Petitioners Brief — Cupp v. Murphy

SUBJECT INDEX

’ Page

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MMMM ecco sensivinevacncedzotrcrviesneteinesccedunecavscoebniaetvetsts 2

Constitutional Provisions Involved .......................2...... 2

Question Presented -22...........e.ceecceeeeecceceeeecceneceeeeeeeeeeees 3

Statement of the Case 0.0.0.0... .ececeeec ec cceeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeee 3

‘Summary of Argument -...2.0..20..22....2..c0- cececeecececeeeceeeeeees 8

- Argument:

A. There Was Probable Cause for the Police To

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B. There Were Exigent Circumstances Justify-

ing Immediate Action -....2...2...0..22.2eceeeeeeeeeeeeeee- 11

C. The Momentary Detention of Murphy Was a

Minimal Intrusion upon His Privacy, and

More Reasonable Than a Formal Arrest for

AO ae) ee 13

, Conclusion .............2.22eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeecceeseeeeececeeees 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited

Page

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) -...00000200... 15

Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.

denied 393 U.S. 1123 (1969) ..........02.... eee 14

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ............ 14

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) ............ 14, 15

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) .................. 10

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) .............. 13

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) ......0..000020.... 15

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) ........ 12, 13

State v. Murphy, 2 Or. App. 251, 465 P.2d 900, cert.

denied 400 U.S. 944 (1970) -...02. eee 3, 16

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ............... 15

United States v. D’Amico, 408 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.

UIT <sacsaaechaccbitiasincenintsiiepabtaieiieialatinisacansceitise anil 14

OE < scasaecencicdleaia gene Shacarbegelecarnesdhtseiemasntnetietest 14

In the Supreme Court

of the United Siates

.OCTOBER TERM, 1972

No. 72-212

HOYT C. CUPP, Superintendent,

Oregon-State Penitentiary,

Petitioner,

V.

DANIEL P. MURPHY,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Oregon court of appeals affirming

respondent Murphy’s conviction of second degree murder

(A. 76-84)® is reported at 2 Or. App. 251, 465 P.2d

900, cert. denied 400 U.S. 944 (1970). The opinion of

the United States District Court for the District of .

Oregon denying Murphy’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus (A. 68-69) is not reported. The opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

®Throughout this brief, “A.” refers to the printed Appendix;

“Tr.” refers to the 6-volume transcript of Murphy’s state-court trial,

Exhibit 1 in the present federal habeas corpus proceedings.

>. TSEC S PORES OGL Sy 5 TONS ORMOOD GE SP CLRO ants ith har a

GE ~ “tie x

—

reversing the judgment of the district court (A. 71-73)

| is reported at 461 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

(A. 74) was entered on May 30, 1972. A timely petition

for rehearing en banc was denied on July 6, 1972 (A.

75). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

August 7, 1972, and was granted on December 4, 1972.

The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254 (1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

- United States Constitution, Amendment IV:

. “The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-

sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,

and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.” =

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1:

“All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-

out due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” |

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QUESTION PRESENTED

When. police officers have probable cause to arrest

or search a murder suspect, does the Fourth Amendment

prohibit them from momentarily detaining the suspect

and scraping his fingernails for evidence, without ob-

taining a search warrant or formally arresting him,

when the delay required to obtain a warrant would

frustrate the search by allowing the suspect to clean his

fingernails, and when a formal arrest would cause a

greater invasion of the suspect’s privacy than the momen-

tary detention and scraping of his fingernails?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A state-court jury convicted Daniel. P. Murphy,

respondent herein, of the second-degree murder of his

wife. His conviction was affirmed by the Oregon court

of appeals. State v. Murphy, 2 Or. App. 251, 465 P.2d

900 (1970) (A. 76-84). This Court denied his petition

for a writ of certiorari: 400 U.S. 944 (1970).

Murphy then commenced the present federal habeas

corpus action in the United States District Court for the

District of Oregon, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq.

Upon review of the state-court record, the district court

denied relief (A. 68-70). On appeal, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and

remanded (A. 71-74). Petitioner Cupp, Murphy’s cus-

todian, seeks reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and

affirmance of the judgment of the district court.

