Motion Amicus Curiae — NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.

Supreme Court brief1974

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

SUPREME COURT, U. Ss.

DEC 29 1973

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1973.

No. 72-1598

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner,

VS.

BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY DIVISION OF

TEXTRON, INC.,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

MOTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR LEAVE TO

FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

and

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF THE RESPONDENT.

MILTON SMITH,

General Counsel,

RICHARD B. BERMAN,

Chamber of Commerce of the

United States of America,

1615 H Street, N. W.,

Washington, D. C. 20006,

GERARD C. SMETANA,

925 South Homan Avenue,

Chicago, Illinois 60607,

JERRY KRONENBERG,

HOWARD MOCcERF,

BoROVSKY, EHRLICH & KRONENBERG,

120 South LaSalle Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60603,

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae.

IN THE

dine Court of the Gnited States

OcToBer TERM, 1973.

No. 72-1598.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner,

WS.

BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY DIVISION OF

TEXTRON, INC.,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

MOTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR LEAVE TO

FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

(herein the “Chamber”) respectfully moves this Court for

leave to file a brief amicus curiae in support of the position

urged herein by the respondent, Bell Aerospace Company

Division of Textron, Inc. In support whereof, the following

is shown:

1. The Chamber is a federation consisting of a membership

of over 3,700 state and local chambers of commerce and trade

and professional associations, a direct business membership in

AE LEE ERE IE NT eT OVO

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

Interest of the Amicus .......................0.... 1

Summary of Argument............................ 2

a Se errr rs a

I. Managerial Personnel Are Not Covered by the

National Labor Relations Act; the Board’s Conten-

tion That Such Personnel Are “Employees”, En-

titled to the Right of Self-Organization Conferred

Therein Is Contrary to the Basic Policies and Pur-

i th PETE TET TTT en oe a

A. Board Policy Prior to the Taft-Hartley Amend-

ERAN GON 4 6084480044444 8 hae DERE 5

B. The Taft-Hartley Amendments............ 10

C. Board Policy Subsequent to the Taft-Hartley

Amendments

D. The Board May Not Reinterpret the Act to

Suit a Change in the Policy Without Sound

Basis for That Change; the Board Has Shown

No Such Basis Here ...............0..... 20

E. The Buyers Involved in the Instant Case Qual-

ify for Exclusion as “Managerial” Employees 23

II. The Lower Court's Holding That the Instant Case

Must Be Remanded for Rule-Making Proceedings

Is in Error and Must Be Reversed..........._ 24

POND. 6 sr ene 7IKs 5 snes devcateusres acess 30

li

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

Cases.

American Locomotive Co., 92 NLRB 115 (1950)..... 16, 23

Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 7 NLRB 1189 (1938)...... 7

Barret Division, Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 65 NLRB

Pe CED ec CANE AGA A OVA 6 BAe Cds na cccnnnnes 6

Denton’s, Inc., 83 NLRB 35 (1949) ................ 16

Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 NLRB 1167 (1947)........ 16

DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB 1019, enf'd 470 F. 2d 305

oe ER OE Uy ere ee eee eT ee eee 21,22

Dravo Corp., 54 NLRB 1174 (1944) ............... 7

Electric Controller & Manufacturing Co., 69 NLRB 1242

CE ok c0 a ois Pade e se bk aknk anaes Cee Cae iwins 6

Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966) . .26, 28, 29

Fibre-Board Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203

Bee Seat Se ae ee GOA ae pe 14

Ford Motor Company, 66 NLRB 1317 (1946). .8, 9, 10, 15, 17

Haberman v. Finch, 418 F. 2d 664 (CA 2, 1969)...... 12

Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 NLRB 509 (1944)....... 6, 9, 17

Illinois State Journal Register, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 412 F. 2d

ee Oe i ok uhh chan Koh ao hee Kaas eRe 19

International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union v. N. L.

Oe Bh, eee es Oe Oe tk Ms CE aa wink vc cee tncaes 19

Julian P. Friez & Sons, 47 NLRB 43 (1943)........... 6,9

Lobue Bros., 109 NLRB 1182 (1954) .............. 21

Maryland Drydock Co., 49 NLRB 733 (1943)......... 11

Mobil Oil Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 482 F. 2d 842 (CA 7,

J

iii

N. L. R. B. v. A. J. Tower, 329 U. S. 324 (1945)...... 22

N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575 ( 80GS) 2s 3

N. L. R. B. v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.,

446 F. 2d 602 (CA 8, 1971) .... 0.06. concen 8, 13, 18

N. L. R. B. v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 481 F. 2d 1018

CRAG, BOTS ali ie bd csc wank va dbiwad 20, 21, 27

N. L. R. B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., oS Saxea AF

Daily Labor Report No. 242 (BNA, Dec. 17, 1973)...

ithe. ks Yndb 6 a6 NOOR BG n0. ke wea eed BERS 21, 22, 27

N. L. R. B. v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 326........ 22

N. L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., 44 F. 2d 783 (CA

Ry RROD bekup Shhh a5 0 Ciena cas eucen: 7, 8, 12, 18

N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 294 U. S. 759 (1964) 3

N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969)

< CEE PES KOA ES NO 4600005 Ueasbe addin ddetal 22, 26, 28, 29

Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485

GOUEED «0's 6A Saeen olen PRG Obie ba Sk ea kk 11, 12, 13

Packard Motor Co., 64 NLRB 1212 ERE s hbo dan kns 11

Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 NLRB 320

REED Kha c5 5 0 ie SOR EEAR SEES 6 oirda ce eoueas 15, 18

Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., 427 F. 2d 936

pt Ne Bicectny., LE EP EORES TIOEED 12

Quality Manufacturing Co., 195 NLRB No. 42 (1972).. 20

Retail Clerks International Association v. N. L. R. B., 336

Po Mls BOD ov cc kokesatdgakckcn 19

Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 95 2.) piesa ae 6

S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943)......... 25

S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947)....2.. 26, 27

Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 NLRB 1491 (1944)....... 6,9, 17,23

Swift & Co., 115 NLRB 752 (1956).......... 16, 17, 18, 23

iv

Union Colleries Coal Co., 41 NLRB 961 (1942)....... 11

Vulcan Corp., 58 NLRB 733 (1944) ...........004. 6,9

Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 64 NLRB 547 (1945).... 6

Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 424 F. 2d

ESSE CCK: Fi 2998) a vn ewan cies veeveyacnwesd 19, 20

Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 NLRB 626 (1945)..... 8, 16, 17

Statutes.

