Brief for Respondent — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee

Supreme Court brief1973

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What actually matters in this document.

Text

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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JURISDICTION Oe eT eee ee ree ee ree eee 2

MQURSTION PRESENTED ............ cece eccccececceces 2

ONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED 2

MTATEMENT ... 1.0... cece ccc eee cece ee eeees 3

BPMGUMENT ... 20.0... eee c cece e eect nec e ea ceees 9

BI. Review by This Court at This Time Would Be

4 © POMBE: 2 oe a 6 dae noe oe ong wees bee erences 12

II. There Is No Conflict in the Circuits ........... 19

MOEUIBION 6 occcey vice shite esness tose ans vevass 22

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

UASES :

pd malgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley

§ Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) ................. 20

EAvins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.

denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) ............e0 cece 21-29

‘B on v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715

rer ee err ee ee re 21

Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) .............. 21

Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth €

Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950) ........ 20

[McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d

=~ -5QT (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946)

20-22

P yblic Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451

RIDA) grouse nessa oee 44 oe bees evevec ett eesssnees 20

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications

» Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ....7, 11-13, 17-19, 22

ll Table of Contents Continued —

CoMMISSION PROCEEDINGS: Page

The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness

Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the

Communications Act, Docket No. 19260 30 F.C.C.2d

CTPA). vexctvcqcsoeseuevseeiece cyewsaeexece 8, 13, 14

ConstTITuTIONAL Provisions, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

U. S. Constitution, Amendment I ................ passim

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C7§554(d) .... 3

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.

BUUCR) pve cones 5eesnyecaet ese soos sees eis 2

OS OPCGY oe on ho oh ween ene chee veandess 3

AT Cy OLS orice dec cessy ints r645ad cs sesasveens: 3

Books AND PERIODICALS:

N. Minnow, Equal Time (1964) ........ 0.0.0. cee eee, 16

T. Thompson, The Crapshoot for Half a Billion, Life

Magazine, Sept. 10, 1971, p. 47 ................. 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1971

No. 71-863

CoLuMBIA Broapcasting System, INc., Petitioner,

v.

DEMocRATIC NA1ioNAL ComMITTEE, Respondent.

No. 71-864

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA, Petitioners,

v.

BusINEss EXECUTIVES’ MOVE For VIETNAM PEACE and

Democratic NATIONAL COMMITTEE, Respondents.

No. 71-866

AMERICAN BROADCASTING Companies, Inc., Petitioner,

v.

Democratic NATIONAL CoMMITTEE, Respondent.

On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL

COMMITTEE IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not yet been

officially reported. It is reproduced in Appendix A to

the petition filed by the Federal Communications Com-

«

a neers

—

2

mission in No. 71-864.’ The decision of the Federal

Communications Commission is reported at 25 F.C.C.

2d 216 (1970) and is reproduced in Appendix B to the

petition filed by the Commission in No. 71-864.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional requisites are adequately set forth

in the petitions filed in these cases.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court below erred in ruling that an ab-

solute ban on all paid announcements to discuss public

issues imposed by broadcast licensees and endorsed by

the Federal Communications Commission is inconsis-

tent with the First Amendment.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED

The pertinent constitutional provisions and some of

the pertinent provisions of the Communications <Act

of 1934 are set forth in the petitions filed in these cases.

The following provisions of the Communications Act

also bear upon the issues in these cases:

Section 307(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,

as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), provides:

‘‘The Commission, if public convenience, inter-

est, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to

the limitations of this chapter, shall grant to any

? Appendix citations in this brief will be to the appendices at-

tached to the petition filed by the government, which will be re-

ferred to as ‘‘FCC Pet.’’

3

applicant therefor a station license provided for

by this chapter.”’

Section 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,

as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), provides:

“Subject to the provisions of this section, the

Commission shall determine, in the ease of each

application filed with it to which section 308 of

this title applies, whether the public interest, con-

venience, and necessity will be served by the grant-

ing of such application, and, if the Commission

upon examination of such application and upon

consideration of such other matters as the Commis-

sion may officially notice, shall find that public

interest, convenience, and necessity would be served

by the granting thereof, it shall grant such appliea-

tion.’’

