Appendix — Swenson v. Stidham

Supreme Court brief1973

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APPENDIX A

STATE of Missouri, Respondent

v.

James William STIDHAM, Appellant.

No. 45537

Supreme Court of Missouri,

Division No. 2.

Sept. 9, 1957. al

Prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder arising out of a prison riot and based on a theory

of conspiracy. The Circuit Court of Butler County, Ran-

dolph Weber, J., entered judgment of conviction and de-

fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Bohling, C., held

that instruction concerning conspiracy using the words,

“aid, abet, assist or encourage” in the disjunctive rather

than conjunctively, was proper and did not erroneously

authorize a conviction upon a finding that defendant did

any one of the four acts.

Judgment affirmed.

1. Criminal Law (Key) 736(2)

In prosecution resulting in a conviction of first degree

murder, question concerning the voluntariness of defend-

ant’s confession was for jury.

2. Homicide (Key) 308(3), 309(5)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder, under defense of alibi the only submissible issue

of guilt under evidence was murder in first degree, and

therefore the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on

murder in the second degree and manslaughter. Section

599.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

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3. Criminal Law (Key) 437

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder arising out of prison riot, diagram of floor plan of

prison basement, which showed location of cells, steel gates

and which was drawn to scale and which was identified

by the person making it as well as others was admissible,

Section 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.MLS.

4. Criminal Law (Key) 404(4)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder arising out of a prison riot, 16-pound sledge ham-

mer found at side of victim’s body the night of riot was

admissible. Section 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M:S.

5. Criminal Law (Key) 1169(5)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder arising out of a prison riot, court’s instruction to

witness not to testify to any statements made by others

and conveyed to defendant by the witness cured any al-

leged error of police office attempting to explain to de-

fendant that officer had a statement from others.

6. Criminal Law (Key) 432

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder, trial court properly refused exhibits allegedly re-

lating to fact that a witness was of unsound mind and in-

competent since the sources of information and the method

and time of preparation of exhibits were not such as to

justify exhibits’ admission. Sections 490.680, 559.010 RSMo

1949, V.A.MLS.

7. Witnesses (Key) 79(3)

It is court’s function, not the function of jury, to pass

on competency of a witness. Section 491.060 RSMq 1949,

V.A.MS.

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8. Witnesses (Key) 330(3)

Trial courts may exercise a sound discretion as to the

extent of the examination of witnesses with respect to

specific acts on collateral matters affecting their credibility

and not directly connected with the issues on trial.

9, Criminal Law (Key) 1136

Where defendant’s counsel did not avail himself of

court’s offer to recall witness, defendant could not assert

error in that he had been unable to cross-examine a wit-

ness completely in respect desired.

10. Homicide (Key) 308(1)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder, instruction properly required jury to find that the

conspirators willfully killed victim.

11. Criminal Law (Key) 755%, 761(11), 811(3)

Where defense to murder prosecution was alibi and

there was no contention or evidence that the victim had

not been murdered, use of the words “kill and murder” and

“killing and murdering” and their repetition several times

in an instruction did not constitute comment on evidence

or single out and give undue prominence to such words

and did not assume a murder had been committed.

12. Homicide (Key) 305

In prosecution resulting in conviction of defendant of

murder in the first degree based on theory defendant had

conspired with others to kill victim during prison riot, un-

der statute that principals in second degree in the com-

mission of any felony or accessories to any murder or other

felony before the fact may be charged, tried, convicted and

punished in same manner, as the principal in the first de-

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gree, use of words “aid, abet, assist or encourage” in in-

struction concerning conspiracy disjunctively rather than

conjunctively did not erroneously authorize conviction up-

on the finding that defendant did any one of the four acts,

Sections 556.120, 556.170, 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

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13. Criminal Law (Key) 64

With respect to convictions of principals in second de-

gree, in absence of statutory provisions, no particular acts

are necessary, nor is it necessary that any physical part in

the commission of the crime be taken; mere encourage-

ment is enough. f

14. Conspiracy (Key) 41 /

Persons entering a conspiracy after its formation ate

deemed in law parties to all acts done by any one of the

conspirators, before or after persons’ entrance, in further-

ance of the conspiracy.

15. Homicide (Key) 234(1)

Evidence justified finding that a conspiracy had been

committed and finding of the actual participation in and

consummation of the conspiracy to murder by defendant

and others named in indictment. Section 559.010 RSMo

1949, V.A.MLS.

16. Criminal Law (Key) 822(1)

An instruction is to be considered as a whole and with

other instructions in the case.

17. Conspiracy (Key) 41

Criminal Law (Key) 64, 69

Act of one of conspirators in the furtherance of a con-

spiracy is the act of the other conspirators and principals

in the

equall:

556.17

18. Cr

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1949,

19. Cr

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20. Cr:

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in the second degree and accessories before the fact are

equally guilty with the principal in first degree. Section

556.170 RSMo 1949, V.A.MS.

18. Criminal Law (Key) 763(19), 781(5)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder, instruction regarding voluntariness of defendant’s

confession was proper and statement in instruction to the

effect that if jury did not believe that a statement, written

or oral and claimed to be a confession made by the de-

fendant, was voluntarily made by him, jury should disre-

gard the statement, was not ambiguous, misleading, incom-

plete or a comment on evidence. Section 559.010 RSMo

1949, V.A.MLS.

19. Criminal Law (Key) 805(3)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree

murder, instruction to effect that if jury believed defend-

ant’s statement, written or oral, was voluntarily made, jury

must consider such statement did not mislead jury al-

though more appropriately the word ‘‘may” could have

been used rather than the word “must”.

20. Criminal Law (Key) 388

Results of a lie detector examination are inadmissible

in evidence.

21. Criminal Law (Key) 900

The statutory right of an accused to no reference to

his failure to testify may be waived by him. Section 546.270

RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; 42 V.A.M.S. Supreme Court Rules,

rules 26.08, 28.02, 28.08.

wach) ee

When an accused takes the stand in his defense, his

failure to testify on specific facts involved in the case is a

legitimate subject of comment by the state in argument.

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22. Criminal Law (Key) 721(2)

23. Criminal Law (Key) 721(2)

Where defendant, accused of murder in first degree,

had taken the stand, defendant’s failure to deny incrim-

inating facts was open to comment whether the denial]

should have occurred in an appearance in chief or in an

appearance in surrebuttal. Section 546.270 RSMo 1949,

V.A.M.S.; 42 V.A.M.S. Supreme Court Rules, rules 26.08,

28.02, 28.08.

eS

Mark H. Hennelly, St. Louis, for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Winston Cook, Sp. Asst.

Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BOHLING, Commissioner.

James William Stidham appeals from a sentence of

life imprisonment for the first degree murder of Walter

Lee Donnell during the riot at the Missouri Penitentiary

on the evening of September 22, 1954, in Cole County, Mis-

souri. § 559.010. (Statutory references are to RSMo 1949

and Y:A.M.S.) The indictment charged defendant, Wil-

liam R. Hoover, Jackie Lee Noble, Paul Edward Kenton,

Rollie Laster, Don Wm. DeLapp and Joseph M. Vidauri

with the commission of the offense. All were inmates of

the penitentiary. Defendant’s case, upon his application

for changé of venue, was tried in the Circuit Court of But-

ler County, Missouri, in July, 1955. Defendant was well

represented by counsel. He has filed no brief. His motion

for new trial presents many issues.

AT

The defense was an alibi; but certain issues: call for

some detail of the facts.

[1] I. There is no merit in defendant's contention

that his written confession was coerced and involuntary

and was admitted in evidence before the State established

that it had been voluntarily given. The court conducted

a full preliminary hearing on the issue, found the issue was

for the jury, and later, after hearing the evidence before

the jury, submitted the issue to the jury for determination.

The testimony was to like effect at each hearing. Two

members of the State Highway Patrol and four members

of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police force, present at the

time defendant claimed physical violence occurred, testi-

fied that no promises had been given, or physical violence,

duress, threats or abuse was offered to defendant, cate-

gorically denying defendant’s testimony. On the conflict-

ing showing the issue of the voluntariness of the confession

was for the jury. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.

2d 88, 93 [3, 4]; State v. Laster, Mo., 293 S.W.2d 300, 303

(1, 2]; State v. Sanford, 354 Mo. 998, 1006 [4]. 193 S.W.2d

31, 37, 38 [2]; State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440,

448 [12]. ‘tan!

Defendant stated, among other things, in his confes-

sion, written in his own hand, that several prisoners broke

into death row and Paul Kenton unlocked his cell door.

He and several other prisoners then went to Creighton’s

cell to attack him but he had his lock blocked and they

could not enter. They then entered Donnell’s cell, and,

quoting: “Kenton held Donnell while Laster stabbed him

several times with an ice pick, at the same time I slashed

at him three or four times around the face and neck with

a knife that Kenton gave me when he opened the door.

When Donnell fell to the floor Linder and Thompson each

said get Donnell with the sledge and they proceeded to

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hit him with a sledge hammer and a crowbar.” Defend-

ant also orally stated that he did not like Donnell because

Donnell had snitched in regard to a riot in July and caused

defendant to be punished; that Donnell had snitched on

some of the boys and they had received a lot of time; and

that he was living his life under a different code than the

officers. |

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The jury could find, aside from defendant’s confession,

the following outlined facts from the evidence.

The homicide occurred in what is known as “death

row.” Death row, consisting of thirty-two cells, was lo-

cated in the basement of “B” Hall. Three heavy steel

gates or doors separated death row proper from other

parts of the building. B Hall proper, above death row,

housed a cell block.

The riot started about 6:30 p. m. September 22, 1954.

Nine inmates, for various reasons were confined in death

row that evening. Defendant, who was known as “Slick,”

and his co-indictee Laster occupied adjoining cells, having

been transferred to death row about July, 1954. Donnell,

the deceased, and James M. Creighton also occupied ad-

joining cells in death row, some distance from defendant

and Laster.

BS BR ARRASES BRAA RII

From the date defendant was placed in death row he

would “holler down” and curse and ridicule Donnell,

threatened to kill Donnell if he ever got to him, said that

“when they come in here and get us out, we are going

down there and kill” Donnell and Creighton; and that they

should have killed Donnell over in E Hall when they

broke out over there.

Clarence Dietzel was on guard duty in death row the

night of the riot. He noticed the disturbance and started

closing the windows to death row. Defendant and Laster

AQ

demanded that the windows opposite their cells be left

open.

About 7:00 or 7:30 p. m. some of the rioters tried to

break into B Basement. While the prisoners were trying

to break into death row, defendant and Laster “hollered”

that they would be down to kill Donnell and Creighton as

soon as they got out of their cells. Defendant said he was

going to kill Donnell because Donnell took the stand against

one Thompson and some others.

DeLapp, known as Curley, Kenton, Noble, Hoover, and

Vidauri, were among the number trying to break in. They

worked on the first door with a sledge hammer, crowbars,

pick and other small tools. DeLapp called to defendant,

saying: “Slick, this is Curley DeLapp. We will be in to

get you out if it takes, costs us hell and high water.” “We

are coming down to get you out. We are going to get you

out.” Defendant answered: “Hurry up, Goddamn it, I am

waiting for you.” DeLapp sent Hoover and Kenton out

to burn the buildings. They returned. Vidauri guarded

a paint bucket containing knives, having 5 or 6 inch blades,

used in the twine plant. After working on the door for a

while, DeLapp called to defendant that they could not

make it and were going to try something else. Defendant

told DeLapp to come around to the south windows and said

he might make it there. DeLapp, Noble, Hoover and Ken-

ton went out and tried to make an entrance through the

wall into death row with the sledge hammer. Defendant

and Laster talked to DeLapp through the open windows

and had him go hack and work on the door. They again

started to work on the door and DeLapp called to defend-

ant saying: “We are going to try again.” Then, in a short

time someone produced a key and the men came into B

Basement proper. DeLapp and also Kenton demanded

Dietzel’s keys, threatening to kill him if he refused to hand

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\\ them over. Dietzel insisted he did not have the keys and

‘ did not give the keys to them. DeLapp with the help of

others, then broke the lock on the second door with a

sledge hammer. DeLapp, Noble, Kenton and Hoover im.

mediately entered to where guard Dietzel was. They

placed Dietzel on a small table and searched him for the

keys, Kenton pulling the lining completely out of his coat.

DeLapp ordered Dietzel to call the warden’s office and im-

mediately took the telephone from him. About this time

the door to death row proper opened. Noble and Kenton

placed Dietzel in one of the death row cells, where he re-

mained for about twenty minutes, and was then taken up

the steps and placed in the mop room in B Hall.

DeLapp, Noble, Kenton, Hoover, Vidauri and one

Miller finally released defendant and Laster, as well as

other prisoners who desired to be released from their cells

in death row. DeLapp led them up the aisle and said to

the onlookers: “Get back men, they are coming out now”;

and when they came out and stopped, DeLapp put his arm

around defendant’s shoulders and said: “Gentlemen, I have

brought you this far, this is your leader from here on.”

Defendant answered: ‘Well men, I am ready to work.”

They then went into the room where Vidauri was guard-

ing the knives and returned to death row armed with

weapons. Defendant told Vidauri to go ahead but Vi-

dauri answered, “No, I am going with you. I am all the

way with you guys.” They thern»went back into death

row. DeLapp had the other inmates go upstairs in B

Hall.

Defendant, Laster, Hoover, DeLapp, Kenton, Noble and

Vidauri tried to break into Creighton’s cell. They had a

sledge hammer, a pole and other weapons. Creighton had

jammed his lock with concrete and a comb. Defendant

said he was going to settle the score with Donnell and

3 All

Creighton, They broke Creighton’s jaw in two places, using

apole. He got the pole away from them, and started using

iton them. Defendant told Donnell they would be over to

get him next. They could not get Creighton’s cell door

open and started working on Donnell’s door. Creighton

heard Donnell’s door go back and saw the seven men walk

up to go into Donnell’s cell. ‘He could not see through the

‘cell walls. He heard Donnell hollering: “I ain’t no rat, I

ain't no snitch. And I ain’t never harmed you boys,” and

he was begging them. Pretty soon Donnell was going Oh,

oh, and he hollered real loud and got to kind of gurgling.

The men then ran out of Donnell’s cell and up the aisle.

They went to a wash basin and each washed his hands.

Defendant and Noble took off their undershirts and dis-

carded them.

Donnell received a multiplicity of wounds. He had

five stab wounds in the front and four stab wounds in the

back on the left side in.the region of the heart and lungs.

Two of the front wounds passed completely through his

heart and two of the back wounds penetrated his heart.

His skull had sustained an egg shell type fracture, three

or four inches in area, a multiple crushing type fracture of

many small fragments, which could have been made by a

bloody, 16-pound sledge hammer found alongside hi® body

about 10:30 p. m. that day by an officer. He had other

wounds on his body. :

[2] II. Defendant contends error resulted from the

court's failure to instruct on murder in the second degree

and manslaughter. The defense was an alibi. The only

submissible issue of guilt under the evidence was murder

in the first degree. State v. Taylor, 347 Mo. 607, 148 S.W.