National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449,

450) 29 U. S.C. 151, 152

PU BES) oon 6c 0 064554568965 08s Kae ises 11

National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136,

73 Stat. 519) 29 U. S. C. 141, 151 et seq.

NS BF icnkd-6 ch x6 49 bow ba Rk w hs 0b 060s ese 54% 13

ee BURSA) oak kc ni Kowk ee wven aes cress 20

I oon o a ok ai 4454 O46 oO beh a bes eee 21

Administrative Procedures Act,

Section 4 (5 U. S.C. S53) 2... ccc ccc ccc vcvces 24

Miscellaneous.

H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14, 17

EEG ES nbs Kock Waekk aw 89s eR tae xe eve bees 11

S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-5 (1947)...... 11

js ah Sas i RR at me

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973.

No. 72-1598.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Petitioner,

vs. J :

BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY DIVISION OF

TEXTRON, INC.,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF THE RESPONDENT.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.

The interest of the Chamber of Commerce of the United

States of America is set forth in the foregoing Motion for

Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae herein.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

I.

Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the

National Labor Relations Board’s policy was to exclude “man-

agerial” employees from the statutory right to organize under

the National Labor Relations Act. This practice was one of

total exclusion, for the Board never granted personnel it found

to be “managerial” the statutory right to engage in collective

bargaining with their employer. Moreover, this exclusionary

practice was not limited only to those managerial personnel

who were involved in the formulation of their employer’s labor

relations policies, but extended to those involved in purely

business and commercial matters as well.

During the same period, however, the Board allowed fore-

men and supervisors to form unions and collectively bargain

with their employer. Congress found that this practice was

contrary to the policies of the Act, and in 1947, amended the

- Act to exclude “supervisors” from its protection. However,

Congress had no reason to quarrel with the Board’s described

practice of excluding other managerial personnel because that

practice comported with the policy and principle of maintaining

and preserving within the Act management’s legitimate right

to manage.

After the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board continued

to exclude all “managerial” employees from the Act’s coverage

holding that such exclusion was consistent with the will of

Congress. In the instant case, however, the Board has taken

the position that managerial personnel are not excluded from

the Act’s coverage unless their duties might involve a conflict

of interest between their obligation to the employer and their

loyalty to the bargaining unit and that this conflict can only

Sa aa Pte Oe

3

arise if the persons at issue are involved in labor relations or

personnel matters. According to the Board’s view, all other

managerial personnel are included within the Act’s coverage.

The Board’s new and revised position is contrary to its own

past practice, Congressional intent and sound principles of

labor-management relations pursuant to which persons charged

with the creation and effectuation of management policies,

whether labor relations oriented or not, must have a sole, un-

divided allegiance to management.

II.

Although the Board enunciated a new and erroneous policy

with respect to its treatment of “managerial” employees in this

matter, it was not precluded from doing so in an adjudicatory

proceeding, rather than through rule-making hearings, as the

court below concluded. Rule-making is not the most appro-

priate procedure for resolving the issue herein because any rule

that might result would be incapable of dealing with the multi-

tude of factual situations in ‘which the issue might present

itself. That is, rule-making would result in no substantial

judicial or administrative economy. Ad hoc litigation is the

satisfactory way of resolving such an issue.

Moreover, this case is governed by N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-

Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1964) wherein this Court held

that the Board was not precluded from formulating a rule in

an adjudicatory proceeding so long as the Board applied the

tule to the parties to that proceeding and not just prospectively.

The rule enunciated in this case, however erroneous, was formu-

lated in an adjudicatory proceeding affecting the parties to this

proceeding.

ARGUMENT.

L

MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL ARE NOT COVERED BY THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT; THE BOARD'S

CONTENTION THAT SUCH PERSONNEL ARE “EM-

PLOYEES”, ENTITLED TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-OR-

GANIZATION CONFERRED THEREIN IS CONTRARY TO

THE BASIC POLICIES AND PURPOSES OF THE ACT.

In this case’ the Board determined that buyers employed by

Bell Aerospace Company, Division of Textron, Inc., constituted

a unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes and, upon

petition by a union, were subject to the Board’s procedures.

While the Board did not disagree that the buyers in question

might well be “managerial” employees, it nevertheless con-

cluded that managerial personnel were “employees” covered

by the Act. The rule enunciated and applied by the Board

was that “managerial” employees are so covered by the Act

unless their duties and responsibilities “include determinations

which should be made free of any conflict of interest which

could arise if the person involved was a participating member

of a labor organization.” The Board found no such conflict

herein and ordered the Employer to bargain with the labor

organization representing the unit of buyers.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforce-

ment of the Board’s order.? The Court concluded that all true

“managerial” employees were excluded from coverage by the

1. The Board’s order in the underlying representation case is

reported at 190 NLRB No. 66 (1970); its Order denying recon-

sideration is reported at 196 NLRB No. 127 (1972); and its

Decision and Order putting into issue the question here under con-

sideration is reported at 197 NLRB No. 30 (1972).

2. 475 F. 2d 485 (CA 2, 1973).

5

Act, and found that the exclusion was not limited to the “con-

flict of interest” test as contended by the Board, but embraced

any person who is involved in “formulating, determining and

effectuating his employers’ policies or has discretion, inde-

pendent of an employer’s established policy, in the performance

of his duties.”

The issue which thus separates the Board from the Second

Circuit relates to the kind of managerial personnel exempt

from the Act. In satisfaction of its own test, the Board would

exclude only those who formulate or effectuate their employer’s

labor or employment policies; the court would additionally

exclude those who act for their employer in purely business

respects unrelated to matters of labor policy or labor relations,

such as the buyers involved herein. :

Analysis of the history of the Board’s own policy with respect

to managerial personnel reveals the error the rule enunciated

by the Board in this matter. That history reveals that, until

this instant case, the Board has never accorded “managerial”

employees bargaining rights under the Act, and nothing that

Congress has said remotely suggests approval of the Board’s

present interpretation of its policy.

A. Board Policy Prior to the Taft-Hartley Amendments.

Though the Wagner Act nowhere contains the term “man-

agerial employee”, the Board, as a matter of policy, has con-

sistently excluded personnel it found to be within that category

from coverage under the statute. Moreover, the Board excluded

such personnel because their duties encompassed formulation,

determination and effectuation of their employers’ policies or

because they had independent discretion in the performance of

their duties. The exclusion was not restricted to only those

who formulated or enforced labor or personnel policies.

As observed by the Court below, the concept of “managerial

employee” first arose in the context of cases in which either the

6

employer or the union argued that certain personnel should be

excluded from proposed larger bargaining units because, as

a result of their duties, those persons were in a close relation-

ship with management. Thus, for example, in Julian P. Friez

& Sons, 47 NLRB 43 (1943), the Board excluded from a

unit of production and maintenance employees, personnel

charged with expediting the completion of orders and assuring

adherence to production time schedules because they were

“closely related to management”.

In Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 NLRB 1491 (1944), expeditors

who contacted vendors, placed orders, kept records of the

progress of deliveries and had authority to reassign orders, were

excluded from a unit of office clerical, technical and profes-

sional employees because “the authority possessed by these

employees to exercise their discretion in making commitments

on behalf of the Company stamps them as managerial.* Buyers

such as those involved herein were similarly excluded from the

statutorily-recognized right of self-organization. Thus, in Hud-

son Motor Car Co., 55 NLRB 509 (1944) buyers were ex-

cluded from a clerical unit since they purchased “all materials

required by the Company and were, therefore, ‘closely allied

to management.’ ”

Similarly, in Vulcan Corp., 58 NLRB 733 (1944) a buyer

was excluded from a production and maintenance unit because

the responsibility of his position placed him within the “man-

agerial” category.*

Analysis of the Board’s practice under the Wagner Act thus

reveals that the Board excluded personnel from the rights of

Union representation because their duties and responsibilities

categorized them as “managerial”, and that the exclusionary

practice was not restricted only to those who had responsibilities

in the area of labor relations.

3. See, also, Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 95 (1938); Westing-

house Air Brake Co., 64 NLRB 547 (1945); Electric Controller &

eae ey Co., 69 NLRB 1242 (1946).

See, also, Barrett Division, Allied Chemical & Dye Corp.,

_ 65 “NLRB 903 (1946).

7

The Board now views its early practice differently. It con-

tends that it never excluded “managerial employees” from the

Act’s coverage. Rather, it is argued, such personnel were only

excluded from joining rank and file bargaining units either be-

cause they did not share a sufficient “community of interest”

with the rank and file or because they had confidential relation-

ship with the employer in matters concerning labor relations.

These arguments are novel and constitute an attempt to retro-

actively restructure a “policy” to conform to its current view.

There arguments do not withstand analysis.

The Board’s first argument—that from the inception of the

Act “managerial employees” were not excluded from the Act’s

coverage but were merely excluded from rank and file units be-

cause they lacked a sufficient community of interest with larger

groups—is based upon occasional implication and dicta con-

tained in a few cases that such personnel might still be “em-

ployees” within the meaning of the Act,® and is without merit.

The Board has never found a unit of managerial personnel

appropriate. It can hardly be maintained that the failure in

practice to find that such personnel are entitled to Union repre-

sentation constitutes a policy requiring approval of the Board’s

present view. In N. L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., 444 F.

2d 783 (CA 4, 1971), the Board maintained that “confidential”

employees were entitled to the Act’s protection. There, as here,

the Board argued that its policy was merely to exclude the per-

sonnel in issue from rank and file bargaining units, but that

such personnel were still “employees”. The Court observed that

although the Board had, in earlier cases, implied that confi- -

dential employees might be covered by the Act, the Board had

never certified a bargaining unit made up entirely of them. In

response to the Board’s contention, the Court stated:

5. See Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 7 NLRB 1189 (1938); and

Dravo Corp., 54 NLRB 1174 (1944), where the Board specifically

Stated that it was not considering the relationship between the

excluded expediters and buyers and management in making its

decision. reference to the existence of their rights to self-

organization under the Act was pure dictum.

“Simply saying, as the Board does, that confidential em-

ployees have always been given the right to self-organiza-

tion in spite of their exclusion from bargaining units does

not answer the question.” /d., at 786.

Moreover, the same argument was urged on the Court of Ap-

peals for the Eighth Circuit with respect to “managerial em-

ployees” and similarly was rejected. NLRB v. North Arkansas

Electric Cooperative, Inc., 446 F. 2d 602 (CA 8, 1971).

The Second Circuit’s observation in Wheeling raises a sound

challenge which the Board’s argument here cannot overcome.

If, as the Board contends, its pre-Taft-Hartley policy was

merely to exclude managerial personnel from the rank and file,

why then has it never found a separate unit of “managerial

employees” appropriate in and of itself? If the Board's policy

were then as it now contends that it was, it would have been

able to find a separate unit of those employees appropriate.

Even if managerial personnel lacked a sufficient community of

interest to be included within a broader unit, they certainly

would constitute an appropriate unit themselves. “Community

of interest” would not bar such a unit.

However, in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 NLRB 626 (1945),

the Board specifically found that since the duties.and responsi-

bilities of certain time-study personnel made them “managerial”,

they “should neither be included in a unit with other employees

nor established in a separate unit.” Id., at 628-9.° Therefore,

the Board can hardly maintain in retrospect that the mere lack

of “community of interest” as between two groups of covered

_ employees was in fact the Board’s pre-Taft-Hartley policy. .

Rather, “managerial employees” were not accorded the right

to self-organization precisely because they formulated or en-—

forced management policies or exercised discretion in the per-

formance of their duties. =

6. Yale & Towne was overruled in Ford Motor Company, 66

NLRB 1317 (1946), discussed infra on the basis of the Board's

factual determination in Ford that time study personhel were not

“managerial”. The holding in Ford, however, does not reflect

an abandonment of the policy statement expressed in Yale & Towne.

SPELL NATIT REO RAT SOE ME RETA KOK TE TRS ARS ARG GRIME AEM AEP —

9

Further, the Board’s argument that its early policy supports

its present view of excluding from the Act’s coverage only

those managerial persons who formulate or effectuate labor or

personnel policies is demonstrably in error. ‘

First, the Board in its brief to this Court, acknowledges

that its pre-Taft-Hartley policy excluded managerial employees

who were not necessarily concerned with labor relations.’ This’

is supported by Board decisions,* and it can hardly be denied by

the Board now that its policy then contained the restriction it

here urges.

Second, shortly before the 1947 amendments, the Board had

‘occasion to review its policy concerning both “managerial em-

ployees” and “confidential employees” in Ford Motor Co., 66

NLRB 1317 (1946). While the Board held in Ford that it

would thereafter restrict the exclusion of “confidential em-

ployees” to those having a confidential relationship to persons

responsible for formulation of the employer’s labor policy, it

reaffirmed its prior, unrestricted, exclusionary policy regarding

“managerial employees.” ' .

In Ford, the employer contended that certain time study

personnel were either “managerial” or “confidential”, and on

either basis should be excluded from a unit of office clerical

employees. With respect to “managerial employees”, the Board

Stated:

“We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of

rank and file workers executive employees who are in a

position to formulate, determine and effectuate manage-

ment policies. These employees we have considered and

still deem to be ‘managerial’, in that they express and make

operative the decisions of management.” /d., at 1322.

7. Board's brief at Page 13, n. 6.

8. See, e.g., Julian P. Friez & Sons; Spicer Mfg. Co.; Hudson

Motor Car Co.; Vulcan Corp., and those cases cited in Footnotes

3 and 4, supra.

