Appendix — Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1973

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Text

INDEX

: 4 Volume I

st of Relevant Docket Entries

. Complaint [Doc. 1] A-1

, Referring This Action to Judge Metzner for

il Purposes, dated August 31, 1961 [Doc. 42] ... A-33

mn n and Order of December 5, 1961 [Doc. 50) A-35

a rial Order, February 7, 1962 [Doc. 59] ............ A-36

pole ’s Answer and Counterclaims [Doc. 63] ........ AAl

piliday’s Answer [Doc. 83] . A-99

wtrial Order, July 12, 1962 [Doc. 101] —.......... A-116

fetrial Order, September 21, 1962 [Doc. 122) ....... A-118

fetrial Order, January 10, 1963 [Doc. 144] ........ A-129

Order, January 19, 1963 [Doc. 146] .......... A-127

pin ion and Order of Special Master dated January

"a2, 1963, Exhibit C to Bromley Affidavit dated

bruary 15, 1963 [Doc. 179] A-133

thibit A to the Affidavit of John F. Sonnett, dated

February 1, 1963 [Doc. 166] A-143

Rhibits B and C to the Affidavit of John F. Son-

bett, dated February 1, 1963 [Doc. 167] —......... A-226

tr Order, February 1, 1963 [Doc. 168] ........ A-253

inion and Order, February 7, 1963 [Doc. 173] ..... A-255

cl p0’s Notice of Position, dated February 8, 1963

Doc. 174] A-268

at

mecript of Pretrial Hearing, Februgry 8, 1963

5. 188]

sript of Pretrial Hearing, May 2, 1963 [Doe.

A-ii

Opinion and Order, dated May 3, 1963 [Doe. 191] .... A317

Opinion and Order of May 3, 1963 Granting Addi-

tional Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (memoran-

dum endorsed on motion papers dated February

15, 1963) [Doc. 179B] A232

Judgment of the Court of Appeals on Interlocutory

Appeal, Entered July 10, 1964 [Docket No. 28405]

[Doc. 478] A3%

Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirming Dis-

missal of the Counterclaims, Entered July 10,

1964 [Docket No. 28406] [Doce. 479] A326

Opinion of the Court of Appeals in Dockets No.

28405 and No. 28406 [Doc. 478] A328

Opinion and Order of Special Master J. Lee Rankin,

dated July 30, 1965 [Doc. 481] A-357

Opinion and Order of Judge Metzner, dated Novem-

ber 16, 1965 [Doc. 487] A-396

Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Metzner on

December 30, 1965 [Doc. 498] AA

Opinion and Order of Judge Metzner Denying De-

fendants’ Motion for a Pre-Hearing Order, dated

January 4, 1966 [Doc. 496] AA22

Order by Judge Metzner of January 4, 1966 Desig-

nating Herbert Brownell as Special Master in

Place of J. Lee Rankin [Doc. 497] AAA

Volume II

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

Robert W. Rummel [Docs. 554-2 through 554-10] A425

Testimony at Damage Hearing of John B. Connelly

[Doc. 554-11] A-9TT

—

A-iii

Volume III

PAGE

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

Edward J. Morehouse [Does. 554-13, 554-14] .... A-1209

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

Edward Wemple [Docs. 554-15 through 554-18,

554-32] A-1243

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

John C. Biegler [Doc. 554-19] A-1527

Volume IV

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

Gene M. Woodfin [ Does. 554-23, 554-24] 0... A-1567

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

Nathan S. Simat [Does. 554-25, -26, -27, -28, -30,

31] A-1575

Excerpts from Testimony at Damage Hearing of

L. John Hichner [Does. 554-31, -32] A-1727

Testimony at Damage Hearing of Van Court M.

Hare, Jr. [Doc. 554-32] A-1773

Excerpts from Pretrial Deposition of Robert W.

Rummel [Docs. 224, 225, 226] A-1797

Excerpts from Pretrial Deposition of Charles C.

Tillinghast [Docs. 210 through 222] .................... A-1850

Excerpts from Pretrial Deposition of Emmett O.

