It was not the
law in this case at that time.
The Court: What you are saying is that this
Court had better not leave any loose ends because
the School Board will grab it; is that it?
Mr. .Mattox: No, sir.
The Court: What are you saying?
Mr. Mattox: I am saying this School Board will
follow the order of this Court to.the nth degree
and I am sure that it will.
80a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August 7, 1970
The Court: All right, sir. Thank you.
[33] The Court: I cannot, I can tell you right
now in good conscience, order the operation of a
school system which the Defendants have openly—
and I am not critical of it because I think you can
look at the figures and see they were right—and
I am going to make a finding of that in my ultimate
findings. Just the figures themselves tell what the
School Board did. It was a nice, honest thing to
come in and say, “Let’s not waste any more time —
on it. It simply has not worked, and let’s get to it.”
{77] ss *# @ :
Q. [Mr. Little] Coming to the basic plan, Mr. Adams,
we are presenting today, what was the basic guideline, or
let me go back just a moment, who prepared this plan, sir?
A. [Mr. Adams] This plan was prepared by members of
my staff, under my direction.
Q. What was the basic guidelines used in preparing this
plan, sir? A. We went to the statement from the Bench,
that we should consider the Charlotte-Mecklenburg and
the Norfolk case, and the Norfolk case, which the decision
was made on [78] June 22nd, seemed to express the opin-
ion that gave us more direction in terms of preparing the
Plan that we have submitted, and we extracted an excerpt
from that decision and we have used that, and I would like
to read it, if I may, as the basis for the Plan we have
submitted.
Q. What you are reading are Exhibits from the Brewer
case; is that correct? A. Right.
8la
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August 7, 1970
“The Plan should immediately desegregate all high
schools. With respect to elementary and junior high
schools, the Board should explore reasonable methods of
desegregation, including rezoning, pairing, grouping, school
consolidation and transportation. If it appears that black
residential areas are so large that not all schools can be
integrated, the School Board must take further steps to
make sure that no pupil is excluded because of his race
from a desegregated school.
“The Board should make available to pupils in the black
schools special classes, functions and programs:on a inte-
grated basis and it should assign these pupils to integrated
schools for a substantial portion of their school careers.
“The School Board must amend its transfer position to
freely allow majority to minority transfers and provide
[79] transportation by bus or common carrier so individual
pupils can leave black schools. The plan must include pro-
visions for the integration of facilities so that in each school
the racial ratio shall be approximately the same as the
ratio throughout the system.”
[102] * * #
Q. (Mr. Little] All right, Mr. Adams, if you will, pro-
ceed to explain the basic plan for the elementary schools?
A. [Mr. Adams] We have taken advantage of all of the
suggestions of the Court in that we have rezoned, we have
paired, we have clustered, and we have consolidated and
made use of available transportation to desegregate the
elementary schools as far as possible.
Q. May I come back to the—excuse me.
The Court: May I just ask one question?
Mr. Little: Yes.
82a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August 7, 1970
The Court: You did not give any [103] con-
sideration to additional transportation—
The Witness: Yes, sir. -
The Court: —is that correct?
The Witness: No—we did.
Mr. Little: The witness said he did.
The Court: He did?
Mr. Little: Yes, sir, to the extent reasonable, I
think he said.
The Witness: We considered transportation to the
extent of reasonableness—
The Court: No, I mean additional from what we
have already got, City Transit, school busses, and
so forth?
The Witness: We went to Virginia Transit and
asked them if they could provide any more trans-
portation to move elementary children. and they did
not.
We did not have enough of our own transportation
in order to do all of that, so that we have—
The Court: Let me interrupt something. I am not
critical of it at this stage. I am trying to find out
whether or not you came up with any other plan,
or suggested [104] plan, contingent upon your
having the transportation you wish you had per-
haps?
The Witness: We certainly looked at, we certainly
looked at the idea of eliminating the large number
of black schools that we had in this area that are
primarily here. And we felt that even if we had
transportation, we had many factors that entered
into the discouragement of use of transportation.
83a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August 7, 1970
We did look at and we did consider the pairing
of the elementary schools that we left totally black
with those that are almost all white.
The Court: But that would take transportation?
The Witness: That would take transportation.
The Court: Did you come to the conclusion, Mr.
