Appendix — Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara Cty.

Supreme Court brief1973

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Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroszz TRR, 1972

No. 71-1428

K mr J. Hewsiey,

Petitioner,

V.

„

Mowtcrean Court, San Jose-Mrrrras

. Jupio1au Disraict, Santa Cuara County,

4 Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INDEX

PAGE

Record from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California

Docket Entries , la

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June

12, 1970 4a

Return on Order to Show Cause, filéd July 24,

1970 10a

Traverse by Petitioner, filed July 30, 1970 19a

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Cor-

pus, dated July 31, 1970 29a

4, 1970 : — 308

Sla

Notice of Appeal, dated August 7, 1970 —

Proceedings in The United States Court of Ap-

peals for The Ninth Circuit:

Opinion, dated January 19, 1972 82a

order denying rehearing, dated February 18,

1972

Order Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari ... 36a

Docket Entries

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

C-70 1276 OJC RFP

Kirsy J. Henstey,

vs.

MoxrorraL. Covert, San Jose-Mmprras Jupician Disrnior

Santa Ciara County, Pzopie or THE Stare or CaLirorNia.

we *

For Plaintiff: 2

Perer R. Stromer

515 North First Street, Suite 201

San Jose, California 95112

For Defendant:

Louis P. Bzrena, District Attorney

190 W. Hedding Street

San Jose, California 95110

Basis of Action:

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

*

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1970

6-16 1. Filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

12 2. Filed Appli. by Petnr. for Stay of Execution

in Connection with Petn. for Hab. Corp.

18 4.

7-6 7.

Baas Rete

PROCEEDINGS

Filed O. S. C. returnable June 26, 1970 at 10

AM. in San Jose; Resp. to File A Return by

June 22, 1970; Petur. May File a Traverse

Prior to June 26, 1970.

Filed motion by petnr. to Transfer to San Jose

and Assigned to Judge Peckham & to Con. Hrg.

to July 24 ,1970, 10 A.M.

Filed Order Cont. to San Jose, Calif. for Hrg.

before Judge Peckham on July 24, 1970, 10

Filed Reassignment Order of Case to Judge

Peckham

Filed Petnr’s Memo of Pts. & Auths.

Filed Resps Ret to OSC, Pts & Auths in Oppos.

to Petn for Writ of HC.

On aft hrg. Mo for Convening TI Juez

Cover not Given; Appli for OSC Submitted

Filed Petnr’s Traverse & Affidavit of Trial

Counsel, Robert C. Bienvenu

Filed Order Denying Petn. for Writ of Hab.

Corp. Copies mailed.

Filed petnr’s memo of pts & auths.

Filed Order granting Certificate of probable

cause to appeal

(Copies mailed to Parties of Record)

Ba

Docket Entries

DATE PROCEEDINGS

6 13. Filed defts proof of svc of memo of pts & auths.

7 14. Filed notice of Appeal by Pltff under provision

FRAP Rules 24 & 22-B

10 1. Mailed Clerk’s notice of filing appeal

7 15. Filed 6250.00 Cost Bond on Appeal by Pltff

13 16. Filed designated for record on appeal by Pltff

& No Reporter’s Transcript will be required

9-16 Made, Hand Carried Record on Appeal CCA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NonrR iN DisrRror or CALIFORNIA

Sax FRANCO, CALAro nx 94102

Name Peter R. Stromer

Number 295-4430

Address 515 North First Street

Attorney for Petitioner

4a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Persons in State Custody

No. C-70 1276 OJC

Kmor J. Hamar,

vs.

Monica. gn tan Jone eee JunictalL District

Santa Cana County, Prorla or ran Stats or CaLonxII.

1.

2.

[File Endorsement and Instructions Omitted]

Name and location of court which imposed sentence:

Municipal Court for the San-Jose Milpitas Judicial

District, 200 West Hedding, San Jose, California.

The indictment number upon which and the offense

for which sentence was imposed: No. 10511-C. Vio-

lation of California Education Code § 29007.

The date upon which sentence was imposed and the

terms of the sentence: July 1, 1969 sentenced to one

year in jail and fined $625.00.

A finding of guilty was made after a plea of not

guilty.

That finding was mado by a judge without» jory

7. Did you appeal from the judgment of convietion or

the imposition of sentence? Yes.

