Brief for the United States — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee
Supreme Court brief1973
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Text
| A. BEM’s request for broadcast time --_-_-__ |
1. The proceedings before the Com-
mission_____________________-_
2. The Commission’s decision in
} B. DNC’s request for a declaratory ruling -__
) 1. The proceedings before the Com-
mission. ____-___________--__-
2. The Commission’s decision on
DNC’s request_________-____--
C. The Commission’s inquiry into access to
the broadcast media by individuals and
GPOUDS.... nwo nn cee wencn nee oenss 5s
| D. The decision of the court of appeals_-_____
| E. Subsequent developments in the Commis-
sion’s inquiry into fairness and access-_-
mmary of argument___-._...-.--------------
e 468-033—72——1
18
20
II
It was reasonable and constitutionally proper
for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion to refrain from recognizing and imple-
menting the right of access claimed by re-
spondents, and to rely, instead, on the exer-
cise of journalistic discretion in this area by
broadcast licensees within the framework of
their obligations under the Fairness Doc-
ics caaiuen ctecm ae haeciuesane
A. The Fairness Doctrine is the funda-
mental safeguard of the public’s
First Amendment interest in
B. So long as the Commission’s regula-
tory program serves the public
interest in ways that are consistent
with First Amendment values, the
Constitution does not require the
Commission to adopt a particular
affirmative regulatory policy that
arguably might further freedom
of speech if the Commission has
reasonable grounds for refusing
C. The Commission’s decisions here
were in accordance with the
regulatory scheme Congress
enacted and were reasonable in
the context of the safeguards
that the Fairness Doctrine affords
itn titadnncnsninnene
1. Broadcasters are not common
Ill
Argument—Continued
2. In the framework of com-
mercial broadcasting pre-
scribed by Congress, the
Fairness Doctrine provides
reasonable public access
without discrimination and
thereby - satisfies First page
Amendment requirements 45
3. In light of the serious prob-
lems in implementing a
regulatory policy requiring
licensees to accept editorial
advertisements, the Com-
mission reasonably refused
to do so at this time-_-_-__- 54
CR id ct tercnectinnianewanscnedeneexnes 62
Cases:
American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571___- 38, 39, 45
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B'rith, 4
F.C.C. 2d 190, affirmed, 403 F. 2d 169,
certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 930__.._______- 33
Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 405 F. 2d 1082, certiorari denied sub
nom. Tobacco Institute v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 396 U.S. 842____-____-_- 60
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, Nos.
71-891, 71-919, O.T., 1971, affirmed per
- curiam, March 27, 1972_-_..------------- 54
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 454 F. 2d 1018__ 49, 61
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 5386_-.---------- 53
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P. & F. Radio
Ee CI swe etecce wens vcesscs 29
IV
Cases—Continued me
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576____- 13,
24, 56, 57, 60
Democratic National Commiitee v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, C.A. D.C., No.
71-1637, decided February 2, 1972, petition
for a writ of certiorari filed April 28, 1972,
No. 71-1405, O.T. 1971._....-------____- 49, 61
Democratic National Committee v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, No. 71-1738, de-
cided February 22, 1972___.........____- 60, 61
Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525_____- 28, 42
Federal Communications Commission v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284_______- 52
Federal Communications Commission v. Poits-
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184____- 27, 28, 37
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67. _..._--- 53
Friends of the Earth v. Federal Communications
Commission, 449 F. 2d 1164_.......-____- 61
Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann.
Rep. 32 (1929), reversed, 37 F. 2d 993,
petition for certiorari dismissed, 281 U.S.
WOO dp udhiones ceeeanthdssnadebGueenade 28
Green v. Federal Communications Commission,
OOF Fe Besa accedasdnlasecess 61
Healey v. Federal Communications Commission,
C.A. D.C., No. 24,630, decided March 3,
SEEN Gdisk dene ane senda mckeen as 61
Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of
Tacoma, 455 P. 9d 350..... 2.2... -- 48
Jefferson v. Hackney, No. 70-5064, O.T. 1971,
decided May 30, 1972. _.....-.-.-...--.- 36
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority,
ee i ht eh eck sake 48
Larus Brothers v. Federal Communications
Commission, 447 F. 2d 876__.....-.------ 61
Cases—Continued
Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F.
Supp. 1097, affirmed, 441 F.2d 1257... __
Minshall Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 2d 796.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
a ne
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
1B
39
7,
12, 20, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 44
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., No. 71-
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dis-
trict, 64 Cal. Reptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 982. _-
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102
a
VI
Constitution, statutes and regulations:
United States Constitution, First Amend- _,,,,
TR oc ccd bacewenednuusenueeeneneoncun 2,
6, 7, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32,
34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, et seg_______-_- 27
Section 2(a)._........---------------- 40
Section 3(h)..........__------ 2, 22, 40, 43,45
Sections 201-223. _________-__-_-_-__- 40
Section 301_____-____-__-------- ee 27
Section 303____._____---_----- --_ 27
Section 303(g)_._._.....-----------_-- 28
Section 304______._-------- eee 27
Section 307______...--..----------_-- 27
Section 309_____....-.--------------- 27
Section 309(h)(1)_.......------------- 27
Section 315. ....--...---------------- 42, 43
Section 315(a)....2.-..-.--------- 3, 5, 29, 31
Section 326____.......-.------------- 28
Section 390___.......-.-------------- 53
Section 392___....._...---------- eee 53
Section 396(g)(1)(A)_--..------------- 53
Section 397____._._._._.-_-----_-_--- 53
Section 402(a)_..__.__._.-._-____--__-- 15
Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162__._ _ 27,
28, 40, 42
Public Health Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.
TOR a ikhace de Oe teem einaeeseseds 54
Public Law 92-225, approved February 7,
1972:
Section 103(a)(2)(A)__..-------------- 42-43
Section 103(b)(2)(B)__.....----------- 43
VII
Miscellaneous:
Center for Law and Social Policy, 23 P. & F. aie
Radio Reg. 2d. 187_________.._..___ 51, 52
II Chafee, Government and Mass Communica-
tion (1949)_________-_--_- 34, 37, 58
67 Cong. Rec.:
de ee 27
12501-12505_____...-_-_____.. 41,42
|b | > Ske eee ee eee ee ea 41
BO alg We a i eee 41
BR ade ecu ee tecdieeeneres. 41, 42
En Bane ‘Program Policy Statement, 25 Fed.
Reg. 7291_.........-.._... | 29, 30, 42, 46, 50
Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415________ 46
F.C.C. proposed rules on cable television, 37
Fed. Reg. 3289._....................___ 38
Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33
F.C.C. 2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3883__._____ 18
H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., Ist Sess...._.______ 40
H.R. Rep. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess______ 42
2d 1550 (1971)_____-_------e 52
Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532 (1971)______ 56
Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689 61 (p | eee ae 55, 56
Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 30 F.C.C.
2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825..... 13, 14, 15
Order and Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket
19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 798, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980_ 19
Order in Docket No. 19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 800,
OF Ped: Hee. BOTS ote e oo 20
= ORE EE BLES OLI TELE LGEIO LE NE NETO IEIOELD
VIII
Miscellaneous—Continued
Political Broadcasts—Equal Time, Hearings
before Subcommittee of the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee,
88th Cong., Ist Sess., on H.J. Res. 247, a,
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Prob-
lems by Broadcast Applicants, 36 Fed. Reg.
ne rgccancegcnwsne and enecnnnonan 46
Primer on Ascertainment of Problems by Broad-
cast Applicants, 27 F.C.C 2d 650___...---- 30
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,
13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949)_____- 11, 12, 14, 30, 46, 47
S. Rep. No. 772, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.,p.4-- 41
ee
4 On i ee ,
Gn the Supreme Court of the United States
Octoser TERM, 1971
Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, 71-866
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
v.
Bustness Executives’ Move ror VIETNAM PEACE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
Vv.
DEMocRATIC NATIONAL CoMMITTEE
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 446) is
reported at 450 F. 2d 642. The opinions of the Federal
Communications Commission (App. 247, 357) are
reported at 25 F.C.C. 2d 242 and 25 F.C.C. 2d 216.
(1)
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (App. 493)
was entered on August 3, 1971, and reissued on Octo-
ber 29, 1971 (U.S. Pet. App. 155a-156a). A timely
petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing
en banc was denied on October 4, 1971 (App. 494).
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on Janu-
ary 3, 1972, and was granted on February 28, 1972.
The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under the powers granted to it by the
Federal Communications Act, and in light of the in-
herent limitations on the broadcast spectrum, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, which under its
‘‘Fairness Doctrine” requires broadcast licensees to
present programming involving controversial issues of
publie importance, must, because of the First Amend-
ment, also require that the licensees sell time to indi-
viduals and groups for the advertising of their partic-
ular views.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to-the Constitution provides
in relevant part:
The Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech * * *.
Section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 1064, et seq., as amended, 47 U.S.C. 153(h),
provides:
* & #
“Common carrier’ or “carrier”? means aly
person engaged as a common carrier for hire.
3
in interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trans-
mission of energy, except where reference js
made to common carriers not subject to this
chapter; but a person engaged in radio broad-
casting shall not, insofar as such person is so
engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act -of 1934,
48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 717, 47 U.S.C.
315(a), provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any public
Office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such li-
censee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section. No obligation is imposed under
this subsection upon any licensee to allow the
use of its station by any such candidate. Ap-
pearance by a legally qualified candidate on
any—
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the ap-
pearance of the candidate is incidental to the
presentation of the subject or subjects covered
by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news
events (including but not limited to political
conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadeast-
ing station within the meaning of this subsec-
tion. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall
a aii cs
4
be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-
nection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-
spot coverage of news events, from the obliga-
tion imposed upon them under this chapter to
operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.
These cases arose on petitions for review (App.
419, 422) of two orders of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, announced on the same day (App.
247, 357), regarding claims that commercial radio
and television broadcasters cannot refuse to sell any
broadcast time for editorial advertisements concern-
ing controversial issues of publie importance. Both
complainants—Business Executives’ Move for Viet-
nam Peace (BEM), a national organization com-
posed of business executives, and the Democratic
National Committee (DNC), the governing body of
the national Democratic Party between conventions—
urged that broadcasters were required to accept edi-
torial advertisements without regard to whether the
station licensee had otherwise fulfilled its affirmative
and continuing obligation under the Commission's
Fairness Doctrine to inform the public on questions~
of public importance by presenting representative and
contrasting views. The court of appeals reversed the
Commission’s orders denying these claims and re-
manded the cases for further proceedings, holding
that under the First Amendment the Commission can-
not permit broadcasters to maintain a flat ban on
eee age:
ao a Sere
9]
public issue advertisements when other commercial
messages are accepted, notwithstanding the broad-
casters’ coverage of public issues under the Fairness
Doctrine (App. 446). The court directed the Commis-
sion to develop reasonable procedures and regulations
for determining which and how many editorial ad-
vertisements shall be broadcast.
