Appellants Brief — Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1973

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Argument: Point I The fact the judicial power of the United States

is extended “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”

by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution does not impose a

permanent barrier in the path of State legislatures seeking to

protect citizens, property, ecology, economy and general

welfare from the deleterious effects of massive oil-spill pollution

NN EE LEDER OE EO GETS Sy eT E TTY 20

A. Preliminary Statement .......... ere ea ee ithcs decent 20

(1) The subject is water and the need to conserve it ...... 22

(2) The subject is also preservation of other resources and

the State’s right and duty to protect them from oil

NN 6b Fuki n bee vbasscepeeeaicbicbenve 25

i CCM Acie ewesscosencesscsecens 31

(1) Absolute liability without fault is the sine qua non of

protection against oil-spills, and the comerstone of

objections to the Florida Act .............-.0-0005 32

s C. Police Power is Power to Protect ...............-e000: 41

oi (1) If the State cannot secure a remedy when its citizens

3 have been wronged, then the police power of the State

is little more than an academic curiosity ............ 42

(2) Power to protect shore property and the State’s natural

resources from deleterious effects of a massive oil-spill

oe kk EOE eee ee eee 49

D. Extension of Admiralty: Outside the Limits ............ 51

(1) By extending scope of maritime tort jurisdiction

beyond the locality of navigable waters, Congress has

exceeded Admiralty Clause authority and intruded

mppeeen Che Sinte’d ROO NNE aivawic.n cs ch ceddccacess 52

(2) Should this Court decide the Admiralty Extension Act

to be valid on its face, traditional common law

jurisdiction saved to suitors in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 marks

a preserve of concurrent State authority ............ 55

(3) To the extent that Federal law fails to protect citizens

of the State from loss of property and damage to

natural resources, the State has a right and a duty to

legislate in the area of marine oil-spill pollution control 58

E, The Jensen Doctrine In Inapplicable .................. 61

(1) Jensen’s absolute prohibitions against State legislation

affecting maritime commerce must remain limited to

Se ee Oe UNE UEIN s n.o vba tcc vec nxduemess 6 61

De ett, EEA Oe PERS ACRES IE LST Re REG, 5

F. Limitation of Liability Means No Recovery ............. 63

(1) In a conflict of interests between the State in protecting

against effects of an oil-spill, and the Maritime in

protecting shippers from claims resulting therefrom, the

State’s interest is dominant ..........--++-+--0000. 63

(2) Limitation of Liability in the present context is a bad

use of a good legal theory .......---0-seeeeeeeees 66

Argument: Point II The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 in

no way preempted the states from imposing requirements and

liabilities to protect against massive oil-spill pollution of their

territorial waters—instead, it describes a joint Federal-State

scheme to combat a serious economic and environmental problem

eg err rr re Terry Ty ree 69

ae Tee ere ee 71

(1) The Federal Act defines the problem and declares

national policy while contemplating State participation

in the enforcement of it ..........-22eeeeeeeceees 71

(2) If Federalism is more than an academic theory, it

requires expression in the instant case .............. 78

(3) The “gap theory” of State law filling gaps in Federal

Statutory schemes is alive and well in Rodrigue ....... 83

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) ...... 14,52

American Waterways Operators, Inc., The v. Askew, $35 F.Supp

1241 (m.D. Fla. 1971) ....----eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1,32,61,63

Barracuda Tanker Corp., In re, 281 F.Supp 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)

modified 409 F.2d 1013 ........---+++++-++> 11,16,25,34,67

Belfast, The, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868) ......-----+++++0 15,54

Berman 0. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ....-----+++-ee 13,41,44

Blackheath, The, 195 U.S. 361 (1904) ......-- ssegueeeravaees 52

Campbell v. Missouri P. R. Co., 121 Mo. 340, 25 S.W. 936 (1894) ..42

Central States, The, 9 F Supp 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935) ......--+-++: 65

Chevron Oil Co.v. Huson, US. ,30L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) . 19,83

City of Norwich, The, 118 U.S. 468 (1886) .....-----++++-+++s: 63

Cleveland Terminal & Valley RR. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 US.

oe ee er Orn rete he 52

Clyde Mallory Lines v. State of Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935)..... 47

Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) ...

13,45,46

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—

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931) ........-2eceeees 15,41,54

Eagle, The, 75 U.S, (8 Wall.) 15 (1868) ..............-0006- 14,52

Escanaba v. L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883) ..... 46

Genesee Chief, The, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851)........ 14,50,52

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ..........-.-002- 81

Gilman v. Philadelphia, 44 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866) ............ 46

Grand Republic, The—The Nassau, 29 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1929) ..... 65

Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922) ...14,53

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierewjewski, 261 U.S.

SO ROE Enis bane Rack coi hdd bo eswnseteesean 78

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 79 (1965) ............... 15,59

Hamilton, The, 207 U.S, 398 (1907) ............. 15,50,57,64,78

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) ............000000 81

Movisbang, The, 110 US. 100 (1006) .. 6.6. 00-. vo voccccccce 64

Mosley v. atta, 92 UB. BES (IOS4) ... wc vccccvcccccvcssevess 54

Huron Portland Cement Co. v, City of Detroit, 362 U.S.

WD TR i xkscnksuss ankennieexes 13,44, 45,47,59,76

Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elev. Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886) .. .50,52

Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941) .............. 15,51,62, 82

Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) ........... 45, 46, 47,48

' Knickerbocker Ice Co., v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) ..........

8,13,18,49,56,77,78, 82

Lee v. New Jersey, 207 US. 67 (1907) .....cscccccccecccccess 47

License Cases, The, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 590 (1846) ............... 81

Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nav. Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist.

Ferminal, 251 US. 4B CUSNG) oo ost s ccc cecse 63

Lottawanna, The, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875) .............. 8,54

Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1890) .............. 47

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) ..... 15, 56

ST ee re COE os wath kc ch pac sc ccvvccceci 52

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) .......... 74

Maurer v. Hamilton, 308 U.S. 598 (1939) ..............e0e00e- 47

Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Can Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1939) ....... 69

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819) .......... 80

McNeil, Ex parte, 80-U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872) ...............- 46

Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) .. 2... ce eee eee ee ee eee 71

Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1881) ................ 46

Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) ........

8, 19,64, 83,84

Morgan’s Louisiana & Tennessee R. & SS. Co. v. Board of Health,

PE ROO oh haunt kb es nsew pn snneess sos evi 47,48

Nebbiae v. New York, 291 US. 502 (1933) .............. 68

New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., v. Merchants Bank of Boston, 47

eS ONC ci clecbdedees ae tecncesanees’s 66

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104(1911) .............. 41

Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559 (1882) ................ 46

‘

Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107

Se ss og a «ck 50h sn ace 46,47

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ........... 68

Phenix Ins. Co, Ex Parte, 118 U.S. 610 (1886) .14,50,52,64

Plymouth, The,70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865) ............ 14,50,52

Port Richmond & B.P. Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, 234

ET RI a ie haa ook vet eee aes bene 47

Ramsey v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611 (1827) .......... 51,53

Rebecca, The, 20 F.Cas. 373 No. 11, 619) D. Me. 1831) .......... 66

Richardson v, Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911)........ 14,63, 64, 65,67

Rodrigue v, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969)1983,84

Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US.

ec dle conse REE PP POP EG its er gree 51, 56,82

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) ............... 81

Skirctes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1940) ...........020e ee eeeeee 47

Slaughterhouse Cases, The, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) ......... 81

Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931) ......... 200 - eee ee eeee 47

South Carolina v, Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1937) ........... 47

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1944) ............ 47

Scuthern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) .............

8,13,15,49,56,62,78,89

Southshore, The, 35 F.2d110 (3rd Cir. 1929) cert. den. 281 US.

TUN CE ee is cickss iis a aoa 65

Standard Dredging Corporation v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943) ...

15,16,61,62,89

St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896) ..

13,41,42,43

Steamer St. Lawrence, The, 66 U.S. (1 Black.) 522 (1862) 8,14,15,54

Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, The, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825)14,52

Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857) ............. 15,57

Thomas Barlum, The, 293 U.S. 21 (1934) .........20 ce ceceeees 55

Thomas vo. Lene, 2 Sumn. 9 (1834) ........scccccccccvcces 50,51

oe a a er meer 67

DI is te Pe hikbe net bccn ecpeccceswcaae 52

Tungus, The v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) .......... 56,62,64

United States v, Butler, 297 U.S. 1(1935) .........22e eee eeeee 82

United States v, Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ............-2005- 68

United States v, Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1940) ......... 82

United States v, Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960) ............-.-5++ 72

United States v, Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) . 17,68

United States v, Standard Oil Co. 384 U.S. 224 (1966) ........... 31

Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law,404U.S. _, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) .

14,53,54

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sf

Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 218 (1924) ...18,77,82

Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) ............... 78

Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) .76

Wilmington Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S.

ORE TU ie kh Cheick cs ce 47

RUF E) kccn a Pee chueachukbadedccekexksakoiusicct ue 58,60

Earl Faircloth v. M/T Delian Apollon (M.D. Fla.) No.

GT, Penn My THIN go ovo saci kes 30

United States Constitution

fs rr rer Ey renee 78

Aatigts TE, BOONE a bok ks cs ae 8,7,11,14, 46,

49, 50,51,52, 53, 54,56, 57,78, 82

DE in 6k oo oe ue hane sews ean 3, 16,67, 68

RO Rk 0 Ss oh web a hee ewnden 3,15, 59,60

Amendment X ........ 3,13,48, 49,5 0,51,80, 81, 82

Statutes—Federal

28 U.S.C.

ORIN sn b's b's 0G bab oo obo eke;

PE EE 6 oo b.0 ko bop dds oe shkence

RD 6 6 be dibs 50 oe

NI I 6 60 5 oo bobs oe cae

33 U.S.C.

ee OU ick s skh ebick ss boda cans

god oc sires cub vbwecc

chests cee nag, BEE PE pee er

cote. OP aah ern a a:

I i ork ok ec oc oe bo ueueeeiae..

etapa tnt cost eg FS nn chart

ey EE in os ccc bv cus ak in

OE 6 Wh eeu cassdbacccsl

NI sh 6 5 ike cc.

eine ee EEE SO On Sie ean?

ete te li og, CEE ee eo 75, 76

—ay

42 U.S.C. Sections 4331-47, National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190 § 101(c)......... 58

46 US.C.

Sections 181-189, 9 Stat. 635 .......... 16, 63,66, 67

Section 188 ......... 3,10, 16,18, 25, 33,36, 64,65

Es nc. ks de nee od be oe nee 3,64,65

ee RE ee Relea era are re 3,14,51,55

ee et ee ee i ec pans e 55

Section 1308, 49 Stat. 1207. § 8 (1936) ......... 68

Section 190-195, 27 Stat. 445. § 6 (1893) ........ 68

Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L.

91-224, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (April 3, 1970)

Sc pehbesie cca CU ewes » &y ve 2,3, 4, 7, 9,21

ee eee reer yp rr reye ert reer 4

a re reer ee 4

Ss ice cae evaciee shone 4

os dss ipa wesw 4

ey 5,8

Section AR(pp{h) ... cc cccccccvccsccvcccee 5

i reer ee ee 5

1954 London International Convention for the Prevention

of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as amended April 11,

1962, Annex A (1966) 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.1.AS. No.

6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 382. 00... cc eee eee were eens 28

Statutes—State

Chapter 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970

3,5, 6, 9,11, 12, 13,14, 21, 58

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Section 372.04, Florida Statutes (1970) ............ 72

Chapter 376, Florida Statutes (1970) 58, 61

IC 5scas kes cecucieus Poe °

I, Rane oes he bu hk be W ec c ka 33

IE $n 64 hn bee oo pln os has 72

Section 376.07 ....... ene neu ees beabae es Te

DON III: oo cine «odes dns ee oaaecenes 36

IN 55s sicnw snc kv oh auineses 72

OO ee 33,35,36,72,74

pss th nag:iah TC ST rs Oe OES 35,73

A IE he we bees we 6s bbe Wa ech 73

Chapter 16B—16.08 Regulations, Department of Natural

Resources, State of Florida ...........ccce0: 3,6

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

Baldwin, Public Policy on Oil—An Ecological Perspectwe, 1

Ecology L. Q. 245 (Spring 1971) 31

Bryan, Water Supply and Pollution Control Aspects of

Urbanization, 30 Law & Contemp. Probl. 174 (1965) 23

Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Inter. Law J. 317

(1970) 20, 24, 30,33

Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward A New Solution to the

Problem of Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 632

(1970) 25,34

Harolds, Limitation of Liability and Its Application to Pleasure

Boats, 37 Temp. L. Q. 423 (1964) 67

Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water

Quality, Part I: State Pollution Control Problems, 52 lowa

L. Rev. 186 (1966)

Mason, The Supreme Court and Federalism, 44 Texas L. Rev.

1187 (1966) 80

Mendelsohn, Maritime Lia rility for Oil Pollution—Domestic and .

International Law, 38 Geo. Washington L. Rev. 1 (1969)

31,33,40

Muskie, Torts, Transportation, and Pollution: Do the Old Shoes

Still Fit? 7 Harv. Journal on Legislation 477 (1970) 69

Nanda, The Torrey Canyon Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44

Denver L. J. 400 (1967) 25,33

Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water Quality

Improvement Act of 1970, 55 Corelli L. Rev. 973 (1970)

26, 27,34

Note, Limitation of Liability, 35 Columbia L. Rev. 246 (1935)

Schmidhauser, “State’s Rights” and the Origin of the Supreme

Court’s Power as Arbiter in Federal-State Relations, 4

Wayne L. Rev. 101 (Spring 1958) 79

Shutler, Pollution of the Sea By Oil, 7 Houston L. Rev. 415

(1970) 28,41

Books

Bryce, 1, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (3rd ed. 1893) 79

Carr, DEATH OF SWEET WATERS (1966) 93

Carson, THE SILENT SPRING (1962) 24

Cooley, Il, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 43

Cowan, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968)

25, 33

de Toqueville, 1, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN (Bradley ed. 1945) 79

Gilmore and Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957) 64, 66

Graham, DISASTER BY DEFAULT: POLITICS AND WATER

POLLUTION (1966) 24, 71

Legare, 2, THE WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGARE (1845) 81

Madison, 2, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Hunt ed. 1901) 80

Rodale, OUR POISONED EARTH AND SKY (1964) 24

Wright, THE COMING WATER FAMINE (1966) 24

- |

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| |

Newspapers and Periodicals

St. Petersburg Independent, February 18, 1970 So 30

Tampa Tribune, February 16, 1970 be ai 30

Stein, Problems and Progress in Water Pollution, 2 Natural Resources

Journal 388 (1962) 24

Other

Hearings on H.R. 6495, H.R. 6609, H.R. 6794, and H.R. 7325 Before the

House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st. Cong., Ist

Sess., 261-269 (1969) 39

Senate Report No. 1593, June 11, 1948 (To accompany H.R. 238); House

Report No. 1523, Mar. 8, 1948, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1948. 56

United States Code Congressional and Administratwe News, May 5, 1970

76

Legal, Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability and Financial

Responsibility as Related to Oil Pollution, A Study by the Program of

Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington

University, For the United States Coast Guard (1970) $1, $7

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- October Term, 1971

No. 71-1082

REUBIN O’D. ASKEW, et al.,

Appellants,

-Vs-

THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS

OPERATORS, INC., et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

OPINION BELOW 7

The opinion of the district court is reported in The

American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F.Supp.

1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971). A copy thereof is:included herewith

in the Appendix (A 39-55).

JURISDICTION

This appeal is from a final order entered in a suit for

injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284/3),

The order was entered December 10, 1971. Notice of Appeal

was filed in the United States District Court, Northem

District, of Florida, December 23, 1971. Jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked in accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1253, authorizing appeal from an order of a three-judge court

permanently enjoining enforcement of a state statute when

such order gives rise to a substantial question such as one

involving conflict between state and federal interests. The

Court noted probable jurisdiction on April 17, 1972. 40 L.W.