Adams, that the only way, whether you like it or
don’t like it is really immaterial at this stage, that
you can really get rid of all these—now, I counted 19,
roughly 19—to get rid of [105] these all-black
schools would be transportation?
The Witness: That is the only way.
The Court: All right, sir, that is what I wanted
to know.
The Witness: That is, we have 12 schools that
are more than 90 percent black and we have 7 schools
that are more than 90 percent white, and the only
way that we can eliminate those schools from this
situation is by transportation and cross-bussing and
pairing of those schools.
[111] * * «#
Q. [Mr. Little] All right, sir. Now, did the Fourth Cir-
cuit in what you read, did they not direct that you consider
time and distance, age of children? [112] A. [Mr. Adams]
That is correct.
Q. And you did that? A. We did consider that,
Q. What else did you consider? A. We, of course, have
the problem of obtaining the transporiaticn recessary to
do this job. We were informed at the close—we ‘made some
investigation during ‘the trial that indicated it would take
us up to three months to get the transportation if we had
the money and ordered at that time. We did not see any
a
84a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August 7, 1970
reasonable way of getting additional transportation since
VTC could not furnish it.
Q. Stop right there.
You did confer and go over this with VTC to see if
available public transportation was available? A. That’s
right.
Q. And’what were you advised? A. We were advised
that they could not handle it. In fact, they were handling
all they could with the load that we had suggested for the
secondary schools.
[202] * ¢
The Court: Excuse me. Mr. Adams,’ while you
are on this, in consideration of pairing, was your
- failure to pair schools, and it is obvious if you paired
certain schools you could get rid of all these 12 all-
black and 7 all-white, but was your failure to do it
based solely upon the transportation problem or did
you or—not you—but did the Board give eonsidera-
tion to patron opposition of taking their children
from an area such as the West End into the East
End?
The Witness: We did not take the patron oppo-
sition into account. We did it on the basis of dis-
tance, the time, and the age of the children, and
the fact that it looked like to us that it would be
very difficult for us to do any pairing without a lot
of pairing.
[294] * 2 @
[The Court]
First, I believe you do not have a unitary system
until I study it. It may be that you have no choice.
I am not saying you don’t. Where you have 19
a ee Lo
t
85a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of August 7, 1970
schools that are racially identifiable, 12 right off-
hand, just like that, and 7 just like that. The 7 white
are even more glaring than the 12 Negro because
of the racial population of the City of Richmond,
60-40. Now, that’s just a—I just don’t think at this
stage it would be true, but I want to tell you this,
Mr. Little: I am not satisfied at this stage that
every reasonable effort has been made to explore,
and I know that when I say this I am satisfied Dr.
Little and Mr. Adams have been working day and
night diligently to do the best they could, the school
Board too. I know we get tired and discouraged and
sometimes we think that is the end of it; and there
are other things that perhaps can be done.
I have no intention—I don’t think [295] that the
Swann case—I think in conformance with the Swann
case, I have no intention of saying that these schools
are not going to open until the City of Richmond
goes out and buys 200 new busses. Now then, don’t
be too happy. You all are waiting for a decision
- from the Supreme Court. All of us would like to
have it. I am not sure, even when it comes that it
is going to answer all the questions that the general
public seems to have in their minds. It may just
say no racial balance is necessary in every school. I
think that’s true. They may not even mention the
word “bussing”. But it seems to me it would be
completely unreasonable to force a school system
that has no transportation, and you all don’t have
any to any great extent, to go out and buy new busses
when the United States Supreme Court may say
that is wrong.
86a
Letter of School Board to District Court
(Filed November 16, 1970)
November 13, 1970
The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Judge
District Court of the United States
Eastern District of Virginia
Post Office Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Re: Civil Action No. 3353
Report from The School Board of the
City of Richmond
Dear Judge Merhige:
Pursuant to the directive of this Court as set forth in
Paragraph 5 of the Order entered in this cause on August
17, 1970, the School Board of the City of Richmond, by
counsel, submits this report covering steps taken in order
to create a unity system in the Richmond Public Schools.