5a

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus

Persons in state Custody

8. If you answered “yes” to (7), list

10.

11.

(a) The name of each court to which you appealed:

Appellate Department, Superior Court of the

State of California in and for the County of

Santa Clara (Appeal plus petition for rehearing

and/or certification).

(b) The result in each such court to which you ap-

pealed: Affirmed conviction.

(c) The date of each such result: February 2, 1970.

Petition for rehearing and/or certification to Dis-

trict Court of Appeal denied March 5, 1970.

(d) If known, citations of any written opinion or

orders entered pursuant to such results: Opin-

ion #222 In the Superior Court of the State of

California in and for the County of Santa Clara,

Appellate Department.

[Not applicable].

State concisely the grounds on which you base your

allegations that you are being held in custody unlaw-

fully: f

(a) Violation of U.S. Constitution, 1st Amendment.

(b) Violation of U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment.

State concisely and in the same order the facts which

support each of the grounds set out in (10):

(a) The conviction herein is illegal and violative of

petitioner’s free exercise of religious belief guar-

anteed by the U.S. Constitution, Amendment I.

Petitioner is the chief presiding officer and direc- ©

6a

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus

Persons in state Custody

tor of a bona fide church and religious denomina-

tion. He has been convicted for exercising his

religious beliefs whereby, in furtherance of its

exclusively religious activities, his Church has

awarded honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates

to individuals who complete a course of instruc-

tion in the Church's principles.

The United States Supreme Court as long ago as

1872 decreed that controversies over church doc-

trine and practice were beyond the scope and

jurisdiction of civil authorities.

“In this country the full and free rights to

entertain any religious belief, to practice any

religious principle, and to teach any religious

doctrine which does not violate the laws of

morality and property, and which does not

infringe personal rights is conceded to all. The

law knows no heresy, and is committed.to the

support of no dogma, the establishment of no

sect.” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, at 728-

729 (1872), quoted with approval in Presby-

terian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440

(1969).

(b) Failure of trial counsel to appear and present any

defense of fact or law that was available to peti-

tioner when the Trial Court re-opened the case

prevented petitioner from obtaining evidence nec-

essary to his defense. It is respectfully submitted

that such inadvertence by counsel effectively de-

nied petitioner a trial on the merits and consti-

tates a denial of due process contra petitioner’s

7a

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus

Persons in state Custody

Constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution.

12. Prior to this petition have you filed with respect to

13.

this conviction.

(a) Any petition in a State court for relief from this

conviction? “Yes.

(b) Any petitions in State courts for habeas corpus?

Yes.

(c) Any petitions in the United States Supreme Court

for certiorari other than petitions, if any, already

specified in (8)? No.

(d) Any other petitions, motions or applications in

this or any other court? No.

If you answered “yes” to any part of (12), list with

respect to each petition, motion or application:

(a) the specific nature thereof: Petition for rehearing

and/or certification to California District Court of

Appeals.

(b) the name and location of the court in which each

was filed: Superior Court Appellate Department,

190 North Market Street, San Jose, California.

(e) the disposition thereof : Petition denied without

opinion. State Habeas Corpus petitions denied

without opinion by District Court of Appeal &

California Supreme Court.

(d) the date of each such disposition: March 5, 1970

—Petition for rehearing denied. March 20, 1970—

Habeas Corpus denied by Court of Appeal.

14.

8a

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus

Persons in state Custody

June 10, 1970—Habeas Corpus denied by Supreme

Court.

(e) if know, citations of any written opinions or orders

entered pursuant to each such disposition: NONE.

Has any ground set forth in (10) been previously pre-

sented to this or any other court, state or federal, in

any petition, motion or application, which you have

filed? Yes.

15. If you answer “yes” to (14), identify.

16.

17.

(a) which grounds have been previously presented:

ALL.

(b) The proceeding in which each ground was raised:

In petition for rehearing and in State Habeas

Corpus petitions.

[Not applicable]

Were you represented by an attorney at any time dur-

ing the course of— ‘

(a) your arraignment aa pleat Yes.

(b) your trial, if any? Yes.

(e) your sentencing? Yes.

(a) your appeal, if any, from the judgment of con-

Vviction or the imposition of sentence? Yes.

(e) preparation, presentation or consideration of any

\petitions, motions or applications with respect to

_ , this conviction, which you filed? Les.