3503.

&

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the District Court erred in declaring unconstitu-

tional a statute designed to protect the state, its citizens, and

its environment from economic and ecological damage

‘esulting from massive pollution of its territorial waters

wncident to an occurrence during the transport of oil or other

substances by sea, on ground that in Article III, Section 2,

Clause 3, United States Constitution, the states surrendered to

the federal government all power to enact substantive

legislation affecting maritime commerce.

2. Whether the District Court erred in construing the

Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L.

91-224, 91st Congress, 2d Session (April 3, 1970); 33 U.S.C.

§ 1161 et. seq. as preempting the states from enacting

legislation ithposing absolute and unlimited liability upon

owners or operators of vessels or terminal facilities which

cause massive pollution of the state’s territorial waters by oil

or other substances.

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—

STATUTES INVOLVED

Chapter 70-224, Laws of Florida, 1970, published as

Chapter 376, Florida Statutes (1970), is too lengthy for

inclusion verbatim, and is set out in the Appendix (A 56-73).

Chapter 16B-16.08, Regulations, Department of Natural

Resources, State of Florida, promulgated in accordance with

Chapter 70-244, §§ 7, 14, Laws of Florida, 1970, is set out

in the Appendix (A 73-74).

The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L.

91-224, 91st Congress, 2d Session (April 3, 1970), Codified as

33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. is also set out in appropriate part in

the Appendix (A 75-90).

The Limitation of Liability Act, originally Chapter 43,

Section 3, 9 Stat. 635 (March 3, 1851), amended and codified

as 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964) is set out in the Appendix (A

91-92).

46 U.S.C. § 189

§ 189. Limitation of liability of owners of vessels for debts

The individual liability of a shipowner shall be limited to

the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his

individual share of the vessel bears to the whole; and the

aggregate liabilities of all the owners of vessel on account of

the same shall not exceed the value of such vessels and freight

pending: Provided, That this provision shall not prevent any

claimant from joining all the owners in one action; nor shall

the same apply to wages due to persons employed by said

shipowners. June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 57.

The extension of Admiralty Act, 62 Stat. 496 (June 19,

1948), 46 U.S.C. 740, is set out in the Appendix (A 93).

Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution, the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ninth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Tenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution are set out in

the Appendix (A 94).

28 U.S.C. § 1333

§ 1333. Admiralty, maritime and prize cases

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive

of the courts of the states, of:

(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,

saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they

are otherwise entitled.

(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all

proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize,

June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 931; May 24, 1949, c. 139, §

79, 63 Stat. 101.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L.

91-224, 91st Congress, 2d Session, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seg,

(hereafter “W.Q.1.A.” in citation; “Federal Act” in text)

became law April 3, 1970, while the Florida legislature was in

annual session. The Federal Act prohibits the discharge by

vessels of oil into navigable waters of the United States or the

contiguous zone. W.Q.1.A. §§ 11(a), (b), et seg. Should such

a discharge occur through willful negligence or willful

misconduct within privity or knowledge of the owner or

operator of the vessel, the government may recover the entire

clean-up cost from the owner or operator. W.Q.1LA. §

11(f)(1). If a discharge occurs other than from willful

negligence or misconduct, the government can _ recover

clean-up costs unless the owner or operator can prove any of

four defenses: act of God, act of war, negligence on the part

of the government, or act or omission of a third party.

W.Q.LA. § 11(f)(1).

This strict liability is not without limitation, however,

Recovery is limited to $100 per gross ton of the vessel or

$14 million, whichever is less. W.Q.1.A. § 11(g). Conse

quential damages, or costs imposed by such a discharge on

other than “the government,” are not recoverable under the

Federal Act.

The Federal Act also requires owners of vessels of more

than 300 gross tons using United States ports or navigable

waters to establish and maintain evidence of financial

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5

responsibility equal to the aforementioned limits by insurance,

surety bonds, qualification as a self-insuror, or other means.

W.Q.LA. § I11(p)(1). In the event of a discharge, the

government may proceed directly against the insuror who has

benefit of all defenses available to the vessel owner or

operator. W.Q.1.A. § 11(p)(3).

Section 11(0)(2) of the Federal Act reads:

Nothing in this sectiorashall be construed as preempting

any State or political |subdivision thereof from imposing

any requirement of liabil ith respect to the discharge of

oil into any waters wit ch State.

The Florida Oil-Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act,

Chapter 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970; Chapter 376, Florida

Statutes (1970) (hereafter referred to in citation by chapter

number and in text as “Florida Act”) was a Committee

Substitute for Senate Bill No. 450 (A 56-73). It passed the

legislature less than 90 days after the Federal Act became law,

was approved by the Governor June 30, 1970, and took

effect in part the following day (A 73). Provisions of the

Federal Act were fresh insthe minds of committee members.

Federal-State cooperation is keynoted throughout the State

Act.

The legislature further declares that it is the intent of this

act to support and complement applicable provisions of the

federal water quality improvement act of 1970! specifically

those provisions relating to the national contingency plan

for removal of oil and other pollutants. Ch. 71-244, Laws

of Florida, 1970, § 2(6).

Nothing in this act shall affect in any way the right of any

person.who renders assistance in containing or removing oil

or other pollutants to reimbursement for costs of such

- Containment or removal under the applicable provisions of

the federal water quality improvement act of 1970! or any

rights which said person may have against any third party

whose acts or omissions in any way have caused or

"$8 U.S.C.A. § 1151 et seq.

a

contributed to the discharge of such oil or other pollutants,

Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970, § 8(5). .

This act, being necessary for the general welfare, the

public safety of the state and its inhabitants, shall be

liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under

this act and the federal water quality improvement act of

1970.’ Ch. 70-244, § 21, Laws of Florida, 1970.

Limitations of the Federal Act were also fresh in the minds

of state legislative committee members who recognized gaps in

protection afforded by the Federal Act, and sought to fill

those gaps with safeguards peculiarly necessary to Florida

Instead of liability limited by gross tonnage of an offending

vessel up to an arbitrary ceiling for pollution by oil alone, the

Florida Act imposes unlimited liability without fault upon

vessels discharging other pollutants as well as oil while

destined for or leaving any Florida port. Ch. 70-244 § 12,

Laws of Florida, 1970. Instead of recovery limited to clean-up

costs of the State alone, the Florida Act provides for damages

“resulting from injury to others.” Ch. 70-244, § 12. Terminal

facilities, whether onshore or offshore, are subject to the same

liability as vessels. Ch. 70-244, § 3(9). ‘Owners and operators

are liable, Ch. 70-244, § 12, and must maintain satisfactory

evidence of financial responsibility measured by $100 per

gross ton of the largest vessel up to a $5 million ceiling as

opposed to the $14,000,000 limit in the Federal Act. Ch.

16B-16.08, Regs. Department of Natural Resources, State of

Florida; Ch. 70-244, §§ 7, 14. (A 73-74). Special

containment gear and crews trained in use thereof are required,

Ch. 70-244, § 7(1)(a), and vessels are subject to inspection by

state officials to ascertain presence of such gear and to assess

seaworthiness of the ship prior to entry into any Florida port.

Ch. 70-244, § 7(c).

The effective date for regulatory requirements of the

Florida. Act, including financial responsibility and unlimited

and absolute liability provisions, was extended by the Board

of Natural Resources to March 15, 1971.

Suit was filed March 9, 1971, and a hearing on plaintiffs’

133 U.S.C.A. § 1151 et seq.

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7

plication for temporary restraining order was held March

11-12, 1971.

Plaintiffs and intervenors include merchant shippers, world

shipping associations which insure an estimated three-fourths

of the world’s tonnage, certain members of the Florida coastal

barge and towing industry, and owners and operators of oil

terminal facilities and heavy industries located in Florida

rts.

" etic are members of the Cabinet of the State of

Florida, before the Court in dual capacities. They were sued

in their official position as highest elected officers of. the

state, and they were sued as members of the Board of Natural

Resources. Also included are the director of the Department

of Natural Resources, and a conservation officer. The State of

Florida intervened as a party defendant on ground that

interests to be adjudicated were much broader: than those

protected by the Department of Natural Resources.

At the two-day hearing on_ plaintiffs’ application for

temporary restraining order, testimony of plaintiffs’ represent-

atives revealed that not one of them had attempted to comply

with the Florida Act or regulations issued thereunder, but

that shippers had advised them that vessels would be diverted

from Florida ports if the Act were implemented. Indeed,

certain vessels had in fact been diverted to ports in other

states. Testimony of an employee of the Department of

Natural Resources was to the effect that some 669 vessels had

been approved for traffic to and from Florida ports, their

owners or operators having complied in advance with financial

responsibility requirements. The temporary restraining order

was subsequently entered nunc pro tunc to March 12, 1971.

The three-judge panel was convened and heard this cause

on April 27, 1971. Judgment of the District Court was

entered December 10, 1971, with a memorandum opinion

finding (1) that maritime law ‘evolved’ under Article Ill,

Section 2 of the United States Constitution, augmented from

time to time by the federal judiciary, and changed further by

congressional enactment, such as the Water Quality Improve-

ment Act of 1970; (2) that the Federal Act is ‘tangible

evidence’ that the Florida Act is an unconstitutional intrusion

ay

into the federal maritime domain because it makes changes in

substantive maritime law such as providing absolute and

unlimited liability for owners and operators of offending

vessels, and because it also contains provisions for compen-

sating state and private parties for property damage as well as

clean-up costs; (3) that oil-spill pollution is a maritime tort

governed strictly by rules of admiralty law and is exclusively

within the federal domain; (4) that since the Florida Act

substitutes absolute and unlimited liability for admiralty’s

negligence and unseaworthiness tests and severely limited

liability, it contravenes federally protected tenets of maritime

law and is invalid upon the authority of Southern Pacific Co,

v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); (5) that to permit Florida to

legislate in such fashion would be to ‘sound the death knell to

the principle of uniformity’; (6) that limited remedies and

relief available under the Federal Act notwithstanding,

Congress did not leave ‘gaps’ in oil-spill pollution laws for the

states to fill in—even though the Federal Act fails to provide a

remedy, the states are nonetheless precluded from creating

one—under authority of Moragne v. United States Lines, Inc.,

398 U.S. 375 (1970); (7) that the preemption disclaimer of

Section 11 (0)(2) of the Federal Act does not mean what it

says because Congress lacks power to permit states to legislate

requirements or liabilities with respect to discharge of oil

within state waters when such legislation might tend to

affect—or conflict with established rules governing—maritime

- commerce, on authority of Knickerbocker Ice Company v.

Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558

(1875) and The Steamer St. Lawrence, 1 B1. 522 (1862); and

(8) that the Florida Act must fall in its entirety, despite a

severability clause, because, absent fatally defective provisions,

the Act ‘would not comprise a coherent legislative scheme,’ a

point that will not be disputed on appeal.

Notice of Appeal was filed with the United States-District

Court, Middle District of Florida, on December 23, 1971, and

probable jurisdiction noted on April 17, 1972.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

L

A. The essential question to be decided here is to what

extent a state, in the exercise of its police power, may

legislate to control, establish responsibility, and assess liability

for massive oil-spill pollution of its territorial waters. The

District Court ruled that Florida was precluded from passing

any legislation which would have an adverse effect upon or

otherwise interfere with established tenets of general maritime

law, and that, as to oil-spill pollution laws, Congress had

preempted the field by passage of the Water Quality

Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 91, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et

seq. (Federal Act). But the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and

Pollution Control Act of 1970, Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida,

1970; Chap. 376, Florida Statutes, (Florida Act) is a valid

expression of the State’s police power, protecting dominant

State interests not otherwise protected under (a) maritime

law, or (b) the Federal Act. Moreover, the Federal Act

expressly disclaims preemption. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(0)(2).

(1)

Necessity for conserving supplies of fresh water are urgent.

In the United States, approximately 650 billion gallons of

water are available for use per day. By the year 2000, it is

estimated that our consumption of fresh water will increase to

1000 billion gallons per day. It has been suggested that it will

be necessary to re-cycle water as we do glass and aluminum,

and to refine our desalinization processes, if we are to

continue to exist as an American civilization.

The public was just becoming aware of the water crisis

when the 60,000 gross ton tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground

and spilled half its Cargo, an estimated 450,000 barrels of

crude oil, into the English Channel. World-wide attention was

focused on efforts of Great Britain and France to control and

abate the massive oil-slick. The R.A.F. finally bombed the

wreck, and cleanup costs alone to France, Great Britain, and

the States of Guernsey were more than $16,000,000. In a

a

10

limitation proceeding under 46 U.S.C.-§ 183, owners of the

Torrey Canyon limited their liability to $50, the value of one

remaining life boat.

(2)

Had the Federal Act controlled the Torrey Canyon disaster,

claimants would still have found themselves more than $10 ,

million short. That Act limits liability to $100 per gross ton

or $14,000,000 whichever is lesser. Had the stranding

occurred in the contiguous zone, the discharge of oil would

probably not have constituted a violation under the Act in

any case. Had the Florida Act controlled, not only would

cleanup costs have been compensable, but owners of the

Torrey Canyon would have been exposed to claims from

private-owner damages to shore-front property as well. At

118,000 deadweight tons, the Torrey Canyon is less than half

the size of super-tankers afloat today and dwarfed by 500,000

to 800,000 ton giants on the drawing boards. The Florida Act

reflects natural concern for this State’s vulnerable coastline.

Damages to the ecology from a massive oil-spill are incapable

of final measurement for a long period of time following the

event, but adverse effects may be predicted with reasonable

accuracy based upon previous spills. Aside from destroying

the food chain and immediately killing fish and seabirds, there

are more dramatic effects. For example, when the tanker P.W.

Thirtle grounded off Newport, Rhode Island, 31,000 gallons

of crude oil were discharged in an effort to refloat her. This is

said to have resulted in virtual destruction of the entire oyster

fishing industry of Narragansett Bay.

Concern for ecology and economy of the State reached a

peak in mid-February, 1970, when the tanker Delian Apollon

ran aground, spilling 21,000 gallons of Bunker ‘C’ oil into

Tampa Bay. It formed a slick estimated to be 100 square

miles. in size, and cost nearly $1.5 million to clean up, the

amount of settlement in a suit filed by the State of Florida

Against this background, aware of limitations in the Federal

Act, the Florida legislature passed the State Act. It takes up

where the Federal Act leaves off.

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11

B. The District Court found that the Florida Act violated

Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution, in that

unlimited and absolute liability of the Act conflicted with (a)

general maritime law, and (b) provisions of the Federal Act.

But the thrust of the Florida Act is to provide a remedy for

non-maritime interests who are damaged on land by an

occurrence within territorial waters; i.e. a beach-front resort

and peripheral businesses dependent upon tourism attracted to

Florida by clean air, beaches, and climate. It is also designed

to protect aquafarming projects and commercial fishing

enterprise within the State’s territorial waters. Is there any

limitation to interests protected by the Florida Act? Should

an arbitrary limitation be imposed, measured by the value of

the vessel after it went down? Why should all public and

private interests of the State who are adversely affected by a

massive oil-spill be subject to frustrations of the Limitation of

Liability Act? E.g. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.Supp.

228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) modified, 409 F.2d 1013.

The Florida Act subjects shippers to absolute and unlimited

liability for damage resulting from a spill, and requires them

to demonstrate evidence of financial responsibility in an

amount satisfactory to the State’ Department of Natural

Resources before calling at Florida ports. Maritime interests,

claiming that inability to purchase insurance for an unlimited

amount precluded their doing business in the State, filed suit

contesting validity of the Act. They admitted that they had

made no attempt to comply with the Act. A State employee

testified during the TRO hearing, that 28 maritime companies

had shown satisfactory financial responsibility, clearing 669

ships for traffic to and from Florida ports. It is conceded that

maritime interests prefer to sail fully insured against all

contingencies, and that unlimited liability precludes insurance

alone as a means of showing financial responsibility, but this

should not sustain an argument going to constitutionality of

the Florida Act.