As the record discloses, the present plan approved by
this Court on an interim basis was prepared pursuant to
this Court’s directive that the School Board follow the
specific guidelines set forth by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in the Norfolk and Charlotte cases. This
report is submitted without prejudice to the rights of the
School Board to contest the validity and applicability of
these specific guidelines to the Richmond case and its right
to re-examine its position in the event any of the guidelines
is subsequently modified or held invalid. Similarly, the
School Board submits this report without prejudice to its
position that this Court erred in finding that the present
plan was nonunitary and that the implementation of the
87a
Letter of School Board to District Court
plaintiffs’ plan would meet the test of reasonableness as
presently defined by the Fourth Circuit. The School Board
further reserves the right to re-evaluate its position upon
the rendition of the anticipated decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg and other cases argued on October 12-14, 1970.
In view of the present lack of preciseness and uncertainty
regarding the extent of its admitted affirmative duty to
disestablish its former dual system of schools, the School
Board, with the view of being able to implement a new plan
at the earliest practicable date, is in the process of pre-
paring three definitive new plans for the operation of
public schools within the City of Richmond: This planning
is being done on the assumption that the aforementioned
forthcoming decisions of the United States Supreme Court
will more clearly delineate the extent and scope of the
affirmative duty resting upon it. The School Board is mak-
ing plans based upon the most likely alternatives and di-
rectives to be enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
aforesaid cases.
The first essential step in the eciedition of these plans
involves the preparation of current spot maps showing the
precise residence of each enrollee in the public schools of
the City. It is anticipated that these spot maps for all
elementary students will be completed by November 16,
1970, and for all secondary students by December 1, 1970.
In a normal school year, such spot maps could have been
prepared approximately 30 days earlier, but additional
time is required this year because of the tremendous shift-
ing of pupils occasioned by the implementation of the pres-
ent plan and the delayed enrollment of many students this
year. In addition, the spot maps would not be realistic
until the completion of the efforts to locate approximately
5
4
3
88a
Letter of School Board to District Court
3,500 students whose enrollment had been previously antici-
pated. Considerable time and effort is being spent at this
time to complete this task.
It is anticipated that the three definitive plans will be
completed on or before January 15, 1971. Fe
Under the organization pattern for all three plans, the
elementary level will consist of Grades K through the 5th
Grade; the middle schools will consist of Grades 6 through
8; and the high schools will consist of Grades 9 through 12.
The only variations from this organizational concept will
be those necessitated either by the number of students in-
volved or the availability of appropriate buildings.
One of the plans will be predicated on normal geograph-
ical zoning for all three levels within the system. The
basic criteria of this plan will be proximity and accessi-
bility of students to existing schools but with a view of
integrating to the extent possible when geographic zoning
alone is used as a basic criteria.
With respect to the second plan, the elementary level
assignments will be based on normal geographic zoning
with an effort of combining proximity and accessibility
with the integratioff of as many schools at the elementary
level as-will be feasible under reasonable geographic zon-
ing. In this secénd plan every middle school and high
school will be integrated to a substantial degree to the
extent white students are available. The plan will also
embrace the concept of providing integrated learning ex-
periences for those elementary students who under normal
geographic zoning will of necessity be in predominantly
white or predominantly black schools.
The third plan being prepared is designed to cover the
possibility that the forthcoming decisions of the United
States Supreme Court will spell out an affirmative duty on
89a
Letter of School Board to District Court
the part of the School Board to develop a plan which will
require a substantial degree of integration within every
school in the system. This plan will be an alternative to
that plan previously submitted to this Court by the plain-
tiffs. The School Board concurs in the testimony of Dr.
Foster given in this case to the effect that if every school
within the system must be integrated, considerable im-
provements both from a logistical and educational stand-
point can be made in the formulation of a plan similar to
the one he presented. This third plan will involve more
transportation of pupils than is required under the plan
approved by this Court on an interim basis. It will involve
considerable additional pairing of many schools within the
system requiring the transportation of approximately one-
half of the students in each paired school to the other
school. Subject to adjustments which will be made upon
the completion of the plan, it is anticipated that this plan
will require the transportation of approximately 7,500 to
8,000 additional students. This in turn would require the
purchase of approximately 120 buses at an average cost of
$7,500.00 each for a total initial capital expenditure of
approximately $900,000.00. In addition, the total antici-
pated operating expenses for these additional 120 buses
is estimated to be $384,000.00 per school year. Under past
practices of the State Board of Education, the School
Board of the City of Richmond would receive reimburse-
ments toward these operating expenses in the approximate
amount of $168,000.00, which would result in a net operat-
ing cost to the Richmond School Board of approximately
$216,000.00 per school year. Under present laws and prac-
tices, there will be no state reimbursement for any initial
capital outlay or for subsequent replacement of automotive
equipment.
ae 7
ee en ha a Ee ee
90a
Letter of School Board to District Court
a
Based on recent inquiries made of Baker Equipment
Engineering Company, Smith-Moore Body Company, Inc.,
and Crenshaw Equipment Company, the School Board is
advised that new buses can be obtained witliin 90 to 120
days of the date an order is placed for such equipment.
