Brief for the United States — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee

Supreme Court brief1973

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What actually matters in this document.

Text

| A. BEM’s request for broadcast time --_-_-__ |

1. The proceedings before the Com-

mission_____________________-_

2. The Commission’s decision in

} B. DNC’s request for a declaratory ruling -__

) 1. The proceedings before the Com-

mission. ____-___________--__-

2. The Commission’s decision on

DNC’s request_________-____--

C. The Commission’s inquiry into access to

the broadcast media by individuals and

GPOUDS.... nwo nn cee wencn nee oenss 5s

| D. The decision of the court of appeals_-_____

| E. Subsequent developments in the Commis-

sion’s inquiry into fairness and access-_-

mmary of argument___-._...-.--------------

e 468-033—72——1

18

20

II

It was reasonable and constitutionally proper

for the Federal Communications Commis-

sion to refrain from recognizing and imple-

menting the right of access claimed by re-

spondents, and to rely, instead, on the exer-

cise of journalistic discretion in this area by

broadcast licensees within the framework of

their obligations under the Fairness Doc-

ics caaiuen ctecm ae haeciuesane

A. The Fairness Doctrine is the funda-

mental safeguard of the public’s

First Amendment interest in

B. So long as the Commission’s regula-

tory program serves the public

interest in ways that are consistent

with First Amendment values, the

Constitution does not require the

Commission to adopt a particular

affirmative regulatory policy that

arguably might further freedom

of speech if the Commission has

reasonable grounds for refusing

C. The Commission’s decisions here

were in accordance with the

regulatory scheme Congress

enacted and were reasonable in

the context of the safeguards

that the Fairness Doctrine affords

itn titadnncnsninnene

1. Broadcasters are not common

Ill

Argument—Continued

2. In the framework of com-

mercial broadcasting pre-

scribed by Congress, the

Fairness Doctrine provides

reasonable public access

without discrimination and

thereby - satisfies First page

Amendment requirements 45

3. In light of the serious prob-

lems in implementing a

regulatory policy requiring

licensees to accept editorial

advertisements, the Com-

mission reasonably refused

to do so at this time-_-_-__- 54

CR id ct tercnectinnianewanscnedeneexnes 62

Cases:

American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville

& Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571___- 38, 39, 45

Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B'rith, 4

F.C.C. 2d 190, affirmed, 403 F. 2d 169,

certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 930__.._______- 33

Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commis-

sion, 405 F. 2d 1082, certiorari denied sub

nom. Tobacco Institute v. Federal Communica-

tions Commission, 396 U.S. 842____-____-_- 60

Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, Nos.

71-891, 71-919, O.T., 1971, affirmed per

- curiam, March 27, 1972_-_..------------- 54

Columbia Broadcasting System v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, 454 F. 2d 1018__ 49, 61

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 5386_-.---------- 53

Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P. & F. Radio

Ee CI swe etecce wens vcesscs 29

IV

Cases—Continued me

Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576____- 13,

24, 56, 57, 60

Democratic National Commiitee v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, C.A. D.C., No.

71-1637, decided February 2, 1972, petition

for a writ of certiorari filed April 28, 1972,

No. 71-1405, O.T. 1971._....-------____- 49, 61

Democratic National Committee v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, No. 71-1738, de-

cided February 22, 1972___.........____- 60, 61

Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525_____- 28, 42

Federal Communications Commission v. Ameri-

can Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284_______- 52

Federal Communications Commission v. Poits-

ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184____- 27, 28, 37

Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67. _..._--- 53

Friends of the Earth v. Federal Communications

Commission, 449 F. 2d 1164_.......-____- 61

Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann.

Rep. 32 (1929), reversed, 37 F. 2d 993,

petition for certiorari dismissed, 281 U.S.

WOO dp udhiones ceeeanthdssnadebGueenade 28

Green v. Federal Communications Commission,

OOF Fe Besa accedasdnlasecess 61

Healey v. Federal Communications Commission,

C.A. D.C., No. 24,630, decided March 3,

SEEN Gdisk dene ane senda mckeen as 61

Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of

Tacoma, 455 P. 9d 350..... 2.2... -- 48

Jefferson v. Hackney, No. 70-5064, O.T. 1971,

decided May 30, 1972. _.....-.-.-...--.- 36

Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority,

ee i ht eh eck sake 48

Larus Brothers v. Federal Communications

Commission, 447 F. 2d 876__.....-.------ 61

Cases—Continued

Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F.

Supp. 1097, affirmed, 441 F.2d 1257... __

Minshall Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 2d 796.

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319

a ne

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.

1B

39

7,

12, 20, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 44

United States v. Midwest Video Corp., No. 71-

Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dis-

trict, 64 Cal. Reptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 982. _-

Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102

a

VI

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

United States Constitution, First Amend- _,,,,

TR oc ccd bacewenednuusenueeeneneoncun 2,

6, 7, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32,

34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61

Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,

as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, et seg_______-_- 27

Section 2(a)._........---------------- 40

Section 3(h)..........__------ 2, 22, 40, 43,45

Sections 201-223. _________-__-_-_-__- 40

Section 301_____-____-__-------- ee 27

Section 303____._____---_----- --_ 27

Section 303(g)_._._.....-----------_-- 28

Section 304______._-------- eee 27

Section 307______...--..----------_-- 27

Section 309_____....-.--------------- 27

Section 309(h)(1)_.......------------- 27

Section 315. ....--...---------------- 42, 43

Section 315(a)....2.-..-.--------- 3, 5, 29, 31

Section 326____.......-.------------- 28

Section 390___.......-.-------------- 53

Section 392___....._...---------- eee 53

Section 396(g)(1)(A)_--..------------- 53

Section 397____._._._._.-_-----_-_--- 53

Section 402(a)_..__.__._.-._-____--__-- 15

Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162__._ _ 27,

28, 40, 42

Public Health Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.

TOR a ikhace de Oe teem einaeeseseds 54

Public Law 92-225, approved February 7,

1972:

Section 103(a)(2)(A)__..-------------- 42-43

Section 103(b)(2)(B)__.....----------- 43

VII

Miscellaneous:

Center for Law and Social Policy, 23 P. & F. aie

Radio Reg. 2d. 187_________.._..___ 51, 52

II Chafee, Government and Mass Communica-

tion (1949)_________-_--_- 34, 37, 58

67 Cong. Rec.:

de ee 27

12501-12505_____...-_-_____.. 41,42

|b | > Ske eee ee eee ee ea 41

BO alg We a i eee 41

BR ade ecu ee tecdieeeneres. 41, 42

En Bane ‘Program Policy Statement, 25 Fed.

Reg. 7291_.........-.._... | 29, 30, 42, 46, 50

Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415________ 46

F.C.C. proposed rules on cable television, 37

Fed. Reg. 3289._....................___ 38

Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33

F.C.C. 2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3883__._____ 18

H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., Ist Sess...._.______ 40

H.R. Rep. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess______ 42

2d 1550 (1971)_____-_------e 52

Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532 (1971)______ 56

Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689 61 (p | eee ae 55, 56

Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 30 F.C.C.

2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825..... 13, 14, 15

Order and Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket

19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 798, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980_ 19

Order in Docket No. 19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 800,

OF Ped: Hee. BOTS ote e oo 20

= ORE EE BLES OLI TELE LGEIO LE NE NETO IEIOELD

VIII

Miscellaneous—Continued

Political Broadcasts—Equal Time, Hearings

before Subcommittee of the House Inter-

state and Foreign Commerce Committee,

88th Cong., Ist Sess., on H.J. Res. 247, a,

Primer on Ascertainment of Community Prob-

lems by Broadcast Applicants, 36 Fed. Reg.

ne rgccancegcnwsne and enecnnnonan 46

Primer on Ascertainment of Problems by Broad-

cast Applicants, 27 F.C.C 2d 650___...---- 30

Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,

13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949)_____- 11, 12, 14, 30, 46, 47

S. Rep. No. 772, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.,p.4-- 41

ee

4 On i ee ,

Gn the Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TERM, 1971

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, 71-866

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS

v.

Bustness Executives’ Move ror VIETNAM PEACE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION AND UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS

Vv.

DEMocRATIC NATIONAL CoMMITTEE

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 446) is

reported at 450 F. 2d 642. The opinions of the Federal

Communications Commission (App. 247, 357) are

reported at 25 F.C.C. 2d 242 and 25 F.C.C. 2d 216.

(1)

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App. 493)

was entered on August 3, 1971, and reissued on Octo-

ber 29, 1971 (U.S. Pet. App. 155a-156a). A timely

petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing

en banc was denied on October 4, 1971 (App. 494).

The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on Janu-

ary 3, 1972, and was granted on February 28, 1972.

The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the powers granted to it by the

Federal Communications Act, and in light of the in-

herent limitations on the broadcast spectrum, the Fed-

eral Communications Commission, which under its

‘‘Fairness Doctrine” requires broadcast licensees to

present programming involving controversial issues of

publie importance, must, because of the First Amend-

ment, also require that the licensees sell time to indi-

viduals and groups for the advertising of their partic-

ular views.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to-the Constitution provides

in relevant part:

The Congress shall make no law

abridging the freedom of speech * * *.

Section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934,

48 Stat. 1064, et seq., as amended, 47 U.S.C. 153(h),

provides:

* & #

“Common carrier’ or “carrier”? means aly

person engaged as a common carrier for hire.

3

in interstate or foreign communication by wire

or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trans-

mission of energy, except where reference js

made to common carriers not subject to this

chapter; but a person engaged in radio broad-

casting shall not, insofar as such person is so

engaged, be deemed a common carrier.

Section 315(a) of the Communications Act -of 1934,

48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 717, 47 U.S.C.

315(a), provides:

If any licensee shall permit any person who

is a legally qualified candidate for any public

Office to use a broadcasting station, he shall

afford equal opportunities to all other such

candidates for that office in the use of such

broadcasting station: Provided, That such li-

censee shall have no power of censorship over

the material broadcast under the provisions of

this section. No obligation is imposed under

this subsection upon any licensee to allow the

use of its station by any such candidate. Ap-

pearance by a legally qualified candidate on

any—

(1) bona fide newscast,

(2) bona fide news interview,

(3) bona fide news documentary (if the ap-

pearance of the candidate is incidental to the

presentation of the subject or subjects covered

by the news documentary), or

(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news

events (including but not limited to political

conventions and activities incidental thereto),

shall not be deemed to be use of a broadeast-

ing station within the meaning of this subsec-

tion. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall

a aii cs

4

be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-

nection with the presentation of newscasts, news

interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-

spot coverage of news events, from the obliga-

tion imposed upon them under this chapter to

operate in the public interest and to afford

reasonable opportunity for the discussion of

conflicting views on issues of public importance.

These cases arose on petitions for review (App.

419, 422) of two orders of the Federal Communica-

tions Commission, announced on the same day (App.

247, 357), regarding claims that commercial radio

and television broadcasters cannot refuse to sell any

broadcast time for editorial advertisements concern-

ing controversial issues of publie importance. Both

complainants—Business Executives’ Move for Viet-

nam Peace (BEM), a national organization com-

posed of business executives, and the Democratic

National Committee (DNC), the governing body of

the national Democratic Party between conventions—

urged that broadcasters were required to accept edi-

torial advertisements without regard to whether the

station licensee had otherwise fulfilled its affirmative

and continuing obligation under the Commission's

Fairness Doctrine to inform the public on questions~

of public importance by presenting representative and

contrasting views. The court of appeals reversed the

Commission’s orders denying these claims and re-

manded the cases for further proceedings, holding

that under the First Amendment the Commission can-

not permit broadcasters to maintain a flat ban on

eee age:

ao a Sere

9]

public issue advertisements when other commercial

messages are accepted, notwithstanding the broad-

casters’ coverage of public issues under the Fairness

Doctrine (App. 446). The court directed the Commis-

sion to develop reasonable procedures and regulations

for determining which and how many editorial ad-

vertisements shall be broadcast.