9a

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus

Persons in state Custody

18. If you answered “yes” to one or more parts of (17),

list—

(a) the name and address of each attorney who rep-

resented you:

I. Robert C. Bienvenu, Modesto, California.

II. Richard T. Tosaw, 928 12th St,

Modesto, Cal.

III. Peter R. Stromer, 515 North First Street,

Suite 201, San Jose, California 95112

(b) the proceedings at which each such attorney rep-

resented you:

I. Trial.

II. Appeal.

III. Petition for rehearing & State Habeas Cor-

pus Petitions.

19. [Not applicable]

Strate or Caurrorn1a,

County or Santa Cara, ss.:

Prrzr R. Srromen, being first sworn under oath, pre-

sents that he has subscribed to the foregoing petition

and does state that the information therein is true and

correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

/8/ Peter R. Stromer

Signature of Affiant

ö Attorney for Petitioner

Jurat Omitted]

10a

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

Authorities in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

[File Endorsement and Caption Omitted]

Comes now Lovis P. Brrena, District Attorney of Santa

Clara County and his deputy, Dennis Atan Lempznt for

the People of the State of California and for a return to

the Order to Show Cause heretofore issued in the above-

entitled matter on June 12, 1970.

*

On February 14, 1969, a complaint was filed in the Mu-

nicipal Court for the San Jose-Milpitas Judicial District,

accusing the defendant, Kmsy J. Henstxy, Petitioner, of

a misdemeanor, to wit, a violation of California Education

Code Section 29007.

II.

Trial was had in the aforementioned court before his

Honor, Judge EDwWann J. NRLSOx, on May 19, 1969.

At the time of trial, the defendant and his attorney then

being present, witnesses were, talled by the People and

evidence was submitted.

At the close of the People’s case, after the People had

rested, the defendant moved for a dismissal. Extensive

argument was had regarding the court’s jurisdiction in the

case, and the judge ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction

„„ a mye hat abana

The following day, the People filed a Notice of Motion

to re-open the case for further argument regarding juris-

diction. The defendant filed a Notice in Opposition to

that motion.

lla

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

Authorities in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

On May 27, 1969, the court set aside the stay and placed

the matter back on calendar for June 11 to consider the

People’s motion. The defendant was not present at that

time although he had been notified and was aware of the

proceeding. 8

On June 11, the defendant again absented himself from

the proceedings when the court determined that it did in

fact have jurisdiction pursuant to Penal Code Section 781.

III.

On June 25, the time the court had set for further trial

in this matter, the defendant not being present, the judge

found the defendant guilty and set the date of senteneing

for June 27, 1969.

IV.

On June 27, 1969, the court continued sentencing until

July 1, 1969, at the request of the defendant.

The defendant, with his counsel, appeared on J uly 1,

1969, and sentence was imposed by the court.

Execution of this sentence was stayed at the request of

the defendant pending his appeal.

V.

Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supe-

rior Court was filed by the defendant on J uly 3, 1969.

On February 2, 1970, the Appellate Division of the Supe-

rior Court of Santa Clara County filed a written opinion,

No. 222, which affirmed in all respects, the Petitioner’s

conviction. Petition for re-hearing and or certification to

the District Court of Appeal was denied by the Appellate

Division on March 5, 1970.

12a

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

Authorities. in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

The Court of Appeals of the State of California in 1

. ree te et Ge Pet.

tioner on March 20, 1970.

The California Supreme Court in Crim. 14608 similarly

denied Petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition on June 10,

VII.

Each of the courts above mentioned were presented with

basically. the same allegations by the Petitioner and each

of the Courts found that there had been no violation of

either state or federal constitutional rights. In fact, there

has not been a violation of any constitutional rights pos-

sessed by this Petitioner and the judgment is valid in ail

respects.

This Petitioner is not presently in _custody. He is at

liberty on his own recognizance the outcome of

this habeas: corpus proceeding. Therefore, this court is

not in a position, at this time, to hear, consider, or grant

a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Posts ab AUTHORITIES

we. rag Section 2241 (o) (3), provides as follows:

ee ee e eee eee

* (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitu-

ee, ii

css

13a

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

Authorities in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

In the many cases that have construed the above sec-

tion with particular emphasis on the word “custody” there

has been uniformity in holding that unless the individual

is in physical custody, the Writ of Habeas Corpus is not

available to him. Additionally, where an individual has

been releaged either on bail or on his own recognizance,

the status of that individual is not one of “in custody” to

come within the purview of the Federal Habeas Corpus.

