Motion Amicus Curiae — NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.
Supreme Court brief1974
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SUPREME COURT, U. Ss.
DEC 29 1973
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OcToBEeR TERM, 1973.
No. 72-1598
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
VS.
BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY DIVISION OF
TEXTRON, INC.,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
MOTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR LEAVE TO
FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
and
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF THE RESPONDENT.
MILTON SMITH,
General Counsel,
RICHARD B. BERMAN,
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America,
1615 H Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20006,
GERARD C. SMETANA,
925 South Homan Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois 60607,
JERRY KRONENBERG,
HOWARD MOCcERF,
BoROVSKY, EHRLICH & KRONENBERG,
120 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603,
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae.
IN THE
dine Court of the Gnited States
OcToBer TERM, 1973.
No. 72-1598.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
WS.
BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY DIVISION OF
TEXTRON, INC.,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
MOTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR LEAVE TO
FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
(herein the “Chamber”) respectfully moves this Court for
leave to file a brief amicus curiae in support of the position
urged herein by the respondent, Bell Aerospace Company
Division of Textron, Inc. In support whereof, the following
is shown:
1. The Chamber is a federation consisting of a membership
of over 3,700 state and local chambers of commerce and trade
and professional associations, a direct business membership in
AE LEE ERE IE NT eT OVO
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
Interest of the Amicus .......................0.... 1
Summary of Argument............................ 2
a Se errr rs a
I. Managerial Personnel Are Not Covered by the
National Labor Relations Act; the Board’s Conten-
tion That Such Personnel Are “Employees”, En-
titled to the Right of Self-Organization Conferred
Therein Is Contrary to the Basic Policies and Pur-
i th PETE TET TTT en oe a
A. Board Policy Prior to the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ERAN GON 4 6084480044444 8 hae DERE 5
B. The Taft-Hartley Amendments............ 10
C. Board Policy Subsequent to the Taft-Hartley
Amendments
D. The Board May Not Reinterpret the Act to
Suit a Change in the Policy Without Sound
Basis for That Change; the Board Has Shown
No Such Basis Here ...............0..... 20
E. The Buyers Involved in the Instant Case Qual-
ify for Exclusion as “Managerial” Employees 23
II. The Lower Court's Holding That the Instant Case
Must Be Remanded for Rule-Making Proceedings
Is in Error and Must Be Reversed..........._ 24
POND. 6 sr ene 7IKs 5 snes devcateusres acess 30
li
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
Cases.
American Locomotive Co., 92 NLRB 115 (1950)..... 16, 23
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 7 NLRB 1189 (1938)...... 7
Barret Division, Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 65 NLRB
Pe CED ec CANE AGA A OVA 6 BAe Cds na cccnnnnes 6
Denton’s, Inc., 83 NLRB 35 (1949) ................ 16
Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 NLRB 1167 (1947)........ 16
DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB 1019, enf'd 470 F. 2d 305
oe ER OE Uy ere ee eee eT ee eee 21,22
Dravo Corp., 54 NLRB 1174 (1944) ............... 7
Electric Controller & Manufacturing Co., 69 NLRB 1242
CE ok c0 a ois Pade e se bk aknk anaes Cee Cae iwins 6
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966) . .26, 28, 29
Fibre-Board Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203
Bee Seat Se ae ee GOA ae pe 14
Ford Motor Company, 66 NLRB 1317 (1946). .8, 9, 10, 15, 17
Haberman v. Finch, 418 F. 2d 664 (CA 2, 1969)...... 12
Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 NLRB 509 (1944)....... 6, 9, 17
Illinois State Journal Register, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 412 F. 2d
ee Oe i ok uhh chan Koh ao hee Kaas eRe 19
International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union v. N. L.
Oe Bh, eee es Oe Oe tk Ms CE aa wink vc cee tncaes 19
Julian P. Friez & Sons, 47 NLRB 43 (1943)........... 6,9
Lobue Bros., 109 NLRB 1182 (1954) .............. 21
Maryland Drydock Co., 49 NLRB 733 (1943)......... 11
Mobil Oil Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 482 F. 2d 842 (CA 7,
J
iii
N. L. R. B. v. A. J. Tower, 329 U. S. 324 (1945)...... 22
N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575 ( 80GS) 2s 3
N. L. R. B. v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
446 F. 2d 602 (CA 8, 1971) .... 0.06. concen 8, 13, 18
N. L. R. B. v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 481 F. 2d 1018
CRAG, BOTS ali ie bd csc wank va dbiwad 20, 21, 27
N. L. R. B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., oS Saxea AF
Daily Labor Report No. 242 (BNA, Dec. 17, 1973)...
ithe. ks Yndb 6 a6 NOOR BG n0. ke wea eed BERS 21, 22, 27
N. L. R. B. v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 326........ 22
N. L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., 44 F. 2d 783 (CA
Ry RROD bekup Shhh a5 0 Ciena cas eucen: 7, 8, 12, 18
N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 294 U. S. 759 (1964) 3
N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969)
< CEE PES KOA ES NO 4600005 Ueasbe addin ddetal 22, 26, 28, 29
Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485
GOUEED «0's 6A Saeen olen PRG Obie ba Sk ea kk 11, 12, 13
Packard Motor Co., 64 NLRB 1212 ERE s hbo dan kns 11
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 NLRB 320
REED Kha c5 5 0 ie SOR EEAR SEES 6 oirda ce eoueas 15, 18
Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., 427 F. 2d 936
pt Ne Bicectny., LE EP EORES TIOEED 12
Quality Manufacturing Co., 195 NLRB No. 42 (1972).. 20
Retail Clerks International Association v. N. L. R. B., 336
Po Mls BOD ov cc kokesatdgakckcn 19
Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 95 2.) piesa ae 6
S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943)......... 25
S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947)....2.. 26, 27
Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 NLRB 1491 (1944)....... 6,9, 17,23
Swift & Co., 115 NLRB 752 (1956).......... 16, 17, 18, 23
iv
Union Colleries Coal Co., 41 NLRB 961 (1942)....... 11
Vulcan Corp., 58 NLRB 733 (1944) ...........004. 6,9
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 64 NLRB 547 (1945).... 6
Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 424 F. 2d
ESSE CCK: Fi 2998) a vn ewan cies veeveyacnwesd 19, 20
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 NLRB 626 (1945)..... 8, 16, 17
Statutes.