STATEMENT

The Democratie National Committee (DNC), a re-

spondent in these cases, is the governing body of the

National Democratie Party between conventions. On

May 19, 1970, DNC filed with the Federal Communica-

tions Commission (Commission) a request for a de-

elaratory ruling that broadcast licensees ‘‘may not, as

a general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible enti-

ties, such as the DNC, for the solicitation of funds and

for comment on publie issues.’” FOC Pet., App. B, p.

48a. The Commission is authorized to issue such rul-

ings pursuant to section 5(d) of the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), and section 1.2 of its

own regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2.

At the time the request was filed, DNC was planning

an extensive campaign on television and radio to raise

money for the Democratie Party. The Party had in-

4 i,

curred substantial debts during the 1968 presidential

campaign, and funds were desperately needed to meet

the demands of creditors. In addition, the 1970 off-

year elections were on the political horizon, and money

was needed to support the campaigns of Democratic

candidates for national office. DNC realized from the

outset that any effective campaign to solicit funds would

have to be accompanied by statements of the Democratic

Party’s position on controversial issues of public im-

portance and the Party’s alternatives to the policies of

the incumbent Republican Administration.

DNC selected the broadcast media for its planned

campaign for two reasons. First, that forum—and

particularly television—is the most powerful and most

effective medium of communication ever devised by

man. Second, access to the broadcast media would _

permit DNC to reach the greatest potential number of ©

small contributors and thus reverse the disturbing

tendency of political parties to rely on large contribu-

tions. DNC’s initial inquiries, however, had indicated

that the broadcast networks and individual licensees

had widely varying policies concerning the sale of

time for the purposes intended by DNC. For example,

some broadcasters flatly refused to sell time for such

purposes; others limited the sale of time for such pur-

poses to election campaign periods. DNC sought the

declaratory ruling before expending the thousands of

dollars/necessary to develop its media campaign.

With Commissioner Johnson dissenting, the Com-

mission rejected the declaratory ruling sought by DNC.

The Commission ruled, in effect, that broadcasters

could, consistent with their obligations under the ‘‘pub-

lic interest’’ standards of the Communications Act and

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5

the First Amendment, refuse to sell any time to DNC

or other responsible entities to discuss controversial

issues of public importance.?

The Commission’s endorsement of the broadcasters’

flat ban on paid editorial advertisements * was grounded

in what the court of appeals aptly described as **spec-

tres of chaos, grossly unbalanced programming and

financial disaster.’” FOC Pet., App. A, p. 42a. The

Commission, for example, said that the rule sought by

DNC would result in ‘‘a return to the chaotic situation

of radio’s early days,’’ that “the public’s agenda for

discussion of public issues would . . . be set substan-

tively and increasingly by the affluent,’’ and that broad-

casters would no longer be able to exercise their edito-

rial judgment and journalistic control over ‘the man-

ner in which the public is to be informed.”” FCC Pet.,

App. B, pp. 65a-66a. The Commission’s opinion, how-

ever, is devoid of any attempt by the Commission to

apply its administrative expertise to reconcile the con-

flicting interests it perceived.

* The Commission did rule that it would be arbitrary for broad-

casters to refuse to carry paid fund-raising solicitations by the

major political parties or limit such solicitations to election periods.

FOC Pet., App. B, pp. 72a-75a. However, the Commission’s en-

dorsement of the flat ban on editorial advertisements renders its

ruling on fund-raising solicitations meaningless. To be effective,

any fund-raising solicitation sponsored by DNC on the broadcast

media would necessarily have to be accompanied by an expression

of the Democratic Party’s positions on controversial public issues.

The Commission’s approval of the flat ban on editorial advertise-

ments presumably would permit a broadcaster to reject a fund-

raising solicitation that also contained comment on public issues.

’The term ‘‘editorial advertisements’’ is used throughout this

brief to describe paid announcements by responsible entities seek-

ing to express their views on public issues.

6 _

The net result of the Commission’s ruling is to per-

mit the hawkers of detergents, mouth washes, beer, dog

food and brassieres to maintain their present monopoly

over that portion of the broadcast day that is reserved

for paid announcements.

