Appellants Brief — Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1973
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Argument: Point I The fact the judicial power of the United States
is extended “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”
by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution does not impose a
permanent barrier in the path of State legislatures seeking to
protect citizens, property, ecology, economy and general
welfare from the deleterious effects of massive oil-spill pollution
NN EE LEDER OE EO GETS Sy eT E TTY 20
A. Preliminary Statement .......... ere ea ee ithcs decent 20
(1) The subject is water and the need to conserve it ...... 22
(2) The subject is also preservation of other resources and
the State’s right and duty to protect them from oil
NN 6b Fuki n bee vbasscepeeeaicbicbenve 25
i CCM Acie ewesscosencesscsecens 31
(1) Absolute liability without fault is the sine qua non of
protection against oil-spills, and the comerstone of
objections to the Florida Act .............-.0-0005 32
s C. Police Power is Power to Protect ...............-e000: 41
oi (1) If the State cannot secure a remedy when its citizens
3 have been wronged, then the police power of the State
is little more than an academic curiosity ............ 42
(2) Power to protect shore property and the State’s natural
resources from deleterious effects of a massive oil-spill
oe kk EOE eee ee eee 49
D. Extension of Admiralty: Outside the Limits ............ 51
(1) By extending scope of maritime tort jurisdiction
beyond the locality of navigable waters, Congress has
exceeded Admiralty Clause authority and intruded
mppeeen Che Sinte’d ROO NNE aivawic.n cs ch ceddccacess 52
(2) Should this Court decide the Admiralty Extension Act
to be valid on its face, traditional common law
jurisdiction saved to suitors in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 marks
a preserve of concurrent State authority ............ 55
(3) To the extent that Federal law fails to protect citizens
of the State from loss of property and damage to
natural resources, the State has a right and a duty to
legislate in the area of marine oil-spill pollution control 58
E, The Jensen Doctrine In Inapplicable .................. 61
(1) Jensen’s absolute prohibitions against State legislation
affecting maritime commerce must remain limited to
Se ee Oe UNE UEIN s n.o vba tcc vec nxduemess 6 61
De ett, EEA Oe PERS ACRES IE LST Re REG, 5
F. Limitation of Liability Means No Recovery ............. 63
(1) In a conflict of interests between the State in protecting
against effects of an oil-spill, and the Maritime in
protecting shippers from claims resulting therefrom, the
State’s interest is dominant ..........--++-+--0000. 63
(2) Limitation of Liability in the present context is a bad
use of a good legal theory .......---0-seeeeeeeees 66
Argument: Point II The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 in
no way preempted the states from imposing requirements and
liabilities to protect against massive oil-spill pollution of their
territorial waters—instead, it describes a joint Federal-State
scheme to combat a serious economic and environmental problem
eg err rr re Terry Ty ree 69
ae Tee ere ee 71
(1) The Federal Act defines the problem and declares
national policy while contemplating State participation
in the enforcement of it ..........-22eeeeeeeceees 71
(2) If Federalism is more than an academic theory, it
requires expression in the instant case .............. 78
(3) The “gap theory” of State law filling gaps in Federal
Statutory schemes is alive and well in Rodrigue ....... 83
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) ...... 14,52
American Waterways Operators, Inc., The v. Askew, $35 F.Supp
1241 (m.D. Fla. 1971) ....----eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1,32,61,63
Barracuda Tanker Corp., In re, 281 F.Supp 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
modified 409 F.2d 1013 ........---+++++-++> 11,16,25,34,67
Belfast, The, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868) ......-----+++++0 15,54
Berman 0. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ....-----+++-ee 13,41,44
Blackheath, The, 195 U.S. 361 (1904) ......-- ssegueeeravaees 52
Campbell v. Missouri P. R. Co., 121 Mo. 340, 25 S.W. 936 (1894) ..42
Central States, The, 9 F Supp 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935) ......--+-++: 65
Chevron Oil Co.v. Huson, US. ,30L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) . 19,83
City of Norwich, The, 118 U.S. 468 (1886) .....-----++++-+++s: 63
Cleveland Terminal & Valley RR. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 US.
oe ee er Orn rete he 52
Clyde Mallory Lines v. State of Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935)..... 47
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) ...
13,45,46
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—
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931) ........-2eceeees 15,41,54
Eagle, The, 75 U.S, (8 Wall.) 15 (1868) ..............-0006- 14,52
Escanaba v. L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883) ..... 46
Genesee Chief, The, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851)........ 14,50,52
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ..........-.-002- 81
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 44 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866) ............ 46
Grand Republic, The—The Nassau, 29 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1929) ..... 65
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922) ...14,53
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierewjewski, 261 U.S.
SO ROE Enis bane Rack coi hdd bo eswnseteesean 78
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 79 (1965) ............... 15,59
Hamilton, The, 207 U.S, 398 (1907) ............. 15,50,57,64,78
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) ............000000 81
Movisbang, The, 110 US. 100 (1006) .. 6.6. 00-. vo voccccccce 64
Mosley v. atta, 92 UB. BES (IOS4) ... wc vccccvcccccvcssevess 54
Huron Portland Cement Co. v, City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
WD TR i xkscnksuss ankennieexes 13,44, 45,47,59,76
Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elev. Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886) .. .50,52
Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941) .............. 15,51,62, 82
Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) ........... 45, 46, 47,48
' Knickerbocker Ice Co., v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) ..........
8,13,18,49,56,77,78, 82
Lee v. New Jersey, 207 US. 67 (1907) .....cscccccccecccccess 47
License Cases, The, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 590 (1846) ............... 81
Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nav. Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist.
Ferminal, 251 US. 4B CUSNG) oo ost s ccc cecse 63
Lottawanna, The, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875) .............. 8,54
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1890) .............. 47
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) ..... 15, 56
ST ee re COE os wath kc ch pac sc ccvvccceci 52
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) .......... 74
Maurer v. Hamilton, 308 U.S. 598 (1939) ..............e0e00e- 47
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Can Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1939) ....... 69
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819) .......... 80
McNeil, Ex parte, 80-U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872) ...............- 46
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) .. 2... ce eee eee ee ee eee 71
Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1881) ................ 46
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) ........
8, 19,64, 83,84
Morgan’s Louisiana & Tennessee R. & SS. Co. v. Board of Health,
PE ROO oh haunt kb es nsew pn snneess sos evi 47,48
Nebbiae v. New York, 291 US. 502 (1933) .............. 68
New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., v. Merchants Bank of Boston, 47
eS ONC ci clecbdedees ae tecncesanees’s 66
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104(1911) .............. 41
Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559 (1882) ................ 46
‘
Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107
Se ss og a «ck 50h sn ace 46,47
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ........... 68
Phenix Ins. Co, Ex Parte, 118 U.S. 610 (1886) .14,50,52,64
Plymouth, The,70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865) ............ 14,50,52
Port Richmond & B.P. Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, 234
ET RI a ie haa ook vet eee aes bene 47
Ramsey v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611 (1827) .......... 51,53
Rebecca, The, 20 F.Cas. 373 No. 11, 619) D. Me. 1831) .......... 66
Richardson v, Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911)........ 14,63, 64, 65,67
Rodrigue v, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969)1983,84
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US.
ec dle conse REE PP POP EG its er gree 51, 56,82
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) ............... 81
Skirctes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1940) ...........020e ee eeeeee 47
Slaughterhouse Cases, The, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) ......... 81
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931) ......... 200 - eee ee eeee 47
South Carolina v, Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1937) ........... 47
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1944) ............ 47
Scuthern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) .............
8,13,15,49,56,62,78,89
Southshore, The, 35 F.2d110 (3rd Cir. 1929) cert. den. 281 US.
TUN CE ee is cickss iis a aoa 65
Standard Dredging Corporation v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943) ...
15,16,61,62,89
St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896) ..
13,41,42,43
Steamer St. Lawrence, The, 66 U.S. (1 Black.) 522 (1862) 8,14,15,54
Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, The, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825)14,52
Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857) ............. 15,57
Thomas Barlum, The, 293 U.S. 21 (1934) .........20 ce ceceeees 55
Thomas vo. Lene, 2 Sumn. 9 (1834) ........scccccccccvcces 50,51
oe a a er meer 67
DI is te Pe hikbe net bccn ecpeccceswcaae 52
Tungus, The v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) .......... 56,62,64
United States v, Butler, 297 U.S. 1(1935) .........22e eee eeeee 82
United States v, Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ............-2005- 68
United States v, Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1940) ......... 82
United States v, Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960) ............-.-5++ 72
United States v, Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) . 17,68
United States v, Standard Oil Co. 384 U.S. 224 (1966) ........... 31
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law,404U.S. _, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) .
14,53,54
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sf
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 218 (1924) ...18,77,82
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) ............... 78
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) .76
Wilmington Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S.
ORE TU ie kh Cheick cs ce 47
RUF E) kccn a Pee chueachukbadedccekexksakoiusicct ue 58,60
Earl Faircloth v. M/T Delian Apollon (M.D. Fla.) No.
GT, Penn My THIN go ovo saci kes 30
United States Constitution
fs rr rer Ey renee 78
Aatigts TE, BOONE a bok ks cs ae 8,7,11,14, 46,
49, 50,51,52, 53, 54,56, 57,78, 82
DE in 6k oo oe ue hane sews ean 3, 16,67, 68
RO Rk 0 Ss oh web a hee ewnden 3,15, 59,60
Amendment X ........ 3,13,48, 49,5 0,51,80, 81, 82
Statutes—Federal
28 U.S.C.
ORIN sn b's b's 0G bab oo obo eke;
PE EE 6 oo b.0 ko bop dds oe shkence
RD 6 6 be dibs 50 oe
NI I 6 60 5 oo bobs oe cae
33 U.S.C.
ee OU ick s skh ebick ss boda cans
god oc sires cub vbwecc
chests cee nag, BEE PE pee er
cote. OP aah ern a a:
I i ork ok ec oc oe bo ueueeeiae..
etapa tnt cost eg FS nn chart
ey EE in os ccc bv cus ak in
OE 6 Wh eeu cassdbacccsl
NI sh 6 5 ike cc.
eine ee EEE SO On Sie ean?
ete te li og, CEE ee eo 75, 76
—ay
42 U.S.C. Sections 4331-47, National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190 § 101(c)......... 58
46 US.C.
Sections 181-189, 9 Stat. 635 .......... 16, 63,66, 67
Section 188 ......... 3,10, 16,18, 25, 33,36, 64,65
Es nc. ks de nee od be oe nee 3,64,65
ee RE ee Relea era are re 3,14,51,55
ee et ee ee i ec pans e 55
Section 1308, 49 Stat. 1207. § 8 (1936) ......... 68
Section 190-195, 27 Stat. 445. § 6 (1893) ........ 68
Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L.
91-224, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (April 3, 1970)
Sc pehbesie cca CU ewes » &y ve 2,3, 4, 7, 9,21
ee eee reer yp rr reye ert reer 4
a re reer ee 4
Ss ice cae evaciee shone 4
os dss ipa wesw 4
ey 5,8
Section AR(pp{h) ... cc cccccccvccsccvcccee 5
i reer ee ee 5
1954 London International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as amended April 11,
1962, Annex A (1966) 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.1.AS. No.
6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 382. 00... cc eee eee were eens 28
Statutes—State
Chapter 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970
3,5, 6, 9,11, 12, 13,14, 21, 58
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Section 372.04, Florida Statutes (1970) ............ 72
Chapter 376, Florida Statutes (1970) 58, 61
IC 5scas kes cecucieus Poe °
I, Rane oes he bu hk be W ec c ka 33
IE $n 64 hn bee oo pln os has 72
Section 376.07 ....... ene neu ees beabae es Te
DON III: oo cine «odes dns ee oaaecenes 36
IN 55s sicnw snc kv oh auineses 72
OO ee 33,35,36,72,74
pss th nag:iah TC ST rs Oe OES 35,73
A IE he we bees we 6s bbe Wa ech 73
Chapter 16B—16.08 Regulations, Department of Natural
Resources, State of Florida ...........ccce0: 3,6
LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
Baldwin, Public Policy on Oil—An Ecological Perspectwe, 1
Ecology L. Q. 245 (Spring 1971) 31
Bryan, Water Supply and Pollution Control Aspects of
Urbanization, 30 Law & Contemp. Probl. 174 (1965) 23
Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Inter. Law J. 317
(1970) 20, 24, 30,33
Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward A New Solution to the
Problem of Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 632
(1970) 25,34
Harolds, Limitation of Liability and Its Application to Pleasure
Boats, 37 Temp. L. Q. 423 (1964) 67
Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water
Quality, Part I: State Pollution Control Problems, 52 lowa
L. Rev. 186 (1966)
Mason, The Supreme Court and Federalism, 44 Texas L. Rev.
1187 (1966) 80
Mendelsohn, Maritime Lia rility for Oil Pollution—Domestic and .
International Law, 38 Geo. Washington L. Rev. 1 (1969)
31,33,40
Muskie, Torts, Transportation, and Pollution: Do the Old Shoes
Still Fit? 7 Harv. Journal on Legislation 477 (1970) 69
Nanda, The Torrey Canyon Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44
Denver L. J. 400 (1967) 25,33
Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, 55 Corelli L. Rev. 973 (1970)
26, 27,34
Note, Limitation of Liability, 35 Columbia L. Rev. 246 (1935)
Schmidhauser, “State’s Rights” and the Origin of the Supreme
Court’s Power as Arbiter in Federal-State Relations, 4
Wayne L. Rev. 101 (Spring 1958) 79
Shutler, Pollution of the Sea By Oil, 7 Houston L. Rev. 415
(1970) 28,41
Books
Bryce, 1, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (3rd ed. 1893) 79
Carr, DEATH OF SWEET WATERS (1966) 93
Carson, THE SILENT SPRING (1962) 24
Cooley, Il, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 43
Cowan, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968)
25, 33
de Toqueville, 1, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN (Bradley ed. 1945) 79
Gilmore and Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957) 64, 66
Graham, DISASTER BY DEFAULT: POLITICS AND WATER
POLLUTION (1966) 24, 71
Legare, 2, THE WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGARE (1845) 81
Madison, 2, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Hunt ed. 1901) 80
Rodale, OUR POISONED EARTH AND SKY (1964) 24
Wright, THE COMING WATER FAMINE (1966) 24
- |
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| |
Newspapers and Periodicals
St. Petersburg Independent, February 18, 1970 So 30
Tampa Tribune, February 16, 1970 be ai 30
Stein, Problems and Progress in Water Pollution, 2 Natural Resources
Journal 388 (1962) 24
Other
Hearings on H.R. 6495, H.R. 6609, H.R. 6794, and H.R. 7325 Before the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st. Cong., Ist
Sess., 261-269 (1969) 39
Senate Report No. 1593, June 11, 1948 (To accompany H.R. 238); House
Report No. 1523, Mar. 8, 1948, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1948. 56
United States Code Congressional and Administratwe News, May 5, 1970
76
Legal, Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability and Financial
Responsibility as Related to Oil Pollution, A Study by the Program of
Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington
University, For the United States Coast Guard (1970) $1, $7
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
- October Term, 1971
No. 71-1082
REUBIN O’D. ASKEW, et al.,
Appellants,
-Vs-
THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS
OPERATORS, INC., et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
OPINION BELOW 7
The opinion of the district court is reported in The
American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F.Supp.
1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971). A copy thereof is:included herewith
in the Appendix (A 39-55).
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final order entered in a suit for
injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284/3),
The order was entered December 10, 1971. Notice of Appeal
was filed in the United States District Court, Northem
District, of Florida, December 23, 1971. Jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked in accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1253, authorizing appeal from an order of a three-judge court
permanently enjoining enforcement of a state statute when
such order gives rise to a substantial question such as one
involving conflict between state and federal interests. The
Court noted probable jurisdiction on April 17, 1972. 40 L.W.