A. BEM’S REQUEST FOR BROADCAST TIME
1. The Proceedings Before The Commission. On
January 22, 1970, BEM filed a complaint with the
Commission alleging that radio station WTOP, Wash-
ington, D.C., had refused to sell it time to broadcast
one-minute spot announcements expressing opposition
to the Vietnam war.’ The station had a general policy
of refusing to sell spot announcement time to persons
or groups desiring to air their views on controversial
public issues (App. 292, 316; 450-451 n. 3), and BEM
claimed that the station’s refusal] to sell time on this
basis violated the First Amendment and the Fairness
Doctrine.” BEM stated, without supporting data, that
the station had regularly presented pro-Vietnam war
views, but had not devoted any significant amount of
time to the other side.
WTOP responded that it had covered all viewpoints
on the war and that although a complete quantitative
evaluation of its coverage of such a long-term issue
was not possible, particularly since WTOP is an al]-
*BEM included sam
(App. 298-306).
*See Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended. 47 U.S.C. 315(a).
ple announcements with its complaint
LEE IES IN ERED LONI ONL LE LIES YOR EEDA pee ge
—
6
news station, a spot check of the three months sur-
rounding BEM’s request showed that the station’s
news reports included on numerous occasions the views
of a variety of critics of the war, in addition to hard
news coverage of the war. Four station commentators
had also reflected various viewpoints on thejgubject
(App. 312-319).’
On March 31, 1970, the Commission requested
WTOP to submit by April 7 a statement on whether
it had presented the viewpoints embodied in the com-
plainant’s announcements (App. 349). In response,
WTOP submitted an affidavit of its Executive Editor
stating that each of the viewpoints in the BEM an-
nouncements had been expressed a number of times
over WTOP (App. 352). BEM commented by saying
that the affidavit added nothing new (App. 353).
2. The Commission’s Decision in BEM. In its deci-
sion of August 5, 1970, the Commission viewed BEM’s
complaint as charging (1) that WTOP had failed
to meet its fairness obligation with respect to the
Vietnam War; and (2) that the station’s refusal to
carry BEM’s announcements violated the Fairness
Doctrine and the First Amendment (App. 357-368).
With respect to the fairness aspect of the complaint,
the Commission found that BEM had not demon-
strated that WTOP had failed to fulfill its respon-
> WTOP also referred to its coverage of particular events
related to the war, such as Moratorium activities in October and
November of 1969; the President’s speech on Vietnam on
November 3, 1969, in connection with which it had presented
critics of the war; and its news interview programs, which
had also presented national figures both for and against the
war policies. (App. 314-315.)
mee
maps EAU et
wegen LES RICRAS adhe
7
sibility to afford a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of significant contrasting views in its
overall programming; the licensee had specified a
number of specific instances in which it had presented
anti-Vietnam war views, while the complainant had
made no more than a general allegation of a failure
to present conflicting views (App. 360-365)‘
The Commission further held that WTOP’s policy
of refusing to sell time for Spot announcements on
controversial issues did not per se violate the Fair-
ness Doctrine or any Commission policy. The Com-
mission noted that a broadcast licensee is not a
common carrier under the Act and therefore is not
required to open its doors to all persons seeking to
use its facilities. Since the licensee had presented
contrasting views on the Vietnam war, including the
viewpoints embodied in BEM’s announcements, the
Commission found no reason to require the station to
present the views of any particular group in any par-
ticular format. It also relied upon the more extensive
analyses set forth in its DNC decision issued the
same day.
As to BEM’s contention under the First Amend-
ment, the Commission ruled that Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
395 U.S. 367, did not support BEM’s constitutional
*The Commission adhered to its established policy that in the
absence of specific evidence of a failure to comply with fair-
ness requirements, it would not be reasonable to require a
i to prove the contrary by producing transcripts or re-’
cordings of all of its Programs touching on an issue. Here,
BEM had not afforded any basis for its complaint on fairness
(App. 364).
ee EEL L EME NDOIEREA GIR RY I eh ay | + eaeteuedt BOSE DETEA LSA RRS ohm He Hat ny
——
claims and, relying on its decision in the DNC case,
infra, concluded that BEM’s position that WTOP
must sell it time is inconsistent with the system of
broadcasting created by Congress (App. 368):
* * * the Communications Act specifically pro-
vides that a broadcaster shall not be deemed a
common carrier, and thus he may exercise his
judgment as to the particular program matter
he will present. The licensee is thus constantly
called upon to make choices between types and
formats of programming and the persons to
participate therein. If the licensee were re-
quired to present any matter brought to him
which was not obscene, etc., the result would be
not only chaotic but a wholly different broad-
casting system which Congress has not chosen
to adopt. [Citation omitted. ]
Four Commissioners joined in the opinion, two con-
curred in the result, and Commissioner Johnson
dissented.
8
B. DNC’S REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY RULING
1. The Proceedings Before the Commission. On
May 19, 1970, while the BEM complaint was under
consideration, DNC requested the Commission to issue
a declaratory ruling that (App. 33-34) :
a. A broadcaster may not, as a general policy,
refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such
as the DNC, for the solicitation of funds and
for comment on public issues; or, alternatively,
b. Any such ‘‘general policy’’ will be taken
into consideration—in a manner adverse to the
broadcaster—by the Commission in evaluating
9
whether the grant of a broadeaster’s renewal
application accords with the public interest.
DNC alleged that televised requests for funds were
essential to the integrity of the nation’s political proc-
esses, as well as to relieve its own precarious financial]
situation, and that it must promptly launch a national
radio and television appeal for funds but could not do
so unless “it can be certain that it will be able to
obtain the access to the broadcast media which imple-
mentation of the plan demands” (App. 16-22). DNC
contended that a broadcaster’s refusal to grant access
to its facilities by responsible groups violates the First
Amendment as construed by this Court in the Red
Iton case, and also contravenes the public interest
standards of the Communications Act (App. 25-33).°
*The three major networks, American Broadcasting Co.
(ABC), National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), and the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), submitted comments in response.
NBC advised in a brief letter (App. 47) that it had no pol-
ABC set forth excerpts from its Standards and Policies in-
dicating that except for religious broadcasts, ABC permitted
wlicitations of funds only with its specific permission; that
it would sell time to candidates, their representatives or politi-
cal organizations upon the opening of an election campaign
as determined on the basis of appropriate election laws, or, in
its discretion, prior to the official opening of a campaign where
it determined that individuals or organizations had a recog-
tized interest in the forthcoming campaign; and that whenever
it permitted its facilities to be used for the presentation of one
viewpoint, it would afford opportunity for the presentation of
468-033—72
2
a
2. The Commission’s Decision on DNC’s Request.
In an opinion rendered on the same day as its deci-
sion in BEM, the Commission upheld DNC’s claims
regarding solicitation of funds by political parties.
The Commission noted that none of the three major
television networks now had a policy against selling
time to political parties for fund raising during non-
campaign periods (App. 269), ‘but that CBS’s previ-
ous policy “‘of confining such sales of time to election
periods would appear arbitrary, since the need for the
widest possible financial support for political parties
10
contrasting views and would itself decide what subjects were
of such interest or importance as to warrant time for their
presentation. In the absence of special public interest consider-
ations, however, ABC would not sell time for comment on con-
troversial public issues or for the solicitation of funds. In view
of the importance of maintaining strong and viable major
political parties, however, ABC proposed to permit fund solici-
tation by the parties on a reasonable basis. In addition, ABC
contended that making time available to any-responsible entity
that wished to advance its views on controversial issues of pub-
lic importance or to solicit funds would raise serious problems
under the Fairness Doctrine. (App. 42-46.)
CBS submitted a lengthy response, with sttechennte (App.
48-242). It stated that it would permit the presentation by
political parties of a special category of spot announcements
for the purpose of fund raising, and that these announcements
would not have to be on behalf of candidates or ballot prop-
ositions (App. 58). As to a right of general access, how-
ever, CBS stated that the public is best served by the presen-
tation of issues and viewpoints within a balanced program
schedule, utilizing newsworthiness as the sole criterion; thata —
regulatory policy imposing common carrier obligations on
broadcasters would be contrary to the public interest; that
there is no constitutional right to compel broadcast stations
to carry programs; and that Congress and the Commission had
specifically rejected such a requirement.
11
is not confined to such periods * * *” (App. 272).
With respect to the question of access, the Commis-
sion’ rejected DNC’s contention that individuals or
groups have a right to purchase time to comment on
public issues—a contention viewed by the Commission
as going “to the heart of the system of broadcasting
which has developed in this country * * *” (App.
256). The Commission reviewed the licensee’s respon-
sibility, as a public trustee, to meet the needs and in-
terests of the public in the various categories of pro-
gramming, including the Special obligation to devote
broadcast time to the presentation of news and public
affairs, and the discretion necessarily afforded the li-
censee in discharging his obligations. This discretion,
the Commission emphasized, must be exercised in a
manner consistent with the ‘public interest (App.
259) : ‘‘representative community views and voices on
controversial issues which are of importance” must be
presented and ‘‘[a] licensee policy of excluding par-
tisan voices and always itself presenting views in a
bland, inoffensive manner would run counter to the
‘profound national commitment that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ”
As stated in the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.0.C. 1246, 1249 (1949) :
It is this right of the publie to be informed,
ss =Yrather than any right on the part of the Govern-
ment, any broadcast licensee or any individual
member of the public to broadcast his own par-
ticular views on any matter, which is the foun-
dation stone of the American system of
broadcasting.
>
——ee . — ween ora ones ere nye ea
a RP eT IT PR ee , : -—_
a,
Applying these principles to DNC’s request, the
Commission could not find that a licensee fulfilling
these overriding public interest responsibilities none-
theless operates in a manner inconsistent with the
public interest or the First Amendment when it re-
fuses to sell time to individuals or groups wishing to
express their particular views. While “there is of
course no Commission policy thwarting sale of time
to comment on public issues” (App. 265), Congress
had specifically refused to impose common carrier
responsibilities in the broadcast area (App. 260) and
the Court in Red Lion, as had the Commission in its
Report on Edttorializing, stressed “the right of the
public to be informed—not the right of the broad-
caster or any individual or group to speak over
_ broadeast facilities’? (App. 263).
Thus, recognition of “a near-absolute right of any
person who has the money to buy time * * * would
create a common carrier situation which Congress after
due deliberation, specifically rejected * * * (App. 267).
And, in the Commission’s view, it would be contrary to
the public interest to transfer responsibility for what
should be broadeast from the licensees acting as public
trustees to those affluent individuals or groups with
the resources to buy air time (App. 263-264). There
would be serious practical difficulties in administering
such a system, where access would depend on the finan-
cial resources of the person seeking to state his
opinions on public issues. These problems could not
be solved by a “first come, first served platform”
(App. 269), which itself would be against the public
12
13
interest and would tend to undermine the rationale
for the Commission’s requirement that broadcasters
present contrasting views at the broadcaster’s expense
if necessary * (App. 267-268).
The Commission concluded that neither the Act
nor the First Amendment compels such a result. It
pointed out that broadcasting is not analogous to
other government regulated forums such as public
parks or transit systems since in those areas, unlike
broadcasting, there is no independent obligation of a
licensee to present representative views reflecting
opposing viewpoints on public issues.
Five Commissioners joined the opinion; one con-
curred (App. 273) and Commissioner Johnson dis-
sented (App. 274-287).