10

About “confidential employees”, the Board said the following: :

“We have also excluded from units of rank and file em-

ployees, persons who, in the regular course of their duties,

have access to confidential data bearing directly upon the

employees’ labor relations, designating them as ‘confiden-

tial’. However, upon re-appraisal, we are of the opinion

our intention to limit the term ‘confidential’, so as to em- j

brace only those employees who assist and act in a con- |

fidential capacity to persons who exercise ‘managerial’

functions in the field of labor relations.” Jd., at 1322.

Had the Board been of the belief that its practice with regard

to “managerial employees” required a similar re-evaluation and

restriction only to exclude those who themselves “exercise ‘man-

agerial’ functions in the field of labor relations”, it presumably

would have so stated.* Thus, when Congress enacted the Taft-

Hartley amendments in 1947, the Board's policy with regard to

managerial personnel was one of exclusion from the coverage

by the Act, and the exclusion was not limited only to those

who formulate and effectuate their employers’ labor policies but

extended to those whose duties involved purely business matters

as well.

B. The Taft-Hartley Amendments.

Prior to the 1947 amendments; the Board’s treatment of

one category of management personnel,—supervisors,—exhibited

far less consistency that did its policy with respect to those

8. As noted above, the Board found in Ford that, based on

their duties, the time employees involved were neither man- |

rial nor confidential. course, the factual finding that the duties —

the at issue did not involve formulation, determina-

er acy nage the Poa of those duties is not a

rejection of the standard itself but, rather, a consistent application

of it. In fact, the Board’s conclusion is supported by its finding

that the time-study personnel were merely engaged in routine fact-

finding duties through the means of time and motion studies.

eS

11

managerial persons such as buyers, expeditors, and commercial

representatives who formulate or effectuate commercial policies

and act as representatives of the employer in dealing with the

public. The Board’s “policy” with regard to supervisory per-

sonnel reached this Court for resolution in Packard Motor Car

Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485 (1947). Reaction to that

decision compelled Congress to overturn it by amending the

Act to exclude “supervisors” from coverage.’®

The five to four majority of this Court held in Packard that,

since the term “employee” as defined in the Wagner Act" was

virtually unrestricted so as to include “any” employee, the Board

was not precluded from finding a unit of foremen to be appro-

priate. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and

Justice Burton, dissented. Rejecting the Board’s contention,

Justice Douglas wrote:

“For if foremen are ‘employees’ within the meaning of

the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents,

managers, assistant managers, superintendents—indeed, all

who are on the payroll of the company, including the

president; all who are commonly referred to as manage-

ment, with the exception of the directors. If a union of

vice-presidents applied for recognition as a collective bar-

gaining agency, I do not see how we could deny it and

yet allow the present application.” 330 U. S. at 494.

Justice Douglas was of the view that if Congress had intended

such a fundamental change in basic industrial philosophy as

9. The Board had held that foremen were entitled to organize

in an independent union. Union Colleries Coal Co., 41 NLRB

961 (1942). Then it was held that even a te unit of super-

visory would not be te the of

collective i Maryland Co., 49 733

(1943). Fi . in Packard Motor Co., 64 NLRB 1212 (1945)

the Board reversed itself and again held that foremen were entitled

to form their own union. This latter decision reached this Court,

as discussed herein.

10. See, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14, 17

(1947) and S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-5 (1947).

11. Section 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U. S. C. Section 152.

12

that which would result from granting those within the manage-

ment class the right to self-organization, it would have left a

clear and unmistakable trace of that purpose. Reviewing the

legislative history of the Wanger Act, he observed that the

reports and debates were completely barren of any reference

to the collective bargaining problems of supervisory personnel

and concluded that Congress could not, therefore, have intended

the result reached by the majority.

Congress’ response to Packard, the exclusion of “supervisors”

from coverage by the Act, did not contain that portion of

Justice Douglas’ dissent relating to the organization of other

management personnel. Nor do the debates and reports on the

1947 amendments express any Congressional concern that

legislation was needed with respect to the Board’s policy con-

cerning “managerial” employees. The Court below reviewed

this legislative history and interpreted Congressional silence as

a recognition that there were other persons clearly more “man-

agerial” than those involved in labor relations; that it was

inconceivable that the Board would treat such personnel as

employees; and, therefore, that it was not necessary to enact

legislation excluding them.

The Second Circuit’s interpretation is consistent with the

sound principle that the courts “should enforce a statute in

such a manner that its overriding purpose will be achieved,

even if the words used leave room for a contrary interpretation.’?

The overriding purpose of the 1947 Act was to “reconcile and,

insofar as possible, equalize the power of competing economic

forces within the society in order to encourage the making of

voluntary agreements governing labor management relations

and prevent industrial strife. . . . Its purpose is not artificially

to create or manufacture new economic forces.”"*

12. N.L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., supra, at 787, citing

Haberman Vv. Finch, 418 F. 2d 664, 666 (CA 2, 1969).

13. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., 427 F. 2d 936,

946 (CA 6, 1970) and cases cited therein.

a TN Rl aia

EET ~—

13

Justice Douglas, in Packard, had viewed the Board’s policy

with respect to “supervisors” as an artificial creation which was

contrary to the philosophy underlying the Act. Congress acted

to correct that artificiality.

The Board’s hindsight analysis herein creates such an arti-

ficial entity by drawing the line not between the forces of

management and labor but within the management group itself.

Nothing could be more contrary to the express purpose of the

Act.’* The Board never accorded “managerial” employees the

right to organize prior to the 1947 amendments. However,

the Board now asserts that despite its practice to the contrary,

“managerial” employees have always been covered by the Act;

and, therefore, Congressional silence constitutes approval of

the view it now takes. The Eighth Circuit responded to the

Board’s interpretation by stating:

“While not controlling, the Court is entitled to give con-

siderable weight to the construction of a statute by the

administrative agency entrusted with execution when that

statute has been subsequently considered by Congress and

not materially amended. This is especially true here where

Congress enacted an amendment excluding supervisors

from coverage after they had been included by Board

interpretation but did not make reference to ‘managerial

employees’ who had not been so included. N. L. R. B. v.

North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra, at 607.

(Footnotes omitted.)

In short, Congress was silent with respect to the Board’s

practice because that practice was not contrary to the purposes

of the Act. The Board’s contention here, however, involves an

artificial restructuring of that practice that is contrary to Con-

gressional intent. The further contention of the Board that

14. See, Sec. 1, Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 29

U. S. C. Section 141 and See, National Labor Relations Act, 29,

U. S. C. Section 151, declaring Congress’ conviction that free col-

lective bargaining and the prevention of industrial strife can only be

accomplished if the forces of labor and management recognize the

other’s legitimate rights.