Cocke [Docs. 228, 231, 233, 235] A-1913

Jones v. Uris Sales Corp.—Master’s Report [not a

part of the Record herein] A-1934

Volume V

Notice of Filing of Report of Special Master dated

September 21, 1968 [Doc. 509] A-1965

Report of Special Master, Filed September 21, 1968

[Doe. 508] A-1966

A-iv

PAGE

Defendants’ Objections to the Report of the Special

_ Master, dated November 1, 1968 [Doe. 511] A-1967

Opinion and Order, Filed December 23, 1969, Adopt-

ing and Confirming the Report of the Special

Master [Doce. 519] A-227

Opinion and Order of April 13, 1970 Awarding

Attorney’s Fee and Costs [Doce. 530) oon. A-2060

Final Judgment Entered April 14, 1970 [Doe. 531] .. A-2073

Volume VI

Toolco’s Notice of Motion to Dismiss TWA’s Com-

plaint, August 8, 1961 [Doc. 22] A-2075

Order by Judge Herlands, dated August 14, 1961

[Doe. 25] A-2077

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before J udge Metz-

ner, September 6, 1961 [Doc. 47] A-2078

Pretrial Order of Judge Metzner, September 7 , 1961

[Doc. 44] A-2112

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before J udge Metz-

ner, October 2, 1961 [Doc. 48] A-2115

Pretrial Order of Judge Metzner, December 18, 1961

[Doc. 354] A-2138

Tooleo’s Notice of Motion Before Special Master

J. Lee Rankin, February 15, 1962 [Doc. 66] ........ A-2140

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before J udge Metz-

ner, February 23, 1962 [Doc. 79] A-2141

Orders of Special Master J. Lee Rankin, April 17,

1962, contained in excerpts from transcript of

deposition of Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr. [Doc.

217] A-2176

Interrogatory Propounded by TWA to Tooleo, May

4, 1962 [Doc. 89]

A-2197

PAGE

Interrogatory Propounded by TWA to Raymond M.

Holliday, May 4, 1962 [Doc. 90] A-2203

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, May 17, 1962 [Doc. 96] A-2206

Portion of Transcript of Proceedings Before Spe-

cial Master J. Lee Rankin, June 4, 1962 [Doc.

218] A-2233

TWA’s Notice of Motion and Affidavit of John F.

Sonnett, June 25, 1962 [Doc. 305] A-2234

Affidavit of John R. Hupper, July 2, 1962 [Doc.

315] 7 A-2240

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, July 12, 1962 [Doc. 107] A-2245

Pretrial Order of Judge Metzner, July 23, 1962

[Doe. 103] A-2267

Pretrial Order of Judge Metzner, July 24, 1962

[Doc. 93] A-2268

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, July 26, 1962 [Doc. 113] A-2270

Affidavit of Robert G. Zeller, August 28, 1962 with

Exhibits A-K [Doc. 110] A-2283

Memorandum Reviewing the History of TWA’s Ap-

plication for Permission to Propound an Inter-

rogatory of Hughes Tool Company Concerning

the Location of Howard R. Hughes, August 30,

1962 [Doc. 106] A-2297

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, September 6, 1962 [Doc. 355] A-2305

Afidavit of John F. Sonnett, September 14, 1962,

and Exhibits C and D thereto [Doe. 117] _......... A-2316

Portions of Transcript of Proceedings Before Spe-

_ Gal Master J. Lee Rankin, September 15, 1962

[Doe. 226] A-2382

A-vi

PAGE

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, September 19, 1962 [Doe. 129] A-239)

Portions of Transcript of Discovery Proceedings

Before Special Master J. Lee Rankin, October 25,

1962 [Doce. 226] A-2428

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, October 29, 1962 [Doc. 184] A-2438

Notice of Motion by Tooleo, December 4, 1962, for

Leave to Depose Sessel and Wadsworth [Doc.

338] A-2461

Transcript of Proceedings Before Special Master

J. Lee Rankin, December 14, 1962 [Doc. 237] .... A-2462

Transcript of Proceedings Before Special Master

J. Lee Rankin, December 28, 1962 [Doc. 237] .... A-2514

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, January 9, 1963 [Doc. 185] A-2523

Transcript of Proceedings Before Special Master

J. Lee Rankin, January 14, 1963 [Doc. 237] ........ A-2571

Notice of Motion by Tooleo, January 14, 1963 [Doce.