In hearings before the congressional committees considering

the Federal Act, maritime interests attacked absolute liability

as being inequitable in view of the fact that marine disasters

were often unavoidable, i.e., striking a mine, or being caught

ie

12

in a hurricane. Ships in innocent passage, goes the argument,

should not be deemed responsible for results of an accident

caused by an unforseen force. But this argument overlooks

the fact that in most instances, ship and cargo are

insured, and that the ship would not be in hurricane latitudes

in the first place were it not for profits derived from the

voyage to (a) the owner of the bottom whose mortgage is

being paid by the time-charter, (b) the charterer, whose leased

tanker-fleet may have been on a course charted by (c) an

operator, a subsidiary of (d) the cargo-owner, a major

petroleum company. Profit is behind all of the motives that

got the vessel into the storm in the first place,.and that

profit-margin takes into account loss by unavoidable accident,

It is the non-maritime property-owner ashore who is truly the

innocent party. Why should he or the public fisc assume

liability for any or all of the maritime parties noted above?

The argument also ignores modern concepts of tort law, that

liability should fall upon the party in the best Position to

bear the loss or distribute the risk. In this context that party

is the vessel or cargo owner or both agencies together, since

they profit from the carriage contract, appreciate’ the full risks

involved, and are in the best position to insure against them.

C. (1) The Florida Act is a valid expression of the state’s

police power. If the State cannot protect its citizens and

property from ravages of oil-spill pollution caused by ships

calling at its ports, then it has failed to meet an essential

responsibility of government. Without unlimited and absolute

liability, such protection is not afforded.

Maritime interests argue that-since they may lawfully store,

use, and transfer pollutants in the course of their lawful

business, they should be liable only for negligence in its

operation. If they can demonstrate no negligence, they should

suffer no liability. To this, the citizen responds: ‘I also own

my property and have a lawful right to enjoy it and a clean

environment. I did nothing to cause the spill of pollutants

into state waters. You are blameless of negligence. Yet the

waters are polluted, the air is fouled, our beaches smeared,

and my business is ruined as the result of a discharge from

operation of your agency, albeit careful and cautious and

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13

prudent. Why should I be denied redress even though I have -

done nothing-to bring about this discharge?’ (Paraphrased

from St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. —

1 (1896), a case involving sparks from passing locomotives

rather than oil from passing vessels, but analogous to the

equitable argument in the case at bar.)

The Florida Act makes those who traffic in pollutants

responsible for damage to property and the environme

which those pollutants cause upon discharge into state waters.

To deny the State’s competency to do this is to assert that

the ultimate burden for oil-spill pollution is properly that of

the private citizen or the public treasury rather than those

_ whose instrumentality caused the discharge. The police power

of the State is peculiarly appropriate to the object sought by.

the Florida Act.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) describes the breadth

of the police power. Huron Portland Cement C. p. City of

Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) approves its application in a

maritime commerce context. Mechanics of the Florida Act are

necessary to its enforcement, i.e., provisions for maintaining

financial responsibility; requiring certain containment gear;

requiring minimum sea conditions for entry and unloading;

provisions for boarding and: inspection. This Court has

sanctioned such mechanics in one form or another in a line of

" cases beginning with Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53

U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The District Court’s failure to

recognize the Florida Act as a legitimate exercise of the

State’s police power led it to err.

(2)

‘Powers to provide protection described in the Florida Act

were reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment. The

Tenth Amendment contemplates a conflict of power between

the state and Federal domains. But, the District Court’s

treatment of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S..205-

(1917) and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149

(1920), tends to establish admiralty as a third, autonomous

sovereignty, impervious to influences of either state or

14

national governments. This case should not add to the legend.

Article Ill, Section 2 is, on its face, simply a delegation of

judicial power over cases of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction. It has now been so broadened as to authorize

congressional action. extending substantive maritime law far

beyond its original limits.

The Florida Act speaks to sea-to-shore and, hence,

non-maritime, torts. Oil-spill damages described in the State

Act are consummated on land. Hence, admiralty jurisdiction

would not have arisen at all, The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)

20 (1865); Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U.S. 610 (1886);

The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), had

it not been for the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 62

Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740. But, see Richardson v. Harmon,

222 U.S. 96 (1911), an anomaly.

D. (1) But in extending admiralty jurisdiction to land,

Congress over-stepped the constitutional grant of Article III,

Section 2. That provision has been judicially determined to

speak to torts only if they occurred on navigable water. The

Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). Since

congressional authority for extending maritime jurisdiction

relies exclusively upon the Admiralty Clause, The Genesee

Chief; The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1868); American Ins.

Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), and congressional

power can only be as extensive as Article III, Section 2, then

the Court becomes the surveyor determining how far that

power may extend. Congress cannot extend it beyond this

Court’s interpretations of Article III, Section 2, without

exercising a judicial function. In the case of torts, substantive

federal jurisdiction is measured by locality; if the tort occurs

on navigable water it is a maritime tort. Victory Carriers, Inc.

v. Law, 404 U.S. , 30 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1971), reminds us that

the locality test was settled law 50 years ago. Grant

Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), In

extending maritime tort jurisdiction over sea-to-shore torts

beyond navigable waters, Congress has rendered admiralty law

amphibious; locality means nothing. Congress. has also

construed the Admiralty Clause in a manner inconsistent with

this Court, exercising a super-judicial function. The Steamer

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_—_

15

St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 523 (1861); The Belfast, 74

US. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22

(1931). The Admiralty Extension Act is invalid.

(2)

But, if the Admiralty Extension Act is not unconstitution-

al, states are still free to enact substantive law in matters

maritime. The extension of admiralty jurisdiction to land was

not exclusive. Legislative history clearly shows that the Act

signified no intrusion into common law preserves of the

Saving Clause. Admiralty is not exclusive within the maritime

tort context. Cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1

Wheat.) 304 (1816). Strict principles of uniformity are not

applicable here, Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), and

the state may still act substantively in the field of maritime

tort remedies. There is no authority for suggesting that the

state has lost its concurrent jurisdiction over maritime torts.

The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, (1907); Taylor v. Carryl, 61

U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857).

(3)

The Constitution recognizes an individual’s fundamental

right to a healthful environment. This right, though not

enumerated, was retained by the people in the Ninth

Amendment. Certainly there is a guarantee to a healthy

environment as fundamental as the penumbral right to

privacy. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 79 (1965). In

the Florida Act, this guarantee is secured against continuing

assaults of oil pollution of the seas. People of Florida had a

right to take up statutory arms in defense of their

environment.

E. The Jensen Doctrine is inapplicable to an attack against

the Florida Act. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen sets out a

hide-bound principle of uniformity necessary only to certain

matters maritime which the District Court mistaken applied

ouside the arena of Jensen’s facts, Standard Dredging Corp. v.

Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1942), despite language of the Jensen

—y

16

Case itself which impliedly precludes its application into the

common law area of torts. 244 U.S. at 218.

F. (1) Limitation of liability should not be applicable to a

sea-to-shore tort, despite Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96

(1911), which extended the Limitation of Liability Act, 46

U.S.C. §§ 181-189, to a non-maritime tort. If that case is of

sufficient vitality to reach sea-to-shore tort actions arising out

of an oil-spill, then it will frustrate (a) fair recovery of cleanup

costs by other agencies than the Federal government, and (b)

private property owners’ recovery in common law actions,

Reasons underlying codification of the concept of limited

liability never contemplated severe damage to shore property

inflicted by a massive oil-spill. Continued protection of

maritime interests to the detriment of the state and its

citizens is no longer justified in an era of sophisticated

maritime insurance and super-tankers. It is apparent that

limitation proceedings would not protect ship-owners from

claims of the United States arising under the Federal Act.

Why should limits imposed by 46 U.S.C. § 183 be resurrected

to preclude a non-Federal claim?

& (2)

History of limitation of liability further demonstrates its

inappropriateness to an oil-spill context. Designed to protect

ship-owners from claims of cargo-owners and passengers, it

was never conceived to thwart just claims of persons not in

privity with maritime commerce. Its application to Torrey

Canyon cleanup claims, in re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281

F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) modified, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d

Cir 1969), shows how inequitable its extension to this context

would be. Moreover, its applicability to torts consummated on

land is unconstitutional in that (a) it extends admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction beyond the locality of navigable waters,

and (b) has the effect of depriving damaged property owners

of their property without substantive due process of law in

violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Limitation of liability is strictly a creature of an

act of Congress. It is no less an arbitrary deprivation of

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17

property than it would be if owners of the ship took control

of the ruined beachfront under authority of a Federal statute.

Cf. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799

(1950). While the hotel-owner whose business is ruined has his

day in court as a result of limitation proceedings, it is form

without substance; that he will be denied full compensation

for his loss is fore-ordained. To apply it in this context is a

perversion of the remedy which the Limitation of Liability

Act was designed to provide. This unconstitutional application

of an ancient tenet of maritime law should not be affirmed as

a legitimate frustration of the states’ police power.

Ol

| A. Just as maritime law should continue to develop in a

| reasonably consistent pattern, so should states take

appropriate measures to assure protection of their citizens,

economy, and ecology from massive oil-spills. Despite obvious

conflict in this case, these ambitions are not mutually

exclusive. That they clash at all is because the District Court

interpreted the apparent conflict raised by the complaint in

absolute terms of hornbook dogma, willing to uphold abstract

tenets of “uniformity” to the detriment of the State and its

citizens. The position of the State is, however, that the

Florida Act should be judged not by its asserted conflict with

narrow principles of maritime law, but by its response to the

Federal Act.

(1)

Analysis of both Federal and State Acts indicates that,

while they partially overlap in territorial application, the

former is not restrictive of the other. Rather than competition

in regulation of maritime commerce, the two Acts speak to

Federal-State cooperation in meeting the threat of oil

pollution of coastal waters. Although the Florida Act provides

unlimited and absolute liability while the Federal Act provides

certain defenses and limits liability, there is no antagonism

between conflicting jurisdictions. Liability under the Federal

18

Act attaches only to cleanup costs incurred by governmental

agencies. Under the State Act, liability is measured by the

actual cleanup costs to the State and to damage claims by

private citizens. The primary responsibility of the government

the Federal Act is in coordinating response of State and

Federal teams to a maritime disaster threatening pollution of

coastal waters. In the National Contingency~Plan, the Federal

Act contemplates close cooperation between State and

Federal agencies to combat a mutual nemesis. There is a

strong implication in the Federal Act that court proceedings

arising thereunder are not within the province of maritime law

at all; i.e. express grant of jurisdiction to the Federal judiciary

which would be unnecessary had Congress deemed the Federal

Act to be a part of general maritime law, and, as noted,

liability measured by tonnage up to $14,000,000 with no

reference to, or room for, limitation proceedings under 46

U.S.C. § 183.

Moreover, in 1161(0)(2), the Federal Act expressly

disclaims preemption of States from providing “any require-

ment or liability with respect to the discharge of oil into any

waters within such State.” Surely this speaks to state

substantive law. The District Court erred in finding that in

that Section, Congress did not mean what it said because

Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)

precludes such delegation of authority to state legislatures. To

frustrate the clear expression of Federalism contained in the

Federal Act on authority of Knickerbocker Ice is to overlook

(a) the limited purposes for which that case was decided

(based upon necessity for upholding the Jensen Doctrine,

already shown to be inapplicable here), and (b) the strong

dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis, particularly appropriate to the

instant contoversy, in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264

U.S. 218 (1924). -

(2)

A review of the historical development of Federalism in the

United States describes reason for its emphasis in this case. To

hold that states are precluded from exercising their Federalist

responsibilities—so clearly contemplated in the Federal

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19

Act-merely to extend the abstraction of “uniformity”

beyond confines of the Jensen context, would be contrary to

previously cited authority of this Court, inconsistent with the

clear intent of Congress in the Federal Act, and a denial of

the police power of the State.

(3)

The District Court noted that, as to arguments raised by

Florida that the State Act filled gaps deliberately left by

Congress in the Federal Act, the “gap” theory had been put

to rest by Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375

(1970), a case the State of Florida respectfully suggests is

inappropriate to the instant controversy. In so doing, the

District Court overlooked this Court’s opinions in Rodrigue v.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), and Chevron

Oil Co. v. Huson, U.S. ,30 L.Ed. 2d 296, (1971). The

“gap” theory is an integral part of Congress’ expression of

Federalism in the Federal Act, and should be affirmed as such

by reversal of the judgment of the District Court.

ARGUMENT

The fact that judicial power of the United States is

extended “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction” by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution

does not impose a permanent barrier in the path of State

legislatures seeking to protect citizens, property, ecology,

economy and gencral welfare from the deleterious effects

of massive oilspill pollution of state waters.

A. Preliminary Statement

“Pollution has been defined as ‘... any substance added to the

marine environment as a result of man’s activities which has a measur-

able and generally detrimental effect upon the environment.’ Ketchum,

Man’s Resources in the Marine Environment, in Conference

on Pollution and Marine Ecology 1, 3 (1967). The majority of oil

pollution is caused by persistent oils, that is, crude oil, fuel oil,

heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oil. These oils persist for months on

the surface of the sea and are capable of being carried considerable dis-

tances by currents, winds, and surface drifts.”

Issues rising here are as subtle as they are varied. They

reach across key provisions of the Constitution, to be

discussed below, and involve decisions of this Court which

track development of (a) maritime law, and (b) our federal

system of state and national priorities. Ultimately, considera-

tion of these issues leads to a bed-rock question of national

and, perhaps, international consequence: the extent to which

a state, in the exercise of its police power, may enact

legislation to control, establish responsibility, and assess

liability for oil-spill pollution of its territorial waters. The

thrust of the District Court’s order is that it cannot do so in

any case; that in certain constitutional provisions states have

irrevocably surrendered this power to the Federal domain; and

that several statutes enacted under authority of these

1 Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harvard International Law Journal 316,

(Spring 1969), fn. 1.

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21

constitutional provisions preempt the field of (a) water

quality control as it relates to oil-spill pollution, and (b) all

matters maritime.

It is Florida’s position that its Oil Spill Prevention and

Pollution Control Act of 1970? (hereinafter the Florida or

State Act) is not such an onerous intrusion into federal

maritime law as the Court below found it to be. To the

extent that friction between the state and the maritime

province occurs, however, Florida’s position is firmly fixed

upon the high-ground fact that it has not only a right but a

duty to protect the health and welfare of its citizens, and

that, in a collision between this duty and prerogatives claimed

under maritime law, it is the latter that must give way to the

former.

This, of course, presumes that the State Act is a valid

exercise of the police power. Florida contends that it is unless

Congress has preempted the field in the Water Quality

Improvement Act of 1970° (hereinafter the Federal Act). The

District Court held that the Federal Act does in fact preempt

the field. But Congress, and the State of Florida, disagree.*

Any exercise of the police power implies a certain urgency.

It is helpful to view the Florida Act from the perspective of

urgency that prompted its passage.

Dominant state interests are at stake here: conservation of

water as a natural resource, the right of its citizens to an

unpolluted environment, and the right of its citizens to the

full use and enjoyment of their property. The Legislature of

the State of Florida determined that these rights and

resources were fundamental and compelling, and were

endangered by continued assaults of marine pollution. The

2Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970; Chapter 376, Florida Statutes.

3Pub.L. 91-244, 91st Congress, 2d Session (Apr. 3, 1970), 84 Stat. 91; 33 U.S.C.

§ 1161 et seq.

“38 U.S.C. § 1161 (0)(2).

—

22

State Act was designed to protect. these interests. It was

conceived as an expression of the State’s police power, “bei

necessary for the general welfare, the public health, and the

public safety of the state and its inhabitants... ”* It was also

conceived as an expression of federalism, a willingness to

enter into a joint venture with the national government for

the abatement and control of oil-spill pollution, an enterprise

shaped by Congress in the Federal Act, (which only provides

for Federal action, for damages assessable for Federal costs,

for massive Federal-State cooperation, and which specifically

disavows preemption).