Moss v. State of Maryland, 272 F. Supp. 371 (1967).

Historically, the Great Writ or Writ of Habeas Corpus

is available to free an individual who is illegally incar-

cerated. However, as stated in Brown v. Johnston, 306

U.S. 19, 26 (1939), there is no higher duty than to main-

tain (the Writ of Habeas Corpus! unimpaired. Here,

where the Petitioner's liberty has not been infringed upon,

this great constitutional relief, should not be invoked un-

necessarily lest it be vitiated by its over broad use.

IX.

The Petitioner intentionally and deliberately bypassed

an available state remedy. Therefore, Respondent feels

in view of the fundamental nature of the defect, the peti-

tion should be summarily denied.

Ponts anp AUTHORITIES

Section 1043 of the California Penal Code provides in

part that if a defendant in a misdemeanor action absents

himself with full knowledge that a trial is to be or is

being had, the trial may proceed in his absence. In so

absenting himself from the trial and having the full knowl-

edge of its occurrence, the defendant knowingly relinquishes

14

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

Ae ts Docbdithon'to Petition'for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

his right to defendant himself and to present such evidence

as might lead to an acquittal.

In the case of Nelson v. People of the State of California,

346 F. 2d 73 (1965), decided by the Ninth Cireuit Court of

Appeals, the court stated, If a habeas applicant, after

consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, under-

standably and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking

to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts whether,

for strategic, tactical, or any other reason that can fairly

be described as a deliberate bypass of state procedures,

than it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him

all relief if the state courts refuse to entertain his federal

claims on the merits—though of course, only after the

federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or

by some other means, of the facts bearing on the appli-

eant’s defaults“ The courts went on to say, “If either

reason motivated the action of Petitioner’s counsel, and

their plans backfired, counsel’s deliberate choice (emphasis

added) of the strategy would amount to a waiver binding

on Petitioner and would proclude him from a decision on

the merits of his federal claim either in the state court

or here.”

; Traveling slightly further beck in time, we find in the

ease of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, “We therefore hold that

the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief

to an applicant who had deliberately bypassed the orderly

procedure of the state courts and so doing has forfeited

his state court remedies.”

Hut we wish to make very clear that this grant of dis-

cretion is not to be interpreted as a permission to intro-

duce legal fictions into federal habeas corpus. The classic

; definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304

15a

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

Authorities in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

U.S. 458, 464, ‘An intentional relinquishment or abandon-

ment of a known right or privilege—furnishes the con-

trolling standard.” The attached affidavit by the under-

signed clearly demonstrates that the decision made by

Petitioner’s counsel was a deliberate decision to remain ab-

sent from the proceedings, and by pass the right to defend

oneself,

Here, it is clear that the benefit of the Writ of Habeas

Corpus should not be available to the Petitioner who, but

for his conscious choice, would have had other remedies

available to him.

X.

With regard to the allegations contained in the petition

regarding the status of the Petitioner, the so-called re-

ligious organization which he heads, and the nature and

effect of the Honorary Doctor of Divinity” Degree issued,

the record before this court is barren of any scentilla of

proof to substantiate the claimed ‘facts’ as set forth.

The Petitioner failed to present these “facts” in the ap-

propriate judicial tribunal to wit, Judge Nelson’s court

and should not now be permitted to bring before the court

without benefit of cross examination or otherwise items

Which were not heretofore sought to be proved.

Conrciusion

The state courts refused to entertain the Petitioner’s

assertions of the deprivation of his constitutional rights

in view of his intentional and deliberate absence from the

trial.

16a

Return to Order to Show Cause and Points and

1 th iti in O iti to P biti. for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Wuenzronz, we respectfully submit that the Order to

Show Cause be discharged, habeas corpus be denied and

the proceedings be dismissed.

Dare: July 24, 1970, in San Jose, California

Lous P. Benewa, District Attorney

Santa Clara County

By /s/ Dewy Alx LemperT

Dennis Alan Lempert

Deputy District Attorney

Attorneys for the People

17a

[Caption Omitted]

- I,.Denwis Avan Lempert, Deputy District Attorney, 190

West Hedding Street, San Jose, California declare:

That I was the Deputy District Attorney responsible for

the trial of Kmsy J. HxxsLxr.