C. THE COMMISSION’S INQUIRY INTO ACCESS TO THE
BROADCAST MEDIA BY INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS
On June 19, 1971, after the argument in the court
of appeals in these cases, but before the court’s deci-
sion, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in
Docket 19260, 30 F.C.C. 2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825,
instituting a broad Study into the efficacy of the
operation of the fairness doctrine. The Commission
specifically undertook the study “in the light of current
demands for access to the broadcast media to consider
issues of public concern.” However, the Commission
cautioned that it could not
abandon the fairness doctrine or treat broad-
casters as common carriers who must accept all
material offered by any and all comers. The
* Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576.
i ROSTER RETAIN tans Neonates
14
Communications Act is explicit in these re-
spects (see Section 315(a) and Section 3(h))
and we take the Act as a “given” from which
this inquiry necessarily proceeds. * * * [30 F.C.C.
2d at 26-27.]
Rather, the Commission sought comments on whether
the policies it has developed under the Act are the most
effective means of fostering “ ‘uninhibited, robust,
wide-open’ debate on public issues (New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270)”:
The basic issue we pose here is whether
Commission-made policies indeed promote that
goal to the maximum extent. Or, are there revi-
sions or even entirely new policies that would
serve it more effectively ?
** * Tt is most important to note in this connec-
tion that, toa major extent, ours is a commercially
based broadcast system and that this system
renders a vital service to the Nation. Any poli-
cies adopted by this Commission in the areas
covered in the present inquiry should be con-
sistent with the maintenance and growth of
that system and should, among other appro-
priate standards, be so measured. * * * Pro-
posals that in the short run might afford great
insight into public issues, but in the long run
might tend to undermine the existing broad-
cast system—e.g., nothing but informational
programming in a debate format—would not,
in this view, serve the public interest. [30
F.C.C. 2d at 27.]
Noting that it had been 22 years since the Com-
mission’s 1949 Report on Editorializing, supra, the
Commission observed that it was time for another
ao
—
15
overview: “‘If our policies are sound, they should
have stood the test of time and application. If they
unreasonably restrict the journalistic functions of
broadcasters or permit broadcasters unreasonably to
restrict access—then corrective action is called for.’’
Specifically recognizing that the respondents in
these cases had claimed that the present system of
access under fairness is inadequate, the Commission
devoted Part IV of the study to the question whether
“there is any feasible method of providing access for
discussion of public issues outside the requirements
of the fairness doctrine.” 30 F.C.C. 2d at 33. It called
for comment on the problems raised by paid and free
time, the specific standards for determining how ac-
cess time should be allocated, and the effect of access
by others on the licensees’ general responsibility to
the public and on the licensees’ duties under the fair-
ness doctrine. In sum the Commission addressed its
inquiry to whether criteria or guidelines for public
access can and should be prescribed, or whether the
complex problems in doing so require that decisions
on access be left to the responsible discretion of the
broadcast licensees, subject to correction of abuses on
complaint to the Commission (36 Fed. Reg. 11827).
D. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Upon petitions for review filed by BEM and DNC
pursuant to Section 402(a) of the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. 402(a), the court of appeals, with
Judge McGowan dissenting, reversed. The court sum-
marized its holding as follows (App. 449):
16
We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid
public issue announcements is in violation of
the First Amendment, at least when other sorts
of paid announcements are accepted. We do not
hold, however, that the planned announcements
of the petitioners—or, for that matter, of any
other particular applicant for air time—must
necessarily be accepted by broadcast licensees.
Rather, we confine ourselves to invalidating the
flat ban alone, leaving it up to the licensees and
the Commission to develop and administer rea-
sonable procedures and regulations determining
which and how many ‘“‘editorial advertisements”
will be put on the air.
In reaching this result, the court first found “state
action’”’ because of the extent of governmental regula-
tion of broadcasting; the importance of the use of the
licensed broadcasting media for the communication of
ideas; and the Commission’s refusal to disapprove
the policy of some licensees not to accept editorial
advertising (App. 458-464).
The court then discussed the question of access. Al-
though recognizing that the physical limitations of
broadeast time necessarily restrict access to the air-
waves, the court concluded that within these limita-
tions there is nevertheless under the First Amend-
ment “a reasonably regulated, ‘abridgeable’ right to
speak” held collectively by the general public (App.
467). This abridgeable interest, in the court’s view, is
derived from the following: the public’s right to re-
ceive ideas and information (App. 466); the public’s
“First Amendment interest in the mode or manner—
as well as the content—of public debate aired on the
A
17
broadcast media’’ (App. 466-467) ; and “the interest
of individuals and groups in effective self-expression”
(App. 467). Moreover, the court held that if com-
mercial advertising is sold at all, a total ban against
editorial advertising by broadcasters violates the First
Amendment because such a ban discriminates against
controversial speech in favor of commercial speech
(App. 474-480).
The court ordered the Commission to develop rea-
sonable guidelines governing acceptance of editorial
advertisements by broadcasters and remanded the
cases to the Commission for this purpose (App. 480-
489).
Judge McGowan, dissenting, stated that the respon-
sibilities of broadcast licensees to present controversial]
views on issues of public importance, subject to the
fairness doctrine, satisfied the requirements of the
First Amendment. He notéd that “This is the system
which Congress has, wisely or not, provided as the
alternative to public ownership and operation of radio
and television communications facilities. * * * [t is
hardly the path of. wisdom to scrap it for a system
in which money alone determines what issues are to
be aired * * *” (App. 490). He concluded that “with-
in the context of a regulatory scheme which has made
provision for the airing of controversial issues of pub-
lie importance,” the First Amendment permits, but
does not require, licensees to accept paid editorial
advertising (App. 491). On the other hand, under the
majority’s decision, “The Commission has, at the least,
been set a task of heroic proportions, and one whose
a
18
very complexities may undermine the premise upon
which it is founded” (App. 490).
E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMISSION’s
INQUIRY INTO FAIRNESS AND ACCESS
After denial by the court of appeals of motions for
rehearing (App. 494) and stay of the mandate (App.
496, 498), the government applied to this Court for
a stay of the mandate. When this Court initially
denied that motion on January 24, 1972, the Commis-
sion published a further notice of inquiry soliciting
comments on the procedures and guidelines necessary
to carry out the mandate of the court of appeals.
Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33 F.C.C.
2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3383.’
*The Commission asked the parties particularly to address
the following areas (33 F.C.C. 2d at 555-556) :
a. May a licensee limit the time available for editorial
advertisements and, if so, on what basis?
b. What regulation may the licensee make as to the
placement of editorial advertisements?
c. May a licensee prevent domination by a few groups
or er viewpoints and, if so, by what means?
d. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on
the ground that the particular viewpoint has been sufi-
ciently expressed, short of finding undue dominance?
e. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on
standards of taste and suitability for access to the home?
f. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on
the ground that its subject matter is of little or no sig-
nificance or interest to the community ?
g. Are any restrictions on content permissible short of
a finding that the material is outside the protection of the
First Amendment?
h. Should the Commission’s Cullman doctrine be appli-
cable to editorial and controversial issue advertisements
a
7
re eee stot EE 7 ia
19
When this Court granted certiorari on February 28,
1972, it also stayed the mandate of the court of ap-
peals. The Commission then withdrew the above notice.
What policies, if any, concerning access to the
broadcast media might properly and feasibly
be evolved under the public interest standard of
the Communications Act, and what would be
their relationship to, and effect upon, present or
proposed fairness doctrine policies. We, thus,
do not invite comment on what the First
Amendment may or may not require in this
area, but rather on pertinent public interest
considerations, including of course the policy of
fostering robust, wide-open debate. [Order and
Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260,
33 F.C.C. 24 798, 799, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980.] *
Written comments have been filed and oral presenta-
tions were made during pane] discussions and oral
which the licensee would not have aired in the first place
*The Commission confined its inquiry to the non-constitu-
tional aspects of access because the First Amendment issue
tiorari had been granted. It also stated “that final decision
** * may be delayed and made in light of the Supreme Court's
ie eS ELLA RPE ss
_———
20
argument’ before the Commission during the week
of March 27, 1972.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A
The Commission’s Fairness Doctrine, as developed
over many years of broadcast regulation, as approved
by Congress and as sustained by this Court in Red
Lion, requires licensees to operate as public trustees,
giving coverage to public issues that is adequate and
that fairly reflects opposing views. This must be done
at the broadcaster’s own expense if necessary. In addi-
tion, the broadcaster has an affirmative obligation to
discover and fulfill the needs and desires of his par-
ticular service area. Failure to comply with these
duties can result in loss of the license to broadcast.
Freedom of broadcast journalism is thus subor-
dinated to the public interest in hearing diverse views,
although the broadcaster must still exercise discretion
in determining how to allocate broadcasting time be-
tween the various areas of interest to the public. And,
in serving the “paramount’’ right *® of the listeners
and viewers with respect to issues of public impor-
tance, the licensee must use responsible journalistic
judgment in choosing the format for the program and
the spokesmen to present opinions on the question.
* The scheduling of the panel discussions and oral argument,
as well as the agenda, were set forth in an Order in Docket No
19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 800, 37 Fed. Reg. 4978.
1° Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 390.
ss
OP SS os
78 <a lah ey af ee
21
B
In holding that the First Amendment requires
broadcasters ‘to sell advertising time to persons wish-
ing to discuss controversial public issues regardless
of whether the broadcaster has fulfilled its obligation
under the Fairness Doctrine to cover such issues fully
and fairly, the court of appeals relied on the public’s
interest in the content of discussion, in the mode of
presentation, and in effective self-expression.
While the Commission obviously shares these con-
cerns since they are the very foundation of the Fair-
ness Doctrine, the court’s conclusion—that the
Constitution compels the Commission to institute a
regulatory scheme forbidding broadcasters from hav-
ing a policy of not selling time for editorial adver-
tisements—does not follow. When it comes to how the
Commission should affirmatively promote the publie’s
First Amendment interest in the communications
media, the Constitution permits a range of choices,
just as the Constitution allowed Congress a range of
choices in deciding what kind of system of broadcast
regulation would best serve the public interest, con-
venience and necessity. Of course, when the Com-
mission does develop a certain regulatory scheme such
as the Fairness Doctrine, this must be consistent with
the First Amendment; and whether jit is depends not
only on the objective but also on the means adopted
to achieve it.
But if the Commission refrains from adopting a
particular affirmative policy, as it did here, its deci-
sion should be sustained as within permissible limits
of constitutional choice if the Commi&gion has reason-
5
\
ILENE LOL LE VMI LS LENGE EDEL SER NE Hn Ban ae
are ~~
22
able grounds, in light of the existing regulatory sys-
tem, for not adopting it. Otherwise, whatever a court,
on the basis of the limited information before it,
deems best to encourage freedom of speech on the
airwaves will become frozen into the Act. And the
Commission and Congress would thereby be ousted of
their decision-making roles in the highly complex
and important area of commercial broadcasting where
the question of what ought to be done is often inter-
twined with the practical administrative question of
what reasonably can be done.
C
1. In refusing to recognize and implement the right
of access claimed by respondents, the Commission
acted consistently with First Amendment values and
in accordance with the regulatory system Congress
enacted. Section 3(h) of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. 153(h), declares that broadcasters are not
common carriers. The legislative history of the Act
and its predecessor, the~Radio Act of 1927, shows
that Congress explicitly rejected a provision that
would have required licensees to act as common car-
riers with respect to questions affecting the public.
