Amicus Curiae Brief — Gosa v. Mayden

OCT 25 9i2

Supreme Court of the Hnite RATERE oe. corm

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

No. 71-1398

JOHN W. WARNER, Secretary of the Navy,

Petitioner,

,

Vv.

JOHN W. FLEMINGS,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 71-6314

JAMES ROY GOSA,

Petitioner,

v.

J. A. MAYDEN, Warden

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION-POR-LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE

AND BRIEF OF THE WORKERS DEFENSE LEAGUE,

AAMC LS RP

ROWLAND WATTS,

112 East Nineteenth Street,

New York, New York 10003,

Attorney for the Workers Defense

League, Amicus Curiae

JAP he Me e R e e 2 e e

eeseoeoeeeeoseneveneesseonneas ess

ARGUMENT:

If retroactive application of O’Callahan is not mandated

by classical jurisdictional concepts, administrative

impact would be so minor, and personal impact on the

former defendant so substantial, as to merit granting

NE Fis s eck bkonad6 Chin keccccoees 3

B. Consequences of Punitive Discharges are Dispropor-

tionately Severe When Contrasted with Civilian

MS Soe ewok es occr Pens Cole lee.

IE i609. p's 64 SkGCKS Es osc ow wed ucins 9

APPENDIX A: Analysis of a Sample of Reported Decisions

of the United States Court of Military Appeals for

Possible Effect of Retroactivity ................. 10

APPENDIX B: Army, Navy and Marine Corps Court-Martial

cascani OEEOE Pn t taped aaa 12

APPENDIX C: Effects of a Dishonorable Discharge: A Case

History

i a ti teh ahd Bh Nee ee ee eo ee oe ee

RS Oe eee ONE OE SSS SR he eo 6 eee 6 6S

Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae

TO THE HONORABLE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES:

The undersigned, as counsel for the Workers Defense

League, located in New York City, respectfully moves this

Honorable Court for leave to file the accompanying brief as

Amicus Curiae. The written consent of the attorneys for all

parties has been obtained and filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Although the brief was not served within the period prescribed

by the Rules of this Court, counsel for all parties were advised,

when their consent was requested, that the text of the accom-

_ panying brief would be forwarded to them on October 13,

1972, and that service of the printed brief would be accom-

plished not later than October 23, 1972. Said dates have been

complied with. ~

Respectfully submitted,

ROWLAND WATTS

112 East Nineteenth Street

New York, New York 10003

Attorney for Workers

Defense League

October 20, 1972

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

No. 71-1398

JOHN W. WARNER, Secretary of the Navy,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JOHN W. FLEMINGS,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 71-6314

JAMES ROY GOSA,

Petitioner,

v.

J. A. MAYDEN, Warden

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE WORKERS DEFENSE LEAGUE,

AMICUS CURIAE

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The Workers Defense League is submitting a brief herein as

amicus curiae because of its interest in the question of jurisdic-

3

tion and the impact of court-martial proceedings in these cases.

" The Workers Defense League is an organization dedicated to

the protection and extension of those civil rights which are

guaranteed by the laws and Constitution of the United States. It

has long been concerned with military justice, and previously

appeared as amicus curiae in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579

(1953).

The Workers Defense League maintains that courts-martial,

despite recent improvements, have always been fundamentally

and procedurally infected with infirmities which mandate this

Court’s rejection of their past assertions of jurisdiction over

offenses respecting which the Federal and State civil courts had

statutory jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

IF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF O’CAL-

LAHAN 1S NOT MANDATED BY CLASSICAL

JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTS, ADMINISTRA-

TIVE IMPACT WOULD BE SO MINOR, AND

PERSONAL IMPACT ON THE FORMER DE-

FENDANT SO SUBSTANTIAL, AS TO MERIT

GRANTING OF RETROACTIVITY.