145] A-2574

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, January 17, 1963 [Doc. 186] A-2576

Notice of Motion by Tooleo, January 22, 1963 [Doe.

147] A-2602

Transcript of Proceedings Before Special Master

J. Lee Rankin, January 23, 1963 [Doc. 237] ........ A-2603

Notice of Motion by Tooleo, January 25, 1963 [Doe.

152] A-2615

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, January 28, 1963 [Doc. 187] A-2616

Letter of Chester C. Davis to Judge Metzner, Jan-

uary 29, 1963 [Doec. 448] A-2642

A-vii

Letter of Chester C. Davis to Special Master J. Lee

Rankin, February 4, 1963 [Doc. 458] .................... A-2645

Lefer from John F.. Sonnett to Chester C. Davis,

February 5, 1963 [Doc. 459] A-2647

Notice of Motion by Toolco, February 6, 1963 [Doc.

170) z A-2648

Affidavit of Nazeeh Habashy, February 6, 1963 [Doe.

172] A-2649

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, February 6, 1963 [Doc. 187] A-2650

Afidavit of Bruce Bromley, February 15, 1963

[without exhibits] [Doc. 179] A-2676

Affidavit of William C. Chanler, February 15, 1963

[Doc. 179] A-2689

Order to Show Cause dated February 16, 1963, and

Affidavit of John F. Sonnett, February 15, 1963

[Doc. 180] A-2692

Transcript of Pretrial Hearing Before Judge Metz-

ner, February 21, 1963 [Doe. 189] A-2704

Order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-

cuit dated June 6, 1963, Granting Leave to Appeal

and Staying Damage Hearing Pending Appeal .. A-2736

Orders of the Supreme Court of the United States,

dated November 16, 1964 Granting Writs of Cer-

tiorari A-2737

Orders of the Supreme Court, dated March 8, 1965,

Dismissing the Writs of Certiorari as Improvi-

dently Granted in Hughes Tool Company et al. v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., Nos. 443 gnd 501 .... A-2738

Opinion of the Court of Appeals dated September 1,

1971, in Docket Nos. 34902, 35114, Affirming with

: — the Judgment of the District

A-2739

is eee

PAGE

Orders of the Court of Appeals, dated September

28, 1971, Denying Petitions for Rehearing and

Rehearing in banc A-2799

Volume VII

PAGE

Excerpts from Transcript of Deposition of Charles

C. Tillinghast, Jr. [Excerpts from Does. 54, 210,

211, 216, 221] A-2800

Vol. 11 of Defendants’ Exhibits to Deposition of

Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr. (consisting of Ex-

hibit 11, with subparts 11-A through 11-T, inclu-

sive) [Doc. 238] A320

Opinions and Orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board

with respect to the Hughes Tool Company—TWA

Control Relationship, as follows:

(a) CAB Opinion and Order No. 3210, October

17, 1944 (officially reported at 6 C.A.B.

153) [not a part of the Record herein] .... A-3297

(b) CAB Order No. 4437, January 26, 1946 ... A-3307

(c) CAB Order No. E-922, October 29, 1947 .... A-3309

(d) CAB Opinion and Order No. E-1735, June

30, 1948 (officially reported at 9 C.A.B.

381) [not a part of the Record herein] .... A-3311

(e) CAB Opinion and Order No. E-4701, Oc-

tober 6, 1950 (officially reported at 12

C.A.B. 192) [not a part of the Record

herein] A-3333

(f) CAB Opinion and Order No. E-16195, De-

cember 29, 1960 (officially reported at 32

C.A.B. 13638) A-3408

A-1567

Excerpts From Testimony at Damage Hearing

of Gene M. Woodfin

[Tr. 6838] °° * Mr. Sonnett: I understand, but

I propose to spend a little time on this.

Q Under the heading “Jet Aircraft,” it reads:

“TWA’s major U.S. airline competitors have an-

nounced that they have ordered jet aircraft for de-

livery beginning in 1958. The cost of jet aircraft

will greatly exceed that of the latest models of

piston-engine aircraft (although they will have

greater speed and capacity) and their use will require

substantial investments in ground equipment and

will pose major problems relating to operations, traf-

fie control, maintenance and airport availability.