The court’s decision pushes broadeasting very far in
the direction Congress disapproved, yet the system of
broadcast regulation Congress legislated has never
been thought to be outside the permissible limits of
constitutional choice. In light of Section 3(h), the
Commission reasonably refused to recognize a right of
access as broad as that suggested by the court below
and, instead, began a general inquiry to determine
| 23
whether there is any feasible method of providing ad-
ditional public access within the present statutory
structure. This is a sound approach to such a complex
problem and it is a constitutionally permissible one.
2. The court of appeals held that a broadcaster's
refusal to sell time for editorial advertisements dis-
eriminates against public issues in favor of commer-
cial advertising. But this question can properly be
viewed only in terms of how the broadcaster allocates
air time between commercial uses and public issue
speech. And since licensees must devote substantial
air time to public issues regardless of whether they
accept product advertising, there is no discrimination.
Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals’ assump-
tion, broadcasters do exercise control over product
advertisements; indeed they have an obligation to do
so. And the general duties of broadecasters—both com-
mercial and non-commercial—under the Fairness Doc-
trine extend to every minute of every day the station
is on the air. It does not make a constitutional differ-
ence that some broadcasters accept commercial adver-
tising; at the least, the Constitution allows the Com-
mission to develop a regulatory system, as it has
done, that makes no such distinction.
3. There are, moreover, practical reasons why it was
reasonable for the Commission to conclude that it
should not recognize and implement the right of ag-
cess claimed by respondents.
The ‘‘right’”’ created by the court below is a right of
access only for those persons wealthy enough to pur-
chase air time and could therefore lead to domination
ee
24
of the discussion of public issues by the rich. Yet this
Court in Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392, expressed disap-
proval of a system in which the “highest bidders”
would get the available time. Indeed it has already
been suggested that the result reached by the court
below on the basis of the First Amendment, if imple-
mented, would itself be unconstitutional because it
discriminates against the poor.
Moreover, a first-come, first-served system of appor-
tioning the limited time available could still lead to
domination by the rich, who could make continued
requests for time. It is no answer to say that the Com-
mission could devise rules for determining whether
one person’s speech should be broadcast instead of
another’s. That would interject the Commission, as
never before, into day-to-day programming decisions.
The Commission reasonably decided not to embark
upon such a venture, at least not without further
study.
Furthermore, if the Commission’s Cullman doctrine
were applied to editorial advertisements that broad-
casters were compelled to aecept, the broadcasters
would be required to present contrasting views,
free-of-charge. if necessary. But Commissioner Cox,
concurring in DNC (App. 369), pointed out that
requiring broadcasters to correct imbalances they had
not created by allowing free reply time would “un-
reasonably expose them to erosion of their advertising
revenues.’’ While it was suggested below that the solu-
tion would be to suspend the Fairness Doctrine in this
area, that would hardly result in a better regulatory
system than the present one, which requires broad-
428
gees <
‘ POEL HESS FEE on
25
casters to give full coverage to public issues and to
present contrasting views.
Finally, the court’s decision thrusts the Commission
into the role of arbiter, with each refusal to sell time
giving rise to a potential First Amendment claim.
Even if the Commiission could find a way of deciding
competing claims for the limited time available on a
basis that would not prefer one person’s speech over
another’s, the danger that this eventually would occur
is real—anid it is a danger the Commission has sought
to avoid in developing the issue-oriented Fairness
Doctrine, which requires licensees to exercise reason-
able discretion in determining what spokesman should
present the various sides of a public issue and in what
format the presentation should be made. :
Before the court had rendered its decision here, the
Commission had begun a comprehensive inquiry to
consider what changes, if any, should be made in the
present regulatory system with respect to coverage
of controversial public issues. The need for this kind
of far-reaching and thorough inquiry, which the Com-
mission has resumed, is one of the reasons why Con-
gress created an administrative agency to deal with
such important and complex matters of regulatory
policy.
Since the Commission’s refusal to implement, at this
time, the right of access claimed by respondents was
teasonable in light of the foregoing considerations
and of the protections afforded by the Fairness Doc-
tine to the publie’s First Amendment interest in
broadcasting, the court of appeals should have affirmed
the Commission’s decisions in these cases.
468-033—72__-3
Se ee
a
26
ARGUMENT
Because the broadcast spectrum is limited, its use
must be regulated to accommodate the interests of all,
lest in the “cacaphony of competing voices’’ none will
clearly be heard. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 376.
Accordingly, no individual or group has “an un-
abridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast com-
parable to the right of every individual to speak, write
or publish.” Jd. at 388. “It is the right of the viewers
and listeners * * * which is paramount.” Id. at 390.
To implement this right of the listening and viewing
public, choices must be made among various means of
accommodating the public’s interest in maintaining
freedom of speech within the inherent physical limita-
tions on access to the airwaves. In the public interest
standards of the Communications Act of 1934, and in
the 1959 amendment to Section 315 of that Act, Con-
gress charged the Federal Communications Commis-
sion with the primary responsibility of making these
choices. The decision of the court of appeals in this
case substantially encroaches upon that responsibility. —
In effect it transfers the making of basic policy judg-
ments from the Commission to the courts, and, in so
doing, sets a significant new course for broadcasting, a
course that in our view is both unwise and unwar-
ranted. This case has great importance because of the
immediate consequences of the court’s decision for
radio and television broadcasting, but it is important
too because of what the decision below portends for
the future role of the Commission and the courts in
the regulatory system Congress has legislated.
a
IT WAS REASONABLE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROPER FOR
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION TO RE-
_FRAIN FROM RECOGNIZING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
RIGHT OF ACCESS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS, AND TO
RELY, INSTEAD, ON THE EXERCISE OF JOURNALISTIC
DISCRETION IN THIS AREA BY BROADCAST ‘LICENSEES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UN-
DER THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
27
A. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IS THE FUNDAMENTAL SAFEGUARD OF
THE PUBLIC’s FIRST AMENDMENT INTEREST IN BROADCASTING
Congress brought order to the chaotic state of
broadcasting in 1927 by repudiating the doctrine that
“anyone who will may transmit’? and replacing it
with the principle “that the right of the public
to service is superior to the right of any indi-
vidual * * *.”’* In the Radio Act of 1927” and the
Communications Act of 1934," which essentially re-
enacted the earlier law," Congress preserved public
ownership of broadcasting channels, provided that
broadcasters would be licensed and regulated on the
basis of “public convenience, interest or necessity,”’ **
set up an expert administrative agency “‘to carry out
its legislative policy,’’™ and charged the agency with
the duty of promoting ‘‘the larger and more effective
"67 Cong. Rec. 5479 (remarks of Congressman White),
quoted in Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 376 n. 5.
% 44 Stat. 1162, as amended, 46 Stat. 844.
* 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151 et 8eq.
“ Federal Communications Commission, v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137.
* See 47 U.S.C. 301, 304, 809(h) (1).
* 47 U.S.C. 303, 307, 309.
" Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broad-
tasting Co., supra, 309 U.S. at 138.
CAPRESSO SEAR
PREPAC ATS BELLA LAE AN ETT 5 PEND YT
28
use oferadio in the public interest.” * As this Court
stated in Pottsville Broadcasting, supra, 309 U.S. at
138, ‘‘Underlying the whole law is recognition of the
rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evo-
lution of broadcasting and of the corresponding re-
quirement that the administrative process possess
sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors * * *.”
From the beginning Congress has recognized that
commercial broadcasting is closely related to First
Amendment interests.” While the Commission may |
not “interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication,” 47 U.S.C. 326, it has the.
duty to regulate broadcasting in the public interest,
which includes the public’s “collective right to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment.’’ Red Lion, supra,
395 U.S. at 390.
These objectives have remained in the forefront of
broadcast regulation. Only two years after passage of
the Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, the
predecessor of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion held that the “public interest requires ample
play for the free and fair competition of opposing
views, and * * * the principle applies * * * to all
discussions of issues of importance to the public.””
As radio and television assumed greater importance
1847 U.S.C. 303(g).
See Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 389; Farmers Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529.
2° Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33
(1929), reversed on other grounds, 37 F. 2d 993 (C.A. D.C.), peti-
tion for certiorari dismissed, 281 U.S. 706.
29
in our society, the Commission’s responsibilities in-
ereased accordingly and a regul
from these basic precepts.
Thus, with the subsequent approy
(47 U.S.C. 315(a)) and this Court (
395 U.S. at 386-401), the Commission developed the
Fairness Doctrine, based on the premise that under
the Communications Act a bro
operate as public trustee.”
a “two-fold duty”: to «
lie issues,”’
atory system evolved
al of Congress
Red Lion, supra,
adeast licensee must
As such, the licensee has
give adequate coverage to pub-
ahd to give coverage that is ‘‘fair in that
it accurately reflects the opposing views.’’ Red Lion,
supra, 395 U.S. at 377. “This must be done at the
broadcaster’s own expense if sponsorship is unayail-
able. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P. & F. Radio
Reg. 895 (1963). Moreover, the duty must be met by
programming obtained at the licensee ’s own initiative
if available from no other source.’’ Id! at 377-378. In
satisfying these duties, the licensee must make a
“diligent, positive and continuing effort * * *to dis-
cover and fulfill the tastes, needs
and desires of his * * *
service area.’’
En bane Program Policy Statement,
See, ¢.g., En Bane Program Policy, 23 Fed. Reg. 7291,
7294 :
The licensee is, in effect, a “trustee”
his license to operate his station imposes
delegable duty to serve the public inte
munity he had chosen to represent as
Great confidence and trust are_pl
have qualified as broadcasters. The
ilege to select the material to be b
and the operation of his comp
medium of communication is
in the sense that
upon him a non-
rest in the com-
a broadcaster.
aced in the citizens who
primary duty and priv-
roadcast to his audience
onent of this powerful
left in his hands.
REIGNS RENTER EE OE Ne OT
PRETEEN SO Sins
—
30
25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295.” The consequence of failure
by the licensee to meet these obligations is, as Judge
McGowan stated in his dissent in this case (App.
490), loss of the right to broadcast.
In this respect, freedom of broadcast journalism
is subordinated to the public’s interest in hearing di-
verse views on matters of public importance and the
“paramount”’ rights of the listeners and viewers are
thereby served. See Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at
389-390. But journalistic discretion must nevertheless
be exercised. The broadcaster must still decide how to
allocate time between entertainment and non-enter-
tainment programs and how much time to devote to
specialized programming on matters such as science,
religion, sports, news, education, public affairs, and
the interests of minority groups. And with respect to
questions of public importance, the ‘“‘licensee will in
each instance be called upon to exercise his best judg-
ment and good sense in determining what subjects
should be considered, the particular format of the
programs to be devoted to each subject, the different
shades of opinion to be presenteg, and the spokesmen
for each point of view.’’ Report on Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 ¥.C.C. 1246, 1251.
22 See, with respect to the licensee’s duty to ascertain com-
munity needs and interests, Suburban Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C.
1021, affirmed, Henry v. Federal Communications Commission,
302 F. 2d 191 (C.A.D.C.) ; Minshall Broadcasting Co., 11 F.CC.
2d 796; City of Camden, 18 F.C.C. 2d 412, 418-426 and n. 22;
Primer on Ascertainment of Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C. 2d 650.