This estimated delivery date would, of course, be altered
in the event of any prolonged strikes or in the event that a
tremendous demand is made on the suppliers as a result
of desegregation decrees throughout the country.
Previous testimony in this case has established the pro-
cedures followed for the appropriation of school funds and
has also established the current financial predicament of
the City of Richmond.
Finally, it is the considered fadlament of the school
administration and the Richmond School Board that the
implementation of any significant changes in the present
plan during this school year would produce irreparable
damage to the public school system. The system’s ability _
to absorb as well as it has the dramatic changes occasioned
by the implementation of the present plan attests to the
viability of the system as a whole, but the implementation
has not been made without a substantial deleterious effect
on the system. The massive relocation of teachers and
students has been accompanied by the as yet unexplained
loss of approximately 3,500 students. Even more signifi-
cantly, the tremendous logistical and administrative prob-
lems have had their predictable effect upon the normal
educational program within the schools. These problems
generated are being resolved as quickly as possible, but the
administration has been strained to the utmost. In light
of the foregoing, the School Board urgently requests this
Court to weigh the easily anticipated drastic effect on the
entire system if additional sweeping changes are ordered
RE A Be OP ANE INT >
Ot age
9la
Letter of School Board to District Court
to be implemented during this present school year. The
School Board of the City of Richmond intends fully to
comply with all requirements and directives of the United
States Supreme Court as said requirements and directives
are interpreted by this Court. It is in a posture of prepar-
ing itself to meet whatever directives may be forthcoming,
but it must have reasonable time to implement any addi-
tional significant changes which might be required.
Respectfully submitted,
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE
CITY OF RICHMOND
By Georce B. Litre
Of Counsel
92a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of November 18, 1970
[35] * * *
The Court: While we are here, what is the status?
Mr. Little: The status is this, sir: That after
conferring with counsel for the plaintiffs we have
reached agreement with respect to three of the pro-
posed schools. We are unable to agree on the bal-
ance of the schools, and I would very strenuously
urge the Court to try to set a date where we can
present evidence with respect to other schools, par-
ticularly two of the three elementary schools in the
annexed area.
The Court: If your motion, the joinder, is suecess-
ful, as I am inclined to think at this stage, it prob-
ably will be subject to what I learn from these memo-
randa, would this complicate that issue?
Mr. Little: No, Your Honor, because before we
met with the attorneys for the plaintiffs we re-ex-
amined the proposed site locations in light of three
possible alternatives.
Number one, if the Supreme Court approves the
basic concept of neighborhood or normal geographic
school zones, [36] would they be applicable there?
Number two, if the Court is restricted to decreeing
the unitary plan within the confines of the City of
Richmond, would it work?
But we also considered and have considered and
are ready to present evidence that even if we go fur-
ther in this suit and are successful in consolidating
the three school-distritts of the three adjoining lo-
ealities, that the sites involved would be appropriate
for that purpose as well.
LTT ee. ee *_
RNS A ESET ALE LTE TI EP BES PN ES TNS Se eee
93a
Excerpts from Transcriphtof Proceedings
of November 18, 1970
And we are most anxious to attempt to move for-
ward to present additional evidence to this Court as
to the propriety of moving ahead on these schools
and as to the dire financial consequences that we are
experiencing as a result of this injunction. Even
above and beyond the real hardship that the people
in the annexed area will have commencing in Jan-
uary and September, we of necessity, in view of
the injunction, we will have to go to double shift op-
erations.
So I do respectfully ask the Court, while all coun-
sel are present in the pending suit, that we attempt
to get a date for a hearing on the injunction.