2d 802, 805 [5]; State v. Clymer, Mo., 159 S.W.2d 808, 812

[9]; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362, 80 S.W.2d 865, 868 [1,

2]. See State v. Laster, Mo., 293 S.W.2d 300, 302, and §

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559.010. It also follows that error was not committed in

overruling defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal

and judgment of acquittal as to murder in the first degree.

[3,4] III. Defendant’s contentions that State’s Ex.

hibits No. 1 and No. 9 should not have been received in

evidence because hearsay, not properly identified and be-

cause such action violated his constitutional rights are

without merit. The testimony established that Exhibit 1

was a diagram of the floor plan of B Basement, showed the

location of the cells, steel gates, et cetera, was drawn to

scale, and it was identified by the person making it and

others. State’s Exhibit 1 was admissible. State v. McGee,

336 Mo. 1082, 83 S.W.2d 98, 107 [26]; State v. McHarness,

Mo., 255 S.W.2d 826, 829 [6]. Exhibit 9 was a bloody

16-pound sledge hammer found at the side of Donnell’s

body by W. S. Barton of the State Highway Patrol about

10:30 p. m. the night of the riot. It was also identified by

a number of other witnesses. Defendant’s confession re-

fers to the use of a sledge hammer in the killing of Donnell.

There was no error in the admission of Exhibit 9. State

v. Hopkins, 278 Mo. 388, 213 S.W. 126, 128 [5]; State v.

Wilson, 223 Mo. 173, 189, 122 S.W. 671, 676 [5].

{5] IV. During the examination of Officer Eitzman

of St. Louis, who was present at the time defendant gave

his written confession, the officer stated he talked. to de-

fendant “and explained to him that I had a statement

* **” Defendant’s objection to the remark was sustained

and the witness was instructed not to testify to any state-

ments made by other prisoners and conveyed to defendant

by the witness. Notwithstanding the court’s ruling, de

fendant’s motion for new trial asserts the court could not

cure the alleged error. A more questionable situation

arose under similar circumstances in State v. Vidauri, Mo.,

293 S.W.2d 955, 956 [2,3], and was ruled against defend-

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ant’s contention. See State v. Montgomery, Mo., 223 S.W.

2d 463, 466 [11,12]. The point is ruled against defendant.

[6,7] V. Defendant claims error in the exclusion of

his Exhibits B, C, C-1, and D. Exhibit B was never of-

fered in evidence.

Defendant objected to James M. Creighton being sworn

as a witness on the ground he was of unsound mind and

incompetent. The jury was excused and a voir dire hear-

ing was conducted at which Mrs. Alma Miller, the Medical

Records Clerk of State Hospital No. 1, at Fulton, and

Creighton were examined. Mrs. Miller produced a file of

a number of pages marked defendant’s Exhibit B for iden-

tification, and out of the file defendant offered and the

court accepted in evidence at the voir dire examination two

typewritten sheets marked defendant’s Exhibits C and C-1;

and another typewritten sheet marked defendant’s Ex-

hibit D.

Creighton testified on voir dire that he had been in

“solitary” for about eighteen months and “played crazy,”

put on a good act to get out of solitary and be sent to the

State Hospital and after thirty-five days was returned to

the Penitentiary; that he had never been before a Probate

Court and committed as an insane person; and that he had

been in a mental institution only that one time. The court

found that Creighton was a competent witness.

Later, upon Creighton’s cross-examination before the

jury defendant developed that Creighton had put on a

pretty good act and had been transferred to the State Hos-

pital at Fulton, where he remained five or six weeks be-

fore being retransferred to the Penitentiary, and placed

in death row in May, 1954. Upon an objection being in-

terposed to a question, counsel for defendant, out of the

presence of the jury, stated he was asking the court to

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make Creighton’s competency as a witness a jury question,

The court informed counsel the jury passed on the cred-

ibility of witnesses but not their competency and counsel]

was entitled to examine the witness on any matters affect-

ing his credibility. Counsel stated he would not pursue the

matter further. His subsequent offer of said Exhibits C,

C-1, and D in evidence before the jury was refused.

Mrs. Miller testified that Exhibits C and C-1 were

attached to a Missouri Penitentiary letterhead; that she

did not know who made the record or when it was made,

and could not say it was a record of State Hospital No. 1;

and with respect to Exhibit D she was not willing to swear

it was correct because it was not signed. The showing was

such as to permit of a finding that the sources of infor-

mation, and method and time of preparation of the exhibits

were not such as to justify their admission before the jury.

$ 490.680; Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 363 Mo.

864, 254 S.W.2d 577, 579 [1]. In addition, it was the court's

function, and not the function of the jury, to pass on the

competency of the witness. § 491.060; State v. Whitsett,

232 Mo. 511, 526(IV), 134 S.W. 555, 560(4); Kleinschmidt

v. Bell, 353 Mo. 516, 183 S.W.2d 87, 91 [4,5]; State v. Herr-

ing, 268 Mo. 514, 188 S.W. 169, 172 [3, 5-8]; 97 C.J.S. Wit-

nesses § 119 f, p. 541; 2 Wigmore on Evidence 523, §§ 487,

497(c).

[8.9] VI. The court sustained an objection to de-

fendant’s offer of proof at the close of the cross-examination

of witness Creighton that he had access to one Mary Annis,

they both being confined in the Cole County jail at the time

of trial. Thereafter and prior to the calling of the next

witness the court made it clear to defendant’s counsel that

he was at liberty to show the interest of the witness in

testifying in the case and to develop any arrangement

made covering any special privileges in connection with

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his testimony, and offered to recall the witness for further

cross-examination. Defendant’s motion for new trial states

the court erred in not permitting him to cross-examine the

witness completely with respect to his association with

Mary Annis. Trial courts may exercise a sound discretion

as to the extent of the examination of witnesses with re-

spect to specific acts on collateral matters affecting their

credibility and not directly connected with the issues on

trial. Adriance v. Arnot, 31 Mo. 471; State v. Nasello, 325

Mo. 442, 30 S.W.2d 132, 139 [26]; State v. Brotherton, Mo.,

966 S.W.2d 712, 714 [2]. Counsel did not avail himself of

the court’s offer to recall the witness and may not now

successfully urge reversible error.

VII. Defendant makes many attacks on the State’s

main instruction, Instruction No. 4, which, after defining

“felonious,” and other terms, reads, in so far as ques-

tioned:

“Bearing in mind these definitions and those included

in the other instructions, the court instructs the jury that

if you believe and find from the evidence, beyond a reason-

able doubt, that Rollie Laster, William R. Hoover, Paul

Edward Kenton, Jackie Lee Noble, Don William DeLapp,

and Joseph M. Vidauri entered into a conspiracy and agree-

ment to act in concert and together to kill and murder

Walter Lee Donnell at the time and place and in the manner

and by the means hereafter set forth in this instruction,

and if you believe and find from the evidence, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that pursuant to such a conspiracy and

agreement those aforesaid persons, acting in concert and

together, on September 22, 1954, in Cole County, Missouri,

wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice

aforethought did make an assault upon Walter Lee Donnell,

and then and there did wilfully, deliberately, premedi-

tatedly, and with malice aforethought forcibly strike, hit,

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stab, cut, and beat Walter Lee Donnell in and upon his face,

head, and body, with a sledge hammer, and a knife, and

another sharp instrument or dagger, if you so find, thereby

giving Walter Lee Donnell about his face, head, and body,

mortal wounds from the effects of which he died on Sep-

tember 22, 1954, if you so find, and if you further believe

‘and find from the evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the defendant, James William Stidham, at the time of

such killing and murdering, was a member of the con-

spiracy and agreement aforesaid and theretofore had con-

spired and agreed with Rollie Laster, William R. Hoover,

Paul Edward Kenton, Jackie Lee Noble, Don William De-

Lapp, and Joseph M. Vidauri, to aid, abet, assist or en-

courage them in the killing and murdering of Walter Lee

Donnell at the time and place and in the manner and by the

means aforesaid, and if you further believe and find from

the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defend-

ant, James William Stidham, pursuant to such conspir-

acy and agreement, was actually present during the killing

and murdering aforesaid of Walter Lee Donnell, and that

he knew of the felonious purpose and intent of Rollie

Laster, William R. Hoover, Paul Edward Kenton, Jackie

Lee Noble, Don William DeLapp, and Joseph Vidauri to kill

and murder Walter Lee Donnell as aforesaid, and that

James William Stidham then and there knowingly and in-

tentionally aided, abetted, assisted, or encouraged the

aforesaid persons, or any of them, in the aforesaid killing

and murdering, then you should find the defendant, James

William Stidham, guilty of Murder in the First Degree and

by your verdict so say. * * *”

[10] a. The required finding of the instruction that

pursuant to a conspiracy the conspirators acting in concert

“then and there did wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly,

and with malice aforethought forcibly strike, hit, stab, cut,

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and beat Walter Lee Donnell in and upon his face, head,

and body, with a sledge hammer, and a knife, and another

sharp instrument or dagger, if you so find, thereby giving

Walter Lee Donnell about his face, head and body, mortal

wounds from the effects of which he died on September 22,

1954, if you so find,” refutes defendant’s assertion that the

instruction did not require the jury to find that the con-

spirators wilfully, et cetera, killed, Donnell.

[11] b. The use of the words “kill and murder” and

“killing and murdering” and their repetition several times

in the instruction did not, as stated by defendant, consti-

tute a comment on the evidence, or single out and give

undue prominence to such words, under the facts adduced

in evidence by the State and did not assume a murder had

been committed. The instruction required the finding of

the submitted facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The de-

fense was an alibi; and there was no contention or evi-

dence that Donnell had not been murdered.

[12,13] c. Defendant questions the use of the words

“aid, abet, assist or encourage” and “aided, abetted, as-

sisted, or encouraged” in the instruction, contending the

use of the terms disjunctively rather than conjunctively

erroneously authorized a conviction upon a finding that de-

fendant did any one of the four acts.’ Under § 556.170

principals in the second degree in the commission of any

felony or accessories to any murder or other felony be-

fore the fact “may be charged, tried, convicted and pun-

ished in the same manner, as the principal in the first

degree.” Consult also § 556.120 on the offense of con-

spiracy. Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. 4, Ch. III, p.

*34, defines a principal in the first degree as “the actor

or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and in the second de-

gree he is who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to

. be done”; and an accessory before the fact “to be one

‘sabia ‘sme

Sep

sli ae ates

AGREE RN Lhe pine PRGA OR FOS

Al8

who, being absent at the time of the crime committed,

doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to com-

mit a crime.” See authorities there cited; also 22 CJS.

Criminal Law §§ 85-93, p. 152; 14 Am.Jur. 820, B, 832, C.

It is stated in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 88, p. 159, with

respect to principals in the second degree, in the absence

of statutory provisions that “no particular acts are neces-

sary; nor is it necessary that any physical part in the com-

mission of the crime be taken; mere encouragement is

enough.” And see Id., § 93, p. 164, with respect to an

accessory before the fact. McMannus v. Lee, 43 Mo. 206,

208, states: ‘The law is well laid down that any person

who is present at the commission of a trespass, encourag-

ing or exciting the same by words, gestures, looks, or

signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances

or approves the same, is in law deemed to be an aider and

abettor, and liable as a principal * * *.” Approved in

State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 104, 110(11), 9 S.W. 646, 650,

652(11), 11 S.W. 1133, and other cases. See also State v.

Messino, 325 Mo. 743, 766(V), 30 S.W.2d 750, 760(V);

State v. Lawrence, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 842, 848; State v. Ruffin,

Mo., 286 S.W.2d 743, 748 [10, 11]; State v. Murray, Mo.,

193 S.W. 830, 832; State v. Clymer, Mo., 159 S.W.2d 808,

811 [8]; People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 284, 28 N.W.

896, 897. The submission was not erroneous.

[14,15] d. We have hereinbefore stated enough, but

not all, of the evidenze favorable to the State. Generally,

a conspiracy is not shown by direct evidence. It is often

inferred from the circumstances. State v. Parr, 296 Mo.

406, 246 S.W. 903, 906 [8]. in i rstan case there was

ample evidence for a finding of the conspiracy submitted

and the actual participation in and consummation of the _

said conspiracy by the persons named in the instruction.

Persons entering a conspiracy after its formation are

Alg

deemed in law parties to all acts done by any one of the

conspirators, before or after his entrance, in furtherance

of the conspiracy. State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 105, 106,

9 S.W. 646, 650; State v. Crab, 121 Mo. 554, 563, 26.S.W.

548, 550; State v. Richetti, 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S.W.2d 330,

342 [14, 15]; 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 75, p. 1107; 11 Am.Jur.

571, § 40.

[16] An instruction is to be considered as a whole

and with the other instructions in the case. Instruction

No. 4 is to be read with No. 5, set out infra. The Missouri

cases cited to Point VII, c. sustain Instruction No. 4. It

was more favorable to defendant than the law required

it to be. We need not detail the other attacks against

it.

VIII. Defendant’s motion questions Instruction No.

5, which reads:

“The Court instructs the jury that, if you believe and

find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

the defendant, James William Stidham, and William R.

Hoover, Rollie Laster, Paul Edward Kenton, Jackie Lee

Noble, Don William De Lapp and Joseph M. Vidauri en-

tered into a conspiracy and agreement to act in concert

and together to kill and murder Walter Lee Donnell at

the time and place and in the manner and by the means

set forth in Instruction No. 4, then the act of either of them

pursuant to such conspiracy and agreement to kill and

murder Walter Lee Donnell would be in law the act of

each one so conspiring and agreeing.

“The word ‘Conspiracy,’ as used in these instructions,

means a common agreement and understanding between

two or more persons which is formed for the purpose of

committing and doing by their joint efforts some crimiial

act.

A20

“The Court instructs the jury that all persons are

principals who are guilty of acting in concert and together

in the commission of a crime. When a crime is actually

committed by one or more persons and another person is

actually present, and, knowing of the felonious purpose

and intent of the person or persons committing the crime,

he knowingly and intentionally aids, abets, assists or en-

courages the person or persons actually committing the

crime in the commission of the same, then such person so

knowingly and intentionally aiding, abetting, assisting or

encouraging the person or persons actually committing

the crime in the commission of the same is a principal

and he is equally guilty with the person or persons who

actually commits the crime.

“However, you are further instructed that the mere

presence of a person at the time and place of the commis-

sion of a crime by another or others is not alone sufficient

to justify him in any manner responsible for the commis-

sion of such crime. On the contrary, before such person

can be found in any manner responsible for the commission

of such crime, the evidence in the case must show, beyond

a reasonable doubt, not only that such person was

actually present at the commission of such crime, but also

that such person knew of the felonious purpose and intent

on the part of the person or persons actually committing

the crime, and that he then and there was knowingly and

intentionally aiding, abetting, assisting or encouraging the

person or persons committing the crime in the commission

of the same.”