A. BEM’S REQUEST FOR BROADCAST TIME

1. The Proceedings Before The Commission. On

January 22, 1970, BEM filed a complaint with the

Commission alleging that radio station WTOP, Wash-

ington, D.C., had refused to sell it time to broadcast

one-minute spot announcements expressing opposition

to the Vietnam war.’ The station had a general policy

of refusing to sell spot announcement time to persons

or groups desiring to air their views on controversial

public issues (App. 292, 316; 450-451 n. 3), and BEM

claimed that the station’s refusal] to sell time on this

basis violated the First Amendment and the Fairness

Doctrine.” BEM stated, without supporting data, that

the station had regularly presented pro-Vietnam war

views, but had not devoted any significant amount of

time to the other side.

WTOP responded that it had covered all viewpoints

on the war and that although a complete quantitative

evaluation of its coverage of such a long-term issue

was not possible, particularly since WTOP is an al]-

*BEM included sam

(App. 298-306).

*See Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as

amended. 47 U.S.C. 315(a).

ple announcements with its complaint

LEE IES IN ERED LONI ONL LE LIES YOR EEDA pee ge

—

6

news station, a spot check of the three months sur-

rounding BEM’s request showed that the station’s

news reports included on numerous occasions the views

of a variety of critics of the war, in addition to hard

news coverage of the war. Four station commentators

had also reflected various viewpoints on thejgubject

(App. 312-319).’

On March 31, 1970, the Commission requested

WTOP to submit by April 7 a statement on whether

it had presented the viewpoints embodied in the com-

plainant’s announcements (App. 349). In response,

WTOP submitted an affidavit of its Executive Editor

stating that each of the viewpoints in the BEM an-

nouncements had been expressed a number of times

over WTOP (App. 352). BEM commented by saying

that the affidavit added nothing new (App. 353).

2. The Commission’s Decision in BEM. In its deci-

sion of August 5, 1970, the Commission viewed BEM’s

complaint as charging (1) that WTOP had failed

to meet its fairness obligation with respect to the

Vietnam War; and (2) that the station’s refusal to

carry BEM’s announcements violated the Fairness

Doctrine and the First Amendment (App. 357-368).

With respect to the fairness aspect of the complaint,

the Commission found that BEM had not demon-

strated that WTOP had failed to fulfill its respon-

> WTOP also referred to its coverage of particular events

related to the war, such as Moratorium activities in October and

November of 1969; the President’s speech on Vietnam on

November 3, 1969, in connection with which it had presented

critics of the war; and its news interview programs, which

had also presented national figures both for and against the

war policies. (App. 314-315.)

mee

maps EAU et

wegen LES RICRAS adhe

7

sibility to afford a reasonable opportunity for the

presentation of significant contrasting views in its

overall programming; the licensee had specified a

number of specific instances in which it had presented

anti-Vietnam war views, while the complainant had

made no more than a general allegation of a failure

to present conflicting views (App. 360-365)‘

The Commission further held that WTOP’s policy

of refusing to sell time for Spot announcements on

controversial issues did not per se violate the Fair-

ness Doctrine or any Commission policy. The Com-

mission noted that a broadcast licensee is not a

common carrier under the Act and therefore is not

required to open its doors to all persons seeking to

use its facilities. Since the licensee had presented

contrasting views on the Vietnam war, including the

viewpoints embodied in BEM’s announcements, the

Commission found no reason to require the station to

present the views of any particular group in any par-

ticular format. It also relied upon the more extensive

analyses set forth in its DNC decision issued the

same day.

As to BEM’s contention under the First Amend-

ment, the Commission ruled that Red Lion Broad-

casting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,

395 U.S. 367, did not support BEM’s constitutional

*The Commission adhered to its established policy that in the

absence of specific evidence of a failure to comply with fair-

ness requirements, it would not be reasonable to require a

i to prove the contrary by producing transcripts or re-’

cordings of all of its Programs touching on an issue. Here,

BEM had not afforded any basis for its complaint on fairness

(App. 364).

ee EEL L EME NDOIEREA GIR RY I eh ay | + eaeteuedt BOSE DETEA LSA RRS ohm He Hat ny

——

claims and, relying on its decision in the DNC case,

infra, concluded that BEM’s position that WTOP

must sell it time is inconsistent with the system of

broadcasting created by Congress (App. 368):

* * * the Communications Act specifically pro-

vides that a broadcaster shall not be deemed a

common carrier, and thus he may exercise his

judgment as to the particular program matter

he will present. The licensee is thus constantly

called upon to make choices between types and

formats of programming and the persons to

participate therein. If the licensee were re-

quired to present any matter brought to him

which was not obscene, etc., the result would be

not only chaotic but a wholly different broad-

casting system which Congress has not chosen

to adopt. [Citation omitted. ]

Four Commissioners joined in the opinion, two con-

curred in the result, and Commissioner Johnson

dissented.

8

B. DNC’S REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY RULING

1. The Proceedings Before the Commission. On

May 19, 1970, while the BEM complaint was under

consideration, DNC requested the Commission to issue

a declaratory ruling that (App. 33-34) :

a. A broadcaster may not, as a general policy,

refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such

as the DNC, for the solicitation of funds and

for comment on public issues; or, alternatively,

b. Any such ‘‘general policy’’ will be taken

into consideration—in a manner adverse to the

broadcaster—by the Commission in evaluating

9

whether the grant of a broadeaster’s renewal

application accords with the public interest.

DNC alleged that televised requests for funds were

essential to the integrity of the nation’s political proc-

esses, as well as to relieve its own precarious financial]

situation, and that it must promptly launch a national

radio and television appeal for funds but could not do

so unless “it can be certain that it will be able to

obtain the access to the broadcast media which imple-

mentation of the plan demands” (App. 16-22). DNC

contended that a broadcaster’s refusal to grant access

to its facilities by responsible groups violates the First

Amendment as construed by this Court in the Red

Iton case, and also contravenes the public interest

standards of the Communications Act (App. 25-33).°

*The three major networks, American Broadcasting Co.

(ABC), National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), and the Columbia

Broadcasting System (CBS), submitted comments in response.

NBC advised in a brief letter (App. 47) that it had no pol-

ABC set forth excerpts from its Standards and Policies in-

dicating that except for religious broadcasts, ABC permitted

wlicitations of funds only with its specific permission; that

it would sell time to candidates, their representatives or politi-

cal organizations upon the opening of an election campaign

as determined on the basis of appropriate election laws, or, in

its discretion, prior to the official opening of a campaign where

it determined that individuals or organizations had a recog-

tized interest in the forthcoming campaign; and that whenever

it permitted its facilities to be used for the presentation of one

viewpoint, it would afford opportunity for the presentation of

468-033—72

2

a

2. The Commission’s Decision on DNC’s Request.

In an opinion rendered on the same day as its deci-

sion in BEM, the Commission upheld DNC’s claims

regarding solicitation of funds by political parties.

The Commission noted that none of the three major

television networks now had a policy against selling

time to political parties for fund raising during non-

campaign periods (App. 269), ‘but that CBS’s previ-

ous policy “‘of confining such sales of time to election

periods would appear arbitrary, since the need for the

widest possible financial support for political parties

10

contrasting views and would itself decide what subjects were

of such interest or importance as to warrant time for their

presentation. In the absence of special public interest consider-

ations, however, ABC would not sell time for comment on con-

troversial public issues or for the solicitation of funds. In view

of the importance of maintaining strong and viable major

political parties, however, ABC proposed to permit fund solici-

tation by the parties on a reasonable basis. In addition, ABC

contended that making time available to any-responsible entity

that wished to advance its views on controversial issues of pub-

lic importance or to solicit funds would raise serious problems

under the Fairness Doctrine. (App. 42-46.)

CBS submitted a lengthy response, with sttechennte (App.

48-242). It stated that it would permit the presentation by

political parties of a special category of spot announcements

for the purpose of fund raising, and that these announcements

would not have to be on behalf of candidates or ballot prop-

ositions (App. 58). As to a right of general access, how-

ever, CBS stated that the public is best served by the presen-

tation of issues and viewpoints within a balanced program

schedule, utilizing newsworthiness as the sole criterion; thata —

regulatory policy imposing common carrier obligations on

broadcasters would be contrary to the public interest; that

there is no constitutional right to compel broadcast stations

to carry programs; and that Congress and the Commission had

specifically rejected such a requirement.

11

is not confined to such periods * * *” (App. 272).

With respect to the question of access, the Commis-

sion’ rejected DNC’s contention that individuals or

groups have a right to purchase time to comment on

public issues—a contention viewed by the Commission

as going “to the heart of the system of broadcasting

which has developed in this country * * *” (App.

256). The Commission reviewed the licensee’s respon-

sibility, as a public trustee, to meet the needs and in-

terests of the public in the various categories of pro-

gramming, including the Special obligation to devote

broadcast time to the presentation of news and public

affairs, and the discretion necessarily afforded the li-

censee in discharging his obligations. This discretion,

the Commission emphasized, must be exercised in a

manner consistent with the ‘public interest (App.

259) : ‘‘representative community views and voices on

controversial issues which are of importance” must be

presented and ‘‘[a] licensee policy of excluding par-

tisan voices and always itself presenting views in a

bland, inoffensive manner would run counter to the

‘profound national commitment that debate on public

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ”

As stated in the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast

Licensees, 13 F.0.C. 1246, 1249 (1949) :

It is this right of the publie to be informed,

ss =Yrather than any right on the part of the Govern-

ment, any broadcast licensee or any individual

member of the public to broadcast his own par-

ticular views on any matter, which is the foun-

dation stone of the American system of

broadcasting.

>

——ee . — ween ora ones ere nye ea

a RP eT IT PR ee , : -—_

a,

Applying these principles to DNC’s request, the

Commission could not find that a licensee fulfilling

these overriding public interest responsibilities none-

theless operates in a manner inconsistent with the

public interest or the First Amendment when it re-

fuses to sell time to individuals or groups wishing to

express their particular views. While “there is of

course no Commission policy thwarting sale of time

to comment on public issues” (App. 265), Congress

had specifically refused to impose common carrier

responsibilities in the broadcast area (App. 260) and

the Court in Red Lion, as had the Commission in its

Report on Edttorializing, stressed “the right of the

public to be informed—not the right of the broad-

caster or any individual or group to speak over

_ broadeast facilities’? (App. 263).

Thus, recognition of “a near-absolute right of any

person who has the money to buy time * * * would

create a common carrier situation which Congress after

due deliberation, specifically rejected * * * (App. 267).

And, in the Commission’s view, it would be contrary to

the public interest to transfer responsibility for what

should be broadeast from the licensees acting as public

trustees to those affluent individuals or groups with

the resources to buy air time (App. 263-264). There

would be serious practical difficulties in administering

such a system, where access would depend on the finan-

cial resources of the person seeking to state his

opinions on public issues. These problems could not

be solved by a “first come, first served platform”

(App. 269), which itself would be against the public

12

13

interest and would tend to undermine the rationale

for the Commission’s requirement that broadcasters

present contrasting views at the broadcaster’s expense

if necessary * (App. 267-268).

