Brief for Respondent — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee
Supreme Court brief1973
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Text
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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EOrmnions BELOW ......... cece cece cece eee eeeeeeeees 1
JURISDICTION Oe eT eee ee ree ee ree eee 2
MQURSTION PRESENTED ............ cece eccccececceces 2
ONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED 2
MTATEMENT ... 1.0... cece ccc eee cece ee eeees 3
BPMGUMENT ... 20.0... eee c cece e eect nec e ea ceees 9
BI. Review by This Court at This Time Would Be
4 © POMBE: 2 oe a 6 dae noe oe ong wees bee erences 12
II. There Is No Conflict in the Circuits ........... 19
MOEUIBION 6 occcey vice shite esness tose ans vevass 22
3
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UASES :
pd malgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
§ Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) ................. 20
EAvins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) ............e0 cece 21-29
‘B on v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
rer ee err ee ee re 21
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) .............. 21
Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth €
Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950) ........ 20
[McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d
=~ -5QT (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946)
20-22
P yblic Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451
RIDA) grouse nessa oee 44 oe bees evevec ett eesssnees 20
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
» Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ....7, 11-13, 17-19, 22
ll Table of Contents Continued —
CoMMISSION PROCEEDINGS: Page
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, Docket No. 19260 30 F.C.C.2d
CTPA). vexctvcqcsoeseuevseeiece cyewsaeexece 8, 13, 14
ConstTITuTIONAL Provisions, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
U. S. Constitution, Amendment I ................ passim
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C7§554(d) .... 3
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
BUUCR) pve cones 5eesnyecaet ese soos sees eis 2
OS OPCGY oe on ho oh ween ene chee veandess 3
AT Cy OLS orice dec cessy ints r645ad cs sesasveens: 3
Books AND PERIODICALS:
N. Minnow, Equal Time (1964) ........ 0.0.0. cee eee, 16
T. Thompson, The Crapshoot for Half a Billion, Life
Magazine, Sept. 10, 1971, p. 47 ................. 14
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBEeR TERM, 1971
No. 71-863
CoLuMBIA Broapcasting System, INc., Petitioner,
v.
DEMocRATIC NA1ioNAL ComMITTEE, Respondent.
No. 71-864
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, Petitioners,
v.
BusINEss EXECUTIVES’ MOVE For VIETNAM PEACE and
Democratic NATIONAL COMMITTEE, Respondents.
No. 71-866
AMERICAN BROADCASTING Companies, Inc., Petitioner,
v.
Democratic NATIONAL CoMMITTEE, Respondent.
On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
COMMITTEE IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not yet been
officially reported. It is reproduced in Appendix A to
the petition filed by the Federal Communications Com-
«
a neers
—
2
mission in No. 71-864.’ The decision of the Federal
Communications Commission is reported at 25 F.C.C.
2d 216 (1970) and is reproduced in Appendix B to the
petition filed by the Commission in No. 71-864.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional requisites are adequately set forth
in the petitions filed in these cases.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court below erred in ruling that an ab-
solute ban on all paid announcements to discuss public
issues imposed by broadcast licensees and endorsed by
the Federal Communications Commission is inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED
The pertinent constitutional provisions and some of
the pertinent provisions of the Communications <Act
of 1934 are set forth in the petitions filed in these cases.
The following provisions of the Communications Act
also bear upon the issues in these cases:
Section 307(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), provides:
‘‘The Commission, if public convenience, inter-
est, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to
the limitations of this chapter, shall grant to any
? Appendix citations in this brief will be to the appendices at-
tached to the petition filed by the government, which will be re-
ferred to as ‘‘FCC Pet.’’
3
applicant therefor a station license provided for
by this chapter.”’
Section 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), provides:
“Subject to the provisions of this section, the
Commission shall determine, in the ease of each
application filed with it to which section 308 of
this title applies, whether the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity will be served by the grant-
ing of such application, and, if the Commission
upon examination of such application and upon
consideration of such other matters as the Commis-
sion may officially notice, shall find that public
interest, convenience, and necessity would be served
by the granting thereof, it shall grant such appliea-
tion.’’