14

Congress was mistaken as to the true nature of Board policy

with respect to “managerial” employees is belied by the Board’s

own continued adherence to this “mistaken” policy after 1947.

Moreover, the Board’s contention is contrary to sound policy

and principle.

One of the purposes underlying the Talft-Hartley amendments

was to give effect to the recognized rights of management.

Management’s legitimate goal is to operate the Employer’s busi-

ness and control allocation of resources—both human and tech-

nological—in order to obtain a level of acceptable profitability.

In pursuit of the goal, management must be accorded the right

to formulate and determine its commercial and business policies

unhindered by Union interference. The unionization of those

who formulate and exercise discretion in making critical busi-

ness judgments would have such an interfering effect on the

ability of the Company to function and thus maintain its profit-

ability.

The needs of management require that managerial per-

sonnel have total freedom to function on the Company’s behalf

on its own terms. Unionization of managerial personnel would

impose restrictions upon their conduct as a result of any terms

and conditions contained in a collective bargaining agreement.

Management further requires an undivided. loyalty on the part

of those responsible for making decisions and formulating

policies in all respects—not merely from those involved in

labor or personnel matters. The mere fact of unionization

of such personnel would result in a necessarily divided loyalty.

The limited restriction on the organization of managerial em-

ployees here urged by the Board fails to respect these funda-

mental managerial prerogatives recogmized in the Act. The

language in the concurring opinion of Justices Stewart, Douglas

and Harlan in Fibre-Board Paper Products Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,

379 U. S. 203 (1964), 225-226 is particularly apt in this

respect:

LST TE RTE NIN TSI ANS OED NATE RL I WRI PAM OT TS RESO

15

“It is possible that . . . Congress may eventually decide

to give organized labor or government a far heavier hand

in controlling what until now have been considered the

prerogatives of private business management. That path

would mark a sharp departure from the traditional prin-

ciples of a free enterprise economy. Whether we should

follow it is, within constitutional limitations, for Congress

to choose. But it is a path which Congress certainly did

not choose when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.”

C. Board Policy Subsequent to the Taft-Hartley Amendments.

The history of the Board’s treatment of “managerial” em-

ployees after the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments leaves

no doubt that its practice continued to be one of excluding

such personnel from the Act’s coverage even though their duties

were unrelated to labor or personnel relations.

Shortly after the 1947 amendments, the Board stated that

its policy had been unaffected by the recent enactment. In

Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 NLRB 320 (1947)

the Board refused to exclude store managers from a store-wide

unit because their limited duties and responsibilities made them

neither supervisory nor managerial. The Board rejected the

contention of supervisory status because the managers had no

authority with respect to hire, discharge or discipline. In re-

sponse to the contention that they were “managerial”, the Board

stated:

“The determination of ‘managerial’, like the determination

of ‘supervisory’ is to some extent necessarily a matter of

the degree of authority exercised. We have in the past,

and before the passage of the recent amendments to the

Act, recognized and defined as ‘managerial’ employees,

executives who formulate and effectuate management

policies by expressing and making operative the decisions

of their employer, and have excluded such managerial em-

ployees from bargaining units. Matter of Ford Motor Com-

pany, Chicago Branch, 66 N. L. R. B. 1317. (Emphasis

added )

eee

16

“We believe that the Act, as amended, contemplates the

continuance of this practice.”

This practice of excluding “managerial” personnel from the

right to statutory self-organization continued to encompass such

persons as buyers who had no relationship with their employer’s

labor policies. For example, in Denver Dry Goods Co., 74

NLRB 1167 (1947) assistant buyers were excluded from a

unit of sales, clerical and office employees because their duties

were “more closely identified with management.” They were

required to compile good sales records as an example to other

employees, assisted buyers in the selection of merchandise and

took over buyers’ duties when the buyers were absent.

Similarly, in Denton’s, Inc., 83 NLRB 35 (1949) personnel

with buying functions were excluded from a unit of sales em-

ployees because they contacted vendors in the performance of

their duties even though some of them spent only twenty per

cent of their time in buying and the rest in selling. Also, in

American Locomotive Co., 92 NLRB 115 (1950), buyers were

excluded from an office and clerical because they were au-

thorized to negotiate for credit and made purchases for the em-

ployer in an amount of six million dollars a year. The Board

held that such personnel could “not be accorded bargaining

rights under the Act.” Id., at 117.

The Board, in support of its newly enunciated rule, contends,

of course, that managerial personnel such as those in the above

cases were not really excluded from the right of statutorily-

aided self-organization but were merely excluded from the

larger units because they lacked a sufficient interest to be in-

cluded. The fact that they were excluded from larger units

reflects only the fact that the cases arose in that comfext and the

petitioners did not seek a separate unit of those nagerial”

employees; however, .in Swift & Co., 115 NLRB 752 (1956)

the Board ruled squarely.on the propriety of granting the right

' to representation to a unit consisting wholly of “managerial”

employees, adhering to its prior practice as expressed, for ex-

ample, in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra.

17

The personnel at issue in Swift were buyers—procurement

drivers—who kept supplies of eggs and poultry coming into the

employer's plant and exercised discretion in meeting competitors’

prices. They had nothing to do with labor or personnel matters,

but the Board found their duties were an “exercise of a mana-

gerial prerogative.” The petitioning unit sought, alternatively, a

separate unit confined to those employees.

In reliance upon the same legislative history that it here

urges in support of its contrary contention, the Board there

categorically stated:

“We are of the opinion that such a unit is not appropriate.

It was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the

coveragé of the Act all individuals allied with management.

Such individuals cannot be deemed to be employees for

the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, we reaffirm the

Board’s position that representatives of management may

not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act and deny

the Petitioners’ alternative request.” Id., at 753-4 (Foot-

Thus, from the very inception of the Act and continuing for

approximately 30 years, the Board consistently excluded from

the right to union representation those personnel who exercised

managerial functions in purely business related areas, and not

only those who exercised responsibility in the formulation of

labor or personnel policies.

The Board repudiates its clear Statement of policy set forth

in Swift by contending that that case was an aberration and a

“sweeping and inaccurate” statement of its practice.* This

contention is patently without merit. The Board’s statement of

policy in Swift is consistent with both its pre and post 1947

Practice and the proper interpretation of Congressional intent

with respect to that practice.’ Rather, Swift is said to be an

15. Board’s brief at 27.

16. See, Spicer Mfg. Corp., supra; Hudson Motor Car Co.,

supra; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra; Ford Motor Co., supra,

18

“aberration” because it cannot be explained away by the Board

in a manner consistent with the view it now urges on this Court.

In addition to its overruling of Swift, the Board also wishes

now to re-write history.