[37] se ¢
{[Mr. Lucas] With respect to the construetion mat-
ter, I would like to advise the Court that we have had
Dr. Foster, who testified in this court, come in and go
with the school officials to inspect the various sites.
And after counselling with Dr. Foster in terms of his
experience as an administrator we did agree to the
three locations indicated, and based upon the con-
siderations Mr. Little has related, we object to all
the rest. And whatever time the Court sets a hearing,
we of course will be available.
penny
» 94a
PS Re ee pilinctel
Letter of Counsel for Plaintiffs
(Dated January 6, 1971)
Mr. George B. Little »
Attorney at Law
1510 Ross Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Re: Bradley, et al., v. School Board of
the City of Richmond, Virginia
Civil Action No. 3353
Dear Mr. Little:
I am enclosing herewith a summary recap of the fees and
a separate attached sheet showing expenses to date in this
matter. The first part of the fees covers the period begin-
ning with the motion for further relief through August 11,
1970.
Two lawyers, one more than ten years ex-
perience (LRL), second lawyer four years
experience, chiefly school cases, Legal De-
fense Fund, 32 days out of office, in and
around Richmond, average 10 hours per
day, at $45.00 per hour _ $28,800.00
Same lawyers, 5 days office work, minimum
of 8 hours per day, at $45.00 per hour 20,000.00
Two associate lawyers with more than ten
years experience, local Richmond Bar, 3
days pretrial preparation, minimum 10
hours per day, at $45.00 per hour 2,700.00
Two lawyers, 10 days trial, not active in
participation, 8 hours per day, at $45.00
per hour 7,200.00
sleaiaiadea ta MELLEL SERIAL NS LLIN IG LILI I ILE EPSP AG IES SAILS ORGAN FEE rR
al
95a
Letter of Counsel for Plaintiffs
Additional hours subsequent to 8-11-70
Preparation of motion for summary re-
versal in 4th Circuit, two lawyers (LRL
and NJC) 5 hours NJC; 2 hours LRL; at
$45.00 per hour
Opposition to stay request for both District
Court and Supreme Court, including travel
time—20 hours NJC; 2 hours LRL; at
$45.00 per hour
Pretrial conference in Richmond, NJC, in-
cluding travel time, 10 hours at $45.00 per
hour
“Preparation of amended complaint, includ-
ing travel time; 40 hours NJC; 20 hours
LRL; at $45.00 per hour
November 17, 18—hearing on motion to add
parties, LRL, including travel time, 25
hours at $45.00 per hour
November 28—to Miami for depositions,
including travel time, LRL, 12 hours at
$45.00 per hour
ToraL Frees
ToraL Expenses
315.00
450.00
2,700.00
1,125.00
540.00
$46,820.00
13,327.56
Granp Tota Fees and Expenses $60,147.56
Very truly yours,
Ratner, SucarmMon & Lucas
Louis R. Lucas
96a
Submission of Desegregation Plans for 1971-72
(Filed January 15, 1971)
The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Judge
District Court of the United States
Eastern District of Virginia
Post Office Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Re: Civil Action No. 3353
Dear Judge Merhige:
Pursuant to its Report of November 13, 1970, the School
Board of the City of Richmond, by counsel, submits three
new plans of operation for the Richmond Public Schools
for the 1971-72 school year.
These plans are submitted without prejudice to the rights
of the School Board to contest the validity and applicability
of the specific guidelines set forth by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in the Norfolk and Charlotte cases
to the Richmond case and its right to re-examine its position
in the event any of the guidelines is subsequently modified or
held invalid. Neither should the submission of these plans
be taken as a waiver of the position of the School Board that
this Court erred in finding that the present plan was non-
unitary and that the implementation of the planitiffs’ plan
would meet the test of reasonableness as presently defined
by the Fourth Circuit.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the School
Board’s three new plans are based upon the most likely
alternatives and directives expected to be enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in its decisions in the Swann
and other cases argued on October 12-14, 1970.
BANE PSEA Bg) DRIER tn RS Da NNN pele
ELE SERPS PII ELLIE, ALLO ENE LY IESE SIS TREE AE
97a
Submission of Desegregation Plans for 1971-72
Under the basic organizational pattern for all three plans,
the elementary level consists of Grades K through the Sth
Grade; the middle schools consist of Grades 6 through 8;
and the high schools consist of Grades 9 through 12. The
variations from this organizational concept are those neces-
sitated either by the number of students involved or the
availability of appropriate buildings.