STATEMENT
The Democratie National Committee (DNC), a re-
spondent in these cases, is the governing body of the
National Democratie Party between conventions. On
May 19, 1970, DNC filed with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (Commission) a request for a de-
elaratory ruling that broadcast licensees ‘‘may not, as
a general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible enti-
ties, such as the DNC, for the solicitation of funds and
for comment on publie issues.’” FOC Pet., App. B, p.
48a. The Commission is authorized to issue such rul-
ings pursuant to section 5(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), and section 1.2 of its
own regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2.
At the time the request was filed, DNC was planning
an extensive campaign on television and radio to raise
money for the Democratie Party. The Party had in-
4 i,
curred substantial debts during the 1968 presidential
campaign, and funds were desperately needed to meet
the demands of creditors. In addition, the 1970 off-
year elections were on the political horizon, and money
was needed to support the campaigns of Democratic
candidates for national office. DNC realized from the
outset that any effective campaign to solicit funds would
have to be accompanied by statements of the Democratic
Party’s position on controversial issues of public im-
portance and the Party’s alternatives to the policies of
the incumbent Republican Administration.
DNC selected the broadcast media for its planned
campaign for two reasons. First, that forum—and
particularly television—is the most powerful and most
effective medium of communication ever devised by
man. Second, access to the broadcast media would _
permit DNC to reach the greatest potential number of ©
small contributors and thus reverse the disturbing
tendency of political parties to rely on large contribu-
tions. DNC’s initial inquiries, however, had indicated
that the broadcast networks and individual licensees
had widely varying policies concerning the sale of
time for the purposes intended by DNC. For example,
some broadcasters flatly refused to sell time for such
purposes; others limited the sale of time for such pur-
poses to election campaign periods. DNC sought the
declaratory ruling before expending the thousands of
dollars/necessary to develop its media campaign.
With Commissioner Johnson dissenting, the Com-
mission rejected the declaratory ruling sought by DNC.
The Commission ruled, in effect, that broadcasters
could, consistent with their obligations under the ‘‘pub-
lic interest’’ standards of the Communications Act and
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5
the First Amendment, refuse to sell any time to DNC
or other responsible entities to discuss controversial
issues of public importance.?
The Commission’s endorsement of the broadcasters’
flat ban on paid editorial advertisements * was grounded
in what the court of appeals aptly described as **spec-
tres of chaos, grossly unbalanced programming and
financial disaster.’” FOC Pet., App. A, p. 42a. The
Commission, for example, said that the rule sought by
DNC would result in ‘‘a return to the chaotic situation
of radio’s early days,’’ that “the public’s agenda for
discussion of public issues would . . . be set substan-
tively and increasingly by the affluent,’’ and that broad-
casters would no longer be able to exercise their edito-
rial judgment and journalistic control over ‘the man-
ner in which the public is to be informed.”” FCC Pet.,
App. B, pp. 65a-66a. The Commission’s opinion, how-
ever, is devoid of any attempt by the Commission to
apply its administrative expertise to reconcile the con-
flicting interests it perceived.
* The Commission did rule that it would be arbitrary for broad-
casters to refuse to carry paid fund-raising solicitations by the
major political parties or limit such solicitations to election periods.
FOC Pet., App. B, pp. 72a-75a. However, the Commission’s en-
dorsement of the flat ban on editorial advertisements renders its
ruling on fund-raising solicitations meaningless. To be effective,
any fund-raising solicitation sponsored by DNC on the broadcast
media would necessarily have to be accompanied by an expression
of the Democratic Party’s positions on controversial public issues.
The Commission’s approval of the flat ban on editorial advertise-
ments presumably would permit a broadcaster to reject a fund-
raising solicitation that also contained comment on public issues.
’The term ‘‘editorial advertisements’’ is used throughout this
brief to describe paid announcements by responsible entities seek-
ing to express their views on public issues.
6 _
The net result of the Commission’s ruling is to per-
mit the hawkers of detergents, mouth washes, beer, dog
food and brassieres to maintain their present monopoly
over that portion of the broadcast day that is reserved
for paid announcements.