The Commission concluded that neither the Act

nor the First Amendment compels such a result. It

pointed out that broadcasting is not analogous to

other government regulated forums such as public

parks or transit systems since in those areas, unlike

broadcasting, there is no independent obligation of a

licensee to present representative views reflecting

opposing viewpoints on public issues.

Five Commissioners joined the opinion; one con-

curred (App. 273) and Commissioner Johnson dis-

sented (App. 274-287).

C. THE COMMISSION’S INQUIRY INTO ACCESS TO THE

BROADCAST MEDIA BY INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

On June 19, 1971, after the argument in the court

of appeals in these cases, but before the court’s deci-

sion, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in

Docket 19260, 30 F.C.C. 2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825,

instituting a broad Study into the efficacy of the

operation of the fairness doctrine. The Commission

specifically undertook the study “in the light of current

demands for access to the broadcast media to consider

issues of public concern.” However, the Commission

cautioned that it could not

abandon the fairness doctrine or treat broad-

casters as common carriers who must accept all

material offered by any and all comers. The

* Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576.

i ROSTER RETAIN tans Neonates

14

Communications Act is explicit in these re-

spects (see Section 315(a) and Section 3(h))

and we take the Act as a “given” from which

this inquiry necessarily proceeds. * * * [30 F.C.C.

2d at 26-27.]

Rather, the Commission sought comments on whether

the policies it has developed under the Act are the most

effective means of fostering “ ‘uninhibited, robust,

wide-open’ debate on public issues (New York Times

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270)”:

The basic issue we pose here is whether

Commission-made policies indeed promote that

goal to the maximum extent. Or, are there revi-

sions or even entirely new policies that would

serve it more effectively ?

** * Tt is most important to note in this connec-

tion that, toa major extent, ours is a commercially

based broadcast system and that this system

renders a vital service to the Nation. Any poli-

cies adopted by this Commission in the areas

covered in the present inquiry should be con-

sistent with the maintenance and growth of

that system and should, among other appro-

priate standards, be so measured. * * * Pro-

posals that in the short run might afford great

insight into public issues, but in the long run

might tend to undermine the existing broad-

cast system—e.g., nothing but informational

programming in a debate format—would not,

in this view, serve the public interest. [30

F.C.C. 2d at 27.]

Noting that it had been 22 years since the Com-

mission’s 1949 Report on Editorializing, supra, the

Commission observed that it was time for another

ao

—

15

overview: “‘If our policies are sound, they should

have stood the test of time and application. If they

unreasonably restrict the journalistic functions of

broadcasters or permit broadcasters unreasonably to

restrict access—then corrective action is called for.’’

Specifically recognizing that the respondents in

these cases had claimed that the present system of

access under fairness is inadequate, the Commission

devoted Part IV of the study to the question whether

“there is any feasible method of providing access for

discussion of public issues outside the requirements

of the fairness doctrine.” 30 F.C.C. 2d at 33. It called

for comment on the problems raised by paid and free

time, the specific standards for determining how ac-

cess time should be allocated, and the effect of access

by others on the licensees’ general responsibility to

the public and on the licensees’ duties under the fair-

ness doctrine. In sum the Commission addressed its

inquiry to whether criteria or guidelines for public

access can and should be prescribed, or whether the

complex problems in doing so require that decisions

on access be left to the responsible discretion of the

broadcast licensees, subject to correction of abuses on

complaint to the Commission (36 Fed. Reg. 11827).

D. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Upon petitions for review filed by BEM and DNC

pursuant to Section 402(a) of the Communications

Act, 47 U.S.C. 402(a), the court of appeals, with

Judge McGowan dissenting, reversed. The court sum-

marized its holding as follows (App. 449):

16

We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid

public issue announcements is in violation of

the First Amendment, at least when other sorts

of paid announcements are accepted. We do not

hold, however, that the planned announcements

of the petitioners—or, for that matter, of any

other particular applicant for air time—must

necessarily be accepted by broadcast licensees.

Rather, we confine ourselves to invalidating the

flat ban alone, leaving it up to the licensees and

the Commission to develop and administer rea-

sonable procedures and regulations determining

which and how many ‘“‘editorial advertisements”

will be put on the air.

In reaching this result, the court first found “state

action’”’ because of the extent of governmental regula-

tion of broadcasting; the importance of the use of the

licensed broadcasting media for the communication of

ideas; and the Commission’s refusal to disapprove

the policy of some licensees not to accept editorial

advertising (App. 458-464).

The court then discussed the question of access. Al-

though recognizing that the physical limitations of

broadeast time necessarily restrict access to the air-

waves, the court concluded that within these limita-

tions there is nevertheless under the First Amend-

ment “a reasonably regulated, ‘abridgeable’ right to

speak” held collectively by the general public (App.

467). This abridgeable interest, in the court’s view, is

derived from the following: the public’s right to re-

ceive ideas and information (App. 466); the public’s

“First Amendment interest in the mode or manner—

as well as the content—of public debate aired on the

A

17

broadcast media’’ (App. 466-467) ; and “the interest

of individuals and groups in effective self-expression”

(App. 467). Moreover, the court held that if com-

mercial advertising is sold at all, a total ban against

editorial advertising by broadcasters violates the First

Amendment because such a ban discriminates against

controversial speech in favor of commercial speech

(App. 474-480).

The court ordered the Commission to develop rea-

sonable guidelines governing acceptance of editorial

advertisements by broadcasters and remanded the

cases to the Commission for this purpose (App. 480-

489).

Judge McGowan, dissenting, stated that the respon-

sibilities of broadcast licensees to present controversial]

views on issues of public importance, subject to the

fairness doctrine, satisfied the requirements of the

First Amendment. He notéd that “This is the system

which Congress has, wisely or not, provided as the

alternative to public ownership and operation of radio

and television communications facilities. * * * [t is

hardly the path of. wisdom to scrap it for a system

in which money alone determines what issues are to

be aired * * *” (App. 490). He concluded that “with-

in the context of a regulatory scheme which has made

provision for the airing of controversial issues of pub-

lie importance,” the First Amendment permits, but

does not require, licensees to accept paid editorial

advertising (App. 491). On the other hand, under the

majority’s decision, “The Commission has, at the least,

been set a task of heroic proportions, and one whose

a

18

very complexities may undermine the premise upon

which it is founded” (App. 490).

E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMISSION’s

INQUIRY INTO FAIRNESS AND ACCESS

After denial by the court of appeals of motions for

rehearing (App. 494) and stay of the mandate (App.

496, 498), the government applied to this Court for

a stay of the mandate. When this Court initially

denied that motion on January 24, 1972, the Commis-

sion published a further notice of inquiry soliciting

comments on the procedures and guidelines necessary

to carry out the mandate of the court of appeals.

Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33 F.C.C.

2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3383.’

*The Commission asked the parties particularly to address

the following areas (33 F.C.C. 2d at 555-556) :

a. May a licensee limit the time available for editorial

advertisements and, if so, on what basis?

b. What regulation may the licensee make as to the

placement of editorial advertisements?

c. May a licensee prevent domination by a few groups

or er viewpoints and, if so, by what means?

d. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on

the ground that the particular viewpoint has been sufi-

ciently expressed, short of finding undue dominance?

e. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on

standards of taste and suitability for access to the home?

f. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on

the ground that its subject matter is of little or no sig-

nificance or interest to the community ?

g. Are any restrictions on content permissible short of

a finding that the material is outside the protection of the

First Amendment?

h. Should the Commission’s Cullman doctrine be appli-

cable to editorial and controversial issue advertisements

a

7

re eee stot EE 7 ia

19

When this Court granted certiorari on February 28,

1972, it also stayed the mandate of the court of ap-

peals. The Commission then withdrew the above notice.

What policies, if any, concerning access to the

broadcast media might properly and feasibly

be evolved under the public interest standard of

the Communications Act, and what would be

their relationship to, and effect upon, present or

proposed fairness doctrine policies. We, thus,

do not invite comment on what the First

Amendment may or may not require in this

area, but rather on pertinent public interest

considerations, including of course the policy of

fostering robust, wide-open debate. [Order and

Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260,

33 F.C.C. 24 798, 799, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980.] *

Written comments have been filed and oral presenta-

tions were made during pane] discussions and oral

which the licensee would not have aired in the first place

*The Commission confined its inquiry to the non-constitu-

tional aspects of access because the First Amendment issue

tiorari had been granted. It also stated “that final decision

** * may be delayed and made in light of the Supreme Court's

ie eS ELLA RPE ss

_———

20

argument’ before the Commission during the week

of March 27, 1972.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A

The Commission’s Fairness Doctrine, as developed

over many years of broadcast regulation, as approved

by Congress and as sustained by this Court in Red

Lion, requires licensees to operate as public trustees,

giving coverage to public issues that is adequate and

that fairly reflects opposing views. This must be done

at the broadcaster’s own expense if necessary. In addi-

tion, the broadcaster has an affirmative obligation to

discover and fulfill the needs and desires of his par-

ticular service area. Failure to comply with these

duties can result in loss of the license to broadcast.

Freedom of broadcast journalism is thus subor-

dinated to the public interest in hearing diverse views,

although the broadcaster must still exercise discretion

in determining how to allocate broadcasting time be-

tween the various areas of interest to the public. And,

in serving the “paramount’’ right *® of the listeners

and viewers with respect to issues of public impor-

tance, the licensee must use responsible journalistic

judgment in choosing the format for the program and

the spokesmen to present opinions on the question.

* The scheduling of the panel discussions and oral argument,

as well as the agenda, were set forth in an Order in Docket No

19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 800, 37 Fed. Reg. 4978.

1° Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 390.

ss

OP SS os

78 <a lah ey af ee

21

B

In holding that the First Amendment requires

broadcasters ‘to sell advertising time to persons wish-

ing to discuss controversial public issues regardless

of whether the broadcaster has fulfilled its obligation

under the Fairness Doctrine to cover such issues fully

and fairly, the court of appeals relied on the public’s

interest in the content of discussion, in the mode of

presentation, and in effective self-expression.

While the Commission obviously shares these con-

cerns since they are the very foundation of the Fair-

ness Doctrine, the court’s conclusion—that the

Constitution compels the Commission to institute a

regulatory scheme forbidding broadcasters from hav-

ing a policy of not selling time for editorial adver-

tisements—does not follow. When it comes to how the

Commission should affirmatively promote the publie’s

First Amendment interest in the communications

media, the Constitution permits a range of choices,

just as the Constitution allowed Congress a range of

choices in deciding what kind of system of broadcast

regulation would best serve the public interest, con-

venience and necessity. Of course, when the Com-

mission does develop a certain regulatory scheme such

as the Fairness Doctrine, this must be consistent with

the First Amendment; and whether jit is depends not

only on the objective but also on the means adopted

to achieve it.

But if the Commission refrains from adopting a

particular affirmative policy, as it did here, its deci-

sion should be sustained as within permissible limits

of constitutional choice if the Commi&gion has reason-

5

\

ILENE LOL LE VMI LS LENGE EDEL SER NE Hn Ban ae

are ~~

22

able grounds, in light of the existing regulatory sys-

tem, for not adopting it. Otherwise, whatever a court,

on the basis of the limited information before it,

deems best to encourage freedom of speech on the

airwaves will become frozen into the Act. And the

Commission and Congress would thereby be ousted of

their decision-making roles in the highly complex

and important area of commercial broadcasting where

the question of what ought to be done is often inter-

twined with the practical administrative question of

what reasonably can be done.