[17] This instruction is to be considered with the

other instructions in the case. The submitted facts of the

first paragraph of Instruction No. 5 were required to be

found beyond a reasonable doubt. The other paragraphs of

the instruction are merely definitive, legal statements of

aed DRAENEI

—< .

——

2 SE ES

Jeph

Bec sch aaa

»

A21

what constitutes a conspirator and a conspiracy, assume

nothing, and are not subject to successful attack on the

ground they are abstract. We have hereinbefore held

there was substantial evidence of the submitted conspiracy

. embracing all the named participants. The conspiracy

was incidental to the offense charged. It is also the law

that the act of one of the conspirators in the furtherance

of the conspiracy is the act of the other conspirators, and

¢ 556.170 makes principals in the second degree and ac-

cessories before the fact equally guilty with the principal

in the first degree. (See instructions in State v. Cantlin,

118 Mo. 100, 107, 111(II), 23 S.W. 1091, 1093, 1095(2),

considered to fairly cover the issue.) What we have

hereinbefore said sufficiently answers defendant’s attacks

against Instruction No. 5. Instructions less favorable to a

defendant have been approved. State v. Walker, supra;

State v. Messino, supra; State v. Murray, supra; State v.

Lawrence, supra; State v. Clymer, supra; State v. Nasello,

325 Mo. 442, 459(IV), 30 S.W.2d 132, 137(IV) (instruction

2 therein being to tHe same effect as instruction 2 set out

in State v. Messino, supra); State v. Williams, 309 Mo.

155, 274 S.W. 427, 434(VII); State v. Dowling, 360 Mo.

746, 230 S.W.2d 691, 694 [6]; State v. Mayberry, Mo., 272

S.W.2d 236, 243 [20].

[18] IX. Defendant also questions Instruction No.

6, which reads:

“The Court instructs the jury that before any alleged

statement can be valid, and before you can even consider

it, it must have been made voluntarily, that is ;to say,

without anyone having offered to the person who. i¢ claimed

to have made such a statement any hope of leniency or

reward of any kind for making such statement, and with-

out anyone making any threat or doing any violence to

the person claimed to have made any such statement in

order to induce or force him to confess.

ORLOV EES OR Se 33.

A22

“If the jury does not believe that a statement, written

or oral, and claimed to be a confession made by the de-

fendant, was voluntarily made by him as defined above,

the jury should entirely disregard such statement in ar-

riving at your verdict.

“If, however, the jury does believe that a statement,

written or oral, and claimed to be a confession made by

the defendant, was voluntarily made by him as defined

above, the jury must consider such statement and you

should give it such weight as you believe it deserves in

arriving at your verdict.”

- We do not agree with the contention in defendant's

motion that the clause “claimed to be a confession made

by the defendant” is ambiguous, misleading, incomplete

and a comment on the evidence. The State’s evidence

was that the statements were voluntary and defendant’s

evidence was to the contrary. No intelligent jury would

be confused. It was proper to instruct on the voluntari-

ness of defendant’s statement. State v. Cunningkin, Mo.,

261 S.W.2d 85, 87.

[19] Defendant contends in his motion the use of the

word “must” in the third paragraph of Instruction No. 6

gives judicial direction to the jury, invades the province

of the jury and is a comment on the evidence. The in-

struction is a cautionary instruction on a collateral issue,

does not direct a verdict, and is not on an issue tbe court

is required to instruct upon as part of the law of the case

under Sup.Ct. Rule 26.02, 42 V.A.M.S. § 546.070(4); State

v. Cunningkin, Mo., supra; State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577,

116 S.W.2d 88, 94, 95; State v. Francies, Mo., 295 S.W.2d

8, 15 [24, 25]. Trial juries “shall be sworn well and truly

to try the case.” Sup.Ct.R. 26.02. See §§ 546.070, 546.220;

State v. Duff, 253 Mo. 415, 424(IV), 161 S.W. 683, 685 (IV).

The oath administered to trial jurors embraces the obliga-

tion to try the case according to the evidence. Consult 50

d

A23

CJ.S. Juries § 296, p. 1088; 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 293.

The instruction made it plain that before the jury could

“even consider” defendant’s statement, the jury should find

“it must have been made voluntarily,” and if the jury did

not so find, the jury “should entirely disregard” it in reach-

ing the verdict. An instruction substantially identical to

the instant instruction was given in State v. Laster, Mo., 293

S.W.2d 300, 304, a companion case, and we stated, no issue

being presented, “an adequate instruction was given on

this subject.” In State v. Stibbens, 188 Mo. 387, 396(III),

87 S.W. 460, 462(3), an instruction told ‘the jury “you

should take such confession into consideration” if volun-

tarily made. See State v. Pillow, Mo., 169 S.W.2d 414,

416; State v. Hostetter, Mo., 222 S.W. 750, 753(II); State

y. Hartman, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 276 [1, 2]. We are not ap-

proving the use of the word “must” in the instruction. A

more appropriate word would be “may.” However, the

jury, if it found defendant voluntarily made the state-

ment, would, unless it violated its oath, consider the state-

ment. The questioned clause was modified by the suc-

ceeding clause; and under the instruction, if the statement

was made voluntarily, the jury was not told how to con-

sider the statement and was free to give the statement no

weight whatever in arriving at the verdict. It stated the

duty the law placed upon the jury. We conclude on the

record before us that the jury was not misled and reversi-

ble error did not occur. Consult State v. Harris, 357 Mo.

1119, 212 S.W.2d 426, 428 [7, 8].

[20] X. Defendant complains of the court’s over-

ruling of his motion for a polygraph examination of him-

self, which he offered to pay for. We see no necessity

for requesting a court to rule on a motion of this nature.

The authorities are to the effect that the results of lie

detector examinations are inadmissible in evidence. 23

C.J.S. Criminal Law § 967, p. 295; 20 Am. Jur. 633, § 762;

Henderson v. State of Oklahoma, 94 Okl.Cr. 45, 230 P.2d

a” |

y

LOA SL GAN pNP 1 ti SDA)

a

A24

495, 23 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1306 (annotation). See State vy.

Cole, 345 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43, 51 [12]; State v. Hud-

son, Mo., 289 S.W. 920 [2].

[21-28] XI. Defendant contends in his motion that

the court erred in not sustaining his objection to the prose-

cuting attorney’s statement in argument that defendant

failed to go back on the stand and.rebut certain testimony

adduced by the State in rebuttal to testimony given by de-

fendant while on the stand. The statutory right of an ac-

cused to no reference to his failure to testify (Sup.Ct.R.

6.08; § 546.270) may be waived by him. State v. Tiedt,

360 Mo. 594, 229 S.W.2d 582, 587 [8]. It is made clear in

State v. Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 234 (III), 157 S.W. 600, 604

[4], 46 L.R.A., N.S., 13, that when an accused takes the

stand in his defense, as in the instant case, his failure to

testify on specific facts involved in the case is a legitimate

subject for comment by the state in argument. State v.

Pierson, 343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149, 157 [14]: State v.

Smith, Mo., 252 S.W. 662, 667 [14].. Having taken the

stand, defendant’s failure to deny incriminating facts was

open to comment whether the denial should have occurred

on an appearance in chief or an appearance in sur-

rebuttal.

The transcript discloses that all matters for considera-

tion here upon the record (Sup.Ct.R. 28.02, 28.08) are in

proper form and sufficient.

The judgment is affirmed.

BARRETT and STOCKARD, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion by BOHLING, C., is adopted as

the opinion of the court. i

EAGER, P. J., and STORCKMAN, J., and BROAD-

DUS, S. J., concur.

LEEDY, J., not sitting.

A25

APPENDIX B

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

Vv.

James William STIDHAM, Appellant.

No. 52406.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

June 5, 1967.

Appeal from judgment of the Circuit Court, Butler

County, Howard R. Maness, J., denying prisoner’s second

motion to vacate judgment of conviction. The Supreme

Court, Storckman, C. J., held that in view of fact that

prisoner would, regardless of judgment on appeal, be im-

mediately entitled to proceed under provisions of not yet

effective amended rule requiring motions to vacate to be

in questionnaire form and providing for appointment of

counsel if motion presents questions of law or issues of

fact and movant is shown to be indigent, prisoner would

be granted maximum relief to which he was entitled so

that further proceedings could be held in compliance with

provisions of amended rule.

Order and judgment reversed and cause remanded

with directions.

1. Criminal Law (Key) 998(1)

Although effective date of newly revised rule requir-

ing motion to vacate judgment to be in questionnaire form

and providing for appointment of counsel if motion pre-

sents questions of law or issues of fact and movant is

shown to be indigent is September 1, 1967, trial courts

may use the new procedure before that date. V.A.M.LR.

S.Ct. Rule 27.26.

Saget incre Ranat tibia tat cinnegehal

Seed

A26

2. Criminal Law (Key) 998(21)

Amended rule requiring motions to vacate judgment

to be in questionnaire form and providing for appointment

of counsel if the motion presents questions of law or issues

of fact and movant is shown to be indigent is intended to

discover and adjudicate all claims for relief in one applica-

tion and avoid successive motions. V.A.M.R. S.Ct. Rule

27.26.

3. Criminal Law (Key) 1189 nee

In view of fact that regardless of whether denial of

prisoner’s second motion to vacate judgment of conviction

was affirmed or reversed, he would be immediately en-

titled to proceed under not yet effective amended rule re-

quiring motions to vacate to be in questionnaire form and

providing for appointment of counsel if motion presents

questions of law or issues of fact and movant is shown to

be indigent, prisoner was granted maximum relief to which

he was entitled so that order and judgment denying mo-

tion were reversed and cause was remanded with direc-

tions that all further proceedings be in compliance with

amended rule. V.A.M.R. S.Ct. Rule 27.26 (c, e, h, i).

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Walter W. Nowotny,

Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

James William Stidham, pro se.

STORCKMAN, Chief Justice.

The appellant James William Stidham is a prisoner

in the Missouri State Penitentiary where he is serving a

sentence of life imprisonment for murder. The judgment

of conviction was affirmed by this court on September 9,

1957. State v. Stidham. Mo., 305 S.W.2d 7. On March 9,

1964, Stidham, pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R. filed

pro se in the Circuit Court of Butler County a motion to

Be

A27

vacate and set aside his sentence. The motion to vacate

was denied without an evidentiary hearing and on appeal

this court on June 13,1966, affirmed the order and judg-

ment. State v. Stidham, Mo., 403 S.W.2d 616. Thereafter,

Stidham filedi pro se a second motion to vacate under Rule

27.26 which presented claims not made in his first motion.

The trial cowrt without an evidentiary hearing also denied

the second motion to vacate and the prisoner’s appeal from

that order amd judgment is now before us. The movant

filed a brief pro se in this court and made an oral argu-

ment.

[1] On January 9, 1967, this court adopted a revised

S.Ct. Rule 27.26. The effective date of the revised rule is

September 1, 1967, but the trial courts may use the new

procedure before that date. State v. Garner, Mo., 412

S.W.2d 155, 157.

[2] The amended rule was adopted after considerable

study and is intended to provide a post-conviction pro-

cedure in accord with the principles enunciated in the so-

called trilogy of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83

S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83

S.Ct. 822, 9 IL.Ed.2d 837,.and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.

293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770. Further in keeping with

the teachings: of the trilogy, the amended rule is designed

to discover amd adjudicate all claims for relief in one ap-

plication and avoid successive motions by requiring mo-

tions to be in ‘questionnaire form and by ‘providing for the

appointment of counsel if the motion presents questions of

law or issues; of fact and the movant is shown to be in-

digent.

[3] These and other provisions intended to furnish

more adequate post-conviction relief were not provided by

Rule 27.26 im effect at the time the present motion was

filed or when the appeal was argued and submitted in this

court. It is apparent, however, that regardless of whether

Sea i iiidaermccieball

A28

this court affirms the order and judgment, or reverses and

remands the cause, the movant will be immediately en-

titled to proceed under the provisions of amended Rule

27.26 and compliance with the amended rule would be

obligatory after September 1 this year. In these circum-

stances, it would be improvident to process the appeal

_ further and undertake to prepare an opinion on the merits,

The maximum relief to which the appellant is entitled in

this court is a reversal of the order and judgment of the

trial court and a remand for further proceedings under

amended Rule 27.26. Bosler v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 363 F.2d

154; Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18

L.Ed.2d 33. Furthermore, it appears that appellant's mo-

tion raises one or more issues of fact on which »ppellant

would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, the order and judgment is reversed and

the cause is remanded with directions that all further pro-

ceedings be in compliance with the provisions of amended

Rule 27.26. If appellant elects to proceed with his motion

in the trial court, counsel must be appointed under sub-

paragraph (h) of the amended rule since appellant has

been shown to be an indigent person. Counsel should file

an amended motion which includes every ground known

to the prisoner for vacating, setting aside or correcting his

conviction and sentence and the prisoner shall verify the

correctness of the motion, including the fact that he has re-

cited all claims known to him, all as required by sub-

paragraph (c) of the amended rule. The trial court then

is required to conduct a full evidentiary hearjng on the

amended motion as required by subparagraph (e) of the

amended rule, assuming that the motion raises questions

of fact as does the present motion, after which the court

then is to decide all issues of fact and questions of law,

making findings of fact and conclusions of law as required

by subparagraph (i) of amended S.Ct. Rule 27.26.

All of the Judges concur.

A29

APPENDIX C

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.

James W. STIDHAM, Appellant.

Nos. 45537, 54674.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

Division No. 2.

Feb. 9, 1970.

The Supreme Court set aside its affirmance of prior

postconviction judgment and remanded cause for amend-

ment of motion to vacate in view of revised postconviction

procedure. The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis,

Michael .F. Godfrey, J., and the Circuit Court of Butler

County, Randy Weber, J., entered judgment from which

petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Barrett, C., held

that even though indictment did not charge conspiracy, in-

struction hypothesizing that defendants conspired, acted in

concert, and aided and abetted in killing did not violate due

process on theory that. it violated constitutional proscrip-

tion against jury’s consideration of crime not included in

indictment where evidence supported hypothesis, indict-

ments charged defendants with killing victim by assault

with deadly weapons with malice aforethought and con-

spiracy was inherent and may have been incidentally in-

cluded offense.

Affirmed.

1. Constitutional Law (Key) 268 (2)

Even though indictment did not charge conspiracy,

instruction hypothesizing that defendants conspired, acted

in concert, and aided and abetted in killing did not. violate

due process on theory that it violated constitutional pro-

A30

scription against jury’s consideration of crime not included

in indictment where evidence supported hypothesis, in.

dictments chargec defendants with killing victim by assault

with deadly weapons with malice aforethought and. con-

spiracy was inherent and may have been incidentally in-

cluded offense. V.A.M.S. Const. art. 1, § 18(a); Sections

544.250, 556.120, 56.130, 556.170 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.