31
B, 80 LONG AS THE COMMISSION’S REGULATORY PROGRAM SERVES TIE
PUBLIC INTEREST IN WAYS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT VALUES, THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THE
COMMISSION TO ADOPT A PARTICULAR AFFIRMATIVE REGULATORY
POLICY THAT ARGUABLY MIGHT FURTHER FREEDOM OF SPEECH IF
THE COMMISSION HAS REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR REFUSING TO
DO 80
In this case, there has been no showing that any
broadcaster failed “to afford reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance.” 47 U.S.C. 315(a). BEM did not
demonstrate that its profferred views were novel or
different in substance from anti-Vietnam war views
already carried on WTOP; and DNO, in seeking a
declaratory ruling, made no claim that any particular
broadcaster had violated the Fairness Doctrine.*? The
court of appeals nonetheless decided that the First
Amendment requires broadcasters to sell advertising
time to persons wishing to discuss issues already fully
and fairly presented by the station. We submit that
the court’s holding is, in substance, essentially a dis-
agreement with the Commission on a policy matter that
Congress properly entrusted to the agency.
The court of appeals recognized that the licensee’s
responsibility for the presentation of controversial
issues of public importance under the Fairness Doc-
trine serves the public’s right to hear debate on con-
troversial public issues. But, in the corrt’s opinion,
the public has an additional interest “na the mode or
™ Hence, this is not a case involving “a discriminatory re-
fusal [by the Commission] to require tie licensee to broadcast
certain views which have been denied access to the airwaves.”
Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 396.
Pate eae nee nerecrnse cnet ns ence ar tee oan
=
32
manner—as well as the content—of public debate aired
in the broadcast media” (App. 466) ; individuals and
groups have a First Amendment interest ‘‘in effective
self-expression’? (App. 467). Although in Red Lion
this Court held that there is no “unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast,” 395 U.S. at 388, the
court below found in the First Amendment a “reason-
ably regulated, ‘abridgeable’ right to speak’’ over the
airwaves (App. 467). The licensee’s initiation and
control of the presentation of controversial public
issues, even subject to the requirements of the Com-
mission’s Fairness Doctrine, do not, in the court’s view,
satisfy the First Amendment because they represent
only the broadcaster’s view of what is important; in ad-
dition, some members of the public must have initiative
and control over self-expression independent of the li-
censee’s responsibility to determine what shall be broad-
cast, at least so long as commercial advertisements are
accepted. But the court stated that the “abridgeable”
First Amendment right of access it defined must be
limited and cannot be exercised by all members of
the public. Consequently, the plaintiffs in these cases
are not necessarily entitled to present their announce-
ments on the air. Instead, the court ordered the
Commission to adopt “‘a scheme of reasonable regula-
tion” that would govern the selling of time for edi-
torial advertising in light of the court’s holding that
licensees must grant access to some (App. 486).
The Commission and the court below are agreed that
broadcast regulation must be guided by the public’s
First Amendment interests in the communications
33
media; indeed, Congress and the Commission have
recognized this from the outset. And it is common
ground that the public has an interest not only in the
eontent of the discussion of controversial public issues,
but also, as the court of appeals put it, ‘“‘in the mode
or manner’ of the presentation (App. 466) ; the Com-
mission made this clear when it stated in DNC that a
“licensee policy of excluding partisan voices and
always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive
manner would run counter to the ‘profound national
commitment that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’” (App. 259).*
There is also no dispute about the court’s statement
that the public has an interest ‘‘in effective self-
expression’’ (App. 467); the Commission itself here
warned against the exclusion of ‘‘partisan voices”’
(App. 259).”°
Rather, the point of departure is that these consid-
erations have led the Commission to develop the Fair-
ness Doctrine, whereas the same considerations led the
court of appeals to create what it termed an ‘‘abridge-
able” right of access. It is apparent:that the court’s
result is far from manifest in the Constitution’s com-
mand that “‘Congress shall make no law * * * abridg-
ing the freedom of speech * * *.’’ Indeed, the lan-
*See also Storer Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 2d 678; Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai Brith, 4 F.C.C. 2d 190, 191,
afirmed, 403 F. 2d 169, 170 (C.A.D.C.) ; certiorari denied, 394
US. 930.
* See also Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 392, n. 18 (“The ex-
pression of views opposing those which broadcasters per-
mit to be aired in the first place need not be confined solely to
the broadcasters themselves as proxies.”). :
468-033—72—_4
34 4
guage of the First Amendment scarcely appears to
mandate an “abridgeable right’’ regulated by Com-
mission rules that delineate when an individual may
and may not exercise it.
The difficulty is that this is not a traditional First
Amendment case involving negative restraints on gov-
ernmental action. Instead, the’question here is whether
the government must take certain affirmative action
to promote freedom of speech or, more precisely,
whether the Commission must institute a regulatory
scheme outlawing bans on editorial advertisements in
an attempt to promote the public’s First Amendment
interest ‘in broadcasting. That is a practical question,
involving many complexities of implementation as well
as potentially far-reaching consequences for the broad-
cast media and their regulation—a question peculiary
suited to administrative determination. If, as in this
case, a court decides in favor of such an affirmative
regulatory policy solely in terms of what it divines
from the First Amendment, then the Commission is
ousted from its role of deciding how the public’s
interest in broadcasting can best be promoted and
Congress is rendered powerless to change the court’s
result. This is not the way such significant regulatory
~ decisions should be made; and it is not the way Con-
gress intended them to be made with respect to
broadcasting.
Professor Zechariah Chafee put it well: ”
Once we get away from the bare words of
the [First] Amendment, we must construe it as
**TI Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 640-641
(1949). .
yorM wry
(tile v a
‘ 35
part of a Constitution which creates a govern-
ment for the purpose of performing several
very important tasks. The [First] Amendment
should be interpreted so as not to cripple the
regular work of the government. A part of this
work is the regulation of interstate and foreign
commerce, and this has come in our modern
age to include the job of parceling out the air
among broadcasters, which Congress has in-
trusted to the FCO. Therefore, every free-
speech problem in the radio has to be considered
with reference to the satisfactory performance
of this job as well as to the value of open dis-
cussion. Although free speech should weigh
heavily in the scale in the event of conflict,
still the Commission should be. given ample
scope to do its job.”"
This correctly indicates, we believe, that when the
Commission formulates regulations for encouraging
free discussion over the airwaves, it must act con-
sistently with the First Amendment and that whether
it has done so depends not only on the objective but
also on the means adopted to achieve it. See Red Lion,
upra. Likewise, when the Commission refuses to
mdertake a particular affirmative regulatory policy
that arguably would promote freedom of Speech, its
refusal must be reasonable ™ or, as J udge McGowan
” Professor Chafee added that the First Amendment prevents
ission from engaging in two kinds of activity : censor-
hip and prejudicial administration that penalizes “the expres-
fon of particular ideas.” Id. at 641-642,
"See United States y. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
SEDAN NE ILO an pian renee pect ean ee
TSI ORY OT Peay
DIMLAI I
37
speech in the communications media—suggests both
regulation and non-regulation and that the appro-
priate courses to follow in this complex field could be
effectively marked “neither directly through self-
executing legislation nor by the judicial process.’
Pottsville Broadcasting, supra, 309 U.S. at 142. More-
over, when we deal with any proposed governmental]
policy to promote First Amendment interests in broad-
casting, it is well to remember Professor Chafee’s
warning that “there is no bright line between en-
couragement and repression.” * Before the attempt is
made, there should be careful and thorough considera-
tion of the future consequences and of the need for
further affirmative action in light of the existing
regulatory system and technological developments.”
* II Chafee, supra, at 710; see also id. at 709:
Whenever anybody is inclined to look to the government
for help in making the mass media do what we desire of
them, he had better ask himself one antiseptic question:
“Am I envisaging myself as *the official who is going to
administer the policy which seems to me so good?” Justice
Holmes remarked that, when socialism came, he hoped he
would be “on the committee.” You and I are not going to
be on the committee which is charged with making news-
papers or radio scripts better written and more accurate
and impartial. It is very easy to assume that splendid
ws in our crowd will be exercising the large powers
over the flow of facts and opinions which seem to us essen-
_ tial to save society, but that is an iridescent dream. We
must be prepared to take our chances with the kind of poli-
ticians we particularly dislike, because that is what we may
get.
"In its decision in DNC, the Commission noted that it recog-
nized the need to foster “a multitude of voices in the discussion
of public issues” and stated that it “is seeking to promote a new
technology which can make a most significant contribution in
siti, Site ae ia ae
Sa cit rhb
itictndaeiet ia ats Ke is eR ieee.
38
This in turn demands the kind of searching inquiry
the Commission began before the court of appeals
rendered its decision and thereby, in Judge
McGowan’s words, “dictate[d] the result in advance”
(App. 491).*
In addition, when the issue is whether regulations
should be adopted to advance the public’s First
Amendment interest there are many practical con-
siderations that have to be taken into account, not the
least of which is*whether the Commission is equipped
to handle the particular task. ‘‘ [T]he Federal Commun-
nications Commission * * * would ill serve the pub-
lic interest if the courts’—and, we should add, the
Commission itself—‘imposed such heavy burdens on
[it] as to overtax [its] capacities.’ * In the end, the
this respect—cable television. Because of the potentially great
number of channels, cable opens up the possibility of common
carrier channels, public access channels, etc.” (App. 265-266).
See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., No. 71-506, decided
June 7, 1972.
In its proposed rules on cable television the Commission has
provided that, with respect to cable systems in major television
markets, the system must have a number of different kinds of
access channels. See 37 Fed. Reg. 3289, Section 76.251. For ex-
ample, Section 76.251(a) (4) provides:
* * * Each such system shall maintain at least one specially
designated, noncommercial public access channel available
on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. The system shall
maintain and have available for public use at least the
minimal equipment and facilities necessary for the produc-
tion of programing for such a channel. * * *
32 See pp. 13-15; 18-20 supra.
88 See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 591-592, where the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, in an individual rate reduction proceeding,
determined to continue following the practice it had adhered
39
Commission might conclude that although the aim is
worthy, the means available for achieving it counsel
against pursuing the particular course that has been
advocated. However, this is not a conclusion open to
the Commission under the decision of the court of
appeals in this case, although as Judge McGowan
stated in dissent (App. 490) :
The Commission has, at the least, been set a
task of heroic proportions, and one whose very
complexities may undermine the premise upon
which it: is founded. The question is whether
the Constitution requires that it be undertaken.
I am not convinced that it does. * * *
In sum, we believe that the Constitution permits a
range of legislative choices regarding how the public’s
interest in freedom of speech over the airwaves is to
be advanced, that in the absence of specific direction
by Congress the Commission has leeway to decide not |
to adopt a particular course so long as it has reason-
able grounds for refraining so to act and so long
as the regulatory scheme it has adopted is consistent
to in the past, although it intended to consider the issues there
presented in a rulemaking proceeding where it could assess the
industry-wide effect of a change in policy.
. The Court there held that “We can see no justification for
denying the Commission reasonable latitude to decide where
it will resolve these complex issues, in addition to how it will
resolve them. The action by the District Court here not only
deprives the Commission of the opportunity to make the initial
resolution of the issues but also prevents it from doing so ina
more suitable context.” /d. at 592.