The cases at bar are concerned with the possible retroactive

application of this Court’s holding in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395

US. 258 (1969), as refined in Relford v. Commandant, 401

U.S. 355 (1971).In effect, this Court will determine whether, if

retroactivity is not mandatory, it is appropriate in light of the

considerations set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US. 618

(1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

It is our contention that retroactivity is required because

O’°Callahan is concerned with what Judge Weinstein aptly

termed “classic competence jurisdiction,” United States ex rel.

~~]

4

Flemings v. Chaffee, 330 F Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. N.Y. 1971). It

is horn book law that the rulings of a court lacking power over

the person or the act involved are necessarily null and void. To

hold otherwise “would militate against our whole concept of

power and jurisdiction,” Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-

ton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960).

If, nonetheless, the Linkletter-Stovall considerations are

here pertinent, we contend that the onerous éffects of punitive

discharges awarded by courts-martial are so substantial, and the

burden upon the Government of administering appropriate re-

lief to affected applicants so readily met, as to compel this

Court to hold that court-martial jurisdiction should always have

been limited to the least possible power adequate to protect

valid military interests, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,

350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955). Every unnecessary extension of mili-

tary jurisdiction has constituted an improper encroachment

upon the civil courts and the treasured personal rights secured

by the Bill of Rights, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957).

We therefore offer to this point the following data and

arguments.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT OF RETROACTIVITY

WOULD BE MINOR

During the three year interval since the O'Callahan decision,

the only published statistical analysis of its probable retroactive

impact has been Blumenfeld, Retroactivity after O’Callahan: an

Analytical and Statistical Approach, 60 Geo. L. J. 551 (1972)

(hereafter, Blumenfeld). We have made a gase-by-case analysis

of all pre-O’Callahan opinions reported in Volumes 3, 8, 13 and

18 of Decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals,

so as to augment the data presented in Blumenfeld. Of the 590

cases analyzed, 10 (1.7%) would probably be affected by retro-

5

activity; 139 (23.6%) of the opinions do not contain sufficient

factual information for determining the effect with reasonable

certainty; the remaining 441 (74.7%) almost certainly will not

be affected by the outcome of the cases at bar. Appendix A

gives the enumerations by categories.

The figures for affected cases should be read with some

caution. Approximately one-third of all courts-martial involve

unauthorized absences (denounced by Article 86, Uniform Code

of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §886); Appendix B; cf. Blumen-

feld, 580-581, n. 149. It has been the experience of the Military

Justice Program of amicus that such cases present few eviden-

tiary or procedural problems likely to be granted review by the

Court of Military Appeals. Consequently, civilian-type offenses

are reviewed in that Court with greater proportional frequency

than are they tried by courts-marital. As there is no reason to

believe that, prior to the O'Callahan decision, O’Callahan-

Relford considerations were weighed in deciding whether to

grant review in the Court of Military Appeals, any over-repre-

sentation of civilian-type offenses in the sample of cases ana-

lyzed would d fortiori extend to cases which would be affected

by retroactive application of O’Callahan.

The above data lend weight to Blumenfeld’s determination

that “approximately one percent of all general court-martial

cases tried and appealed from June 2, 1969, until December 31,

1970, involved offenses that were nonservice-connected,” Blum-

enfeld, 580, n. 147. The data suggest that said determination

can be generalized to all such courts-martial during the past two

decades.

Even if it is assumed that substantial numbers of affected

individuals would seek administrative or judicial relief,* the

* A questionable assumption in the light of recent experience. See

Blumenfeld, 578 et. seq., n. 140-149. As a practical matter, only sentences

to lengthy periods of confinement or punitive discharge create a s.ufficient-

6

attendant administrative burden is insufficient cause for reject-

ing retroactivity. “The concept that the Bill of Rights and other

constitutional protections against arbitrary government are

inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expedi-

ency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if

allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written

Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government,”

Reid v. Covert, supra, at 14. If we are indeed a nation ruled by

laws, not men, judicially rewriting the Constitution to suit

alleged administrative convenience would constitute a blatant

succoring of bureaucratic arrogance.