Plan I is predicated on the concept of proximal geo-
graphic zoning for all three levels within the system. The
basic criteria of this plan will be the proximity and accessi-
bility of students to existing schools but with a view of inte-
grating to the extent possible when proximal geographic
zoning alone is used as a basic criteria.
In Plan II the elementary level assignments are based
on proximal geographic zoning combined with pairing of
contiguous school attendance areas. All middle and high
schools are integrated to a substantial degree.
Plan III is submitted to cover the possibility that the
United States Supreme Court will place an affirmative duty
on every school board to implement a plan requiring a sub-
stantial degree of integration within every school in the
system. This plan is an alternative to the plan as submitted
by the plaintiffs in this case. Transportation details will be
furnished to the Court no later than January 20, 1971.
If the School Board is required to implement elementary
Plan III, it will recommend to the Richmond City Council
the purchase of transportation equipment to enable the
School Board to furnish the transportation required there-
under. The Court will recall that this record demonstrates
that VTC would not be able to provide this additional trans-
portation. Moreover, if these very young children are re-
quired to be transported, their safety and well-being could
only be assured through the utilization of equipment over
which the School Board has complete control.
43
R ae
GEE rer oer Rh st
98a
Submission of Desegregation Plans for 1971-72
The School Board is currently in the process of com-
pleting attendance zone or line descriptions for the ele-
mentary, middle and high schools, and will submit these
exhibits forthwith.
Finally, I am enclosing a copy of Mr. L. D. Adams’ letter
to me of January 15, 1971, in the second paragraph of
which he explains how arrangements were made to handle
the elementary school students returning to the Richmond
School System from Chesterfield at the beginning of the
1971-72 school session. The considerable overcrowding in-
volved in making these arrangements makes it imperative
that the injunction against construction be lifted at the
earliest practicable date.
Respectfully submitted,
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY
oF RICHMOND
January 15, 1971
Mr. George Little, Attorney
1510 Ross Building
801 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Dear Mr. Little:
I am submitting to you today three plans of operation for
the Richmond Public Schools for the 1971-72 school year,
in accordance with our understanding that they might be
considered in light of more definitive rulings by the Supreme
Court which are expected sometime during this school year.
You will note that we have made arrangements to handle
the elementary school population being returned to us from
Chesterfield County at the beginning of the 1971-72 school
99a
Submission of Desegregation Plans for 1971-72
session. We have planned to accommodate these students
by removing the sixth grade from the elementary schools in
the newly annexed area, by changing one additional ele-
mentary school to middle school use, by overcrowding in
all middle and secondary schools, as well as going beyond
the 90% capacity figure that we use in all elementary
schools. The 90% capacity figure is essential because our
class size is now 27, whereas our capacity figure is based
on a class size of 30 pupils.
It is the intent of the School Board to request from City
Council such School Board-owned transportation facilities
as may be needed in addition to those provided by public
carrier and as required in the implementation of an ap-
proved school desegregation plan.
Sincerely,
/s/ L. D. Apams
L. D. Adams
Superintendent
100a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of February 16, 1971
(17) eee
The Court: That is one of the reasons that I have
come to the conclusion that I must enter an order,
preferably by April 1, and the school board just has
to do the best they can. I am sorry. I don’t mean
to put it that way, but this matter in 1967, every-
body knew what they had to do. All you had to do
was read the law. Nothing was done. You can’t
go on and on and on.
I am hoping, of course, we will have the United
States Supreme Court opinion down by then, but we
might not.
The circuits are now beginning to say, and I am
satisfied my circuit is going to say it, we can’t wait.
Just can’t wait.
That may be a subtle way of suggesting to our
betters in Washington that they ought to move along.
I don’t know.
But be that as it may I don’t think it is fair to the
school boards or the people to wait becayse we could
get up into August. I cannot approve the interim
plan outside a mandate from the Fourth Circuit for
next year.
If there had been any other way it wouldn’t have
been approved this time, but we had no choice. It
was either [18] the schools stayed closed or they
operated under an illegal operation. Freedom of
choice, which admittedly was not feasible, or we had
to do the best we could.
So I want that entered. I want that done by April
1. Iam sorry. I am sure arrangements can be made.
That gives people five months. April, May, June,
July, August, that’s right, five months.