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449,
450) 29 U. S.C. 151, 152
PU BES) oon 6c 0 064554568965 08s Kae ises 11
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136,
73 Stat. 519) 29 U. S. C. 141, 151 et seq.
NS BF icnkd-6 ch x6 49 bow ba Rk w hs 0b 060s ese 54% 13
ee BURSA) oak kc ni Kowk ee wven aes cress 20
I oon o a ok ai 4454 O46 oO beh a bes eee 21
Administrative Procedures Act,
Section 4 (5 U. S.C. S53) 2... ccc ccc ccc vcvces 24
Miscellaneous.
H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14, 17
EEG ES nbs Kock Waekk aw 89s eR tae xe eve bees 11
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-5 (1947)...... 11
js ah Sas i RR at me
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1973.
No. 72-1598.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
vs. J :
BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY DIVISION OF
TEXTRON, INC.,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF THE RESPONDENT.
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.
The interest of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America is set forth in the foregoing Motion for
Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
I.
Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the
National Labor Relations Board’s policy was to exclude “man-
agerial” employees from the statutory right to organize under
the National Labor Relations Act. This practice was one of
total exclusion, for the Board never granted personnel it found
to be “managerial” the statutory right to engage in collective
bargaining with their employer. Moreover, this exclusionary
practice was not limited only to those managerial personnel
who were involved in the formulation of their employer’s labor
relations policies, but extended to those involved in purely
business and commercial matters as well.
During the same period, however, the Board allowed fore-
men and supervisors to form unions and collectively bargain
with their employer. Congress found that this practice was
contrary to the policies of the Act, and in 1947, amended the
- Act to exclude “supervisors” from its protection. However,
Congress had no reason to quarrel with the Board’s described
practice of excluding other managerial personnel because that
practice comported with the policy and principle of maintaining
and preserving within the Act management’s legitimate right
to manage.
After the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board continued
to exclude all “managerial” employees from the Act’s coverage
holding that such exclusion was consistent with the will of
Congress. In the instant case, however, the Board has taken
the position that managerial personnel are not excluded from
the Act’s coverage unless their duties might involve a conflict
of interest between their obligation to the employer and their
loyalty to the bargaining unit and that this conflict can only
Sa aa Pte Oe
3
arise if the persons at issue are involved in labor relations or
personnel matters. According to the Board’s view, all other
managerial personnel are included within the Act’s coverage.
The Board’s new and revised position is contrary to its own
past practice, Congressional intent and sound principles of
labor-management relations pursuant to which persons charged
with the creation and effectuation of management policies,
whether labor relations oriented or not, must have a sole, un-
divided allegiance to management.
II.
Although the Board enunciated a new and erroneous policy
with respect to its treatment of “managerial” employees in this
matter, it was not precluded from doing so in an adjudicatory
proceeding, rather than through rule-making hearings, as the
court below concluded. Rule-making is not the most appro-
priate procedure for resolving the issue herein because any rule
that might result would be incapable of dealing with the multi-
tude of factual situations in ‘which the issue might present
itself. That is, rule-making would result in no substantial
judicial or administrative economy. Ad hoc litigation is the
satisfactory way of resolving such an issue.
Moreover, this case is governed by N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1964) wherein this Court held
that the Board was not precluded from formulating a rule in
an adjudicatory proceeding so long as the Board applied the
tule to the parties to that proceeding and not just prospectively.
The rule enunciated in this case, however erroneous, was formu-
lated in an adjudicatory proceeding affecting the parties to this
proceeding.
ARGUMENT.
L
MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL ARE NOT COVERED BY THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT; THE BOARD'S
CONTENTION THAT SUCH PERSONNEL ARE “EM-
PLOYEES”, ENTITLED TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-OR-
GANIZATION CONFERRED THEREIN IS CONTRARY TO
THE BASIC POLICIES AND PURPOSES OF THE ACT.
In this case’ the Board determined that buyers employed by
Bell Aerospace Company, Division of Textron, Inc., constituted
a unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes and, upon
petition by a union, were subject to the Board’s procedures.
While the Board did not disagree that the buyers in question
might well be “managerial” employees, it nevertheless con-
cluded that managerial personnel were “employees” covered
by the Act. The rule enunciated and applied by the Board
was that “managerial” employees are so covered by the Act
unless their duties and responsibilities “include determinations
which should be made free of any conflict of interest which
could arise if the person involved was a participating member
of a labor organization.” The Board found no such conflict
herein and ordered the Employer to bargain with the labor
organization representing the unit of buyers.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforce-
ment of the Board’s order.? The Court concluded that all true
“managerial” employees were excluded from coverage by the
1. The Board’s order in the underlying representation case is
reported at 190 NLRB No. 66 (1970); its Order denying recon-
sideration is reported at 196 NLRB No. 127 (1972); and its
Decision and Order putting into issue the question here under con-
sideration is reported at 197 NLRB No. 30 (1972).
2. 475 F. 2d 485 (CA 2, 1973).
5
Act, and found that the exclusion was not limited to the “con-
flict of interest” test as contended by the Board, but embraced
any person who is involved in “formulating, determining and
effectuating his employers’ policies or has discretion, inde-
pendent of an employer’s established policy, in the performance
of his duties.”
The issue which thus separates the Board from the Second
Circuit relates to the kind of managerial personnel exempt
from the Act. In satisfaction of its own test, the Board would
exclude only those who formulate or effectuate their employer’s
labor or employment policies; the court would additionally
exclude those who act for their employer in purely business
respects unrelated to matters of labor policy or labor relations,
such as the buyers involved herein. :
Analysis of the history of the Board’s own policy with respect
to managerial personnel reveals the error the rule enunciated
by the Board in this matter. That history reveals that, until
this instant case, the Board has never accorded “managerial”
employees bargaining rights under the Act, and nothing that
Congress has said remotely suggests approval of the Board’s
present interpretation of its policy.
A. Board Policy Prior to the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
Though the Wagner Act nowhere contains the term “man-
agerial employee”, the Board, as a matter of policy, has con-
sistently excluded personnel it found to be within that category
from coverage under the statute. Moreover, the Board excluded
such personnel because their duties encompassed formulation,
determination and effectuation of their employers’ policies or
because they had independent discretion in the performance of
their duties. The exclusion was not restricted to only those
who formulated or enforced labor or personnel policies.
As observed by the Court below, the concept of “managerial
employee” first arose in the context of cases in which either the
6
employer or the union argued that certain personnel should be
excluded from proposed larger bargaining units because, as
a result of their duties, those persons were in a close relation-
ship with management. Thus, for example, in Julian P. Friez
& Sons, 47 NLRB 43 (1943), the Board excluded from a
unit of production and maintenance employees, personnel
charged with expediting the completion of orders and assuring
adherence to production time schedules because they were
“closely related to management”.
In Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 NLRB 1491 (1944), expeditors
who contacted vendors, placed orders, kept records of the
progress of deliveries and had authority to reassign orders, were
excluded from a unit of office clerical, technical and profes-
sional employees because “the authority possessed by these
employees to exercise their discretion in making commitments
on behalf of the Company stamps them as managerial.* Buyers
such as those involved herein were similarly excluded from the
statutorily-recognized right of self-organization. Thus, in Hud-
son Motor Car Co., 55 NLRB 509 (1944) buyers were ex-
cluded from a clerical unit since they purchased “all materials
required by the Company and were, therefore, ‘closely allied
to management.’ ”
Similarly, in Vulcan Corp., 58 NLRB 733 (1944) a buyer
was excluded from a production and maintenance unit because
the responsibility of his position placed him within the “man-
agerial” category.*
Analysis of the Board’s practice under the Wagner Act thus
reveals that the Board excluded personnel from the rights of
Union representation because their duties and responsibilities
categorized them as “managerial”, and that the exclusionary
practice was not restricted only to those who had responsibilities
in the area of labor relations.
3. See, also, Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 95 (1938); Westing-
house Air Brake Co., 64 NLRB 547 (1945); Electric Controller &
eae ey Co., 69 NLRB 1242 (1946).
See, also, Barrett Division, Allied Chemical & Dye Corp.,
_ 65 “NLRB 903 (1946).
7
The Board now views its early practice differently. It con-
tends that it never excluded “managerial employees” from the
Act’s coverage. Rather, it is argued, such personnel were only
excluded from joining rank and file bargaining units either be-
cause they did not share a sufficient “community of interest”
with the rank and file or because they had confidential relation-
ship with the employer in matters concerning labor relations.
These arguments are novel and constitute an attempt to retro-
actively restructure a “policy” to conform to its current view.
There arguments do not withstand analysis.
The Board’s first argument—that from the inception of the
Act “managerial employees” were not excluded from the Act’s
coverage but were merely excluded from rank and file units be-
cause they lacked a sufficient community of interest with larger
groups—is based upon occasional implication and dicta con-
tained in a few cases that such personnel might still be “em-
ployees” within the meaning of the Act,® and is without merit.
The Board has never found a unit of managerial personnel
appropriate. It can hardly be maintained that the failure in
practice to find that such personnel are entitled to Union repre-
sentation constitutes a policy requiring approval of the Board’s
present view. In N. L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., 444 F.
2d 783 (CA 4, 1971), the Board maintained that “confidential”
employees were entitled to the Act’s protection. There, as here,
the Board argued that its policy was merely to exclude the per-
sonnel in issue from rank and file bargaining units, but that
such personnel were still “employees”. The Court observed that
although the Board had, in earlier cases, implied that confi- -
dential employees might be covered by the Act, the Board had
never certified a bargaining unit made up entirely of them. In
response to the Board’s contention, the Court stated:
5. See Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 7 NLRB 1189 (1938); and
Dravo Corp., 54 NLRB 1174 (1944), where the Board specifically
Stated that it was not considering the relationship between the
excluded expediters and buyers and management in making its
decision. reference to the existence of their rights to self-
organization under the Act was pure dictum.
“Simply saying, as the Board does, that confidential em-
ployees have always been given the right to self-organiza-
tion in spite of their exclusion from bargaining units does
not answer the question.” /d., at 786.
Moreover, the same argument was urged on the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit with respect to “managerial em-
ployees” and similarly was rejected. NLRB v. North Arkansas
Electric Cooperative, Inc., 446 F. 2d 602 (CA 8, 1971).
The Second Circuit’s observation in Wheeling raises a sound
challenge which the Board’s argument here cannot overcome.
If, as the Board contends, its pre-Taft-Hartley policy was
merely to exclude managerial personnel from the rank and file,
why then has it never found a separate unit of “managerial
employees” appropriate in and of itself? If the Board's policy
were then as it now contends that it was, it would have been
able to find a separate unit of those employees appropriate.
Even if managerial personnel lacked a sufficient community of
interest to be included within a broader unit, they certainly
would constitute an appropriate unit themselves. “Community
of interest” would not bar such a unit.
However, in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 NLRB 626 (1945),
the Board specifically found that since the duties.and responsi-
bilities of certain time-study personnel made them “managerial”,
they “should neither be included in a unit with other employees
nor established in a separate unit.” Id., at 628-9.° Therefore,
the Board can hardly maintain in retrospect that the mere lack
of “community of interest” as between two groups of covered
_ employees was in fact the Board’s pre-Taft-Hartley policy. .
Rather, “managerial employees” were not accorded the right
to self-organization precisely because they formulated or en-—
forced management policies or exercised discretion in the per-
formance of their duties. =
6. Yale & Towne was overruled in Ford Motor Company, 66
NLRB 1317 (1946), discussed infra on the basis of the Board's
factual determination in Ford that time study personhel were not
“managerial”. The holding in Ford, however, does not reflect
an abandonment of the policy statement expressed in Yale & Towne.
SPELL NATIT REO RAT SOE ME RETA KOK TE TRS ARS ARG GRIME AEM AEP —
9
Further, the Board’s argument that its early policy supports
its present view of excluding from the Act’s coverage only
those managerial persons who formulate or effectuate labor or
personnel policies is demonstrably in error. ‘
First, the Board in its brief to this Court, acknowledges
that its pre-Taft-Hartley policy excluded managerial employees
who were not necessarily concerned with labor relations.’ This’
is supported by Board decisions,* and it can hardly be denied by
the Board now that its policy then contained the restriction it
here urges.
Second, shortly before the 1947 amendments, the Board had
‘occasion to review its policy concerning both “managerial em-
ployees” and “confidential employees” in Ford Motor Co., 66
NLRB 1317 (1946). While the Board held in Ford that it
would thereafter restrict the exclusion of “confidential em-
ployees” to those having a confidential relationship to persons
responsible for formulation of the employer’s labor policy, it
reaffirmed its prior, unrestricted, exclusionary policy regarding
“managerial employees.” ' .
In Ford, the employer contended that certain time study
personnel were either “managerial” or “confidential”, and on
either basis should be excluded from a unit of office clerical
employees. With respect to “managerial employees”, the Board
Stated:
“We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of
rank and file workers executive employees who are in a
position to formulate, determine and effectuate manage-
ment policies. These employees we have considered and
still deem to be ‘managerial’, in that they express and make
operative the decisions of management.” /d., at 1322.
7. Board's brief at Page 13, n. 6.
8. See, e.g., Julian P. Friez & Sons; Spicer Mfg. Co.; Hudson
Motor Car Co.; Vulcan Corp., and those cases cited in Footnotes
3 and 4, supra.