B. CONSEQUENCES OF PUNITIVE DISCHARGES ARE

DISPROPORTIONATELY SEVERE WHEN CONTRASTED

WITH CIVILIAN SENTENCES

A Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharge can be given only

upon conviction by general or certain special courts-martial. In

the Army, approximately 81% of all enlisted men convicted by

general courts-martial during calendar years 1964-1968 were

adjudged punitive discharges. Appendix B, Table B-3. After

serving any sentence of confinement, the recipient of such a

discharge is subject to consequences which far exceed any

disability that can grow out of a civilian criminal conviction.

It should be noted that our statistics are not necessarily representative

of convictions prior to 1951. Those convictions antedate Congressional

Presidential actions designed to secure a fair trial for an accused

In such cases, the very fact-finding procedure upon which the

is predicated is necessarily suspect. Thus there is substantial

that Flemings in fact stole the car (in 1944); there is no serious

that Gosa committed the rape (in 1966).

7

The recipient of a punitive discharge is deprived of virtually

all veterans’ benefits, including medical benefits for disabilities

incurred in the line of duty prior to commission of the under-

lying offense. (By way of contrast, a civilian employee later

fired for cause does not lose disability compensation.) He is

subject to the same statutory disabilities as is a civilian ex-

convict. Further, he is stigmatized as disloyal at every turn in

his civilian life. - ‘

Employment opportunities are all but non-existent in any

branch of Government or in defense-related industry. In the

balance of the private sector, employment applications univer-

sally require statements of criminal convictions and military

service, including type of discharge. The punitively discharged

applicant consequently starts with two red flags when seeking

employment.

R-T-P, Inc. (formerly the Joint Apprenticeship Program,

founded by amicus) advises us that approximately half of the

trade unions will not entertain as apprenticeship application

from recipients of punitive discharges. Those that do, do so

hesitantly. The financial sector perceives a greater risk in lend-

ing money to punitively discharged persons. In Appendix C, a

single but not atypical case history is described.

Regardless of the age of the accused at time of trial, there

exists no effective statutory provision for expunging or remit-

ting a punitive discharge at any time.* This contrasts with the

Amy Court of Military Review, and formerly The Judge Advocate Gen.

eal of the Army, anticipates the adoption of such a provision:

[The trial judge at courts-martial] should have the power to suspend

and the power to impose deferred sentences. A deferred sentence is

a sentence which is withheld for a prescribed period. If the accused

. Straightens out, we'll say, in six months, then the judge issues an

Order which wipes out not only the sentence but the conviction. It

salubrious provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§4209, 5005 et. seq.

(Federal Youth Corrections Act), 5031 et. seg., and comparable

legislation enacted by the various States.

The contrast is particularly striking when viewed in the light

of the youthfulness of personnel tried by general courts-martial.

Appendix B, Table B-1 contains data provided by the Records

Control and Analysis Branch of the United States Army Judi-

ciary for calendar years 1960 through 1969. They reveal that of

18,589 enlisted personnel tried by general courts-martial, 6,365

(34%) were below the age of twenty; 8,614 (47%) were between

twenty and 24 years of age, inclusive.

During Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, more than 90% of the

records of trial received for review at the Army’s Defense

Appellate Division involved convictions of persons under twen-

ty-five years old at time of trial. Appendix B, Table B-4.

Data provided by the Military Justice Division of the Office

of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, contained in

Appendix B, Table B-2, are comparable. We have been advised

that the Air Force does not keep comparable statistics.

We contend that the penalties involved in most of those

convictions which might be voided by retroactive application of

O'Callahan are far in excess of the maximunt permitted in the

civilian courts which properly had concurrent if not exclusive

jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Furthermore, the possi-

bility that subsequent good behavior would result in expunging

purges the man’s record completely. In other words, the ABA

Standards on Sentencing Alternatives should ke adopted . . .