Only one issue has been raised and preserved through-

REE RR I RT CPE EN OSORIO SERA ZEN ot rrp Ape:

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4

out these proceedings. In Murphy’s state-court trial, as

part of its showing that Murphy strangled his wife while

she was in bed, the prosecution introduced evidence that

certain scrapings taken from under Murphy’s fingernails

consisted in part of skin cells, blood cells, and white

cotton and rayon acetate fibers (Tr. 331-337). Murphy

contends, and petitioner herein denies, that the finger-

nail scrapings in question were unconstitutionally seized

from him.

The facts concerning the seizure of the evidence in

question are generally undisputed. On the morning of

August 25, 1967, Detectives Hutchins and Prunk, of the

Portland, Oregon, police bureau, were assigned to in-

vestigate the murder of Doris Murphy, whose body had

been discovered by the Murphys’ son, Patrick (Tr. 28,

35, 52; A. 29, 35, 50-51). They arrived at the Murphy

home shortly after 8 a.m. (Tr. 28; A. 29). The deceased

was found lying on her back in a perfectly made-up

bed. She was clad in a pink and white rayon acetate

nightgown, which was fully extended over her body

(Tr. 35, 111, 146, 153-154, 278-279, 337-338; A. 35).

There were lacerations and abrasions on her throat, of

a sort which could have been left by an assailant with

fingernails; and it. appeared to the detectives that she

-had been strangled (Tr. 29, 35, 41, 44; A. 29, 35, 41, 44).

There were no signs of forcible entry, struggle, or rob-

bery (Tr. 35, 146-154; A. 35).

From Patrick Murphy, the detectives learned that

respondent Murphy had not been at the Murphy house

5

for some time, but had been expected home on the night

of August 24, and that Patrick had heard something,

apparently the sound of a motor vehicle, in the driveway

that night (Tr. 35, 44-45, 58; A. 35, 44, 56). They also

learned that Murphy -and the deceased had not been

getting along well, and that there had been at least one

fight between them during the preceding year, after

which bruises had been visible on the deceased’s face

and neck (Tr. 34-36, 58; A. 34-36, 58). While talking to

Patrick, the detectives observed that he bit his finger-

nails so extensively that one of the detectives described

him as having “absolutely no fingernails” (Tr. 41; A.

40-41).

About noon on the same day, August 25, Detective

Prunk telephoned Camp Sherman, Oregon, where Mur-

phy was then residing, and learned that Murphy had left

Camp Sherman to go to Portland tke night before and

had not returned (Tr. 31-32, 292-293; A. 32). Prunk left

word of Mrs. Murphy’s death and asked that Murphy

call the police station on his return (Tr. 31-32, 279-280,

463; A. 32).

Murphy returned Prunk’s call about 4 p.m. (Tr. 37-

38; A. 37-38). When Prunk confirmed that Mrs. Murphy

was dead, Murphy immediately began an account of

where he had been the night before, without asking any

questions about his wife’s death, and without being

asked where he had been (Tr. 37-38, 49; A. 37-38, 48).

He told Prunk that he had left Camp Sherman about

8 p.m. on the night of the 24th in an old pickup truck,

EMAL IIE EE IPRS, ROGAN RL EEE TIMP I ORAM OTE EE IY DO CRD

6

to bring a washing machine to Portland to be repaired;

that he had stopped in Salem for a couple of drinks on

the way and had arrived at his Portland home quite

late; that the door of the house was locked, and he had

slept in the pickup in the driveway, rather than disturb

his wife; that he had awakened after some time and

tried to push the truck out of the driveway to avoid

making noise, but ultimately had to start the engine;

and that he had driven off to another place where he had

slept until daylight and then taken the washing machine

to be repaired (Tr. 37-38; A. 37-38). At Prunk’s request,

Murphy then agreed to return to Portland to discuss

the case further (Tr. 38; A. 38).

About 7:45 p.m., Murphy came to the Portland police

station and talked to Detectives Hutchins and Prunk

(Tr. 38-39; A. 38-39) ). He repeated essentially the same

account of his activities on the night of the 24th that

he had related to Detective Prunk over the telephone,

but exhibited a general lack of interest in the murder

of his wife which struck the detectives as unusual (Tr.

48-49, 54-56; A. 48-49, 52-54).