That after proceedings were stayed on May 19, 1969,

I personally contacted the defendant’s attorney, Robert C.

Bienvenu in Modesto. I advised Mr. Bienvenu of the pro-

ceedings pending in Judge Nelson’s court and was advised

by Mr. Bienyenu that under no circumstances would he or

his client, Krasy J. Hewsuey, return to this jurisdiction for

any further proceedings.

I declare om information and belief and under penalty

of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

. DATED: July 24, 1970, at San Jose, California.

/8/ Dennis Avan Lempert

Deputy District Attorney

Dennis Alan Lempert

18a

Affidavit of Dennis A. Lempert

[Caption Omitted]

- I, Dewms Aan Lempzer, Deputy District Attorney, 190

West Hedding Street, San Jose, California declare:

That between the period of June 14, 1970 through July

10, 1970, I was attending National District Attorney’s Col-

lege at Houston, Texas.

That upon my return to the office, I was unaware until

July 15, 1970 of the pendency. of the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus.

That I have attempted to the greatest extent possible

to complete the Return to Order To Show Cause. How-

ever, I was unable to complete said document until 9:00

a.m. this date.

That on Wednesday, July 22, 1970, I contacted attorney

for the petitioner and advised him of my circumstances

and requested a stipulated continuance. Mr. Stromer de-

élined to agree to a continuance and I at that time indi-

cated to him the general nature of the legal basis in the

Return to Order To Show Cause.

That I therefore respectfully request the Court in its

discretion to permit the filing of the Return to Order To

Show Cause at this time in view of the unusual circum-

stances causing its delay.

I declare on information and belief and under penalty

of perjury that thesforegoing is true and correct.

Dated: July 24, 1970, at San Jose, California.

/s/ Dewsts Avan LEMPERT

Dennis Alan Lempert

Deputy District Attorney

19a

Traverse by Petitioner and Affidavit of Trial Counsel,

Robert C. Bienvenu

[File Endorsement and Caption Omitted]

Petitioner for his traverse of the return to the writ of

habeas corpus, alleges:

L

Answering the allegations of paragraphs I and II thereof

petitioner admits all the material allegations thereof ex-

cept that allegation wherein it is stated that defendant

had been notified and was aware of the proceedings either

on May 27, 1969 or June 11, 1969, which allegation is ex-

pressly denied.

II.

Answering the allegations of paragraphs III, IV, V and

VI thereof, petitioner admits the allegations therein.

III.

Answering the allegations of paragraph VII thereof,

petitioner admits the allegations therein, except that peti-

tioner denies that there has not been a violation of his

constitutional rights and further denies that judgment is

valid in all respects.

IV.

Answering the allegations of paragraph VIII thereof,

petitioner admits that he is released on his own recogni-

zance per a Stay of Execution granted by the Honorable

Edward J. Nelson, J Municipal Court, San Jose-

Milpitas Judicial District pending the outcome of this

habeas corpus proceeding. Except as herein admitted, peti-

Traverse by Petition and. Affidavit of Trial Counsel,

tioner denies that he is not presently in custody, being

in constructive custody of the trial court, respondent here-

in, and further denies that this court is not in a position,

at this time, to hear, oe, or grant a Writ ‘of Habeas

Corpus.

Pai

=>

¥.

Petitioner reiterates all of the facts stated in the peti-

tion and pleadings filed herein on his behalf as reasons

why such detention is without warrant of law.

Wuenrzerons, Kimsy J. Heweray, the petitioner herein

prays that the said Writ of Habeas Corpus be sustained

and that he be delivered from the custody and restraint

of said respondent as prayed for in the petition for said

Writ and for his discharge from the custody, restraint

and detention of his liberty as hereinabove set forth and

for such other, further and different relief as to the Court

ra ON ene, EM

/s/ Peres R. Srromen

Peter R. Stromer

Attorney for Petitioner

‘I, the undersigned, say:

Lam the attorney for the Petitioner in this action; Peti-

tioner is absent from the County of Santa Clara, Cali-

fornia, where I have my office, and I make this verification

for and on behalf of that party for that reason; I have

read the above document and know its contents; I am

21a

Traverse by Petition and Affidavit of Trial Counsel,

8 Robert C. Bienvenu

informed and believe and, on that ground, allege that the

matters stated in it are true.