Hodson, The Manual for Courts-Martial—1984, 57 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 11

(1972). Note that the Department of Defense has recently adopted a

policy and implemented procedures favoring recharacterization of undesir-

able discharges (typically awarded on request, in lieu of court-martial) in

cases involving use or possession of drugs. Blumenfeld, 572, n. 117.

9

the record of conviction does not exist; although in many cases

it would, if the accused had been tried in civil courts.

Because the effect of retroactivity on the administration of

justice, if relevant to the instant cases, must be examined from

the perspectives of the affected persons as well as the adminis-

trators of justice, we submit that the data we have presented

tips the balance of interests in favor of retroactive application

of O'Callahan.

CONCLUSION .,

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be

affirmed, and the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

ROWLAND WATTS

112 East Nineteenth Street

New York, New York 10003

Attorney for the Workers Defense

League, Amicus Curiae

Marcy H. Cowan

Fredric J. Gross

Roy A. Jacobs

doyce Kornbluh

Edward N. Leavy

OF COUNSEL

; ce

APPENDIX A

ANALYSIS OF A SAMPLE OF REPORTED DECISIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

FOR POSSIBLE EFFECT OF RETROACTIVITY

The opinion in every case reported in 3 USCMA (October

Terms, 1952-3), 8 USCMA (October Terms, 1956-7), 13

USCMA (October Terms, 1961-2) and 18 USCMA (October

Term, 1968) but excluding those cases decided subsequent to

June 2, 1969, has been analyzed in an effort to determine if

retroactive application of O'Callahan would nullify the pro-

ceedings.

In conducting the analysis, consideration was given to the

following factors: (A) Was the nature of the offense(s) charged

purely military (e.g., desertion, disobedience)? (B) Did the

perpetrator use his or his victim’s military status as an aid to

accomplishing the crime (e.g., assaulting one’s company com-

mander while off post would be deemed service-connected)?

(C) Was the offense committed on post or at post limits? (D)

Did the crime occur in a locality where a non-military American

flag court was open (N.b., Okinawa was deemed not be be such

a locality on the authority of United States ex rel. Jacobs v.

Froehlke, 334 F.Supp. 1107 (D. D.C. 1971), appeal pending)?

The results are summarized in Table A below. A list of those

cases which apparently would be affected by retroactivity, and

those in which the opinion is insufficiently detailed to permit

such a determination, is provided so as to permit replication.

As not all courts-martial are reviewed by the Court of

Military Appeals, and as cases in which the Court reversed a

conviction are included in the tabulation, extrapolations from

these data must be made with caution.

11

TABLE A: EFFECT OF RETROACTIVITY

ON CASES IN SAMPLE

Vol. Affected Indeterminate Unaffected Total

3 3 16 128 147

8 4 56 162 222

13 ms 30 88 121

18 0 37 63 100

total .° 139 441 590

% 1.7 23.6 74.7 100.

3USCMA: 8 USCMA: 13 USCMA: 18 USCMA:

Cases which would be affected, listed by docket number i in se-

quence of Court’s decision:

1244 9392 15700 [none]