During the conversation, Detective Hutchins noticed

a dark spot under Murphy’s right thumbnail (Tr. 53,

61-62; A. 51-52, 60). This prompted him to think about

taking fingernail scrapings, although, as he put it, the

thought probably would have occurred to him anyway,

in view of the lacerations which he had observed on the

deceased’s throat (Tr. 53, 62-63; A. 52, 60-61).

About 9.30 p.m., while Murphy conferred with two

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7

attorneys who had come to the police station to repre-

sent him, the detectives discussed taking fingernail scrap-

ings with a deputy district attorney who was also present

(Tr. 32-33, 39-40; A. 33, 39-40). One the advice of his

counsel, Murphy refused to consent to the taking of the

fingernail scrapings in question (Tr. 66, 310-312; A. 64).

Nevertheless, the police detained h'm long enough to

scrape his fingernails, in the presence of defense counsel

and others, and then released him (Tr. 32-33, 288-289,

316-317; A. 33). Murphy was not formally arrested until

approximately one month later, when the grand jury

returned an indictment accusing him of murder (Tr. 19;

A. 21). .

After reviewing these facts, both the Oregon court

of appeals and the federal district court held, in essence,

that:

(1) At the time they obtained the fingernail scrap-

ings in question, the police had probable cause to search

Murphy’s person, or to arrest him, or to do both;

(2) Since the police had probable cause to arrest

him, Murphy could nét complain of the fact that he was

merely detained momentarily, while the scrapings were

taken, and then released; and

(3) The police were justified in insinedlabedy taking

the fingernail scrapings from Murphy, since any effort

to obtain a warrant for that purpose would have required

the police, not only to detain him longer than they did,

but also to restrain him, guard him, or otherwise place

him in a position where he could not destroy the evi-

SNe IRWIN RR Re Be ie ok ORES SLANE PRAISE SONI IRS le

EASIEST

8

dence in question by clipping his nails, putting his hands

in his mouth, going to the lavatory, or cleaning his

hands in some other way (A. 68-69, 76-84).

The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed, saying that:

“* * * there were no such exigent circum-

stances existing at the time of the search which would

require that it immediately be conducted without

the procurement of a warrant, assuming that such

probable cause existed as might have justified the

issuance of a warrant.” (A. 72).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In this case, the police had ample cause either to

arrest Murphy for the murder of his wife or to obtain

a warrant to search his person for evidence of that crime.

They needed to act immediately, without taking the time

to obtain a warrant, because Murphy was aware that the

police wished to scrape his fingernails and could easily

have destroyed the incriminating evidence found under

them, the moment he was left free to do so. The police

took the challenged evidence in a reasonable manner,

with defense counsel present. Their momentary deten-

tion of Murphy was a less serious invasion of his privacy

than would have occurred had the police made the full-

scale, formal arrest for murder which they had cause

to make; and such an arrest would not, in itself, have

conferred upon Murphy any constitutional protection

from the search which was conducted. Accordingly, the

search and seizure in this case was reasonable and should

be upheld under the Fourth Amendment.

——

ARGUMENT

A. There Was Probable Cause for the Police To Act.

As pointed out in the Statement of the Case above,

both the Oregon court of appeals and the federal

district court held that, at the time the police obtained

the evidence challenged in this case, they had probable

cause either to arrest Murphy for the murder of his

wife or to obtain a warrant authorizing them to scrape

his fingernails fot gvidence of that crime. The Ninth

Circuit’s opinion also “assumes” that such probable

cause existed, and a review of the record herein demon-

strates that sufficient cause indeed existed to justify

either action.

The police were investigating a murder by strangula-

tion which had apparently been committed the night

before the body was discovered. The absence of evidence

of forcible entry of the Murphy house suggested that the

killer had ready access to the premises. The undis-

turbed appearance of the bedroom in which the deceased

was found indicated that the killer was well. known to

the deceased. The lack of evidence of robbery further

indicated that the killer was not a burglar. Murphy and

the deceased were known to have had a stormy marriage,

and Murphy was known to have inflicted injuries to the

deceased’s face and neck in the past. Murphy was known

to have been at the house on the night of the murder,

although he claimed not to have gone inside. The de-

cedent’s son, the only other person in the house on the

night in question, did not have fingernails which could

PERI ROE PTE ERIE ELIE GE ELEC BNET HI 8 NOR II INC EIN lt A NE Re enh Sea

* : > ded ET OTE FE RF EGR OS BST PUT

10

have made the lacerations observed on the victim’s

throat. When first contacted by the police, Murphy had

immediately volunteered a great deal of information con-

cerning his activities on the night in question, yet neither

during his initial telephone conversation with the police

nor during his conversation at the police station did he

display any concern or curiosity about his wife’s fate.