10
About “confidential employees”, the Board said the following: :
“We have also excluded from units of rank and file em-
ployees, persons who, in the regular course of their duties,
have access to confidential data bearing directly upon the
employees’ labor relations, designating them as ‘confiden-
tial’. However, upon re-appraisal, we are of the opinion
our intention to limit the term ‘confidential’, so as to em- j
brace only those employees who assist and act in a con- |
fidential capacity to persons who exercise ‘managerial’
functions in the field of labor relations.” Jd., at 1322.
Had the Board been of the belief that its practice with regard
to “managerial employees” required a similar re-evaluation and
restriction only to exclude those who themselves “exercise ‘man-
agerial’ functions in the field of labor relations”, it presumably
would have so stated.* Thus, when Congress enacted the Taft-
Hartley amendments in 1947, the Board's policy with regard to
managerial personnel was one of exclusion from the coverage
by the Act, and the exclusion was not limited only to those
who formulate and effectuate their employers’ labor policies but
extended to those whose duties involved purely business matters
as well.
B. The Taft-Hartley Amendments.
Prior to the 1947 amendments; the Board’s treatment of
one category of management personnel,—supervisors,—exhibited
far less consistency that did its policy with respect to those
8. As noted above, the Board found in Ford that, based on
their duties, the time employees involved were neither man- |
rial nor confidential. course, the factual finding that the duties —
the at issue did not involve formulation, determina-
er acy nage the Poa of those duties is not a
rejection of the standard itself but, rather, a consistent application
of it. In fact, the Board’s conclusion is supported by its finding
that the time-study personnel were merely engaged in routine fact-
finding duties through the means of time and motion studies.
eS
11
managerial persons such as buyers, expeditors, and commercial
representatives who formulate or effectuate commercial policies
and act as representatives of the employer in dealing with the
public. The Board’s “policy” with regard to supervisory per-
sonnel reached this Court for resolution in Packard Motor Car
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485 (1947). Reaction to that
decision compelled Congress to overturn it by amending the
Act to exclude “supervisors” from coverage.’®
The five to four majority of this Court held in Packard that,
since the term “employee” as defined in the Wagner Act" was
virtually unrestricted so as to include “any” employee, the Board
was not precluded from finding a unit of foremen to be appro-
priate. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and
Justice Burton, dissented. Rejecting the Board’s contention,
Justice Douglas wrote:
“For if foremen are ‘employees’ within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents,
managers, assistant managers, superintendents—indeed, all
who are on the payroll of the company, including the
president; all who are commonly referred to as manage-
ment, with the exception of the directors. If a union of
vice-presidents applied for recognition as a collective bar-
gaining agency, I do not see how we could deny it and
yet allow the present application.” 330 U. S. at 494.
Justice Douglas was of the view that if Congress had intended
such a fundamental change in basic industrial philosophy as
9. The Board had held that foremen were entitled to organize
in an independent union. Union Colleries Coal Co., 41 NLRB
961 (1942). Then it was held that even a te unit of super-
visory would not be te the of
collective i Maryland Co., 49 733
(1943). Fi . in Packard Motor Co., 64 NLRB 1212 (1945)
the Board reversed itself and again held that foremen were entitled
to form their own union. This latter decision reached this Court,
as discussed herein.
10. See, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14, 17
(1947) and S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-5 (1947).
11. Section 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U. S. C. Section 152.
12
that which would result from granting those within the manage-
ment class the right to self-organization, it would have left a
clear and unmistakable trace of that purpose. Reviewing the
legislative history of the Wanger Act, he observed that the
reports and debates were completely barren of any reference
to the collective bargaining problems of supervisory personnel
and concluded that Congress could not, therefore, have intended
the result reached by the majority.
Congress’ response to Packard, the exclusion of “supervisors”
from coverage by the Act, did not contain that portion of
Justice Douglas’ dissent relating to the organization of other
management personnel. Nor do the debates and reports on the
1947 amendments express any Congressional concern that
legislation was needed with respect to the Board’s policy con-
cerning “managerial” employees. The Court below reviewed
this legislative history and interpreted Congressional silence as
a recognition that there were other persons clearly more “man-
agerial” than those involved in labor relations; that it was
inconceivable that the Board would treat such personnel as
employees; and, therefore, that it was not necessary to enact
legislation excluding them.
The Second Circuit’s interpretation is consistent with the
sound principle that the courts “should enforce a statute in
such a manner that its overriding purpose will be achieved,
even if the words used leave room for a contrary interpretation.’?
The overriding purpose of the 1947 Act was to “reconcile and,
insofar as possible, equalize the power of competing economic
forces within the society in order to encourage the making of
voluntary agreements governing labor management relations
and prevent industrial strife. . . . Its purpose is not artificially
to create or manufacture new economic forces.”"*
12. N.L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., supra, at 787, citing
Haberman Vv. Finch, 418 F. 2d 664, 666 (CA 2, 1969).
13. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., 427 F. 2d 936,
946 (CA 6, 1970) and cases cited therein.
a TN Rl aia
EET ~—
13
Justice Douglas, in Packard, had viewed the Board’s policy
with respect to “supervisors” as an artificial creation which was
contrary to the philosophy underlying the Act. Congress acted
to correct that artificiality.
The Board’s hindsight analysis herein creates such an arti-
ficial entity by drawing the line not between the forces of
management and labor but within the management group itself.
Nothing could be more contrary to the express purpose of the
Act.’* The Board never accorded “managerial” employees the
right to organize prior to the 1947 amendments. However,
the Board now asserts that despite its practice to the contrary,
“managerial” employees have always been covered by the Act;
and, therefore, Congressional silence constitutes approval of
the view it now takes. The Eighth Circuit responded to the
Board’s interpretation by stating:
“While not controlling, the Court is entitled to give con-
siderable weight to the construction of a statute by the
administrative agency entrusted with execution when that
statute has been subsequently considered by Congress and
not materially amended. This is especially true here where
Congress enacted an amendment excluding supervisors
from coverage after they had been included by Board
interpretation but did not make reference to ‘managerial
employees’ who had not been so included. N. L. R. B. v.
North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra, at 607.
(Footnotes omitted.)
In short, Congress was silent with respect to the Board’s
practice because that practice was not contrary to the purposes
of the Act. The Board’s contention here, however, involves an
artificial restructuring of that practice that is contrary to Con-
gressional intent. The further contention of the Board that
14. See, Sec. 1, Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 29
U. S. C. Section 141 and See, National Labor Relations Act, 29,
U. S. C. Section 151, declaring Congress’ conviction that free col-
lective bargaining and the prevention of industrial strife can only be
accomplished if the forces of labor and management recognize the
other’s legitimate rights.