On the same day that the Commission denied DNC’s

request for a declaratory ruling, it also denied a com-

plaint against a Washington, D.C., radio station filed

by the Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace

(BEM), an organization opposed to this country’s

Indochina policies. BEM’s request to purchase time

to present spot announcements expressing its opposition

to the war in Indochina was rejected by the station and,

relying essentially on its reasoning in its DNC ruling,

the Commission sustained the station’s action. FCC

Pet., App. C. Both DNC and BEM sought review in

the court of appeals.

The court of appeals, with one judge dissenting, re-

versed the Commission’s endorsement of the flat ban on

editorial advertisements. ‘‘We hold specifically that

a flat ban on paid political announcements is in violation

of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of

paid announcements are accepted.”” FOC Pet., App.

A, p. 3a. The court was careful, however, to limit its

ruling to the very narrow question it was deciding:

“The actual issue before us is relatively narrow

and we decide it narrowly.... [W]e leave undis-

turbed the licensee’s basic right to exercise judg-

ment and control in public issue programming and

the sale of advertising time. All we do is forbid an

extreme form of control which totally excludes con-

troversial public debate from broadcast adver-

tising time. ... We do not hold, however, that the

planned announcements of the petitioners—r,

for that matter, of any other particular applicant

ott

FILES ETD IEP ETE I SO ENS

_ :

for air time—must necessarily be accepted by

broadcast licensees. ... [W]e confine ourselves

to invalidating the flat ban alone, leaving it up to

the licensees and the Commission to develop and

administer reasonable procedures and regulations

determining which and how many ‘editorial ad-

vertisements’ will be put on the air.’’ Jd.

The court of appeals’ decision was firmly grounded

in this Court’s seminal ruling in Red Lion Broadcast-

ing Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395

U.S. 367 (1969), which recognized the predominant

First Amendment interest of the viewing and listening

public in being fully informed by the broadcast media

of conflicting viewpoints on controversial issues of pub-

lic importance. The court below ruled that the rights

defined by Red Lion necessarily included an interest in

the mode and manner in which those viewpoints were

presented. ‘‘It is too late to argue that the First

Amendment protects ideas but not an individual’s in-

terest in expressing them and doing so in his own way.”

FCC Pet., App. A, p. 22a.

The court found that editorial advertisements had a

unique potential for furthering those First Amendment

values. Unlike normal programming over which

broadcasters exercise total control of format and con-

tent, editorial advertisements give to those who wish to

speak on public issues an opportunity to exercise such

control. For that reason, the court described editorial

advertisements as ‘‘a special and separate mode of ex-

pression, not simply a duplication of other expression

on the same medium.’’ FCC Pet., App. A, p. 23a. In

addition, the court noted that, ‘‘[i]n the First Amend-

ment area, our best guarantee has always been a ‘free

market’ in which partisans who feel strongly on partic-

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ular issues may decide on their own to speak out and

to speak out in their own way.’’ FOC Pet., App. A,

p. 24a.

The court responded to broadcaster objections that

any requirement they accept editorial advertisements

would deprive them of their traditional journalistic

control over the presentation of public issues. The

court noted that it was dealing only with that portion

of the broadcast day—the portion reserved for paid

announcements—‘‘in which editorial control over con-

tent has never been of major importance.’’ The court

also stressed that ‘“‘broadcasters would retain full lat-

itude to control the content of their programming.”’

FCC Pet., App. A, p. 38a.

The broadcasters and the Commission raised a vari-

ety of other objections to any scheme for editorial ad-

vertisements—objections that the court characterized as

suggestions of an ‘‘administrative apocalypse’’* and

‘“‘spectres of chaos, grossly unbalanced programming

and financial disaster.””* ‘The court discussed each of

those objections, ruling that some did not override the

First Amendment interests at stake and that others

could be resolved by an exercise of the Commission’s

administrative expertise. The court noted that it was

recognizing only an ‘‘abridgeable’’ right of access to

the broadcast media for the presentation of editorial

advertisements. FCC Pet., App. A, p. 22a. ‘‘It is

_ well established in First Amendment law governing ac-

cess to forums that ‘reasonable regulations’ may be

promulgated and enforced to limit the exercise of free

speech.’”? FCC Pet., App. A, p. 39a. The regulations

FCC Pet., App. A, p. 40a.