2. Constitutional Law (Key) 268(2),

‘Instruction defining conspiracy and stating that all

persons who are guilty of acting in concert and together in

commission of crime are principals did not infringe on due

process by allowing state to prove and jury to be instructed

to consider crime not included in indictment where instruc-

tion was warranted by statute and there was evidence of

conspiracy, actual participation in and consummation, in

conspiracy by defendants even though indictment did not

charge conspiracy. V.A.M.S. Const. art. 1, § 18(a); Sec-

tions 544.250, 556.120, 556.130, 556.170 RSMo 1959, V.A.MS.

3. Constitutional Law (Key) 268 (8)

Record containing corroboration for testimony of two

witnesses, alleged to have given perjured testimony, failed

to establish violation of due process by state’s knowing use

of perjured testimony based on fact that such witnesses

who had been inmates, had had their sentences commuted

and had been released from prison. V.A.M.R. Crim. Rule

27.26.

4. Constitutional Law (Key) 268.1(3)

Where defendant was not prosecuted by information,

but by indictment, eliminating need for preliminary hear-

ing, failure of court to appoint counsel at preliminary hear-

ing, even though defendant requested counsel at such hear-

ings, did not deny defendant due process of law. Section

544.250 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.

PE 2: am " hy

A31

5. Criminal Law (Key) 998 (17)

Record, including many pretrial motions by defend-

ant’s counsel, failed to support defendant’s allegation of

lack of counsel prior to trial.

§. Criminal Law (Key) 531(3)

Record failed to support claim that defendant’s confes-

" sion was extracted through physical force and threats of

physical force by being beaten with cork ball bat and by

not being given any food or water for three days.

7. Constitutional Law (Key) 266

Where, after trial judge overruled motion to suppress

confession, all witnesses testified to same facts and circum-

stances as they had on motion to suppress as it related to

issue of voluntariness, and upon this testimony issue of vol-

untariness was submitted to jury, court’s procedure for de-

termining voluntariness did not fail to comport with mini-

mum standards of due process.

8. Criminal Law (Key) 1172(2)

Instructions on voluntary confession were not prej-

udicially erroneous where there was, at time of trial, only

claim that oral and written confessions were obtained by

physical force and violence, and no claim of mental coercion

and where claim of mental coercion was not raised until

13 years later on motion to vacate sentence. V.A.M.R.

Crim. Rule 27.26.

9. Criminal Law (Key) 998 (6)

Where, at time defendant gave his statements, circum-

stances surrounding victim’s death and defendant’s part

in it were known, and defendant's statements played but

little if any part in his conviction in view Of other testiniony,

A32

claim that statement was not voluntary, on ground that

three errors, one in age, one in place of residence and prior

record, conclusively established that statement was not vol-

untary, was not ground for postconviction relief. V.A.M.R.

Crim. Rule 27.26.

10. Criminal Law (Key) 532

In view of trial court’s opinion that statement given

by defendant “is and should be admissible in evidence”

supported by cogent and convincing evidence, allowing

statement to go to jury did not violate Supreme Court de-

cision establishing procedure for admission of confession.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Kenneth M. Romines,

Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Mark M. Hennelly, St. Louis, for appellant.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

In 1952 James William (known to one and all as

“Slick”) Stidham was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment

for his part in the armed robbery of the Grapette Pottling

Company in Joplin. For the details of that crime see State

v. Stidham, Mo., 258 S.W.2d 620. On October 3, 1955,

after a jury trial and verdict in July 1955, Stidham: was

sentenced to life imprisonment for his participation in the

slaying of fellow-inmate Walter Lee Donnell on Sep-

tember 22, 1954, at the height of the riot of approximately

800 inmates of the main prison in Jefferson City. In the

trial of the latter case and now, at the behest of Father

Clark, he has been represented by a distinguished lawyer,

Mr. Mz.rk M. Hennelly, then a successful and experienced

criminal lawyer, now a vice-president and general counsel

of one of the larger railroads., The murder conviction was

appealed upon a full transcript of three volumes, there

A33

was a complete appellate review, the opinion was turned

into twenty-three headnotes, after counsel raised what he

deemed, no doubt every conceivable point and error. That

conviction of murder was affirmed on September 9, 1957, in

State v. Stidham, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 7. In view of some of

the problems now raised it should be pointed out that be-

fore the murder case reached trial stage Stidham’s diligent

counsel filed every conceivable motion and plea, including

the right to a change of venue which accounts for the trial

in Butler County, many miles from Jefferson City. Over

the years, following the affirmation of the life sentence,

Stidham has lodged in this court innumerable letters, com-

munications and pro se motions and they have all been

responded to. In June 1966 he personally filed and argued

an appeal from a 27.26, V.A.M.R. proceeding in Butler

County in which he attempted to present several of the

issues now before the court. State v. Stidham, 403 S.W.

9d 616. In the meanwhile the court en banc revised its

post-conviction procedure, and Stidham having unsuc-

cessfully instituted another 27.26 proceeding, this court

set aside its affirmance of the prior post-conviction judg-

ment and remanded the cause for an amendment of the

motion to vacate “which includes every ground known to

the prisoner,” and in the spirit of the rule for “a full evi-

dentiary hearing” on all questions of fact. The order

and judgment in that opinion is reported in State v.

Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297. And on that proceeding, on

Stidham’s behalf, there has been a change of venue from

Butler County and there has been a new and complete

hearing before Honorable Michael F. Godfrey, a circuit

judge in St. Louis. Furthermore, in response to what

was deemed to be the spirit of the Bosler cases, (Bosler

v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 363 F.2d 154 and Swenson v. Bosler,

386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33) the court en

bane set aside the judgment of this court upon the original

appeal, 305 S.W.2d 7, and again appointed Mr. Hennelly

Ree Meg eer es RS Cee Sr eee |

A34

to represent Stidham in both cases. As indicated, there

was a full hearing on the 27.26 proceeding, all issues were

found against Stidham and he has appealed the judgment

in that case. In the order setting aside the original sub-

mission the two causes were consolidated and are to be

disposed of in this opinion. It should be stated in this con-:

nection that Mr. Hennelly has raised, extensively briefed,

and orally argued every conceivable claim of error in the

original trial, all of which covers and includes every pos-

sible right to relief in a post-conviction proceeding.

One of the claims of infringement of due process is

that the state was “allowed to prove and the jury was

instructed to consider a crime not included in the indict-

ment.” Const.Mo. Art. I, Sec. 18(a), V.A.M.S. Thus, it

is said, he was indicted for the murder of Donnell, but

he “was not, however, indicted for participating in a con-

spiracy to kill Donnell.” Therefore, it is urged that the

court erred in admitting in evidence conversations and

conduct on the part of others engaged in slaying Don-

nell. By the same token it is contended that the court

prejudicially erred in instructing the jury in referring to

and hypothesizing a concert of action, an aiding and

abetting in slaying Donnell. In the first place the argu-

ment overlooks not only the theory but the specific al-

legations of the indictment. And in the second place

it ignores the facts of Donnell’s killing, the circumstances

in which he was savagely murdered. While Stidham,

as well as his codefendants, was given a severance, the

indictment charged that “William R. Hoover, Jackie Lee

Noble, Paul Edward Kenton, James William Stidham,

Rollie Laster, Don Wm. DeLapp and Joseph M. Vidauri'

1. The details of Donnell’s murder are set forth in the

records and appeals of Stidham’s codefendants: State v. Laster,

365 Mo. 1076, 293 S.W.2d 300 (certiorari denied 352 U.S. 936, 77

S.Ct. 237, 1 L.Ed.2d 167); State v. Noble, Mo., 387 S.W.2d 522;

State v. Kenton, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 433; State v. Vidauri, Mo., 293

S.W.2d 955 and State v. Vidauri, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 437.

A35

+ * * did then and there feloniously, wilfully, deliberately,

premeditatedly, on purpose and of their malice afore-

thought, make an assault upon one Walter Lee Donnell

‘and then and there with dangerous and deadly weapons,

to wit: a sledgehammer, and a knife, and another sharp

instrument or dagger * * * a wooden table leg, and

other blunt instruments * *:’ * and their fists and

hands and feet * * * strike, hit, stab, cut, beat and stomp”

and thereby kill Donnell. The testimony was that

Kenton held Donnell while Laster stabbed him with an

ice pick, Stidham “slashed” him with a knife, and two

others hit him in thé head with a sledgehammer. In ad-

dition to other bruises and contusions an autopsy on Don-

nell’s body revealed “a severe mashed in, or compressed

area in the right side of the face approximately just

underneath the right eye, that extended back, involving

the right ear with separation of the lower part of the

ear, lower part of the ear was torn away from the body

about a third of its normal attachment area.” There was a

multiple, crashing, “eggshell type fracture” of the skull,

two knife-cut wounds of the neck, five puncture or stab

wounds in the chest and four stab wounds in the back.

The doctor said that two of the stab wounds had entered

the heart cavity and of course were fatal. The testimony

showed that until the three doors to Death Row were

forced and Stidham and Laster released and Stidham fur-

nished a knife DeLapp led the group bent on killing Don-

nell. As soon as Stidham was released DeLapp put his

arm around Stidham’s shoulders and said, “Gentlemen, I

have brought you this far, this is your leader from here on.”

And shortly this group gained entrance to Donnell’s cell

and killed him. Prior to the riot Stidham had repeatedly

threatened to kill both Donnell and James M. Creighton.

[1] This briefly narrated record completely refutes

the appellant’s claim of an invasion of due process in

tdi han eet ised

V7

submitting “a crime not included in the indictment.” The

indictment did not in terms charge the misdemeanor of.-

fense of conspiracy (RSMo 1959, §§ 556.120, 556.130,

V.A.M.S.), even though inherent in the circumstances jt

may have been an incidentally included offense. Principal

instruction number 4 hypothesized that the seven named

defendants “entered into a conspiracy and agreement”

and “acting in concert and together” and “aided, abetted,

A36

. assisted or encouraged” in slaying Donnell but, as in-

dicated, the evidence supports the hypothesis. There was

a separate conventional instruction defining “conspiracy”

stating that “all persons are principals who are guilty of

acting in concert and together in the commission of a

crime.”

[2] The latter instruction was not only warranted

by specific statute (RSMo 1959, § 556.170), upon this rec-

ord, as the court held on the previous appeal, State v.

Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 1. c. 15, “there was ample evidence

for a finding of the conspiracy submitted and the actual

participation in and consummation of the said conspiracy

by the persons named in the instruction.” A case directly

in point in every respect is State-v. Holloway, 355 Mo.

217, 195 S.W.2d 662, an instance of a- murder in a jail-

break. Excerpting, the court said, “Goldie and Buster

were co-conspirators with appellant. Their testimony was

competent in establishing the fact of the common design

or conspiracy...* * * Conversations between Goldie and

Buster were competent evidence against appellant although

made outside of appellant’s presence. * * * Furthermore,

proof that appellant and others conspired together to com-

mit an unlawful act and that the killing occurred in .

furtherance of the conspiracy may be shown under an

indictment or information charging first degree murder

only.” (Emphasis supplied. )

A37

Relying on Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct.

1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, appellant contends that due process

was violated in that the state knowingly used perjured

testimony. This assignment is leveled at the state’s use

of Herman Trout and James Creighton, also prison inmates,

as witnesses. (For a partial review of Creighton’s bizarre

life from a sentence of death in 1932 to a commutation of

prison sentence in 1956 see State v. Creighton, 330 Mo.

1176, 52 S.W.2d 556.) The argument now is directed solely

to the fact that the sentences of Creighton and Trout have

been commuted and they have been released from prison.

In the trial of this cause there was first a motion to dis-

qualify Creighton as a witness upon the allegation that he

was of unsound mind. That motion was heard at length,

all medical and psychiatric records from the State Hospital

at Fulton were introduced, and the court found as was all

but obvious that he was indeed not incompetent as a wit-

ness. See State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 1. c. 13. Upon the

original trial and appeal it was sought to establish the claim

of perjured testimony or incompetent witness by offering

to prove that while Creighton was held in the Cole County

‘\ jail he was granted special favors, particularly that “he

\had access to one Mary Annis” (305 S.W.2d 7) despite the

appellant’s proof from the Fulton Hospital records that

Creighton “is a homosexual.”

[3] In any event and apart from the federal cases,

this court has long since “recognize(d) that a judgment

obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony should

be vacated upon a proper factual showing.” State v.

Garton, Mo., 396 S.W.2d 581.. The insuperable difficulty

with this particular claim of infringement of due process

is that it is not supported by the record. Annotation 3

L.Ed.2d 1991. The only circumstance now present as to

both Creighton and Trout is the fact that in July 1955

they did testify as state’s witnesses and subsequently

tenants tintin nt ai ¥

Sh aR

A38

their sentences were commuted by the then..Governor of

Missouri. And again, on this issue, there was a hearing

on the 27.26 motion and aside from the bare fact lof the

commuted sentences the court found as did another court

in 1964 (State v. Stidham, 403 S.W.2d 616) that “(t)he rec-

ord is barren of facts to support such allegations.” It is

not necessary to detail their testimony, their evidence and

that of numerous other witnesses is all set forth in the ap-

peals of at least five of the participants in Donnell’s slay-

ing. On the 27.26 hearing the trial gourt could have added,

after reading the record in Stidham’s original appeal, that

the testimony of Creighton and Trout was cogently: cor-

roborated in every detail by a number of physical facts

and by othex, witnesses, particuJarly by the prison guard,

Mr. Dietzel, on duty in Death Row when Donnell was mur-

dered. In contrast to the testimony of Creighton and Trout

there is no corroboration whatever of Stidham’s testimony

that he went up to B-Hall and spent the night of the riot

innocently listening to the radio, had no knowledge of Don-

nell’s slaying and took no part in the riot. The one in-

criminating circumstance that even he has never and can-

not brush away is the conceded fact that after the three

doors to Death Row were broken open and after his cell

was unlocked he, unlike others and undoubtedly contrary

to prison rules, did leave Death Row. Thus upon this rec-

crd there was no support for the charge of knowing use of

perjured testimony.

A further due process point is the claim of the “court’s

failure to make timely appointment of counsel.” Here the

appellant relies upon Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84

S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 USS.

436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Powell v. Alabama, 287

U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 and other landmark cases

dealing with the appointment of counsel. It is not nec-

essary here to again examine those cases, their standards

$

A39

are recognized and applied even though the Miranda and

Escobedo cases are not retroactive. Johnson v. New Jersey,

384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. There is no

factual similarity in this and any of the cited cases, par-

ticularly, for example, as in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,

83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193, and Arsenault v. Massa-

chusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S.Ct. 35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5, in which

there were pleas. of guilty at the preliminary or “at a

probable cause hearing” and the pleas were introduced in

evidence upon the jury trials. In certain instances in

which there has been manifest injustice, this jurisdiction

recognized the importance of the right to counsel long be-

fore Escobedo and Miranda. See Ex parte Stone, Mo.App.,

955 S.W.2d 155; State v. Jackson, 344 Mo. 1055, 130 S.W.2d

595 and State v. Witt, Mo., 422 S.W.2d 304.