“TWA has placed no orders for jet aircraft, but

its management believes that it will be necessary for

TWA to operate such aircraft if it is to maintain

its competitive position and that the cost of the re-

quired aircraft, spare parts, and engines will ex-

ceed $320,000,000. Accordingly, TWA is making

plans for the operation of Boeing 707 and Convair

880 jets.

[Tr. 6839] “Hughes has placed orders, under con-

tracts assignable to TWA, for 15 Boeing 707-131

aircraft, 18 Boeing 707-331 aircraft, and 30 Convair

880 aircraft, for delivery beginning in 1959. These

contracts are subject to modification as to number

and model of aircraft covered and as to specifica-

tions of the aircraft, including seating capacity.

Hughes is not committed to sell any of these aircraft

to TWA, nor is TWA committed to buy any of them

_ from Hughes. Any such transaction between TWA

* and Hughes requires approval of the Civil Aeronau-

ties Board.

A-1568

W oodfin—Cross

“One of TWA’s a ie turbo.

prop aircraft and others have ordered such aircraft,

TWA has not ordered such aircraft, but is consider.

ing these and other types of new aircraft for future

use.”

Assuming those statements set forth in the registration

statement or prospectus were correctly made, would you

have advised TWA at the time to engage in the financing

which, in fact, it did engage in in 1957?

A. Well, if I may say so, the financing in 1957—and |

don’t know that this question has ever been put to

(Tr. 6840] me, but the purpose of the issue appears in the

prospectus. It also appears in the digest and DHR Trans

World Exhibit No. 7. This money was to pay for planes,

the Lockheed 1649 and spare parts, which it had, and to

pick up some additional bank borrowing on money that it

had to have at that time.

This was not intended to be a financing to cover $32),

000,000 worth of jets. They were on order—I would judge

from what I read here that they were using the Hughes

Tool Company credit to get a place in line to have these

planes ordered.

And I would not necessarily have advised any financing.

at all at that stage of the game if Hughes was content to

pay the down payments which I think run about 10 per cent

of the purchase cost on these over a period of time until, as

the pressure got a little stronger for Hughes Tool Com-

pany, you could hope to have a better climate for financing.

Mr. Morehouse didn’t want to do any financing during

this period of time either, and I don’t think I would havé

in 1957.

Q. So that, in your opinion, the financing in June of 1957

was not in the best interests of TWA and you would not

have so regarded it at the time?

A-1569

Woodfn—Cross

[Tr. 6841] A. I didn’t say that, Mr. Sonnett.

I said they had to have that financing—they were in

trouble—to pay for their 1649’s.

I thought you asked me and I apologize if I misunder-

stood, if I would have advised them to have done a financ-

ing which would contemplate the financing of $320 million

af jets in 1957. I did not intend to say that it was not

necessary to have the financing of the some $43 million at

that time to pay for planes that they had and were re-

Q. If you would assume, Mr. Woodfin, that every state-

ment of fact set forth in the prospectus before you had

been true, would you have advised TWA to go ahead with

this financing in June-of 1957?

A. I don’t think any of those facts set forth there would

be germane to the problem of whether or not you needed

the money to pay for the airplanes. If they take the air-

planes away, you had to do something. You didn’t have

bank credit. You would owe the bank $55 million. You

would come to a point where you had to do some financing.

The principal shareholder says, “I will put my money

out.” The minority come along. I think this is one of those

times you reach when you’ve got to put the [Tr. 6842]

‘money up.

Q. Are you saying that the decision would have been

made by Hughes and not by the management and that you

had to accept whatever decision Hughes made?

A. Well, I’d say this: I’d say that, if the management

desided it wanted to have this offering and they talked to

Mr, Hughes, who owned—and let’s asyme the most inde-

pendent, competent management you want to assume, but

We've still got to make some assumptions about ownership,

fad if he says, “I am not willing to subscribe to my part

Wit” I don’t think you could have done it.

as

a * * . + .

A-1570

Woodfin—Cross

[Tr. 7200] The Special Master: I believe yon in.

timated before leaving aside any question of motives,

that the program of financing that was actually car.

ried out by TWA is a reasonable one within—while

men might reasonably have differed whether to do

some of this in 1955 or 1956 or 1957, that even in

retrospect, the actual financing program was within

the realm of good business judgment.