1990 9592 16268

2720 9444 16405

9768

Indeterminate cases

1194 9223 9646 10180 | 15282 16163 | 21346 21689

1945 9401 9738 9546 | 15332 16204 | 20903 21703

2119 9113 9861 10227 | 15334 16018 | 21342 21526

2068 9587 9762 9645 | 15525 16207 | 21004 21555

3354 9731 10331 10311 | 15636 16282 | 21203 21657

3580 9992 10428 10833 | 15724 16489 | 21223 21676

3627 9199 10597 10567 | 15094 15936 | 21100 21704

3629 9681 9647 10799 | 15676 16064 | 21465 21709

1738 9421 9737 9723 | 15643 16172 | 21106 21719

3102 9687 10009 10418 | 15626 16237 | 21306 21721

2819 9606 10088 10429 | 15636 16491 | 21253 21636

12

APPENDIX B

ARMY, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

COURT-MARTIAL STATISTICS

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14

TABLE B-3: ENLISTED PERSONNEL CONVICTED BY

ARMY GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL, 1964-1968

Calendar Year

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Tots

Number Convicted 1650 1318 1483 2086 2239 987%

Discharges Adjudged

_-Dishonorable 634 517 694 902 880 367

Bad Conduct 729533 496 = 808915 at

, See 1363 1050 1190 1710 1795 71%

% Convicted with

Discharge ...... 83. 80. 80 82 80 81

TABLE B-4: ANALYSIS OF ARMY GENERAL AND

(BAD-CONDUCT-DISCHARGE AUTHORIZED) SPECIAL

COURT-MARTIAL DATA (FISCAL YEARS 1971, 1972)

CIVIL- % UNDER

OFFENSES CONVIC- AWOL TYPE 25 YEARS

TRIED TIONS CHARGES* OFFENSES OLD

FY 1971. 7807 82.3% 40.4% 42.9% 92.0%

FY1972 . 7142 80.4% 26.2% 53.9% 91.5%

* *£ *€£ *& *

Counsel expresses deep gratitude to personnel in the United

States Army Judiciary and in the Military Justice Division of

the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy who fully

cooperated with counsel’s request for the data presented herein,

and did so on very short notice.

1S MAE RNIN NIE LE AGN REN EMT

15

APPENDIX C

EFFECTS OF A DISCHONORABLE DISCHARGE:

A CASE HISTORY

On January 13, 1945, William A. Manera, then sixteen years

> old but having misrepresented his age to a draft board, was

inducted into the United States Army.

Private Manera, Serial Number 42 164 526, was subsequent-

> ly trained and qualified at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to drive various

military vehicles, including 3/4 ton trucks. Upon reassignment

’ to Korea, he was required to obtain further qualification to

_ operate military vehicles for his new unit. He did not so qualify

because of an alleged failure to use proper hand signals.

: On July 27, 1947, Manera and five other soldiers were given

| permission to travel on leave by 3/4 ton truck to a point remote

' from post. The assigned driver of the truck, together with his

' companions, suggested Manera take the wheel. At their repeated

urging, and with the knowledge that the Army had previously

| qualified him to drive such a vehicle, Manera assumed control of

| the truck and proceeded to operate it with due diligence.

At one point in the trip the truck hit a large hole in the road

_ and went out of control. Manera attempted to brake its mo-

_ mentum, but the brakes failed. Manera reached for the hand

| brake, but because of his short stature and the handle’s posi-

| tion, he momentarily lost sight of the road. Thereupon the

| truck went off an embankment at the entrance to a small

_ bridge.

Two Korean children playing at the water’s edge were

struck by the truck. One suffered only minor injuries, but the

other died a few days later despite Manera’s carrying the child

_ toa hospital.

16

Manera was tried by a general court-martial for variow |

offenses related to this unfortunate incident. He pleaded not

guilty, but was convicted and sentenced to a year in confine

ment at hard labor, total forfeitures and a dishonorable dis F

charge. On review, the sentence and conviction were affirmed. &

On June 28, 1947, Manera was released from confinement

and received his dishonorable discharge certificate. On tha

occasion he was given an orientation lecture by a Major in the

Army. He advised Manera that he could never re-enlist, he could

not go on military property, he was not allowed to vote, he

could not hold a Government job and he could not personally

own “titles, lands and property.” As Manera has said, the

Major’s description of the significance of the dishonorable dis

charge “distorted my mind.”

Returning to civilian life, Manera experienced many hard.

ships because of the dishonorable discharge. For one year he

could not obtain employment. He became financially deper-

dent upon his adoptive grandmother. Later he was to work for

year and a half as a printer’s helper by concealing the fact of his

military service and dishonorable discharge. He was still quite

young and entirely believable when he asserted that he had

never been in the armed forces.