On the same day that the Commission denied DNC’s
request for a declaratory ruling, it also denied a com-
plaint against a Washington, D.C., radio station filed
by the Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace
(BEM), an organization opposed to this country’s
Indochina policies. BEM’s request to purchase time
to present spot announcements expressing its opposition
to the war in Indochina was rejected by the station and,
relying essentially on its reasoning in its DNC ruling,
the Commission sustained the station’s action. FCC
Pet., App. C. Both DNC and BEM sought review in
the court of appeals.
The court of appeals, with one judge dissenting, re-
versed the Commission’s endorsement of the flat ban on
editorial advertisements. ‘‘We hold specifically that
a flat ban on paid political announcements is in violation
of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of
paid announcements are accepted.”” FOC Pet., App.
A, p. 3a. The court was careful, however, to limit its
ruling to the very narrow question it was deciding:
“The actual issue before us is relatively narrow
and we decide it narrowly.... [W]e leave undis-
turbed the licensee’s basic right to exercise judg-
ment and control in public issue programming and
the sale of advertising time. All we do is forbid an
extreme form of control which totally excludes con-
troversial public debate from broadcast adver-
tising time. ... We do not hold, however, that the
planned announcements of the petitioners—r,
for that matter, of any other particular applicant
ott
FILES ETD IEP ETE I SO ENS
_ :
for air time—must necessarily be accepted by
broadcast licensees. ... [W]e confine ourselves
to invalidating the flat ban alone, leaving it up to
the licensees and the Commission to develop and
administer reasonable procedures and regulations
determining which and how many ‘editorial ad-
vertisements’ will be put on the air.’’ Jd.
The court of appeals’ decision was firmly grounded
in this Court’s seminal ruling in Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), which recognized the predominant
First Amendment interest of the viewing and listening
public in being fully informed by the broadcast media
of conflicting viewpoints on controversial issues of pub-
lic importance. The court below ruled that the rights
defined by Red Lion necessarily included an interest in
the mode and manner in which those viewpoints were
presented. ‘‘It is too late to argue that the First
Amendment protects ideas but not an individual’s in-
terest in expressing them and doing so in his own way.”
FCC Pet., App. A, p. 22a.
The court found that editorial advertisements had a
unique potential for furthering those First Amendment
values. Unlike normal programming over which
broadcasters exercise total control of format and con-
tent, editorial advertisements give to those who wish to
speak on public issues an opportunity to exercise such
control. For that reason, the court described editorial
advertisements as ‘‘a special and separate mode of ex-
pression, not simply a duplication of other expression
on the same medium.’’ FCC Pet., App. A, p. 23a. In
addition, the court noted that, ‘‘[i]n the First Amend-
ment area, our best guarantee has always been a ‘free
market’ in which partisans who feel strongly on partic-
a... ee EQN
eh
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ular issues may decide on their own to speak out and
to speak out in their own way.’’ FOC Pet., App. A,
p. 24a.
The court responded to broadcaster objections that
any requirement they accept editorial advertisements
would deprive them of their traditional journalistic
control over the presentation of public issues. The
court noted that it was dealing only with that portion
of the broadcast day—the portion reserved for paid
announcements—‘‘in which editorial control over con-
tent has never been of major importance.’’ The court
also stressed that ‘“‘broadcasters would retain full lat-
itude to control the content of their programming.”’
FCC Pet., App. A, p. 38a.
The broadcasters and the Commission raised a vari-
ety of other objections to any scheme for editorial ad-
vertisements—objections that the court characterized as
suggestions of an ‘‘administrative apocalypse’’* and
‘“‘spectres of chaos, grossly unbalanced programming
and financial disaster.””* ‘The court discussed each of
those objections, ruling that some did not override the
First Amendment interests at stake and that others
could be resolved by an exercise of the Commission’s
administrative expertise. The court noted that it was
recognizing only an ‘‘abridgeable’’ right of access to
the broadcast media for the presentation of editorial
advertisements. FCC Pet., App. A, p. 22a. ‘‘It is
_ well established in First Amendment law governing ac-
cess to forums that ‘reasonable regulations’ may be
promulgated and enforced to limit the exercise of free
speech.’”? FCC Pet., App. A, p. 39a. The regulations
FCC Pet., App. A, p. 40a.