Executed on July 27, 1970, at San Jose, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true

and correct.

/8/ Peres R. Srromer

Peter R. Stromer

Declaration. of Robert C. Bienvenu

Rosert C. B.] says:

That I am an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice

in the State of California. That I was the attorney of

record for defendant, Kirby J. Hensley, at the trial held

in the Municipal Court for the San Jose-Milpitas Judicial

District on May 19, 1969.

That upon the completion of the prosecution’s case, a

motion for acquittal was made pursuant to Section 1118

of the Penal Code of the State of California. That, after

argument by both sides, the Court ended the trial, bail was

exonerated and defendant and all his witnesses left the

courtroom without presenting a defense.

Subsequently, a telephone call was received from Deputy

District Attorney Lempart stating that he was making a

motion to reopen the case.

No authority was cited to declarant permitting the re-

opening of a criminal proceedings upon the completion of

the prosecution’s case after jeopary had attached. Declar-

ant indicated that he would not and, in fact, did not, appear

at the time of the motion but filed a written Memorandum

in Opposition to the Notice of Motion.

The Court granted the motion, found defendant guilty

and pronounced sentence on July 1, 1969. A Notice of

Appeal was filed on July 2, 1969. On July 5, 1969, declar-

ant’s wife passed away and a substitution of attorneys was

made and since that time, declarant has not been associated

with the case.

Declarant at no time deliberately bypassed any estab-

lished state procedures in the case. Though declarant did

not appear personally at the time of the hearing on the

motion to reopen, a complete memorandum in opposition

3

Declaration of Robert C. Bienvenu

thereto was timely filed. The memorandum before the

Court contained everything declarant would have said in

oral argument. Nothing further could have been added,

and to travel to San Jose from Modesto to reiterate the

contents would have taken a full day from declarant’s

practice and wasted the Court’s time. It is a common

practice to submit motions for the Court’s decision based

upon a written memorandum when the attorneys involved

practice in another city a long distance from the courthouse

where the matter is to be heard.

The defendant was convicted in absentia on the mis-

demeanor charge but this too is in accord with established

state procedure.

A timely motion of appeal was filed in the case and

handled by another attorney. Therefore, from the begin-

ning of the case to the present time, every act performed

by declarant was in complete accord with established state

procedures.

I declare under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing

is true and correct.

Executed on July 27, 1970, at Modesto, California.

/8/ Rosert C. BRN N

Robert C. Bienvenu

*

Points and Authorities

" [Caption Omitted]

5 1 8

The Nelson case, Nelson v. People of the State of Cali-

fornia, 346 F. 2d 73 is clearly distinguishable from the case

at bar. In Nelson, the District Court, in its dismissal of

Nelson's habeas corpus proceeding, never did reach the

merits of Nelson's contention as to his constitutional rights

for us the Court pointed out that Nelson’s claim to sup-

press evidence illegally obtained must first be raised at

trial by appropriate objection and not raised for the first

time on appeal. (emphasis supplied) (citations) Petitioner

herein has not had a trial on the merits to this date. Absent

such ‘a trial, petitioner has not yet had an opportunity to

present any defense to the charges made leading to this

conviction. —

Farther, the District Court, in Nelson, concluded that

Nelson had been competently represented by his counsel,

that Nelson at.no time contended that in handling the

eee, ee

son's wishes.

Petitioner herein emphatically’ Andes that his trial coun-

sel advised him that the trial was to be reopened in San

Jose and failure of petitioner to appear would lead to his

conviction. As stated in the pleadings on file herein, peti-

tioner was advised contra, that the trial in San Jose was

dismissed and chat pefitioner need not appear further.

There was 10 deliberate by-passing of state procedure.

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals makes clear in

Nelson, supra, there must be “strategic, tactical, or any

other reasons than can fairly be described as the deliberate

by-passing of state procedure, Id, at 79. “At all

25a

Points and Authorities

events we wish it clearly understood that the standard

here put forth depends. on the considered choice of the

petitioner. A choice made by counsel not participated in

by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief.” Id.,

(emphasis supplied.)

II

Just as the facts herein show no deliberate by- pass of

state procedures there is no evidence to show a waiver of

a federally guaranteed constitutional right. The rules that

govern the determination of whether a constitutional right

has been waived are summarized in Brookhart v. Janis,

384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ot. 1245, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1966) :

“The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed

constitutional right is, of course, a federal question

controlled by federal law.”