C

1. In refusing to recognize and implement the right

of access claimed by respondents, the Commission

acted consistently with First Amendment values and

in accordance with the regulatory system Congress

enacted. Section 3(h) of the Communications Act,

47 U.S.C. 153(h), declares that broadcasters are not

common carriers. The legislative history of the Act

and its predecessor, the~Radio Act of 1927, shows

that Congress explicitly rejected a provision that

would have required licensees to act as common car-

riers with respect to questions affecting the public.

The court’s decision pushes broadeasting very far in

the direction Congress disapproved, yet the system of

broadcast regulation Congress legislated has never

been thought to be outside the permissible limits of

constitutional choice. In light of Section 3(h), the

Commission reasonably refused to recognize a right of

access as broad as that suggested by the court below

and, instead, began a general inquiry to determine

| 23

whether there is any feasible method of providing ad-

ditional public access within the present statutory

structure. This is a sound approach to such a complex

problem and it is a constitutionally permissible one.

2. The court of appeals held that a broadcaster's

refusal to sell time for editorial advertisements dis-

eriminates against public issues in favor of commer-

cial advertising. But this question can properly be

viewed only in terms of how the broadcaster allocates

air time between commercial uses and public issue

speech. And since licensees must devote substantial

air time to public issues regardless of whether they

accept product advertising, there is no discrimination.

Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals’ assump-

tion, broadcasters do exercise control over product

advertisements; indeed they have an obligation to do

so. And the general duties of broadecasters—both com-

mercial and non-commercial—under the Fairness Doc-

trine extend to every minute of every day the station

is on the air. It does not make a constitutional differ-

ence that some broadcasters accept commercial adver-

tising; at the least, the Constitution allows the Com-

mission to develop a regulatory system, as it has

done, that makes no such distinction.

3. There are, moreover, practical reasons why it was

reasonable for the Commission to conclude that it

should not recognize and implement the right of ag-

cess claimed by respondents.

The ‘‘right’”’ created by the court below is a right of

access only for those persons wealthy enough to pur-

chase air time and could therefore lead to domination

ee

24

of the discussion of public issues by the rich. Yet this

Court in Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392, expressed disap-

proval of a system in which the “highest bidders”

would get the available time. Indeed it has already

been suggested that the result reached by the court

below on the basis of the First Amendment, if imple-

mented, would itself be unconstitutional because it

discriminates against the poor.

Moreover, a first-come, first-served system of appor-

tioning the limited time available could still lead to

domination by the rich, who could make continued

requests for time. It is no answer to say that the Com-

mission could devise rules for determining whether

one person’s speech should be broadcast instead of

another’s. That would interject the Commission, as

never before, into day-to-day programming decisions.

The Commission reasonably decided not to embark

upon such a venture, at least not without further

study.

Furthermore, if the Commission’s Cullman doctrine

were applied to editorial advertisements that broad-

casters were compelled to aecept, the broadcasters

would be required to present contrasting views,

free-of-charge. if necessary. But Commissioner Cox,

concurring in DNC (App. 369), pointed out that

requiring broadcasters to correct imbalances they had

not created by allowing free reply time would “un-

reasonably expose them to erosion of their advertising

revenues.’’ While it was suggested below that the solu-

tion would be to suspend the Fairness Doctrine in this

area, that would hardly result in a better regulatory

system than the present one, which requires broad-

428

gees <

‘ POEL HESS FEE on

25

casters to give full coverage to public issues and to

present contrasting views.

Finally, the court’s decision thrusts the Commission

into the role of arbiter, with each refusal to sell time

giving rise to a potential First Amendment claim.

Even if the Commiission could find a way of deciding

competing claims for the limited time available on a

basis that would not prefer one person’s speech over

another’s, the danger that this eventually would occur

is real—anid it is a danger the Commission has sought

to avoid in developing the issue-oriented Fairness

Doctrine, which requires licensees to exercise reason-

able discretion in determining what spokesman should

present the various sides of a public issue and in what

format the presentation should be made. :

Before the court had rendered its decision here, the

Commission had begun a comprehensive inquiry to

consider what changes, if any, should be made in the

present regulatory system with respect to coverage

of controversial public issues. The need for this kind

of far-reaching and thorough inquiry, which the Com-

mission has resumed, is one of the reasons why Con-

gress created an administrative agency to deal with

such important and complex matters of regulatory

policy.

Since the Commission’s refusal to implement, at this

time, the right of access claimed by respondents was

teasonable in light of the foregoing considerations

and of the protections afforded by the Fairness Doc-

tine to the publie’s First Amendment interest in

broadcasting, the court of appeals should have affirmed

the Commission’s decisions in these cases.

468-033—72__-3

Se ee

a

26

ARGUMENT

Because the broadcast spectrum is limited, its use

must be regulated to accommodate the interests of all,

lest in the “cacaphony of competing voices’’ none will

clearly be heard. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed-

eral Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 376.

Accordingly, no individual or group has “an un-

abridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast com-

parable to the right of every individual to speak, write

or publish.” Jd. at 388. “It is the right of the viewers

and listeners * * * which is paramount.” Id. at 390.

To implement this right of the listening and viewing

public, choices must be made among various means of

accommodating the public’s interest in maintaining

freedom of speech within the inherent physical limita-

tions on access to the airwaves. In the public interest

standards of the Communications Act of 1934, and in

the 1959 amendment to Section 315 of that Act, Con-

gress charged the Federal Communications Commis-

sion with the primary responsibility of making these

choices. The decision of the court of appeals in this

case substantially encroaches upon that responsibility. —

In effect it transfers the making of basic policy judg-

ments from the Commission to the courts, and, in so

doing, sets a significant new course for broadcasting, a

course that in our view is both unwise and unwar-

ranted. This case has great importance because of the

immediate consequences of the court’s decision for

radio and television broadcasting, but it is important

too because of what the decision below portends for

the future role of the Commission and the courts in

the regulatory system Congress has legislated.

a

IT WAS REASONABLE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROPER FOR

THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION TO RE-

_FRAIN FROM RECOGNIZING AND IMPLEMENTING THE

RIGHT OF ACCESS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS, AND TO

RELY, INSTEAD, ON THE EXERCISE OF JOURNALISTIC

DISCRETION IN THIS AREA BY BROADCAST ‘LICENSEES

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UN-

DER THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

27

A. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IS THE FUNDAMENTAL SAFEGUARD OF

THE PUBLIC’s FIRST AMENDMENT INTEREST IN BROADCASTING

Congress brought order to the chaotic state of

broadcasting in 1927 by repudiating the doctrine that

“anyone who will may transmit’? and replacing it

with the principle “that the right of the public

to service is superior to the right of any indi-

vidual * * *.”’* In the Radio Act of 1927” and the

Communications Act of 1934," which essentially re-

enacted the earlier law," Congress preserved public

ownership of broadcasting channels, provided that

broadcasters would be licensed and regulated on the

basis of “public convenience, interest or necessity,”’ **

set up an expert administrative agency “‘to carry out

its legislative policy,’’™ and charged the agency with

the duty of promoting ‘‘the larger and more effective

"67 Cong. Rec. 5479 (remarks of Congressman White),

quoted in Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 376 n. 5.

% 44 Stat. 1162, as amended, 46 Stat. 844.

* 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151 et 8eq.

“ Federal Communications Commission, v. Pottsville Broad-

casting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137.

* See 47 U.S.C. 301, 304, 809(h) (1).

* 47 U.S.C. 303, 307, 309.

" Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broad-

tasting Co., supra, 309 U.S. at 138.

CAPRESSO SEAR

PREPAC ATS BELLA LAE AN ETT 5 PEND YT

28

use oferadio in the public interest.” * As this Court

stated in Pottsville Broadcasting, supra, 309 U.S. at

138, ‘‘Underlying the whole law is recognition of the

rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evo-

lution of broadcasting and of the corresponding re-

quirement that the administrative process possess

sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors * * *.”

From the beginning Congress has recognized that

commercial broadcasting is closely related to First

Amendment interests.” While the Commission may |

not “interfere with the right of free speech by means

of radio communication,” 47 U.S.C. 326, it has the.

duty to regulate broadcasting in the public interest,

which includes the public’s “collective right to have

the medium function consistently with the ends and

purposes of the First Amendment.’’ Red Lion, supra,

395 U.S. at 390.

These objectives have remained in the forefront of

broadcast regulation. Only two years after passage of

the Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, the

predecessor of the Federal Communications Commis-

sion held that the “public interest requires ample

play for the free and fair competition of opposing

views, and * * * the principle applies * * * to all

discussions of issues of importance to the public.””

As radio and television assumed greater importance

1847 U.S.C. 303(g).

See Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 389; Farmers Union v.

WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529.

2° Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33

(1929), reversed on other grounds, 37 F. 2d 993 (C.A. D.C.), peti-

tion for certiorari dismissed, 281 U.S. 706.

29

in our society, the Commission’s responsibilities in-

ereased accordingly and a regul

from these basic precepts.

Thus, with the subsequent approy

(47 U.S.C. 315(a)) and this Court (

395 U.S. at 386-401), the Commission developed the

Fairness Doctrine, based on the premise that under

the Communications Act a bro

operate as public trustee.”

a “two-fold duty”: to «

lie issues,”’

atory system evolved

al of Congress

Red Lion, supra,

adeast licensee must

As such, the licensee has

give adequate coverage to pub-

ahd to give coverage that is ‘‘fair in that

it accurately reflects the opposing views.’’ Red Lion,

supra, 395 U.S. at 377. “This must be done at the

broadcaster’s own expense if sponsorship is unayail-

able. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P. & F. Radio

Reg. 895 (1963). Moreover, the duty must be met by

programming obtained at the licensee ’s own initiative

if available from no other source.’’ Id! at 377-378. In

satisfying these duties, the licensee must make a

“diligent, positive and continuing effort * * *to dis-

cover and fulfill the tastes, needs

and desires of his * * *

service area.’’

En bane Program Policy Statement,

See, ¢.g., En Bane Program Policy, 23 Fed. Reg. 7291,

7294 :

The licensee is, in effect, a “trustee”

his license to operate his station imposes

delegable duty to serve the public inte

munity he had chosen to represent as

Great confidence and trust are_pl

have qualified as broadcasters. The

ilege to select the material to be b

and the operation of his comp

medium of communication is

in the sense that

upon him a non-

rest in the com-

a broadcaster.

aced in the citizens who

primary duty and priv-

roadcast to his audience

onent of this powerful

left in his hands.

REIGNS RENTER EE OE Ne OT

PRETEEN SO Sins

—

30

25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295.” The consequence of failure

by the licensee to meet these obligations is, as Judge

McGowan stated in his dissent in this case (App.

490), loss of the right to broadcast.

In this respect, freedom of broadcast journalism

is subordinated to the public’s interest in hearing di-

verse views on matters of public importance and the

“paramount”’ rights of the listeners and viewers are

thereby served. See Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at

389-390. But journalistic discretion must nevertheless

be exercised. The broadcaster must still decide how to

allocate time between entertainment and non-enter-

tainment programs and how much time to devote to

specialized programming on matters such as science,

religion, sports, news, education, public affairs, and

the interests of minority groups. And with respect to

questions of public importance, the ‘“‘licensee will in

each instance be called upon to exercise his best judg-

ment and good sense in determining what subjects

should be considered, the particular format of the

programs to be devoted to each subject, the different

shades of opinion to be presenteg, and the spokesmen

for each point of view.’’ Report on Editorializing by

Broadcast Licensees, 13 ¥.C.C. 1246, 1251.