5 FCC Pet., App. A, p. 42a.
_ 9
referred to by the court commonly govern the time,
place and manner of such speech. By opposing such a
limited and abridgeable right, the court viewed the
Commission and broadcasters as proposing an extreme
form of censorship by which ‘“public issue advertising
may be aired ‘at no time, in no place, and in no manner’
over the broadcast media.”” FCC Pet., App. A, p. 39a.
The court remanded the case to the Commission to
“develop reasonable regulatory guidelines to deal with
editorial advertisements” and to determine whether,
in light of the regulatory guidelines developed, DNC
would be entitled to purchase time to present the pub-
lic issue announcements it was planning. FOC Pet.,
App. A, p. 44a.
ARGUMENT
In their efforts to persuade this Court to grant plen-
ary review of the decision below, petitioners have
shrouded the issues in this case in a fog of hyperbole
and shrill rhetoric that obscures the limited and narrow
impact of the court of appeals’ ruling. Petitioners
convey the impression that the court below has un-
justifiably demolished the congressionally mandated
scheme for regulating broadcasting and has under-
mined the entire foundation of public issue broadeast-
ing in this country. It takes only a cursory reading of
the decision below to lift that fog of hyperbole and
shrill rhetoric and to realize that the extremely narrow
ruling by the court of appeals does not warrant plenary
review by this Court at this time.
The court below took special pains to emphasize the
narrowness of its ruling because the same visions of
Armageddon that characterize the petitions in this
Court permeated the arguments made by the Commis-
: i
sion and the broadcast networks in the court of appeals.
Confronted by those forebodings of doom for the broad-
east industry and predictions of an ‘‘administrative
apocalypse’’® for the Commission, the court below
stressed :
‘““The actual issue before us is relatively narrow
and we decide it narrowly. We do not have to cut
the ‘heart’ of our system of broadcasting ; we leave
undisturbed the licensee’s basic right to exercise
judgment and control in public issue programming
‘and the sale of advertising time. All we do is for-
bid an extreme form of eontrol which totally ex-
cludes controversial public debate from broadcast
advertising time.’”” FOC Pet., App. A, p. 3a.
(Emphasis in original.)
* * *
“The arguments of the Commission and inter-
venors fall well short of the mark. The reason is
that they have apparently misunderstood the nar-
rowness of the issue here. All that we are con-
sidering is the permissibility of a total, flat ban on
editorial advertising. All petitioners ask is that
broadcasters be required to accept some editorial
advertising. They do not advocate an absolute
right to air their advertisements.”’ FCC Pet.
App. A, p. 37a. (Emphasis in original.)
Consistent with those admonitions, the court below
stated its narrow holding concisely and precisely : “We
hold specifically that a flat ban on paid public issue an-
nouncements is in violation of the First Amendment,
at least when other sorts of paid announcements are
accepted.’? FCC Pet., App. A, p. 3a.
The relief granted by the court below was equally
narrow. That court simply remanded the proceding
6 FCC Pet., App. A, p. 40a.
a2 ¥
SELLER OLA OLIGO IO OF IM, OEE I ny Bae:
7 11
to require the Commission to apply its administrative
expertise and to ‘‘develop reasonable regulatory guide-
lines to deal with editorial advertisements’’ ‘—an ex-
ercise that the Commission studiously avoided in con-
sidering DNC’s request for a declaratory ruling. The
court even stopped short of deciding whether DNC was
entitled to purchase broadcast time to present the pub-
lic issue announcements it had planned. The court
left that determination to be made by the Commission
in light of the regulatory guidelines it developed. FCC
Pet., App. A, p. 44a.