5 FCC Pet., App. A, p. 42a.

_ 9

referred to by the court commonly govern the time,

place and manner of such speech. By opposing such a

limited and abridgeable right, the court viewed the

Commission and broadcasters as proposing an extreme

form of censorship by which ‘“public issue advertising

may be aired ‘at no time, in no place, and in no manner’

over the broadcast media.”” FCC Pet., App. A, p. 39a.

The court remanded the case to the Commission to

“develop reasonable regulatory guidelines to deal with

editorial advertisements” and to determine whether,

in light of the regulatory guidelines developed, DNC

would be entitled to purchase time to present the pub-

lic issue announcements it was planning. FOC Pet.,

App. A, p. 44a.

ARGUMENT

In their efforts to persuade this Court to grant plen-

ary review of the decision below, petitioners have

shrouded the issues in this case in a fog of hyperbole

and shrill rhetoric that obscures the limited and narrow

impact of the court of appeals’ ruling. Petitioners

convey the impression that the court below has un-

justifiably demolished the congressionally mandated

scheme for regulating broadcasting and has under-

mined the entire foundation of public issue broadeast-

ing in this country. It takes only a cursory reading of

the decision below to lift that fog of hyperbole and

shrill rhetoric and to realize that the extremely narrow

ruling by the court of appeals does not warrant plenary

review by this Court at this time.

The court below took special pains to emphasize the

narrowness of its ruling because the same visions of

Armageddon that characterize the petitions in this

Court permeated the arguments made by the Commis-

: i

sion and the broadcast networks in the court of appeals.

Confronted by those forebodings of doom for the broad-

east industry and predictions of an ‘‘administrative

apocalypse’’® for the Commission, the court below

stressed :

‘““The actual issue before us is relatively narrow

and we decide it narrowly. We do not have to cut

the ‘heart’ of our system of broadcasting ; we leave

undisturbed the licensee’s basic right to exercise

judgment and control in public issue programming

‘and the sale of advertising time. All we do is for-

bid an extreme form of eontrol which totally ex-

cludes controversial public debate from broadcast

advertising time.’”” FOC Pet., App. A, p. 3a.

(Emphasis in original.)

* * *

“The arguments of the Commission and inter-

venors fall well short of the mark. The reason is

that they have apparently misunderstood the nar-

rowness of the issue here. All that we are con-

sidering is the permissibility of a total, flat ban on

editorial advertising. All petitioners ask is that

broadcasters be required to accept some editorial

advertising. They do not advocate an absolute

right to air their advertisements.”’ FCC Pet.

App. A, p. 37a. (Emphasis in original.)

Consistent with those admonitions, the court below

stated its narrow holding concisely and precisely : “We

hold specifically that a flat ban on paid public issue an-

nouncements is in violation of the First Amendment,

at least when other sorts of paid announcements are

accepted.’? FCC Pet., App. A, p. 3a.

The relief granted by the court below was equally

narrow. That court simply remanded the proceding

6 FCC Pet., App. A, p. 40a.

a2 ¥

SELLER OLA OLIGO IO OF IM, OEE I ny Bae:

7 11

to require the Commission to apply its administrative

expertise and to ‘‘develop reasonable regulatory guide-

lines to deal with editorial advertisements’’ ‘—an ex-

ercise that the Commission studiously avoided in con-

sidering DNC’s request for a declaratory ruling. The

court even stopped short of deciding whether DNC was

entitled to purchase broadcast time to present the pub-

lic issue announcements it had planned. The court

left that determination to be made by the Commission

in light of the regulatory guidelines it developed. FCC

Pet., App. A, p. 44a.