To conclude, as the District Court did, that a state cannot

legislate in this area because the power of Congress to regulate

maritime commerce is exclusive, is to rely heavily upon a

non-sequitur. It is true that Congress alone may regulate

: maritime commerce. But it does not follow from this that the

state is forbidden to exercise its police power to protect

fundamental and compelling state interests. These points will

be discussed below.

Through all of the flurry of legal argument invoking

traditional concepts of Federal maritime policy, the Court is

respectfully requested to measure the State Act by the end

sought to be achieved: the right of a state to protect its

property and that of its citizens. The property sought to be

protected is, at least in one sense, necessary to life itself.

(1.)

The subject is water and the need to

conserve it.

The possibilities of losing our water supply by depletion or

pollution evoke fears almost as old as western civilization. To

destroy sweet water is to threaten life. The effects of sucha

loss are so awesome that the power to accomplish it was

ascribed early in our experience only to the deity who’

apportioned the power among a select few. So Moses

threatened Pharoah:

5Ch. 70-244, Laws of Florida, 1970, § 21.

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y de

“Behold, I will smite with the rod that is in my hand upon

the waters which are in the river, and they shall be turned.

And the fish that are in the river shall die, and the river

shall become foul... ”’ Exodus 7:17-18.

But, 4000 years later, the “‘select few” have multiplied

several million-fold, and today foul rivers and dead fish are

commonplace. To appreciate the magnitude of the problem, it

is necessary to understand the extent of our need for water.

In 1963, experts estimated that the maximum amount of

fresh water available for all uses in the United States was

approximately 650 billion gallons per day.® It was estimated

that the total fresh water usage eight years ago was 360

billion gallons per day.” The projection for the year 2000 was

1000 billion gallons per day.® Since this is 350 billion gallons

more than we have available, if the experts are within a 30%

margin of error, we can better understand Pharoah’s

predicament.

Two feasible solutions have been suggested. One is to refine

the process for making sea water potable,® and the other is to

re-use Our present water several times; to re-cycle water as we

do aluminum, glass, and paper.'® But in any case, it is

necessary to safeguard the quality of even that water we

intend to re-use. As Professor Hines observed in Part I of his

Iowa Law Review trilogy on this general problem, 52 Iowa L.

Rev. at p. 188:

Re-use of water requires that certain water quality levels be

maintained, however, and here is where water pollution is a

© Report of the Staff of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 88th Cong,., Ist

Sess. A Study of Pollution—Water 3 (Comm. Print 1963), cited in Hines, Nor Any

Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part I: State Pollution Control

Programs, 52 lowa L. Rev. 186 at 187, fn 2.

_ftines, p- 188, fn 3.

Id.

"Can, DEATH OF THE SWEET WATERS, 211-213 (1966).

See, Bryan, Water Supply and Pollution Control Aspects of Urbanization, 30

Law & Contemp. Prob. 174 (1965).

critical obstacle to the assurance of adequate water supplies

for the forseeable future. * * *

24

Two conclusions are reached from Professor Hines’ trilogy

and from a review of commentators he cites.'! First, the

water crisis will worsen, not abate, without strenuous efforts

to conserve our present supply. Second, even with such

strenuous efforts, developments in processes for re-cycling and

for desalizination are necessary if we are to survive as a

civilization.

The public had only just awakened to the urgent necessity

for conserving water resources when Moses smote the waters

with his rod. In late March, 1967, the 60,000 gross ton oil

tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground on Seven Stones Reef off

the coast of Cornwall, England. The ship split open and

discharged most of its crude oil cargo into the English

Channel. Worldwide attention was focused on the efforts of

two nations, Britain and France, to combat the massive slick.

A multitude of procedures were employed, without success.

Property damage particularly along the French coast was

enormous. The damage to marine and animal life will never be

accurately gauged. The R.A.F. finally bombed the wreck to

destroy it, and the British exchequer alone was £1,600,000

lighter.' ? ;

The Torrey Canyon was American owned and Liberian

registered. Therefore, the Board of Investigation of Liberia

held an official inquiry April 3-5, 1967, to determine the

cause of the stranding of the vessel. The Board found the sole

cause to have been negligence of the captain. It recommended

that his license be revoked.2>

11% Graham, DISASTER BY DEFAULT: POLITICS AND WATER POL-

LUTION (1966); Wright, THE COMING WATER FAMINE (1966); Rodale, OUR

POISONED EARTH AND SKY (1964); Carson, THE SILENT SPRING (1962);

Stein, Problems and Progress in Water Pollution 2 Natural Resources J. 388 (1962).

125c¢, Comments, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Inter. L. J. 316 (1969),

hereinafter cited as “Comments.”

13 Comments, p. 331, fn 69.

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25

The owners of the Torrey Canyon, as authorized by the

Limited Liability Act of 1851, Ch. 43, §3, 9 Stat. 635, 46

U.S.C. §183 (1964), were permitted to file a petition to limit

their liability to $50, the value of one surviving lifeboat.'*

This order was subsequently modified, 409 F. 2d 1013 (2d

Cir. 1969), but only by virtue of ingenious legal tactics by

attorneys for the governments of Great Britain, France, and

the States of Guernsey to avoid absurd limitations of

maritime law.' *

(2.)

The subject is also preservation of other

resources and the state’s right and duty to

protect them from oil pollution.

The problem with a massive oil slick is that its ultimate

effects are not always ascertainable before legal action must

be taken, and even when they are, there’s not very much that

victims can do to obtain compensable damages for their loss.

’ More than 880,000 barrels of oil were aboard the Torrey

Canyon, and more than half of it was estimated to have been

released into the sea.'® Britain figured its cost of clean-up at

$8,156,400. France sought an additional $8 million for

removing oil from its coasts. To off-set these clean-up costs,

the tanker’s owners settled out of court with the British and

French governments for $7.2 million.!7 Assuming that the

Federal Act had been in effect and had controlled the

outcome of liability arising out of the Torrey Canyon episode,

claimants would have received 1.2 million dollars less! At

$100 per gross ton, a 60,000 gross ton tanker has a liability

limit of $6 million. Even though the clean-up costs exceeded

$16 million, the $14,000,000 ceiling in the Federal Act would

never have been reached. See Notes, Liability for Oil Pollution

in re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

For the legal landscape prior to 1948, See Nanda, The Torrey Canyon Disaster:

mae v4 Legal Aspects, 44 Denver L. J.

Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward a New Solution for the Problem of

Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 632 (1970).

E. Cowan, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).

a

26

Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55

Cornell Law Review 973 (1970), where at fn 78, p. 982, is

the following comment relative to the $100 per gross ton

limitation in the Federal Act:

“Using the Torrey Canyon figures (59,000 tons of oil

cleaned up at a cost of $16 million), it costs about $270 to

clean up one ton of oil. Since the ratio of deadweight

tonnage (cargo capacity) to gross tonnage on the Torrey

Canyon was about two to one... the cleanup costs were

approximately $540 per gross ton.

“The $100 per gross ton limit is inadequate even if one

assumes, as did the American Petroleum Institute (1969

Hearings, pt. 4, 1318), the cost of cleanup following the

. Torrey Canyon wreck to be $7.2 million. Using that figure,

the costs come to $244 per gross ton.

“A study conducted by the Federal Water Pollution

Control Administration also indicates the insufficiency of

the $100 per gross ton figure. It was found that cleanup

costs range from under $1.00 to over $5.00 per gallon of

oil. There may be from 240 to 300 gallons of oil in one

ton, depending upon specific gravity and temperature.

Finally, the ratio of carrying capacity to gross tonnage

varies from 2.7:1 to 1.5:1. Using figures of $1.00 per

gallon, 250 gallons per ton, and a ratio of 1.8:1, cleanup

cost was calculated to be $450 per gross ton.

“Although gross tonnage has traditionally been used to

calculate liability, it is more meaningful to speak in terms

of dead weight tonnage. The latter is the cargo carrying

capacity of the vessel, and the ratio between the two varies

from vessel to vessel. Thus, although a liability figure based

on gross tonnage would accurately reflect cleanup costs of

the oil carried on one vessel, it might. be very inaccurate

when applied to another vessel. The amount of oil, not the

vessel’s gross tonnage, determines the cleanup costs. * * *”

If one estimates cleanup costs to be $270 per ton on an

average, the $14 million ceiling on negligence liability under

the Federal Act will limit recovery to spills somewhat under

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27

the Torrey Canyon class; it has been estimated by the same

commentator quoted above that this limitation will pay costs

of cleanup of only 51,851 tons of oil.!®

The Torrey Canyon, of course, at 118,000 dead weight tons,

was not the largest tanker afloat by any means. The tankers

E. Maersk (100,600 dwt), Bergebig (149,500 dwt), Esso

Scotia (250,000 dwt), Universe Island and Universe Kuewait

(each at 312,000 dwt) are already in use.’ But even these

larger vessels are not enough. The increase in shipment of oil

by sea demands bigger bottoms. As is noted at 10 Harvard

International Law Journal at page 317:

“*** (B)etween 1938 and 1967 world production of

oil increased nearly seven times, from 278 million tons per

year to 1,828 million tons. In 1967, it was estimated that

more than 700 million tons of this annual production were

being transported by sea.

“Not only is more oil being moved by sea each year, but

the size of oil tankers has also increased. The average

tanker used during World War II had a capacity of 16,000

tons, but by 1965 that average had risen to 27,000 tons,

and new tankers delivered in 1966 average about 76,000

tons. A Japanese company has launched a 276,000 ton

tanker, and other Japanese yards have orders for tankers as

large as 312,000 tons. More than sixty tankers of 150,000

tons or more are on order throughout the world, tankers of

500,000 to 800,000 tons are on the drawing boards, and

those of more than one million tons are thought to be

feasible. On the new 1,010 foot British tanker “Esso

Mercia” two officers have been issued bicycles to help

patrol the decks of the 166,890 ton vessel.

“The size of the tanker fleet itself is growing at a rate

that rivals the growth in average size of new tankers. In

1955 the world tanker fleet numbered about 2,500 vessels.

By 1965 it had increased to 3,500, and in 1968 it

1955 Cornell Law Review 973 at 982, fn 79.

55 Cornell Law Review 973 at p. 983, fn. 80.

28

numbered some 4,300 ships. At the present time nearly one

ship out of every five in the world merchant fleet is

engaged in transporting oil, and nearly the entire fleet is

powered by oil.

If the present limitations upon liability of ship owners are

to continue, limiting the owners’ liability to the value of the

vessel after the accident, and assuming no problems vis-a-vis

knowledge or privity on the part of the owners, it is not at all

inconceivable that an 800,000 dwt. ton super-tanker could

dump more than 3/4 of a million tons of crude oil between

the coast of Florida and the Gulf Stream, break up and sink,

and leave the owners completely free of liability for damages

to the environment, to private property, and to businesses

depending upon tourism.?° Assuming that the Federal Act

were applicable, at a cleanup cost of $270 per ton, the

owners liability would be limited to damage caused by less

than 52,000 tons out of the 750,000 tons spilled.

But even this is not certain under the Federal Act. For

under 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (b)(2) it is not a violation to

discharge oil into or upon waters of the contiguous zone

where such discharge is permitted by article IV of the

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of

the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended.’ Excepted discharges

under the Convention include those to save life at sea,

discharges resulting from damage to a ship, and jettison

discharges to safety of ship and cargo. Patently, catastrophic

oil-spills of the Torrey Canyon category occur for reason of

colision or stranding. It is difficult to imagine either without

“damage to the ship”. Thus, assuming Seven Stones Reef to

have been between three and 12 miles off-shore, the Federal

Act, had it governed recovery, would have availed the

government nothing.

20526 Shutler, Pollution of the Sea By Oil, 7 Houston L. Rev. 415 at p. 438

(1970).

211954 London International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the

Sea by Oil, as amended Apr. 11, 1962, annex A, (1966) 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.LA.S. No.

6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.

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29

Damages to business and to private property in such a

hypothetical catastrophe are almost limitless. It is not difficult

to understand the effect this would have on tourism and the

state’s economy, nor the rage and frustration of private

citizens whose right to enjoy the environment or, indeed,

their homes would be thereby diminished or destroyed.

But what of the damages to the ecology? To what extent is

such a tragedy an overdraft upon the bank in which is stored

this generation’s apportioned amount of our natural re-

sources?

“Some damage to marine life is obvious in the wake of a

disaster such as the one which befell the “Torrey Canyon’.

Surface feeding fishes die when they swim into floating oil,

and even slight, non-fatal contact may render the fish

inedible. Shellfish, among others, are also vulnerable to oil

pollution. When the tanker ‘P.W. Thirtle’ grounded off

Newport, Rhode Island, 31,000 gallons of heavy, black oil

were discharged from her tanks in an effort to refloat the

ship; the result of this was the virtual destruction of the

entire oyster fishery of Narragansett Bay. The most serious

consequences of oil pollution, however, may not be those

which are immediately obvious. According to Dr. Erwin S.

Iversen, a marine biologist:

The greatest problem may be the toxic effects on the

intertidal animals that serve as food for the other more

important fishes...1 don’t think the effect is merely

that of killing large populations of commercial fishes.

Worse than that, it interrupts the so-called food chain.

“There have been few specific studies of the effect that

oil accumulation has on this food chain. One study,

conducted by Dr. Paul Caltsoff of the United States Fish

and Wildlife Service, found that the diatoms on which

oysters feed will not grow where there is even a slight trace

of oil on the water. The effect of oil on such microscopic

marine plant life may be of great importance, because it is

estimated that it takes as much as ten pounds of plant

matter to produce one pound of fish.

30

“Large scale oil pollution, such as that which occurred

When the “Torrey Canyon” ran into Seven Stones Reef,

results in hugh lossess of water birds. Aside from humane

and aesthetic considerations, these birds play a vital role in

the ecology of the seashore, a role which profoundly

affects the fishing industry. The uncertainty as to the

actual extent of the damage done to marine life by oil

pollution makes it difficult to estimate the economic effect

of such damage, but the importance of the fishing industry

within the world’s economy is not in doubt and is steadily

increasing. Between 1958 and 1963, for example, there was

a 42% rise in the world catch. Because of the increasing

importance of seafood protein, future damages to marine

life will have progressively greater economic

consequences.??

All legislation is prospective, and it is necessary in preparing

legislation to think in terms of hypotheticals. But it is not

improbable that Florida would suffer a catastrophic oil-spill

of the dimensions theorized above. Far from it. The “‘it-can’t

happen-here” assurances should have been drowned in the

estimated 21,000 gallons of Bunker “C” oil?? that flowed

from the ruptured hull of the tanker Delian Apollon which

ran aground just south of Gandy Bridge in Tampa Bay on

February 13, 1970. The oil slick several days later covered

100 square miles of Tampa Bay,?* and cost Humble Oil &

Refining Company approximately $1.4 million to clean up, a

settlement out of court of the suit brought by the State of

Florida.?

It is against this background that the Florida legislature

convened in 1970, and passed the State Act. The legislature

was aware of the frustrations and trials met by the Senate

Committee attempting to shape realistic and responsible

2250 Harvard International Law J. $16 at p. $21 (1970).

236+ Petersburg Independent, February 18, 1970, p. 1.

24 Tampa Tribune, February 16, 1970, p. 1.

25 gerl Faircloth v. Motor Tanker Delian Apollon, USDC, M.D., Tampa Division,

No. 70-47-Civ-T, February 16, 1971.

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31

legislation on the Federal level.?® The legislature was also

aware that the Federal Act, which became law during the first

week of the 1970 session, expressly sanctioned the right of

the states to enact legislation in the field of marine oil-spill

pollution. Moreover, Florida lawmakers were aquainted with

shortcomings in the Federal Act, such as the limitation of

negligence liability, and its limited effectiveness to oil pollu-

tion only. The State Act attempts to fill gaps in the Federal

Act; it takes up where the Federal Act leaves off.