3503.
&
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the District Court erred in declaring unconstitu-
tional a statute designed to protect the state, its citizens, and
its environment from economic and ecological damage
‘esulting from massive pollution of its territorial waters
wncident to an occurrence during the transport of oil or other
substances by sea, on ground that in Article III, Section 2,
Clause 3, United States Constitution, the states surrendered to
the federal government all power to enact substantive
legislation affecting maritime commerce.
2. Whether the District Court erred in construing the
Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L.
91-224, 91st Congress, 2d Session (April 3, 1970); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1161 et. seq. as preempting the states from enacting
legislation ithposing absolute and unlimited liability upon
owners or operators of vessels or terminal facilities which
cause massive pollution of the state’s territorial waters by oil
or other substances.
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—
STATUTES INVOLVED
Chapter 70-224, Laws of Florida, 1970, published as
Chapter 376, Florida Statutes (1970), is too lengthy for
inclusion verbatim, and is set out in the Appendix (A 56-73).
Chapter 16B-16.08, Regulations, Department of Natural
Resources, State of Florida, promulgated in accordance with
Chapter 70-244, §§ 7, 14, Laws of Florida, 1970, is set out
in the Appendix (A 73-74).
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L.
91-224, 91st Congress, 2d Session (April 3, 1970), Codified as
33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. is also set out in appropriate part in
the Appendix (A 75-90).
The Limitation of Liability Act, originally Chapter 43,
Section 3, 9 Stat. 635 (March 3, 1851), amended and codified
as 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964) is set out in the Appendix (A
91-92).
46 U.S.C. § 189
§ 189. Limitation of liability of owners of vessels for debts
The individual liability of a shipowner shall be limited to
the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his
individual share of the vessel bears to the whole; and the
aggregate liabilities of all the owners of vessel on account of
the same shall not exceed the value of such vessels and freight
pending: Provided, That this provision shall not prevent any
claimant from joining all the owners in one action; nor shall
the same apply to wages due to persons employed by said
shipowners. June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 57.
The extension of Admiralty Act, 62 Stat. 496 (June 19,
1948), 46 U.S.C. 740, is set out in the Appendix (A 93).
Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution, the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ninth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution are set out in
the Appendix (A 94).
28 U.S.C. § 1333
§ 1333. Admiralty, maritime and prize cases
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the states, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.
(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all
proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize,
June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 931; May 24, 1949, c. 139, §
79, 63 Stat. 101.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L.
91-224, 91st Congress, 2d Session, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seg,
(hereafter “W.Q.1.A.” in citation; “Federal Act” in text)
became law April 3, 1970, while the Florida legislature was in
annual session. The Federal Act prohibits the discharge by
vessels of oil into navigable waters of the United States or the
contiguous zone. W.Q.1.A. §§ 11(a), (b), et seg. Should such
a discharge occur through willful negligence or willful
misconduct within privity or knowledge of the owner or
operator of the vessel, the government may recover the entire
clean-up cost from the owner or operator. W.Q.1LA. §
11(f)(1). If a discharge occurs other than from willful
negligence or misconduct, the government can _ recover
clean-up costs unless the owner or operator can prove any of
four defenses: act of God, act of war, negligence on the part
of the government, or act or omission of a third party.
W.Q.LA. § 11(f)(1).
This strict liability is not without limitation, however,
Recovery is limited to $100 per gross ton of the vessel or
$14 million, whichever is less. W.Q.1.A. § 11(g). Conse
quential damages, or costs imposed by such a discharge on
other than “the government,” are not recoverable under the
Federal Act.
The Federal Act also requires owners of vessels of more
than 300 gross tons using United States ports or navigable
waters to establish and maintain evidence of financial
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5
responsibility equal to the aforementioned limits by insurance,
surety bonds, qualification as a self-insuror, or other means.
W.Q.LA. § I11(p)(1). In the event of a discharge, the
government may proceed directly against the insuror who has
benefit of all defenses available to the vessel owner or
operator. W.Q.1.A. § 11(p)(3).
Section 11(0)(2) of the Federal Act reads:
Nothing in this sectiorashall be construed as preempting
any State or political |subdivision thereof from imposing
any requirement of liabil ith respect to the discharge of
oil into any waters wit ch State.
The Florida Oil-Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act,
Chapter 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970; Chapter 376, Florida
Statutes (1970) (hereafter referred to in citation by chapter
number and in text as “Florida Act”) was a Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill No. 450 (A 56-73). It passed the
legislature less than 90 days after the Federal Act became law,
was approved by the Governor June 30, 1970, and took
effect in part the following day (A 73). Provisions of the
Federal Act were fresh insthe minds of committee members.
Federal-State cooperation is keynoted throughout the State
Act.
The legislature further declares that it is the intent of this
act to support and complement applicable provisions of the
federal water quality improvement act of 1970! specifically
those provisions relating to the national contingency plan
for removal of oil and other pollutants. Ch. 71-244, Laws
of Florida, 1970, § 2(6).
Nothing in this act shall affect in any way the right of any
person.who renders assistance in containing or removing oil
or other pollutants to reimbursement for costs of such
- Containment or removal under the applicable provisions of
the federal water quality improvement act of 1970! or any
rights which said person may have against any third party
whose acts or omissions in any way have caused or
"$8 U.S.C.A. § 1151 et seq.
a
contributed to the discharge of such oil or other pollutants,
Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970, § 8(5). .
This act, being necessary for the general welfare, the
public safety of the state and its inhabitants, shall be
liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under
this act and the federal water quality improvement act of
1970.’ Ch. 70-244, § 21, Laws of Florida, 1970.
Limitations of the Federal Act were also fresh in the minds
of state legislative committee members who recognized gaps in
protection afforded by the Federal Act, and sought to fill
those gaps with safeguards peculiarly necessary to Florida
Instead of liability limited by gross tonnage of an offending
vessel up to an arbitrary ceiling for pollution by oil alone, the
Florida Act imposes unlimited liability without fault upon
vessels discharging other pollutants as well as oil while
destined for or leaving any Florida port. Ch. 70-244 § 12,
Laws of Florida, 1970. Instead of recovery limited to clean-up
costs of the State alone, the Florida Act provides for damages
“resulting from injury to others.” Ch. 70-244, § 12. Terminal
facilities, whether onshore or offshore, are subject to the same
liability as vessels. Ch. 70-244, § 3(9). ‘Owners and operators
are liable, Ch. 70-244, § 12, and must maintain satisfactory
evidence of financial responsibility measured by $100 per
gross ton of the largest vessel up to a $5 million ceiling as
opposed to the $14,000,000 limit in the Federal Act. Ch.
16B-16.08, Regs. Department of Natural Resources, State of
Florida; Ch. 70-244, §§ 7, 14. (A 73-74). Special
containment gear and crews trained in use thereof are required,
Ch. 70-244, § 7(1)(a), and vessels are subject to inspection by
state officials to ascertain presence of such gear and to assess
seaworthiness of the ship prior to entry into any Florida port.
Ch. 70-244, § 7(c).
The effective date for regulatory requirements of the
Florida. Act, including financial responsibility and unlimited
and absolute liability provisions, was extended by the Board
of Natural Resources to March 15, 1971.
Suit was filed March 9, 1971, and a hearing on plaintiffs’
133 U.S.C.A. § 1151 et seq.
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7
plication for temporary restraining order was held March
11-12, 1971.
Plaintiffs and intervenors include merchant shippers, world
shipping associations which insure an estimated three-fourths
of the world’s tonnage, certain members of the Florida coastal
barge and towing industry, and owners and operators of oil
terminal facilities and heavy industries located in Florida
rts.
" etic are members of the Cabinet of the State of
Florida, before the Court in dual capacities. They were sued
in their official position as highest elected officers of. the
state, and they were sued as members of the Board of Natural
Resources. Also included are the director of the Department
of Natural Resources, and a conservation officer. The State of
Florida intervened as a party defendant on ground that
interests to be adjudicated were much broader: than those
protected by the Department of Natural Resources.
At the two-day hearing on_ plaintiffs’ application for
temporary restraining order, testimony of plaintiffs’ represent-
atives revealed that not one of them had attempted to comply
with the Florida Act or regulations issued thereunder, but
that shippers had advised them that vessels would be diverted
from Florida ports if the Act were implemented. Indeed,
certain vessels had in fact been diverted to ports in other
states. Testimony of an employee of the Department of
Natural Resources was to the effect that some 669 vessels had
been approved for traffic to and from Florida ports, their
owners or operators having complied in advance with financial
responsibility requirements. The temporary restraining order
was subsequently entered nunc pro tunc to March 12, 1971.
The three-judge panel was convened and heard this cause
on April 27, 1971. Judgment of the District Court was
entered December 10, 1971, with a memorandum opinion
finding (1) that maritime law ‘evolved’ under Article Ill,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, augmented from
time to time by the federal judiciary, and changed further by
congressional enactment, such as the Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970; (2) that the Federal Act is ‘tangible
evidence’ that the Florida Act is an unconstitutional intrusion
ay
into the federal maritime domain because it makes changes in
substantive maritime law such as providing absolute and
unlimited liability for owners and operators of offending
vessels, and because it also contains provisions for compen-
sating state and private parties for property damage as well as
clean-up costs; (3) that oil-spill pollution is a maritime tort
governed strictly by rules of admiralty law and is exclusively
within the federal domain; (4) that since the Florida Act
substitutes absolute and unlimited liability for admiralty’s
negligence and unseaworthiness tests and severely limited
liability, it contravenes federally protected tenets of maritime
law and is invalid upon the authority of Southern Pacific Co,
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); (5) that to permit Florida to
legislate in such fashion would be to ‘sound the death knell to
the principle of uniformity’; (6) that limited remedies and
relief available under the Federal Act notwithstanding,
Congress did not leave ‘gaps’ in oil-spill pollution laws for the
states to fill in—even though the Federal Act fails to provide a
remedy, the states are nonetheless precluded from creating
one—under authority of Moragne v. United States Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970); (7) that the preemption disclaimer of
Section 11 (0)(2) of the Federal Act does not mean what it
says because Congress lacks power to permit states to legislate
requirements or liabilities with respect to discharge of oil
within state waters when such legislation might tend to
affect—or conflict with established rules governing—maritime
- commerce, on authority of Knickerbocker Ice Company v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558
(1875) and The Steamer St. Lawrence, 1 B1. 522 (1862); and
(8) that the Florida Act must fall in its entirety, despite a
severability clause, because, absent fatally defective provisions,
the Act ‘would not comprise a coherent legislative scheme,’ a
point that will not be disputed on appeal.
Notice of Appeal was filed with the United States-District
Court, Middle District of Florida, on December 23, 1971, and
probable jurisdiction noted on April 17, 1972.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L
A. The essential question to be decided here is to what
extent a state, in the exercise of its police power, may
legislate to control, establish responsibility, and assess liability
for massive oil-spill pollution of its territorial waters. The
District Court ruled that Florida was precluded from passing
any legislation which would have an adverse effect upon or
otherwise interfere with established tenets of general maritime
law, and that, as to oil-spill pollution laws, Congress had
preempted the field by passage of the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 91, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et
seq. (Federal Act). But the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and
Pollution Control Act of 1970, Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida,
1970; Chap. 376, Florida Statutes, (Florida Act) is a valid
expression of the State’s police power, protecting dominant
State interests not otherwise protected under (a) maritime
law, or (b) the Federal Act. Moreover, the Federal Act
expressly disclaims preemption. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(0)(2).
(1)
Necessity for conserving supplies of fresh water are urgent.
In the United States, approximately 650 billion gallons of
water are available for use per day. By the year 2000, it is
estimated that our consumption of fresh water will increase to
1000 billion gallons per day. It has been suggested that it will
be necessary to re-cycle water as we do glass and aluminum,
and to refine our desalinization processes, if we are to
continue to exist as an American civilization.
The public was just becoming aware of the water crisis
when the 60,000 gross ton tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground
and spilled half its Cargo, an estimated 450,000 barrels of
crude oil, into the English Channel. World-wide attention was
focused on efforts of Great Britain and France to control and
abate the massive oil-slick. The R.A.F. finally bombed the
wreck, and cleanup costs alone to France, Great Britain, and
the States of Guernsey were more than $16,000,000. In a
a
10
limitation proceeding under 46 U.S.C.-§ 183, owners of the
Torrey Canyon limited their liability to $50, the value of one
remaining life boat.
(2)
Had the Federal Act controlled the Torrey Canyon disaster,
claimants would still have found themselves more than $10 ,
million short. That Act limits liability to $100 per gross ton
or $14,000,000 whichever is lesser. Had the stranding
occurred in the contiguous zone, the discharge of oil would
probably not have constituted a violation under the Act in
any case. Had the Florida Act controlled, not only would
cleanup costs have been compensable, but owners of the
Torrey Canyon would have been exposed to claims from
private-owner damages to shore-front property as well. At
118,000 deadweight tons, the Torrey Canyon is less than half
the size of super-tankers afloat today and dwarfed by 500,000
to 800,000 ton giants on the drawing boards. The Florida Act
reflects natural concern for this State’s vulnerable coastline.
Damages to the ecology from a massive oil-spill are incapable
of final measurement for a long period of time following the
event, but adverse effects may be predicted with reasonable
accuracy based upon previous spills. Aside from destroying
the food chain and immediately killing fish and seabirds, there
are more dramatic effects. For example, when the tanker P.W.
Thirtle grounded off Newport, Rhode Island, 31,000 gallons
of crude oil were discharged in an effort to refloat her. This is
said to have resulted in virtual destruction of the entire oyster
fishing industry of Narragansett Bay.
Concern for ecology and economy of the State reached a
peak in mid-February, 1970, when the tanker Delian Apollon
ran aground, spilling 21,000 gallons of Bunker ‘C’ oil into
Tampa Bay. It formed a slick estimated to be 100 square
miles. in size, and cost nearly $1.5 million to clean up, the
amount of settlement in a suit filed by the State of Florida
Against this background, aware of limitations in the Federal
Act, the Florida legislature passed the State Act. It takes up
where the Federal Act leaves off.
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11
B. The District Court found that the Florida Act violated
Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution, in that
unlimited and absolute liability of the Act conflicted with (a)
general maritime law, and (b) provisions of the Federal Act.
But the thrust of the Florida Act is to provide a remedy for
non-maritime interests who are damaged on land by an
occurrence within territorial waters; i.e. a beach-front resort
and peripheral businesses dependent upon tourism attracted to
Florida by clean air, beaches, and climate. It is also designed
to protect aquafarming projects and commercial fishing
enterprise within the State’s territorial waters. Is there any
limitation to interests protected by the Florida Act? Should
an arbitrary limitation be imposed, measured by the value of
the vessel after it went down? Why should all public and
private interests of the State who are adversely affected by a
massive oil-spill be subject to frustrations of the Limitation of
Liability Act? E.g. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.Supp.
228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) modified, 409 F.2d 1013.
The Florida Act subjects shippers to absolute and unlimited
liability for damage resulting from a spill, and requires them
to demonstrate evidence of financial responsibility in an
amount satisfactory to the State’ Department of Natural
Resources before calling at Florida ports. Maritime interests,
claiming that inability to purchase insurance for an unlimited
amount precluded their doing business in the State, filed suit
contesting validity of the Act. They admitted that they had
made no attempt to comply with the Act. A State employee
testified during the TRO hearing, that 28 maritime companies
had shown satisfactory financial responsibility, clearing 669
ships for traffic to and from Florida ports. It is conceded that
maritime interests prefer to sail fully insured against all
contingencies, and that unlimited liability precludes insurance
alone as a means of showing financial responsibility, but this
should not sustain an argument going to constitutionality of
the Florida Act.