The sweeping attack now launched on that narrow

ruling is based on nothing more than petitioners’ spec-

ulative ruminations about the possible consequences

of that ruling and their belief that workable regula-

tory guidelines will be impossible to devise. Petition-

ers’ fears of hypothetical harm are an insufficient basis

for plenary review by this Court at this time. This

Court confronted similar arguments in the Red Lion

ease and responded: ‘‘[WJe will not now pass upon

the constitutionality of [the challenged] regulations

by envisioning the most extreme applications conceiv-

able, ... but will deal with those problems if and when

they arise.’’ 395 U.S. at 396. The Commission should

be given an opportunity to develop regulatory guide-

lines governing editorial advertisements before this

Court intercedes. In fact, the Commission had em-

barked on just such a course even before the court be-

low issued its decision that is now under attack.*

™FCC Pet., App. A, p. 44a.

8See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doc-

trine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications

Act, Docket No. 19260, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971) [hereinafter cited

as Fairness Doctrine Inquiry].

12

Two of the petitioners, Columbia Broadcasting Sys-

tem (CBS) and American Broadcasting Companies

(ABC), also allege a conflict in the circuits as a basis

for review in this Court. DNC will show that the sup-

posed conflict does not exist.

I. Review by This Court at This Time Would Be Premature

In passing upon the constitutionality of the Commis-

sion’s personal attack and political editorializing rules

in the Red Lton case, this Court was confronted by

broadcasters’ contentions that those rules would inevit-

ably result in self-censorship and a reduction or elimi-

nation of public interest programming. The Court dis-

missed those cries of alarm by noting that, ‘‘if experi-

ence with the administration of these doctrines indi-

cates that they have the net effect of reducing rather

than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage,

there will be time enough to reconsider their constitu-

tional implications.”’ 395 U.S. at 393. That principle

applies with even greater force in this case.

In rejecting the declaratory ruling requested by

DNC, the Commission did little more than accept the

predictions of dire consequences conjured up by the

broadcasters. For example, the Commission agreed

with the broadcasters that DNC’s proposal could result

in ‘‘a return to the chaotic situation of radio’s early

days’’ and in “‘the public’s agenda for discussion of

public issues . . . [being] set substantively and in-

creasingly by the affluent.’”” FCC Pet., App. B, p. 65a.

At no time did the Commission draw upon its adminis-

trative expertise to examine whether those supposed

consequences could be avoided by the devlopment of

reasonable regulatory guidelines to govern editorial

advertisements.

setiitone

13

In effect, petitioners are asking this Court to grant

plenary review only on the basis of their perception of

the harm that might flow from the decision below be-

fore the Commission has applied its special expertise

to seek to obviate that harm. In Red Inon, this Court

declined to anticipate the possible constitutional conse-

quences of rules already promulgated by the Commis-

sion solely on the basis of suppositions that harm might

result from those rules. Here the Commission has not

even undertaken to promulgate rules to accomodate the

conflicting interests that have emerged from DNC’s

request for a declaratory ruling. In Red Lion, this

Court made clear that it would not reach the merits of

potential constitutional issues affecting broadcasting

until the harm feared from Commission rules had ma-

tured into a reality through experience with those

rules. It necessarily follows that review by this Court

is premature when the Commission has not yet promul-

gated the rules that could make the broadcasters’ fears

even more illusory than they are at this stage of these

proceedings.

The petition filed by the government in this case con-

firms that careful consideration by the Commission of

the problems related to editorial advertisements could

eliminate the hallucinatory concerns expressed by CBS

and ABC in their petitions. The government notes that

the Commission has undertaken a general inquiry into

the fairness doctrine’ and might well ‘‘reach a result

similar to that ordered by the court of appeals.’”? FOC

Pet., p. 15. The government notes only that such a re-

sult would be reached ‘‘only after careful and thorough

consideration of the evidence and opinions elicited in

this inquiry,’”’ and it lists the various ramifications of

* Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, supra, note 8.

VO

BAI

14

editorial advertisements that the Commission intends

to explore in that inquiry. Jd. Thus, the Commission

has already set in motion the machinery for complying

with the limited mandate of the court of appeals. By

deferring any possible review of the questions pre-

sented by the decision below until the Commission com-

pletes its present inquiry, the Court will have the ben-

efit of the evidence and opinions offered in that inquiry

and the Commission’s considered evaluation of that

evidence and those opinions.