14
Congress was mistaken as to the true nature of Board policy
with respect to “managerial” employees is belied by the Board’s
own continued adherence to this “mistaken” policy after 1947.
Moreover, the Board’s contention is contrary to sound policy
and principle.
One of the purposes underlying the Talft-Hartley amendments
was to give effect to the recognized rights of management.
Management’s legitimate goal is to operate the Employer’s busi-
ness and control allocation of resources—both human and tech-
nological—in order to obtain a level of acceptable profitability.
In pursuit of the goal, management must be accorded the right
to formulate and determine its commercial and business policies
unhindered by Union interference. The unionization of those
who formulate and exercise discretion in making critical busi-
ness judgments would have such an interfering effect on the
ability of the Company to function and thus maintain its profit-
ability.
The needs of management require that managerial per-
sonnel have total freedom to function on the Company’s behalf
on its own terms. Unionization of managerial personnel would
impose restrictions upon their conduct as a result of any terms
and conditions contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
Management further requires an undivided. loyalty on the part
of those responsible for making decisions and formulating
policies in all respects—not merely from those involved in
labor or personnel matters. The mere fact of unionization
of such personnel would result in a necessarily divided loyalty.
The limited restriction on the organization of managerial em-
ployees here urged by the Board fails to respect these funda-
mental managerial prerogatives recogmized in the Act. The
language in the concurring opinion of Justices Stewart, Douglas
and Harlan in Fibre-Board Paper Products Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,
379 U. S. 203 (1964), 225-226 is particularly apt in this
respect:
LST TE RTE NIN TSI ANS OED NATE RL I WRI PAM OT TS RESO
15
“It is possible that . . . Congress may eventually decide
to give organized labor or government a far heavier hand
in controlling what until now have been considered the
prerogatives of private business management. That path
would mark a sharp departure from the traditional prin-
ciples of a free enterprise economy. Whether we should
follow it is, within constitutional limitations, for Congress
to choose. But it is a path which Congress certainly did
not choose when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.”
C. Board Policy Subsequent to the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
The history of the Board’s treatment of “managerial” em-
ployees after the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments leaves
no doubt that its practice continued to be one of excluding
such personnel from the Act’s coverage even though their duties
were unrelated to labor or personnel relations.
Shortly after the 1947 amendments, the Board stated that
its policy had been unaffected by the recent enactment. In
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 NLRB 320 (1947)
the Board refused to exclude store managers from a store-wide
unit because their limited duties and responsibilities made them
neither supervisory nor managerial. The Board rejected the
contention of supervisory status because the managers had no
authority with respect to hire, discharge or discipline. In re-
sponse to the contention that they were “managerial”, the Board
stated:
“The determination of ‘managerial’, like the determination
of ‘supervisory’ is to some extent necessarily a matter of
the degree of authority exercised. We have in the past,
and before the passage of the recent amendments to the
Act, recognized and defined as ‘managerial’ employees,
executives who formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions
of their employer, and have excluded such managerial em-
ployees from bargaining units. Matter of Ford Motor Com-
pany, Chicago Branch, 66 N. L. R. B. 1317. (Emphasis
added )
eee
16
“We believe that the Act, as amended, contemplates the
continuance of this practice.”
This practice of excluding “managerial” personnel from the
right to statutory self-organization continued to encompass such
persons as buyers who had no relationship with their employer’s
labor policies. For example, in Denver Dry Goods Co., 74
NLRB 1167 (1947) assistant buyers were excluded from a
unit of sales, clerical and office employees because their duties
were “more closely identified with management.” They were
required to compile good sales records as an example to other
employees, assisted buyers in the selection of merchandise and
took over buyers’ duties when the buyers were absent.
Similarly, in Denton’s, Inc., 83 NLRB 35 (1949) personnel
with buying functions were excluded from a unit of sales em-
ployees because they contacted vendors in the performance of
their duties even though some of them spent only twenty per
cent of their time in buying and the rest in selling. Also, in
American Locomotive Co., 92 NLRB 115 (1950), buyers were
excluded from an office and clerical because they were au-
thorized to negotiate for credit and made purchases for the em-
ployer in an amount of six million dollars a year. The Board
held that such personnel could “not be accorded bargaining
rights under the Act.” Id., at 117.
The Board, in support of its newly enunciated rule, contends,
of course, that managerial personnel such as those in the above
cases were not really excluded from the right of statutorily-
aided self-organization but were merely excluded from the
larger units because they lacked a sufficient interest to be in-
cluded. The fact that they were excluded from larger units
reflects only the fact that the cases arose in that comfext and the
petitioners did not seek a separate unit of those nagerial”
employees; however, .in Swift & Co., 115 NLRB 752 (1956)
the Board ruled squarely.on the propriety of granting the right
' to representation to a unit consisting wholly of “managerial”
employees, adhering to its prior practice as expressed, for ex-
ample, in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra.
17
The personnel at issue in Swift were buyers—procurement
drivers—who kept supplies of eggs and poultry coming into the
employer's plant and exercised discretion in meeting competitors’
prices. They had nothing to do with labor or personnel matters,
but the Board found their duties were an “exercise of a mana-
gerial prerogative.” The petitioning unit sought, alternatively, a
separate unit confined to those employees.
In reliance upon the same legislative history that it here
urges in support of its contrary contention, the Board there
categorically stated:
“We are of the opinion that such a unit is not appropriate.
It was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the
coveragé of the Act all individuals allied with management.
Such individuals cannot be deemed to be employees for
the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, we reaffirm the
Board’s position that representatives of management may
not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act and deny
the Petitioners’ alternative request.” Id., at 753-4 (Foot-
Thus, from the very inception of the Act and continuing for
approximately 30 years, the Board consistently excluded from
the right to union representation those personnel who exercised
managerial functions in purely business related areas, and not
only those who exercised responsibility in the formulation of
labor or personnel policies.
The Board repudiates its clear Statement of policy set forth
in Swift by contending that that case was an aberration and a
“sweeping and inaccurate” statement of its practice.* This
contention is patently without merit. The Board’s statement of
policy in Swift is consistent with both its pre and post 1947
Practice and the proper interpretation of Congressional intent
with respect to that practice.’ Rather, Swift is said to be an
15. Board’s brief at 27.
16. See, Spicer Mfg. Corp., supra; Hudson Motor Car Co.,
supra; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra; Ford Motor Co., supra,
18
“aberration” because it cannot be explained away by the Board
in a manner consistent with the view it now urges on this Court.