22 See, with respect to the licensee’s duty to ascertain com-

munity needs and interests, Suburban Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C.

1021, affirmed, Henry v. Federal Communications Commission,

302 F. 2d 191 (C.A.D.C.) ; Minshall Broadcasting Co., 11 F.CC.

2d 796; City of Camden, 18 F.C.C. 2d 412, 418-426 and n. 22;

Primer on Ascertainment of Problems by Broadcast Applicants,

27 F.C.C. 2d 650.

31

B, 80 LONG AS THE COMMISSION’S REGULATORY PROGRAM SERVES TIE

PUBLIC INTEREST IN WAYS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH FIRST

AMENDMENT VALUES, THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THE

COMMISSION TO ADOPT A PARTICULAR AFFIRMATIVE REGULATORY

POLICY THAT ARGUABLY MIGHT FURTHER FREEDOM OF SPEECH IF

THE COMMISSION HAS REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR REFUSING TO

DO 80

In this case, there has been no showing that any

broadcaster failed “to afford reasonable opportunity

for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of

public importance.” 47 U.S.C. 315(a). BEM did not

demonstrate that its profferred views were novel or

different in substance from anti-Vietnam war views

already carried on WTOP; and DNO, in seeking a

declaratory ruling, made no claim that any particular

broadcaster had violated the Fairness Doctrine.*? The

court of appeals nonetheless decided that the First

Amendment requires broadcasters to sell advertising

time to persons wishing to discuss issues already fully

and fairly presented by the station. We submit that

the court’s holding is, in substance, essentially a dis-

agreement with the Commission on a policy matter that

Congress properly entrusted to the agency.

The court of appeals recognized that the licensee’s

responsibility for the presentation of controversial

issues of public importance under the Fairness Doc-

trine serves the public’s right to hear debate on con-

troversial public issues. But, in the corrt’s opinion,

the public has an additional interest “na the mode or

™ Hence, this is not a case involving “a discriminatory re-

fusal [by the Commission] to require tie licensee to broadcast

certain views which have been denied access to the airwaves.”

Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 396.

Pate eae nee nerecrnse cnet ns ence ar tee oan

=

32

manner—as well as the content—of public debate aired

in the broadcast media” (App. 466) ; individuals and

groups have a First Amendment interest ‘‘in effective

self-expression’? (App. 467). Although in Red Lion

this Court held that there is no “unabridgeable First

Amendment right to broadcast,” 395 U.S. at 388, the

court below found in the First Amendment a “reason-

ably regulated, ‘abridgeable’ right to speak’’ over the

airwaves (App. 467). The licensee’s initiation and

control of the presentation of controversial public

issues, even subject to the requirements of the Com-

mission’s Fairness Doctrine, do not, in the court’s view,

satisfy the First Amendment because they represent

only the broadcaster’s view of what is important; in ad-

dition, some members of the public must have initiative

and control over self-expression independent of the li-

censee’s responsibility to determine what shall be broad-

cast, at least so long as commercial advertisements are

accepted. But the court stated that the “abridgeable”

First Amendment right of access it defined must be

limited and cannot be exercised by all members of

the public. Consequently, the plaintiffs in these cases

are not necessarily entitled to present their announce-

ments on the air. Instead, the court ordered the

Commission to adopt “‘a scheme of reasonable regula-

tion” that would govern the selling of time for edi-

torial advertising in light of the court’s holding that

licensees must grant access to some (App. 486).

The Commission and the court below are agreed that

broadcast regulation must be guided by the public’s

First Amendment interests in the communications

33

media; indeed, Congress and the Commission have

recognized this from the outset. And it is common

ground that the public has an interest not only in the

eontent of the discussion of controversial public issues,

but also, as the court of appeals put it, ‘“‘in the mode

or manner’ of the presentation (App. 466) ; the Com-

mission made this clear when it stated in DNC that a

“licensee policy of excluding partisan voices and

always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive

manner would run counter to the ‘profound national

commitment that debate on public issues should be

uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’” (App. 259).*

There is also no dispute about the court’s statement

that the public has an interest ‘‘in effective self-

expression’’ (App. 467); the Commission itself here

warned against the exclusion of ‘‘partisan voices”’

(App. 259).”°

Rather, the point of departure is that these consid-

erations have led the Commission to develop the Fair-

ness Doctrine, whereas the same considerations led the

court of appeals to create what it termed an ‘‘abridge-

able” right of access. It is apparent:that the court’s

result is far from manifest in the Constitution’s com-

mand that “‘Congress shall make no law * * * abridg-

ing the freedom of speech * * *.’’ Indeed, the lan-

*See also Storer Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 2d 678; Anti-

Defamation League of B'nai Brith, 4 F.C.C. 2d 190, 191,

afirmed, 403 F. 2d 169, 170 (C.A.D.C.) ; certiorari denied, 394

US. 930.

* See also Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 392, n. 18 (“The ex-

pression of views opposing those which broadcasters per-

mit to be aired in the first place need not be confined solely to

the broadcasters themselves as proxies.”). :

468-033—72—_4

34 4

guage of the First Amendment scarcely appears to

mandate an “abridgeable right’’ regulated by Com-

mission rules that delineate when an individual may

and may not exercise it.

The difficulty is that this is not a traditional First

Amendment case involving negative restraints on gov-

ernmental action. Instead, the’question here is whether

the government must take certain affirmative action

to promote freedom of speech or, more precisely,

whether the Commission must institute a regulatory

scheme outlawing bans on editorial advertisements in

an attempt to promote the public’s First Amendment

interest ‘in broadcasting. That is a practical question,

involving many complexities of implementation as well

as potentially far-reaching consequences for the broad-

cast media and their regulation—a question peculiary

suited to administrative determination. If, as in this

case, a court decides in favor of such an affirmative

regulatory policy solely in terms of what it divines

from the First Amendment, then the Commission is

ousted from its role of deciding how the public’s

interest in broadcasting can best be promoted and

Congress is rendered powerless to change the court’s

result. This is not the way such significant regulatory

~ decisions should be made; and it is not the way Con-

gress intended them to be made with respect to

broadcasting.

Professor Zechariah Chafee put it well: ”

Once we get away from the bare words of

the [First] Amendment, we must construe it as

**TI Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 640-641

(1949). .

yorM wry

(tile v a

‘ 35

part of a Constitution which creates a govern-

ment for the purpose of performing several

very important tasks. The [First] Amendment

should be interpreted so as not to cripple the

regular work of the government. A part of this

work is the regulation of interstate and foreign

commerce, and this has come in our modern

age to include the job of parceling out the air

among broadcasters, which Congress has in-

trusted to the FCO. Therefore, every free-

speech problem in the radio has to be considered

with reference to the satisfactory performance

of this job as well as to the value of open dis-

cussion. Although free speech should weigh

heavily in the scale in the event of conflict,

still the Commission should be. given ample

scope to do its job.”"

This correctly indicates, we believe, that when the

Commission formulates regulations for encouraging

free discussion over the airwaves, it must act con-

sistently with the First Amendment and that whether

it has done so depends not only on the objective but

also on the means adopted to achieve it. See Red Lion,

upra. Likewise, when the Commission refuses to

mdertake a particular affirmative regulatory policy

that arguably would promote freedom of Speech, its

refusal must be reasonable ™ or, as J udge McGowan

” Professor Chafee added that the First Amendment prevents

ission from engaging in two kinds of activity : censor-

hip and prejudicial administration that penalizes “the expres-

fon of particular ideas.” Id. at 641-642,

"See United States y. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,

SEDAN NE ILO an pian renee pect ean ee

TSI ORY OT Peay

DIMLAI I

37

speech in the communications media—suggests both

regulation and non-regulation and that the appro-

priate courses to follow in this complex field could be

effectively marked “neither directly through self-

executing legislation nor by the judicial process.’

Pottsville Broadcasting, supra, 309 U.S. at 142. More-

over, when we deal with any proposed governmental]

policy to promote First Amendment interests in broad-

casting, it is well to remember Professor Chafee’s

warning that “there is no bright line between en-

couragement and repression.” * Before the attempt is

made, there should be careful and thorough considera-

tion of the future consequences and of the need for

further affirmative action in light of the existing

regulatory system and technological developments.”

* II Chafee, supra, at 710; see also id. at 709:

Whenever anybody is inclined to look to the government

for help in making the mass media do what we desire of

them, he had better ask himself one antiseptic question:

“Am I envisaging myself as *the official who is going to

administer the policy which seems to me so good?” Justice

Holmes remarked that, when socialism came, he hoped he

would be “on the committee.” You and I are not going to

be on the committee which is charged with making news-

papers or radio scripts better written and more accurate

and impartial. It is very easy to assume that splendid

ws in our crowd will be exercising the large powers

over the flow of facts and opinions which seem to us essen-

_ tial to save society, but that is an iridescent dream. We

must be prepared to take our chances with the kind of poli-

ticians we particularly dislike, because that is what we may

get.

"In its decision in DNC, the Commission noted that it recog-

nized the need to foster “a multitude of voices in the discussion

of public issues” and stated that it “is seeking to promote a new

technology which can make a most significant contribution in

siti, Site ae ia ae

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38

This in turn demands the kind of searching inquiry

the Commission began before the court of appeals

rendered its decision and thereby, in Judge

McGowan’s words, “dictate[d] the result in advance”

(App. 491).*

In addition, when the issue is whether regulations

should be adopted to advance the public’s First

Amendment interest there are many practical con-

siderations that have to be taken into account, not the

least of which is*whether the Commission is equipped

to handle the particular task. ‘‘ [T]he Federal Commun-

nications Commission * * * would ill serve the pub-

lic interest if the courts’—and, we should add, the

Commission itself—‘imposed such heavy burdens on

[it] as to overtax [its] capacities.’ * In the end, the

this respect—cable television. Because of the potentially great

number of channels, cable opens up the possibility of common

carrier channels, public access channels, etc.” (App. 265-266).

See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., No. 71-506, decided

June 7, 1972.

In its proposed rules on cable television the Commission has

provided that, with respect to cable systems in major television

markets, the system must have a number of different kinds of

access channels. See 37 Fed. Reg. 3289, Section 76.251. For ex-

ample, Section 76.251(a) (4) provides:

* * * Each such system shall maintain at least one specially

designated, noncommercial public access channel available

on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. The system shall

maintain and have available for public use at least the

minimal equipment and facilities necessary for the produc-

tion of programing for such a channel. * * *

32 See pp. 13-15; 18-20 supra.

88 See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nash-

ville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 591-592, where the Interstate Com-

merce Commission, in an individual rate reduction proceeding,

determined to continue following the practice it had adhered

39

Commission might conclude that although the aim is

worthy, the means available for achieving it counsel

against pursuing the particular course that has been

advocated. However, this is not a conclusion open to

the Commission under the decision of the court of

appeals in this case, although as Judge McGowan

stated in dissent (App. 490) :

The Commission has, at the least, been set a

task of heroic proportions, and one whose very

complexities may undermine the premise upon

which it: is founded. The question is whether

the Constitution requires that it be undertaken.