B. The District Court’s Error

“Oil is oil and whether useable or not by

industrial standards it has the same deleterious

effect on waterways. In either case, its

presence in our rivers and harbors is

both a menace to navigation and a

pollutant.” 7

“Pollution by oil is no longer accepted as a

necessary, if unfortunate, by-product of oil

use in furnishing the energy needs of the

United States. Damage from oil pollution

has become a major part of the public

concern with the deterioration of our

environment.”?®

“One of the most effective ways to control oil

discharge would be to force the oil companies

to bear all the risks attendant to oil shipping.

If this were possible, many of the problems

involved in oil transport by sea would be

greatly diminished since oil companies and

their insurers would have financial incentive

to take every precaution against potentan

damage.”

26Problems faced by the Congress in attempting to reach a reasonable result in

the Federal Act are well documented in Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil

Pollution— Domestic and International Law, $38 George Washington L. Rev. 1 (1969).

27™Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 at 226

(1966).

?8 regal, Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability and Financial Re-

sponsibility as Related to Oil Pollution, A Study by the Program of Policy Studies in

Science and Technology, George Washington University, For the United States Coast

Guard, (December 1970) at page i.

Baldwin, Public Policy on Oil—An Ecological Perspective, 1 Ecology Law

Quarterly 245, 271 (Spring 1971).

$2

Absolute liability without fault is

the sine qua non of protection

against oil-spills and the corner-

stone of objections to the

Florida Act.

(1,)

“That the Florida Act constituted unlawful intrusion into

the exclusive federal admiralty domain is apparent when

one observes the extent to which that act would change

substantive maritime law. The most obvious changes would

be in the liability now imposed by W.Q.I.A. and maritime

rules on shippers and the operators of onshore and offshore

facilities.... Under the Florida Act... liability without

fault -is the foundation for ‘damage incurred by the state

and for damage resulting from injury to others,’ just as it is

in the case of cleanup costs. By substituting absolute

liability for proof of negligence or unseaworthiness as a

condition to unlimited recovery, the Florida Act, if valid,

would materially change the substantive maritime law

governing the disposition of claims arising from the pollu-

tion of coastal waters.” The American Waterways Oper-

ators, Inc. v. Reubin O’D. Askew, et.al., 335 F. Supp. 1241

(M.D. Fla. 1971), (A 42-43)

The Florida Act deals with sea-to-shore torts. Its principle

thrust is toward their prevention and control. It is concerned

not for welfare of shipping interests, but for welfare of its

citizens. It is designed not to protect traditional concepts of

maritime law, but the property of persons having no connec-

tion with the admiralty. Interests protected by the State Act

are not m privity with maritime commerce through contracts,

employment, freight, cargo, industry or profits.

This is not to say that Florida has no citizens, corporate

or private, engaged in or dependent upon shipping. It is,

rather, to admit the obvious: that such business interests are

incidental to the dominant state interests protected by the the

legislation whose judicially imposed demise is appealed here.

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33

The Florida Act imposes unlimited liability without fault

upon virtually any vessel which discharges oil or any other

pollutants while destined for or leaving any Florida port. §

376.12, Florida Statutes; (A 68); § 376.031(7), Florida

Statutes, (A 58). It does so to complete the protection of

interests described. Anything short of unlimited liability

without fault is less than complete protection. This premise,

upon which the Florida Act is based, is strenuously resisted

by maritime interests. The intensity of their resistence attests

to validity of the premise.

The Florida Act does not deal with minor spills and

discharges. These occur daily in state waters. Damage recovery

from such spills to state waters, the ecology, and shoreline

cleanup is provided under a companion statute.*° Damage

incurred by private property owners, relatively minor, is

remedial in common-law courts. It is doubtful that such

would be frustrated by limitation proceedings under 46 U.S.C.

§ 183 (1964).

Although damages from minor spills are recoverable under

the State Act sub judice, the Act’s focus is not so limited.

The State of Florida does not appeal here from loss of

duplicate remedies. The State’s concern is more urgent. It

goes to the heart of the statutory scheme described above.

The Florida Act is addressed to effects of a maritime

disaster of Torrey Canyon proportions.*! Without unlimited

and absolute liability imposed by statute against owners or

charterers of the offending tanker, no remedy exists for state

*°Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, Part I, The Florida Air and Water Pollution

Control Act of 1967, as amended; Part II, Interstate Environmental Control Compact

of 1971.

3" For descriptions of this occurrence and insight into its appropriateness in the

instant context, see Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution—Domestic and

International Law, 38 George Washington L. Rev. 1 (Oct. 1969); Comment, Oil

Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Inter. LJ. $16 (1969); Nanda, The Torrey Canyon

Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 Denver LJ. 400 (1967); E. Cowan, OIL AND

WATER, THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).

—

34

or private property owners damaged by a massive oil slick.3?

Under Federal maritime law as conceived by the District

Court in this case, owners and charterers would find safe

harbor in admiralty defenses and limitations, while Florida

beaches, marinas, and waterways were smeared with 440,000

barrels of crude oil. Assuming that such an occurrence cost

the State of Florida no more than it cost the governments of

Great Britain, France, and the Guernsey Isles to cleanup

approximately the same size slick, the ‘bottom line’ would

still amount to far more than merely $16,000,000. Aside

from the adverse ecological effects, what would it cost private

hotel owners who depend upon a pollution-free environment

to meet mortgage payments? What would it cost peripheral

businesses such as airlines, buses, taxi and rental car com-

panies? What would it mean to restaurant and night-club

business in the area affected? How much would it lessen

employment? Florida leases territorial sea-beds for aquaculture

projects on the premise that man will one day live off of food

from the sea as he does now from conventional farms.?? If

31,000 gallons of oil discharged off the coast of Rhode Island

by the grounded tanker P.W. Thirtle could virtually destroy

the entire oyster fishing industry on Narragansett Bay, what

would a 440,600 barrel slick do to aquafarming or Florida’s

commercial fishing industry, or the commercial oyster beds in

Apalachicola Bay? Why should all of the interests, public and

private, adversely affected by a massive oil-spill be subject to

frustrations of the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §

183?3* The practical effect in this context of limitation

32 Approximately half of the Torrey Canyon'’s 880,000 barrels of crude oil are

estimated to have spilled into the English Channel to form the largest oil slick in

history. Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward a New Solution to the Problem of

Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 Conn.L.Rev. 682 (1970); Note, Liability for Oil Pollution

Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 973,

982 (1970). Compare this with the 100-square mile slick formed in Tampa Bay by

Delian Apollon when only 21,000 gallons of oil escaped. Cleanup costs for Torrey

Canyon slick were in excess in $16 million; for the Delian Apollon a mere $1.4

million.

33953.67 - 253.75, Florida Statutes.

34 See how it worked with Torrey Canyon: In re Barracuda Tanker, 281 F.Supp.

228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).

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35

proceedings is to deny those damaged any remedy for wrong

done them. That is the result of application of maritime law.

And that is the reason for unlimited and absolute liability in

the Florida Act.

The State Act subjects owners of vessels and terminal

facilities to two principal conditions:

First, under § 376.12 anyone who “permits or suffers” a

polluting discharge is absolutely liable (a) to the state “for

costs of cleanup or other damage” and (b) for damages

resulting from injury to others. (A70) The state must prove

only the fact of the occurrence of the polluting discharge. It

need not plead or prove negligence. The fact that liability is

unlimited makes it no different from any other form of tort

liability, including the liability for negligent pollution damages

which existed prior to this statute. It is the absolute character

of the liability that is unusual.

Second, § 376.14 requires owners or operators of terminal

facilities or vessels to maintain with the Department of

Natural Resources “evidence of financial responsibility based

on the capacity of the terminal facility or tonnage of the

ship, the cargo carried, and other similar factors to which the

vessel could be subjected * * * ” (A70)

It is important for purposes of analysis to keep in mind the

distinction between the absolute liability provision and the

fmancial responsibility requirement.. This distinction is under-

scored by the history of response to the statute. The statute

became effective July 1, 1970. However, the requirement of

filing under the financial responsibility provision was post-

poned to March 15, 1971. Maritime interests took no action

to oppose the law until shortly before the financial respon-

sibility filing date; that, and not the passage of the law,

triggered the opposition.

In the District Court, maritime interests made no attempt

to differentiate between the issues of absolute liability and

financial responsibility. Rather, they maintained generally that

they could not comply with the law without ruinous

—

36

consequences, using their arguments on each issue to buttress

the other. (See paragraphs 25-29, Complaint, A 10-12)

As to absolute liability, maritime interests maintain that

they could not continue to do business while exposed to

unlimited liability under the Act. They pointed out that they

could not insure against such liability.

The unlimited liability to which maritime interests were

subjected is no ground for reasonable objection. Under

common law they were subject to unlimited liability for any

kind of tortious action, just as an individual motorist is

subject to unlimited liability for negligence. Limitation pro-

ceedings under 46 U.S.C. §183, although theoretically avail-

able, would not always be desirable. The strict liability

provision of the Act of course gives them greater exposure,

but businessmen are able to operate subject to strict liability

in other commercial areas.

Although the State Statute purports to eliminate negligence

as an element of liability, the person made liable under

§ 376.12 is one “who permits or suffers” a polluting condi-

tion. (A 68) This language clearly indicates that the fact of

pollution is not enough; some element of responsibility must

be established as a requisite to recovery.

Moreover, §376.11(6) provides that the Department of :

Natural Resources shall recover for the “coastal protection

fund” established under this section “from the person or

persons causing the discharge jointly and severally all sums

expended therefrom... ” (Emphasis supplied; A 67) Again,

wording of the statute reiterates the requirement of establish-

ing responsibility as a necessary condition to recovery.

It is in the insurance aspect that the maritime interests

make their most effective argument, but they do so by

confusing the strict liability and financial responsibility re-

quirements. As discussed more fully below, rules promulgated

under the State Act (as opposed to language of the Act itself)

require that an insurance policy sufficient to meet financial

responsibility requirements must have no limits on the

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37

amount of coverage. (A 73) No insurance company would

prudently issue such a policy.

However, there would seem to be no valid reason why

maritime interests could not obtain insurance having a specific

limit of liability. Such a policy, although it would not meet

the financial responsibility requirement of the present rules,

would offer protection to the insured. Protection afforded by

such a policy would be tantamount to the protection enjoyed

by a motorist who has a liability policy of stated limits and

who must bear the exposure of liability above the policy

limits.

Maritime interests, however, ignored this possibility, and

emphasized that the financial responsibility rule requires an

unlimited policy which cannot be obtained, and by this

confusion made an appealing argument that they could not

insure against the liability imposed by the Act.35

Insurance companies have apparently indicated other objec-

tions to providing coverage under the Act, such as the

provision which allows direct suit against the insurer.>¢

However, only the requirement in the Regulations (A 73-74) of

insurance against unlimited liability appears to support objec-

tions against providing coverage.

Financial responsibility under the state Act (A 70) may be

established by one or more of the following:

1. Evidence of insurance;

2. Surety bonds “conditioned to pay all costs and expenses

of the cleanup of any discharge as well as damages caused to

the state and any other person;”

3. Qualification as a self-insurer;

*5See letter from American Institute of Merchant Shipping to Capt. W. C.

Dahigren, U.S.C.G., published in Legal Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability

and Financial Responsibility as Related to Oil Pollution, A Study By the Program of

Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington University, For the

Cated States Coast Guard (Dec. 1970) at pages 4445 - 449,

Id. at pages 4-2 and +3.

38

4. Other evidence of financial responsibility satisfactory to

the Department.

It should be noted that under the statutory wording only the

surety bond provision expressly requires unlimited liability;

the insurance provision does not.

In practice, the financial responsibility requirement has

been supplemented in three ways, two of which make

compliance easier, and one of which makes compliance more

difficult.

(1) Rules issued by the Department of Natural Resources,

State of Florida, (A 74) require that a showing of financial

responsibility need be established only in “an amount not to

exceed” $100 per gross ton of a company’s largest vessel or

$5 million, whichever is lower; and

(2) Under the “other evidence” method of financial re-

sponsibility the Department accepts certified financial state-

ments which show financial responsibility sufficient to meet

the foregoing standard of $100 per ton up to $5 million

(Transcript of Testimony, Hearing on Application for Tempor-

ary Restraining Order. pp. 237-238); but

(3) Despite the foregoing $100 per gross ton or $5 million

limitation, the rules require that proof of financial responsi-

bility by “evidence of insurance” must be by a policy of

unlimited liability, “conditioned to pay all costs and expenses

of the cleanup of any discharge as well as damages caused to

the state and any other person.” This provision was appar-

ently put in the rules as a copy of the surety bond provision.

As has been noted, no insurance company will write a policy

for unlimited liability. The effect of this rule, therefore, is to

eliminate insurance as a method of qualifying under the

financial responsibility provisions of the Act. But it does not

follow from this that the statutory requirement of evidencing

financial responsibility is consequently unconstitutional or

impossible to comply with.

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39

The maritime interests have, as a matter of fact, demon-

strated the practicality of the “other evidence” method of

qualifying. As of the time of the TRO hearing, 28 applica-

tions for certification had been approved covering a total of

669 ships, 438 of U.S. registry and 231 foreign (Transcript of

Testimony, Hearing on Application for Temporary Restraining

Order, pp. 234-235).

Nevertheless, maritime interests argue that they cannot

qualify on their financials because to do so would be to

subject themselves to unlimited and uninsured liability. This,

of course, is a non-sequitur and completely invalid.

Maritime interests may have a legitimate objection to the

rule for qualification by insurance, since it requires a policy

without mits. But this objection goes to the reasonableness

of -that condition as predicate for financial responsibility

certification, and has nothing to do with the scope of their

ability. In no event can the possible unreasonableness of a

prerequisite to one of several methods for satisfying financial

responsibility published in a Department of Natural Resources

Regulation sustain a practical argument against unlimited and

absolute liability.

During congressional hearings which led ultimately to

passage of the Federal Act, absolute liability was considered

by many to be necessary. It was attacked by maritime

interests on grounds that absolute liability was inequitable.

Examples were cited describing such inequity. Through no

fault of a shipowner, a vessel might strike a mine, or be -

“overwhelmed” by a hurricane or subject to some other

natural calamity at sea.>7

This argument raises two comments: first, it only contem-

plates a small part of the tragedy, only that segment occurring

at sea. It implies an innocent owner or charterer sending an

innocent vessel on innocent passage through innocent sea;

* "Hearings on HR 6495, HR 6609, HR 6794, and HR 7325 Before the House

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 261-69 (1969).

a —

40

suddenly a victim of violent, unforeseen forces that break

open the vessel, threaten lives of passengers and crew, and

cost the owner a lot of money. It misses the rest of the

picture.

It fails to consider the fact that the owner is probably a

heavily insured corporation deriving most of its profits from

leasing bottoms to charterers, most of whom would. be oil

companies who would not have sent the vessel loaded with

crude oil through the hurricane latitudes were it not ne

in order to maintain and operate a highly profitable business

enterprise. It fails to consider the fact that the vessel, cargo,

and freight, in all probability, are insured. Mostly, it fails to

consider the nature of the cargo. Crude oil pollution of

property ashore and territorial waters of nearby states should

also be céntemplated. Adverse effects of ecological and

economic damage inflicted on equally innocent, non-maritime

property owners are ignored completely.

Secondly, implications of the resistance to absolute liability

in arguments before the House Committee describe an

anachronistic concept of tort liability: that because the owner

of a vessel is blameless of the hurricane, he should be

absolved of blame for the loss suffered and therefore immune

to damages compensating for that loss.