The appellant’s complaint as to counsel arose in and

for the most part is based upon these circumstances:

Initially the prosecution of these seven defendants for this

particular offense was instituted by the prosecuting attor-

ney in a magistrate court and preliminary hearings were

held, a necessary prerequisite and procedure before a for-

mal information could be filed in the circuit court. RSMo

1959, § 544.250. Appellant and his counsel make much ado

of the fact that at one of these preliminary hearings he

demanded counsel and yelled out asking for some lawyer

to come forward. In his brief it is said that there was no

appointment of an attorney “until the second arraignment”

and in this connection stated that he was never advised

of his right to a lawyer—even though he requested one at

the preliminary—and that he was entitled to counsel before

his mental examination at the United States Medical

Center in Springfield. ,

[4] The basic fallacy in the appellant’s contention

on this phase of the case is that again there is no factual

Le yree ee:

A40

basis for his ‘claim of an infringement of rights at a pre-

liminary. In the first place there is neither claim nor proof

that anything done or said at any preliminary hearing or

in any medical or mental examination was employed

against him or that the state even secured any relevant

information. State v. Smith, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 208. But

more important and decisive here as to counsel at a pre-

liminary hearing is the fact that Stidham was not prose-

cuted by information. On November 23, 1954, a grand

jury returned an indictment charging Stidham and his ac-

complices with the murder of Donnell. Thus there was

no Occasion or place for a preliminary hearing. “It is a

well-established law of this State that the grand jury may

investigate and indict one charged with a felony although

he has been arrested and held for a preliminary examina-

tion, and is not bound to await the action of the ex-

amining court, for the reason that the action of the exam-

ining couft is no bar to the right of the grand jury to in-

quire into the case and indict the accused, even though he

has been discharged on the preliminary examination.”

“State v. Gieseke, 209 Mo. 331, 339, 108 S.W. 525, 527.

Su Wests nahh Pa As OAR ca ll ENT

wo Bk

1 Ovo Tah

[5] As a matter of fact, other than appellant’s asser-

tions, there is no record support for his charges of lack

of counsel prior to trial. Whatever may have occurred

at any preliminary has not been made a part of this record.

In any event, as stated, an indictment was returned, the

defendants, the indisputable record recites, were duly ar-

raigned, each defendant was furnished a copy of the in-

dictment and upon the request of Stidham for the appoint-

ment of a certain lawyer, the court appointed Mr. Hen-

nelly. Thereafter there were no motions or proceedings or

even references to a preliminary hearing or to anything

that may have occurred during such a hearing. Mr. Hen-

nelly was appointed to represent appellant on November

A4l1

23, 1954, and on December 6, 1954, a formal plea of not

guilty was entered. Almost immediately, on December 14,

1954, on Stidham’s behalf, there were motions for produc-

tion and inspection of any statements that may have been

given, a motion to dismiss for the reason of two offenses—

homicide and assault with intent to kill, a motion for a

severance, a motion for a polygraph examination and a

motion to suppress any statement he may have given.

These procedures were all considered in turn and disposed

of, including a motion for a continuance and finally an ap-

plication for a change of venue. The cause proceeded to

trial and in the first instance a mistrial was declared when

it was discovered that certain jurors were reading news-

paper accounts of the trial. In the present 27.26 proceed-

ing, after an unrestricted hearing, the court found these

issues with respect to counsel against appellant, that is the

court found that failure to appoint counsel at any prelim-

inary stage of the cause or during his interrogation by

police and prison authorities had not infringed any of ap-

pellant’s constitutional rights and that finding is con-

vincingly supported by the record. State v. Donnell, Mo.,

430 S.W.2d 297; Crosswhite v. State, Mo., 426 S.W.2d 67.

As a matter of fact appellant’s interrogation in connection

with the prison riot and Donnell’s Slaying is more ap-

propriately considered in connection with his assertion of

involuntary confession.

There is a threefold assignment of error in this respect,

neither of which would necessarily result, as the appellant

seems to think, in his exoneration and release from im-

prisonment. It is first urged in general terms that the

court erred in admitting in evidence exhibit 16, his own

_ handwritten confession. It is said that its admission de-

prived appellant “of his liberty ‘without due process of law.”

This allegation is not a briefed and argued point; in con-

nection with it, however, it is contended that the court’s

A42

procedure for determining voluntariness “did not comport

with the minimum standards” of due process in that “no

specific finding of voluntariness was made by the judge

prior to submitting the issue to the jury.” In the second

place it is said that under the evidence “the alleged con-

fession was coerced, involuntary, and taken in violation of

the defendant’s Constitutional rights,” meaning pre-

; sumably, that upon the record the confession was involun-

: tary as a matter of law. A third and connected point is

: that the instruction submitting the issue to the jury was

erroneous “by failing to properly instruct the jury on the

; Constitutional standards to be used in making their deter-

; mination as to the voluntariness” of the confession. The

latter point is not too clear—in some aspects it would seem

to say that, a question of law should have been submitted

to the jury. In the argument of this contention, presented

as a separate point, it 1s said that the jury was given an

“unconstitutional standard.” At another point it is said

that the instruction failed to include or submit “mental

coercion or duress” and, therefore, under State v. Williams,

Mo., 369 S.W.2d 408, was prejudicially erroneous. Thus

the complete gamut of involuntary confessions is sought

to be invoked one way orsanother.

It is necessary at this point and as to all claims of

involuntary confession to have some understanding of the

record and the context and manner in’ which_they arose.

In this case, in addition to all other motions, there was a

separate motion to suppress “any and all statements,” oral

or written, that Stidham may have made for the specified

reason that the “alleged statements were involuntary and

as a result of physical force and threats of physical force

applied against this defendant by police officers of the City

of St. Louis, guards of the Missouri State Penitentiary and

officers of the Missouri Highway Patrol.” (Emphasis sup-

A43

plied.) That motion was filed on December 14, 1954, and

the record recites. that it was overruled on December 20,

1954. That motion was filed and passed on while the cause

was pending in Cole County and it does not appear just

what if any evidence was heard before the court passed

on the motion. Thereafter, when in the course of the trial

in July 1955 it appeared for the first time from the testi-

mony of a highway patrol sergeant that Stidham’s oral

and written confessions were to be employed defendant’s

counsel, even in 1955, and unlike in State v. Williams,

“moves the Court to conduct a preliminary examination

and asks the Court to inquire into the voluntariness of the

statement, and to determine whether the statement was

given voluntarily, either the oral or the written statement.”

Thereupon the court interrupted the trial and out of the

jury’s presence and hearing conducted a hearing on ap-

pellant’s motion.

Highway patrol officers, St. Louis police, prison of-

ficials and all others present when Stidham’s statements

were made or given Were examined at length and in de-

tail as to the circumstances in which they were given.

It is not necessary to detail the circumstances, Stidham

in testifying upon the trial and the motion said that after

he was taken to the field house in the recreation area

where the investigation into the riot and, incidentally,

Donnell’s murder, was being conducted, he was hand-

cuffed, “a rope "(was fastened) between the handcuffs

* * * I was lifted up in the air where all my weight had

to bear on my two arms.” He said that the police officers

and patrol officers, fifteen to twenty, left him thus sus-

pended from the ceiling for fifteen minutes and then be-

cause he refused to give a statement they again lifted

him up and beat him with cork ball bats until he passed

out. And, he said, that as a result of this treatment

“I agreed to write a statement that they dictated to me.”

A44

And so after his oral statements and despite his paralyzed

arm he wréte the statement and the officers, unspecified,

forced him to sign it. )

[6-8] Contrary to Stidham’s testimony the severa]

officers who took part in the interrogation, accounted for

Stidham’s presence, every minute of time, and his treat-

ment from the time on September 22nd he was moved from

Death Row to O-Hall and finally on September 27th when

he was escorted from O-Hall to the recreation area and

his interrogation which lasted less than thirty minutes.

Incidentally Stidham was confined in solitary in Death

Row as punishment and for safekeeping because of an at-

tempt to escape the previous January. Creighton was

likewise an incorrigible and confined in Death Row, a maxi-

3 mum security area, as punishment. And the inference

P is that. Donnell, thought by the prison population in general

and Stidham and his friends in particular to be a snitch

was confined there for his personal safety. In any event,

the officers, one by one, denied the use of force, threats or

violence. Donnell was murdered on September 22nd and

the officers say that except in passing Stidham was not

questioned until he gave the statements on September 27th.

He claims, however, that when he was moved to O-Hall

he was placed in a bare cell, without running water, that

the windows were broken and he was only. allowed “to

keep a pair of pants and shoes on” and he said that he

was not “given any food or water for three days.” All of

this testimony was denied by the prison authorities even

though during a part of the time order had not been re-

stored and some buildings were still burning. Without nar-

rating even briefly, the testimony in contradiction of Stid-

ham’s uncorroborated claims was all but overwhelming

and even giving some credence to his version the circum-

stances do not approach those of Brooks v. Florida, 389

oom ae ae

vee at 08 Te aA

RNa Sin. a ren

| ewes 2

A45

~-y.S. 413, 88 S.Ct. 541, 19 L.Ed.2d 643, which “case docu-

ments a shocking display of barbarism.” And again, after

overruling the latter motion to suppress, all these wit-

nesses testified to the same facts and circumstances and

upon this testimony the issue of voluntariness was submitted

to the jury. There was in point of fact upon the trial

of the cause no claim of mental coercion, the claim was that

the oral and written confessions were obtained by physical

force and violence. And this is what Mr. Hennelly argued

to the jury, it was not until his 27.26 hearing, thirteen

years later, that there was a claim of mental duress. In

these circumstances, as upon the original appeal, the then

conventional instructions on voluntary confession were not

prejudicially erroneous. State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 293

S.W.2d 300; State v. Stidham, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 1. c. 16-18.

[9] In view of the insistent argument one other mat-

ter should be noted. In addition to his oral statements

this is Stidham’s confession, admittedly written by him:

“Kenton held Donald while Laster stabbed him

several times with a ice pick, at the same time I

slashed at him three or four times around the faee

and neck with a knife that Kenton gave me when he

opened the door, when Donald fell toahe floor Linder

and Thompson each said get Donald with the sledge

and they proceeded to hit him with a sledgehammer

and crowbar; during this time someone was holding

a flashlight that Kenton previously had. When we

left the cell Donald was lying on his back with his

head pointed toward the door. The knife I had was

a regular kitchen knife about six or seven inches. in

length, when I got back upstairs:in B-Hall, I threw

the knife on the floor near the west end on the south

side of the building.” —

In this statement, according to the appellant, there are

three errors which he says demonstrate that the six officers

signing as witnesses dictated the statement thus conclu-

: A46

sively eStablishing that the statement was not volun-

tary. The statement recites his age as 25 when in fact,

as shown by his birth certificate, he was 28. His residence

was given as Kansas City when in fact he had not lived

there and, three, although not to be found in the statement

that he was credited with three prior felony convictions

when in fact he had but two—one, he says, having been

“nullified.” The officers all say that they had no persona]

knowledge of these items except as Stidham wrote them in

his statement. And to further confuse this issue when he

was in the medical center in Springfield the documents

he introduced in evidence show that in two instances he

gave his age as 32. If these details are of any significance

upon the issue of voluntariness it could be pointed out that

in the statement Creighton’s name is misspelled “Crayton”

and repeatedly Donnell’s name is misspelled “Donald” and

he does not claim that the officers directed him to thus mis-

spell these names. And more significantly as to the slaying

of Donnell, the statement says that “Paul Kenton unlocked

my door” but upon his 27.26 hearing, years later, he says

“It was some colored fellow. I don’t remember who it was.

I think it was Ford.” Thus not only is there a direct

conflict in the testimony, upon the appellant’s own version

there looms a large credibility gap. And in this connec-

tion, by the time Stidham was brought to the interrogation

center on the 27th of September there was but little point

in obtaining a statement, let alone a confession, from him.

. By that time the guards had all been released from the

rioters’ custody and the cells, particularly Mr. Dietzel, and

they along with Stidham’s co-defendants had supplied all

the details of the riot as well as the killing of Donnell.

By the time Stidham gave his statements there was no

mystery as to Donnell’s death or as to Stidham’s part in

it and upon this record the statement played but little if

any part in his conviction.

Wines Uneaten eae a aA

eae

ca. ee

2 WY

A47

All that has gone before in this opinion is but back-

ground and preliminary to appellant’s principal claim that

the trial of his case, particularly as to his oral statements

and his confession, does not meet the standards of Jackson

v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908;

Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16

L.Ed.2d 895; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct.

1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Brooks v. Florida, supra,

and numerous other landmark federal cases concerned with

the subject of voluntary confessions. It is not necessary

here to attempt an explication of these cases, that has

been done several times and their mere citation indicates

an awareness of their significance and controlling force.

One of the latest explications of these and numerous other

cases is Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 and it is sufficient

here to say that the interpretation of the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals is accepted.

[10] The first and basic weakness of appellant’s pre-

sentation is his failure to recognize that unlike Jackson v.

Denno this jurisdiction does not apply or follow the so-

called New York rule in determining the voluntariness or

involuntariness of confessions, Missouri employs the so-

called Massachusetts, procedure “impliedly approved in

Jackson v. Denno,” State v. Washington, Mo., 399 S.W.2d

109, 114. Upon the trial of this case, after the appellant’s

motion and the indicated hearing before the court, out of

the jury’s hearing, the court made this order: “* * * it-is

the Court’s opinion that the matters concerning the state-

ment should be offered in the presence of the Jury, subject

of course to any attacks as to its credibility by the De-

fendant. The Defendant has of course the right to pro-

ceed to challenge the voluntariness of the statement and

confession, even before the Jury, but it is the Court’s opin-

5

i

‘

;

4

4

gn GL

A4sS

ion that upon the evidence that has been offered before

the Court and outside of the hearing of the Jury, that the

statement is and should be admissible in evidence.” Only

a single word is missing, the court unfortunately did not

in the italicized clause employ the word “voluntary,”

nevertheless, the meaning and intent are implicitly plain.

“Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact

or write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is

voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable

clarity.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639,

643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593, 598. It is not necessary to again detail]

the conflicting evidence and demonstrate, as indicated from

even a brief recitation upon the “totality of the circum-

stances” (Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18

L.Ed.2d 423) the judge’s finding of voluntary confession,

prior to submission to the jury, was indeed supported by

cogent and convincing testimony. State v. Hester, Mo.,

1425 S.W.2d 110; Crosswhite v. State, Mo., 426 S.W.2d 67;

State v. Williams, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 956; State v. Glenn, Mo.,

429 S.W.2d 225.

And if this does not suffice, thirteen years later, upon

the 27.26 hearing the appellant was again given full op-

portunity to attack the previous finding and record and he

did so but the court on change of venue found the issues

against appellant. It may be interpolated that upon the

latter hearing he for the first time attempted to inject

the issue not alone of a confession produced by “police

brutality” but of mental duress and coercion. But here he

attempts to connect the murder of Donnell and the events

of September 22 and 27, 1954, with his prior confinement

and general treatment for infraction of rules and attempt-

to-escape events and treatment completely disassociated

with the riot and slaying. Needless to say, these are

“scarcely factors of involuntariness in a plea.” Verdon v.