The sweeping attack now launched on that narrow
ruling is based on nothing more than petitioners’ spec-
ulative ruminations about the possible consequences
of that ruling and their belief that workable regula-
tory guidelines will be impossible to devise. Petition-
ers’ fears of hypothetical harm are an insufficient basis
for plenary review by this Court at this time. This
Court confronted similar arguments in the Red Lion
ease and responded: ‘‘[WJe will not now pass upon
the constitutionality of [the challenged] regulations
by envisioning the most extreme applications conceiv-
able, ... but will deal with those problems if and when
they arise.’’ 395 U.S. at 396. The Commission should
be given an opportunity to develop regulatory guide-
lines governing editorial advertisements before this
Court intercedes. In fact, the Commission had em-
barked on just such a course even before the court be-
low issued its decision that is now under attack.*
™FCC Pet., App. A, p. 44a.
8See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doc-
trine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications
Act, Docket No. 19260, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Fairness Doctrine Inquiry].
12
Two of the petitioners, Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem (CBS) and American Broadcasting Companies
(ABC), also allege a conflict in the circuits as a basis
for review in this Court. DNC will show that the sup-
posed conflict does not exist.
I. Review by This Court at This Time Would Be Premature
In passing upon the constitutionality of the Commis-
sion’s personal attack and political editorializing rules
in the Red Lton case, this Court was confronted by
broadcasters’ contentions that those rules would inevit-
ably result in self-censorship and a reduction or elimi-
nation of public interest programming. The Court dis-
missed those cries of alarm by noting that, ‘‘if experi-
ence with the administration of these doctrines indi-
cates that they have the net effect of reducing rather
than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage,
there will be time enough to reconsider their constitu-
tional implications.”’ 395 U.S. at 393. That principle
applies with even greater force in this case.
In rejecting the declaratory ruling requested by
DNC, the Commission did little more than accept the
predictions of dire consequences conjured up by the
broadcasters. For example, the Commission agreed
with the broadcasters that DNC’s proposal could result
in ‘‘a return to the chaotic situation of radio’s early
days’’ and in “‘the public’s agenda for discussion of
public issues . . . [being] set substantively and in-
creasingly by the affluent.’”” FCC Pet., App. B, p. 65a.
At no time did the Commission draw upon its adminis-
trative expertise to examine whether those supposed
consequences could be avoided by the devlopment of
reasonable regulatory guidelines to govern editorial
advertisements.
setiitone
13
In effect, petitioners are asking this Court to grant
plenary review only on the basis of their perception of
the harm that might flow from the decision below be-
fore the Commission has applied its special expertise
to seek to obviate that harm. In Red Inon, this Court
declined to anticipate the possible constitutional conse-
quences of rules already promulgated by the Commis-
sion solely on the basis of suppositions that harm might
result from those rules. Here the Commission has not
even undertaken to promulgate rules to accomodate the
conflicting interests that have emerged from DNC’s
request for a declaratory ruling. In Red Lion, this
Court made clear that it would not reach the merits of
potential constitutional issues affecting broadcasting
until the harm feared from Commission rules had ma-
tured into a reality through experience with those
rules. It necessarily follows that review by this Court
is premature when the Commission has not yet promul-
gated the rules that could make the broadcasters’ fears
even more illusory than they are at this stage of these
proceedings.
The petition filed by the government in this case con-
firms that careful consideration by the Commission of
the problems related to editorial advertisements could
eliminate the hallucinatory concerns expressed by CBS
and ABC in their petitions. The government notes that
the Commission has undertaken a general inquiry into
the fairness doctrine’ and might well ‘‘reach a result
similar to that ordered by the court of appeals.’”? FOC
Pet., p. 15. The government notes only that such a re-
sult would be reached ‘‘only after careful and thorough
consideration of the evidence and opinions elicited in
this inquiry,’”’ and it lists the various ramifications of
* Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, supra, note 8.
VO
BAI
14
editorial advertisements that the Commission intends
to explore in that inquiry. Jd. Thus, the Commission
has already set in motion the machinery for complying
with the limited mandate of the court of appeals. By
deferring any possible review of the questions pre-
sented by the decision below until the Commission com-
pletes its present inquiry, the Court will have the ben-
efit of the evidence and opinions offered in that inquiry
and the Commission’s considered evaluation of that
evidence and those opinions.