I am not convinced that it does. * * *

In sum, we believe that the Constitution permits a

range of legislative choices regarding how the public’s

interest in freedom of speech over the airwaves is to

be advanced, that in the absence of specific direction

by Congress the Commission has leeway to decide not |

to adopt a particular course so long as it has reason-

able grounds for refraining so to act and so long

as the regulatory scheme it has adopted is consistent

to in the past, although it intended to consider the issues there

presented in a rulemaking proceeding where it could assess the

industry-wide effect of a change in policy.

. The Court there held that “We can see no justification for

denying the Commission reasonable latitude to decide where

it will resolve these complex issues, in addition to how it will

resolve them. The action by the District Court here not only

deprives the Commission of the opportunity to make the initial

resolution of the issues but also prevents it from doing so ina

more suitable context.” /d. at 592.

The posture of the present case is remarkably similar to that

of American Commercial Lines.

* Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v.

Federal Communications Commission, 359 F. 2d 994, 1005 (C.A.

. D.C.).

PUP Ca DAES AASAN SNE ti te: ATER

40

with First Amendment values, and that the court of

appeals erred in holding otherwise. The remainder

of our brief is devoted to showing that the Commis-

sion’s decisions here were reasonable and in accord-

ance with the regulatory structure Congress enacted.

©. THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS HERE WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH

' ‘THE REGULATORY SCHEME CONGRESS ENACTED AND WERE REA-

SONABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SAFEGUARDS THAT THE

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AFFORDS THE PUBLIC

1. Broadcasters Are Not Common Carriers

Congress has chosen to promote broadcasting in

the United States within the structure of the private

enterprise system. Congress could have established

another method but, in light of the inherent limita-

tions on access to broadcasting, expressly ‘‘rejected

the idea of the licensee being required to act as a

common carrier with respect to transmission of com-

ment on public issues’? (Commission’s opinion in

DNC, App. 260). Section 3(h) of the Act, 47 U.S.C.

153(h), specifically provides that ‘‘a person engaged |

in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person

is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”’ *

In its report on H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., the bill |

which became the Radio Act of 1927, the Senate

Commerce Committee recommended a provision re-

*6 This provision also served to distinguish radio broadcasting

from the Commission’s common carrier jurisdiction, which in

1984 was transferred from the Interstate Commerce Commis-

sion to the Federal Communications Commission by Section

2(a) and Sections 201-223 of the Communications Act, 48

Stat. 1064, 1070, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 152(a) , 201-228.

41

quiring licensees, as common carriers, to allow access

in connection with public issue broadcasts. S. Rep. No.

122, 69th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 4. The provision stated (67

Cong. Rec. 12502, 12503) : “if any licensee shall permit a

broadcasting station to be used * * * for the discussion of

any question affecting the public, he shall make no

discrimination as to the use of such broadcasting sta-

tion, and with respect to said matters the licensee

shall be deemed a common carrier in interstate com-

merce: provided, that such licensee shall have no

power to censor the material broadcast * * *. But Senator

Dill, the Committee Chairman, objected that such a pro-

vision would be unworkable because it would force

the broadcaster to “accept anything and everything

that was offered him so long as the price was paid’”’

(67 Cong. Rec. 12502). He argued that broadcasters

would be forced “to give all their time to that kind

of discussion or no public question could be dis-

cussed” (67 Cong. Rec. 12504). Senator Dill offered

an amendment on the floor to eliminate the common

carrier obligation and to limit the access requirement

to candidates for public office. 67 Cong. Rec. 12501-

9 12505.“ The Senate adopted Senator Dill’s amend-

** Senator Dill pointed out that (67 Cong. Ree. 12502) :

* * * under the common-carrier provision a radio station

is compelled to take any kind of broadcasting that any-

body wants to offer, which would mean that it would take

anybody who came in order of the person presenting him-

self and would be compelled to broadcast for an hour's

time speeches of any kind they wanted to broadcast. This

- provision simply says that if a radio station permits one

candidate for a public office to address the listener it must

mn

42

ment (67 Cong. Rec. 12501-12505) and this was later

accepted in the conference report, H.R. Rep. No.

1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10, 14. As enacted, the

amendment became Section 18 of the Radio Act of

1927, 44 Stat. 1170, and after re-enactment, Section

315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088,

47 U.S.C. 315.”

allow all candidates for the public office to do so, and to

4 that extent there must be no discrimination.

: Senator Howell objected that (67 Cong. Rec. 12504):

The Senator from Washington has left in the bill a

provision respecting candidates. It is important. but it

: has not anything like the importance of the provision he

has stricken out—the discussion of public questions.

But Senator Dill replied (id.):

I sympathize with a great deal of what the Senator is

saying, but I want to remind the Senator of the danger

of having the words “public questions” in the hill.

That is such a general term that there is probably no

question of any interest whatsoever that could be discussed

but that the other side of it could demand time: and thus

: a radio station would be placed in the position that the

| Senator from Iowa mentions about candidates, namely, that

they would have to give all their time to that kind of

discussion, or no public question could be discussed.

In exercising its discretion, the broadcaster would fail to

carry out its obligations to the public if it did not make time

available to candidates for political office on a reasonable basis.

since the purpose of Section 315 “is to facilitate political de-

bate over radio and television.” Farmers Union v. WDAY.

360 U.S. 525, 534; see F.C.C. Memorandum on Second sen-

tence of Section 315(a), in Political Broadcasts—Equhl Time.

Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Interstate and

Foreign Commerce Committee. 88th Cong., Ist Sess.. on H.J.

Res. 247, pp. 8490: see also En Bane Program Policy

Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291. Congress has now codified this —

duty to the limited extent of permitting the Commis-

sion to revoke licenses “for willful or repeated failure to —

allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable

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43

The importance of this legislative history, which the

court below failed to discuss, is apparent. The court

of appeals described its decision as merely a ‘‘modest

reform”’ and therefore not inconsistent with Section

3(h) (App. 482-483). But to the extent that the licensee

is required to sell time and is enjoined from exercising

journalistic discretion regarding such factors as what

persons should serve as spokesmen for a particular view-

point on a public issue, what type of format this view

should be presented in, how much time should be de-

voted to the particular presentation, and how fre-

quently the view should be aired, then the licensee

tends to become a common carrier with respect to

public issues. The decision below pushes broadcasting

very far in that direction and does so on the basis of

reasoning that goes beyond the narrow limits pro-

claimed at the beginning of the opinion (App. 449).

Thus, the court warns against judging *tany sort of

speech on public issues worthless”’ (App. 473) and

states that even when a licensee has fully complied with

the Fairness Doctrine with respect to a certain issue

amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a

legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf

of his candidacy.” Section 103(a)(2)(A), P.L. 92-295, ap-

proved February 7, 1972. Congress also revised the language of

Section 315, supra, by adding the following italicized words:

“no obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licen-

see to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.” Sec-

tion 103(b) (2) (B). Except to the extent modified, Congress

has adhered to the original policy adopted in 1997.

* As the Commission stated in DNC. the result would be “a

near-absolute right of any person who has the money to buy

time” (App. 267).

.

such as the Vietnam war, the licensee must neverthe-

less sell time because ‘‘it is not necessarily clear that a

particular antiwar editorial advertisement would add

nothing to the public’s information and understand-

ing” (App. 471-472, emphasis in original). In addition,

the court finds the Fairness Doctrine inadequate he-

cause ‘‘when an individual or group buys time to say

its piece, the crucial controls are in its own hands” |

(App. 468). In our view, these statements, as well as |

others that served as a ground for the decision, indi-

cate that the court did significantly more than institute

a ‘‘modest reform.’’ Instead, the court turned the

question of access into a matter of constitution] com- |

pulsion and, in the process, apparently transformed

each refusal to sell time for editorial advertising into |

a First Amendment issue to be decided ultimately by —

the courts. |

The evident intent of Congress not to go so far |

cannot be dismised with the assertion that the First

Amendment nevertheless demands more. Congress

‘‘eould surely have decreed that each frequency

should be shared among all or some of those who wish

to use it,” Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 390-391; it

44

could have obligated licensees to act as common car-

riers; or it could have forbidden advertisements en-

tirely. Congress chose instead to regulate the airwaves

through the system of commercial broadcasting we

have described above and, as Judge McGowan stated

in dissent, ‘‘[t]his approach has never been thought

to be other than within the permissible limits of con-

stitutional choice’ (App. 490). In light of Congress’

45

direction in Section 3(h), the Commission reasonably

refused to recognize an individual right of access as

broad as that suggested by the court below; but the

Commission did begin a comprehensive inquiry to

determine whether there is any ‘‘feasible method of

providing access for discussion of public issues out-

side the requirements of the fairness doctrine,’’ 30

F.C.C. 2d at 33 (see pp. 13-15 supra). This, we

submit, is not only a constitutionally permissible ap-

proach, but also a sound method of dealing with such

significant regulatory matters; indeed, it is precisely

because of the need for proceeding in this way that

Congress set up an administrative agency to handle

the task.

2. In the framework of commercial broadcast

>» « . €

Congress, the Fuirness Doctrine prov

ing prescribed by

ides reasonable publie

access without discrimination and thereby satisfies First

Amendment requirements

When the Commission’s requirements under’ the

Fairness Doctrine are compared with the require-

ments imposed by the court of appeals on the basis

of its view of the First Amendment, it becomes evi-

dent that the court’s disagreement with the Commis-

sion essentially involves policy differences about the

Manner in which broadcasters, as public trustees,

ought to make their frequencies available for the dis-

cussion of public issues. The Commission has long

held that under the Fairness Doctrine, licensees may

not “themselves make radio unavailable as a medium

*° See note 33 supra, discussing American Commercial Lines,

Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 591-592.

a

46

of free speech.” Report on Editorializing, supra, 13

F.C.C. at 1248. Broadcasters must seek out spokesmen

to present representative and contrasting views on

controversial issues of public importance, although

they may exercise journalistic discretion in selecting

representative spokesmen and in determining what

format shall be used for the presentations. This duty

is a binding condition of the right to broadcast. See,

e.g., Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415; En Banc Pro-

gram Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291; Primer on

Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast

Applicants, 36 Fed. Reg. 4092.

This indeed was the thrust of United Broadcasting

Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, relied on by the court of

appeals (App. 487). This 1945 decision is among

many that contributed to the still-evolving Fairness

Doctrine. The Commission there emphasized, as it

later observed in the landmark Report on Editorial-

izing, that the broadcaster’s duty includes making

BN ee TN

*°In United Broadcasting a labor organization charged that

a Columbus, Ohio, radio station, WHKC, refused to broadcast

programs which solicited membership or discussed controversial

subjects, such as race, religion, or politics; that it discriminated

in administering this policy, and that it censored scripts. The

case was settled. The station agreed that it would consider every

request for time to broadcast concerning controversial public

issues in an open minded and impartial manner; that requests

for such time would be considered in light of its contribution to

a balanced program schedule; and that the station would make

time available for the full and free discussion of public issues |

on a nondiscriminatory basis. In approving the agreement, the

Commission stated that “operation of any station under the

extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the discussion |

of controversial public issues” was inconsistent with the Com-

munications Act’s public interest standard. 10 F.C.C. at 518.