In hearings before the congressional committees considering
the Federal Act, maritime interests attacked absolute liability
as being inequitable in view of the fact that marine disasters
were often unavoidable, i.e., striking a mine, or being caught
ie
12
in a hurricane. Ships in innocent passage, goes the argument,
should not be deemed responsible for results of an accident
caused by an unforseen force. But this argument overlooks
the fact that in most instances, ship and cargo are
insured, and that the ship would not be in hurricane latitudes
in the first place were it not for profits derived from the
voyage to (a) the owner of the bottom whose mortgage is
being paid by the time-charter, (b) the charterer, whose leased
tanker-fleet may have been on a course charted by (c) an
operator, a subsidiary of (d) the cargo-owner, a major
petroleum company. Profit is behind all of the motives that
got the vessel into the storm in the first place,.and that
profit-margin takes into account loss by unavoidable accident,
It is the non-maritime property-owner ashore who is truly the
innocent party. Why should he or the public fisc assume
liability for any or all of the maritime parties noted above?
The argument also ignores modern concepts of tort law, that
liability should fall upon the party in the best Position to
bear the loss or distribute the risk. In this context that party
is the vessel or cargo owner or both agencies together, since
they profit from the carriage contract, appreciate’ the full risks
involved, and are in the best position to insure against them.
C. (1) The Florida Act is a valid expression of the state’s
police power. If the State cannot protect its citizens and
property from ravages of oil-spill pollution caused by ships
calling at its ports, then it has failed to meet an essential
responsibility of government. Without unlimited and absolute
liability, such protection is not afforded.
Maritime interests argue that-since they may lawfully store,
use, and transfer pollutants in the course of their lawful
business, they should be liable only for negligence in its
operation. If they can demonstrate no negligence, they should
suffer no liability. To this, the citizen responds: ‘I also own
my property and have a lawful right to enjoy it and a clean
environment. I did nothing to cause the spill of pollutants
into state waters. You are blameless of negligence. Yet the
waters are polluted, the air is fouled, our beaches smeared,
and my business is ruined as the result of a discharge from
operation of your agency, albeit careful and cautious and
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13
prudent. Why should I be denied redress even though I have -
done nothing-to bring about this discharge?’ (Paraphrased
from St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. —
1 (1896), a case involving sparks from passing locomotives
rather than oil from passing vessels, but analogous to the
equitable argument in the case at bar.)
The Florida Act makes those who traffic in pollutants
responsible for damage to property and the environme
which those pollutants cause upon discharge into state waters.
To deny the State’s competency to do this is to assert that
the ultimate burden for oil-spill pollution is properly that of
the private citizen or the public treasury rather than those
_ whose instrumentality caused the discharge. The police power
of the State is peculiarly appropriate to the object sought by.
the Florida Act.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) describes the breadth
of the police power. Huron Portland Cement C. p. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) approves its application in a
maritime commerce context. Mechanics of the Florida Act are
necessary to its enforcement, i.e., provisions for maintaining
financial responsibility; requiring certain containment gear;
requiring minimum sea conditions for entry and unloading;
provisions for boarding and: inspection. This Court has
sanctioned such mechanics in one form or another in a line of
" cases beginning with Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The District Court’s failure to
recognize the Florida Act as a legitimate exercise of the
State’s police power led it to err.
(2)
‘Powers to provide protection described in the Florida Act
were reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment. The
Tenth Amendment contemplates a conflict of power between
the state and Federal domains. But, the District Court’s
treatment of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S..205-
(1917) and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149
(1920), tends to establish admiralty as a third, autonomous
sovereignty, impervious to influences of either state or
14
national governments. This case should not add to the legend.
Article Ill, Section 2 is, on its face, simply a delegation of
judicial power over cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. It has now been so broadened as to authorize
congressional action. extending substantive maritime law far
beyond its original limits.
The Florida Act speaks to sea-to-shore and, hence,
non-maritime, torts. Oil-spill damages described in the State
Act are consummated on land. Hence, admiralty jurisdiction
would not have arisen at all, The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
20 (1865); Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U.S. 610 (1886);
The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), had
it not been for the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 62
Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740. But, see Richardson v. Harmon,
222 U.S. 96 (1911), an anomaly.
D. (1) But in extending admiralty jurisdiction to land,
Congress over-stepped the constitutional grant of Article III,
Section 2. That provision has been judicially determined to
speak to torts only if they occurred on navigable water. The
Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). Since
congressional authority for extending maritime jurisdiction
relies exclusively upon the Admiralty Clause, The Genesee
Chief; The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1868); American Ins.
Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), and congressional
power can only be as extensive as Article III, Section 2, then
the Court becomes the surveyor determining how far that
power may extend. Congress cannot extend it beyond this
Court’s interpretations of Article III, Section 2, without
exercising a judicial function. In the case of torts, substantive
federal jurisdiction is measured by locality; if the tort occurs
on navigable water it is a maritime tort. Victory Carriers, Inc.
v. Law, 404 U.S. , 30 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1971), reminds us that
the locality test was settled law 50 years ago. Grant
Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), In
extending maritime tort jurisdiction over sea-to-shore torts
beyond navigable waters, Congress has rendered admiralty law
amphibious; locality means nothing. Congress. has also
construed the Admiralty Clause in a manner inconsistent with
this Court, exercising a super-judicial function. The Steamer
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_—_
15
St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 523 (1861); The Belfast, 74
US. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1931). The Admiralty Extension Act is invalid.
(2)
But, if the Admiralty Extension Act is not unconstitution-
al, states are still free to enact substantive law in matters
maritime. The extension of admiralty jurisdiction to land was
not exclusive. Legislative history clearly shows that the Act
signified no intrusion into common law preserves of the
Saving Clause. Admiralty is not exclusive within the maritime
tort context. Cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816). Strict principles of uniformity are not
applicable here, Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), and
the state may still act substantively in the field of maritime
tort remedies. There is no authority for suggesting that the
state has lost its concurrent jurisdiction over maritime torts.
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, (1907); Taylor v. Carryl, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857).
(3)
The Constitution recognizes an individual’s fundamental
right to a healthful environment. This right, though not
enumerated, was retained by the people in the Ninth
Amendment. Certainly there is a guarantee to a healthy
environment as fundamental as the penumbral right to
privacy. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 79 (1965). In
the Florida Act, this guarantee is secured against continuing
assaults of oil pollution of the seas. People of Florida had a
right to take up statutory arms in defense of their
environment.
E. The Jensen Doctrine is inapplicable to an attack against
the Florida Act. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen sets out a
hide-bound principle of uniformity necessary only to certain
matters maritime which the District Court mistaken applied
ouside the arena of Jensen’s facts, Standard Dredging Corp. v.
Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1942), despite language of the Jensen
—y
16
Case itself which impliedly precludes its application into the
common law area of torts. 244 U.S. at 218.
F. (1) Limitation of liability should not be applicable to a
sea-to-shore tort, despite Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96
(1911), which extended the Limitation of Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 181-189, to a non-maritime tort. If that case is of
sufficient vitality to reach sea-to-shore tort actions arising out
of an oil-spill, then it will frustrate (a) fair recovery of cleanup
costs by other agencies than the Federal government, and (b)
private property owners’ recovery in common law actions,
Reasons underlying codification of the concept of limited
liability never contemplated severe damage to shore property
inflicted by a massive oil-spill. Continued protection of
maritime interests to the detriment of the state and its
citizens is no longer justified in an era of sophisticated
maritime insurance and super-tankers. It is apparent that
limitation proceedings would not protect ship-owners from
claims of the United States arising under the Federal Act.
Why should limits imposed by 46 U.S.C. § 183 be resurrected
to preclude a non-Federal claim?
& (2)
History of limitation of liability further demonstrates its
inappropriateness to an oil-spill context. Designed to protect
ship-owners from claims of cargo-owners and passengers, it
was never conceived to thwart just claims of persons not in
privity with maritime commerce. Its application to Torrey
Canyon cleanup claims, in re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281
F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) modified, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d
Cir 1969), shows how inequitable its extension to this context
would be. Moreover, its applicability to torts consummated on
land is unconstitutional in that (a) it extends admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction beyond the locality of navigable waters,
and (b) has the effect of depriving damaged property owners
of their property without substantive due process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Limitation of liability is strictly a creature of an
act of Congress. It is no less an arbitrary deprivation of
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17
property than it would be if owners of the ship took control
of the ruined beachfront under authority of a Federal statute.
Cf. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799
(1950). While the hotel-owner whose business is ruined has his
day in court as a result of limitation proceedings, it is form
without substance; that he will be denied full compensation
for his loss is fore-ordained. To apply it in this context is a
perversion of the remedy which the Limitation of Liability
Act was designed to provide. This unconstitutional application
of an ancient tenet of maritime law should not be affirmed as
a legitimate frustration of the states’ police power.
Ol
| A. Just as maritime law should continue to develop in a
| reasonably consistent pattern, so should states take
appropriate measures to assure protection of their citizens,
economy, and ecology from massive oil-spills. Despite obvious
conflict in this case, these ambitions are not mutually
exclusive. That they clash at all is because the District Court
interpreted the apparent conflict raised by the complaint in
absolute terms of hornbook dogma, willing to uphold abstract
tenets of “uniformity” to the detriment of the State and its
citizens. The position of the State is, however, that the
Florida Act should be judged not by its asserted conflict with
narrow principles of maritime law, but by its response to the
Federal Act.
(1)
Analysis of both Federal and State Acts indicates that,
while they partially overlap in territorial application, the
former is not restrictive of the other. Rather than competition
in regulation of maritime commerce, the two Acts speak to
Federal-State cooperation in meeting the threat of oil
pollution of coastal waters. Although the Florida Act provides
unlimited and absolute liability while the Federal Act provides
certain defenses and limits liability, there is no antagonism
between conflicting jurisdictions. Liability under the Federal
18
Act attaches only to cleanup costs incurred by governmental
agencies. Under the State Act, liability is measured by the
actual cleanup costs to the State and to damage claims by
private citizens. The primary responsibility of the government
the Federal Act is in coordinating response of State and
Federal teams to a maritime disaster threatening pollution of
coastal waters. In the National Contingency~Plan, the Federal
Act contemplates close cooperation between State and
Federal agencies to combat a mutual nemesis. There is a
strong implication in the Federal Act that court proceedings
arising thereunder are not within the province of maritime law
at all; i.e. express grant of jurisdiction to the Federal judiciary
which would be unnecessary had Congress deemed the Federal
Act to be a part of general maritime law, and, as noted,
liability measured by tonnage up to $14,000,000 with no
reference to, or room for, limitation proceedings under 46
U.S.C. § 183.
Moreover, in 1161(0)(2), the Federal Act expressly
disclaims preemption of States from providing “any require-
ment or liability with respect to the discharge of oil into any
waters within such State.” Surely this speaks to state
substantive law. The District Court erred in finding that in
that Section, Congress did not mean what it said because
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)
precludes such delegation of authority to state legislatures. To
frustrate the clear expression of Federalism contained in the
Federal Act on authority of Knickerbocker Ice is to overlook
(a) the limited purposes for which that case was decided
(based upon necessity for upholding the Jensen Doctrine,
already shown to be inapplicable here), and (b) the strong
dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis, particularly appropriate to the
instant contoversy, in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264
U.S. 218 (1924). -
(2)
A review of the historical development of Federalism in the
United States describes reason for its emphasis in this case. To
hold that states are precluded from exercising their Federalist
responsibilities—so clearly contemplated in the Federal
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19
Act-merely to extend the abstraction of “uniformity”
beyond confines of the Jensen context, would be contrary to
previously cited authority of this Court, inconsistent with the
clear intent of Congress in the Federal Act, and a denial of
the police power of the State.
(3)
The District Court noted that, as to arguments raised by
Florida that the State Act filled gaps deliberately left by
Congress in the Federal Act, the “gap” theory had been put
to rest by Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970), a case the State of Florida respectfully suggests is
inappropriate to the instant controversy. In so doing, the
District Court overlooked this Court’s opinions in Rodrigue v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), and Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, U.S. ,30 L.Ed. 2d 296, (1971). The
“gap” theory is an integral part of Congress’ expression of
Federalism in the Federal Act, and should be affirmed as such
by reversal of the judgment of the District Court.
ARGUMENT
The fact that judicial power of the United States is
extended “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction” by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
does not impose a permanent barrier in the path of State
legislatures seeking to protect citizens, property, ecology,
economy and gencral welfare from the deleterious effects
of massive oilspill pollution of state waters.
A. Preliminary Statement
“Pollution has been defined as ‘... any substance added to the
marine environment as a result of man’s activities which has a measur-
able and generally detrimental effect upon the environment.’ Ketchum,
Man’s Resources in the Marine Environment, in Conference
on Pollution and Marine Ecology 1, 3 (1967). The majority of oil
pollution is caused by persistent oils, that is, crude oil, fuel oil,
heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oil. These oils persist for months on
the surface of the sea and are capable of being carried considerable dis-
tances by currents, winds, and surface drifts.”
Issues rising here are as subtle as they are varied. They
reach across key provisions of the Constitution, to be
discussed below, and involve decisions of this Court which
track development of (a) maritime law, and (b) our federal
system of state and national priorities. Ultimately, considera-
tion of these issues leads to a bed-rock question of national
and, perhaps, international consequence: the extent to which
a state, in the exercise of its police power, may enact
legislation to control, establish responsibility, and assess
liability for oil-spill pollution of its territorial waters. The
thrust of the District Court’s order is that it cannot do so in
any case; that in certain constitutional provisions states have
irrevocably surrendered this power to the Federal domain; and
that several statutes enacted under authority of these
1 Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harvard International Law Journal 316,
(Spring 1969), fn. 1.
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21
constitutional provisions preempt the field of (a) water
quality control as it relates to oil-spill pollution, and (b) all
matters maritime.
It is Florida’s position that its Oil Spill Prevention and
Pollution Control Act of 1970? (hereinafter the Florida or
State Act) is not such an onerous intrusion into federal
maritime law as the Court below found it to be. To the
extent that friction between the state and the maritime
province occurs, however, Florida’s position is firmly fixed
upon the high-ground fact that it has not only a right but a
duty to protect the health and welfare of its citizens, and
that, in a collision between this duty and prerogatives claimed
under maritime law, it is the latter that must give way to the
former.
This, of course, presumes that the State Act is a valid
exercise of the police power. Florida contends that it is unless
Congress has preempted the field in the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970° (hereinafter the Federal Act). The
District Court held that the Federal Act does in fact preempt
the field. But Congress, and the State of Florida, disagree.*
Any exercise of the police power implies a certain urgency.
It is helpful to view the Florida Act from the perspective of
urgency that prompted its passage.
Dominant state interests are at stake here: conservation of
water as a natural resource, the right of its citizens to an
unpolluted environment, and the right of its citizens to the
full use and enjoyment of their property. The Legislature of
the State of Florida determined that these rights and
resources were fundamental and compelling, and were
endangered by continued assaults of marine pollution. The
2Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970; Chapter 376, Florida Statutes.
3Pub.L. 91-244, 91st Congress, 2d Session (Apr. 3, 1970), 84 Stat. 91; 33 U.S.C.
§ 1161 et seq.
“38 U.S.C. § 1161 (0)(2).
—
22
State Act was designed to protect. these interests. It was
conceived as an expression of the State’s police power, “bei
necessary for the general welfare, the public health, and the
public safety of the state and its inhabitants... ”* It was also
conceived as an expression of federalism, a willingness to
enter into a joint venture with the national government for
the abatement and control of oil-spill pollution, an enterprise
shaped by Congress in the Federal Act, (which only provides
for Federal action, for damages assessable for Federal costs,
for massive Federal-State cooperation, and which specifically
disavows preemption).