* * * A modern tort-law commentator would have

responded that the question today is not one of fault or

blame but rather who is in the best position to bear the

losses or distribute the risk. Should it be the adjacent shore

owner who had absolutely no relationship to the vessel or

its cargo, indeed, did not even know of its existence until

the oil spilled on his beach, or [should it be] the

government paying for clean-up costs out of the public

treasury? Or should it be the vessel-owner, together with

the cargo-owner, who profit from the carriage contract,

appreciate the full risks that are involved, and are in the

optimum position to bear the losses or distribute those

risks through self, mutual or other forms of insurance??®

38 Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution, 38 George Washington Law

Review 1, (October 1969), at pages 14-15.

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41

It is submitted that absolute liability is required by the

circumstances. A massive oil-spill in its territorial waters is no

less dangerous to the health and welfare of a state than a

major conflagration, hurricane, or other natural disaster would

be.2? Moreover, liability must be measured by damage

proven. To limit claims by an arbitrary and unrelated

yardstick, such as tonnage of the vessel or value of the wreck,

is utterly without foundation in reason, fairness or justice. In

providing unlimited liability without fault, the Florida Act

seeks to protect fundamental state interests. It is a valid

exercise of the police power. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22

(1932; Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Eaton, 183 U.S. 588 (1901);

Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); The China v. Walsh, 74

U.S. (7 Wall) 67 (1868).

Reasons for the exercise have been described. Authority for

the exercise and why it is not an unconstitutional conflict

with Federal prerogatives is discussed below.

C. Police Power is Power to Protect.

“It may be said in a general way that the police power extends

to all the great public needs.’*°

“The right of the citizen not to have his property burned with-

out compensation is no less to be regarded than the right of the

corporation to set it on fire.’"*"

“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and

order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the

traditional applications of the police power to municipal affairs.

Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not de-

limit it... °*?

39Shutler, Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 7 Houston Law Review 415, 418-419

(March 1970).

Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).

‘Mr. Justice Gray in St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1,

26 (1896).

*Mr. Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, (1954).

42

(1.)

If the State cannot secure a remedy

when its citizens have been wronged then

the police power of the State is little

more than an academic curiosity.

If the state is powerless to protect its citizens and its

environment from the ravages of oil-spill pollution caused by

ships calling at its ports, or by corporate entities chartered by

it, or by businesses licensed by it, then it fails to meet one of

the essentials of good government, for it has failed in its duty

to protect property.

The argument of maritime interests, reduced to its last

analysis, is this: the terminal companies and maritime interests

may lawfully use, store, and transfer pollutants, and as they.

are pursuing a lawful business, they are only liable for

negligence in its operation; and when in a given case they can

demonstrate they are guilty of no negligence, then they

cannot be made liable.

To this the citizen answers: ‘I also own my property

lawfully and have a lawful right to enjoy the environment of

the State. I did not do anything to bring about the spill of

pollutants into state waters. You say you are guiltless of

negligence. Yet the waters are polluted and the air is fouled as

a result of a discharge from the operation of your agency,

albeit careful and cautious and prudent. And I am denied

redress even though I have done nothing to in anyway bring

about such a discharge.’ (Paraphrased from Campbell »,

Missouri P.R. Co., 121 Mo. 340, 25 S.W. 936, 25 L.R.A. 175

(1894); quoted with approval in St. Louis & San Francisco R.

Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1896). Neither case involved

water pollution, but the rationale of both cases is analogous

to the instant controversy.)

It may be that prior to the State Act, shippers and terminal

owners were only liable for negligence in an occurrence

causing water pollution, and that, where this criterion of tort

liability could not be proven, the citizen was without redress.

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43

But it does not follow from this that the legislature is,

therefore, powerless to ever enact legislation granting needed

protection to its citizens in the form of absolute liability for

the damages proven as a result of their acts. That is what the

legislature has done. It has made those who traffic in

pollutants responsible for damage to property and to the

environment caused by those pollutants upon discharge into

the waters of the state. It is perfectly competent for the state

to do so. To deny this is to stand for the proposition that the

ultimate burden for oil-spill pollution is properly that of the

private citizen and not those whose instrumentality caused the

discharge. That it may have been so in the past does not

mean that it must continue to be so in the present or for the

future.

The police power of the state is peculiarly appropriate to

the object sought to be achieved by the State Act. While this

is a case of first impression before this Court, state statutes

purporting to impose absolute liability upon railroad corpora-

tions for all property lost through fires caused by sparks

emitted from locomotive engines have been upheld against

constitutional attack. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v.

Mathews, supra; II Cooley Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.)

Ch. XVI, p. 1244. The words of Mr. Justice Gray in the

above cited case, 165 U.S. at p. 26, are applicable:

* * * It is within the authority of ‘the legislature to make

adequate provision for protecting the property of others

against loss or injury by sparks from such engines. The

right of the citizen not to have his property burned

without compensation is no less to be regarded than the

right of the corporation to set it on fire. To require the

utmost care and diligence of the railroad corporations in

‘taking precautions against the escape of fire from their

engines might not afford sufficient protection to the

owners of property in the neighborhood of the railroads.

When both parties are equally faultless, the legislature may

properly consider it to be just that the duty of insuring

private property against loss or injury caused by the use of

—

dangerous instruments should rest upon the railroad com- |

pany which employs the instruments and creates the peril

for its own profit rather than upon the owner of the

property, who has no control over or interest in those

instruments .... The statute is not a penal one, imposing

punishment for a violation of law; but it is purely remedial,

making a party doing a lawful act for its own profit liable

in damages to the innocent party injured thereby, and

giving to that party the whole damages measured by the

injury suffered. (citations omitted)

To argue that the police power of the State does not reach

as far as Florida’s position requires is to overlook the

breadth of the police power itself. In Berman v. Parker 348

U.S. 26 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas described the breadth of

the police power in terms which would surely encompass

circumstances in which the State Act was passed.

To suggest that the State cannot control such pollution

because it is beyond the scope of the police power, is to

overlook further the landmark case of Huron Portland Cement

Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In this case, a

corporation engaged in operating Federal licensed steam

vessels in interstate commerce sought to enjoin enforcement

of the city’s Smoke Abatement Code. Under the Code, the

corporation’s steam vessels could not perform necessary

cleaning of their boilers within the city without undergoing

structural alteration. This Court upheld the ordinance and

ruled that the Code could constitutionally be applied to the

corporation’s ships rejecting the argument that Federal stat-

utes relating to inspection, approval, and licensing of steam

vessels in interstate commerce preempted the area, and that

the Code was an unconstitutional burden on_ interstate

commerce. Said Mr. Justice Stewart for the seven-man

majority at 362 U.S. 442:

“The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of

promoting the health and welfare of the city’s inhabitants.

Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that

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—

45

people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the

most traditional concept of what is compendiously known

as ‘the police power. In the exercise of that power, the

states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of

interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently

with the federal government. * * * (Citations omitted).

“* * * Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a

legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted by

federal action * * * (Citations omitted).

“In determining whether state regulations has been

pre-empted by federal action, ‘the intent to supersede the

exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not

covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred

from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circum-

scribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other

words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of

Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law

of the State.’ Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 56 Led

1182, 1195, 32 S Ct. 715.”

It is clear from the Huron Portland Cement case that an

attack on the State Act based upon a violation of Art. I, §8

of the Constitution must fail, for the mere fact that a State

statute imposes a burden on commerce is not enough. There

must be more. There must be a conflict with the Federal

scheme of things. It is the imposition of the inconsistent

duties or obligations making dual compliance impossible

which is prohibited. See, also Cooley v. Board of Port

Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851) which teaches that states under

their police power can adopt regulations in matters of local

concern even though, in some measure, they affect and

regulate interstate and maritime commerce.

Thus it is not merely a question of whether Congress has

acted in a given field that determines whether states are

preempted from exercising their reserved powers. The congres-

sional act must specifically exclude state legislation, and it

must do so on clear constitutional authority. Kelly v.

46

Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), reviews the cases, and ovserves

at page 14:

When the State is seeking to prevent the operation of

unsafe and unseaworthy vessels in going to and from its

ports, it is exercising a protective power akin to that which

enables the State to exclude diseased persons, animals and

plants. These are not proper subjects of commerce. When

the State is seeking to protect a vital interest, we have

always been slow to find that the inaction of Congress has

shorn the State of the power which it would otherwise

possess. And we are unable to conclude that so far as

concerns the inspection of the hull and machinery of these

vessels of respondents in order to insure safety and

seaworthiness, the Federal laws and regulations, which as

we have found are not expressly applicable, carry any

implied prohibition of state action.

It, should be noted at this juncture—although it will be

discussed in detail below—that the Federal Act does reach

wrongs with which the State Act is concerned. But it can

hardly be said to foreclose state legislation. In the first place,

_the Federal Act provides no remedies to other than Federal

agencies, and, in the second place, it expressly disclaims any

trace of preemption. Thus, it can hardly be maintained that

Congress has precluded the exercise of state police power in

the area of oil-spill pollution of territorial waters.

Nor should it be maintained that, in the absence of

congressional action in specific areas reached by the State

Act, necessity of uniformity of regulation is imposed by

Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution, merely

because the nature of the concern is maritime. The nature of

the concern was maritime in Cooley v. Board of Port

Wardens, supra; Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236 (1872);

Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866); Mobile County v.

Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1881); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105

U.S. 559 (1882); Escanaba & L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago,

107 U.S. 678 (1883); Parkersbury & Ohio River Transp. Co.

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_ —ae

v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883); Morgan’s L. & T.R. &

S.S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U.S. 445 (1886); Manchester

v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Lawton v. Steele, 152

U.S. 133 (1893); Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U.S. 67 (1907); Port

Richmond & B.P. Ferry Co., v. Hudson County, 234 U.S. 317

(1914); Wilmington Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236

U.S. 151 (1915); Kelly v. Washington, supra; Skiriotes v.

Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1940); C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318

U.S. 133 (1943); and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of

Detroit, supra. In each case the Court was confronted with a

local regulation or enactment affecting maritime commerce or

asserted to be exclusively within admiralty and in each case

the local regulation was sustained as an appropriate exercise

of the police power. Cf. Clyde Mallory Lines v. State of

Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935).

47

Requiring vessel owners and operators to maintain financial

responsibility is certainly permissible within the police power.

It is a means—the only means—of enforcing that which might

otherwise be unenforceable.

In like effect, requiring any vessel transporting pollutants in

state waters to be equipped with specific containment gear

and a crew trained in its use is necessary not only for safety

of the port, but also to facilitate commerce by keeping

navigation open for vessels entering and leaving the port. For

safety-sake, a vessel can be refused entry altogether or allowed

to enter under conditions prescribed for safety of the port.

There is no conflict with maritime law merely because the

regulations are set out in a statute. To require containment

gear and a trained crew is not an unreasonable regulation of

maritime commerce, anymore than certain requirements im-

posed by states upon trains, buses, trucks or aircraft represent

an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, i.e. Maurer v.

Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1939); South Carolina v. Barnwell

Bros. 303 U.S. 177 (1937); Southern P. Co. v. Anzona, 325

U.S. 761 (1932); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931).

To require minimum sea conditions and a sound ship as

requisite to entry and unloading operations is also reasonable

for protection of the port.

48

The Florida Act subjects vessels to inspection by a port

manager to determine presence of the required containment

gear and seaworthiness of the ship. This is not new to

maritime law, nor is it unreasonable; particularly when an

oil-spill has been legislatively determined to be of sufficient

threat to the health, welfare, and public safety to warrant an

exercise of the police power. To require containment gear and

not be able to ascertain its presence is to create an

unenforceable requirement. That necessary gear to contain a

spill was not present in a given instance would be unascertain-

able until the oil-spill occurred; and then it would be too late.

If the requirement of containment gear is valid at all, police

power would substantiate enforcement. Enforcement measures

cannot effectively omit boarding and inspection. See Kelly v.

Washington, supra; Morgan’s L. & T. Railroad and Steam Ship

Co. v. Louisianna Board of Health, supra. To the extent that

such measures are an imposition upon maritime commerce,

then maritime commerce must learn to accomodate them—as

it has in the past.

Mechanics of the Florida Act are not new to this Court. In

one form or another, they have met with judicial approbation

before. They have been sanctioned precisely because they are

reasonable means to accomplish the end sought to be

achieved. Effective exercise of the police power would be

frustrated without them.

Although argued and briefed in the District Court, the

order and memorandum opinion appealed from make no

mention of the police power. It is this failure to recognize the

Florida Act for what it is that led the court to error.

But had the phrase ‘police power’ never been coined, it

would matter little to the final analysis of this case. For the

people never surrendered their power to protect against such -

evils as are contemplated in an oil-spill. Whatever the power

to protect in this context be called, the Tenth Amendment is

a gentle reminder that it was reserved to the states.

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49

(2.)

- Power to protect shore property and the

State’s natural resources from deleterious

effects of a massive oil-spill was reserved

to the State.

It is a power and a responsibility peculiarly adaptable to

the State. The State has the capacity and, most importantly,

the motivation to act in this area to protect itself and its

citizens. There is no express delegation of the power to the

Federal domain. The Amendment qualifies all grants.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,

nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people.

Article III, Section 2 (A 94) was found by the District

Court to have been offended by the State Act (A 47), but

there is no express delegation of power there. That Section

speaks to jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and it is respect-

fully submitted that it should be recognized for what it is. It

says the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all

cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. For purposes of

this controversy, that is all it says. It does not say that

substantive maritime law shall extend shoreward to frustrate

police power of the state.

To a disturbing extent, from the states’ point of view,

judicial pronouncements in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,

244 U.S. 205 (1917), and Knickerbocker Ice Company v.

Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), relied upon by the District

Court to support invalidation of the Florida Act, construe the

Admiralty Clause in such fashion as to ignore state sovereign-

ty altogether. On their face, those cases establish an auton-

omous sovereignty within the admiralty, and vest it with far

greater dignity than that ascribed to state legislation. In its

willingness to follow Jensen, and assert an allegiance to this

——

50

third dominion, which is seemingly neither state nor Federal

but independent of them both, the District Court added to the

legend. By ‘legend’ we refer to the Court’s continuing endow-

ment of additional power and scope to the relatively simple

phrase in Article III, Section 2. What is, on its face a delegation

of judicial power over cases of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction, has been so broadened that it now authorizes

congressional action extending substantive maritime law far

beyond its original limits. And each extension, judicial or

legislative, more narrowly restricts the dwindling perimeters of

state sovereignty.

A definition of “reserved powers” proclaimed by the Tenth

Amendment might at one time have included the states’

power to cope with and protect against oil-spill pollution of

its territorial waters and shoreline. It was, after all, a common

law tort, remedial in common law courts. The Plymouth 70

U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S.

610 (1886); Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119

U.S. 388 (1886). Although commenced at sea, the tort was

not consummated within the ebb and flow of the tide,

Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9 (1834), or on navigable waters,

The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), and was

therefore not an admiralty matter. The Plymouth, supra.

Postulating, then, an oil-spill occurring in 1886, damaging

shore property, would have triggered common law tort

response from the victim; admiralty would have had no

cognizance. Had a state act in 1886 imposed unlimited and

absolute liability upon the offending ship’s owner, the

abstraction ‘uniformity’ would have afforded scant comfort in

defense. For the common law remedy saved to suitors in the

Judiciary Act of 1789, (1 Stat. 73, as amended, arguably

strengthening the concurrent jurisdiction aspect, 28 U.S.C. §

1333), affords recourse not only to processes of state courts,

but to the substance of state law as well. The Hamilton, 207

U.S. 398 (1907). If Federal jurisdiction carried with it

law-making powers, so did concurrent state jurisdiction. A

fortiori, where there was no concurrent jurisdiction for reason

that there was no Federal maritime jurisdiction to start with,

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51

substantive state law establishing remedies and liabilities for

sea-to-shore torts would entertain no objections from admir-

alty.

Not being a matter within the Federal maritime domain at

all, such jurisprudence could hardly be considered a subject of

exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Hence, there was no necessity

for a doctrinaire allegiance to principles of uniformity. Just v.

Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).