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responsible provision for the discussion of controver-

sial issues of public importance in the community

served and making sufficient time available for a full

discussion of those issues. 13 F.C.C. at 1249. But as

the Fairness Doctrine developed, the Commission

found that it was not necessarily required, as dicta in

United Broadcasting had indicated, that broadcasters

sell time to private individuals so long as the broad-

easter used his facilities as a forum for discussion of

public issues. Thus, after thorough study of the mat-

ter, the Commission came to the following conclusion

in its Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. at 1251-1252:

It should be recognized that there can be

no one all embracing formula which licensees

can hope to apply to insure the fair and bal-

anced presentation of all public issues. Different

issues will inevitably require different tech-

niques of presentation and production. The

licensee will in each instance be called upon to

exercise his best judgment and good sense in

determining what subjects should be considered,

the particular format of the programs to be

devoted to each subject, the different shades of

opinion to be presented, and the spokesmen for

each point of view. In determining whether to

honor specific requests for time, the station will

inevitably be confronted with such questions as

whether the subject is worth considering,

whether the viewpoint of the requesting party

has already received a sufficient amount of

broadcast time, or whether there may not be

other available groups or individuals who might

be more appropriate spokesmen for the par-

ticular point of view than the person making

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48

the request. The latter’s. personal involvement

in the controversy may also be a factor which

must be considered, for elementary considera-

tions of fairness may dictate that time be allo-

cated to a person or group which has been

specifically attacked over the station, where

otherwise no such obligation would exist. Un-

doubtedly, over a period of time some licensees

may make honest errors of judgment. But

there can be no doubt that any licensee

honestly desiring to tive up to its obligation to.

serve the public interest and making a reason-

able effort to do so, will be able to achieve a fair

and satisfactory resolution of these problems in

the light of the specific facts.“

Although BEM failed to show.’'that WTOP had not

complied with these standards (App. 362-363), the

Commission stressed that WTOP had a continuing,

duty to present a variety of views on the Vietnam

“1 Because of this duty, the cases involving access to a regu-

lated forum relied upon by the court of appeals are inapposite.

Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097

(W. D. Wis.), affirmed, 441 F. 2d 1257 (C.A. 7); Zucker v.

Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.); Kissinger v. New York

City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 4388 (S.D.N.Y.); Hill-

side Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma 455 P. 2d

850 (Wash.); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,

64 Cal. Reptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 982 (Cal.). These are all cases

in which those responsible for access to an advertising forum

have no corresponding responsibility to assure balanced cover-

age of contending positions; nor are there special considera-

tions, as here, suggesting that such an obligation should be

imposed. In those cases, the question was simply whether the

ideas expressed in editorial advertising were to be given access

to the forum at all. Under the broadcasters’ public interest obliga-

tions and the fairness doctrine, however, controversial questions

of public importance must be given access to the broadcast

forum, although the format for their presentation is subject to

licensee discretion.

49 -

war, including views such as those advocated by BEM

(App. 361-362). However, the Commission held that

in the absence of a violation of the Fairness Doctrine,

BEM had no “right’’ to buy time and WTOP had no

duty to sell (App. 368). And the court of appeals

itself stopped short of holding that WTOP necessar-

ily must sell time to BEM ( App. 488).

With respect to the DNC case, the networks are

presently under a duty to present the views of major

political parties on national issues, and they have done

so in the context of news broadcasts and interviews,

and in special presentations (App. 252): For example,

in Columbia Broadcasting System, Ine. y. Federal

Communications Commission, 454 F. 2d 1018 (C.A.

D.C.), the court of appeals recently held that the CBS

network acted pursuant to the Fairness Doctrine in

offering broadcast time to the Chairman of DNC to

present the views of the Democratic Party in a for-

mat to be determined by him. Similarly, the court sus-

tained the American Broadcasting Company in its

grant of time to DNC to present its views on the

Vietnam war.“ And as the statement indicates, supra,

p. 9n. 5, the National Broadeasting Company has no

general policy against the sale of time to major polit-

ical parties for broadcasts on public issues (App. 47).

Thus, each of the major national networks, in diverse

ways in fact makes time available to individuals and

groups who wish to speak out on the issues of the day.

“See Democratic National Committee v. Federal Communi-

tations Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 71-1637, decided February 2,

1972, petition for a writ of certiorari filed April 28, 1972. No.

71-1405.

468—033--72—__5

T a

: 50 |

Under the Fairness Doctrine they must do so as part

of their obligation as public trustees.

But the court of appeals concluded “that the fair-

ness doctrine’s goal of full and fair coverage of issues

on normal programming time does not eliminate the

; public’s interest in a further, complementary airing

j of controversial views during advertising time” (App.

473). The court also held that since broadcasters had

j opened “up a forum for some paid presentations, in-

dependently edited and controlled by members of the

public’? (App. 477), it is discriminatory for them not

to sell such time to persons wishing to express their

~ views on public issues, even though a broadcaster

may be permitted under the Constitution to refuse to

accept any advertisements of any sort (App. 475).

The court based these conclusions, however, on the

incorrect premise that there is for this purpose a con-

stitutionally significant distinction between program-

ming and advertising time, that the broadcast day

should be broken down into segments, each considered

: in isolation. The Communications Act makes no such

; distinction ; the broadcaster’s responsibility as a public

| trustee extends to every minute of every hour the

station is on the air.“ And the ‘‘forum” is the entire

broadeast day, of which advertising is simply one

component part. ‘

To be sure, a station will usually exercise less con-)

trol over advertisements than over its own programs,

although when network programs are carried the

: 43 See, e.g., En Banc Program Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg.

4 7291.

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“crucial controls,’’ as the court below put it, are not

in the station’s hands in any meaningful sense even

during regular programming. But the court of appeals

erred in assuming that broadcasters simply turn over

or relinquish advertising time, allowing advertisers to

do as they please, and that every broadcaster should

do the same for editorial advertisements.“

“See, og. Center for Law and Social Policy, 23° P. & F.

Radio Regulation 2d 187, 188 (1971), describing the control

CBS exercises over advertisements:

The CBS Television Network Program Practices Depart-

ment (Department) has general responsibility for ensuring

that “all matter transmitted by the network measures up to

acceptable standards of propriety.” The Department. has

a staff of thirty-four people in Hollywood and New York

with an operating budget in excess of $650,000. The De-

partment is headed by a network vice president, and each

office is headed by a director. Five editors in New York

and one in Hollywood work exclusively on commercial

clearance: one additional person in each office has the

responsibility for avoiding “commercial congestion ;” the

New York Office has four other persons to assist in the

handling of advertising material: and a medical advisor

reviews new medical claims and new presentations of previ-

ously substantiated claims. The clearance procedures are

separate from the sale of advertising time.

CBS states that advertisements are usually submitted in

script or storyboard form: that all product claims are

required to be substantiated; and that its staff, the adver-

tiser and/or agency often meet to discuss the substantiation

or presentation of a claim. After advertisements have been

accepted for broadcast they will again be reviewed based

on complaints from the public, inquiries from affiliates, or

other information. A thorough review, including consul-

tation of the CBS Law Department, is also conducted

when notice of governmental agency action is received.

Other sources utilized by the Department are the CBS

Research Department, which examines the methodology of

a

52

Broadcasters do exercise control over advertise-

ments and the Commission itself requires that: “*°

every station * * * have a program to protect

the public in this area. The extent of its pro-

gram will, of course, depend upon the size and

resources of the station, with the larger stations

making a correspondingly greater effort in this

field. However somewhere in every station oper-

ation (whether it be owner, manager, Or staff),

there must be cognizance of problems regarding

deceptive or misleading advertising, familiarity

with the important policies and developments

in this area, and the responsibility for deter-

mining the acceptability of advertising offered

to the station.

Compare Federal Communication Commission Vv.

American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284.

Thus, we submit that given the inevitable limitations

on access to broadcasting, the question whether a li-

censee unconstitutionally discriminates against speech

on public issues is meaningfully viewed in terms of

how the licensee allocates air time between con

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a

scientific studies submitted to substantiate claims; the CBS

Engineering Department, which reviews such matters as

claims relating to the performance of television sets: the

National Safety Council; the Council of Better Business

Bureaus; the American Dental Association; the Under-

writers Laboratories; and relevant publications of the

Federal Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commis-

sion, etc. CBS also states that it consults with the NAB

Code Authority, although “compliance with the NAB Code

does not assure that a commercial is acceptable under CBS

standards.”

«5 Jd. at 195; see also Licensee Responsibility with Respect to

the Broadcast of False, Misleading or Deceptive Advertising.

93 P. & F. Radio Regulation 2d 1550 (1971).

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mercial uses and public issue speech, rather than in

terms of the format he chooses. The licensees’ public

interest duty under the Fairness Doctrine assures that

broadcasters who derive their basic revenues from

commercial advertising will also devote substantial air

time to fair and balanced presentation of controver-

sial issues of public importance. There is thus no in-

vidious discrimination against the broadcasting of

speech on publie¢ issues.“*

In contrast to the court, the Commission does not

make a distinction between broadcasters who accept

commercial advertising and those who do not. Whether

the broadcaster is serving the public interest depends

on whether he is fulfilling his obligations under the

Fairness Doctrine and that standard applies to com-

mereial broadcasters such at WTOP as well as to non-

commercial broadcasters, which are not covered by the

court's ruling since they accept no advertising of any

kind.’ This overall approach to evaluating the li-

censee’s performance in the public interest has been

consistently followed by the Commission with the ap-

proval of both Congress and this Court, Red Lion,

supra, 395 U.S. at 380, and indicates that, contrary

© For this reason, cases such as Cor v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

536, Fowler v. Phode Island, 345 U.S. 67, and Niemotko v.

Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, are inapposite.

"See 47 U.S.C. 390, 392, 397, promoting the operation of

noncommercial broadcasting stations. A federally chartered

nonprofit corporation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,

has been created to facilitate the development of educational

broadcasting, “with strict adherence to objectivity and balance

in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature

*** 7 U.S.C. 396(g) (1) (A).

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54

to the ruling below, it does not make a constitutional

difference that a commercial broadcaster accepts prod-

uct advertisements.“ At the least, the Constitution

gives Congress and the Commission enough latitude

to develop a reasonable regulatory scheme that makes

no such distinction.”

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3. In light of the serious problems in implementing a regulatory

policy requiring licensees to accept editorial advertisements.

the Commision reasonably refused to do so at this time

There are further reasons why the Commission

could reasonably conclude, as it did, that although

aes Wi o aa oh Cito NOB 9 sites

: 48 Product advertising, after all, exists in other media of com-

i munication which are not subject to the Fairness Doctrine and

have no constitutional duty not to discriminate against public

issue advertising.

«That. the Commission may properly view the issue as

whether the licensee has presented the point of view advocated

by a particular spokesman, rather than as whether the view-

point was presented in programming initiated or controlled by

the licensee, is shown by this Court’s recent affirmance of the

three-judge district court’s decision in Capital Broadcasting Co.

3 vy. Mitchell, Nos. 71-851, 71-919, affirmed per curiam Mach 2%,

1972.

In that case broadcasters challenged, on First Amendment

grounds, the ban on cigarette advertising in the electronic com-

munications media set forth in the Public Health Smoking Act

4 of 1969, 15 U.S.C. 1835. The court, with Judge Wright dis-

senting, rejected the broadcasters’ claim that the ban suppressed

debate on the smoking issue. Broadcasters could continue to dis-

3 seminate information about cigarettes and were precluded only

‘ from doing so by means of advertisements on the air. Thus, the

4 debate about smoking could continue in other formats of

broadcasting.