» 10la
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of March 4, 1971
[25] eee
By Mr. Little:
Q. Basically let’s come to Plan I just for one or two
questions.
For what purpose was Plan I presented to the Court?
A. [Mr. Adams] Well, the Plan I is based entirely on what
we have called proximal geographic zoning which is ex-
actly what that says. A placing of the students most con-
veniently to school buildings. We do that for two reasons.
One is that in the event that the Supreme Court might rule
that that system of zoning is acceptable thengve would be
on record with a plan.
Secondly, that a proximal geographic zoning does serve
as the base for any other plans since you have to make
your spot counts in those areas in terms of any pairing or
any other type of zoning that you might use. So you would
almost have to start from that position in any plan that we
developed from that point.
[42] eee
The Court: Well, vou all know what the Court
has said before, that it may be—well, we ought to
contemplate that there may be some expression in
the law which would advocate neighborhood schools
for children in grades one through five within, I
think, a mile and a half is a reasonable thing, but
it may be something different and then everybody
else gets bused, which I personally think would be
the best way to accomplish what is necessary, but
be that as it may we are going to have to do what the
courts say.
. . : . SJ
102a
Letter of Counsel for the School Board
(Dated March 11, 1971)
March 11, 1971
Louis R. Lucas, Esquire
525 Commerce Title Building
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
Re: Bradley, et al., v. The School Board of the City
of Richmond
Dear Mr. Lucas:
Enclosed are revised copies of information you requested
concerning fees paid and costs incurred by the School
Board in the above-styled case.
The change reflected in these latest figures was neces-
sitated by the location of two additional bills on behalf of
Mr. Henry T. Wickham, Esquire, for the period Decem-
ber, 1962, to June 1, 1963, and the period January 1, 1964,
to June 1, 1965.
_ The School Board was requested solely by the City At-
torney’s Office for the period dating from the filing of the
original complaint to December, 1962, when Mr. Wickham
was retained as special counsel.
It is our understanding that these enclosures are for
your information only, and, accordingly, will be held in
strictest confidence.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
do not hesitate to contact me.
_ Very truly yours,
/s/ Grorce B. Litrte
George B. Little
103a
Letter of Counsel for the School Board
GBL:app
Enclosures
CC: The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Judge
Norman J. Chachkin, Esquire
March 9, 1971
(Superseding March 2, 1971)
Bradley v. School Board, City of Richmond, Virginia
1. Records of all fees paid or due to attorneys for the
School Board in the above-styled case since the date it -
was filed:
(1) Tucker, Mays, Moore & Reed (firm name changed
later to Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore)
Henry T. Wickham,
Attorney of Record
December 1962
—June 1, 1963 ............ $ 2,500.00
June 1, 1963
—December 31, 1963 .. 1,980.00
January 1, 1964
—June 1, 1965 _.......... 2,100.00
May 1965
—May 1966 ................ 2,190.00
May 1, 1966
—December 22, 1966 .. 90.00
March 1970
—August 1970 ............ 15,000.00
$23,860.00
104a
Letter of Counsel for the School Board
(2) Browder, Russell, Little
& Morris
George B. Little,
Attorney of Record
July 30, 1970
—September 4, 1970 ..
September 5, 1970
—December 31, 1970 ..
January 1, 1971
_—February 26, 1971 ..
*estimated
(3) Jeffreys & Lawler
J. Edward Lawler,
Attorney of Record
July 30, 1970
$17,343.75
33,139.58
13,750.00°
$64,233.33
—September 30,1970 $ 7,540.00
105a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings
of April 16, 1971
[13] * * *
Mr. Chachkin: The only reason | bring that up,
Your Honor, is that if we are forced to go to trial
on schedule as to the Metropolitan aspect of the case,
and the Fourth Circuit should grant a stay, we are
going to be put to a very severe choice between pro-
tecting the relief that we already have by going to
the Supreme Court and continuing on with further
additional or new relief.
The Court: The only thing I can remind you of,
Mr. Chachkin, is that you brought the suit. You
brought every suit that you are involved in.
Mr. Chachkin: If the Court will recall the circum-
stances of the Metropolitan aspect of the case, the
school board filed a motion to join and we were in-
structed to file an amended complaint.