There is a certain irony in the government’s decision

to seek review in this Court after the Commission has

initiated a rule-making proceeding to consider, inter

alia, the very issue decided by the court below. That

inquiry was begun before the court below issued its de-

cision and at a time when the Commission’s ruling on

DNO’s request for a declaratory ruling was the pre-

vailing legal standard. In its Notice announcing that

inquiry, the Commission referred specifically to its

ruling on DNC’s request but nevertheless solicited

comments on ‘‘whether there is any feasible method of

providing access for discussion of public issues outside

the requirements of the fairness doctrine.’’ Fairness

Doctrine Inquiry, 30 F.C.C. 2d at 33. But, now that

the court of appeals has agreed that question deserves

further consideration, the Commission is seeking re-

view of the issue of editorial advertisements in this

Court and has simultaneously suspended its considera-

tion of that question in the pending rule-making pro-

ceeding.”

10 See ‘‘Order Extending Time’’ in FCC Docket No. 19260

(Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, swpra, note 8), released January 3,

1972. On the same day that the Commission released that Order,

the government filed its petition with this Court seeking review of

the court of appeals’ decision.

- 15

At root, the court below has required the Commission

to do nothing more than it had already decided to do.

Yet the petitioners—and particularly CBS and ABC—

foresee only disaster for broadcasting if the Commis-

sion is now permitted to pursue that course. Those

cries of alarm can be explained only by petitioners’

inability or refusal to comprehend the very narrow im-

pact of the decision below.

Petitioners suggest, for example, that the court of

appeals has stripped them of their journalistic super-

vision and control over public issue programming. See

CBS Pet., p. 12; ABC Pet., p. 9. The court below,

however, was careful to note that its decision had no

such impact on broadcasters’ normal programming re-

sponsibilities. It pointed out that it was dealing only

with that portion of the broadcasting day—the portion

allocated for paid advertisements—‘in which editorial

control over content has never been of Major impor-

tance.”” FCC Pet., App. A, p. 38a. In other words,

the court below dealt ‘‘only with time relinquished by

broadcasters to others” and in which “broadcasters

have no... strong First Amendment interest.”’ Jd.

at pp. 19a-20a. Thus, even the broadest possibe read-

ing of the decision below leaves untouched the very

interest of broadcasters that petitioners suggest has

been jeopardized.

Petitioners further contend that any requirement

that broadcasters carry some editorial advertisements

will necessarily conflict with their fairness doctrine

obligations” and give the wealthy a more powerful

voice on the broadcast media." The court of appeals

"See ABC Pet., pp. 10-11.

CBS Pet., pp. 14-15; ABC Pet., pp. 11-12.

—

acknowledged that such problems might arise from its

invalidation of the flat ban on editorial advertisements.

But it did not view the mere existence of those problems

as a sufficient justification for perpetuating that ban.

Rather, it viewed those problems as peculiarly sus-

ceptible to resolution through the Commission’s admin-

istrative processes, and it specifically suggested that

the Commission address those problems under the

court’s mandate. FOO Pet., App. A, pp. 40a-42a. Pe-

titioners, however, urge the mere existence of such

problems as a sufficient reason for interdicting this

proceeding in this Court before the Commission has an

opportunity to develop reasonable regulatory guide-

lines.

16

OBS argues that a necessary consequence of the de-

cision below will be to fill the airwaves with paid an-

nouncements on ‘“‘stale,”’ ‘‘insignificant”’ and ‘‘trivial”’

issues. CBS Pet., p. 15. It is somewhat surprising to

find such an argument made by those who preside over

a medium that was described a decade ago as a “‘vast

wasteland’”’ * and that, if anything, has become more

barren of substance and quality since. For example,

a recent profile of the CBS executive responsible for

programming decisions summarized his philosophy as

a preference for ‘‘not programs that he thinks people

will necessarily like, or benefit from, or be enriched by,

but programs he thinks people will watch.’’** That

18 That description of the desolate nature of television program-

ming was first used by Newton Minnow, then Chairman of the

Federal Communications Commission, in an address to the 39th

Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in

Washington, D. C., on May 9, 1961. That address is reprinted in

N. Minnow, Equal Time 47 (1964).

14'T, Thompson, The Crapshoot for Half a Billion, Life Magazine,

Sept. 10, 1971, p. 47. (Emphasis in original. )

wa 17

same network now suggests to this Court that editorial

advertisements will somehow demean the quality of tele-

vision programming, necessarily Sweeping within its

pejoratives the paid announcements planned by DNC

—announcements designed to discuss current issues

affecting the conduct of our government and to acquit

the Democratic Party’s responsibilities as one of the

two major political parties in our democratic system,

This CBS argument betrays the real interest of the

broadcasters in pursuing this proceeding in this Court.