To conclude, as the District Court did, that a state cannot
legislate in this area because the power of Congress to regulate
maritime commerce is exclusive, is to rely heavily upon a
non-sequitur. It is true that Congress alone may regulate
: maritime commerce. But it does not follow from this that the
state is forbidden to exercise its police power to protect
fundamental and compelling state interests. These points will
be discussed below.
Through all of the flurry of legal argument invoking
traditional concepts of Federal maritime policy, the Court is
respectfully requested to measure the State Act by the end
sought to be achieved: the right of a state to protect its
property and that of its citizens. The property sought to be
protected is, at least in one sense, necessary to life itself.
(1.)
The subject is water and the need to
conserve it.
The possibilities of losing our water supply by depletion or
pollution evoke fears almost as old as western civilization. To
destroy sweet water is to threaten life. The effects of sucha
loss are so awesome that the power to accomplish it was
ascribed early in our experience only to the deity who’
apportioned the power among a select few. So Moses
threatened Pharoah:
5Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970, § 21.
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y de
“Behold, I will smite with the rod that is in my hand upon
the waters which are in the river, and they shall be turned.
And the fish that are in the river shall die, and the river
shall become foul... ”’ Exodus 7:17-18.
But, 4000 years later, the “‘select few” have multiplied
several million-fold, and today foul rivers and dead fish are
commonplace. To appreciate the magnitude of the problem, it
is necessary to understand the extent of our need for water.
In 1963, experts estimated that the maximum amount of
fresh water available for all uses in the United States was
approximately 650 billion gallons per day.® It was estimated
that the total fresh water usage eight years ago was 360
billion gallons per day.” The projection for the year 2000 was
1000 billion gallons per day.® Since this is 350 billion gallons
more than we have available, if the experts are within a 30%
margin of error, we can better understand Pharoah’s
predicament.
Two feasible solutions have been suggested. One is to refine
the process for making sea water potable,® and the other is to
re-use Our present water several times; to re-cycle water as we
do aluminum, glass, and paper.'® But in any case, it is
necessary to safeguard the quality of even that water we
intend to re-use. As Professor Hines observed in Part I of his
Iowa Law Review trilogy on this general problem, 52 Iowa L.
Rev. at p. 188:
Re-use of water requires that certain water quality levels be
maintained, however, and here is where water pollution is a
© Report of the Staff of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 88th Cong,., Ist
Sess. A Study of Pollution—Water 3 (Comm. Print 1963), cited in Hines, Nor Any
Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part I: State Pollution Control
Programs, 52 lowa L. Rev. 186 at 187, fn 2.
_ftines, p- 188, fn 3.
Id.
"Can, DEATH OF THE SWEET WATERS, 211-213 (1966).
See, Bryan, Water Supply and Pollution Control Aspects of Urbanization, 30
Law & Contemp. Prob. 174 (1965).
critical obstacle to the assurance of adequate water supplies
for the forseeable future. * * *
24
Two conclusions are reached from Professor Hines’ trilogy
and from a review of commentators he cites.'! First, the
water crisis will worsen, not abate, without strenuous efforts
to conserve our present supply. Second, even with such
strenuous efforts, developments in processes for re-cycling and
for desalizination are necessary if we are to survive as a
civilization.
The public had only just awakened to the urgent necessity
for conserving water resources when Moses smote the waters
with his rod. In late March, 1967, the 60,000 gross ton oil
tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground on Seven Stones Reef off
the coast of Cornwall, England. The ship split open and
discharged most of its crude oil cargo into the English
Channel. Worldwide attention was focused on the efforts of
two nations, Britain and France, to combat the massive slick.
A multitude of procedures were employed, without success.
Property damage particularly along the French coast was
enormous. The damage to marine and animal life will never be
accurately gauged. The R.A.F. finally bombed the wreck to
destroy it, and the British exchequer alone was £1,600,000
lighter.' ? ;
The Torrey Canyon was American owned and Liberian
registered. Therefore, the Board of Investigation of Liberia
held an official inquiry April 3-5, 1967, to determine the
cause of the stranding of the vessel. The Board found the sole
cause to have been negligence of the captain. It recommended
that his license be revoked.2>
11% Graham, DISASTER BY DEFAULT: POLITICS AND WATER POL-
LUTION (1966); Wright, THE COMING WATER FAMINE (1966); Rodale, OUR
POISONED EARTH AND SKY (1964); Carson, THE SILENT SPRING (1962);
Stein, Problems and Progress in Water Pollution 2 Natural Resources J. 388 (1962).
125c¢, Comments, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Inter. L. J. 316 (1969),
hereinafter cited as “Comments.”
13 Comments, p. 331, fn 69.
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25
The owners of the Torrey Canyon, as authorized by the
Limited Liability Act of 1851, Ch. 43, §3, 9 Stat. 635, 46
U.S.C. §183 (1964), were permitted to file a petition to limit
their liability to $50, the value of one surviving lifeboat.'*
This order was subsequently modified, 409 F. 2d 1013 (2d
Cir. 1969), but only by virtue of ingenious legal tactics by
attorneys for the governments of Great Britain, France, and
the States of Guernsey to avoid absurd limitations of
maritime law.' *
(2.)
The subject is also preservation of other
resources and the state’s right and duty to
protect them from oil pollution.
The problem with a massive oil slick is that its ultimate
effects are not always ascertainable before legal action must
be taken, and even when they are, there’s not very much that
victims can do to obtain compensable damages for their loss.
’ More than 880,000 barrels of oil were aboard the Torrey
Canyon, and more than half of it was estimated to have been
released into the sea.'® Britain figured its cost of clean-up at
$8,156,400. France sought an additional $8 million for
removing oil from its coasts. To off-set these clean-up costs,
the tanker’s owners settled out of court with the British and
French governments for $7.2 million.!7 Assuming that the
Federal Act had been in effect and had controlled the
outcome of liability arising out of the Torrey Canyon episode,
claimants would have received 1.2 million dollars less! At
$100 per gross ton, a 60,000 gross ton tanker has a liability
limit of $6 million. Even though the clean-up costs exceeded
$16 million, the $14,000,000 ceiling in the Federal Act would
never have been reached. See Notes, Liability for Oil Pollution
in re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
For the legal landscape prior to 1948, See Nanda, The Torrey Canyon Disaster:
mae v4 Legal Aspects, 44 Denver L. J.
Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward a New Solution for the Problem of
Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 632 (1970).
E. Cowan, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).
a
26
Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55
Cornell Law Review 973 (1970), where at fn 78, p. 982, is
the following comment relative to the $100 per gross ton
limitation in the Federal Act:
“Using the Torrey Canyon figures (59,000 tons of oil
cleaned up at a cost of $16 million), it costs about $270 to
clean up one ton of oil. Since the ratio of deadweight
tonnage (cargo capacity) to gross tonnage on the Torrey
Canyon was about two to one... the cleanup costs were
approximately $540 per gross ton.
“The $100 per gross ton limit is inadequate even if one
assumes, as did the American Petroleum Institute (1969
Hearings, pt. 4, 1318), the cost of cleanup following the
. Torrey Canyon wreck to be $7.2 million. Using that figure,
the costs come to $244 per gross ton.
“A study conducted by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration also indicates the insufficiency of
the $100 per gross ton figure. It was found that cleanup
costs range from under $1.00 to over $5.00 per gallon of
oil. There may be from 240 to 300 gallons of oil in one
ton, depending upon specific gravity and temperature.
Finally, the ratio of carrying capacity to gross tonnage
varies from 2.7:1 to 1.5:1. Using figures of $1.00 per
gallon, 250 gallons per ton, and a ratio of 1.8:1, cleanup
cost was calculated to be $450 per gross ton.
“Although gross tonnage has traditionally been used to
calculate liability, it is more meaningful to speak in terms
of dead weight tonnage. The latter is the cargo carrying
capacity of the vessel, and the ratio between the two varies
from vessel to vessel. Thus, although a liability figure based
on gross tonnage would accurately reflect cleanup costs of
the oil carried on one vessel, it might. be very inaccurate
when applied to another vessel. The amount of oil, not the
vessel’s gross tonnage, determines the cleanup costs. * * *”
If one estimates cleanup costs to be $270 per ton on an
average, the $14 million ceiling on negligence liability under
the Federal Act will limit recovery to spills somewhat under
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27
the Torrey Canyon class; it has been estimated by the same
commentator quoted above that this limitation will pay costs
of cleanup of only 51,851 tons of oil.!®
The Torrey Canyon, of course, at 118,000 dead weight tons,
was not the largest tanker afloat by any means. The tankers
E. Maersk (100,600 dwt), Bergebig (149,500 dwt), Esso
Scotia (250,000 dwt), Universe Island and Universe Kuewait
(each at 312,000 dwt) are already in use.’ But even these
larger vessels are not enough. The increase in shipment of oil
by sea demands bigger bottoms. As is noted at 10 Harvard
International Law Journal at page 317:
“*** (B)etween 1938 and 1967 world production of
oil increased nearly seven times, from 278 million tons per
year to 1,828 million tons. In 1967, it was estimated that
more than 700 million tons of this annual production were
being transported by sea.
“Not only is more oil being moved by sea each year, but
the size of oil tankers has also increased. The average
tanker used during World War II had a capacity of 16,000
tons, but by 1965 that average had risen to 27,000 tons,
and new tankers delivered in 1966 average about 76,000
tons. A Japanese company has launched a 276,000 ton
tanker, and other Japanese yards have orders for tankers as
large as 312,000 tons. More than sixty tankers of 150,000
tons or more are on order throughout the world, tankers of
500,000 to 800,000 tons are on the drawing boards, and
those of more than one million tons are thought to be
feasible. On the new 1,010 foot British tanker “Esso
Mercia” two officers have been issued bicycles to help
patrol the decks of the 166,890 ton vessel.
“The size of the tanker fleet itself is growing at a rate
that rivals the growth in average size of new tankers. In
1955 the world tanker fleet numbered about 2,500 vessels.
By 1965 it had increased to 3,500, and in 1968 it
1955 Cornell Law Review 973 at 982, fn 79.
55 Cornell Law Review 973 at p. 983, fn. 80.
28
numbered some 4,300 ships. At the present time nearly one
ship out of every five in the world merchant fleet is
engaged in transporting oil, and nearly the entire fleet is
powered by oil.
If the present limitations upon liability of ship owners are
to continue, limiting the owners’ liability to the value of the
vessel after the accident, and assuming no problems vis-a-vis
knowledge or privity on the part of the owners, it is not at all
inconceivable that an 800,000 dwt. ton super-tanker could
dump more than 3/4 of a million tons of crude oil between
the coast of Florida and the Gulf Stream, break up and sink,
and leave the owners completely free of liability for damages
to the environment, to private property, and to businesses
depending upon tourism.?° Assuming that the Federal Act
were applicable, at a cleanup cost of $270 per ton, the
owners liability would be limited to damage caused by less
than 52,000 tons out of the 750,000 tons spilled.
But even this is not certain under the Federal Act. For
under 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (b)(2) it is not a violation to
discharge oil into or upon waters of the contiguous zone
where such discharge is permitted by article IV of the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended.’ Excepted discharges
under the Convention include those to save life at sea,
discharges resulting from damage to a ship, and jettison
discharges to safety of ship and cargo. Patently, catastrophic
oil-spills of the Torrey Canyon category occur for reason of
colision or stranding. It is difficult to imagine either without
“damage to the ship”. Thus, assuming Seven Stones Reef to
have been between three and 12 miles off-shore, the Federal
Act, had it governed recovery, would have availed the
government nothing.
20526 Shutler, Pollution of the Sea By Oil, 7 Houston L. Rev. 415 at p. 438
(1970).
211954 London International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, as amended Apr. 11, 1962, annex A, (1966) 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.LA.S. No.
6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.
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29
Damages to business and to private property in such a
hypothetical catastrophe are almost limitless. It is not difficult
to understand the effect this would have on tourism and the
state’s economy, nor the rage and frustration of private
citizens whose right to enjoy the environment or, indeed,
their homes would be thereby diminished or destroyed.
But what of the damages to the ecology? To what extent is
such a tragedy an overdraft upon the bank in which is stored
this generation’s apportioned amount of our natural re-
sources?
“Some damage to marine life is obvious in the wake of a
disaster such as the one which befell the “Torrey Canyon’.
Surface feeding fishes die when they swim into floating oil,
and even slight, non-fatal contact may render the fish
inedible. Shellfish, among others, are also vulnerable to oil
pollution. When the tanker ‘P.W. Thirtle’ grounded off
Newport, Rhode Island, 31,000 gallons of heavy, black oil
were discharged from her tanks in an effort to refloat the
ship; the result of this was the virtual destruction of the
entire oyster fishery of Narragansett Bay. The most serious
consequences of oil pollution, however, may not be those
which are immediately obvious. According to Dr. Erwin S.
Iversen, a marine biologist:
The greatest problem may be the toxic effects on the
intertidal animals that serve as food for the other more
important fishes...1 don’t think the effect is merely
that of killing large populations of commercial fishes.
Worse than that, it interrupts the so-called food chain.
“There have been few specific studies of the effect that
oil accumulation has on this food chain. One study,
conducted by Dr. Paul Caltsoff of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, found that the diatoms on which
oysters feed will not grow where there is even a slight trace
of oil on the water. The effect of oil on such microscopic
marine plant life may be of great importance, because it is
estimated that it takes as much as ten pounds of plant
matter to produce one pound of fish.
30
“Large scale oil pollution, such as that which occurred
When the “Torrey Canyon” ran into Seven Stones Reef,
results in hugh lossess of water birds. Aside from humane
and aesthetic considerations, these birds play a vital role in
the ecology of the seashore, a role which profoundly
affects the fishing industry. The uncertainty as to the
actual extent of the damage done to marine life by oil
pollution makes it difficult to estimate the economic effect
of such damage, but the importance of the fishing industry
within the world’s economy is not in doubt and is steadily
increasing. Between 1958 and 1963, for example, there was
a 42% rise in the world catch. Because of the increasing
importance of seafood protein, future damages to marine
life will have progressively greater economic
consequences.??
All legislation is prospective, and it is necessary in preparing
legislation to think in terms of hypotheticals. But it is not
improbable that Florida would suffer a catastrophic oil-spill
of the dimensions theorized above. Far from it. The “‘it-can’t
happen-here” assurances should have been drowned in the
estimated 21,000 gallons of Bunker “C” oil?? that flowed
from the ruptured hull of the tanker Delian Apollon which
ran aground just south of Gandy Bridge in Tampa Bay on
February 13, 1970. The oil slick several days later covered
100 square miles of Tampa Bay,?* and cost Humble Oil &
Refining Company approximately $1.4 million to clean up, a
settlement out of court of the suit brought by the State of
Florida.?
It is against this background that the Florida legislature
convened in 1970, and passed the State Act. The legislature
was aware of the frustrations and trials met by the Senate
Committee attempting to shape realistic and responsible
2250 Harvard International Law J. $16 at p. $21 (1970).
236+ Petersburg Independent, February 18, 1970, p. 1.
24 Tampa Tribune, February 16, 1970, p. 1.
25 gerl Faircloth v. Motor Tanker Delian Apollon, USDC, M.D., Tampa Division,
No. 70-47-Civ-T, February 16, 1971.