There is a certain irony in the government’s decision
to seek review in this Court after the Commission has
initiated a rule-making proceeding to consider, inter
alia, the very issue decided by the court below. That
inquiry was begun before the court below issued its de-
cision and at a time when the Commission’s ruling on
DNO’s request for a declaratory ruling was the pre-
vailing legal standard. In its Notice announcing that
inquiry, the Commission referred specifically to its
ruling on DNC’s request but nevertheless solicited
comments on ‘‘whether there is any feasible method of
providing access for discussion of public issues outside
the requirements of the fairness doctrine.’’ Fairness
Doctrine Inquiry, 30 F.C.C. 2d at 33. But, now that
the court of appeals has agreed that question deserves
further consideration, the Commission is seeking re-
view of the issue of editorial advertisements in this
Court and has simultaneously suspended its considera-
tion of that question in the pending rule-making pro-
ceeding.”
10 See ‘‘Order Extending Time’’ in FCC Docket No. 19260
(Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, swpra, note 8), released January 3,
1972. On the same day that the Commission released that Order,
the government filed its petition with this Court seeking review of
the court of appeals’ decision.
- 15
At root, the court below has required the Commission
to do nothing more than it had already decided to do.
Yet the petitioners—and particularly CBS and ABC—
foresee only disaster for broadcasting if the Commis-
sion is now permitted to pursue that course. Those
cries of alarm can be explained only by petitioners’
inability or refusal to comprehend the very narrow im-
pact of the decision below.
Petitioners suggest, for example, that the court of
appeals has stripped them of their journalistic super-
vision and control over public issue programming. See
CBS Pet., p. 12; ABC Pet., p. 9. The court below,
however, was careful to note that its decision had no
such impact on broadcasters’ normal programming re-
sponsibilities. It pointed out that it was dealing only
with that portion of the broadcasting day—the portion
allocated for paid advertisements—‘in which editorial
control over content has never been of Major impor-
tance.”” FCC Pet., App. A, p. 38a. In other words,
the court below dealt ‘‘only with time relinquished by
broadcasters to others” and in which “broadcasters
have no... strong First Amendment interest.”’ Jd.
at pp. 19a-20a. Thus, even the broadest possibe read-
ing of the decision below leaves untouched the very
interest of broadcasters that petitioners suggest has
been jeopardized.
Petitioners further contend that any requirement
that broadcasters carry some editorial advertisements
will necessarily conflict with their fairness doctrine
obligations” and give the wealthy a more powerful
voice on the broadcast media." The court of appeals
"See ABC Pet., pp. 10-11.
CBS Pet., pp. 14-15; ABC Pet., pp. 11-12.
—
acknowledged that such problems might arise from its
invalidation of the flat ban on editorial advertisements.
But it did not view the mere existence of those problems
as a sufficient justification for perpetuating that ban.
Rather, it viewed those problems as peculiarly sus-
ceptible to resolution through the Commission’s admin-
istrative processes, and it specifically suggested that
the Commission address those problems under the
court’s mandate. FOO Pet., App. A, pp. 40a-42a. Pe-
titioners, however, urge the mere existence of such
problems as a sufficient reason for interdicting this
proceeding in this Court before the Commission has an
opportunity to develop reasonable regulatory guide-
lines.
16
OBS argues that a necessary consequence of the de-
cision below will be to fill the airwaves with paid an-
nouncements on ‘“‘stale,”’ ‘‘insignificant”’ and ‘‘trivial”’
issues. CBS Pet., p. 15. It is somewhat surprising to
find such an argument made by those who preside over
a medium that was described a decade ago as a “‘vast
wasteland’”’ * and that, if anything, has become more
barren of substance and quality since. For example,
a recent profile of the CBS executive responsible for
programming decisions summarized his philosophy as
a preference for ‘‘not programs that he thinks people
will necessarily like, or benefit from, or be enriched by,
but programs he thinks people will watch.’’** That
18 That description of the desolate nature of television program-
ming was first used by Newton Minnow, then Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission, in an address to the 39th
Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in
Washington, D. C., on May 9, 1961. That address is reprinted in
N. Minnow, Equal Time 47 (1964).
14'T, Thompson, The Crapshoot for Half a Billion, Life Magazine,
Sept. 10, 1971, p. 47. (Emphasis in original. )
wa 17
same network now suggests to this Court that editorial
advertisements will somehow demean the quality of tele-
vision programming, necessarily Sweeping within its
pejoratives the paid announcements planned by DNC
—announcements designed to discuss current issues
affecting the conduct of our government and to acquit
the Democratic Party’s responsibilities as one of the
two major political parties in our democratic system,
This CBS argument betrays the real interest of the
broadcasters in pursuing this proceeding in this Court.