Bluntly stated, the broadcasters seek to preserve the

monopoly they presently enjoy in deciding what public

issues the American people should be exposed to

through the electronic media. The court below has sim-

ply ruled that other groups in society should, to some

degree, share that awesome responsibility with the few

who are privileged to control the limited number of

broadcast licenses available and the handful of corpo-

rate executives who control the three networks in this

nation. It is understandable that broadcasters would

find such a result disquieting. But the court below was

concérned with core First Amendment values and not

with broadcasters’ sensibilities,

CBS and ABC also assert that the decision below is

in conflict with this Court’s decision in Red Lion. See

CBS Pet., pp. 12-13; ABC Pet., pp. 8-9. That argu-

ment will not withstand analysis. The Red Lion deci-

sion was the constitutional touchstone for the court

of appeals’ decision. That court, however, did not view

Red Lion as placing inflexible parameters on the First

Amendment interests at work in broadcasting. Red

Lion dealt only with the interplay between the First

Amendment and the fairness doctrine as they relate to

a broadcaster’s statutorily imposed public interest obli-

i>... ro

18 i.

gations. But the fairness doctrine does not define the

totality of those public interest obligations. As the

court below observed, ‘‘the fairness doctrine’s goal of

full and fair coverage of issues on normal program-

ming time does not eliminate the public’s interest in a

further, complementary airing of controversial views

during advertising time.’’ FOC Pet., App. A, p. 28a.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, rather than being at odds

with Red Lion, the decision below is, if anything, an ob-

- vious and constitutional implementation of that semi-

nal ruling in the context of editorial advertisements.

The central argument made in this Court by the

government differs substantially in tone and import

from the arguments made by CBS and ABC. In es-

sence, the government argues that, by basing its deci-

sion on constitutional grounds, the court below has

shifted the prime responsibility for ‘‘the making of

the basic policy judgment [relating to editorial adver-

tisements] from the Commission to the courts, and,

in so doing, sets a new and significant course for broad-

casting.”” FCC Pet., p. 10. The government thus

seems to be suggesting that the court of appeals has

improperly usurped a function committed solely to the

Commission’s unbridled discretion. That argument

misses the mark.

The court below was fully aware the maintenance of

a viable regulatory scheme for broadcasting required

that it tread cautiously ‘‘when we are asked to reverse

major substantive interpretations of the grand and

open-ended statutory requirements”’ of the Communi-

eations Act. FCC Pet., App. A, p. 9a. Courts are

traditionally reluctant to intercede in matters that re-

quire an administrative agency to exercise its special

expertise. But the issues in this proceeding trans-

| 19

cended matters within the Commission’s peculiar tech-

nical competence. The declaratory ruling sought by

DNC drew into question the obligations imposed on

broadcasters by the First Amendment. Courts—and

not administrative agencies—are the appropriate ar-

biters of constitutional disputes.

In response to an analogous argument made in Red

_ Lion, this Court admonished that ‘‘Congress need not

stand idly by and permit those with [broadcast] li-

censes to ignore the problems that beset the people or

to exclude from the airways anything but their own

views of fundamental questions.’”? 395 U.S. at 394.

Similarly, the courts need not hold the Constitution in

abeyance while the Commission endorses actions by

broadcasters that jeopardize or deny the effective exer-

cise of First Amendment rights.

For these several reasons, petitioners have stated no

substantial reason to justify review of the decision be-

low by this Court at this time. Rather, as DNC has

shown, review by this Court at this time would be pre-

mature.

II. There Is No Conflict in the Circuits

CBS and ABC assert as an additional ground for re-

view by this Court the claim that the decision below is

in direct conflict with decisions by courts of appeals in

two other circuits.* Those two petitioners purport

to find different bases for the supposed conflict, but

their arguments are equally without merit.