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31
legislation on the Federal level.?® The legislature was also
aware that the Federal Act, which became law during the first
week of the 1970 session, expressly sanctioned the right of
the states to enact legislation in the field of marine oil-spill
pollution. Moreover, Florida lawmakers were aquainted with
shortcomings in the Federal Act, such as the limitation of
negligence liability, and its limited effectiveness to oil pollu-
tion only. The State Act attempts to fill gaps in the Federal
Act; it takes up where the Federal Act leaves off.
B. The District Court’s Error
“Oil is oil and whether useable or not by
industrial standards it has the same deleterious
effect on waterways. In either case, its
presence in our rivers and harbors is
both a menace to navigation and a
pollutant.” 7
“Pollution by oil is no longer accepted as a
necessary, if unfortunate, by-product of oil
use in furnishing the energy needs of the
United States. Damage from oil pollution
has become a major part of the public
concern with the deterioration of our
environment.”?®
“One of the most effective ways to control oil
discharge would be to force the oil companies
to bear all the risks attendant to oil shipping.
If this were possible, many of the problems
involved in oil transport by sea would be
greatly diminished since oil companies and
their insurers would have financial incentive
to take every precaution against potentan
damage.”
26Problems faced by the Congress in attempting to reach a reasonable result in
the Federal Act are well documented in Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil
Pollution— Domestic and International Law, $38 George Washington L. Rev. 1 (1969).
27™Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 at 226
(1966).
?8 regal, Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability and Financial Re-
sponsibility as Related to Oil Pollution, A Study by the Program of Policy Studies in
Science and Technology, George Washington University, For the United States Coast
Guard, (December 1970) at page i.
Baldwin, Public Policy on Oil—An Ecological Perspective, 1 Ecology Law
Quarterly 245, 271 (Spring 1971).
$2
Absolute liability without fault is
the sine qua non of protection
against oil-spills and the corner-
stone of objections to the
Florida Act.
(1,)
“That the Florida Act constituted unlawful intrusion into
the exclusive federal admiralty domain is apparent when
one observes the extent to which that act would change
substantive maritime law. The most obvious changes would
be in the liability now imposed by W.Q.I.A. and maritime
rules on shippers and the operators of onshore and offshore
facilities.... Under the Florida Act... liability without
fault -is the foundation for ‘damage incurred by the state
and for damage resulting from injury to others,’ just as it is
in the case of cleanup costs. By substituting absolute
liability for proof of negligence or unseaworthiness as a
condition to unlimited recovery, the Florida Act, if valid,
would materially change the substantive maritime law
governing the disposition of claims arising from the pollu-
tion of coastal waters.” The American Waterways Oper-
ators, Inc. v. Reubin O’D. Askew, et.al., 335 F. Supp. 1241
(M.D. Fla. 1971), (A 42-43)
The Florida Act deals with sea-to-shore torts. Its principle
thrust is toward their prevention and control. It is concerned
not for welfare of shipping interests, but for welfare of its
citizens. It is designed not to protect traditional concepts of
maritime law, but the property of persons having no connec-
tion with the admiralty. Interests protected by the State Act
are not m privity with maritime commerce through contracts,
employment, freight, cargo, industry or profits.
This is not to say that Florida has no citizens, corporate
or private, engaged in or dependent upon shipping. It is,
rather, to admit the obvious: that such business interests are
incidental to the dominant state interests protected by the the
legislation whose judicially imposed demise is appealed here.
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33
The Florida Act imposes unlimited liability without fault
upon virtually any vessel which discharges oil or any other
pollutants while destined for or leaving any Florida port. §
376.12, Florida Statutes; (A 68); § 376.031(7), Florida
Statutes, (A 58). It does so to complete the protection of
interests described. Anything short of unlimited liability
without fault is less than complete protection. This premise,
upon which the Florida Act is based, is strenuously resisted
by maritime interests. The intensity of their resistence attests
to validity of the premise.
The Florida Act does not deal with minor spills and
discharges. These occur daily in state waters. Damage recovery
from such spills to state waters, the ecology, and shoreline
cleanup is provided under a companion statute.*° Damage
incurred by private property owners, relatively minor, is
remedial in common-law courts. It is doubtful that such
would be frustrated by limitation proceedings under 46 U.S.C.
§ 183 (1964).
Although damages from minor spills are recoverable under
the State Act sub judice, the Act’s focus is not so limited.
The State of Florida does not appeal here from loss of
duplicate remedies. The State’s concern is more urgent. It
goes to the heart of the statutory scheme described above.
The Florida Act is addressed to effects of a maritime
disaster of Torrey Canyon proportions.*! Without unlimited
and absolute liability imposed by statute against owners or
charterers of the offending tanker, no remedy exists for state
*°Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, Part I, The Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act of 1967, as amended; Part II, Interstate Environmental Control Compact
of 1971.
3" For descriptions of this occurrence and insight into its appropriateness in the
instant context, see Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution—Domestic and
International Law, 38 George Washington L. Rev. 1 (Oct. 1969); Comment, Oil
Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Inter. LJ. $16 (1969); Nanda, The Torrey Canyon
Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 Denver LJ. 400 (1967); E. Cowan, OIL AND
WATER, THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).
—
34
or private property owners damaged by a massive oil slick.3?
Under Federal maritime law as conceived by the District
Court in this case, owners and charterers would find safe
harbor in admiralty defenses and limitations, while Florida
beaches, marinas, and waterways were smeared with 440,000
barrels of crude oil. Assuming that such an occurrence cost
the State of Florida no more than it cost the governments of
Great Britain, France, and the Guernsey Isles to cleanup
approximately the same size slick, the ‘bottom line’ would
still amount to far more than merely $16,000,000. Aside
from the adverse ecological effects, what would it cost private
hotel owners who depend upon a pollution-free environment
to meet mortgage payments? What would it cost peripheral
businesses such as airlines, buses, taxi and rental car com-
panies? What would it mean to restaurant and night-club
business in the area affected? How much would it lessen
employment? Florida leases territorial sea-beds for aquaculture
projects on the premise that man will one day live off of food
from the sea as he does now from conventional farms.?? If
31,000 gallons of oil discharged off the coast of Rhode Island
by the grounded tanker P.W. Thirtle could virtually destroy
the entire oyster fishing industry on Narragansett Bay, what
would a 440,600 barrel slick do to aquafarming or Florida’s
commercial fishing industry, or the commercial oyster beds in
Apalachicola Bay? Why should all of the interests, public and
private, adversely affected by a massive oil-spill be subject to
frustrations of the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §
183?3* The practical effect in this context of limitation
32 Approximately half of the Torrey Canyon'’s 880,000 barrels of crude oil are
estimated to have spilled into the English Channel to form the largest oil slick in
history. Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward a New Solution to the Problem of
Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 Conn.L.Rev. 682 (1970); Note, Liability for Oil Pollution
Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 973,
982 (1970). Compare this with the 100-square mile slick formed in Tampa Bay by
Delian Apollon when only 21,000 gallons of oil escaped. Cleanup costs for Torrey
Canyon slick were in excess in $16 million; for the Delian Apollon a mere $1.4
million.
33953.67 - 253.75, Florida Statutes.
34 See how it worked with Torrey Canyon: In re Barracuda Tanker, 281 F.Supp.
228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
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35
proceedings is to deny those damaged any remedy for wrong
done them. That is the result of application of maritime law.
And that is the reason for unlimited and absolute liability in
the Florida Act.
The State Act subjects owners of vessels and terminal
facilities to two principal conditions:
First, under § 376.12 anyone who “permits or suffers” a
polluting discharge is absolutely liable (a) to the state “for
costs of cleanup or other damage” and (b) for damages
resulting from injury to others. (A70) The state must prove
only the fact of the occurrence of the polluting discharge. It
need not plead or prove negligence. The fact that liability is
unlimited makes it no different from any other form of tort
liability, including the liability for negligent pollution damages
which existed prior to this statute. It is the absolute character
of the liability that is unusual.
Second, § 376.14 requires owners or operators of terminal
facilities or vessels to maintain with the Department of
Natural Resources “evidence of financial responsibility based
on the capacity of the terminal facility or tonnage of the
ship, the cargo carried, and other similar factors to which the
vessel could be subjected * * * ” (A70)
It is important for purposes of analysis to keep in mind the
distinction between the absolute liability provision and the
fmancial responsibility requirement.. This distinction is under-
scored by the history of response to the statute. The statute
became effective July 1, 1970. However, the requirement of
filing under the financial responsibility provision was post-
poned to March 15, 1971. Maritime interests took no action
to oppose the law until shortly before the financial respon-
sibility filing date; that, and not the passage of the law,
triggered the opposition.
In the District Court, maritime interests made no attempt
to differentiate between the issues of absolute liability and
financial responsibility. Rather, they maintained generally that
they could not comply with the law without ruinous
—
36
consequences, using their arguments on each issue to buttress
the other. (See paragraphs 25-29, Complaint, A 10-12)
As to absolute liability, maritime interests maintain that
they could not continue to do business while exposed to
unlimited liability under the Act. They pointed out that they
could not insure against such liability.
The unlimited liability to which maritime interests were
subjected is no ground for reasonable objection. Under
common law they were subject to unlimited liability for any
kind of tortious action, just as an individual motorist is
subject to unlimited liability for negligence. Limitation pro-
ceedings under 46 U.S.C. §183, although theoretically avail-
able, would not always be desirable. The strict liability
provision of the Act of course gives them greater exposure,
but businessmen are able to operate subject to strict liability
in other commercial areas.
Although the State Statute purports to eliminate negligence
as an element of liability, the person made liable under
§ 376.12 is one “who permits or suffers” a polluting condi-
tion. (A 68) This language clearly indicates that the fact of
pollution is not enough; some element of responsibility must
be established as a requisite to recovery.
Moreover, §376.11(6) provides that the Department of :
Natural Resources shall recover for the “coastal protection
fund” established under this section “from the person or
persons causing the discharge jointly and severally all sums
expended therefrom... ” (Emphasis supplied; A 67) Again,
wording of the statute reiterates the requirement of establish-
ing responsibility as a necessary condition to recovery.
It is in the insurance aspect that the maritime interests
make their most effective argument, but they do so by
confusing the strict liability and financial responsibility re-
quirements. As discussed more fully below, rules promulgated
under the State Act (as opposed to language of the Act itself)
require that an insurance policy sufficient to meet financial
responsibility requirements must have no limits on the
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37
amount of coverage. (A 73) No insurance company would
prudently issue such a policy.
However, there would seem to be no valid reason why
maritime interests could not obtain insurance having a specific
limit of liability. Such a policy, although it would not meet
the financial responsibility requirement of the present rules,
would offer protection to the insured. Protection afforded by
such a policy would be tantamount to the protection enjoyed
by a motorist who has a liability policy of stated limits and
who must bear the exposure of liability above the policy
limits.
Maritime interests, however, ignored this possibility, and
emphasized that the financial responsibility rule requires an
unlimited policy which cannot be obtained, and by this
confusion made an appealing argument that they could not
insure against the liability imposed by the Act.35
Insurance companies have apparently indicated other objec-
tions to providing coverage under the Act, such as the
provision which allows direct suit against the insurer.>¢
However, only the requirement in the Regulations (A 73-74) of
insurance against unlimited liability appears to support objec-
tions against providing coverage.
Financial responsibility under the state Act (A 70) may be
established by one or more of the following:
1. Evidence of insurance;
2. Surety bonds “conditioned to pay all costs and expenses
of the cleanup of any discharge as well as damages caused to
the state and any other person;”
3. Qualification as a self-insurer;
*5See letter from American Institute of Merchant Shipping to Capt. W. C.
Dahigren, U.S.C.G., published in Legal Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability
and Financial Responsibility as Related to Oil Pollution, A Study By the Program of
Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington University, For the
Cated States Coast Guard (Dec. 1970) at pages 4445 - 449,
Id. at pages 4-2 and +3.
38
4. Other evidence of financial responsibility satisfactory to
the Department.
It should be noted that under the statutory wording only the
surety bond provision expressly requires unlimited liability;
the insurance provision does not.
In practice, the financial responsibility requirement has
been supplemented in three ways, two of which make
compliance easier, and one of which makes compliance more
difficult.
(1) Rules issued by the Department of Natural Resources,
State of Florida, (A 74) require that a showing of financial
responsibility need be established only in “an amount not to
exceed” $100 per gross ton of a company’s largest vessel or
$5 million, whichever is lower; and
(2) Under the “other evidence” method of financial re-
sponsibility the Department accepts certified financial state-
ments which show financial responsibility sufficient to meet
the foregoing standard of $100 per ton up to $5 million
(Transcript of Testimony, Hearing on Application for Tempor-
ary Restraining Order. pp. 237-238); but
(3) Despite the foregoing $100 per gross ton or $5 million
limitation, the rules require that proof of financial responsi-
bility by “evidence of insurance” must be by a policy of
unlimited liability, “conditioned to pay all costs and expenses
of the cleanup of any discharge as well as damages caused to
the state and any other person.” This provision was appar-
ently put in the rules as a copy of the surety bond provision.
As has been noted, no insurance company will write a policy
for unlimited liability. The effect of this rule, therefore, is to
eliminate insurance as a method of qualifying under the
financial responsibility provisions of the Act. But it does not
follow from this that the statutory requirement of evidencing
financial responsibility is consequently unconstitutional or
impossible to comply with.
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39
The maritime interests have, as a matter of fact, demon-
strated the practicality of the “other evidence” method of
qualifying. As of the time of the TRO hearing, 28 applica-
tions for certification had been approved covering a total of
669 ships, 438 of U.S. registry and 231 foreign (Transcript of
Testimony, Hearing on Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, pp. 234-235).
Nevertheless, maritime interests argue that they cannot
qualify on their financials because to do so would be to
subject themselves to unlimited and uninsured liability. This,
of course, is a non-sequitur and completely invalid.
Maritime interests may have a legitimate objection to the
rule for qualification by insurance, since it requires a policy
without mits. But this objection goes to the reasonableness
of -that condition as predicate for financial responsibility
certification, and has nothing to do with the scope of their
ability. In no event can the possible unreasonableness of a
prerequisite to one of several methods for satisfying financial
responsibility published in a Department of Natural Resources
Regulation sustain a practical argument against unlimited and
absolute liability.
During congressional hearings which led ultimately to
passage of the Federal Act, absolute liability was considered
by many to be necessary. It was attacked by maritime
interests on grounds that absolute liability was inequitable.
Examples were cited describing such inequity. Through no
fault of a shipowner, a vessel might strike a mine, or be -
“overwhelmed” by a hurricane or subject to some other
natural calamity at sea.>7
This argument raises two comments: first, it only contem-
plates a small part of the tragedy, only that segment occurring
at sea. It implies an innocent owner or charterer sending an
innocent vessel on innocent passage through innocent sea;
* "Hearings on HR 6495, HR 6609, HR 6794, and HR 7325 Before the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 261-69 (1969).
a —
40
suddenly a victim of violent, unforeseen forces that break
open the vessel, threaten lives of passengers and crew, and
cost the owner a lot of money. It misses the rest of the
picture.
It fails to consider the fact that the owner is probably a
heavily insured corporation deriving most of its profits from
leasing bottoms to charterers, most of whom would. be oil
companies who would not have sent the vessel loaded with
crude oil through the hurricane latitudes were it not ne
in order to maintain and operate a highly profitable business
enterprise. It fails to consider the fact that the vessel, cargo,
and freight, in all probability, are insured. Mostly, it fails to
consider the nature of the cargo. Crude oil pollution of
property ashore and territorial waters of nearby states should
also be céntemplated. Adverse effects of ecological and
economic damage inflicted on equally innocent, non-maritime
property owners are ignored completely.
Secondly, implications of the resistance to absolute liability
in arguments before the House Committee describe an
anachronistic concept of tort liability: that because the owner
of a vessel is blameless of the hurricane, he should be
absolved of blame for the loss suffered and therefore immune
to damages compensating for that loss.