Bluntly stated, the broadcasters seek to preserve the
monopoly they presently enjoy in deciding what public
issues the American people should be exposed to
through the electronic media. The court below has sim-
ply ruled that other groups in society should, to some
degree, share that awesome responsibility with the few
who are privileged to control the limited number of
broadcast licenses available and the handful of corpo-
rate executives who control the three networks in this
nation. It is understandable that broadcasters would
find such a result disquieting. But the court below was
concérned with core First Amendment values and not
with broadcasters’ sensibilities,
CBS and ABC also assert that the decision below is
in conflict with this Court’s decision in Red Lion. See
CBS Pet., pp. 12-13; ABC Pet., pp. 8-9. That argu-
ment will not withstand analysis. The Red Lion deci-
sion was the constitutional touchstone for the court
of appeals’ decision. That court, however, did not view
Red Lion as placing inflexible parameters on the First
Amendment interests at work in broadcasting. Red
Lion dealt only with the interplay between the First
Amendment and the fairness doctrine as they relate to
a broadcaster’s statutorily imposed public interest obli-
i>... ro
18 i.
gations. But the fairness doctrine does not define the
totality of those public interest obligations. As the
court below observed, ‘‘the fairness doctrine’s goal of
full and fair coverage of issues on normal program-
ming time does not eliminate the public’s interest in a
further, complementary airing of controversial views
during advertising time.’’ FOC Pet., App. A, p. 28a.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, rather than being at odds
with Red Lion, the decision below is, if anything, an ob-
- vious and constitutional implementation of that semi-
nal ruling in the context of editorial advertisements.
The central argument made in this Court by the
government differs substantially in tone and import
from the arguments made by CBS and ABC. In es-
sence, the government argues that, by basing its deci-
sion on constitutional grounds, the court below has
shifted the prime responsibility for ‘‘the making of
the basic policy judgment [relating to editorial adver-
tisements] from the Commission to the courts, and,
in so doing, sets a new and significant course for broad-
casting.”” FCC Pet., p. 10. The government thus
seems to be suggesting that the court of appeals has
improperly usurped a function committed solely to the
Commission’s unbridled discretion. That argument
misses the mark.
The court below was fully aware the maintenance of
a viable regulatory scheme for broadcasting required
that it tread cautiously ‘‘when we are asked to reverse
major substantive interpretations of the grand and
open-ended statutory requirements”’ of the Communi-
eations Act. FCC Pet., App. A, p. 9a. Courts are
traditionally reluctant to intercede in matters that re-
quire an administrative agency to exercise its special
expertise. But the issues in this proceeding trans-
| 19
cended matters within the Commission’s peculiar tech-
nical competence. The declaratory ruling sought by
DNC drew into question the obligations imposed on
broadcasters by the First Amendment. Courts—and
not administrative agencies—are the appropriate ar-
biters of constitutional disputes.
In response to an analogous argument made in Red
_ Lion, this Court admonished that ‘‘Congress need not
stand idly by and permit those with [broadcast] li-
censes to ignore the problems that beset the people or
to exclude from the airways anything but their own
views of fundamental questions.’”? 395 U.S. at 394.
Similarly, the courts need not hold the Constitution in
abeyance while the Commission endorses actions by
broadcasters that jeopardize or deny the effective exer-
cise of First Amendment rights.
For these several reasons, petitioners have stated no
substantial reason to justify review of the decision be-
low by this Court at this time. Rather, as DNC has
shown, review by this Court at this time would be pre-
mature.
II. There Is No Conflict in the Circuits
CBS and ABC assert as an additional ground for re-
view by this Court the claim that the decision below is
in direct conflict with decisions by courts of appeals in
two other circuits.* Those two petitioners purport
to find different bases for the supposed conflict, but
their arguments are equally without merit.