United States, 8 Cir., 296 F.2d 549, 552. But again and

A49

_ -upon this issue and in the new 27,26 hearing the patrol,

police and prison officials were again‘ called, including

Patrolman Barton whom Stidham had accused as one of his

termentors and he denied that he ever at any time inter-

rogated or handled Stidham, although he had talked to

Creighton, Trout, Laster, Noble, Hoover, DeLapp and

Vidauri. In any event all these witnesses, all produced

by the state, categorically or implicitly refuted all of Stid-

ham’s claims of mistreatment, either physical or mental.

And upon this new hearing and record another circuit

judge made another complete finding of law and fact. The

court found, citing the Glenn and Washington cases, supra,

that Judge Randolph Weber in 1954 had “followed the cor-

rect procedure in determining the issue of voluntariness

of the confession and specifically made a finding relative

thereto and this Court now so finds that the correct pro-

cedure was utilized.” And finally the court found, as had

the previous court, that the oral and written confessions

were voluntary and, needless to add, the latter finding is

overwhelmingly supported and procedurally and factually

the cause meets all the requirements of the federal cases

and there has been no invasion of due process. Crosswhite

v. State, State v. Glenn and State v. Williams, supra.

Accordingly the original judgment, State v. Stidham,

Mo., 305 S.W.2d 7, is affirmed and the judgment in the

27.26 proceeding is likewise affirmed.

STOCKARD and PRITCHARD, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM:

The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as

the opinion of the court.

All of the Judges concur.

. PRT Tr |

Ce he,

A50

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THRE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAM STIDHAM, >

Petitioner,

” : Civil Action

; No. 18121-2

HAROLD R. SWENSON,

Respondent. ;

Memorandum and Order Denying Petition

for Habeas Corpus

(Filed May 15, 1970)

Petitioner is an inmate of the Missouri State Peniten-

tiary serving a sentence of life imprisonment upon convic-

tion of a first-degree murder. Petitioner filed a petition

for habeas corpus asserting that his conviction is void be-

cause it was rendered without due process of law and in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

In May, 1952 petitioner was sentenced to a 25-year

term in the Penitentiary for robbery. While serving his

term, he was accused and convicted in 1955 of killing

another inmate, for which he was sentenced to a life term.

Petitioner appealed his conviction which was affirmed by

the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1957. See 305 S.W. 2d 7.

In 1964 he filed a 27.26 motion to vacate his sentence which

was denied without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the

Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. See 403 S.W. 2d 616.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a second 27.26 motion alleging

new grounds, which was also denied without an evidentiary

hearing by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Missouri

reversed and remanded on appeal (415 S.W. 2d 297) and

AS1

on December 5, 1968, an evidentiary hearing was held in

the St. Louis City Circuit Court. This hearing resulted in

3 denial of relief under the 27.26 motion, which judgment

was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with

another appeal for-hearing by the court en banc. The Su-

preme Court on Febpiary- 9, 1970 affirmed the decisions

of the lower courts. 449 S.W. 2d 634.

Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in

" this Court, and on March 2, 1970, a show cause order was

issued, since it appeared that petitioner had exhausted his

available state remedies and might have stated a violation

of one or more of his federally protected rights. ‘The re-

spondent filed with this Court, in response to the show

cause order, the transcripts of the records on appeals (Mis-

souri Case Nos. 45537 and 54674), briefs and arguments of

the parties, and the opinions of the Supreme Court of Mis-

souri. It appears to the Court that this record is complete

and that it-fully demonstrates that the petitioner has ex-

hausted his available state remedies.

The petitioner alleges seven grounds for relief: (1)

that he was tried and convicted upon a charge of conspiracy

which was not included in the indictment; (2) that he was

deprived of assistance of counsel at two critical stages of

his trial; (3) that he did not knowingly or competently

waive the assistance of counsel at any stage of the proceed-

ings against him; (4) that certain members of the Missouri

State Highway Patrol and personnel of Missouri State Peni-

tentiary exerted physical and mental punishment upon him

to secure a confession from him; (5) that the trial judge

admitted the confession into evidence without first making

a clear and specific finding that the said confession was

voluntary; (6) that Instruction No. 6 given at the trial did

nct fully set out the constitutional standards for the jury’s

guidance to determine the voluntariness of the said con-

\

0 AR AAD

A52

fession; and (7) that the State of Missouri knowingly useq

perjured testimony of two convicts to obtain the conviction

of petitioner.

The facts are fairly well set out in State v. Stidham,

305 S.W. 2d 7. Very briefly, in 1952 petitioner was sen.

tenced to 25 years’ imprisonment for his part in the armed

robbery of Grapette Bottling Company in Joplin, Missouri,

(See State v. Stidham, 258 S.W. 2d 620.) On October 3.

1955, after a jury verdict of guilty, petitioner was sen-

tenced to life imprisonment for his participation in the

murder of a fellow inmate, Walter Donnell, on Septeinber

22, 1954, during the riot of 800 prisoners in the Missouri

State Penitentiary.

Petitioner’s first contention is that the state was al-

lowed to prove and the jury instructed upon the charge of

conspiracy to murder which was not included in the in-

dictment. The indictment did not charge conspiracy; but

it did charge seven persons- with the murder of Donnell.

Even though petitioner and the other named defendants

were granted severances, the indictments in each trial

named all seven of them. Further, the evidence showed

that the defendants had acted in concert. An objection

was leveled against Instruction No. 4 because it hypoth-

esized that each had entered into a conspiracy and had

acted in concert and “aided, abetted, assisted or encour-

aged” in the slaying. Under Missouri law all persons who

are guilty of acting in concert in the commission of a felony

are considered principals and are charged, tried, con-

victed and punished in the same manner. (See V.A.MS,.,

$ 556.170.) There is no merit to the claim that murder and

conspiracy to commit murder (which was in fact accom-

plished) are such different charges that petitioner could

not have been prepared to defend himself. Furthermore,

there is direct authority for instructing and proving a con-

A53

spiracy to commit murder under an indictment charging

first-degree murder. State v. Holloway, (Mo. Sup.) 195

S.W. 2d 662 (cited by the Missouri Supreme Court) states:

(P)roof that appellant and others conspired together

to commit an unlawful act and that the killing occurred

in furtherance of the conspiracy may be shown un-

der an indictment or information charging first de-

gree murder only.

Petitioner next contends that he was deprived of ef-

fective assistance of counsel at two critical stages of his

trial and that he did not knowingly or competently waive

such assistance at any time. These times were while he

was being interrogated by the police and at his first ar-

raignment.

Factually, there .were two arraignments. The first

was instituted by the prosecuting attorney on an informa-

tion in the magistrate court. There petitioner demanded

counsel, and shouted out in the courtroom for counsel, but

his request was denied. A plea of not guilty was entered

for petitioner. Preliminary hearings were held as required

by V.A.M.S., § 544.250. Petitioner was later rearraigned

on an indictment returned by the grand jury of Cole

County, and at that time counsel was appointed for him.

Petitioner contends that this late appointment of counsel

resulted in the denial of effective assistance of counsel un-

der the standard of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45.

The failure to appoint counsel at interrogation has

been established as a denjal of due process by Escobedo

v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436. However, these cases are not retroactive (Johnson

v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719) and do not control here.

The more serious question concerns the failure to

appoint counsel at the time of the first arraignment, which

A54

petitioner claims resulted in denial of due process, Pet.

tioner cites Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, White y.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, and Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393

U.S. 5, as authority. The Missouri Supreme Court in their

opinion 449 S.W. 2d 634 distinguished the latter two cases

by stating that “(t)here is no factual similarity in this ang

any of the cited cases... (citing White v. Maryland, Supra,

and Arsenault v. Massachusetts, supra) in which there were

pleas of guilty at the preliminary or ‘at a probable cause

hearing’ and the pleas were introduced in evidence upon

jury trials.’ However, in Hamilton v. Alabama, from

which the holdings in White and Arsenault were drawn,

the petitioner, at arraignment without counsel being ap-

pointed, pled not guilty. The Supreme Court held that the

arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding,

and the failure to appoint counsel to represent the defend-

ant at that time is a denial of due process. The court

stated at page 55:

When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit

of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prej-

udice resulted. (Citing cases.) In this case... the

degree of prejudice can never be known. Only ‘the

presence of counsel could have enabled this accused

to know all the defenses available to him and to plead

intelligently.

The respondent and the Missouri Supreme Court opin-

ion state that no infringement of rights occurred for two

reasons. The first is that “There is neither claim nor proof

that anything done or said at any preliminary hearing or

in any medical or mental examination was employed

against |Stidham] or that the state even secured any rele-

vant information.” (448 S.W. 2d at 639.) More decisive,

according to the court, is the fact that Stidham was not

prosecuted by information (under which the preliminary

hearings had been held) but rather by an indictment re-

A55

turned on November 23, 1954. “Thus there was no occa-

sion or place for a preliminary hearing.” Petitioner,

along with his six co-defendants, were arraigned under the

information on September .29, 1954; the information was

dismissed and the indictment was returned on November

93, 1954. On this date counsel was appointed, and peti-

tioner was rearraigned with the presence of counsel on

December 6, 1954.

The important question is whether the arraignment and

preliminary hearing are critical stages in the proceedings

in Missouri. Under Missouri law, a defendant is not re-

quired to assert any right, plea or defense at the arraign-

ment in order to preserve any statutory or constitutional

rights. (V.A.M.S., $ 546.020) Moreover, all rights, pleas

or defenses are preserved inviolate. In State v. Benson,

(Mo. Sup.) 415 S.W. 2d 773, it was held that the absence

of counsel during arraignment is not, per se, a violation

of the Sixth Amendment. In Madison vy. Tahash, (C.A.

8) 359 F. 2d 60, the court held that the arraignment was

not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings in Minne-

sota. Donnell v. Swenson, (W.D. Mo.) 302 F. Supp. 1024,

extended the Tahash holding to cover arraignments in

Missouri.

In State v. Patrick, (Mo. Sup.) 420 S.W. 2d 258, the

preliminary hearing was held not to be a critical stage.

This view is also supported by Pope v. Swenson, (C.A. 8)

395 F.2d 320, 322, in which the court stated, ‘“‘We agree that

denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing under Missouri

law was not a constitutional infirmity in Pope’s convic-

tion, where the defendant pleaded not guilty and was

otherwise not shown to have been prejudiced.” See also

Nolan v. Nash, (C.A. 8) 316 F. 2d 777; Cf. Burnside v.

State of Nebraska, (C.A. 8) 346 F. 2d 88; Holland v. State

of Nebraska, (C.A. 8) 416 F. 2d 1007.

fi

- Ad6

Petitioner in this case did not plead, and, pursuant to

V.A.M.S., § 546.020, a plea of not guilty was entered for

him. At the second arraignment, petitioner pleaded not

guilty, was furnished a copy of the indictment and, upon

his request for a certain lawyer, the court appointed that

f attorney who represented him thereafter. Petitioner raises

d no complaints about the efforts of the attorney in his be

2 half. Petitioner has not shown that he was deprived of

any rights by the failure to appoint counsel at the first

arraignment, and, therefore, in line with the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals, we hold that the failure to appoint coun-

sel at that time was not a deprivation of rights.

Petitioner further asserts that the state knowingly used

perjured testimony of two witnesses against him. The

state used two prison inmates, Herman Trout and James

Creighton, to testify; as proof of perjury, petitioner states

that both prisoners had their sentences commuted and

were released from prison on the same day.

In making such an allegation, the burden of proof is

on petitioner to show both that the testimony was perjured

and that such testimony was knowingly and intentionally

used by the prosecuting attorney in order to obtain a con-

viction. Anderson v. United States, (C.A. 7) 403 F. 2d

451; Smith v. State of Florida, (C.A. 5) 410 F. 2d 1349, and

cases cited therein; Enzor v. United States, (C.A. 5) 296

F. 2d 62; United State v. Jenkins, (C.A. 3) 281 F. 2d 193.

The petitioner has not met this test. His allegations and

the record are devoid of any proof of perjury or willful

use of perjury by the state. Furthermore, petitioner con-

cedes that he has no direct proof, but contends that the

circumstantial evidence, that of commutation of sentence

less than six months after Stidham’s trial, is sufficient

proof to indicate perjury in line with Napue v. Illinois, 360

U.S. 264. That case is not controlling here because there

eee

ie SEE .

AST

was express proof of a “deal” between the prosecutor and

witness in the case. Here there is no such proof.

Petitioner’s three remaining contentions relate to the

issue of voluntariness of his confession. He asserts that

he was coerced by physical and mental punishment to con-

fess, that the confession was admitted without a finding

by the trial judge that it was voluntary, and that the in-

struction given at the trial did not fully set out the con-

stitutional standards for the jury’s guidance in determin-

ing the issue of voluntariness. |

In regard to petitioner’s first allegation, he relies

mainly upon the cases of Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, and

Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737. Both cases use the

criterion of “totality of circumstances” in determining

whether the confessions were voluntary. The respondent

and the Missouri Supreme Court opinion lend little

credence to Stidham’s testimony because “Without nar-

rating even briefly, the testimony in contradiction of Stid-

ham’s uncorroborated claims was all but overwhelming .. .”

This not unexpected. The Supreme Court in both Clewis

and Davis, supra, commented, ‘“‘As is almost invariably so

in cases involving confessions obtained through unob-

served police interrogation, there is a conflict in the tes-

timony as to the events surrounding the interrogation.”

It is necessary to review the uncontroverted facts in

order to determine this issue. The murder was committed

on September 22, 1954 and Stidham confessed on Septem-

ber 27, 1954. He was questioned intermittently up until

that time concerning his part in the murder. He had very

little food and very little sleep. At no time during this

period was he informed of his right to counsel or to re-

main silent. In fact, he asserts that an attempt to get an

attorney was thwarted when the prison authorities refused

to allow a letter to be mailed. On the 27th, Stidham was

-

. ae

A58

taken to the Athletic Building and questioned by a number

of officers who had hand guns and riot guns in their pos-

session. Stidham asserts that he was physically abused

and rendered unconscious at this time, and these acts re.

sulted in his confession. Before and after the interroga-

tions Stidham was in solitary confinement and no visitors,

including parents or priest, were allowed to see him

Other uncontradicted facts indicated that Stidham was de

prived of food for two days after his confession and that he

lost 25 pounds during the period of interrogation.

eon pp RR HAE at Nay

He had consistently denied all involvement in the

murder up until the time of his confession.

The most damaging of the factors considered in the

totality of the circumstances is the failure to inform peti-

tioner of his rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, has

been determined not to be applicable retroactively. (See

Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719.) However, it still

remains that the failure to inform is a significant factor

in determining the issue of voluntariness, although it is

insufficient in itself to require the voiding of the confes-

sion. Wholly apart from the disputed facts, the statement

of facts established by the record and as found at Stid-

ham’s 27.26 evidentiary hearing do not lead to the con-

clusion that such pressures were applied to Stidham as to

result in overcoming his will to maintain his innocence.