In addition to its overruling of Swift, the Board also wishes
now to re-write history.
First, the Board contends that its policy was not as it was
in fact.’’ Next, the Board argues that Congress failed to enact
legislation because it approved non-existent policy under the
mistaken belief as to what that practice really was.’* Finally, the
Board concludes that Swift, which merged the Board’s practice
in fact with a clear statement of that practice, was inaccurate.
In this respect, it is worthy to note that in its first petition for
enforcement in the North Arkansas case,’® the Board, citing a
whole litany of authority, including Swift, which it now attempts
to explain away or repudiate, clung to the very principle that it
now asks this Court to reject. There, the Board argued that it
had always excluded “managerial” personnel “from the protec-
tion of the Act’. The Board further stated its basis for the
policy:
“This exclusionary practice rests on the premise that the
functions and interests of such individuals are more closely
allied with those of management than with production
workers, and therefore they are not truly ‘employees’
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, as read
in conjunction with Section 2(2)” [defining employer].”
Further, the various Circuit Courts of Appeals, called upon
to interpret the Board’s practice, have viewed it as properly
excluding from coverage of the Act not only those managerial
personnel involved in labor relations, but all other managerial
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., supra; Swift & Co., supra;
N. L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., Inc. supra; N. L. R. B. Vv.
North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra.
17. Subpart A above.
18. Subpart B above.
19. 412 F. 2d 324 (CA 8, 1969).
20. 446 F. 2d 602, 605, citing the Board’s brief.
19
personnel as well. A review of those decisions?’ reveals that
there have evolved two independent tests to determine
managerial status: (1) whether the employee is “so closely
related to or aligned with management as to place the employee
in a position of potential conflict of interest between his em-
ployer on the one hand and his fellow workers on the other”
and (2) “whether the employee is formulating, determining
and effectuating his employer’s policies or has discretion, in-
dependent of an employer's established policy, in the per-
formance of his duties.” Jilinois' Journal-Register, Inc. v.
N. L. R. B., 412 F, 2d 37, 41 (CA 7, 1969).
The first test concerns itself with “managerial” employees
who are involved with policies bearing on labor relations, re-
sulting in a potential and serious conflict of interest. However,
contrary to the Board’s urgings, this first test is not, and has
never been, the exclusive measure of managerial status. The
second test, as applied by the Courts as well as previously by
the Board itself, questions whether the individual’s functions in
other areas of managerial responsibility exempt him from the
Act’s coverage.
For example, in N. LwR. B. v. Illinois Journal Register,
supra, at issue was the “managerial” status of certain district
newspaper circulation personnel. To determine whether these
personnel might be managerial under the first test, the court
looked to see what concern, if any, they had with the employees’
labor relations policy. However, to determine whether the cir-
culation personnel qualified under the second test, the court
examined a myriad of non-labor related duties, such as: the
handling of customer complaints; adjusting and remitting sales
receipts; participation in circulation campaigns; attending sales
21. See, International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. N. L.
R. B., 339 F. 2d 116 (CA 2, 1964); Retail Clerks International
Association v. N. L. R. B., 336 F. 2d 642 (CA DC, 1966);
Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 412 F. 2d 37 (CA
7, 1969); Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 424
F 2d 1151 (CA 7, 1970)
20
meetings; recommending discounts for delivery routes; contact-
ing news dealers on behalf of the Employer; leasing space to
serve as substations within their districts; and making purchases.
Similarly, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. N. L. R. B., supra,
the court, under the second test, examined the duties of certain
engineers relating to purely technical matters and to the au-
thority of the engineers to pledge the employers credit. Thus,
the courts have recognized that, under the Act, persons should
properly be excluded from coverage as “managerial” employees
whose duties or functions on behalf of management were not
limited to the creation or effectuation of personnel or labor
relations policies.
D. The Board May Not Reinterpret the Act to Suit a Change
in Policy Without Sound Basis for That Change; the
Board Has Shown No Such Basis Here. q
The National Labor Relations Act reflects the studied will
of Congress as to what this country’s labor-management poli-
cies shall be. Once enacted, the statute does not change unless
the Congress determines that a change is needed. The Board,
on the other hand, is merely the instrument for enforcing the
Act and is not free to reverse a practice of 30 years by merely
taking a revisionist view of history and reinterpretating the
Act in accordance with that view. Such a reversal must have
a sound basis.
For example, in N. L. R. B. v. Quality Manufacturing Co.,
481 F. 2d 1018 (CA 4, 1973) the Board attempted to reverse
a 25-year practice. Prior to the Quality case, the Board had
never found that an employer’s refusal to allow an employee
union representation at an investigatory interview constituted
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board reversed
its view in Quality”® and offered no justification for this reversal
other than that “after reflection” the Board felt that the em-
22 195 NLRB No. 42 (1972). i
~
LNIELOO AL LIL TIT ICO NN CLLR LE I I LO LINN BEET ME Os EINE TOM NAPs ccesiall
Ta seaiiaiian
¢> 7 EDA Oa AD TN ARN EOS ON aR Re LG COT PIE
21
ployer’s conduct constituted a “serious violation” of the Act.
In response to the Board’s contention the Fourth Circuit stated:
“It is clear beyond question, however, that the Board has
no power to alter or rearrange employer-employee relations
to suit its very whim. Rather, the Board can only deter-
mine whether the Act has been violated. And it would
appear that in the entire history of the law as developed
above, the management prerogative of conducting an in-
vestigatory interview such as Quality attempted here has
not been considered a violation of the Act.” N. L. R. B.
Vv. Quality Manufacturing Co., supra, at 1025.
The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion and refused
enforcement of a Board order involving the same policy reversal
at issue in Quality in Mobil Oil Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 482 F.
2d 842 (CA 7, 1973).
During the present.term, this Court had occasion to review
a practice which the Board changed after a lengthy period of
time in N. L. R. B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., ........... U. S.
Ee Pos , Daily Labor Report No. 242 (BNA, December 17, 1973).
Involved was the Board’s reversal of its position regarding
whether a union’s offer to waive initiation fees to those em-
ployees who signed a union recognition fori prior to a Board-
conducted election interfered with the principle of “fair and
free choice of bargaining representatives by employees”
guaranteed by Section 9 of the Act. In 1954 the Board held
that such an offer constituted interference with employees’
selection in a Board conducted election.** Subsequently, the
Board reversed itself merely on the basis of its re-evaluation
that it was “completely illogical to characterize as improper
[the offer of waiver] as inducement or coercion . . .”.%
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Savair, upheld
the Circuit Court’s order denying enforcement of the Board’s
23. Lobue Bros., 109 NLRB 1182 (1954).
24. DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB 1019, at 1021.
22
bargaining order,”® thus rejecting the Board's reversal in policy.