There is a presumption against the waiver of constitu-

tional rights, see, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.

60, 70-71, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly

established that there was “an intentional relinquishment

or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 485, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.

1461. a

III

In Kuhl v. United States, (9th Cir.) 370 F. 2d 20 (1966),

a 5-4 decision, the majority opinion denied a motion to

vacate judgment on grounds of deliberate by-passing of

state criminal procedures by stating: _ |

At is urged in the dissent that we should order a hear -

ing on these questions. We think that to do so here,

in a case im which a defendant had a fair trial and

Points and Authorities

was represented b competent counsel, would be to

reach out to find support for a collateral attack on

his conviction...” Id, at 23. (emphasis supplied)

- Herein, the facts are clearly distinguishable. There has

been no fair trial, if any trial at all, due to inadvertence

of trial counsel.

IV

‘Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 52254 (d) (6) petitioner has not

had a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the state court

proceeding. Not only were material facts not adequately

developed in the state hearing, no facts were developed

in petitioner’s defense. There is thus sufficient evidence

to support a finding that petitioner was denied effective

assistance of counsel. If counsel are sufficiently deficient in

their performance, defendant may claim that his consti-

tutional right to effective representation has been lost;

farther even the fact that defendant has had a fair trial

of that issue in the state court and lost does not mean

that he cannot raise it again in federal court, since it is

a federal right. 28 U.S. C. A. §§2254, 2254(d)(3, 6) Leven

thal v. Gavin, 421 F. 2d 270 (1970).

V

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend v. Sain,

1963, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ot. 745, 9 L. Ed. ad 770, requires

that a federal court grant an evidentiary hearing to a

habeas corpus applicant if . . . the state factual deter-

mination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole.

Id., at 313, 83 S. Ot. at 757.

VI

In order to sustain a claim of ineffective counsel there

must be an affirmative factual basis demonstrating coun-

27a

Points and Authorities

sel’s inadequacy of representation. In re Parker, 423 F.2d

1021 (1970). It is respectfully submitted that the record

herein conclusively shows that trial counsel’s failure to

appear when advised by the District Attorney that the

case was being re-opened constitutes a sufficient factual

basis demonstrating counsel’s inadequacy of representation.

VII

By the express terms of 52254 (d) the presumption of

correctness of state court findings does not arise if the

applicant establishes, among other things, that the state

court hearing was not “full, fair, and adequate” or that

“the material facts were not adequately developed in the

State Court hearing” Sele v. State of California, (9th

Cir.) 423 F.2d 702 (1970).

Clearly, the factual record herein is devoid of any show-

ing that a fair trial was had on the merits. What the

State is contending is that petitioner herein must be al-

lowed to serve a year in jail because his trial counsel’s

inadvertence or incompetence in failing to appear and in

failing to advise his client, petitioner herein, that such

failure to appear by trial counsel and defendant therein

would result in his conviction, must be construed as a

“deliberate by-passing” of state remedies. It is respect-

fully submitted that such a contention must shock the

conscience of this court. A review of the cases wherein

the “deliberate by-passing” doctrine has been formulated,

(Nelson, Kuhl, Selz, supra) shows that in every case the

court made an independent finding that there was adequate

representation by competent counsel before the “deliberate

by-pass” rule was applied. As the U.S. Supreme Court

stated in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, “(A)p-

28a

Points and Authorities

plication of the “deliberate by-pass” doctrine requires the

resolution of factual issues.” Id.

‘Dated: July 27, 1970

/s/ Pur R. Sreomer

Peter R. Stromer

Attorney for Petitioner

29a

Order

[File Endorsement and Caption Omitted]

Petitioner, convicted of a misdemeanor in the state court

and presently out on O.R. (own recognizance), brings an

action in habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality

of the state conviction.

The petition must be denied, because this court does not

have jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e) (3)

provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend

to a prisoner unless he is “in custody” in violation of the

laws of the United States.

The law of this circuit is clear that one who is out on

bail is not “in custody” for either habeas corpus or 28

U.S. C. § 2255 purposes. Matysek v. U.S., 339 F. ad 389,

392-93 (9th Cir. 1964). A fortiori, a person out on O. R.

would not be in custody either.