* * * A modern tort-law commentator would have
responded that the question today is not one of fault or
blame but rather who is in the best position to bear the
losses or distribute the risk. Should it be the adjacent shore
owner who had absolutely no relationship to the vessel or
its cargo, indeed, did not even know of its existence until
the oil spilled on his beach, or [should it be] the
government paying for clean-up costs out of the public
treasury? Or should it be the vessel-owner, together with
the cargo-owner, who profit from the carriage contract,
appreciate the full risks that are involved, and are in the
optimum position to bear the losses or distribute those
risks through self, mutual or other forms of insurance??®
38 Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution, 38 George Washington Law
Review 1, (October 1969), at pages 14-15.
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41
It is submitted that absolute liability is required by the
circumstances. A massive oil-spill in its territorial waters is no
less dangerous to the health and welfare of a state than a
major conflagration, hurricane, or other natural disaster would
be.2? Moreover, liability must be measured by damage
proven. To limit claims by an arbitrary and unrelated
yardstick, such as tonnage of the vessel or value of the wreck,
is utterly without foundation in reason, fairness or justice. In
providing unlimited liability without fault, the Florida Act
seeks to protect fundamental state interests. It is a valid
exercise of the police power. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932; Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Eaton, 183 U.S. 588 (1901);
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); The China v. Walsh, 74
U.S. (7 Wall) 67 (1868).
Reasons for the exercise have been described. Authority for
the exercise and why it is not an unconstitutional conflict
with Federal prerogatives is discussed below.
C. Police Power is Power to Protect.
“It may be said in a general way that the police power extends
to all the great public needs.’*°
“The right of the citizen not to have his property burned with-
out compensation is no less to be regarded than the right of the
corporation to set it on fire.’"*"
“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional applications of the police power to municipal affairs.
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not de-
limit it... °*?
39Shutler, Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 7 Houston Law Review 415, 418-419
(March 1970).
Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
‘Mr. Justice Gray in St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1,
26 (1896).
*Mr. Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, (1954).
42
(1.)
If the State cannot secure a remedy
when its citizens have been wronged then
the police power of the State is little
more than an academic curiosity.
If the state is powerless to protect its citizens and its
environment from the ravages of oil-spill pollution caused by
ships calling at its ports, or by corporate entities chartered by
it, or by businesses licensed by it, then it fails to meet one of
the essentials of good government, for it has failed in its duty
to protect property.
The argument of maritime interests, reduced to its last
analysis, is this: the terminal companies and maritime interests
may lawfully use, store, and transfer pollutants, and as they.
are pursuing a lawful business, they are only liable for
negligence in its operation; and when in a given case they can
demonstrate they are guilty of no negligence, then they
cannot be made liable.
To this the citizen answers: ‘I also own my property
lawfully and have a lawful right to enjoy the environment of
the State. I did not do anything to bring about the spill of
pollutants into state waters. You say you are guiltless of
negligence. Yet the waters are polluted and the air is fouled as
a result of a discharge from the operation of your agency,
albeit careful and cautious and prudent. And I am denied
redress even though I have done nothing to in anyway bring
about such a discharge.’ (Paraphrased from Campbell »,
Missouri P.R. Co., 121 Mo. 340, 25 S.W. 936, 25 L.R.A. 175
(1894); quoted with approval in St. Louis & San Francisco R.
Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896). Neither case involved
water pollution, but the rationale of both cases is analogous
to the instant controversy.)
It may be that prior to the State Act, shippers and terminal
owners were only liable for negligence in an occurrence
causing water pollution, and that, where this criterion of tort
liability could not be proven, the citizen was without redress.
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43
But it does not follow from this that the legislature is,
therefore, powerless to ever enact legislation granting needed
protection to its citizens in the form of absolute liability for
the damages proven as a result of their acts. That is what the
legislature has done. It has made those who traffic in
pollutants responsible for damage to property and to the
environment caused by those pollutants upon discharge into
the waters of the state. It is perfectly competent for the state
to do so. To deny this is to stand for the proposition that the
ultimate burden for oil-spill pollution is properly that of the
private citizen and not those whose instrumentality caused the
discharge. That it may have been so in the past does not
mean that it must continue to be so in the present or for the
future.
The police power of the state is peculiarly appropriate to
the object sought to be achieved by the State Act. While this
is a case of first impression before this Court, state statutes
purporting to impose absolute liability upon railroad corpora-
tions for all property lost through fires caused by sparks
emitted from locomotive engines have been upheld against
constitutional attack. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v.
Mathews, supra; II Cooley Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.)
Ch. XVI, p. 1244. The words of Mr. Justice Gray in the
above cited case, 165 U.S. at p. 26, are applicable:
* * * It is within the authority of ‘the legislature to make
adequate provision for protecting the property of others
against loss or injury by sparks from such engines. The
right of the citizen not to have his property burned
without compensation is no less to be regarded than the
right of the corporation to set it on fire. To require the
utmost care and diligence of the railroad corporations in
‘taking precautions against the escape of fire from their
engines might not afford sufficient protection to the
owners of property in the neighborhood of the railroads.
When both parties are equally faultless, the legislature may
properly consider it to be just that the duty of insuring
private property against loss or injury caused by the use of
—
dangerous instruments should rest upon the railroad com- |
pany which employs the instruments and creates the peril
for its own profit rather than upon the owner of the
property, who has no control over or interest in those
instruments .... The statute is not a penal one, imposing
punishment for a violation of law; but it is purely remedial,
making a party doing a lawful act for its own profit liable
in damages to the innocent party injured thereby, and
giving to that party the whole damages measured by the
injury suffered. (citations omitted)
To argue that the police power of the State does not reach
as far as Florida’s position requires is to overlook the
breadth of the police power itself. In Berman v. Parker 348
U.S. 26 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas described the breadth of
the police power in terms which would surely encompass
circumstances in which the State Act was passed.
To suggest that the State cannot control such pollution
because it is beyond the scope of the police power, is to
overlook further the landmark case of Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In this case, a
corporation engaged in operating Federal licensed steam
vessels in interstate commerce sought to enjoin enforcement
of the city’s Smoke Abatement Code. Under the Code, the
corporation’s steam vessels could not perform necessary
cleaning of their boilers within the city without undergoing
structural alteration. This Court upheld the ordinance and
ruled that the Code could constitutionally be applied to the
corporation’s ships rejecting the argument that Federal stat-
utes relating to inspection, approval, and licensing of steam
vessels in interstate commerce preempted the area, and that
the Code was an unconstitutional burden on_ interstate
commerce. Said Mr. Justice Stewart for the seven-man
majority at 362 U.S. 442:
“The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of
promoting the health and welfare of the city’s inhabitants.
Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that
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—
45
people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the
most traditional concept of what is compendiously known
as ‘the police power. In the exercise of that power, the
states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of
interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently
with the federal government. * * * (Citations omitted).
“* * * Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted by
federal action * * * (Citations omitted).
“In determining whether state regulations has been
pre-empted by federal action, ‘the intent to supersede the
exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not
covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred
from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circum-
scribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law
of the State.’ Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 56 Led
1182, 1195, 32 S Ct. 715.”
It is clear from the Huron Portland Cement case that an
attack on the State Act based upon a violation of Art. I, §8
of the Constitution must fail, for the mere fact that a State
statute imposes a burden on commerce is not enough. There
must be more. There must be a conflict with the Federal
scheme of things. It is the imposition of the inconsistent
duties or obligations making dual compliance impossible
which is prohibited. See, also Cooley v. Board of Port
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851) which teaches that states under
their police power can adopt regulations in matters of local
concern even though, in some measure, they affect and
regulate interstate and maritime commerce.
Thus it is not merely a question of whether Congress has
acted in a given field that determines whether states are
preempted from exercising their reserved powers. The congres-
sional act must specifically exclude state legislation, and it
must do so on clear constitutional authority. Kelly v.
46
Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), reviews the cases, and ovserves
at page 14:
When the State is seeking to prevent the operation of
unsafe and unseaworthy vessels in going to and from its
ports, it is exercising a protective power akin to that which
enables the State to exclude diseased persons, animals and
plants. These are not proper subjects of commerce. When
the State is seeking to protect a vital interest, we have
always been slow to find that the inaction of Congress has
shorn the State of the power which it would otherwise
possess. And we are unable to conclude that so far as
concerns the inspection of the hull and machinery of these
vessels of respondents in order to insure safety and
seaworthiness, the Federal laws and regulations, which as
we have found are not expressly applicable, carry any
implied prohibition of state action.
It, should be noted at this juncture—although it will be
discussed in detail below—that the Federal Act does reach
wrongs with which the State Act is concerned. But it can
hardly be said to foreclose state legislation. In the first place,
_the Federal Act provides no remedies to other than Federal
agencies, and, in the second place, it expressly disclaims any
trace of preemption. Thus, it can hardly be maintained that
Congress has precluded the exercise of state police power in
the area of oil-spill pollution of territorial waters.
Nor should it be maintained that, in the absence of
congressional action in specific areas reached by the State
Act, necessity of uniformity of regulation is imposed by
Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution, merely
because the nature of the concern is maritime. The nature of
the concern was maritime in Cooley v. Board of Port
Wardens, supra; Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236 (1872);
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866); Mobile County v.
Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1881); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105
U.S. 559 (1882); Escanaba & L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago,
107 U.S. 678 (1883); Parkersbury & Ohio River Transp. Co.
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_ —ae
v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883); Morgan’s L. & T.R. &
S.S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U.S. 445 (1886); Manchester
v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133 (1893); Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U.S. 67 (1907); Port
Richmond & B.P. Ferry Co., v. Hudson County, 234 U.S. 317
(1914); Wilmington Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236
U.S. 151 (1915); Kelly v. Washington, supra; Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1940); C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318
U.S. 133 (1943); and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, supra. In each case the Court was confronted with a
local regulation or enactment affecting maritime commerce or
asserted to be exclusively within admiralty and in each case
the local regulation was sustained as an appropriate exercise
of the police power. Cf. Clyde Mallory Lines v. State of
Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935).
47
Requiring vessel owners and operators to maintain financial
responsibility is certainly permissible within the police power.
It is a means—the only means—of enforcing that which might
otherwise be unenforceable.
In like effect, requiring any vessel transporting pollutants in
state waters to be equipped with specific containment gear
and a crew trained in its use is necessary not only for safety
of the port, but also to facilitate commerce by keeping
navigation open for vessels entering and leaving the port. For
safety-sake, a vessel can be refused entry altogether or allowed
to enter under conditions prescribed for safety of the port.
There is no conflict with maritime law merely because the
regulations are set out in a statute. To require containment
gear and a trained crew is not an unreasonable regulation of
maritime commerce, anymore than certain requirements im-
posed by states upon trains, buses, trucks or aircraft represent
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, i.e. Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1939); South Carolina v. Barnwell
Bros. 303 U.S. 177 (1937); Southern P. Co. v. Anzona, 325
U.S. 761 (1932); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931).
To require minimum sea conditions and a sound ship as
requisite to entry and unloading operations is also reasonable
for protection of the port.
48
The Florida Act subjects vessels to inspection by a port
manager to determine presence of the required containment
gear and seaworthiness of the ship. This is not new to
maritime law, nor is it unreasonable; particularly when an
oil-spill has been legislatively determined to be of sufficient
threat to the health, welfare, and public safety to warrant an
exercise of the police power. To require containment gear and
not be able to ascertain its presence is to create an
unenforceable requirement. That necessary gear to contain a
spill was not present in a given instance would be unascertain-
able until the oil-spill occurred; and then it would be too late.
If the requirement of containment gear is valid at all, police
power would substantiate enforcement. Enforcement measures
cannot effectively omit boarding and inspection. See Kelly v.
Washington, supra; Morgan’s L. & T. Railroad and Steam Ship
Co. v. Louisianna Board of Health, supra. To the extent that
such measures are an imposition upon maritime commerce,
then maritime commerce must learn to accomodate them—as
it has in the past.
Mechanics of the Florida Act are not new to this Court. In
one form or another, they have met with judicial approbation
before. They have been sanctioned precisely because they are
reasonable means to accomplish the end sought to be
achieved. Effective exercise of the police power would be
frustrated without them.
Although argued and briefed in the District Court, the
order and memorandum opinion appealed from make no
mention of the police power. It is this failure to recognize the
Florida Act for what it is that led the court to error.
But had the phrase ‘police power’ never been coined, it
would matter little to the final analysis of this case. For the
people never surrendered their power to protect against such -
evils as are contemplated in an oil-spill. Whatever the power
to protect in this context be called, the Tenth Amendment is
a gentle reminder that it was reserved to the states.
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49
(2.)
- Power to protect shore property and the
State’s natural resources from deleterious
effects of a massive oil-spill was reserved
to the State.
It is a power and a responsibility peculiarly adaptable to
the State. The State has the capacity and, most importantly,
the motivation to act in this area to protect itself and its
citizens. There is no express delegation of the power to the
Federal domain. The Amendment qualifies all grants.
Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.
Article III, Section 2 (A 94) was found by the District
Court to have been offended by the State Act (A 47), but
there is no express delegation of power there. That Section
speaks to jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and it is respect-
fully submitted that it should be recognized for what it is. It
says the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. For purposes of
this controversy, that is all it says. It does not say that
substantive maritime law shall extend shoreward to frustrate
police power of the state.
To a disturbing extent, from the states’ point of view,
judicial pronouncements in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917), and Knickerbocker Ice Company v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), relied upon by the District
Court to support invalidation of the Florida Act, construe the
Admiralty Clause in such fashion as to ignore state sovereign-
ty altogether. On their face, those cases establish an auton-
omous sovereignty within the admiralty, and vest it with far
greater dignity than that ascribed to state legislation. In its
willingness to follow Jensen, and assert an allegiance to this
——
50
third dominion, which is seemingly neither state nor Federal
but independent of them both, the District Court added to the
legend. By ‘legend’ we refer to the Court’s continuing endow-
ment of additional power and scope to the relatively simple
phrase in Article III, Section 2. What is, on its face a delegation
of judicial power over cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, has been so broadened that it now authorizes
congressional action extending substantive maritime law far
beyond its original limits. And each extension, judicial or
legislative, more narrowly restricts the dwindling perimeters of
state sovereignty.
A definition of “reserved powers” proclaimed by the Tenth
Amendment might at one time have included the states’
power to cope with and protect against oil-spill pollution of
its territorial waters and shoreline. It was, after all, a common
law tort, remedial in common law courts. The Plymouth 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S.
610 (1886); Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119
U.S. 388 (1886). Although commenced at sea, the tort was
not consummated within the ebb and flow of the tide,
Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9 (1834), or on navigable waters,
The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), and was
therefore not an admiralty matter. The Plymouth, supra.
Postulating, then, an oil-spill occurring in 1886, damaging
shore property, would have triggered common law tort
response from the victim; admiralty would have had no
cognizance. Had a state act in 1886 imposed unlimited and
absolute liability upon the offending ship’s owner, the
abstraction ‘uniformity’ would have afforded scant comfort in
defense. For the common law remedy saved to suitors in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, (1 Stat. 73, as amended, arguably
strengthening the concurrent jurisdiction aspect, 28 U.S.C. §
1333), affords recourse not only to processes of state courts,
but to the substance of state law as well. The Hamilton, 207
U.S. 398 (1907). If Federal jurisdiction carried with it
law-making powers, so did concurrent state jurisdiction. A
fortiori, where there was no concurrent jurisdiction for reason
that there was no Federal maritime jurisdiction to start with,
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51
substantive state law establishing remedies and liabilities for
sea-to-shore torts would entertain no objections from admir-
alty.