Important here is the reason for rejecting the Board’s view, and
that was the-lack of sound basis for the Board’s reversal of
position. Thus, even in an area admitting to wide latitude and
discretion in the exercise of Board expertise, as is the deter-
mination as to what conduct might constitute “interference”
and “coercion” in the selection of a bargaining agent, the
Board is not free to reverse its course without justifiable
grounds.** Much greater justification must be required for the
Board to reverse itself in an area that involves a question of
its basic jurisdiction, or statutory coverage, such as the issue
involved herein. Particularly significant here is the fact that
during the 30 years of consistent exclusion of all managerial
employees from coverage, Congress has amended the Act twice,
and conceivably could have amended it every year, had it felt
the Board’s practices were contrary to the legislative will. The
Board is not now free to re-write that 30 years without a
sound basis. Merely arguing, as the Board Woes, that it has |
always given “managerial” employees the Act's protection, in
the face of its demonstrable practice to the contrary, is not
such a basis.
25. 470 F. 2d 305 (CA 6, 1973).
26. Justice White, in his dissent in Savair recognized that the
issue involved the question of “the proper allocation of institutional
responsibility between an administrative agency and a reviewing
court.” However, those Labor Board cases relied on by the dis-
sent did not involve reversal of longstanding policy. NLRB v: A. J.
Tower, 329 U. S. 324 (1945) was concerned with a challenge to
the validity of the Board’s post-election rule but not with a
in the Board’s position with respect to that rule; NLRB v. Water-
man S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 326, involved a challenge to the Board’s
-interpretation of the statutory language of the Act, but not a
reversal of the Board’s interpretation of that language; NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969), discussed infra in-
volved the Board’s institution of a new rule requiring employers to
submit an eligibility list in Board elections, but did not involve a
change from a prior position with respect to that tule as is: involved
here. Insofar as the propriety of the Board’s reversal of policy
herein is concerned, these cases are of id.
23
E. The Buyers Involved in the Instant Case Qualify for
Exclusion as “Managerial” Employees.
“Despite the absence of any labor relations function, the em-
ployer’s buyers in this case are managerial employees properly
excludable from the Act's coverage.
As observed by the court below, although the buyers can .
commit the employer's credit for amounts not to exceed five
thousand dollars ($5,000) without concurrence of higher
authority, the aggregate amount so pledged over a nineteen
month period was in excess of seven million dollars, and one
of them alone committed over one million dollars.2" The discre-
tion possessed by these buyers in this respect is comparable
with: that enjoyed by buyers in American Locomotive Co.,
supra, and far more extensive than in Swift & Co., supra.
Further, where the amount of purchase is $5,000 or less,
the buyers have authority to cancel the contract and place the
order with an alternate vendor.* This exercise of managerial
discretion is no less than that which qualified expeditors in
Spicer Mfg. Corp., supra, for exclusion. Also, on contracts
involving the Minute Man project which accounts for seventy
percent of the Employer's sales, the buyers work with a “team
consisting of supervisory personnel from the engineering, quality
assurance, manufacturing and finance departments. . . . Once
agreement [on the terms of the contract] is reached, the buyer
is responsible for seeing that contracts are complied with and
adjusting disputes.”
Thus, the buyers involved in the instant case are required
to exercise independent and sound business judgments in the
performance of duties fundamentally important to the employer’s
operations. The employer's success or failure as an enterprise
depends upon the contractual relationships negotiated, executed
27. 475 F. 2d at 486, n. 1.
28. 475 F. 2d at 487.
29. 475 F. 2d at 486-7.
SSRRTERSTET SED NT POPNES SNE RT
24
and administered by these buyers and upon the buyers’ total com-
mitment to act in the employer's best interests. Though their
duties have no relationship to labor relations or personnel mat-
ters, they are, nonetheless, managerial. They should therefore be
excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations
Act.
eR
Il.
THE LOWER COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT
CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR RULE-MAKING PRO-
CEEDINGS IS IN ERROR AND MUST BE REVERSED.
The court below was unsure whether the Board’s decision
in the instant case represented the enunciation of a legally
erroneous new rule excluding from the Act’s coverage only
those “managerial” employees whose duties involved them in .
labor relations matters, or whether the Board applied its prior
standard of excluding all “manayerial” employees, but merely
found, as a factual matter, those persons in issue not truly
“managerial”. The Court, therefore, concluded that the case
must be remanded to the Board. The Court further held that
if the Board were here establishing a new “rule” for the treat-
ment of managerial personnel, it was precluded from doing so
in an adjudicatory proceeding but must, upon remand, hold
rule-making hearings in accordance with the provisions of
Section 4 of the Administrative Procedures Act.*°
‘The Chamber respectfully disagrees with the court’s holding
in this respect. It is the amicus’ view that the Board did enunciate
a new and legally erroneous rule in this case, but its action,
though requiring reversal, does not require it to accept a re-
mand for conducting rule-making hearings.
The Second Circuit’s holding rests in part on its uncertainty
as to the basis for the Board’s decision in this case. The Court,
therefore, felt that judicial determination as to the legality of the
30. 5 U.S. C. Sec. 553. :
a nn
PLT PSOE RAE I ES ATP PRR REE PLS TP I TRL ERT VLR PETRIE NN INE IN SYN TMT
25
'
newly enunciated rule was precluded by this Court's first Chenery
opinion. S. E. C. v. Chenery C
In Chenery, this Court, in di
reviewability of agency action, sta
» 318 U. S. 80 (1943).
ing the principles governi
law. In either ewent the orderly functioning of the process
of review requires that the grounds upon which the ad-
ministrative agemcy acted be clearly disclosed and ade-
quately sustained|.” /Jd., at 94.
' However, the basis; for the Board’s decision herein is not
uncertain. The Board! did not dispute the Employer's conten-
tion that Bell’s buyers were “managerial”. Rather, the Board
concluded that despite: the fact tha: the buyers might be “mana-
gerial”, they were nonetheless entitled to union representa-
tion.” This is the thrust of the Board’s whole argument, and
there exists no uncerttainty that the Board’s decision rests on
this basis. Therefore, the barrier of uncertainty does not here
exist to preclude this Court from ruling on the legality of the
Board’s determination, and there is no need for a remand on
that basis.**
However, the issue of uncertainty is only one of the reasons
for the Second Circuit’'s holding. The second, and perhaps more
critical, is the court's view that the Board could not properly
fromulate a new policy, having the effect of a rule to be
31. See 197 NLRB No. 30, supra.
32. However, it is recognized that even if this Court declares
the Board’s newly enuinciated policy invalid, a remand might be
required to determine whether Rell’s buyers are nevertheless “man-
agerial” under the proper test.