The posture of the present case is remarkably similar to that
of American Commercial Lines.
* Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v.
Federal Communications Commission, 359 F. 2d 994, 1005 (C.A.
. D.C.).
PUP Ca DAES AASAN SNE ti te: ATER
40
with First Amendment values, and that the court of
appeals erred in holding otherwise. The remainder
of our brief is devoted to showing that the Commis-
sion’s decisions here were reasonable and in accord-
ance with the regulatory structure Congress enacted.
©. THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS HERE WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
' ‘THE REGULATORY SCHEME CONGRESS ENACTED AND WERE REA-
SONABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SAFEGUARDS THAT THE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AFFORDS THE PUBLIC
1. Broadcasters Are Not Common Carriers
Congress has chosen to promote broadcasting in
the United States within the structure of the private
enterprise system. Congress could have established
another method but, in light of the inherent limita-
tions on access to broadcasting, expressly ‘‘rejected
the idea of the licensee being required to act as a
common carrier with respect to transmission of com-
ment on public issues’? (Commission’s opinion in
DNC, App. 260). Section 3(h) of the Act, 47 U.S.C.
153(h), specifically provides that ‘‘a person engaged |
in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person
is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”’ *
In its report on H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., the bill |
which became the Radio Act of 1927, the Senate
Commerce Committee recommended a provision re-
*6 This provision also served to distinguish radio broadcasting
from the Commission’s common carrier jurisdiction, which in
1984 was transferred from the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to the Federal Communications Commission by Section
2(a) and Sections 201-223 of the Communications Act, 48
Stat. 1064, 1070, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 152(a) , 201-228.
41
quiring licensees, as common carriers, to allow access
in connection with public issue broadcasts. S. Rep. No.
122, 69th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 4. The provision stated (67
Cong. Rec. 12502, 12503) : “if any licensee shall permit a
broadcasting station to be used * * * for the discussion of
any question affecting the public, he shall make no
discrimination as to the use of such broadcasting sta-
tion, and with respect to said matters the licensee
shall be deemed a common carrier in interstate com-
merce: provided, that such licensee shall have no
power to censor the material broadcast * * *. But Senator
Dill, the Committee Chairman, objected that such a pro-
vision would be unworkable because it would force
the broadcaster to “accept anything and everything
that was offered him so long as the price was paid’”’
(67 Cong. Rec. 12502). He argued that broadcasters
would be forced “to give all their time to that kind
of discussion or no public question could be dis-
cussed” (67 Cong. Rec. 12504). Senator Dill offered
an amendment on the floor to eliminate the common
carrier obligation and to limit the access requirement
to candidates for public office. 67 Cong. Rec. 12501-
9 12505.“ The Senate adopted Senator Dill’s amend-
** Senator Dill pointed out that (67 Cong. Ree. 12502) :
* * * under the common-carrier provision a radio station
is compelled to take any kind of broadcasting that any-
body wants to offer, which would mean that it would take
anybody who came in order of the person presenting him-
self and would be compelled to broadcast for an hour's
time speeches of any kind they wanted to broadcast. This
- provision simply says that if a radio station permits one
candidate for a public office to address the listener it must
mn
42
ment (67 Cong. Rec. 12501-12505) and this was later
accepted in the conference report, H.R. Rep. No.
1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10, 14. As enacted, the
amendment became Section 18 of the Radio Act of
1927, 44 Stat. 1170, and after re-enactment, Section
315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088,
47 U.S.C. 315.”
allow all candidates for the public office to do so, and to
4 that extent there must be no discrimination.
: Senator Howell objected that (67 Cong. Rec. 12504):
The Senator from Washington has left in the bill a
provision respecting candidates. It is important. but it
: has not anything like the importance of the provision he
has stricken out—the discussion of public questions.
But Senator Dill replied (id.):
I sympathize with a great deal of what the Senator is
saying, but I want to remind the Senator of the danger
of having the words “public questions” in the hill.
That is such a general term that there is probably no
question of any interest whatsoever that could be discussed
but that the other side of it could demand time: and thus
: a radio station would be placed in the position that the
| Senator from Iowa mentions about candidates, namely, that
they would have to give all their time to that kind of
discussion, or no public question could be discussed.
In exercising its discretion, the broadcaster would fail to
carry out its obligations to the public if it did not make time
available to candidates for political office on a reasonable basis.
since the purpose of Section 315 “is to facilitate political de-
bate over radio and television.” Farmers Union v. WDAY.
360 U.S. 525, 534; see F.C.C. Memorandum on Second sen-
tence of Section 315(a), in Political Broadcasts—Equhl Time.
Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee. 88th Cong., Ist Sess.. on H.J.
Res. 247, pp. 8490: see also En Bane Program Policy
Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291. Congress has now codified this —
duty to the limited extent of permitting the Commis-
sion to revoke licenses “for willful or repeated failure to —
allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
boise oh ayo
ORAM CED ARES TRS CALA
ee
Sher Math
SOM A ds Rit RES teeiialy wile
EISELE ELLIO I EERIE GIDE, SRW NEE
43
The importance of this legislative history, which the
court below failed to discuss, is apparent. The court
of appeals described its decision as merely a ‘‘modest
reform”’ and therefore not inconsistent with Section
3(h) (App. 482-483). But to the extent that the licensee
is required to sell time and is enjoined from exercising
journalistic discretion regarding such factors as what
persons should serve as spokesmen for a particular view-
point on a public issue, what type of format this view
should be presented in, how much time should be de-
voted to the particular presentation, and how fre-
quently the view should be aired, then the licensee
tends to become a common carrier with respect to
public issues. The decision below pushes broadcasting
very far in that direction and does so on the basis of
reasoning that goes beyond the narrow limits pro-
claimed at the beginning of the opinion (App. 449).
Thus, the court warns against judging *tany sort of
speech on public issues worthless”’ (App. 473) and
states that even when a licensee has fully complied with
the Fairness Doctrine with respect to a certain issue
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a
legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf
of his candidacy.” Section 103(a)(2)(A), P.L. 92-295, ap-
proved February 7, 1972. Congress also revised the language of
Section 315, supra, by adding the following italicized words:
“no obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licen-
see to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.” Sec-
tion 103(b) (2) (B). Except to the extent modified, Congress
has adhered to the original policy adopted in 1997.
* As the Commission stated in DNC. the result would be “a
near-absolute right of any person who has the money to buy
time” (App. 267).
.
such as the Vietnam war, the licensee must neverthe-
less sell time because ‘‘it is not necessarily clear that a
particular antiwar editorial advertisement would add
nothing to the public’s information and understand-
ing” (App. 471-472, emphasis in original). In addition,
the court finds the Fairness Doctrine inadequate he-
cause ‘‘when an individual or group buys time to say
its piece, the crucial controls are in its own hands” |
(App. 468). In our view, these statements, as well as |
others that served as a ground for the decision, indi-
cate that the court did significantly more than institute
a ‘‘modest reform.’’ Instead, the court turned the
question of access into a matter of constitution] com- |
pulsion and, in the process, apparently transformed
each refusal to sell time for editorial advertising into |
a First Amendment issue to be decided ultimately by —
the courts. |
The evident intent of Congress not to go so far |
cannot be dismised with the assertion that the First
Amendment nevertheless demands more. Congress
‘‘eould surely have decreed that each frequency
should be shared among all or some of those who wish
to use it,” Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 390-391; it
44
could have obligated licensees to act as common car-
riers; or it could have forbidden advertisements en-
tirely. Congress chose instead to regulate the airwaves
through the system of commercial broadcasting we
have described above and, as Judge McGowan stated
in dissent, ‘‘[t]his approach has never been thought
to be other than within the permissible limits of con-
stitutional choice’ (App. 490). In light of Congress’
45
direction in Section 3(h), the Commission reasonably
refused to recognize an individual right of access as
broad as that suggested by the court below; but the
Commission did begin a comprehensive inquiry to
determine whether there is any ‘‘feasible method of
providing access for discussion of public issues out-
side the requirements of the fairness doctrine,’’ 30
F.C.C. 2d at 33 (see pp. 13-15 supra). This, we
submit, is not only a constitutionally permissible ap-
proach, but also a sound method of dealing with such
significant regulatory matters; indeed, it is precisely
because of the need for proceeding in this way that
Congress set up an administrative agency to handle
the task.
2. In the framework of commercial broadcast
>» « . €
Congress, the Fuirness Doctrine prov
ing prescribed by
ides reasonable publie
access without discrimination and thereby satisfies First
Amendment requirements
When the Commission’s requirements under’ the
Fairness Doctrine are compared with the require-
ments imposed by the court of appeals on the basis
of its view of the First Amendment, it becomes evi-
dent that the court’s disagreement with the Commis-
sion essentially involves policy differences about the
Manner in which broadcasters, as public trustees,
ought to make their frequencies available for the dis-
cussion of public issues. The Commission has long
held that under the Fairness Doctrine, licensees may
not “themselves make radio unavailable as a medium
*° See note 33 supra, discussing American Commercial Lines,
Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 591-592.
a
46
of free speech.” Report on Editorializing, supra, 13
F.C.C. at 1248. Broadcasters must seek out spokesmen
to present representative and contrasting views on
controversial issues of public importance, although
they may exercise journalistic discretion in selecting
representative spokesmen and in determining what
format shall be used for the presentations. This duty
is a binding condition of the right to broadcast. See,
e.g., Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415; En Banc Pro-
gram Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291; Primer on
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 36 Fed. Reg. 4092.
This indeed was the thrust of United Broadcasting
Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, relied on by the court of
appeals (App. 487). This 1945 decision is among
many that contributed to the still-evolving Fairness
Doctrine. The Commission there emphasized, as it
later observed in the landmark Report on Editorial-
izing, that the broadcaster’s duty includes making
BN ee TN
*°In United Broadcasting a labor organization charged that
a Columbus, Ohio, radio station, WHKC, refused to broadcast
programs which solicited membership or discussed controversial
subjects, such as race, religion, or politics; that it discriminated
in administering this policy, and that it censored scripts. The
case was settled. The station agreed that it would consider every
request for time to broadcast concerning controversial public
issues in an open minded and impartial manner; that requests
for such time would be considered in light of its contribution to
a balanced program schedule; and that the station would make
time available for the full and free discussion of public issues |
on a nondiscriminatory basis. In approving the agreement, the
Commission stated that “operation of any station under the
extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the discussion |
of controversial public issues” was inconsistent with the Com-
munications Act’s public interest standard. 10 F.C.C. at 518.