Finally, when Murphy arrived at the police station, the

officers observed a dark spot under one of his thumb-

nails, which reminded them that, in strangulation cases,

physical evidence is frequently found under the finger-

nails of the assailant, and further suggested that Murphy

was indeed the killer of his wife and that evidence of

the crime would be found under his fingernails.

The present case is therefore not controlled by Davis

v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), one of the principal

cases relied on by the Ninth Circuit. Davis involved the

summary rounding-up and fingerprinting of numerous

persons, including the appellant therein, when no prob-

able cause existed for such investigatory detention of any

of them. Such cause for the investigatory detention of

Murphy was clearly present here.

The present case is also distinguishable from Davis

in at least three other respects which should be noted

in passing, because those distinctions further demon-

strate that the police investigation herein was conducted

with a reasonableness which was lacking in Davis. Davis

was summarily taken to the police station against his

will; Murphy came to the station voluntarily and was

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11

detained, after he expressed a desire to leave, no longer

than was necessary to secure the fingernail scrapings in

question. Davis was not afforded counsel at the police

station; Murphy had two lawyers assisting him through-

out the taking of the evidence in question. And the evi-

dence sought in this case was not of such an indestruct-

able and always-obtainable nature as Davis’s finger-

prints, but readily-destructible traces of matter under a

focal suspect’s fingernails.

B. There Were Exigent Circumstances Justifying

Immediate Action.

After assuming that such probable cause existed in

this case as might have justified the issuance of a war-

rant authorizing the scraping of Murphy’s fingernails,

the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to the district court and

the Oregon court of appeals, that there were no exigent

circumstances which required the police to take im-

mediate action to obtain the evidence challenged in

these proceedings. This holding is clearly erroneous.

It is readily apparent that matter under the finger-

nails can be immediately and irretrievably lost, once the

suspect clips his nails or cleans them in any one of a

number of ways. And the risk that such evidence will

be destroyed is obviously great when, as in this case,

the person to be searched is alerted to the fact that the

police are seeking that evidence, by a request that he

consent to the scraping of his fingernails. The evidence

involved in this case is, if anything, even more perishable

pe ca aS ed ODE BOGE ELS LOI MN EES MEF EE RRP A: Sa

' Sar eae ASS: SL A

a

12

than the alcohol in the bloodstream involved in Schmer-

ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which this

Court upheld the immediate, warrantless seizure of evi-

dence from the person, when the delay involved in ob-

taining a warrant is likely to result in the loss of that

evidence. The alcohol ingested by Schmerber would

dissipate itself only over a comparatively substantial

period of time. Murphy could have destroyed the evi-

dence in this case, by clipping or cleaning his fingernails,

in a matter of seconds.

Indeed, as previously noted in petitioner’s reply to

Murphy’s memorandum in opposition to certiorari, the

record of this case indicates that loss or destruction of

the evidence challenged herein was not merely a theo-

retical possibility, but would actually have occurred if

the police had not acted immediately. On trial, both the

deputy district attorney who was present when the re-

quest for fingernail scrapings was made and the de-

tective who took the scrapings testified that, when the

request was made, Murphy “suddenly” and “immed-

iately” looked at his hands and put them behind his

back and into his pockets, moving them continuously

(See Tr. 311-312, 317; Petitioner’s Reply Memorandum,

at 2).

For the foregoing reasons, the police were clearly

confronted in this case with exigent circumstances justi-

fying immediate action on their part to obtain and pre-

serve the evidence challenged in these proceedings.

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13

C. The Momentary Detention of Murphy Was a Min-

imal Intrusion upon His Privacy, and More Reasonable

Than a Formal Arrest for Murder.

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit notes, as if it were

dispositive of the present case, that Murphy was not

formally under arrest at the time the challenged search

was made, nor was he arrested for some time thereafter.