Petitioner next attacks the procedure used by the trial

court in determining the voluntariness of the confession,

alleging that it is in violation of Jackson v. Denno, 378 US.

368. In that case, a constitutional rule was established

that a jury was not to hear a confession unless and until

the trial judge had determined that it was freely and vol-

untarily given. In Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, the court

further extended this holding at page 544:

A59

The rule allows the jury, if it so chooses, to give ab-

solutely no weight to the confession in determining

the guilt or innocence of a defendant but it is not for

the jury to make the primary determination of volun-

tariness. Although the judge need not make for-

mal findings of fact or write an opinion, his con-

clusion that the confession is voluntary must appear

from the record with unmistakable clarity.

Here, in accordance with a request of Stidham’s coun-

sel, the trial court conducted a preliminary examination

inquiring into the voluntariness of the confession out-

side of the hearing of the jury. Witnesses were called and

cross-examined. This hearing satisifed the requirement

of Jackson v. Denno, supra, that there be a (1 ) reliable

nonjury preliminary or post conviction determination of

the issue of voluntariness, (2) uninfluenced by the truth

or falsity of the confession (3) by procedures “fully ade-

quate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination,

including the resolution of disputed facts upon which

the voluntariness issue may depend.”

At the conclusion of the testimony, the court made

the following statement:

THE COURT: Now, at the conclusion of the hearing

held outside of the hearing of the Jury, the request

by the Defendant for a hearing upon the statement

which has been identified as—

MR. RILEY: 16 and 16-1.

THE COURT: 16 and 16-1, it is the Court’s opinion

that the matters concerning the statement should be

offered in the presence of the Jury, subject of course

to any attacks as to its credibility by the Defendant.

The Defendant has of course the right to proceed to

challenge the voluntariness of the statement and con-

fession, even before the Jury, but it is the Court’s

opinion that upon the evidence that has been offered

before the Court and outside of the hearing of the

gsc |

ah

A60

Jury, that the statement is and should be admissible

in evidence, subject to further examinations of the

witnesses which might be conducted, so we may pro-

ceed with Sergeant Little, as to his identification be.

fore the Jury of the statement in question, Exhibit

16 and 16-1.

MR. HENNELLY: In other words, the Court is over-

ruling my Motion, and request of the Court to hold

as a matter of law, that those eetetniente were in-

voluntary, is that right?

THE COURT: That is right. Mr. Sheriff will you

bring the Jury back in?

If the trial court had simply stated that he found the

confession was voluntarily made after hearing the many

witnesses who testified on this score, the matter would have

been settled and this point could™not be raised in this

Court. There are many cases holding that a ruling by the

Court that the evidence heard “makes a jury issue of the

matter,” or words of similar import, do not satisfy the rule

of Jackson v. Denno, supra. And so the precise question

presented here is whether the Court did find the confes-

sion involuntary or whether he failed to rule on that point

- and decided to let that question be decided by the jury.

The evidence in this case on behalf of the defendant,

which the judge heard, was that he was subjected to brutal

physical torture to induce the confession. If the judge

had believed even a part of his testimony, he would have

undoubtedly held the confession involuntary. The trial

court held a full-scale evidentiary hearing on the volun-

tariness of the confession, and without actually using the

word voluntary, directly held that he believed the state's

witnesses and did not believe the defendant’s testimony.

This reasoning was supported by the direct ruling that

he was denying the request of defendant’s counsel to hold

that the contested statement was involuntary.

A61

It would be highly technical, in this day and age, to

hold that the word “voluntary” was a word of art and, in

its absence, a conviction by a jury, after a long trial, should

be set aside because the judge ruled the statement was

not involuntary instead of ruling that the statement was

voluntary. Jt is the opinion of this Court that the state-

ments and action of the judge does clearly indicate a

finding of voluntariness, and is sufficient under the teach-

ings of Jackson v. Denno, supra, and Sims v. Georgia,

supra.

The petitioner’s third attack is related to the second.

Basically, he contends that since the judge made no spe-

cific finding of voluntariness, his instruction which did

not require them to make a specific finding on the vol-

untariness of the confession was violative of Jackson v.

Denno, supra. Since we have held that the trial court

reliably determined the issue of voluntariness, it was not

necessary for the jury to make a specific finding thereon.

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that the petition for habeas corpus be,

and hereby is, denied.

/s/ Wm. R. Collinson

District Judge

Sawin ade

A62

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 20,685

) Appeal from the

Judgment of the

United States Dis.

Appellant, trict Court for the

Vv. | Western District of

Missouri Denying

Appellant’s _Peti-

tion for the Writ

of Habeas Corpus.

James William Stidham,

Harold R. Swenson, Warden,

Appellee.

[May 24, 1971.]

Before Gipson, HEANEY and BriGut, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

On September 22, 1954, an inmate of the Missouri

State Penitentiary was beaten and stabbed to death by

fellow inmates during a riot in that institution. An in-

vestigation was undertaken by the prison authorities im-

mediately after the quelling of the riot. Written confes-

sions were eventually obtained from several inmates, in-

cluding James William Stidham. Stidham’s confession

was used against him in his 1955 trial in state court in

which he was convicted of first degree murder.

A63

Stidham made a number of attempts to obtain relief

in Missouri courts on the ground that the trial judge did

not find his confession to be voluntary, as required by

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964),’ before submitting

it to the jury. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957);

State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297 (1967); State v. Stidham,

449 S.W.2d 634 (1970). He was unsuccessful in each at-

tempt.

On November 9, 1970, a habeas corpus petition brought

by Stidham was denied by the United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court

found (1) that the trial court which initially tried Stid-

ham had complied with Jackson, and (2) that on the

basis of the undisputed facts adduced at the state trial

and the subsequent state evidentiary hearing, the confes-

sion was voluntary. Stidham appeals from the denial.”

COMPLIANCE WITH JACKSON

At the initial trial, the state court heard evidence out-

side the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of the

confession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial

court stated:

“* * * [I]t is the Court’s opinion that the matters

concerning the statement should be offered in the

presence of the Jury, subject of course to any attacks

as to its credibility by the Defendant. The Defendant

1. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), is retroactively

applicable. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Parker

v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1969), rev’d on other grounds,

396 U.S. 482 (1970).

2. Stidham also contends on appeal that he was denied

assistance of counsel at two critical stages of his trial, that he

was tried and convicted on a charge not included in his indictment

and that the State of Missouri knowingly used the perjured testi-

mony of two convicts in obtaining his conviction. We affirm

the decision of the District Court on each of these issues for the

reasons given in that court’s memorandum opinion. Stidham v.,

Swenson, Civ. No. 18121-2 (W.D. Mo. May 15, 1970).

ae

A64

has of course the right to proceed to challenge the

voluntariness of the statement and confession, even

. before the Jury, but it is the Court’s opinion that upon

q the evidence that has been offered before the Court

and outside of the hearing of the Jury, that the state

4 ment is and should be admissible in evidence, sub.

5 ject to further examinations of the witnesses which

might be conducted * * *

“MR. HENNELLY [Defendant’s counsel]: In other

words, the Court is overruling my Motion, and request

4 of the Court to hold as a matter of law, that those

} statements were involuntary, is that right?

“THE COURT: That is right. * * *”

The United States District Court found that this ruling

comported with the requirements of Jackson v. Denno,

supra, stating:

“It would be highly technical, in this day and age,

to hold that the word ‘voluntary’ was a word of art

and, in its absence, a conviction by a jury, after a

long trial, should be set aside because the judge ruled

the statement not involuntary instead of ruling that

the statement was voluntary. It is the opinion of this

- Court that the statements and action of the judge does

clearly indicate a finding of voluntariness, and is suf-

ficient under the teachings of Jackson v. Denno, supra,

and Sims v. Georgia, [385 U.S. 538 (19...) ].”

We believe that the District Court’s analysis is incor-

rect. It assumes that Missouri law, at the time of Stid-

ham’s trial, required the trial court to find that a confes-

sion was voluntary before permitting it to be considered

by a jury. Our examination of the Missouri case law con-

vinces us that a trial court had and frequently used the

right to submit the question of voluntariness to the jury

without a prior determination that the confession was vol-

untary.

The following statements of the Pre-Jackson-Denno

Missouri procedure support this view:

atte’

a M ~

A65

«« * * [W]hen there is substantial conflicting evi-

dence and the question is close it is better to refer

the underlying issue of voluntariness to the jury than

to exclude the confession, since there is less chance

of a miscarriage of justice by leaving the question

open to a second determination, before the jury on

a rehearing of the evidence under proper instructions,

than by foreclosing the inquiry. The court then can

still exclude the confession if it finds from all the evi-

dence, including that introduced at the preliminary

hearing, that the same was involuntary. * * *”

State v. Gibilterra, 116 S.W.2d 88, 94 (1938).

“It is my view that we should adhere to the standard

of admissibility of confessions of whether or not the

particular confession is voluntary in fact. That has

always been the rule of this Court. * * * [T]his is a

jury question unless its involuntary character so con-

clusively appears that it must be held to be involun-

tary as a matter of law. * * * If the confession is

voluntary in fact, and is true, the defendant’s rights

are not violated by putting it in evidence. Some one

must determine these fact issues, and our system is

to leave them to the jury, when they must be decided

on conflicting evidence.” (Citations omitted. )

State v. Sanford, 193 S.W.2d 37, 38 (1946) (concurring

opinion ). ,

“* * * Under our system of jurisprudence it is gen-

erally left to the jury to determine whether a con-

fession was voluntary, unless the contrary appears

so conclusively that the confession must be held in-

voluntary as a matter of law. * * *” (Citations

omitted. )

State v. Laster, 293 S.W.2d 300, 304 (1956) .*

3. See also, State v. Bridges, 349 S.W.2d 214 (1961); State

v. Barnett, 338 S.W.2d 853 (1960); State v. Falbo, 333 S.W.2d

279 (1960); State v. Statler, 331 S.W.2d 526 (1960); State v.

Phillips, 324 S.W.2d 693 (1959); State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584

(1953); State v. Cochran, 203 S.W.2d 707 (1947); State v. Ellis,

193 S.W.2d 37 (1946).

nD Nk OLA OAS

>, +.

ODD

A66

Our analysis of the record of Stidham’s trial leads ys

to conclude that the trial judge in this case submitted the

voluntariness issue to the jury without making a prior

factual determination that the confession was voluntary.

His finding, that the confession was not “involuntary as

a matter of law”, was not, under the then existing Mis.

souri law, the same as finding that it was voluntary. |f

the trial judge does not make a factual determination that

a confession is voluntary before submitting it to the jury,

Jackson standards are violated. Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2q

459 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 482 (1970).

The Missouri Supreme Court’s treatment of this issue

on Stidham’s appeals buttresses our view that the require:

ments of Jackson were not met. In its first Stidham opin-

ion, 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957), the court stated:

“There is no merit in defendant’s contention that his

written confession was coerced and involuntary and

was admitted in evidence before the State established

that it had been voluntarily given. The court con-

ducted a full preliminary hearing on the issue, found

the issue was for the jury, and later, after hearing the

evidence before the jury submitted the issue to the

jury for determination. * * * On the conflicting show-

ing the issue of the voluntariness of the confession

was for the jury. * * *” (Emphasis added. )

In its most recent Stidham opinion, 449 S.W.2d 634 (1970),

the Missouri Supreme Court examined its procedure and

determined that ‘“* * * Missouri employs the so-called

Massachusetts procedure ‘impliedly approved in Jackson

v. Denno’ * * *”. In doing so, the court relied upon State

v. Washington, 399 S.W.2d 109 (1966). We point out that

State v. ‘Washington was decided after Jackson became

the law, and a comparison of its standard with those

enunciated in the Missouri cases, above cited, reveals the

difference between the 1955 and 1966 standards.

A67

THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONFESSION

The Supreme Court recently reemphasized that a de-

fective procedure, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis

for habeas corpus relief:

“(Our decisions]* did not establish that an applicant

for federal habeas corpus is entitled to a new hearing

on the voluntariness issue, in either the federal or

state courts, merely because he can point to short-

comings in the procedures used to decide the issue

of voluntariness in the state courts. Our decisions

make clear that he must also show that his version

of events, if true, would require the conclusion that

his confession was involuntary.”

Procunier v. Atchley,... U.S... ., 27 L-Ed.2d 524, 529

(1971).

Stidham alleges: that he was returned to his regular

Death Row cell in the early evening of September 22; that

between September 22 and September 27, he was ques-

tioned intermittently by police officers and state troopers

who threatened him with physical harm if he did not tell

everything he knew about the murder; that between Sep-

tember 22 and September 27, he was able only to catch

short naps while sitting on the toilet because his straw

tick, on the floor, was too water-logged to be slept on as

a result of his cell being flooded when rioting inmates

opened water pipes; that he was given nothing to eat

from September 22 until September 29; that he weighed

184 pounds before the riot but only 159 pounds on Sep-

tember 29; that he was never informed of his Miranda

rights;* that on September 27, he was taken to the prison’s

4. The Court was specifically referring to Jackson v. Denno,

supra, and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

5. Since the Miranda decision is not retroactive, Johnson v.

New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), this allegation, even if true, is

‘not dispositive of the case. However, failure to warn of con-

stitutional rights is a factor properly considered in determining

the voluntariness issue. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967);

Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).

athletic field house and questioned in the presence of six

police officers armed with pistols, rifles and riot guns.

that he was questioned for approximately twenty to thirty

minutes, during which time he denied involvement in the

murder; that, thereafter, a rope was placed through his

handcuffs and he was hung up for approximately fifteen

minutes with his hands behind him; that upon his cop.

tinued refusal to implicate himself, he was again hung

up and beaten with corkball or baseball bats until he lost

consciousness; and that he then wrote out a confession

which was dictated to him.

A68

We believe that the above version of the facts, if true.

requires the conclusion that the confession was an involun-

tary one. See, Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967). .

Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Brown v. Missis-

sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

We emphasize that we do not decide or intimate that

the allegations are true. It is not the task of the federal

court to do so in state habeas corpus matters:

“* * * [T]he appropriate remedy when a federal

court finds a Jackson v. Denno error in a prior state

proceeding is to allow the State a reasonable time to

make an error-free determination on the voluntariness

ot the confession at issue. * * *”

Sigler v. Parker, supra at 484.

We only note, as did the United States District Court,

that we have examined the transcripts and other relevant

materials and have found that several of Stidham’s alle-

gations have not been contradicted in the record.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the

case is remanded to that court for further proceedings

consistent with the remedy provided for in Sigler v.

Parker, supra.

A69

GrBson, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Appellant Stidham has been ac-

corded many hearings and with the aid of extremely able

and expert counsel has raised just about every objection

and defense available in the well stocked arsenal of de-

fense tactics—this he has a right to do, but I do not think

the never-ending search for error, fancied or otherwise,

serves the cause of criminal justice. The Courts rather

than spending limited judicial resources in open end legal

proceedings should give heed to the many evils engendered

in the law’s delay and give adherence to the constitutional

mandate for speedy trials. Only by unclogging the dockets

can this be done. Much has been said and written about

the inordinate delays, both at the trial and appellate levels,

that have burdened and made ineffective to a large extent

our system of criminal justice.