PERRET WO SSMS ER OFSTED =
26
prospectively applied in all cases, in an adjudicatory proceeding
but, rather, is required to conduct rule-making hearings in ac-
cordance with Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Chamber similarly disagrees with this argument and, in this
respect, agrees with the Board that rule-making would be an
inappropriate procedure for deciding the issue herein.*
The basis for the Second Circuit’s view is that the Board,
if it chooses, as it has here done, to reverse a policy of long
standing respecting its treatment of “managerial” employees,—
particularly since the Board had engendered a justifiable con-
trary belief as to what its practice had been,—is required to
engage in rule making as a precondition to effecting such a
policy change. The Court relies for its view on an expression
of approval of the rule-making process made in the second
Chenery decision, S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194
(1947) and on the observations of Justice Fortas, speaking ~
for the plurality, and Justices Douglas and Harlan, dissenting,
in N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Company, 394 U. S. 759
(1969) regarding the Board’s formulation of its Excelsior
rule.** Pak
While it is correct, as noted by the court below, that in
Chenery, supra, at 202, this Court observed that while “[t]he
function of filling the interstices of the [Securities] Act should
be performed, as much as possible, through . . . quasi-legislative
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future . . .”, this
Court further noted that “. . . any rigid requirement to that
effect would make the administrative process inflexible and
incapable of dealing with many specialized problems which
33. To be sure, the Chamber, as argued in the preceding sec-
tions of this brief, disagrees with the Board’s theory in support
of its decision and order and that the policy as set forth
therein is a exercise of its duties under the National Labor
Relations Act; however, we agree, for the reasons set forth here,
that an adjudicatory proceeding is a proper procedure for resolving
the question presented.
34. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966).
—
27
arise.” Thus, this Court's expression in Chenery of a preference
for rule-making proceedings over adjudicatory proceedings as a
means for formulating agency rules or policy, must be taken as
qualified; and, whether or not a particular change in policy
might more properly proceed by’ ad hoc litigation would depend
upon whether any standard that might result through quasi-
legislative proceedings would contribute to the administrative
process in dealing with the problem.
Insofar as this particular change in Board policy is concerned,
it is not unlike many others which have preceded it to the
Courts of Appeals® and to this Court®* out of adjudicatory
proceedings. This particular issue, like others which arise under
the National Labor Relations Act, is not most efficiently and
completely resolved through rule-making because any rule that
might result would of necessity have to be sufficiently broad to
cover not only Bell’s buyers, or buyers in general, but also any
personnel of any employer subject to the Act alleged to be
“managerial”. This would be true no matter whether the rule
so formulated were, as the Board argues, restricted to labor
relations matters, or to all management functions. Under either
fest, an evidentiary hearing would have to be held in each
case to determine whether those persons in issue were within
or without the rule. To require the Board to hold hearings to
formulate such rule would not contribute to the Board’s process
in dealing with the issue since a case-by-case determination
must be made in any event. Indeed, proceeding by rule-making
35. See, for example, NLRB v. Quality Manufacturing Co.,
supra, and Mobile Oil Corp. v. NLRB, supra, discussed in Subpart
D, supra. a
36. See, for example: NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S.
575 (1969), wherein the Board announced a change in policy for
determining -whether an employer unlawfully refuses to i
when presented with a union’s claim of majority status for the
first time in proceedings before this Court; and NLRB v. Savair
Mfg. Co., supra, where, this term, the Board’s reversal of its long-
term policy regarding the loyalty of a union’s waiver of initiation
fees was rejected.
28
would, under the circumstances, be a wasteful and unnecessary
act.’
Alternatively,, the Board could, after holding hearings,
promulgate a narrow and specific set of rules governing particu-
lar cases. However, such a set of rules, though perhaps capable
of dealing with the buyers at issue here, could not conceivably
be broad enor gh to encompass the myriad duties of all personnel
in each plant, store, shop or industry in this country. In short,
such rules would make the Board’s processes “inflexible and
incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems
which arise.”
Moreover, N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon, does not, as the
court below suggests, detract from the conclusion that ad hoc
litigation is the preferable procedure for resolving issues as
the one presented herein. Indeed, it furthers that conclusion.
Wyman-Gordon involved a “rule” in the sense that it could
be, and was to be, applied to fit all cases at all times. To
require, as the Excelsior rule does, that an employer submit to
the Board a list of eligible voters, does not involve factual
inquiries on a case-by-case basis as does the resolution of the
problem here, where findings, conclusions and orders in each
case must be developed by evidence and supported by facts,—
facts that will vary in every case. This procedure is not “rule-
making” although the decisions and orders of the Board be-
come its “policy”. Justice Fortas observed the distinction in
Wyman-Gordon when he noted:
“Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles
for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied
and announced therein. See Friendly, The Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies 36-52 (1962). They generally pro-
vide a guide to action that the agency may be expected
to take in future cases. Subject to the qualified role of
stare decisis in the administrative process, they may serve
as precedents. But this is far from saying, as the Solicitor
General suggests, that commands, decisions, or policies
announced in adjudication are “rules” in the sense that
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29
they must, without more, be obeyed by the affected public.”
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra, at 765 (footnote
omitted). y
Here, the Board’s new “rule” is a reversal of policy, and as
such, serves as precedent to inform all those concerned that it
will act in accordance with its new policy when presented with
an allegation of “managerial” status. It is not a command
in the sense that it must be obeyed by all persons in the
future.*’ The issue of managerial status in each and every case
must still be litigated even under the Board’s new “rule”, un-
less reversed by this Court.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit's holding that this case must
be remanded for rule-making proceedings must be reversed.
37. As pointed out by the Board in its brief at 31, the factor
which caused Justice Douglas and Harlan to dissent in Wyman-
Gordon was not the formulation
rather, the fact that the Board
— with Section 4 of the Administrative
P
30
CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that the Court affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it concluded
that all “managerial” employees, whatever the nature of the
management duties they perform, are not covered by the
National Labor Relations Act and reverse that part of the
court’s decision remanding this case to the Board for rule-
making proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
MILTON SMITH,
General Counsel,
RICHARD B. BERMAN,
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America,
1615 H Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20006,
GERARD C. SMETANA,
925 South Homan Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois 60607,
JERRY KRONENBERG,
HOWARD MOCcERF,
BorOvsky, EHRLICH & KRONENBERG,
120 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603,
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.