Not being a matter within the Federal maritime domain at
all, such jurisprudence could hardly be considered a subject of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Hence, there was no necessity
for a doctrinaire allegiance to principles of uniformity. Just v.
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
If the abstract doctrine of uniformity can frustrate the
states’ exercise of reserved powers under the Tenth Amend-
ment by subjecting common law tort action to the full
panoply of maritime rules, the reason is almost entirely
attributable to the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 62 Stat.
496, (June 19, 1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740, (A 93). In that Act,
Congress went beyond the farthest horizons of Admiralty
Clause power, expressed or inferred, explicit or implicit. The
Act re-defines maritime jurisdiction in a manner totally
inconsistent with either the Tenth Amendment or Article III,
Section 2.
D. Extension of Admiralty: Outside the Limits.
“In regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction
of admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The
admiralty has not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have,
any jurisdiction over torts, except as such are maritime torts, that
is, torts upon the high seas, or waters within the ebb and flow of
the tide.”
—Mr. Justice Story*?*
“I think it high time to check this silent and stealing progress of
the admiralty in acquiring jurisdiction to which it has no pretentions,””
—Mr. Justice Johnson**
“Article III impliedly ... empowered Congress to revise and supplement
the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution.”
—Mr, Justice Frankfurter‘ *
‘Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9 (1834).
gg CONCurTing opinion in Ramsey v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611 (1827).
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959).
(1.)
By extending scope of maritime tort
jurisdiction beyond the locality of
navigable waters, Congress exceeded
Admiralty Clause authority and intruded
upon State prerogatives.
Prior to June 19, 1948, admiralty jurisdiction over torts
was limited to the maritime province. Unless it was a
maritime tort, i.e., consummated upon navigable waters, it
was not extended by Article III, Section 2, to the Federal see.
Thus, if a structure on land, a bridge or a pier, were damaged
by a vessel, admiralty courts could not hear the cause. The
Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Ex parte Phenix Ins.
Co., 118 U.S. 610 (1886); Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific
Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); Cleveland Terminal &
Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908);
The Troy, 208 U.S. 321 (1908); Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191
(1911). But see Mr. Justice Brown, concurring, in The
Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904).
In The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
428 (1825), seamen sued for wages in admiralty. In a
four-paragraph opinion, Mr. Justice Story affirmed dismissal
by the lower court for lack of jurisdiction for reason that the
Missouri River voyage of the vessel was not within the ebb and
flow of the tide, and, hence, “in no just sense can the wages
be considered as earned in a maritime employment.”
In The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1851), Mr. Justice Taney broadened this concept to navigable
waters, but he can hardly be said to have precluded necessity
for getting one’s feet wet before one’s cause sounds in
admiralty. Maritime cases and congressional authority arise
not under operation of the Commerce Clause, The Genesee
Chief, supra; The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1868), nor “the
Constitution or laws of the United States”, American Ins. Co.
v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Peter) 511 (1828). Solely within the
Admiralty Clause does the source of congressional power
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53
repose. Since congressional power can only be co-extensive
with that stored in Article LI, Section 2, a determination of
the limits of that grant is necessary. National legislation
extending beyond boundaries of that power is, by definition,
without constitutional authority to conflict with state stat-
utes. The suspicion that this trespass occurs is limited neither
to our time nor subject area. See the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Johnson in Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 611 (1827).
There is no absolute constitutional criterion for the
measurements of whatever it is that is necessary and proper to
enable Congress to implement Federal jurisdiction over admi-
ralty. But it has been traditionally recognized that such
implementation is limited to that which is, in substance,
maritime, Ap the case of contracts, substance is measured by
the nature of the transaction. In the case of tort, substance is
measured by locality. This guide to qualitative analysis was
treated as settled law 50 years ago. Grant Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922), and reiterated as
recently as last December. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
US. , 30 L.Ed.2d 383, 387-389 (1971). This is inference
only. Article Ill, Section 2 makes no mention of either
“nature” or “locality.”
The State of Florida has no particular quarrel with the
inference. As a basis for placing the line of demarcation
between the dominion of admiralty and that of non-admiralty
at the shoreline, it comports with reason and logic. But it is
unreasonable, illogical, and dehors the “historic view of this
Court” (Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra) to extend
maritime tort jurisdiction, and all that it implies, beyond the
traditional admiralty domain. That is what Congress had done
in The Admiralty Extension Act of 1948. It has established a
beachhead of rules, limitations, and defenses peculiar to the
law of the sea well within the dry-land dominion of state
jurisdiction. In so doing it has forceably imposed these
sea-lawyer concepts upon unwilling subjects; the states pro-
test.
54
Congress, in the Admiralty Extension Act, and the District
Court, in striking the State Act, ignored the protest and
shaped new dimensions to maritime torts. Admiralty tort
jurisdiction has been rendered amphibious. No longer does
locality matter: admiralty lives as well upon the land as on
the sea. In the space of one opinion, the District Court
effectively overruled more than 150 years of this Court’s
interpretation of the substance of maritime law and the
jurisdictional grant of Article III, Section 2.
This Court, in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra, quoted
with approval from its decision in Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S.
263, 270 (1934), that “(t)he power reserved to the states,
under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of
controversies in their courts may be restricted only by the
action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of
the Constitution.” Prior to the Admiralty Extension Act of
1948, interpretations of the “judiciary sections of the Consti-
tution” by this Court scrupulously maintained the shoreline
demarcation between admiralty and non-admiralty discussed
above. Congress was without judicial guidance in assaulting
this long-established and judicially approved distinction be-
tween state and maritime regimes. It was also without any
constitutional authority for doing so.
No act of Congress can enlarge purposes of the grant of
jurisdictional power conferred in Article III, Section 2, to
make it broader than the judiciary has determined to be its
true limits. The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 523,
527 (1861). While Congressional power to determine what the
maritime law throughout the United States shall be is
paramount, Zhe Lottawanna 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 577
(1874), the Congress must necessarily act within a sphere of
judicial concepts of the substance of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 636-641
(1868); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1931).
In extending admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over torts
consummated on land, Congress ignored established judicial
concepts and exceeded its authority. The Admiralty Extension
Act is invalid. If the thrust of Victory Carriers is to continue
as a compass heading to circumscribe boundaries between —
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55
state and maritime regimes, the District Court decision in the
case sub judice must be reversed.
(2.)
Should this Court decide the Admiralty
Extension Act to be valid on its face,
traditional common law jurisdiction
saved to suitors in 28 U.S.C. 1333 marks
a preserve of concurrent state authority.
As has been noted, “extension of admiralty” is a theory of
law unknown to traditional maritime jurisprudence. Courts of
admiralty had no jurisdiction over torts consummated on
land. Cases involving such wrongs, even though initiated on
navigable waters, eluded admiralty jurisdiction altogether prior
to 1948 and the Congressional enactment of 46 U.S.C. § 740.
Hence, such actions could in no way be deemed to be within
the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and maritime law.
If admiralty jurisdictic 1 for such torts exists for reason that
their genesis is some act or failure of action originating on
navigable waters, it is solely because Congress ordained it.
Perimeters of admiralty jurisdiction over such tort actions are
staked out in the Admiralty Extension Act—the length and
breadth of Federal dominion in this context is described
there. It is purely a matter of congressional will: all that the
national legislature intended for the admiralty courts to have
is blueprinted in the Act. Had Congress intended such domain
to be exclusively Federal, it would have been easily accom-
plished. In the Ships Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1003, 46
U.S.C. 951, for example, the exclusivity of jurisdiction is
spelled out in conclusive terms. See, generally, The Thomas
Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934). Had exclusive jurisdiction been
so prescribed, an argument could be made that the Admiralty
Extension Act amended such “hybrid” torts out of their
common law status. But legislative history of the Act
indicates rather conclusively that its passage signified no
intentional intrusion upon common law jurisdiction.
56
Adoption of the bill will not create new causes of action,
It merely specifically directs the courts to exercise the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
already conferred by Article III, section 2 of the Constity-
tion and already authorized by the Judiciary Acts. More-
over, there still will remain available the right to a
common-law remedy which the Judiciary Acts... have
expressly saved to claimants. * * * (Senate Report No,
1593, June 11, 1948 (To accompany H.R: 238); House
Report No. 1523, March 8, 1948, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1948.)
Inasmuch as sea-to-shore torts (particularly within the
context of oil-spill remedies) were unreachable in admiralty’s
formative century, and therefore well within concurrent state
jurisdiction, they cannot be said to be within that chosen area
of law exclusively delegated to federal maritime domain. Cf.
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
Strict precepts of uniformity that bottom this Court's
rationale in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917), and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149
(1920) are not required here.
If states have concurrent jurisdiction over maritime torts,
there must be available to them an area of legislative activity
to develop or extend remedies for wrongs, Cf. The Tungus v.
Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), and this area must be broad
enough to accomodate new concepts of tort. Surely the state
is not limited to antiquated forms of action, i.e., trespass on
the case, in an era when experts tell us we are capable of
ultimately befouling our air and water, or vitally injuring an
economy based squarely on a clean environment, as Florida’s
is today. If “concurrent jurisdiction” is more than a theory,
but is amenable to practice, then the only question at this
juncture is whether the state still retains concurrent jurisdic
tion over maritime torts. There is no question but that it was
a state prerogative when the Constitution was developed. We
were reminded of this fact in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan in Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 404-405 (1959):
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57
0
Mr. Chancellor Kent and Mr. Rawle seem to think that the
admiralty jurisdiction given by the Constitution is, in all
cases, necessarily exclusive. But it is believed that this
opinion is founded on mistake. It is exclusive in all matters
of prize, for the reason that, at the common law, this
jurisdiction is vested in the courts of admiralty, to the
exclusion of the courts of common law. But in the cases
where the jurisdiction of common law and admiralty are
concurrent, (as in cases of possessory suits, mariners’ wages,
and maritime torts), there is nothing in the Constitution
necessarily leading to the conclusion that the jurisdiction
was intended to be exclusive; and there is no better ground,
on general reasoning, to contend for it. The reasonable
interpretation ... would seem to be, that it conferred on
the national judiciary the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion exactly according to the nature and extent and
modifications in which it existed in the jurisprudence of
the common law. 3 Story’s Comm. Sec. 1666, note.
[quoted in Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 598
(1857).]
Assuming that concurrent jurisdiction still means that
which Mr. Justice Holmes described in The Hamilton, 207
U.S. 398 (1907), then substantive state law is appropriate to
meet exigencies of an oil-spill age (so long as it is not in
conflict with Federal law) regardless whether admiralty is
extended or not. There must be room for protection the State
Act affords. If such protection is provided by Federal law,
then the State has no quarrel. The Florida Act is more than
merely an advertisement to promote business for its courts. It
is the substance of the protection that is urgent here; not the
choice of court rooms.
If the protection against oil-spill pollution and damage is
not afforded in the Federal sphere, of course, then this Court
must consider yet another constitutional question: to what
extent may the individual citizen rely upon the Ninth
Amendment to reassure his fundamental right to a healthy
environment?
58
(3.)
To the extent that Federal law fails to
protect citizens of the state from loss of
property and damage to natural resources,
the state has a right and a duty to
legislate in the area of marine oil-spill
pollution control.
The essence of the District Court’s opinion appealed here is
that Chapter 376, Florida Statutes (1970) conflicts directly
with paramount Federal enactments and is in other ways
violative of admiralty’s constitutional prerogatives. While the
State of Florida denies any such violations or conflict, the
State also maintains that even if the District Court’s assertion
as to conflict were correct, the State Act must be recognized
as a valid expression of a fundamental right of the people to
self-preservation.
Congress has recognized this right to a healthful environ-
ment. At Section 101 (c) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47,
Congress declares:
The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a
healthful environment and that each person has a respon-
sibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement
of the environment.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has judicially acknowl
edged the necessity of protecting our environment for the
survival of man, and has also noted the devastating effect of
environmental despoilment upon interstate commerce. In
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), at pages
203-204, Chief Judge Brown stated:
In this time of awakening to the reality that we cannot
continue to despoil our environment and yet exist, the
nation knows, if Courts do not, that the destruction of fish
and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a devastating
effect on interestate commerce.
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59
None of the Constitutional provisions or Federal laws
asserted by maritime interests can be interpreted so as to
deprive the citizens of the State of Florida of their right to a
clean and healthful environment. Not only is this right
recognized by Congress and the Courts (see, also, dictum in
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra.), but it
is also a fundamental right of the people, saved to them under
the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 79 (1965), the Court
found at page 484, per Mr. Justice Douglas, that
* * *specific guarantees in the Bill ‘of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance.
Justice Goldberg, in a separate opinion, joined by the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, stated, at page 487:
In reaching the conclusion that the right of marital privacy
is protected, as being within the protected penumbra of
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court refers to
the Ninth Amendment, ante, at 515. I add these words to
emphasize the relevance of the Amendment to the Court’s
holding.
Continuing, at page 488, Justice Goldberg stated:
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal
that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are
additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental
infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental
rights specifically mentioned in the First eight Constitution-
al Amendments.
—
60
And, at page 489:
These statements of Madison and Story make clear that the
Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be
construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights
which the Constitution guaranteed to the people. (Emphasis
Added.)
Justice Goldberg then summarized, at page 493:
In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support
to the view that the “liberty” protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal
Government or the States is not restricted to rights
specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments.
The Justice then explained, also at page 493, how to
determine which rights are reserved under the Ninth
Amendment:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not
left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and
private notions. Rather, they must look to “traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people” to determine
whether a principle [is] ‘so rooted [there] ...as to be
ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105, 78 L. Ed. 674, 677, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 ALR 575.
The inquiry is whether a right involved “‘is of such a
character that it cannot be denied without violating
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lies at
the base of all our civil and political institutions’. . .”
It should brook no argument to state that the right toa
clean, healthful environment is within the “penumbra” of
fundamental rights protected under the Ninth Amendment.
This right as the Court recognized in Zabel v. Tabb, supra, is
essentially the right to exist; certainly, it is so rooted in the
tradition and collective conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. The people of the State of Florida
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_ —
have acted through their legislature to protect this fundament-
al right by the enactment of Chapter 376, Florida Statutes
(1970). In the State Act, the people are asserting their right
to protect their birthright to clean water, coastlines, and other
natural resources from environmental destruction. Their right
to take up statutes in defense of their environment is no
different, except to a matter of degree, from their right to
take up arms to defend against armed attack. Before this
constitutionally guaranteed right, all other rights and privileges
must bow.
61
E. The Jensen Doctrine is Inapplicable
“The Florida Act here constitutes a far greater in-
trusion into the Federal maritime domain than the New York statute
in the Jensen case. If applied to the plaintiffs and intervenors
in this case, the Florida Act would effect—in the words of Jensen—
the “destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime
matters which the Constitution was designed to establish...
We need not belabor the point that to permit the states severally
to regulate these industries as Florida seeks to do would sound
the death knell to the principle of uniformity.’*®
“We are now asked to apply the Jensen doctrine to the
field of unemployment insurance and to invalidate the statute
before us on the ground that it is destructive of admiralty
uniformity .... The Jensen Case has already been severely limited,
and has no vitality beyond that which may continue as to state
workmen's compensation laws.’*7
(1s)
Jensen’s absolute prohibitions against state
legislation affecting maritime commerce must 4
ae ¢ limited to the arena of its own facts:
¢, Memorandum opinion of the District Court, A 44.
Standard Dredging Corporation v. Murphy, 319 U.S. $06, 309 (1942).