The petition for habeas corpus is denied.

Ir 18 80 ORDERED.

Dated: 7/31/70

/s/ Rosrrt F. Pecxkuam

United States District Judge

Order

{File Endorsement and Caption Omitted]

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of his habeas

corpus petition is denied.

However, petitioner. is granted a certificate of probable

cause 80 that he may test this court’s reliance on Matysek

v. United States, 389 F. ad 389, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1964) in

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. ;

Certificate of probable cause granted.

Ir Is So Onno.

August 4, 1970.

/s/ Ron r F. Pecknam

United States Distriet Judge

3la

Notice of Appeal

[File Endorsement and Caption Omitted]

Notice is hereby given that Kmsy J. Hxxstar, petitioner

above named, hereby appeals to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, from the order and judg-

ment rendered, made and entered herein on July 31, 1970,

denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus herein

on the ground that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the

matter.

Datep: August 5, 1970

/s/ Px R. Srromern

Attorney for Petitioner

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

Fer the Ninth Cirenit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Fon ras Norra Cmourr

No. 26274

Kmsy H. Hewazzy,

Appellant,

vs.

Momiorean Covet, Sax Josz-Muverras Jupicu. District

. Sawra Cuanza County, Stare or Catirorni,

Appellee.

[January 19, 1972]

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Before:

Konrson and Canrnn, Circuit Judges, and

Surrn,“ District Judge.

Pm Cuno:

Tue sole question on appeal is whether or not a person

released on his own recognizance following trial, convic-

e Honorable Russell B. phe iguanas ad ant

Missoula, Montana, sitting by designation. 4

*

33a

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Cirouit

tion and sentence on a state criminal charge is within the

purview of 28 U.S. C. §2241, which extends the remedy of

habeas corpus to persons “in custody” in violation of the

federal constitution.“ We conclude that he is not.’

Not long ago, this court squarely ruled on this question

in Matysek v. United States, 339 F.2d 389 (1964), cert.

denied 381 U.S. 917. We held that a person released on

bail was not “in custody,” actual or constructive, so as to

satisfy 28 U.S. C. 62241.“

Appellant Hensley urges that Matysek has been implic-

itly overruled by the recent Supreme Court cases of

Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968); Peyton v.

Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) and Carafas v. LaVallee, 391

U.S. 234 (1968). These cases are distinguishable because

in each of them there existed actual or constructive cus-

tody. In Walker and Rowe, the petitioners were in actual

custody and in Carafas, the petitioner was on parole. In

Matysek, this court, while recognizing that release on

parole constituted constructive custody, distinguished a

1 Hensley has been at liberty on recognizance at all times since

conviction. Initially the state court stayed execution of sentence.

At the exhaustion of Hensley’s state remedies the district court

issued a stay of execuiton pending habeas proceedings therein.

Both the district court and this court denied a stay of execution

pending this appeal. Subsequently, the Circuit Justice granted the

stay.

* We are unable to treat this petition as one seeking coram nobis

relief because Hensley seeks to challenge a state court proceeding

in federal court. Coram nobis lies only to challenge errors occur-

ring in the same court. 7 Moore’s Federal Practice 60.14, p. 146.

* The decisional rule is different in several other circuits. Capler

v. Greenville, 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Burris v. Ryan, 397

gl bg Cir. 1968) ; Ouletta v. Sarver, 428 F.2d 804 (8th

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals -

For the Ninth Cirowit

bail situation holding that the attendant restrictions did

not constitute custody. The Supreme Court has not, to

this date, considered the express question posed herein.

We feel, therefore, constrained to follow Matysek v.

United States, supra.

Affirmed.

35a,

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and

Rejecting Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc

[File Endorsement and Caption Omitted]

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted to

deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the sugges-

tion for a rehearing in banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for

an in banc hearing, and’no judge of the court has requested

a vote on the suggestion for rehearing in banc. Fed. R.

App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion

for a rehearing in banc is rejected.

Feb. 18, 1972

M. Ourven Komscn

United States Circuit Judge

36a,

Order Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Oorosze Term, 1972

No. 71-1428

Kmsy H. Henstey,

Petitioner,

v.

Mumme. Cover, San Jose-Muverras JuprolaL. Drsrnror,

Sawra Ciara County,

Respondent.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.

October 10, 1972

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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