If the abstract doctrine of uniformity can frustrate the

states’ exercise of reserved powers under the Tenth Amend-

ment by subjecting common law tort action to the full

panoply of maritime rules, the reason is almost entirely

attributable to the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 62 Stat.

496, (June 19, 1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740, (A 93). In that Act,

Congress went beyond the farthest horizons of Admiralty

Clause power, expressed or inferred, explicit or implicit. The

Act re-defines maritime jurisdiction in a manner totally

inconsistent with either the Tenth Amendment or Article III,

Section 2.

D. Extension of Admiralty: Outside the Limits.

“In regard to torts, I have always understood that the jurisdiction

of admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The

admiralty has not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have,

any jurisdiction over torts, except as such are maritime torts, that

is, torts upon the high seas, or waters within the ebb and flow of

the tide.”

—Mr. Justice Story*?*

“I think it high time to check this silent and stealing progress of

the admiralty in acquiring jurisdiction to which it has no pretentions,””

—Mr. Justice Johnson**

“Article III impliedly ... empowered Congress to revise and supplement

the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution.”

—Mr, Justice Frankfurter‘ *

‘Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9 (1834).

gg CONCurTing opinion in Ramsey v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611 (1827).

Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959).

(1.)

By extending scope of maritime tort

jurisdiction beyond the locality of

navigable waters, Congress exceeded

Admiralty Clause authority and intruded

upon State prerogatives.

Prior to June 19, 1948, admiralty jurisdiction over torts

was limited to the maritime province. Unless it was a

maritime tort, i.e., consummated upon navigable waters, it

was not extended by Article III, Section 2, to the Federal see.

Thus, if a structure on land, a bridge or a pier, were damaged

by a vessel, admiralty courts could not hear the cause. The

Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); Ex parte Phenix Ins.

Co., 118 U.S. 610 (1886); Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific

Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); Cleveland Terminal &

Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908);

The Troy, 208 U.S. 321 (1908); Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191

(1911). But see Mr. Justice Brown, concurring, in The

Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904).

In The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)

428 (1825), seamen sued for wages in admiralty. In a

four-paragraph opinion, Mr. Justice Story affirmed dismissal

by the lower court for lack of jurisdiction for reason that the

Missouri River voyage of the vessel was not within the ebb and

flow of the tide, and, hence, “in no just sense can the wages

be considered as earned in a maritime employment.”

In The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443

(1851), Mr. Justice Taney broadened this concept to navigable

waters, but he can hardly be said to have precluded necessity

for getting one’s feet wet before one’s cause sounds in

admiralty. Maritime cases and congressional authority arise

not under operation of the Commerce Clause, The Genesee

Chief, supra; The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1868), nor “the

Constitution or laws of the United States”, American Ins. Co.

v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Peter) 511 (1828). Solely within the

Admiralty Clause does the source of congressional power

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53

repose. Since congressional power can only be co-extensive

with that stored in Article LI, Section 2, a determination of

the limits of that grant is necessary. National legislation

extending beyond boundaries of that power is, by definition,

without constitutional authority to conflict with state stat-

utes. The suspicion that this trespass occurs is limited neither

to our time nor subject area. See the concurring opinion of

Mr. Justice Johnson in Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12

Wheat.) 611 (1827).

There is no absolute constitutional criterion for the

measurements of whatever it is that is necessary and proper to

enable Congress to implement Federal jurisdiction over admi-

ralty. But it has been traditionally recognized that such

implementation is limited to that which is, in substance,

maritime, Ap the case of contracts, substance is measured by

the nature of the transaction. In the case of tort, substance is

measured by locality. This guide to qualitative analysis was

treated as settled law 50 years ago. Grant Smith-Porter Ship

Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922), and reiterated as

recently as last December. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404

US. , 30 L.Ed.2d 383, 387-389 (1971). This is inference

only. Article Ill, Section 2 makes no mention of either

“nature” or “locality.”

The State of Florida has no particular quarrel with the

inference. As a basis for placing the line of demarcation

between the dominion of admiralty and that of non-admiralty

at the shoreline, it comports with reason and logic. But it is

unreasonable, illogical, and dehors the “historic view of this

Court” (Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra) to extend

maritime tort jurisdiction, and all that it implies, beyond the

traditional admiralty domain. That is what Congress had done

in The Admiralty Extension Act of 1948. It has established a

beachhead of rules, limitations, and defenses peculiar to the

law of the sea well within the dry-land dominion of state

jurisdiction. In so doing it has forceably imposed these

sea-lawyer concepts upon unwilling subjects; the states pro-

test.

54

Congress, in the Admiralty Extension Act, and the District

Court, in striking the State Act, ignored the protest and

shaped new dimensions to maritime torts. Admiralty tort

jurisdiction has been rendered amphibious. No longer does

locality matter: admiralty lives as well upon the land as on

the sea. In the space of one opinion, the District Court

effectively overruled more than 150 years of this Court’s

interpretation of the substance of maritime law and the

jurisdictional grant of Article III, Section 2.

This Court, in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra, quoted

with approval from its decision in Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S.

263, 270 (1934), that “(t)he power reserved to the states,

under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of

controversies in their courts may be restricted only by the

action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of

the Constitution.” Prior to the Admiralty Extension Act of

1948, interpretations of the “judiciary sections of the Consti-

tution” by this Court scrupulously maintained the shoreline

demarcation between admiralty and non-admiralty discussed

above. Congress was without judicial guidance in assaulting

this long-established and judicially approved distinction be-

tween state and maritime regimes. It was also without any

constitutional authority for doing so.

No act of Congress can enlarge purposes of the grant of

jurisdictional power conferred in Article III, Section 2, to

make it broader than the judiciary has determined to be its

true limits. The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 523,

527 (1861). While Congressional power to determine what the

maritime law throughout the United States shall be is

paramount, Zhe Lottawanna 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 577

(1874), the Congress must necessarily act within a sphere of

judicial concepts of the substance of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 636-641

(1868); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1931).

In extending admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over torts

consummated on land, Congress ignored established judicial

concepts and exceeded its authority. The Admiralty Extension

Act is invalid. If the thrust of Victory Carriers is to continue

as a compass heading to circumscribe boundaries between —

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55

state and maritime regimes, the District Court decision in the

case sub judice must be reversed.

(2.)

Should this Court decide the Admiralty

Extension Act to be valid on its face,

traditional common law jurisdiction

saved to suitors in 28 U.S.C. 1333 marks

a preserve of concurrent state authority.

As has been noted, “extension of admiralty” is a theory of

law unknown to traditional maritime jurisprudence. Courts of

admiralty had no jurisdiction over torts consummated on

land. Cases involving such wrongs, even though initiated on

navigable waters, eluded admiralty jurisdiction altogether prior

to 1948 and the Congressional enactment of 46 U.S.C. § 740.

Hence, such actions could in no way be deemed to be within

the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and maritime law.

If admiralty jurisdictic 1 for such torts exists for reason that

their genesis is some act or failure of action originating on

navigable waters, it is solely because Congress ordained it.

Perimeters of admiralty jurisdiction over such tort actions are

staked out in the Admiralty Extension Act—the length and

breadth of Federal dominion in this context is described

there. It is purely a matter of congressional will: all that the

national legislature intended for the admiralty courts to have

is blueprinted in the Act. Had Congress intended such domain

to be exclusively Federal, it would have been easily accom-

plished. In the Ships Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1003, 46

U.S.C. 951, for example, the exclusivity of jurisdiction is

spelled out in conclusive terms. See, generally, The Thomas

Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934). Had exclusive jurisdiction been

so prescribed, an argument could be made that the Admiralty

Extension Act amended such “hybrid” torts out of their

common law status. But legislative history of the Act

indicates rather conclusively that its passage signified no

intentional intrusion upon common law jurisdiction.

56

Adoption of the bill will not create new causes of action,

It merely specifically directs the courts to exercise the

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States

already conferred by Article III, section 2 of the Constity-

tion and already authorized by the Judiciary Acts. More-

over, there still will remain available the right to a

common-law remedy which the Judiciary Acts... have

expressly saved to claimants. * * * (Senate Report No,

1593, June 11, 1948 (To accompany H.R: 238); House

Report No. 1523, March 8, 1948, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,

1948.)

Inasmuch as sea-to-shore torts (particularly within the

context of oil-spill remedies) were unreachable in admiralty’s

formative century, and therefore well within concurrent state

jurisdiction, they cannot be said to be within that chosen area

of law exclusively delegated to federal maritime domain. Cf.

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

Strict precepts of uniformity that bottom this Court's

rationale in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205

(1917), and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149

(1920) are not required here.

If states have concurrent jurisdiction over maritime torts,

there must be available to them an area of legislative activity

to develop or extend remedies for wrongs, Cf. The Tungus v.

Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), and this area must be broad

enough to accomodate new concepts of tort. Surely the state

is not limited to antiquated forms of action, i.e., trespass on

the case, in an era when experts tell us we are capable of

ultimately befouling our air and water, or vitally injuring an

economy based squarely on a clean environment, as Florida’s

is today. If “concurrent jurisdiction” is more than a theory,

but is amenable to practice, then the only question at this

juncture is whether the state still retains concurrent jurisdic

tion over maritime torts. There is no question but that it was

a state prerogative when the Constitution was developed. We

were reminded of this fact in the dissenting opinion of Mr.

Justice Brennan in Romero v. International Terminal

Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 404-405 (1959):

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57

0

Mr. Chancellor Kent and Mr. Rawle seem to think that the

admiralty jurisdiction given by the Constitution is, in all

cases, necessarily exclusive. But it is believed that this

opinion is founded on mistake. It is exclusive in all matters

of prize, for the reason that, at the common law, this

jurisdiction is vested in the courts of admiralty, to the

exclusion of the courts of common law. But in the cases

where the jurisdiction of common law and admiralty are

concurrent, (as in cases of possessory suits, mariners’ wages,

and maritime torts), there is nothing in the Constitution

necessarily leading to the conclusion that the jurisdiction

was intended to be exclusive; and there is no better ground,

on general reasoning, to contend for it. The reasonable

interpretation ... would seem to be, that it conferred on

the national judiciary the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-

tion exactly according to the nature and extent and

modifications in which it existed in the jurisprudence of

the common law. 3 Story’s Comm. Sec. 1666, note.

[quoted in Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 598

(1857).]

Assuming that concurrent jurisdiction still means that

which Mr. Justice Holmes described in The Hamilton, 207

U.S. 398 (1907), then substantive state law is appropriate to

meet exigencies of an oil-spill age (so long as it is not in

conflict with Federal law) regardless whether admiralty is

extended or not. There must be room for protection the State

Act affords. If such protection is provided by Federal law,

then the State has no quarrel. The Florida Act is more than

merely an advertisement to promote business for its courts. It

is the substance of the protection that is urgent here; not the

choice of court rooms.

If the protection against oil-spill pollution and damage is

not afforded in the Federal sphere, of course, then this Court

must consider yet another constitutional question: to what

extent may the individual citizen rely upon the Ninth

Amendment to reassure his fundamental right to a healthy

environment?

58

(3.)

To the extent that Federal law fails to

protect citizens of the state from loss of

property and damage to natural resources,

the state has a right and a duty to

legislate in the area of marine oil-spill

pollution control.

The essence of the District Court’s opinion appealed here is

that Chapter 376, Florida Statutes (1970) conflicts directly

with paramount Federal enactments and is in other ways

violative of admiralty’s constitutional prerogatives. While the

State of Florida denies any such violations or conflict, the

State also maintains that even if the District Court’s assertion

as to conflict were correct, the State Act must be recognized

as a valid expression of a fundamental right of the people to

self-preservation.

Congress has recognized this right to a healthful environ-

ment. At Section 101 (c) of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47,

Congress declares:

The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a

healthful environment and that each person has a respon-

sibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement

of the environment.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has judicially acknowl

edged the necessity of protecting our environment for the

survival of man, and has also noted the devastating effect of

environmental despoilment upon interstate commerce. In

Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), at pages

203-204, Chief Judge Brown stated:

In this time of awakening to the reality that we cannot

continue to despoil our environment and yet exist, the

nation knows, if Courts do not, that the destruction of fish

and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a devastating

effect on interestate commerce.

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—

59

None of the Constitutional provisions or Federal laws

asserted by maritime interests can be interpreted so as to

deprive the citizens of the State of Florida of their right to a

clean and healthful environment. Not only is this right

recognized by Congress and the Courts (see, also, dictum in

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra.), but it

is also a fundamental right of the people, saved to them under

the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall

not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by

the people.

In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 79 (1965), the Court

found at page 484, per Mr. Justice Douglas, that

* * *specific guarantees in the Bill ‘of Rights have

penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees

that help give them life and substance.

Justice Goldberg, in a separate opinion, joined by the Chief

Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, stated, at page 487:

In reaching the conclusion that the right of marital privacy

is protected, as being within the protected penumbra of

specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court refers to

the Ninth Amendment, ante, at 515. I add these words to

emphasize the relevance of the Amendment to the Court’s

holding.

Continuing, at page 488, Justice Goldberg stated:

The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal

that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are

additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental

infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental

rights specifically mentioned in the First eight Constitution-

al Amendments.

—

60

And, at page 489:

These statements of Madison and Story make clear that the

Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be

construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights

which the Constitution guaranteed to the people. (Emphasis

Added.)

Justice Goldberg then summarized, at page 493:

In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support

to the view that the “liberty” protected by the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal

Government or the States is not restricted to rights

specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments.

The Justice then explained, also at page 493, how to

determine which rights are reserved under the Ninth

Amendment:

In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not

left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and

private notions. Rather, they must look to “traditions and

[collective] conscience of our people” to determine

whether a principle [is] ‘so rooted [there] ...as to be

ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.

97, 105, 78 L. Ed. 674, 677, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 ALR 575.

The inquiry is whether a right involved “‘is of such a

character that it cannot be denied without violating

‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lies at

the base of all our civil and political institutions’. . .”

It should brook no argument to state that the right toa

clean, healthful environment is within the “penumbra” of

fundamental rights protected under the Ninth Amendment.

This right as the Court recognized in Zabel v. Tabb, supra, is

essentially the right to exist; certainly, it is so rooted in the

tradition and collective conscience of our people as to be

ranked as fundamental. The people of the State of Florida

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_ —

have acted through their legislature to protect this fundament-

al right by the enactment of Chapter 376, Florida Statutes

(1970). In the State Act, the people are asserting their right

to protect their birthright to clean water, coastlines, and other

natural resources from environmental destruction. Their right

to take up statutes in defense of their environment is no

different, except to a matter of degree, from their right to

take up arms to defend against armed attack. Before this

constitutionally guaranteed right, all other rights and privileges

must bow.

61

E. The Jensen Doctrine is Inapplicable

“The Florida Act here constitutes a far greater in-

trusion into the Federal maritime domain than the New York statute

in the Jensen case. If applied to the plaintiffs and intervenors

in this case, the Florida Act would effect—in the words of Jensen—

the “destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime

matters which the Constitution was designed to establish...

We need not belabor the point that to permit the states severally

to regulate these industries as Florida seeks to do would sound

the death knell to the principle of uniformity.’*®

“We are now asked to apply the Jensen doctrine to the

field of unemployment insurance and to invalidate the statute

before us on the ground that it is destructive of admiralty

uniformity .... The Jensen Case has already been severely limited,

and has no vitality beyond that which may continue as to state

workmen's compensation laws.’*7

(1s)

Jensen’s absolute prohibitions against state

legislation affecting maritime commerce must 4

ae ¢ limited to the arena of its own facts:

¢, Memorandum opinion of the District Court, A 44.

Standard Dredging Corporation v. Murphy, 319 U.S. $06, 309 (1942).