62
It is respectfully submitted that in drafting Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), this Court used a very
broad-nibbed pen. Any state legislation was declared to be
invalid when it “works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its inter.
national and interstate relations.” 244 U.S. at 216. It is
difficult to conceive of a state statute affecting maritime
commerce which would stand guiltless of some intrusion into
those prohibited areas. Even state statutes subsequently
approved by this Court, ie., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358
U.S. 588 (1959), are not totally free of a mild trespass into
that yard marked “uniformity”. It is, perhaps, for this reason
that a later decision limited application of the Jensen doctrine ,
to workmen’s compensation cases, Standard Dredging Corpor-
ation v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1942), and the requisite
“uniformity” concept to those situations “where the essential
features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved.”
Just. v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 392 (1941).
In any event, the District Court misapplied the Jensen rule
in the present context. The Jensen decision, by strong
implication at least, limits its application to those areas of
jurisprudence within the exclusive federal maritime domain.
At 244 U.S. 218:
* * *The remedy which the Compensation Statute
attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown to the
common law, encapable of enforcement by the ordinary
processes of any court and is not saved to suitors from the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction.
As discussed above, the Florida Act concerns sea-to-shore
torts, triable only before common law courts at the time the
Jensen Case was decided. If the Admiralty Extension Act can
be said to bring an oil-spill damage action within maritime
tort jurisdiction, it also remains within the. purview of the
common law as a tort. If concurrent jurisdiction exists, states
- are free to legislate within that jurisdiction, and the
“uniformity” concept of Jensen cannot coexist with such
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w—
63
state power. In resting a corner of its case upon the Jensen
doctrine in this context, the District Court erred.
F. Limitation of Liability Means No Recovery.
“Even if fault was established, the vessel-owner’s financial
responsibility for property damage would be limited to the value
of the vessel at the end of the voyage, plus the “freight then
pending,” unless the damage was caused with the owner's privity or
knowledge. ’**
“That object was to enable merchants to invest money in ships
without subjecting them to the indefinite hazard of losing thew
whole property by the negligence or misconduct of the master or
crew, but only subjecting them to the loss of their investment.’*°
“The notion as applicable to a collision case seems to us to be
that if you surrender the offending vessel you are free, just as
it was said by a judge in the time of Edward Ill, ‘If my dog kills
your sheep and I freshly after the fact tender you the dog you
are without recourse against me.’ "*°
(1.)
In a conflict of interests between the y
" State in protecting against effects of an
oil-spill, and the maritime in protecting
shippers from claims resulting therefrom,
the State’s interest is dominant.
Whether or not this Court determines that the Admiralty
Extension Act is invalid as applied in the context of the case
sub judice, the problem of Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S.
96 (1911) remains. In an oil-spill frame of reference, the
Limitation of Liability Act, 9 Stat. 635, 46 U.S.C. §§
181-189, would frustrate justice regardless of the forum or
legal theory applicable. In Richardson, a tort claim arose from
collision of a ship with a bridge. A limitation proceeding was
upheld despite the non-maritime nature of the tort.
gMemorandum opinion of the District Court, A 43.
Mr. Justice Bradley in The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 504 (1886).
- Justice Holmes in Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nav. Co. v.
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 251 U.S. 48, 53 (1919).
—
64
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, (1970),
this Court discarded antiquated notions circumscribing re.
covery in a wrongful death action, and overruled The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). Underlying the Court's
rationale was a concern that it was unfair and unjust for
general maritime law to allow recovery for injury, but not for
death. There was no jusitification for the dichotomy beyond a
stultified adherence to the ancient felony-murder doctrine.
Rule had supplanted reason. No one knew why The
Harrisburg held as it did; the fact of the holding was
sufficient for subsequent cases. See, The Tungus v. Skovgaard,
358 U.S. 588 (1959).
The State of Florida is not unaware of the reluctance of
the Court to overrule precedent. But if Richardson y,
Harmon, supra, is of sufficient vitality to permit limitation
proceedings to frustrate fair recovery in a common law tort
action for damages to shore property arising from an oil-spill,
then that case must be overruled or sharply limited in
application. Reasons underlying development of the concept
of limitation of liability never contemplated the severe
damage of a massive oil-spill. Public policy on the side of the
state is far more urgent than that on the side of maritime
interests, particularly with marine liability insurance weighed
into the balance. There is no justification today for protecting
owners and charterers of tankers to the detriment of the State
and its citizens.
The Limited Liability Act cannot co-exist in the same
courtroom with the Florida Act. Although 46 U.S.C. § 183 is
limited to sea-going vessels, § 188 applies the limitation to
“all vessels used on lakes or rivers or inland navigation,
including canal boats, barges, and lighters,” and § 189 has
been construed to abrogate common law rights to substantive
remedies saved to suitors altogether. Compare, Richardson v.
Harmon, supra, with The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907), and
Ex parte Phenix, 118 U.S. 610 (1886); see Gilmore and
Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957), at p. 677. Lower
courts have indicated rather conclusively that state statutes
and local ordinances which regulate maritime commerce on
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65
canals and harbors have no effect upon limitation proceedings
under the Act. The Grand Republic—The Nassau, 29 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1929); The South Shore, 35 F.2d 110 (3rd _ Cir.
1929) cert. den. 281 U.S. 722 (1930); The Central States, 9
F.Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
There is no question but that particular advantages afforded
maritime interests by the Limitation of Liability Act would,
assuming continued vitality of Richardson v. Harmon, supra,
and 46 U.S.C. § 189, clash head-on with absolute and
unlimited liability aspects of the Florida Act. But it also
conflicts directly with Section 1161 (f) of the Federal Act (A
81). For the Federal Act, “notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law”, imposes liability upon “such owner or
operator of any vessel from which oil is discharged in
violation... for the actual costs incurred... for the removal
of such oil by the United States Government in an amount
not to exceed $100 per gross ton of such vessel or
$14,000,000, whichever is lesser... .” The section goes on to
state that the costs shall constitute a maritime lien against the
vessel and that an in rem action may be brought against the
vessel to collect the amount due. But more significantly, it .
further provides that an action may also be brought against
the owner or operator of such vessel in any court of
competent jurisdiction to recover such costs. Limitation of
liability codified with 46 U.S.C. § 183, gives way before the
emphatic (and subsequent) language of the Federal Act.
Having given way before the Federal Act, are these
maritime fictions elastic enough to snap back into place to
frustrate a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state? Defendants submit that they are not, that what is
appropriate for a Federal act purporting to control water
standards is no less appropriate for a state act seeking to
achieve the same end.
Dominant state interests which would be frustrated by
unbridled application of the Limitation of Liability Act have
been described above. But there is another basis for denying
this particular aspect of maritime law as a ground for striking
the Florida Act. It is contemplated in the phrase “due process
of law”, and it is the fundamental right of every individual
deprived of his property or the use of it by operation of the
government.
66
(2.)
Limitation of liability in the
present context is a bad use of
a good legal theory.
Limitation of ship-owners’ liability first appeared in the
14th Century as a means of encouraging investment in
shipping. The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 376 (No. 11, 619) (D.
Me. 1831); Gilmore and Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY,
(1957) pp. 663-667; Note, 35 Columbia L. Rev. 246 (1935).
Shipping was risky business, and insurance was unknown. It
was necessary to devise a means whereby one’s entire fortune
didn’t go down with part of it in a loss at sea. Limitation of
liability concepts were developed to meet the risks and by
1800 had been codified in most maritime countries. The
United States enacted its first limitation statute fifty years
later. 9 Stat. 634 (1851), as amended 46 U.S.C. § § 181-189
(1964). Like other legislation, it was congressional response to
an unfortunate occurrence at sea. When the S. S. Lexington
left the port of New York in 1840, part of \its manifest
included a box, contents unknown. When it sank, its owners
were held liable for the full value of those contents: $18,000
in gold. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank
of Boston, 47 U.S. (6. How.) 344 (1848). The Limitation of
Liability Act was, in part, a result of this case.
Statutes of limitation were designed to insulate ship-
owners from claims of cargo-owners and passengers who have
contracted with the ship-owner, or his agent, for carriage or
passage. Presumably passengers and cargo-owners are fully
aware of thé risks of maritime transport. Possibility of
negligence on the part of captain or crew is an accepted
hazard. The parties are in privity, so to speak, and it is
neither unreasonable nor improper that this voluntary rela
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67
tionship should subject them to peculiarities of the law of the
sea, not the least of which is a limitation of the owner’s
liability.
But what of parties not in privity with operation of cargo
or passage, whose only relationship is an unwilling one in that
they have been damaged by some maritime instrumentality? Is
it reasonable or proper that persons innocent of the sea
should be subject to its laws?
Since its creation in 1851, the Limitation of Liability Act
has been legislatively and judicially extended to cover sub-
jects, situations, and localities which would have seemed
revolutionary to owners of the S. S. Lexington. It has been
extended to all navigable waters, regardless of size, 24 Stat.
80 (1886), to all vessels regardless of size or employment, The
Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914); Harolds, Limitation of Liability
and its Application to Pleasure Boats, 37 Temp.L.Q. 423
(1964), and to torts consummated on land, Richardson v.
Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911), including massive oil-spills, In re
Barracuda Tanker Corporation, 281 F.Supp 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), modified 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
Extension of limited liability to lakes and pleasure craft is
questionable; its extension to frustrate recovery by innocent
parties ashore is unconscionable. When it crosses the shoreline,
as in Barracuda Tanker, it crosses the limits of constitution-
ality. For it has the effect of (a) leaving the locality of the
constitutional grant in Article III, Section 2, discussed above,
and (b) violating the Fifth Amendment right to substantive
due process of law necessarily attendant to any deprivation by
government of private property for a public purpose. (And if
there is no public purpose advanced in the Limited Liability
Act, then there is no foundation for the law in the first
place.)
The distinction in application of the Limitation of Liability
Act demonstrated here is not a distinction without a
difference. For it is not unreasonable to require a cargo-owner
who has contracted for carriage of his goods to be limited in
his recovery. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207
68
(1936) § 8, 46 U.S.C. § 1308; the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445
(1893) § 6, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195. He is deemed to have
contracted for such services with full knowledge of limitation,
But to impose the limitation formula upon the recovery of a
beachfront hotel owner is to deprive him of a necessary
element of substantive due process.
If ‘we define substantive due process as a constitutional
that no person shall be deprived of his property for
arbitrary reasons without meaningful recourse, the difference
in the distinction becomes clear. Such deprivation of property
is constitutionally acceptable only if the conduct from which
the deprivation flows is proscribed by reasonable legislation
reasonably applied. The implication here is that the legislation
must be applied for the purposes intended, and that those
purposes must comport with the Constitution. The essence of
substantive due process is freedom from arbitrary action with
property no less than life or liberty. Cf. United States ».
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1933); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US.
393 (1922); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
To the extent that a massive oil-slick smears a beach-front
hotel thereby driving away guests and hurting his other
business, the owner of the hotel should have a remedy. If
under limitation proceedings, the ship-owner may limit his
liability to the hotelowner by the value of a sunken wreck,
the plaintiff is deprived of the basic element of his right, to
wit, compensation. Remedial action afforded in admiralty
courts, or in commonlaw courts occupied by the Limitation
- of Liability Act, is no remedy at all in this context. To the
extent that an act of Congress compels this deprivation of
property without due process of law, the Fifth Amendment is
violated. If the Limitation of Liability Act is not unconsti-
tutional on its face, it quickly becomes so under this
application. Due process of law is a concept intended to
protect individuals from such an arbitrary exercise of govern
ment power “unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice.” Twining v. New Jersey,
supra.
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69
In a totally different context, Mr. Justice Frankfurter once
commented: “The use of a legal remedy devised for a simple
situation might in a totally different environment become a
ersion of that remedy.” Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Can
Co., 309 U.S. 310, 322 (1939).
This is the heart of the problem. To employ limitation of
liability in a manner never intended (nor even conceived when
the act was passed) to frustrate full recovery of a claimant
under circumstances to which the Florida Act is directed, is a .
perversion of the original intent of the Limitation of Liability
Act and an unconstitutionally arbitrary use thereof.
The Florida Act seeks to provide a remedy for its citizens
where none exists. May an unconstitutional application of a
maritime statute be the basis for striking the Florida Act? The
State respectfully submits that it may not.
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 In No Way
Preempted the States From Imposing Requirements and
Liabilities to Protect Against Massive Oil-Spill Pollution of
Their Territorial Waters—Instead, It Describes A Joint
Federal-State Scheme to Combat A Serious Economic aritt
Environmental Problem.
A. Preliminary Statement
“Our environmental problems stem largely from a pressing
need to emerge from the entire system of legal theory and
precedent that guided us during the first century of industrial-
ization in this country.’*'!
To consider issues arising under this general question, it is
necessary to define relative positions. To declare position is to
imply certain priorities. The position of the State of Florida
*"Hon, Edmund S. Muskie, Torts, Transportation, and Pollution: Do the Old
Shoes Still Fit? 7 Harvard Journal on Legislation 477, 492 (1970).
70
' rests on several premises. First, that there will be no “losing
side” to this controversy. Issues at bar are so far-reaching and
of such serious social, economic, and environmental conse.
quence that, once resolved, the whole fabric consisting of
state, Federal, and maritime interests, will be benefitted,
Second, this case should not be decided solely upon historical
interests asserted by state or maritime parties as predominate,
one over the other. Nor is it appropriate to arrive at a holding
based solely upon prior decisions. For cases supporting
exercise of the state police power, and those establishing rigid
principles of uniformity in matters maritime are of equal
dignity; they form long lines, but on parallel planes. The last
word in either cause will probably not be spoken here. If
jealously guarded prerogatives of state and maritime interests
receive added impetus in ‘new directions as a result of this
appeal, it will be incidental to the essential question decided.
It is true that Florida has a responsibility to protect its
citizens and its environment from dangers of a massive
oil-spill, assuming that no other protection is afforded. We do
not understand the District Court or maritime interests to
deny this. It is equally true that maritime law, if not a corpus
juris existing independently of state and national influences,
must continue to develop in a cohesive, universally recognized
pattern. Florida has no quarrel with this.
These ambitions are not mutually exclusive. That they
conflict in the instant appeal is because they were considered
by the District Court in terms of hornbook precedent. But
dogmas of the stormy past, to paraphrase Mr. Lincoln, are
inappropriate to govern crises of the age of supertankers.
Rules of decisions applicable to wrongful death or workmen's
compensation cases cannot be rigidly applied in this context.
“Uniformity” is an abstraction; it cannot be the sine qua non
of every regulation affecting maritime commerce. Causes of
regulation will not be the same in each instance. Where
problems to be controlled differ, regulations effecting control
will differ.
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v
71
+
It is the position of the State of Florida that the State Act
should not be judged by its conflicts with ancient tenets of
maritime law, but by its response to challenges expressed in
the Federal Act. Those challenges call for a combined
FederalState operation to combat a major threat to our
environment. To the extent that the maritime industry resists
this response, it sets itself apart, disputing not merely the
State of Florida, but the national policy as expressed in the
Federal Act, and the urgent priorities of other coastal states
as well.
B. The Federal Act
“It is a question of the first magnitude whether
the destiny of the great rivers is to be the sewers of the cities
along thei banks or to be protected against everything which
threatens their purity. To decide the whole matter at one blow by
an irrevocable fiat would be at least premature.’*
“Historians have noted that over the centuries,
Oriental despotism has been associated with centralized
control of water resources.’**
(1.)
As compared to the Florida Act,
The Federal Act defines the problem and
declares national policy while
contemplating State participation in the
. enforcement of it.
Congress declares it to be policy of the United States
“...that there be no discharge of oil into or upon the
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or
into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone.” § 1161 (b)
(1); A 76, and prohibits such discharge in harmful quantities,
52M, Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Min
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