In a similar manner, counsel for Murphy in his state-

court trial acknowledged at one point that, if the police

had formally arrested Murphy before they scraped his

fingernails, “probably we wouldn’t have too much to

argue about” (Tr. 10-11; A. 13). This tacit assumption

that under no circumstances can a search be made with-

out a*prior formal arrest, even when provable cause

exists which would justify either an arrest or a search,

does violence to the Fourth Amendment’s standard of

~ reasonableness. :

As this Court has stated, in a different context, there

is no constitutional right to be arrested: situations exist

when arrest would be unwise despite the existence of

probable cause. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,

310 (1966). Such a situation is presented here.

In this case, the police had at least that minimum

quantum of probable cause which would have justified

a formal arrest. Instead, they merely detained Murphy

until they had obtained the fingernail scrapings which

they sought and then released him. They took the scrap-

ings in a reasonable manner and with defense counsel

present. And, unlike the taking of the blood sample

involved in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),

14

the taking of that evidence did not require an actual

intrusion into the body. The minimal interference with

the person which occurred in this case “was so minor an

imposition that [Murphy] suffered no true humiliation

or affront to his dignity.” See United States v. D’Amico,

408 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1969) (seizure of hair samples from

person in custody). See also United States v. Richard-

son, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968) (examination of de-

fendant’s hands under ultraviolet light); Brent v. White,

398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1123

(1969) (genital scrapings revealing rape victim’s blood).

~~—~Surely this momentary detention of Murphy con-

stituted a less serious invasion of his privacy than a

full-scale arrest for murder, with its resultant publicity

and indefinite detention. The Fourth Amendment should

not be held to require a greater invasion of privacy

where a lesser one, equally justified, will serve the

purpose of the criminal investigation. The search com;

plained of here should not only be tolerated under the

Fourth Amendment, but encouraged as more reasonable,

and therefore preferable, to the more drastic alternative

of a formal arrest.

This Court has held that probable cause will support

an immediate search of an automobile, without a war-

rant, and without a prior arrest of the occupants, where

the potential mobility of the automobile makes it likely

that evidence will be lost if an immediate search is not :

conducted. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49

(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-159

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15

wt

(1925). The present case is one in which the actual

mobility of a human being and his potential ability to

destroy traces of incriminating evidence on his own per-

son call for the application of a similar rule. Or, at the

very least, the response of the police to the situation

confronting them in this case should be upheld as rea-

sonable, by application of those cases in which this Court

has held that Fourth Amendment standards of reason-

ableness are not inflexible, but permit intermediate gov-

ernmental responses of varying magnitude, in proportion

to the gravity of the factual situation. See, e.g., Adams

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).

In his memorandum in opposition to certiorari, Mur-

phy suggested that, rather than being informally de-

tained only momentarily, while the challenged evidence

was taken, he should have been formally detained at the

police station until a warrant authorizing the scraping

of his fingernails could be issued (Memorandum in Op-

position, at 2). But there is no greater reason to hold,

in the case of persons, than there is in the case of auto-

mobiles that immobilization for an indefinite period of

time is necessarily a “lesser” intrusion than an immediate

search. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52

(1970). And in this case, such an abnormal degree of

restraint would have had to.be placed on Murphy

throughout any period of detention, if such highly perish-

able evidence as fingernail scrapings was to be pre-

served, that the immediate taking of that evidence was

- als) ALT Ne oT ON ONS OE IE NE PAPE Ee MOREE ETON RR Ser rT eee

16

clearly more reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

As the Oregon court of appeals correctly observed:

“Unless [Murphy] were bound, manacled,

guarded or by some other means placed in a position

where he could not clip his fingernails, scrape the

nails of one hand with the nails of another, put his

fingers in his mouth or go to the lavatory from the

time the police asked-him for permission to take fin-

gernail scrapings until the time that they sought and

obtained a warrant, it was entirely likely that the

evidence would have been destroyed in the interim.

Proper application of the Fourth Amendment does

not require such extremes. * * *” State v. Murphy,

2 Or. App. 251,°260, 465 P.2d 900, 904-905, cert de-

nied 400 U.S. 944 (1970).

CONCLUSION

For the abéve reasons, the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be

reversed, and the judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Oregon affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

LEE JOHNSON

Attorney General of Oregon

JOHN W. OSBURN

Solicitor General

THOMAS H. DENNEY

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for Petitioner

January 1973

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