He left that first job and travelled to California. There he

once was arrested while riding with a friend in whose car Los

Angeles police allegedly found marijuana. The charges against

Manera were dismissed; the friend was later acquitted. The

experience of the arrest, and the scornful attitude displayed by

police officials upon learning of his dishonorable discharge,

convinced Manera that he would be happier back home in New

York. Manera obtained employment gluing valises. As soon

he had saved enough money to leave California, he quit that job

and returned to New York. There he again obtained employ-

ment in a printing shop by concealing his military history.

17

Subsequently, his employer learned of the dishonorable

discharge. Manera was fired. Ostensibly, the cause was his falsifi-

cation of the job application.

He was next employed cleaning the interiors of airplanes,

first for American Airlines, later for United. In each instance, he

had falsified his employment application by concealing his

military experiences.

While working for the airlines, he made application for a

chauffeur’s license. In that application he was candid about his

dishonorable discharge. After a two year wait he received the

license, and became eligible to drive a taxi. About a year later,

while driving hacks part time, he was examined by one Captain

Delaney of the New York City Police Department, who threat-

ened revocation of the license because of the court-martial

conviction and the, California arrest. Manera filed a written

statement in his defense.\For a period of time he most anxious-

ly awaited the results. He never heard further about the matter.

Since 1966 he has ibtven taxis as his sole source of income.

He lives in fear of a revocation of his hack license.

Manera has never registered to vote in the belief that he is

ineligible to do so. He has never served on a jury. He is unable

to obtain a loan without a cosigner. He cannot afford the

purchase of a home, although with Gi benefits such a purchase

would have been within his means. He was afflicted with malar-

ia while in Korea, and has suffered occasional relapses subse-

quent to his discharge. He has been refused treatment in

Veterans Administration hospitals for those attacks of malaria.

His efforts to purchase a New York City taxi medallion (re-

quired for owners of licensed cabs, and valued in the neighbor-

hood of $15,000) were aborted upon the broker’s learning that

Manera had received a dishonorable discharge.

18

Aside from the legal and administrative restraints on his

activities, Manera bears a moral scar of which he is deeply

ashamed. “I can’t stand up and argue with nobody,” he com.

plains. “I have a dishonorable discharge that can be thrown up

to me at any time.”

On one occasion Manera assisted in the apprehension of an

armed assailant of a third party. When the arresting officer

offered to obtain for him publicity respecting his heroism, and

indicated that it could lead to improved employment opportun-

ities, Manera insisted that he be kept out of the public eye. He

was asked if he cared to testify when the assailant was brought

to trial, but could not bring himself to do so, lest others hear of

his dishonorable discharge. His children, aged 4 to 12, do not

know about his dishonorable discharge. How could he enjoy

their respect and love were they to know?

Manera’s crime was not one of moral turpitude. Uninten-

tional vehicular homicide occurs all too frequently in the civil-

ian world, but never results in an equivalent loss of rights,

privileges and self respect. Manera was only 17 years old when

he was convicted. His record is otherwise unblemished. But he

has been forced to live with the burden of his conviction and

dishonorable discharge for the past twenty-five years. They will

be his cross until death.

‘I’ve been: afraid, more than anything else,” he notes. “I

cannot make a move like a normal man makes a move.”

19

VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK _ )

COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) SS:

William A. Manera, being duly sworn, deposes and says that

he has read the foregoing account entitled “Effects of a Dis-

honorable Discharge: a Case History” and it is true to the best

of his knowledge and belief.

/s/ WILLIAM A. MANERA

(William A. Manera)

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME

THIS 11th DAY OF OCTOBER, 1972.

/s/ MARILYN S. BROOK

(Marilyn S. Brook)

Notary Public, State of

New York, No. 31-5463725

Qualified in New York County.

Oommission Expires March 30, 1974.

[RAISED SEAL }