2
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47
responsible provision for the discussion of controver-
sial issues of public importance in the community
served and making sufficient time available for a full
discussion of those issues. 13 F.C.C. at 1249. But as
the Fairness Doctrine developed, the Commission
found that it was not necessarily required, as dicta in
United Broadcasting had indicated, that broadcasters
sell time to private individuals so long as the broad-
easter used his facilities as a forum for discussion of
public issues. Thus, after thorough study of the mat-
ter, the Commission came to the following conclusion
in its Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. at 1251-1252:
It should be recognized that there can be
no one all embracing formula which licensees
can hope to apply to insure the fair and bal-
anced presentation of all public issues. Different
issues will inevitably require different tech-
niques of presentation and production. The
licensee will in each instance be called upon to
exercise his best judgment and good sense in
determining what subjects should be considered,
the particular format of the programs to be
devoted to each subject, the different shades of
opinion to be presented, and the spokesmen for
each point of view. In determining whether to
honor specific requests for time, the station will
inevitably be confronted with such questions as
whether the subject is worth considering,
whether the viewpoint of the requesting party
has already received a sufficient amount of
broadcast time, or whether there may not be
other available groups or individuals who might
be more appropriate spokesmen for the par-
ticular point of view than the person making
Ak
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48
the request. The latter’s. personal involvement
in the controversy may also be a factor which
must be considered, for elementary considera-
tions of fairness may dictate that time be allo-
cated to a person or group which has been
specifically attacked over the station, where
otherwise no such obligation would exist. Un-
doubtedly, over a period of time some licensees
may make honest errors of judgment. But
there can be no doubt that any licensee
honestly desiring to tive up to its obligation to.
serve the public interest and making a reason-
able effort to do so, will be able to achieve a fair
and satisfactory resolution of these problems in
the light of the specific facts.“
Although BEM failed to show.’'that WTOP had not
complied with these standards (App. 362-363), the
Commission stressed that WTOP had a continuing,
duty to present a variety of views on the Vietnam
“1 Because of this duty, the cases involving access to a regu-
lated forum relied upon by the court of appeals are inapposite.
Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097
(W. D. Wis.), affirmed, 441 F. 2d 1257 (C.A. 7); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.); Kissinger v. New York
City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 4388 (S.D.N.Y.); Hill-
side Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma 455 P. 2d
850 (Wash.); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,
64 Cal. Reptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 982 (Cal.). These are all cases
in which those responsible for access to an advertising forum
have no corresponding responsibility to assure balanced cover-
age of contending positions; nor are there special considera-
tions, as here, suggesting that such an obligation should be
imposed. In those cases, the question was simply whether the
ideas expressed in editorial advertising were to be given access
to the forum at all. Under the broadcasters’ public interest obliga-
tions and the fairness doctrine, however, controversial questions
of public importance must be given access to the broadcast
forum, although the format for their presentation is subject to
licensee discretion.
49 -
war, including views such as those advocated by BEM
(App. 361-362). However, the Commission held that
in the absence of a violation of the Fairness Doctrine,
BEM had no “right’’ to buy time and WTOP had no
duty to sell (App. 368). And the court of appeals
itself stopped short of holding that WTOP necessar-
ily must sell time to BEM ( App. 488).
With respect to the DNC case, the networks are
presently under a duty to present the views of major
political parties on national issues, and they have done
so in the context of news broadcasts and interviews,
and in special presentations (App. 252): For example,
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Ine. y. Federal
Communications Commission, 454 F. 2d 1018 (C.A.
D.C.), the court of appeals recently held that the CBS
network acted pursuant to the Fairness Doctrine in
offering broadcast time to the Chairman of DNC to
present the views of the Democratic Party in a for-
mat to be determined by him. Similarly, the court sus-
tained the American Broadcasting Company in its
grant of time to DNC to present its views on the
Vietnam war.“ And as the statement indicates, supra,
p. 9n. 5, the National Broadeasting Company has no
general policy against the sale of time to major polit-
ical parties for broadcasts on public issues (App. 47).
Thus, each of the major national networks, in diverse
ways in fact makes time available to individuals and
groups who wish to speak out on the issues of the day.
“See Democratic National Committee v. Federal Communi-
tations Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 71-1637, decided February 2,
1972, petition for a writ of certiorari filed April 28, 1972. No.
71-1405.
468—033--72—__5
T a
: 50 |
Under the Fairness Doctrine they must do so as part
of their obligation as public trustees.
But the court of appeals concluded “that the fair-
ness doctrine’s goal of full and fair coverage of issues
on normal programming time does not eliminate the
; public’s interest in a further, complementary airing
j of controversial views during advertising time” (App.
473). The court also held that since broadcasters had
j opened “up a forum for some paid presentations, in-
dependently edited and controlled by members of the
public’? (App. 477), it is discriminatory for them not
to sell such time to persons wishing to express their
~ views on public issues, even though a broadcaster
may be permitted under the Constitution to refuse to
accept any advertisements of any sort (App. 475).
The court based these conclusions, however, on the
incorrect premise that there is for this purpose a con-
stitutionally significant distinction between program-
ming and advertising time, that the broadcast day
should be broken down into segments, each considered
: in isolation. The Communications Act makes no such
; distinction ; the broadcaster’s responsibility as a public
| trustee extends to every minute of every hour the
station is on the air.“ And the ‘‘forum” is the entire
broadeast day, of which advertising is simply one
component part. ‘
To be sure, a station will usually exercise less con-)
trol over advertisements than over its own programs,
although when network programs are carried the
: 43 See, e.g., En Banc Program Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg.
4 7291.
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“crucial controls,’’ as the court below put it, are not
in the station’s hands in any meaningful sense even
during regular programming. But the court of appeals
erred in assuming that broadcasters simply turn over
or relinquish advertising time, allowing advertisers to
do as they please, and that every broadcaster should
do the same for editorial advertisements.“
“See, og. Center for Law and Social Policy, 23° P. & F.
Radio Regulation 2d 187, 188 (1971), describing the control
CBS exercises over advertisements:
The CBS Television Network Program Practices Depart-
ment (Department) has general responsibility for ensuring
that “all matter transmitted by the network measures up to
acceptable standards of propriety.” The Department. has
a staff of thirty-four people in Hollywood and New York
with an operating budget in excess of $650,000. The De-
partment is headed by a network vice president, and each
office is headed by a director. Five editors in New York
and one in Hollywood work exclusively on commercial
clearance: one additional person in each office has the
responsibility for avoiding “commercial congestion ;” the
New York Office has four other persons to assist in the
handling of advertising material: and a medical advisor
reviews new medical claims and new presentations of previ-
ously substantiated claims. The clearance procedures are
separate from the sale of advertising time.
CBS states that advertisements are usually submitted in
script or storyboard form: that all product claims are
required to be substantiated; and that its staff, the adver-
tiser and/or agency often meet to discuss the substantiation
or presentation of a claim. After advertisements have been
accepted for broadcast they will again be reviewed based
on complaints from the public, inquiries from affiliates, or
other information. A thorough review, including consul-
tation of the CBS Law Department, is also conducted
when notice of governmental agency action is received.
Other sources utilized by the Department are the CBS
Research Department, which examines the methodology of
a
52
Broadcasters do exercise control over advertise-
ments and the Commission itself requires that: “*°
every station * * * have a program to protect
the public in this area. The extent of its pro-
gram will, of course, depend upon the size and
resources of the station, with the larger stations
making a correspondingly greater effort in this
field. However somewhere in every station oper-
ation (whether it be owner, manager, Or staff),
there must be cognizance of problems regarding
deceptive or misleading advertising, familiarity
with the important policies and developments
in this area, and the responsibility for deter-
mining the acceptability of advertising offered
to the station.
Compare Federal Communication Commission Vv.
American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284.
Thus, we submit that given the inevitable limitations
on access to broadcasting, the question whether a li-
censee unconstitutionally discriminates against speech
on public issues is meaningfully viewed in terms of
how the licensee allocates air time between con
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a
scientific studies submitted to substantiate claims; the CBS
Engineering Department, which reviews such matters as
claims relating to the performance of television sets: the
National Safety Council; the Council of Better Business
Bureaus; the American Dental Association; the Under-
writers Laboratories; and relevant publications of the
Federal Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, etc. CBS also states that it consults with the NAB
Code Authority, although “compliance with the NAB Code
does not assure that a commercial is acceptable under CBS
standards.”
«5 Jd. at 195; see also Licensee Responsibility with Respect to
the Broadcast of False, Misleading or Deceptive Advertising.
93 P. & F. Radio Regulation 2d 1550 (1971).
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53
mercial uses and public issue speech, rather than in
terms of the format he chooses. The licensees’ public
interest duty under the Fairness Doctrine assures that
broadcasters who derive their basic revenues from
commercial advertising will also devote substantial air
time to fair and balanced presentation of controver-
sial issues of public importance. There is thus no in-
vidious discrimination against the broadcasting of
speech on publie¢ issues.“*
In contrast to the court, the Commission does not
make a distinction between broadcasters who accept
commercial advertising and those who do not. Whether
the broadcaster is serving the public interest depends
on whether he is fulfilling his obligations under the
Fairness Doctrine and that standard applies to com-
mereial broadcasters such at WTOP as well as to non-
commercial broadcasters, which are not covered by the
court's ruling since they accept no advertising of any
kind.’ This overall approach to evaluating the li-
censee’s performance in the public interest has been
consistently followed by the Commission with the ap-
proval of both Congress and this Court, Red Lion,
supra, 395 U.S. at 380, and indicates that, contrary
© For this reason, cases such as Cor v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, Fowler v. Phode Island, 345 U.S. 67, and Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, are inapposite.
"See 47 U.S.C. 390, 392, 397, promoting the operation of
noncommercial broadcasting stations. A federally chartered
nonprofit corporation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
has been created to facilitate the development of educational
broadcasting, “with strict adherence to objectivity and balance
in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature
*** 7 U.S.C. 396(g) (1) (A).
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54
to the ruling below, it does not make a constitutional
difference that a commercial broadcaster accepts prod-
uct advertisements.“ At the least, the Constitution
gives Congress and the Commission enough latitude
to develop a reasonable regulatory scheme that makes
no such distinction.”
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3. In light of the serious problems in implementing a regulatory
policy requiring licensees to accept editorial advertisements.
the Commision reasonably refused to do so at this time
There are further reasons why the Commission
could reasonably conclude, as it did, that although
aes Wi o aa oh Cito NOB 9 sites
: 48 Product advertising, after all, exists in other media of com-
i munication which are not subject to the Fairness Doctrine and
have no constitutional duty not to discriminate against public
issue advertising.
«That. the Commission may properly view the issue as
whether the licensee has presented the point of view advocated
by a particular spokesman, rather than as whether the view-
point was presented in programming initiated or controlled by
the licensee, is shown by this Court’s recent affirmance of the
three-judge district court’s decision in Capital Broadcasting Co.
3 vy. Mitchell, Nos. 71-851, 71-919, affirmed per curiam Mach 2%,
1972.
In that case broadcasters challenged, on First Amendment
grounds, the ban on cigarette advertising in the electronic com-
munications media set forth in the Public Health Smoking Act
4 of 1969, 15 U.S.C. 1835. The court, with Judge Wright dis-
senting, rejected the broadcasters’ claim that the ban suppressed
debate on the smoking issue. Broadcasters could continue to dis-
3 seminate information about cigarettes and were precluded only
‘ from doing so by means of advertisements on the air. Thus, the
4 debate about smoking could continue in other formats of
broadcasting.
Similarly, in this case, even if a broadcaster has a flat ban on
advertisements about controversial public issues. those issues
must nevertheless be presented during normal programming
time and the Commission properly relied on this as adequately
serving the public interest.