Similarly, in this case, even if a broadcaster has a flat ban on

advertisements about controversial public issues. those issues

must nevertheless be presented during normal programming

time and the Commission properly relied on this as adequately

serving the public interest.

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55

there is no policy against selling time for comment on

public issues (App. 265), a licensee need not do so if it

otherwise complies with the Fairness Doctrine. In its

opinions in DNC and BEM, the Commission men-

tioned a number of undesirable consequences _ that

could flow from a regulatory system, such as that con-

templated by the court of appeals, outlawing flat bans

on editorial advertisements.

First, the “‘right’’ recognized by the court of ap-

peals is a constitutional right of access not for all

individuals or groups but only for those wealthy

enough to purchase time. In DNC, the Commission

found this objectionable because “the publie’s agenda

for discussion of public issues would then be set sub-

stantively and increasingly by the affluent—by the per-

son or group which ‘* * * has the financial resources

and interest to purchase sustained access to the mass

communications media * * *’ (Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405

F. 2d 1082 (C.A.D.C. 1968), certiorari denied, 396

U.S. 842)” (App. 263). And in Red Lion this Court

expressed its disapproval of a system wherein the

“highest bidders’’ would get the available time, 395

U.S. at 392, or, as Judge McGowan described it in

dissent, a system wherein “money alone determines

what issues are to be aired, and in what format”

(App. 490). Indeed, one commentator has already

suggested that the regulatory scheme mandated by

the court below on the basis of the First Amendment

is itself unconstitutional because it discriminates

against the poor.”

*° See Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 694 (1972), which proposes a

convoluted solution to this by a “submarket rate system,” id. at

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Next, there is the problem of rationing time among

those with enough money to buy it. Commissioner

Johnson, dissenting in DNC, proposed that this be

done on a first-come, first-served basis (App. 281).

But that would still mean that affluent individuals or

groups could dominate the limited amount of avail-

able time by continued requests for access; moreover,

if there were a long waiting list of persons wishing to

air their views, an issue sought to be addressed might

become stale while other, less-immediate questions

were discussed. It has been suggested that “ [t] hese

problems could be avoided by relaxing to a limited

extent the constitutional principles against content

discrimination and regulatory discretion.”’” But this,

we submit, only serves to illustrate further the reason-

ableness of the Commission’s refusal to embark upon

such a venture, at least not without additional study,

and thereby interject itself, as never before, into the

day-to-day programming decisions of broadcasters.

Moreover, consideration must be given to what

effects such a regulatory system would have on the

Fairness Doctrine, and, particularly, on the Cullman

doctrine, which requires broadcasters to present, at

695. Professor Jaffe criticizes this proposal because it “would

raise incredible administrative problems.” Jaffe, The Editorial

Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and

Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 789 (1972).

51 Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 697 (1972). In seeking to solve such

problems, others have proposed that representative community

boards be set up to decide which persons shall be allowed to

present their opinions. Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532, 568

(1971).

52 (yllman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576; see Red Lion,

supra, 395 U.S. at 377.

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57

their own expense if necessary, opposing views on pub-

lic issues when the licensee has chosen to broadcast a

program giving only one viewpoint. The premise of

Cullman is that the licensee ’s voluntary choice to

present one side of the issue gives rise to an affirma-

tive duty to present opposing viewpoints. If Cullman

nevertheless applied, each editorial advertisement

could generate claims for free reply time and the

licensee would thus become obligated to correct an

imbalance he. had not created. Commissioner Cox,

concurring in BEM, stated: “J fully support the

Cullman doctrine in those cases where broadcasters

elect to accept sponsored controversial issue program-

ming or paid spots, but think that to require them to

accept such matter would unreasonably expose them

to erosion of their advertising revenues”’ (App. 369,

emphasis in original).

It was suggested below that if financial harm or other

problems result, the Fairness Doctrine can simply be

“suspended”’ * in this area or the Commission can make

“necessary adjustments,”’ “ These assertions, we sub-

mit, are a further indication of the imprudence of

the court of appeals’ decision. For if Cullman does

not, or cannot, apply to editorial advertisements, then

the public will hear only one-sided presentations on

public issues by those rich enough to buy time. That

is searcely a “‘better’’ regulatory scheme than, or a

significant improvement in, the: present system which

Tequires licensees to cover publie issues and present

“App. 281 (Commissioner Johnson dissenting in DNC).

“App. 486 (opinion of the court of appeals).

i.

58

contrasting views. At the least, the Commission could

reasonably conclude that the foreseeable dangers mili-

tate against instituting such a regulatory scheme at

this time.

Above all else, one thing is clear: the court below

has required the Commission to embark upon a course

that will involve it to an unprecedented degree in

determining who shall get on the air to present their

particular views. Under the issue-oriented Fairness

Doctrine, this is a matter that traditionally has been

left to the licensee’s reasonable discretion.” But the

court has thrust the Commission into the role of

arbiter, with each refusal to sell time giving rise to a

potential First Amendment question. Perhaps it is not

inevitable that under the court’s decision the Commis-

sion would find itself forced to decide competing

claims to buy limited time on the basis of criteria

that favor one person’s speech over another’s.* But

the possibility is a real one—and one the Commission

has, from the beginning, sought to avoid as it devel-

oped the Fairness Doctrine. Indeed, the needless

assumption of such a role (which amounts to a form

of selective prior restraint) by a government agency

would not be easy to reconcile with the First Amend-

ment. At the very least, we think the Constitution per-

Sik erick ae ROS Bie Savina

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§ 85In DNC, however, the Commission observed that “[t]here

could be a case where the licensee’s policy in this area would

; be arbitrary (e.g., when he covers the issue, and in announce-

j ments of a few seconds duration, and then refuses to let others

dis¢uss the issue on this basis). No such case is or has been

before us. * * *” (App. 269, n. 13).

56 See II Chafee, supra, at 709, quoted in note 30 supra.

a

Becreresacever SHOEI RONDO LT het YOR CE AGEMENT

—

59

mitted the Commission to choose not to run the risk

of setting out on such a course in these cases,” and to

rely instead on the safeguards of the Fairness Doc-

trine to assure responsible broadcast journalism.

In summary, we submit that the existing public

trustee approach adopted by Congress and the Com-

mission is a proper way of serving the public’s First

Amendment interests in broadcasting, and that it was

thus constitutionally permissible for the Commission

here to decide to continue following that approach,

which leaves the question whether editorial adver-

tisement will be accepted as a matter of journalistic

discretion to be decided by the licensee. Whether

further adjustments and changes are desirable or

possible is a matter under consideration in the Com-

mission’s current general inquiry into the Fairness

Doctrine,” where there will be careful and thorough

study of the evidence and opinions elicited. Whether

and to what degree the licensee would be able to con-

trol the views and the manner in which they are

expressed, the amount of time that should be allocated

to public issue advertising, the experience of licensees

who accept such advertising, how disputes regarding

refusals to sell time to particular applicants would be

resolved, on what basis a licensee could reject certain

controversial advertising—all this and much more

would have to be taken into account in determining

"Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733

(White, J. concurring) ( refusing in another context of selective

Prior restraint to “start the courts down a long and hazardous

road * * * without congressional guidance and direction”).

* See supra, pp. 13-15.

60

not only what kind of regulations the Commission

should adopt to implement any rule requiring that

licensees accept public issue advertising, but also

whether such a rule should be adopted at all.”

The need for engaging in this kind of far-reaching

and thorough inquiry ° before making such a signifi-

°°—In the pending inquiry, the Commission has before it a

wide variety of viewpoints. Some advocate an absolute right

in public issue spokesmen to broadcast their views in a manner

and format of their own choosing without any right of the

broadcaster to reject requests for time except on grounds of

obscenity. Such proposals range from sale of time for paid

spot announcements to sale of time for lengthy public issue

programs and announcements both on a paid and free basis.

Other submissions argue for the maintenance of the status quo.

claiming that any other system would impair the balance of

the Fairness Doctrine in favor of wealthy spokesmen or groups

and would impose an unfair obligation on broadcasters to make

free time available under the Cullman doctrine. Some would

allow the broadcaster to deny access, but only because the par-

ticular mode of presentation does not adequately advise the

public of the issues; or because what is discussed is not 4

controversial issue of public importance. This proposal would

permit rejection of requests in the discretion of the broadcaster

on an ad hoc basis for reasons pertaining to the public interest,

but subject to review under a reasonableness standard by the

Commission.

¢ The Commission had opened its general inquiry into the

Fairness Doctrine before the court’s decision in this case,

because, among other reasons, it had since 1968 “seen the law

in this field explode, as knowledgeable and aggressive parties

recognized the potential, and legal availability, of the broad-

cast media to expound on these public issues.” Democratic Na-

tional Committee v. Federal Communications Commission.

C.A.D.C., No. 71-1788 (decided Feb. 22, 1972). Some of the

more recent court decisions dealing with the Fairness Doctrine

are: Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission, 405 F.2d

1082 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v.

Federal Communications Commission, 396 U.S. 842; Retail

Store Employees Union v. Federal Communications Commis-

sion, 436 F.2d 248 (C.A.D.C.); Neckritz v. Federal Communi-

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61

eant regulatory decision is one of the reasons why

Congress created an administrative agency in this

field to determine whether—as well as how—problems

such as these can be surmounted. But the court of

appeals has ordered the Commission up the slope

without considering whether this is justified in hight

of the dangers and complexities of the climb; and from

that order, purportedly a constitutional command,

there can be no turning back.

The Constitjition does not compel the court’s result,

but requires only that, in the context of an overall regu-

latory program that is consistent with the First

Amendment, the Commission have reasonable grounds

for deciding not to adopt a proposed affirmative pol-

icy that arguably would further encourage freedom

of speech in broadcasting, such as that advocated

by respondents in this case. As we have discussed

above, that standard was met here, since the Com-

mission’s rejection of respondents’ claims was sup-

ported by substantial considerations that have thus

far led the Commission to conclude that First Amend-

cations Commission, 446 F.2d 501, 502 (C.A. 9); Friends’ of

the Earth vy. Federal Communications Commission, 449 F.2d

1164 (C.A.D.C.); Green v. Federal Communications Commis-

tion, 447 F.2d 323 (C.A.D.C.) ; Columbia Broadcasting System,

Inc..w. Federal Communications Commission, 454 F.2d 1018

(C.A.D.C.) ; Democratic National Committee v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 71-1637, decided Febru-

ary 2, 1972, petition for a writ of certiorari pending, No.

11-1405, O.T. 1971; Larus Brothers v. Federal Communications

Commission, 447 F.2d 876 (C.A. 4); Democratic National Com-

mittee v. Federal Communications Commission, C.A.D.C. No.

11-1738, decided February 22, 1972: Healey v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 24,630, decided March 3,

1972,

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62

ment values in this area will be better served by con-

tinued reliance on the journalistic discretion of

broadeasters operating in compliance with their obli-

gations under the Fairness Doctrine. Accordingly, the

court below should have affirmed the Commission’s

decisions.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

Erwin N. GRISWOLD,

Solicitor General.

WALKER B. CoMEcys,

Acting Assistant Attorney Gencral.

A. RayMonD RANDOLPH, Jr.,

Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Howarp E. SHAPIRO,

Attorney.

JoHN W. PETTIT,

General Counsel,

CuarRLes A, ZIELINSKI,

Counsel,

Federal Communications Commission.

JUNE 1972.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972

LEVELING ALTE AIL AEN AIEEE GP SMM.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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