62

It is respectfully submitted that in drafting Southern Pacific

Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), this Court used a very

broad-nibbed pen. Any state legislation was declared to be

invalid when it “works material prejudice to the characteristic

features of the general maritime law or interferes with the

proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its inter.

national and interstate relations.” 244 U.S. at 216. It is

difficult to conceive of a state statute affecting maritime

commerce which would stand guiltless of some intrusion into

those prohibited areas. Even state statutes subsequently

approved by this Court, ie., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358

U.S. 588 (1959), are not totally free of a mild trespass into

that yard marked “uniformity”. It is, perhaps, for this reason

that a later decision limited application of the Jensen doctrine ,

to workmen’s compensation cases, Standard Dredging Corpor-

ation v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1942), and the requisite

“uniformity” concept to those situations “where the essential

features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved.”

Just. v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 392 (1941).

In any event, the District Court misapplied the Jensen rule

in the present context. The Jensen decision, by strong

implication at least, limits its application to those areas of

jurisprudence within the exclusive federal maritime domain.

At 244 U.S. 218:

* * *The remedy which the Compensation Statute

attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown to the

common law, encapable of enforcement by the ordinary

processes of any court and is not saved to suitors from the

grant of exclusive jurisdiction.

As discussed above, the Florida Act concerns sea-to-shore

torts, triable only before common law courts at the time the

Jensen Case was decided. If the Admiralty Extension Act can

be said to bring an oil-spill damage action within maritime

tort jurisdiction, it also remains within the. purview of the

common law as a tort. If concurrent jurisdiction exists, states

- are free to legislate within that jurisdiction, and the

“uniformity” concept of Jensen cannot coexist with such

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w—

63

state power. In resting a corner of its case upon the Jensen

doctrine in this context, the District Court erred.

F. Limitation of Liability Means No Recovery.

“Even if fault was established, the vessel-owner’s financial

responsibility for property damage would be limited to the value

of the vessel at the end of the voyage, plus the “freight then

pending,” unless the damage was caused with the owner's privity or

knowledge. ’**

“That object was to enable merchants to invest money in ships

without subjecting them to the indefinite hazard of losing thew

whole property by the negligence or misconduct of the master or

crew, but only subjecting them to the loss of their investment.’*°

“The notion as applicable to a collision case seems to us to be

that if you surrender the offending vessel you are free, just as

it was said by a judge in the time of Edward Ill, ‘If my dog kills

your sheep and I freshly after the fact tender you the dog you

are without recourse against me.’ "*°

(1.)

In a conflict of interests between the y

" State in protecting against effects of an

oil-spill, and the maritime in protecting

shippers from claims resulting therefrom,

the State’s interest is dominant.

Whether or not this Court determines that the Admiralty

Extension Act is invalid as applied in the context of the case

sub judice, the problem of Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S.

96 (1911) remains. In an oil-spill frame of reference, the

Limitation of Liability Act, 9 Stat. 635, 46 U.S.C. §§

181-189, would frustrate justice regardless of the forum or

legal theory applicable. In Richardson, a tort claim arose from

collision of a ship with a bridge. A limitation proceeding was

upheld despite the non-maritime nature of the tort.

gMemorandum opinion of the District Court, A 43.

Mr. Justice Bradley in The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 504 (1886).

- Justice Holmes in Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nav. Co. v.

Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 251 U.S. 48, 53 (1919).

—

64

In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, (1970),

this Court discarded antiquated notions circumscribing re.

covery in a wrongful death action, and overruled The

Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). Underlying the Court's

rationale was a concern that it was unfair and unjust for

general maritime law to allow recovery for injury, but not for

death. There was no jusitification for the dichotomy beyond a

stultified adherence to the ancient felony-murder doctrine.

Rule had supplanted reason. No one knew why The

Harrisburg held as it did; the fact of the holding was

sufficient for subsequent cases. See, The Tungus v. Skovgaard,

358 U.S. 588 (1959).

The State of Florida is not unaware of the reluctance of

the Court to overrule precedent. But if Richardson y,

Harmon, supra, is of sufficient vitality to permit limitation

proceedings to frustrate fair recovery in a common law tort

action for damages to shore property arising from an oil-spill,

then that case must be overruled or sharply limited in

application. Reasons underlying development of the concept

of limitation of liability never contemplated the severe

damage of a massive oil-spill. Public policy on the side of the

state is far more urgent than that on the side of maritime

interests, particularly with marine liability insurance weighed

into the balance. There is no justification today for protecting

owners and charterers of tankers to the detriment of the State

and its citizens.

The Limited Liability Act cannot co-exist in the same

courtroom with the Florida Act. Although 46 U.S.C. § 183 is

limited to sea-going vessels, § 188 applies the limitation to

“all vessels used on lakes or rivers or inland navigation,

including canal boats, barges, and lighters,” and § 189 has

been construed to abrogate common law rights to substantive

remedies saved to suitors altogether. Compare, Richardson v.

Harmon, supra, with The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907), and

Ex parte Phenix, 118 U.S. 610 (1886); see Gilmore and

Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957), at p. 677. Lower

courts have indicated rather conclusively that state statutes

and local ordinances which regulate maritime commerce on

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65

canals and harbors have no effect upon limitation proceedings

under the Act. The Grand Republic—The Nassau, 29 F.2d 37

(2d Cir. 1929); The South Shore, 35 F.2d 110 (3rd _ Cir.

1929) cert. den. 281 U.S. 722 (1930); The Central States, 9

F.Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).

There is no question but that particular advantages afforded

maritime interests by the Limitation of Liability Act would,

assuming continued vitality of Richardson v. Harmon, supra,

and 46 U.S.C. § 189, clash head-on with absolute and

unlimited liability aspects of the Florida Act. But it also

conflicts directly with Section 1161 (f) of the Federal Act (A

81). For the Federal Act, “notwithstanding any other pro-

vision of law”, imposes liability upon “such owner or

operator of any vessel from which oil is discharged in

violation... for the actual costs incurred... for the removal

of such oil by the United States Government in an amount

not to exceed $100 per gross ton of such vessel or

$14,000,000, whichever is lesser... .” The section goes on to

state that the costs shall constitute a maritime lien against the

vessel and that an in rem action may be brought against the

vessel to collect the amount due. But more significantly, it .

further provides that an action may also be brought against

the owner or operator of such vessel in any court of

competent jurisdiction to recover such costs. Limitation of

liability codified with 46 U.S.C. § 183, gives way before the

emphatic (and subsequent) language of the Federal Act.

Having given way before the Federal Act, are these

maritime fictions elastic enough to snap back into place to

frustrate a legitimate exercise of the police power of the

state? Defendants submit that they are not, that what is

appropriate for a Federal act purporting to control water

standards is no less appropriate for a state act seeking to

achieve the same end.

Dominant state interests which would be frustrated by

unbridled application of the Limitation of Liability Act have

been described above. But there is another basis for denying

this particular aspect of maritime law as a ground for striking

the Florida Act. It is contemplated in the phrase “due process

of law”, and it is the fundamental right of every individual

deprived of his property or the use of it by operation of the

government.

66

(2.)

Limitation of liability in the

present context is a bad use of

a good legal theory.

Limitation of ship-owners’ liability first appeared in the

14th Century as a means of encouraging investment in

shipping. The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 376 (No. 11, 619) (D.

Me. 1831); Gilmore and Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY,

(1957) pp. 663-667; Note, 35 Columbia L. Rev. 246 (1935).

Shipping was risky business, and insurance was unknown. It

was necessary to devise a means whereby one’s entire fortune

didn’t go down with part of it in a loss at sea. Limitation of

liability concepts were developed to meet the risks and by

1800 had been codified in most maritime countries. The

United States enacted its first limitation statute fifty years

later. 9 Stat. 634 (1851), as amended 46 U.S.C. § § 181-189

(1964). Like other legislation, it was congressional response to

an unfortunate occurrence at sea. When the S. S. Lexington

left the port of New York in 1840, part of \its manifest

included a box, contents unknown. When it sank, its owners

were held liable for the full value of those contents: $18,000

in gold. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank

of Boston, 47 U.S. (6. How.) 344 (1848). The Limitation of

Liability Act was, in part, a result of this case.

Statutes of limitation were designed to insulate ship-

owners from claims of cargo-owners and passengers who have

contracted with the ship-owner, or his agent, for carriage or

passage. Presumably passengers and cargo-owners are fully

aware of thé risks of maritime transport. Possibility of

negligence on the part of captain or crew is an accepted

hazard. The parties are in privity, so to speak, and it is

neither unreasonable nor improper that this voluntary rela

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67

tionship should subject them to peculiarities of the law of the

sea, not the least of which is a limitation of the owner’s

liability.

But what of parties not in privity with operation of cargo

or passage, whose only relationship is an unwilling one in that

they have been damaged by some maritime instrumentality? Is

it reasonable or proper that persons innocent of the sea

should be subject to its laws?

Since its creation in 1851, the Limitation of Liability Act

has been legislatively and judicially extended to cover sub-

jects, situations, and localities which would have seemed

revolutionary to owners of the S. S. Lexington. It has been

extended to all navigable waters, regardless of size, 24 Stat.

80 (1886), to all vessels regardless of size or employment, The

Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914); Harolds, Limitation of Liability

and its Application to Pleasure Boats, 37 Temp.L.Q. 423

(1964), and to torts consummated on land, Richardson v.

Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911), including massive oil-spills, In re

Barracuda Tanker Corporation, 281 F.Supp 228 (S.D.N.Y.

1968), modified 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).

Extension of limited liability to lakes and pleasure craft is

questionable; its extension to frustrate recovery by innocent

parties ashore is unconscionable. When it crosses the shoreline,

as in Barracuda Tanker, it crosses the limits of constitution-

ality. For it has the effect of (a) leaving the locality of the

constitutional grant in Article III, Section 2, discussed above,

and (b) violating the Fifth Amendment right to substantive

due process of law necessarily attendant to any deprivation by

government of private property for a public purpose. (And if

there is no public purpose advanced in the Limited Liability

Act, then there is no foundation for the law in the first

place.)

The distinction in application of the Limitation of Liability

Act demonstrated here is not a distinction without a

difference. For it is not unreasonable to require a cargo-owner

who has contracted for carriage of his goods to be limited in

his recovery. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207

68

(1936) § 8, 46 U.S.C. § 1308; the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445

(1893) § 6, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195. He is deemed to have

contracted for such services with full knowledge of limitation,

But to impose the limitation formula upon the recovery of a

beachfront hotel owner is to deprive him of a necessary

element of substantive due process.

If ‘we define substantive due process as a constitutional

that no person shall be deprived of his property for

arbitrary reasons without meaningful recourse, the difference

in the distinction becomes clear. Such deprivation of property

is constitutionally acceptable only if the conduct from which

the deprivation flows is proscribed by reasonable legislation

reasonably applied. The implication here is that the legislation

must be applied for the purposes intended, and that those

purposes must comport with the Constitution. The essence of

substantive due process is freedom from arbitrary action with

property no less than life or liberty. Cf. United States ».

Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States

v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Nebbia v. New York, 291

U.S. 502 (1933); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US.

393 (1922); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

To the extent that a massive oil-slick smears a beach-front

hotel thereby driving away guests and hurting his other

business, the owner of the hotel should have a remedy. If

under limitation proceedings, the ship-owner may limit his

liability to the hotelowner by the value of a sunken wreck,

the plaintiff is deprived of the basic element of his right, to

wit, compensation. Remedial action afforded in admiralty

courts, or in commonlaw courts occupied by the Limitation

- of Liability Act, is no remedy at all in this context. To the

extent that an act of Congress compels this deprivation of

property without due process of law, the Fifth Amendment is

violated. If the Limitation of Liability Act is not unconsti-

tutional on its face, it quickly becomes so under this

application. Due process of law is a concept intended to

protect individuals from such an arbitrary exercise of govern

ment power “unrestrained by the established principles of

private rights and distributive justice.” Twining v. New Jersey,

supra.

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69

In a totally different context, Mr. Justice Frankfurter once

commented: “The use of a legal remedy devised for a simple

situation might in a totally different environment become a

ersion of that remedy.” Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Can

Co., 309 U.S. 310, 322 (1939).

This is the heart of the problem. To employ limitation of

liability in a manner never intended (nor even conceived when

the act was passed) to frustrate full recovery of a claimant

under circumstances to which the Florida Act is directed, is a .

perversion of the original intent of the Limitation of Liability

Act and an unconstitutionally arbitrary use thereof.

The Florida Act seeks to provide a remedy for its citizens

where none exists. May an unconstitutional application of a

maritime statute be the basis for striking the Florida Act? The

State respectfully submits that it may not.

The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 In No Way

Preempted the States From Imposing Requirements and

Liabilities to Protect Against Massive Oil-Spill Pollution of

Their Territorial Waters—Instead, It Describes A Joint

Federal-State Scheme to Combat A Serious Economic aritt

Environmental Problem.

A. Preliminary Statement

“Our environmental problems stem largely from a pressing

need to emerge from the entire system of legal theory and

precedent that guided us during the first century of industrial-

ization in this country.’*'!

To consider issues arising under this general question, it is

necessary to define relative positions. To declare position is to

imply certain priorities. The position of the State of Florida

*"Hon, Edmund S. Muskie, Torts, Transportation, and Pollution: Do the Old

Shoes Still Fit? 7 Harvard Journal on Legislation 477, 492 (1970).

70

' rests on several premises. First, that there will be no “losing

side” to this controversy. Issues at bar are so far-reaching and

of such serious social, economic, and environmental conse.

quence that, once resolved, the whole fabric consisting of

state, Federal, and maritime interests, will be benefitted,

Second, this case should not be decided solely upon historical

interests asserted by state or maritime parties as predominate,

one over the other. Nor is it appropriate to arrive at a holding

based solely upon prior decisions. For cases supporting

exercise of the state police power, and those establishing rigid

principles of uniformity in matters maritime are of equal

dignity; they form long lines, but on parallel planes. The last

word in either cause will probably not be spoken here. If

jealously guarded prerogatives of state and maritime interests

receive added impetus in ‘new directions as a result of this

appeal, it will be incidental to the essential question decided.

It is true that Florida has a responsibility to protect its

citizens and its environment from dangers of a massive

oil-spill, assuming that no other protection is afforded. We do

not understand the District Court or maritime interests to

deny this. It is equally true that maritime law, if not a corpus

juris existing independently of state and national influences,

must continue to develop in a cohesive, universally recognized

pattern. Florida has no quarrel with this.

These ambitions are not mutually exclusive. That they

conflict in the instant appeal is because they were considered

by the District Court in terms of hornbook precedent. But

dogmas of the stormy past, to paraphrase Mr. Lincoln, are

inappropriate to govern crises of the age of supertankers.

Rules of decisions applicable to wrongful death or workmen's

compensation cases cannot be rigidly applied in this context.

“Uniformity” is an abstraction; it cannot be the sine qua non

of every regulation affecting maritime commerce. Causes of

regulation will not be the same in each instance. Where

problems to be controlled differ, regulations effecting control

will differ.

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v

71

+

It is the position of the State of Florida that the State Act

should not be judged by its conflicts with ancient tenets of

maritime law, but by its response to challenges expressed in

the Federal Act. Those challenges call for a combined

FederalState operation to combat a major threat to our

environment. To the extent that the maritime industry resists

this response, it sets itself apart, disputing not merely the

State of Florida, but the national policy as expressed in the

Federal Act, and the urgent priorities of other coastal states

as well.

B. The Federal Act

“It is a question of the first magnitude whether

the destiny of the great rivers is to be the sewers of the cities

along thei banks or to be protected against everything which

threatens their purity. To decide the whole matter at one blow by

an irrevocable fiat would be at least premature.’*

“Historians have noted that over the centuries,

Oriental despotism has been associated with centralized

control of water resources.’**

(1.)

As compared to the Florida Act,

The Federal Act defines the problem and

declares national policy while

contemplating State participation in the

. enforcement of it.

Congress declares it to be policy of the United States

“...that there be no discharge of oil into or upon the

navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or

into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone.” § 1161 (b)

(1); A 76, and prohibits such discharge in harmful quantities,

52M, Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Min

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