CORA RR AAR ION A Bi As od
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55
there is no policy against selling time for comment on
public issues (App. 265), a licensee need not do so if it
otherwise complies with the Fairness Doctrine. In its
opinions in DNC and BEM, the Commission men-
tioned a number of undesirable consequences _ that
could flow from a regulatory system, such as that con-
templated by the court of appeals, outlawing flat bans
on editorial advertisements.
First, the “‘right’’ recognized by the court of ap-
peals is a constitutional right of access not for all
individuals or groups but only for those wealthy
enough to purchase time. In DNC, the Commission
found this objectionable because “the publie’s agenda
for discussion of public issues would then be set sub-
stantively and increasingly by the affluent—by the per-
son or group which ‘* * * has the financial resources
and interest to purchase sustained access to the mass
communications media * * *’ (Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405
F. 2d 1082 (C.A.D.C. 1968), certiorari denied, 396
U.S. 842)” (App. 263). And in Red Lion this Court
expressed its disapproval of a system wherein the
“highest bidders’’ would get the available time, 395
U.S. at 392, or, as Judge McGowan described it in
dissent, a system wherein “money alone determines
what issues are to be aired, and in what format”
(App. 490). Indeed, one commentator has already
suggested that the regulatory scheme mandated by
the court below on the basis of the First Amendment
is itself unconstitutional because it discriminates
against the poor.”
*° See Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 694 (1972), which proposes a
convoluted solution to this by a “submarket rate system,” id. at
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Next, there is the problem of rationing time among
those with enough money to buy it. Commissioner
Johnson, dissenting in DNC, proposed that this be
done on a first-come, first-served basis (App. 281).
But that would still mean that affluent individuals or
groups could dominate the limited amount of avail-
able time by continued requests for access; moreover,
if there were a long waiting list of persons wishing to
air their views, an issue sought to be addressed might
become stale while other, less-immediate questions
were discussed. It has been suggested that “ [t] hese
problems could be avoided by relaxing to a limited
extent the constitutional principles against content
discrimination and regulatory discretion.”’” But this,
we submit, only serves to illustrate further the reason-
ableness of the Commission’s refusal to embark upon
such a venture, at least not without additional study,
and thereby interject itself, as never before, into the
day-to-day programming decisions of broadcasters.
Moreover, consideration must be given to what
effects such a regulatory system would have on the
Fairness Doctrine, and, particularly, on the Cullman
doctrine, which requires broadcasters to present, at
695. Professor Jaffe criticizes this proposal because it “would
raise incredible administrative problems.” Jaffe, The Editorial
Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 789 (1972).
51 Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 697 (1972). In seeking to solve such
problems, others have proposed that representative community
boards be set up to decide which persons shall be allowed to
present their opinions. Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532, 568
(1971).
52 (yllman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576; see Red Lion,
supra, 395 U.S. at 377.
aT
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57
their own expense if necessary, opposing views on pub-
lic issues when the licensee has chosen to broadcast a
program giving only one viewpoint. The premise of
Cullman is that the licensee ’s voluntary choice to
present one side of the issue gives rise to an affirma-
tive duty to present opposing viewpoints. If Cullman
nevertheless applied, each editorial advertisement
could generate claims for free reply time and the
licensee would thus become obligated to correct an
imbalance he. had not created. Commissioner Cox,
concurring in BEM, stated: “J fully support the
Cullman doctrine in those cases where broadcasters
elect to accept sponsored controversial issue program-
ming or paid spots, but think that to require them to
accept such matter would unreasonably expose them
to erosion of their advertising revenues”’ (App. 369,
emphasis in original).
It was suggested below that if financial harm or other
problems result, the Fairness Doctrine can simply be
“suspended”’ * in this area or the Commission can make
“necessary adjustments,”’ “ These assertions, we sub-
mit, are a further indication of the imprudence of
the court of appeals’ decision. For if Cullman does
not, or cannot, apply to editorial advertisements, then
the public will hear only one-sided presentations on
public issues by those rich enough to buy time. That
is searcely a “‘better’’ regulatory scheme than, or a
significant improvement in, the: present system which
Tequires licensees to cover publie issues and present
“App. 281 (Commissioner Johnson dissenting in DNC).
“App. 486 (opinion of the court of appeals).
i.
58
contrasting views. At the least, the Commission could
reasonably conclude that the foreseeable dangers mili-
tate against instituting such a regulatory scheme at
this time.
Above all else, one thing is clear: the court below
has required the Commission to embark upon a course
that will involve it to an unprecedented degree in
determining who shall get on the air to present their
particular views. Under the issue-oriented Fairness
Doctrine, this is a matter that traditionally has been
left to the licensee’s reasonable discretion.” But the
court has thrust the Commission into the role of
arbiter, with each refusal to sell time giving rise to a
potential First Amendment question. Perhaps it is not
inevitable that under the court’s decision the Commis-
sion would find itself forced to decide competing
claims to buy limited time on the basis of criteria
that favor one person’s speech over another’s.* But
the possibility is a real one—and one the Commission
has, from the beginning, sought to avoid as it devel-
oped the Fairness Doctrine. Indeed, the needless
assumption of such a role (which amounts to a form
of selective prior restraint) by a government agency
would not be easy to reconcile with the First Amend-
ment. At the very least, we think the Constitution per-
Sik erick ae ROS Bie Savina
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§ 85In DNC, however, the Commission observed that “[t]here
could be a case where the licensee’s policy in this area would
; be arbitrary (e.g., when he covers the issue, and in announce-
j ments of a few seconds duration, and then refuses to let others
dis¢uss the issue on this basis). No such case is or has been
before us. * * *” (App. 269, n. 13).
56 See II Chafee, supra, at 709, quoted in note 30 supra.
a
Becreresacever SHOEI RONDO LT het YOR CE AGEMENT
—
59
mitted the Commission to choose not to run the risk
of setting out on such a course in these cases,” and to
rely instead on the safeguards of the Fairness Doc-
trine to assure responsible broadcast journalism.
In summary, we submit that the existing public
trustee approach adopted by Congress and the Com-
mission is a proper way of serving the public’s First
Amendment interests in broadcasting, and that it was
thus constitutionally permissible for the Commission
here to decide to continue following that approach,
which leaves the question whether editorial adver-
tisement will be accepted as a matter of journalistic
discretion to be decided by the licensee. Whether
further adjustments and changes are desirable or
possible is a matter under consideration in the Com-
mission’s current general inquiry into the Fairness
Doctrine,” where there will be careful and thorough
study of the evidence and opinions elicited. Whether
and to what degree the licensee would be able to con-
trol the views and the manner in which they are
expressed, the amount of time that should be allocated
to public issue advertising, the experience of licensees
who accept such advertising, how disputes regarding
refusals to sell time to particular applicants would be
resolved, on what basis a licensee could reject certain
controversial advertising—all this and much more
would have to be taken into account in determining
"Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733
(White, J. concurring) ( refusing in another context of selective
Prior restraint to “start the courts down a long and hazardous
road * * * without congressional guidance and direction”).
* See supra, pp. 13-15.
60
not only what kind of regulations the Commission
should adopt to implement any rule requiring that
licensees accept public issue advertising, but also
whether such a rule should be adopted at all.”
The need for engaging in this kind of far-reaching
and thorough inquiry ° before making such a signifi-
°°—In the pending inquiry, the Commission has before it a
wide variety of viewpoints. Some advocate an absolute right
in public issue spokesmen to broadcast their views in a manner
and format of their own choosing without any right of the
broadcaster to reject requests for time except on grounds of
obscenity. Such proposals range from sale of time for paid
spot announcements to sale of time for lengthy public issue
programs and announcements both on a paid and free basis.
Other submissions argue for the maintenance of the status quo.
claiming that any other system would impair the balance of
the Fairness Doctrine in favor of wealthy spokesmen or groups
and would impose an unfair obligation on broadcasters to make
free time available under the Cullman doctrine. Some would
allow the broadcaster to deny access, but only because the par-
ticular mode of presentation does not adequately advise the
public of the issues; or because what is discussed is not 4
controversial issue of public importance. This proposal would
permit rejection of requests in the discretion of the broadcaster
on an ad hoc basis for reasons pertaining to the public interest,
but subject to review under a reasonableness standard by the
Commission.
¢ The Commission had opened its general inquiry into the
Fairness Doctrine before the court’s decision in this case,
because, among other reasons, it had since 1968 “seen the law
in this field explode, as knowledgeable and aggressive parties
recognized the potential, and legal availability, of the broad-
cast media to expound on these public issues.” Democratic Na-
tional Committee v. Federal Communications Commission.
C.A.D.C., No. 71-1788 (decided Feb. 22, 1972). Some of the
more recent court decisions dealing with the Fairness Doctrine
are: Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission, 405 F.2d
1082 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v.
Federal Communications Commission, 396 U.S. 842; Retail
Store Employees Union v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 436 F.2d 248 (C.A.D.C.); Neckritz v. Federal Communi-
Sort eA SHES tetas Cath BRAS
aA ct ARE Na SDL BRAN NIS Ese EE a
TRIN ESR. PRIS TREN DSN WS CORRS
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61
eant regulatory decision is one of the reasons why
Congress created an administrative agency in this
field to determine whether—as well as how—problems
such as these can be surmounted. But the court of
appeals has ordered the Commission up the slope
without considering whether this is justified in hight
of the dangers and complexities of the climb; and from
that order, purportedly a constitutional command,
there can be no turning back.
The Constitjition does not compel the court’s result,
but requires only that, in the context of an overall regu-
latory program that is consistent with the First
Amendment, the Commission have reasonable grounds
for deciding not to adopt a proposed affirmative pol-
icy that arguably would further encourage freedom
of speech in broadcasting, such as that advocated
by respondents in this case. As we have discussed
above, that standard was met here, since the Com-
mission’s rejection of respondents’ claims was sup-
ported by substantial considerations that have thus
far led the Commission to conclude that First Amend-
cations Commission, 446 F.2d 501, 502 (C.A. 9); Friends’ of
the Earth vy. Federal Communications Commission, 449 F.2d
1164 (C.A.D.C.); Green v. Federal Communications Commis-
tion, 447 F.2d 323 (C.A.D.C.) ; Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc..w. Federal Communications Commission, 454 F.2d 1018
(C.A.D.C.) ; Democratic National Committee v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 71-1637, decided Febru-
ary 2, 1972, petition for a writ of certiorari pending, No.
11-1405, O.T. 1971; Larus Brothers v. Federal Communications
Commission, 447 F.2d 876 (C.A. 4); Democratic National Com-
mittee v. Federal Communications Commission, C.A.D.C. No.
11-1738, decided February 22, 1972: Healey v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 24,630, decided March 3,
1972,
a
62
ment values in this area will be better served by con-
tinued reliance on the journalistic discretion of
broadeasters operating in compliance with their obli-
gations under the Fairness Doctrine. Accordingly, the
court below should have affirmed the Commission’s
decisions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
court of appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
Erwin N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.
WALKER B. CoMEcys,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gencral.
A. RayMonD RANDOLPH, Jr.,
Assistant to the Solicitor General.
Howarp E. SHAPIRO,
Attorney.
JoHN W. PETTIT,
General Counsel,
CuarRLes A, ZIELINSKI,
Counsel,
Federal Communications Commission.
JUNE 1972.
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972
LEVELING ALTE AIL AEN AIEEE GP SMM.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.