The Court: I understand that, but I am talking
about the original suit was filed by the plaintiffs.
The [14] relief that was ultimately granted, recently,
is a motion to stay, was relief that you all asked for.
Well, not really what you asked for, but it was pre-
cipitated by your filing a suit. So I can’t be sympa-
thetic along those lines.
Of course you are not looking for sympathy.
Mr. Chachkin: I am not looking for sympathy,
Your Honor. I realize how strange it is for the plain-
tiffs to be asking for a continuance. This is the first
time we have ever asked for any delay in this case,
to my knowledge.
It is unusual for plaintiffs in a school desegrega-
tion case to ask for delay.
PRM SAALEN
106a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of April 16, 1971
I don’t see how this case can be tried in two weeks,
adequately.
The Court: I plan to work you nights, Saturdays.
Mr. Chachkin: I was anticipating that, Your
Honor. I recall the trial last year.
I am still forced to the conclusion that it will be
very difficult to adequately present the issues, even
on that schedule, in that period of time.
[23] eee
The Court: Tell me the rush in trying this case,
Mr. Little. I really haven’t concluded as to the mo-
tion, whether [24] it should be granted or not.
I don’t understand the rush except all school mat-
ters ought to be handled as expeditiously as possible.
I told you before, I told you when you made your
motion for modification of the other order, you men-
tioned during the course of your argument this
aspect of the case and I told you that under no cir-
cumstances was I going to be rushed into a decision
on it. I was going to do it the best I could, expedite
it. I try to do that in all cases. I am not going to
work under deadlines with a matter of this impor-
tance. I want you to understand that.
Mr. Little: Your Honor, let’s start right with that
point. What is the urgency in this case?
Our basic problem is, without getting into the
merits,:our basic problem in this case is that the
rights to equal educational opportunities and equal
plaintiffs’ full enjoyment of their constitutional
rights to equal educational opportunities and to equal
education cannot be afforded within the confines of
the City of Richmond. That the full complete relief
107a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of April 16, 1971
to which they are entitled can only be afforded
through a consolidated—the implementation of a
consolidated plan.
So we are talking about constitutional rights of
plaintiffs. I find myself in a unique position today
because I have the pleasure of repeating to this
Court what this Court [25] has so often repeated
to the School Board of the City of Richmond. As-
suming our theory is sound, and I think we can cer-
tainly assume it for the purposes of this motion,
we would not object to a delay of a week or two or
something like that. But as this Court has indicated
approximately 12 lawyers have cleared their dockets,
the Court has cleared its docket and the earliest this
ease could be back in court would be in August, at
the earliest. I submit that any delay like that, if we
are correct that the consolidated plan is the only one
that will afford complete and effective relief, real-
istically speaking, in all probability we are talking
about an additional year’s delay in the implementa-
tion of a plan.
Now, it is all well and good to speculate on stays
and so forth, but this Court in the past when previous
suggestions along this line have been made has an-
swered very wisely and said, “I have no control over
what other Courts do, but I recognize my duty with
respect to the rights of these plaintiffs.”
I don’t think the possibility of a year’s delay in
the implementation of the relief sought can be re-
conciled with the very specific pronouncements of the
Supreme Court which have been repeatedly and cor-
rectly reaffirmed by this Court that the time—
The Court: Say that again.
[26] Mr. Little: Sir?
108a
Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of Apru 16, 1971
The Court: Say it again.
Mr. Little: I don’t think that the probability of a
year’s delay in the implementation of a unitary plan,
what we consider to be the full and complete relief
to which the plaintiffs are entitled, can be reconciled
with the very clear pronouncements of the Supreme
Court which this Court has previously adhered to.
The Court: I thought you said something about
and correctly.
Mr. Little: I said correctly. I was giving you
credit for following the law of the land, sir. That’s
right.
I think the Court is inclined to do that. I don’t
think the possibility of this delay can be reconciled
with the language in the cases with which this Court
is all too familiar. This requires at once action. I
think this is why there is a material question about
the propriety of any continuance.
[28] * * *
[Mr. Little] I call the Court’s attention to things
that it is well aware of. Number one, Mr. Chachkin
and Mr. Lucas are supremely competent counsel. I
don’t know of any counsel more versed in cases—
The Court: Be careful now. I still have their
mo
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