I would affirm on the basis that the Missouri Supreme

Court has correctly enunciated the Missouri law applied

in this case at the original trial and that Court’s holding

that the procedure in this case was compatible with Jack-

son v. Denno. State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.

1970). A State Supreme Court is the best interpreter of

its own laws. In addition, a review 2of the entire record

of the original conviction, the record in the plenary hear-

ing in the state post-conviction review, together with the

federal post-conviction review in the federal District Court

does not affirmatively demonstrate any ground for upset-

ting the jury verdict of 1954.

First as to the law, the preliminary inquiry into the

voluntariness of the confession during the original trial

of this case held by the trial judge out of the presence of

the jury, I think, adequately satisfied the requirements

of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963). The failure of

the trial judge to use the word “voluntary” instead of “not

RSIS

eae, eel

eS ae i ai OR, PMR

A70

involuntary” is a matter of semantics and too technica]

a basis upon which to upset a conviction affirmed by the

highest state court. The jury is the ultimate trier of fact

on the voluntariness issue if the confession is not involun-

tary as a matter of law. Jackson v. Denno, required a

preliminary examination outside of the hearing of the jury

on the issue of voluntariness. This was done.

The trial judge at the plenary preliminary hearing

could only do one of two things; hold the confession in-

voluntary as a matter of law and thus not admit it, or

view it as not involuntary as a matter of law and admit

it in evidence together with any evidence on the volun-

tariness issue that the accused wished to present. After

all, the jury is the sole and only arbiter of the facts and

only has to give the confession such weight as it deems

merited. The trial judge could not say the confession .

is voluntary and instruct the jury that it must accept

the confession and act accordingly.' The judge here made

the only finding he could legally make to have the con-

fession admitted into evidence for the jury’s considera-

tion; that is, it was admissible on the ground that it was not

involuntary as a matter of law. This was a far cry from

the limited and incomplete procedure condemned in Jack-

son v. Denno.

The argument here appears to be more a matter of

semantics or technicalities than a substantial procedural

defect in trial proceedings. The trial court’s decision in

admitting the confession was based on conflicting evidence,

the same evidence that is now urged to upset the verdict

and judgment of the state court. No new evidence has

been adduced and we are in effect now being asked to

1. The trial judge could not tell the jury the confession

was voluntary; that would constitute error in a Missouri state

trial, be considered a fatal comment on the evidence and as in-

vading the province of the jury.

A7l1

review this same evidence and hold the procedure bad

because the judge did not use the magic rubric. “volun-

tary” but said in effect, as is clearly shown by the record,

that the confession was admissible and not involuntary as

a matter of law.” By refusing to hold that the confession

and statements were involuntary, the Court in the context

of this hearing would be holding that the confession and

statements were voluntary. This particular preliminary

hearing on the confession and statements was not held

just to see if there was conflicting evidence, as under the

New York rule held defective in Jackson v. Denno.

Second as to the facts, I agree with the majority

that Procunier v. Atchley,... U.S... ., 27 L.Ed.2d 524

( ), is not applicable to this case as the appellant

would clearly be entitled to have the confession ruled in-

admissible if his version of the facts is correct and, in

addition, his conviction would be a travesty on justice if

his version of the facts in the case is correct. The con-

flict of the evidence in this case carries throughout the

confession and the other evidence adduced at the trial.

The decision on the admissibility of the confession is solely

predicated on credibility factors. The only evidence of a

forced or involuntary confession comes from the mouth of

the accused. All of the other evidence, including that of

2. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing on the issue

of the admissibility of the confession (and it would not be ad-

missible if involuntary), the trial judge said,

“It is the Court’s opinion that the matters concerning the

statement should be offered in the presence of the Jury, * * *

The defendant has of course the right to proceed to challenge

the voluntariness of the statement and confession, even before

the Jury, but it is the Court’s opinion that upon the evidence *

* » * that the statement is and should be admissible in evi-

dence, subject to further examinations of the witnesses * * *.”

And in response to appellant’s counsel’s question of whether he

was overruling the motion and request “to hold as a matter of

law that those statements were involuntary”, replied “That is

right.”

A72

four St. Louis, Missouri, policemen and two State High-

way Patrolmen are in direct conflict with the testimony

of the accused in regard to the confession. Further, testj-

mony of the accused regarding his non-participation in the

killing of Donnell is rather persuasively refuted by prison

guard Dietzel and inmates Creighton and Trout, all of

whose statements are consistent with the State’s version of

the group assault and killing of inmate Donnell.

In other words for Stidham to be innocent as claimed

all of the other testimony in the case, except as to formal

matters and some neutral medical testimony from the

Springfield Medical Center, would have to be out and out

perjury. As noted by the Missouri Supreme Court in

Stidham’s original appeal, State v. Stidham, 365 S.W.2d

7 (1957), the accused Stidham while taking the stand failed

to controvert essential elements of the State’s case and

failed to adduce any corroboration for his version of the

facts.*

The trial lasted several days and the jury after being

out 11. hours rendered a unanimous verdict of guilty. Cer-

tainly no material error affecting the integrity of the fact-

finding process has been disclosed.

3. A reading of the record of the original trial shows the

rioters made a particular effort to break through three doors to

get into Death Row where Stidham was being held in solitary

confinement (for infraction of prison rules—escape) for the par-

ticular purpose of releasing Stidham and then presenting him to

the group as their leader. Stidham’s version that he left the

Death Row area immediately and went upstairs to another cell and

listened on the radio while drinking coffee during all of the period

of the tumultuous riot does not appear credible. Also no cor-

roboration has been produced by Stidham either at the time of

trial or since. While on the other hand three witnesses, guard

Dietzel and inmates Creighton and Trout, directly controverted

Stidham’s version of his actions at that time and place Stiaham

at the scene of the crime with the other six defendants who were

accused of this brutal and sadistic killing. Without detailing all

of the evidence, the evidence presented aside from the confession

was persuasive.

A73

I would affirm Judge Collinson and his view that the

action of the original trial judge “clearly indicates a finding

of voluntariness and is sufficient under the teachings of

Jackson v. Denno, supra, and Sims v. Georgia, supra.”

Furthermore issues of credibility and issues of fact decided

long ago should not be upset by technicalities or semantics.

There appears to be no constitutional defect in the fact-

finding process utilized in this case and the issue of credi-

bility after full hearing was decided adversely to Stidham

both in the original trial and at a plenary State post-con-

viction hearing, affirmed in 449 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. 1970).

I would affirm the District Court’s denial of relief.

A true copy.

Attest:

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

AT74

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term, 1970

James William Stidham, ‘

Appellant,

Vs. > No. 20685

Harold R. Swenson,

%

d

A

4

4

4

4

Appellee. J

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

3 This appeal comes before the Court on consideration

1 of appellee’s petition for rehearing or transfer to the Court

en banc. Being fully advised in the premises, it is now

here ordered:

1. Petition for rehearing en banc is denied by an

equally divided Court;

2. Petition for rehearing by the panel to which the

case was previously submitted is denied.

June 11, 1971

A75

APPENDIX G

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAM STIDHAM, 5

Petitioner, blk

ivil Action

ny - No. 18711-2

HAROLD R. SWENSON,

Respondent. J

Order Granting Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

and Denying Petition for Habeas Corpus

(Filed November 5, 1970)

On February 18, 1970, Stidham filed a petition for

habeas corpus which was denied by this Court by order

entered on May 15, 1970. Stidham v. Swenson, Civil Ac-

tion No. 18121-2. Stidham filed a notice of appeal and a

request for certificate of probable cause which was granted,

along with leave to appeal in forma pauperis. On June

25, 1970, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Stid-

ham’s motion to dismiss the appeal. At that time the

Clerk of the Court informed Stidham that if he intended

to renew his claims, he had to proceed anew in the district

court. ,

On September 25, Stidham filed another petition for

habeas corpus in this Court in which he by reference to

his prior petition stated identical grounds for relief.

Shortly before or at the same time he filed a motion to

reinstate the appeal in the Court of Appeals, despite the

instructions given to him when his appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeals denied his motion.

The pertinent facts are set out in the order denying

the petition for habeas corpus in Civil Action No. 18121-2

eS

£bS eA BER Wisnata Adak

A76

and need not be restated here. In that petition, Stidham

stated seven grounds for relief, which were: (1) that he

was tried and convicted upon a charge of conspiracy which

was not included in the indictment; (2) that he was de

prived of assistance of counsel at two critical stages of

the proceedings against him; (3) that he did not know.

ingly or competently waive the assistance of counsel at

any stage of the proceedings; (4) that certain members

of the Missouri State Highway Patrol and personnel of

the Missouri State Penitentiary exerted physical and

mental punishment upon him to secure a confession from

him; (5) that the trial judge admitted the confession into

evidence without first making a clear and specific finding

that the said confession was voluntary; (6) that Instruc-

tion No. 6 given at the trial did not fully set out the con-

stitutional standards for the jury’s guidance to determine

the voluntariness of the said confession; and (7) that the

state knowingly used perjured testimony of two convicts

to obtain the conviction of petitioner.

By amendment to this petition herein, Stidham states

an additional ground for relief, alleging that he was denied

the right to confront and cross-exaiftine a state’s witness

whose testimony as to certain implicating statements was

objected to, the objection sustained, but the jury not in-

structed to disregard.

In regard to Stidham’s seven allegations which are

raised here for the second time and upon which this Court

denied relief in the prior petition (18121-2), it is unneces-

sary to restate our findings, and we readopt them here.

However, one point—that he was denied counsel at ar-

raignment and preliminary hearing—does merit further

consideration.

Factually, there were two arraignments. The first

was instituted by the prosecuting attorney on an informa-

we

tig Se

AT77

tion in the magistrate court. Although Stidham demanded

counsel at that time, none was appointed. A plea of not

guilty was entered for him. (V.A.MLS., § 546.020) Pre-

liminary hearings were held as required by V.A.MS.,

¢ 544.250. The information was later dismissed, and Stid-

ham was arraigned again on an indictment returned by

the Grand Jury of Cole County. At that time counsel

(whom he had requested) was appointed for him. In the

prior civil action (18121-2), we held that Stidham was not

entitled to relief because the arraignment and preliminary

hearing have been held not to be critical stages in Missouri.

State v. Benson, (Mo. Sup.) 415 S.W. 2d 773; State v.

Patrick, (Mo. Sup.) 420 S.W. 2d 258; Madison v. Tahash,

(C.A. 8) 359 F. 2d 60; Donnell v. Swenson, (W.D. Mo.) 302

F. Supp. 1024; Pope v. Swenson, (C.A. 8) 395 F. 2d 320;

Nolan v. Nash, (C.A. 8) 316 F. 2d 777.

Subsequent to our opinion in the prior habeas corpus

action, the Supreme Court handed down Coleman v. Ala-

bama, 399 U.S. 1, in which it was held that a preliminary

hearing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, that

counsel was essential to protect the accused against any

erroneous or improper prosecution, and that the right of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment is applicable to such

proceedings.

Coleman was decided on June 22, 1970. The arraign-

ment and preliminary hearing in question here occurred

in 1955. Assuming, but not deciding, that Coleman would

apply to the fact situation here, it must be determined

whether or not Coleman is to be applied -retroactively.

Although the Supreme Court has not rendered a decision

on this point, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has'‘ex-

pressly held that Coleman is not retroactive. Konvalin v.

Sigler, (C.A. 8) No. 19731 (decided September 22, 1970,

not yet reported). Therefore, in line with our controlling

A78

court, we hold that Coleman does not apply retroactively

to this situation.

Stidham’s latest contentions are that he was denieq

the right to confront and cross-examine one Officer Eitz.

man who “testified before the jury and judge that he took

statements imiplicating petitioner in the murder he was on

trial for;” and that the testimony of Eitzman in regard to

these implicating statements was objected to, the objection

sustained, but the jury was not instructed to disregard it,

Stidham claims that he exhausted his state remedies

in regard to these contentions because the Missouri Sy-

preme Court decided them adversely to him on his direct

appeal. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W. 2d 7. However, a re-

view of that case shows that Stidham did not raise the issue

that he was denied the right to confront and cross-ex-

amine Officer Eitzman in regard to alleged implicating

statements. Nor was the issue raised in any of Stidham’s

appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court from denials of his

27.26 motions. See State v. Stidham, (Mo. Sup.) 403 S.W.

2d 616; 415 S.W. 2d 297; 449 S.W. 2d 634. Since Stidham

does have presently-existing and adequate state remedies

to raise this contention, the contention must be dismissed

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Fay v. Noia, 372

USS. 391.

In his direct appeal from his conviction, Stidham did

allege that the trial court should have instructed the jury

to disregard the testimony of Eitzman. in regard to im-

plicating statements, after sustaining an objection to it.

The Missouri Supreme Court found the issue in favor of

the state.

The objected-to testimony of Eitzman was as follows:

“I had talked to him and explained to him that I hada

statement—” (Tr. 508). The trial court sustained the ob-

A79

jection to what Eitzman told Stidham; ruled that the wit-

ness was not to testify or be asked what statements he

made, or what statements he had from other parties; and

determined that the jury did not need to be instructed to

disregard because nothing damaging had been said when

the defense halted the testimony by its objection. (Tr. 508-

§11)

There does not appear to be a denial of a federally-

protected right by the trial court’s determination not to

instruct the jury to disregard Eitzman’s incomplete re-

mark. Therefore, no relief can be granted by this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis

be, and it is hereby, granted; and

ORDERED that the petition for habeas corpus be, and

it hereby is, denied.

/s/ Wm R. Collinson

District Judge

ob net aE TS eee eT |

A80

APPENDIX H

Judgment

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term, 1969

James William Stidham,

Appellant,

vs.

Harold R. Swenson, Warden, Mis-

souri State Penitentiary.

\

- No. 20337

4

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

Motion of appellant to dismiss the appeal from the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Missouri in this cause having been filed, and in pursuance

of said motion,

It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court

that the appeal from the said District Court in this cause

be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice.

And it is further ordered that the mandate in this

cause issue forthwith to the said District Court.

June 24, 1970

A81

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term, 1969

James William Stidham, .

Appellant,

vs. r No. 20337

Harold R. Swenson, Warden, Mis-

souri State Penitentiary.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

Judgment of this Court dismissing the appeal in this

cause from the United States District Court for the West-

ern District of Missouri was entered June 24, 1970. Our

mandate issued to the aforesaid District Court on that

date. The case now comes before the Court on considera-

tion of appellant’s motion to reinstate the appeal on our

docket. Being fully advised in the premises, it is now here

ordered that the motion be, and it is hereby, denied.

October 14, 1970

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Appendix — Swenson v. Stidham · 409 U.S. 224 | Frix