First, the Board contends that its policy was not as it was

in fact.’’ Next, the Board argues that Congress failed to enact

legislation because it approved non-existent policy under the

mistaken belief as to what that practice really was.’* Finally, the

Board concludes that Swift, which merged the Board’s practice

in fact with a clear statement of that practice, was inaccurate.

In this respect, it is worthy to note that in its first petition for

enforcement in the North Arkansas case,’® the Board, citing a

whole litany of authority, including Swift, which it now attempts

to explain away or repudiate, clung to the very principle that it

now asks this Court to reject. There, the Board argued that it

had always excluded “managerial” personnel “from the protec-

tion of the Act’. The Board further stated its basis for the

policy:

“This exclusionary practice rests on the premise that the

functions and interests of such individuals are more closely

allied with those of management than with production

workers, and therefore they are not truly ‘employees’

within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, as read

in conjunction with Section 2(2)” [defining employer].”

Further, the various Circuit Courts of Appeals, called upon

to interpret the Board’s practice, have viewed it as properly

excluding from coverage of the Act not only those managerial

personnel involved in labor relations, but all other managerial

Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., supra; Swift & Co., supra;

N. L. R. B. v. Wheeling Electric Co., Inc. supra; N. L. R. B. Vv.

North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra.

17. Subpart A above.

18. Subpart B above.

19. 412 F. 2d 324 (CA 8, 1969).

20. 446 F. 2d 602, 605, citing the Board’s brief.

19

personnel as well. A review of those decisions?’ reveals that

there have evolved two independent tests to determine

managerial status: (1) whether the employee is “so closely

related to or aligned with management as to place the employee

in a position of potential conflict of interest between his em-

ployer on the one hand and his fellow workers on the other”

and (2) “whether the employee is formulating, determining

and effectuating his employer’s policies or has discretion, in-

dependent of an employer's established policy, in the per-

formance of his duties.” Jilinois' Journal-Register, Inc. v.

N. L. R. B., 412 F, 2d 37, 41 (CA 7, 1969).

The first test concerns itself with “managerial” employees

who are involved with policies bearing on labor relations, re-

sulting in a potential and serious conflict of interest. However,

contrary to the Board’s urgings, this first test is not, and has

never been, the exclusive measure of managerial status. The

second test, as applied by the Courts as well as previously by

the Board itself, questions whether the individual’s functions in

other areas of managerial responsibility exempt him from the

Act’s coverage.

For example, in N. LwR. B. v. Illinois Journal Register,

supra, at issue was the “managerial” status of certain district

newspaper circulation personnel. To determine whether these

personnel might be managerial under the first test, the court

looked to see what concern, if any, they had with the employees’

labor relations policy. However, to determine whether the cir-

culation personnel qualified under the second test, the court

examined a myriad of non-labor related duties, such as: the

handling of customer complaints; adjusting and remitting sales

receipts; participation in circulation campaigns; attending sales

21. See, International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. N. L.

R. B., 339 F. 2d 116 (CA 2, 1964); Retail Clerks International

Association v. N. L. R. B., 336 F. 2d 642 (CA DC, 1966);

Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 412 F. 2d 37 (CA

7, 1969); Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 424

F 2d 1151 (CA 7, 1970)

20

meetings; recommending discounts for delivery routes; contact-

ing news dealers on behalf of the Employer; leasing space to

serve as substations within their districts; and making purchases.

Similarly, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. N. L. R. B., supra,

the court, under the second test, examined the duties of certain

engineers relating to purely technical matters and to the au-

thority of the engineers to pledge the employers credit. Thus,

the courts have recognized that, under the Act, persons should

properly be excluded from coverage as “managerial” employees

whose duties or functions on behalf of management were not

limited to the creation or effectuation of personnel or labor

relations policies.

D. The Board May Not Reinterpret the Act to Suit a Change

in Policy Without Sound Basis for That Change; the

Board Has Shown No Such Basis Here. q

The National Labor Relations Act reflects the studied will

of Congress as to what this country’s labor-management poli-

cies shall be. Once enacted, the statute does not change unless

the Congress determines that a change is needed. The Board,

on the other hand, is merely the instrument for enforcing the

Act and is not free to reverse a practice of 30 years by merely

taking a revisionist view of history and reinterpretating the

Act in accordance with that view. Such a reversal must have

a sound basis.

For example, in N. L. R. B. v. Quality Manufacturing Co.,

481 F. 2d 1018 (CA 4, 1973) the Board attempted to reverse

a 25-year practice. Prior to the Quality case, the Board had

never found that an employer’s refusal to allow an employee

union representation at an investigatory interview constituted

a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board reversed

its view in Quality”® and offered no justification for this reversal

other than that “after reflection” the Board felt that the em-

22 195 NLRB No. 42 (1972). i

~

LNIELOO AL LIL TIT ICO NN CLLR LE I I LO LINN BEET ME Os EINE TOM NAPs ccesiall

Ta seaiiaiian

¢> 7 EDA Oa AD TN ARN EOS ON aR Re LG COT PIE

21

ployer’s conduct constituted a “serious violation” of the Act.

In response to the Board’s contention the Fourth Circuit stated:

“It is clear beyond question, however, that the Board has

no power to alter or rearrange employer-employee relations

to suit its very whim. Rather, the Board can only deter-

mine whether the Act has been violated. And it would

appear that in the entire history of the law as developed

above, the management prerogative of conducting an in-

vestigatory interview such as Quality attempted here has

not been considered a violation of the Act.” N. L. R. B.

Vv. Quality Manufacturing Co., supra, at 1025.

The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion and refused

enforcement of a Board order involving the same policy reversal

at issue in Quality in Mobil Oil Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 482 F.

2d 842 (CA 7, 1973).

During the present.term, this Court had occasion to review

a practice which the Board changed after a lengthy period of

time in N. L. R. B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., ........... U. S.

Ee Pos , Daily Labor Report No. 242 (BNA, December 17, 1973).

Involved was the Board’s reversal of its position regarding

whether a union’s offer to waive initiation fees to those em-

ployees who signed a union recognition fori prior to a Board-

conducted election interfered with the principle of “fair and

free choice of bargaining representatives by employees”

guaranteed by Section 9 of the Act. In 1954 the Board held

that such an offer constituted interference with employees’

selection in a Board conducted election.** Subsequently, the

Board reversed itself merely on the basis of its re-evaluation

that it was “completely illogical to characterize as improper

[the offer of waiver] as inducement or coercion . . .”.%

Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Savair, upheld

the Circuit Court’s order denying enforcement of the Board’s

23. Lobue Bros., 109 NLRB 1182 (1954).

24. DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB 1019, at 1021.

22

bargaining order,”® thus rejecting the Board's reversal in policy.