ABC contends that the holding by the court below

that the actions by broadcasters constitute state action

oe

* The government’s petition does not claim that review is nec-

essary because of a conflict in the circuits.

—

20

and are thus subject to the restraints of the First

Amendment conflicts with contrary rulings in Massa-

chusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers

Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950), and McIntire y.,

William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d

Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946). In both

eases, the courts of appeals rejected claims of a right

of access growing out of contractual commitments but

framed in constitutional terms on the ground that a

broadcaster’s actions are private in nature and are

thus unrestrained by constitutional guarantees. The

court below refused to follow those decisions, observing

that they reflected ‘‘a crabbed judicial view of ‘state

action.’ ’’ FOC Pet., App. A, p. lla.

In its state action ruling, the court below was simply

applying constitutional principles evolved in decisions

by this Court—decisions that have rendered obsolete

the restrictive view of state action expresseqdin the

Massachusetts Universalist Convention and McIntire

cases. Only two years after the Massachusetts Univer-

salist Convention case was decided, this Court held that,

when a federal agency licenses a private organization

to provide services to the public and when that agency

exercises continuing and pervasive supervision to as-

sure compliance with statutory requirements, the

First Amendment applies with equal force to the li-

censee and the agency. Public Utilities Commission v.

Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Subsequent decisions by

this Court have abandoned the rigid and formalistic

classification of behavior as “private’’ and ‘‘state’’ and

have examined instead the realities of interaction be-

tween government and private groups to determine

whether constitutional restrictions are applicable. See,

e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan

Wa

21

Valley Plaza. Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) ; Evans v. New-

ton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) ; Burton v. Wilmington Park-

ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 ( 1961). ‘‘Conduct that is

formally ‘private’ may become so intertwined with

governmental policies or so impregnated with a govern-

mental character as to become subject to the constitu-

tional limitations placed upon state action.”” Evans v.

Newton, supra, 382 U.S. at 299.

One would have to blink at reality to conclude that

broadcasting in this country is not “intertwined with

governmental policies.’’ Virtually all aspects of a

broadcaster’s operations are subject to the Commis-

sion’s control and supervision. Indeed, the ban on ed-

itorial advertisements at issue in this case could not

exist without the ‘Commigsion’s consent and approval.

If any conflict exists on the state action question, it is

between the decisions of the First and Third Circuits

cited by ABC and the decisions of this Court.

CBS alleges that the conflict exists only with respect

to the Third Circuit’s decision in McIntire and only

with respect to the Third Circuit’s observations on the

First Amendment issues implicit in the question of the

right of access to the broadcast media. CBS claims

that the Third Circuit’s opinion constitutes ‘‘a square

rejection of the First Amendment claim’”’ of any such

right of access. CBS Pet., p. 18. However, in light

of the Third Circuit’s state action ruling in McIntire,

its comments on the First Amendment issue were noth-

ing but dicta. A supposed conflict between dicta in one

circuit and a holding on an issue of law in another cir-

cuit does not require resolution by this Court.

OBS contends, however, that the McIntire dicta was

subsequently adopted and applied by the Third Cir-

cuit to a First Amendment claim of access in Avins v.

22

Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,

390 U.S. 920 (1968). The Avins decision dealt only

with an author’s claim that his article was improperly

rejected for publication in a law review. But in con-

sidering only access to the print media, Avins neither

addressed nor reached the markedly different First

Amendment considerations involved in access to the

broadcast media. In fact, Avins predates this Court’s

decision in Red Lion, which represents the first effort

to sketch the contours of the First Amendment values

at work in broadcasting. It is extremely doubtful that

even the Third Circuit would agree that its simplistic

view of the First Amendment’s relevance in broadcast-

ing, first expressed 27 years ago in McIntire, has sur-

vived the Red [ton decision. Consequently, any argu-

able conflict between the McIntire-Avins decisions and

the decision below is more apparent than real. It is

certainly not a conflict that requires resolution by this

Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that the petitions for a writ of certiorari should

be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

CHARLES H. WILSON, JR.

Stuart J. Beck

1000 Hill Building

Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel for Respondent

Democratic National Committee

Dated: February 2, 1972

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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