ABC contends that the holding by the court below
that the actions by broadcasters constitute state action
oe
* The government’s petition does not claim that review is nec-
essary because of a conflict in the circuits.
—
20
and are thus subject to the restraints of the First
Amendment conflicts with contrary rulings in Massa-
chusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers
Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950), and McIntire y.,
William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946). In both
eases, the courts of appeals rejected claims of a right
of access growing out of contractual commitments but
framed in constitutional terms on the ground that a
broadcaster’s actions are private in nature and are
thus unrestrained by constitutional guarantees. The
court below refused to follow those decisions, observing
that they reflected ‘‘a crabbed judicial view of ‘state
action.’ ’’ FOC Pet., App. A, p. lla.
In its state action ruling, the court below was simply
applying constitutional principles evolved in decisions
by this Court—decisions that have rendered obsolete
the restrictive view of state action expresseqdin the
Massachusetts Universalist Convention and McIntire
cases. Only two years after the Massachusetts Univer-
salist Convention case was decided, this Court held that,
when a federal agency licenses a private organization
to provide services to the public and when that agency
exercises continuing and pervasive supervision to as-
sure compliance with statutory requirements, the
First Amendment applies with equal force to the li-
censee and the agency. Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Subsequent decisions by
this Court have abandoned the rigid and formalistic
classification of behavior as “private’’ and ‘‘state’’ and
have examined instead the realities of interaction be-
tween government and private groups to determine
whether constitutional restrictions are applicable. See,
e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Wa
21
Valley Plaza. Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) ; Evans v. New-
ton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) ; Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 ( 1961). ‘‘Conduct that is
formally ‘private’ may become so intertwined with
governmental policies or so impregnated with a govern-
mental character as to become subject to the constitu-
tional limitations placed upon state action.”” Evans v.
Newton, supra, 382 U.S. at 299.
One would have to blink at reality to conclude that
broadcasting in this country is not “intertwined with
governmental policies.’’ Virtually all aspects of a
broadcaster’s operations are subject to the Commis-
sion’s control and supervision. Indeed, the ban on ed-
itorial advertisements at issue in this case could not
exist without the ‘Commigsion’s consent and approval.
If any conflict exists on the state action question, it is
between the decisions of the First and Third Circuits
cited by ABC and the decisions of this Court.
CBS alleges that the conflict exists only with respect
to the Third Circuit’s decision in McIntire and only
with respect to the Third Circuit’s observations on the
First Amendment issues implicit in the question of the
right of access to the broadcast media. CBS claims
that the Third Circuit’s opinion constitutes ‘‘a square
rejection of the First Amendment claim’”’ of any such
right of access. CBS Pet., p. 18. However, in light
of the Third Circuit’s state action ruling in McIntire,
its comments on the First Amendment issue were noth-
ing but dicta. A supposed conflict between dicta in one
circuit and a holding on an issue of law in another cir-
cuit does not require resolution by this Court.
OBS contends, however, that the McIntire dicta was
subsequently adopted and applied by the Third Cir-
cuit to a First Amendment claim of access in Avins v.
22
Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968). The Avins decision dealt only
with an author’s claim that his article was improperly
rejected for publication in a law review. But in con-
sidering only access to the print media, Avins neither
addressed nor reached the markedly different First
Amendment considerations involved in access to the
broadcast media. In fact, Avins predates this Court’s
decision in Red Lion, which represents the first effort
to sketch the contours of the First Amendment values
at work in broadcasting. It is extremely doubtful that
even the Third Circuit would agree that its simplistic
view of the First Amendment’s relevance in broadcast-
ing, first expressed 27 years ago in McIntire, has sur-
vived the Red [ton decision. Consequently, any argu-
able conflict between the McIntire-Avins decisions and
the decision below is more apparent than real. It is
certainly not a conflict that requires resolution by this
Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the petitions for a writ of certiorari should
be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
CHARLES H. WILSON, JR.
Stuart J. Beck
1000 Hill Building
Washington, D.C. 20006
Counsel for Respondent
Democratic National Committee
Dated: February 2, 1972
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.