Important here is the reason for rejecting the Board’s view, and

that was the-lack of sound basis for the Board’s reversal of

position. Thus, even in an area admitting to wide latitude and

discretion in the exercise of Board expertise, as is the deter-

mination as to what conduct might constitute “interference”

and “coercion” in the selection of a bargaining agent, the

Board is not free to reverse its course without justifiable

grounds.** Much greater justification must be required for the

Board to reverse itself in an area that involves a question of

its basic jurisdiction, or statutory coverage, such as the issue

involved herein. Particularly significant here is the fact that

during the 30 years of consistent exclusion of all managerial

employees from coverage, Congress has amended the Act twice,

and conceivably could have amended it every year, had it felt

the Board’s practices were contrary to the legislative will. The

Board is not now free to re-write that 30 years without a

sound basis. Merely arguing, as the Board Woes, that it has |

always given “managerial” employees the Act's protection, in

the face of its demonstrable practice to the contrary, is not

such a basis.

25. 470 F. 2d 305 (CA 6, 1973).

26. Justice White, in his dissent in Savair recognized that the

issue involved the question of “the proper allocation of institutional

responsibility between an administrative agency and a reviewing

court.” However, those Labor Board cases relied on by the dis-

sent did not involve reversal of longstanding policy. NLRB v: A. J.

Tower, 329 U. S. 324 (1945) was concerned with a challenge to

the validity of the Board’s post-election rule but not with a

in the Board’s position with respect to that rule; NLRB v. Water-

man S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 326, involved a challenge to the Board’s

-interpretation of the statutory language of the Act, but not a

reversal of the Board’s interpretation of that language; NLRB v.

Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969), discussed infra in-

volved the Board’s institution of a new rule requiring employers to

submit an eligibility list in Board elections, but did not involve a

change from a prior position with respect to that tule as is: involved

here. Insofar as the propriety of the Board’s reversal of policy

herein is concerned, these cases are of id.

23

E. The Buyers Involved in the Instant Case Qualify for

Exclusion as “Managerial” Employees.

“Despite the absence of any labor relations function, the em-

ployer’s buyers in this case are managerial employees properly

excludable from the Act's coverage.

As observed by the court below, although the buyers can .

commit the employer's credit for amounts not to exceed five

thousand dollars ($5,000) without concurrence of higher

authority, the aggregate amount so pledged over a nineteen

month period was in excess of seven million dollars, and one

of them alone committed over one million dollars.2" The discre-

tion possessed by these buyers in this respect is comparable

with: that enjoyed by buyers in American Locomotive Co.,

supra, and far more extensive than in Swift & Co., supra.

Further, where the amount of purchase is $5,000 or less,

the buyers have authority to cancel the contract and place the

order with an alternate vendor.* This exercise of managerial

discretion is no less than that which qualified expeditors in

Spicer Mfg. Corp., supra, for exclusion. Also, on contracts

involving the Minute Man project which accounts for seventy

percent of the Employer's sales, the buyers work with a “team

consisting of supervisory personnel from the engineering, quality

assurance, manufacturing and finance departments. . . . Once

agreement [on the terms of the contract] is reached, the buyer

is responsible for seeing that contracts are complied with and

adjusting disputes.”

Thus, the buyers involved in the instant case are required

to exercise independent and sound business judgments in the

performance of duties fundamentally important to the employer’s

operations. The employer's success or failure as an enterprise

depends upon the contractual relationships negotiated, executed

27. 475 F. 2d at 486, n. 1.

28. 475 F. 2d at 487.

29. 475 F. 2d at 486-7.

SSRRTERSTET SED NT POPNES SNE RT

24

and administered by these buyers and upon the buyers’ total com-

mitment to act in the employer's best interests. Though their

duties have no relationship to labor relations or personnel mat-

ters, they are, nonetheless, managerial. They should therefore be

excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations

Act.

eR

Il.

THE LOWER COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT

CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR RULE-MAKING PRO-

CEEDINGS IS IN ERROR AND MUST BE REVERSED.

The court below was unsure whether the Board’s decision

in the instant case represented the enunciation of a legally

erroneous new rule excluding from the Act’s coverage only

those “managerial” employees whose duties involved them in .

labor relations matters, or whether the Board applied its prior

standard of excluding all “manayerial” employees, but merely

found, as a factual matter, those persons in issue not truly

“managerial”. The Court, therefore, concluded that the case

must be remanded to the Board. The Court further held that

if the Board were here establishing a new “rule” for the treat-

ment of managerial personnel, it was precluded from doing so

in an adjudicatory proceeding but must, upon remand, hold

rule-making hearings in accordance with the provisions of

Section 4 of the Administrative Procedures Act.*°

‘The Chamber respectfully disagrees with the court’s holding

in this respect. It is the amicus’ view that the Board did enunciate

a new and legally erroneous rule in this case, but its action,

though requiring reversal, does not require it to accept a re-

mand for conducting rule-making hearings.

The Second Circuit’s holding rests in part on its uncertainty

as to the basis for the Board’s decision in this case. The Court,

therefore, felt that judicial determination as to the legality of the

30. 5 U.S. C. Sec. 553. :

a nn

PLT PSOE RAE I ES ATP PRR REE PLS TP I TRL ERT VLR PETRIE NN INE IN SYN TMT

25

'

newly enunciated rule was precluded by this Court's first Chenery

opinion. S. E. C. v. Chenery C

In Chenery, this Court, in di

reviewability of agency action, sta

» 318 U. S. 80 (1943).

ing the principles governi

law. In either ewent the orderly functioning of the process

of review requires that the grounds upon which the ad-

ministrative agemcy acted be clearly disclosed and ade-

quately sustained|.” /Jd., at 94.

' However, the basis; for the Board’s decision herein is not

uncertain. The Board! did not dispute the Employer's conten-

tion that Bell’s buyers were “managerial”. Rather, the Board

concluded that despite: the fact tha: the buyers might be “mana-

gerial”, they were nonetheless entitled to union representa-

tion.” This is the thrust of the Board’s whole argument, and

there exists no uncerttainty that the Board’s decision rests on

this basis. Therefore, the barrier of uncertainty does not here

exist to preclude this Court from ruling on the legality of the

Board’s determination, and there is no need for a remand on

that basis.**

However, the issue of uncertainty is only one of the reasons

for the Second Circuit’'s holding. The second, and perhaps more

critical, is the court's view that the Board could not properly

fromulate a new policy, having the effect of a rule to be

31. See 197 NLRB No. 30, supra.

32. However, it is recognized that even if this Court declares

the Board’s newly enuinciated policy invalid, a remand might be

required to determine whether Rell’s buyers are nevertheless “man-

agerial” under the proper test.

PERRET WO SSMS ER OFSTED =

26

prospectively applied in all cases, in an adjudicatory proceeding

but, rather, is required to conduct rule-making hearings in ac-

cordance with Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Chamber similarly disagrees with this argument and, in this

respect, agrees with the Board that rule-making would be an

inappropriate procedure for deciding the issue herein.*

The basis for the Second Circuit’s view is that the Board,

if it chooses, as it has here done, to reverse a policy of long

standing respecting its treatment of “managerial” employees,—

particularly since the Board had engendered a justifiable con-

trary belief as to what its practice had been,—is required to

engage in rule making as a precondition to effecting such a

policy change. The Court relies for its view on an expression

of approval of the rule-making process made in the second

Chenery decision, S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194

(1947) and on the observations of Justice Fortas, speaking ~

for the plurality, and Justices Douglas and Harlan, dissenting,

in N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Company, 394 U. S. 759

(1969) regarding the Board’s formulation of its Excelsior

rule.** Pak

While it is correct, as noted by the court below, that in

Chenery, supra, at 202, this Court observed that while “[t]he

function of filling the interstices of the [Securities] Act should

be performed, as much as possible, through . . . quasi-legislative

promulgation of rules to be applied in the future . . .”, this

Court further noted that “. . . any rigid requirement to that

effect would make the administrative process inflexible and

incapable of dealing with many specialized problems which

33. To be sure, the Chamber, as argued in the preceding sec-

tions of this brief, disagrees with the Board’s theory in support

of its decision and order and that the policy as set forth

therein is a exercise of its duties under the National Labor

Relations Act; however, we agree, for the reasons set forth here,

that an adjudicatory proceeding is a proper procedure for resolving

the question presented.

34. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966).

—

27

arise.” Thus, this Court's expression in Chenery of a preference

for rule-making proceedings over adjudicatory proceedings as a

means for formulating agency rules or policy, must be taken as

qualified; and, whether or not a particular change in policy

might more properly proceed by’ ad hoc litigation would depend

upon whether any standard that might result through quasi-

legislative proceedings would contribute to the administrative

process in dealing with the problem.

Insofar as this particular change in Board policy is concerned,

it is not unlike many others which have preceded it to the

Courts of Appeals® and to this Court®* out of adjudicatory

proceedings. This particular issue, like others which arise under

the National Labor Relations Act, is not most efficiently and

completely resolved through rule-making because any rule that

might result would of necessity have to be sufficiently broad to

cover not only Bell’s buyers, or buyers in general, but also any

personnel of any employer subject to the Act alleged to be

“managerial”. This would be true no matter whether the rule

so formulated were, as the Board argues, restricted to labor

relations matters, or to all management functions. Under either

fest, an evidentiary hearing would have to be held in each

case to determine whether those persons in issue were within

or without the rule. To require the Board to hold hearings to

formulate such rule would not contribute to the Board’s process

in dealing with the issue since a case-by-case determination

must be made in any event. Indeed, proceeding by rule-making

35. See, for example, NLRB v. Quality Manufacturing Co.,

supra, and Mobile Oil Corp. v. NLRB, supra, discussed in Subpart

D, supra. a

36. See, for example: NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S.

575 (1969), wherein the Board announced a change in policy for

determining -whether an employer unlawfully refuses to i

when presented with a union’s claim of majority status for the

first time in proceedings before this Court; and NLRB v. Savair

Mfg. Co., supra, where, this term, the Board’s reversal of its long-

term policy regarding the loyalty of a union’s waiver of initiation

fees was rejected.

28

would, under the circumstances, be a wasteful and unnecessary

act.’

Alternatively,, the Board could, after holding hearings,

promulgate a narrow and specific set of rules governing particu-

lar cases. However, such a set of rules, though perhaps capable

of dealing with the buyers at issue here, could not conceivably

be broad enor gh to encompass the myriad duties of all personnel

in each plant, store, shop or industry in this country. In short,

such rules would make the Board’s processes “inflexible and

incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems

which arise.”

Moreover, N. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon, does not, as the

court below suggests, detract from the conclusion that ad hoc

litigation is the preferable procedure for resolving issues as

the one presented herein. Indeed, it furthers that conclusion.

Wyman-Gordon involved a “rule” in the sense that it could

be, and was to be, applied to fit all cases at all times. To

require, as the Excelsior rule does, that an employer submit to

the Board a list of eligible voters, does not involve factual

inquiries on a case-by-case basis as does the resolution of the

problem here, where findings, conclusions and orders in each

case must be developed by evidence and supported by facts,—

facts that will vary in every case. This procedure is not “rule-

making” although the decisions and orders of the Board be-

come its “policy”. Justice Fortas observed the distinction in

Wyman-Gordon when he noted:

“Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles

for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied

and announced therein. See Friendly, The Federal Ad-

ministrative Agencies 36-52 (1962). They generally pro-

vide a guide to action that the agency may be expected

to take in future cases. Subject to the qualified role of

stare decisis in the administrative process, they may serve

as precedents. But this is far from saying, as the Solicitor

General suggests, that commands, decisions, or policies

announced in adjudication are “rules” in the sense that

TO ae Ra Yee eran

AR LNRM TT

SN FE EN IE I SP RENT ILENE RE RE MP MERE FES ES RN RN we Pigs

29

they must, without more, be obeyed by the affected public.”

NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra, at 765 (footnote

omitted). y

Here, the Board’s new “rule” is a reversal of policy, and as

such, serves as precedent to inform all those concerned that it

will act in accordance with its new policy when presented with

an allegation of “managerial” status. It is not a command

in the sense that it must be obeyed by all persons in the

future.*’ The issue of managerial status in each and every case

must still be litigated even under the Board’s new “rule”, un-

less reversed by this Court.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit's holding that this case must

be remanded for rule-making proceedings must be reversed.

37. As pointed out by the Board in its brief at 31, the factor

which caused Justice Douglas and Harlan to dissent in Wyman-

Gordon was not the formulation

rather, the fact that the Board

— with Section 4 of the Administrative

P

30

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that the Court affirm

the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it concluded

that all “managerial” employees, whatever the nature of the

management duties they perform, are not covered by the

National Labor Relations Act and reverse that part of the

court’s decision remanding this case to the Board for rule-

making proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

MILTON SMITH,

General Counsel,

RICHARD B. BERMAN,

Chamber of Commerce of the

United States of America,

1615 H Street, N. W.,

Washington, D. C. 20006,

GERARD C. SMETANA,

925 South Homan Avenue,

Chicago, Illinois 60607,

JERRY KRONENBERG,

HOWARD MOCcERF,

BorOvsky, EHRLICH & KRONENBERG,

120 South LaSalle Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60603,

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.