(Tr. 7201] The Witness: If Hughes hadn’t been

there they would have been in serious trouble, be.

cause they ran into deep operating troubles starting

in—I don’t know whether it is operating trouble. But

they started losing money.

You see, the start of 1955—1955 was a bad year for

TWA. They were down from $10 million earnings in

the previous year to the $5 million at the end of 1955,

and each quarter was getting progressively worse

in comparison to the preceding year. Contrary to

American, Pan American and United, they lost

money in 1956. The other companies made money

in 1956. They lost money in 1957. They lost money

in 1958. It wasn’t until 1959 that they started making

a little money again.

By this time, of course, their chances of any big

equity financing other than with Hughes’ help or any

big borrowing had disappeared and continued to be

more difficult to do from the very date that they had

the May financing or June financing, whenever it is

—it doesn’t tell us precisely—in 1955, because the

market went down like a rock from then, from then

on down the road, and their earnings went down.

A-1571

Woodfn—Cross

(Tr. 7259] * * * Q. Addressing ourselves again to page

9 of your report, the last sentence of the paragraph, the

first paragraph under (e) reads:

“Mr. Morehouse is assuming, contrary to our view,

that the common stockholders would double their

holdings in TWA when they could at best expect only

a nominal rate of return for the foreseeable future.”

Bearing that in mind,—

{Tr. 7260] A..I mean by “nominal rate of return,” of —

course, TWA was paying no dividend. This was a nominal

rate of return on the additional equity that was invested.

We would assume they would put it in tax—in govern-

ment notes or short-term governments or something so

they could get some return on it.

The Special Master: It would be the corporation

that could only expect a nominal return?

The Witness: Yes, the sentence is poorly drafted.

By Mr. Sonnett:

Q. With respect to that statement, let us consider the

1957 TWA common stock offering. That was a one-for-one

offering, I think, as we have already established, was it not?

A. Yes, completely underwritten by Mr. Hughes when

the company was in dire straits for money after loss years

1956, 1957, and in a very bad year in 1957.

Q. The subscription price of the 1957 offering—

A. $18.

Q. (continuing) —13 when the market was 14—

A. That’s correct.

‘Q (continuing) —what better expectation could the

tlockholders of TWA have in 1957 than presumably they

had [T'r. 7261] or would have had in 1955?

a:

A-1572

Woodfn—Cross

A. Well, they would have had very little, except they

were getting much closer to the jet age. At that time they

had the ‘equipment to pay for which they had on hand

There was a very definitive use for the money. And I am

sure it was an unhappy financing. It is not one that one

would have wanted to undertake, unless it was required,

Q. Do you recall the number of shares of the 1957 offer.

ing which were made available to stockholders other than

Hughes?

A. Well, I can’t tell you precisely, but it was—Hughes

at that time owned about 74 per cent, as I recall. So it is

about 25 per cent of 3.3 million.

The Special Master: Was your question offered

or taken up?

The Witness: Offered.

Mr. Sonnett: Offered.

By Mr. Sonnett:

Q. Our figure is 860,894 shares were made available to

stockholders other than Hughes.

Do you know how many of those shares were subscribed

for by others than Hughes?

A. Well, approximately three-fourths.

[Tr. 7262] Q. About 75 per cent, then?

A. That’s correct.

Mr. Sonnett: Would you mark this—

The Witness: 75 per cent of the 25 per cent.

Mr. Sonnett: Correct.

Will you mark these two letters, one July 9, 1957

of TWA to the Hughes Tool Company, and the sec-

ond July 11, 1957 of the same subject matter to the

New York Trust Company as the next exhibit, A

and B?

A-1573

Woodfn—Cross

(Letter dated July 9, 1957, from TWA to Hughes

Tool Company, marked TWA Exhibit 267A for iden-

tification as of this date.)

(Letter dated July 11, 1957, from TWA to New

York Trust Company, marked TWA Exhibit 267B

for identification as of this date.)

Mr. Sonnett: I will offer these in evidence.

Mr. Leisure: I will object to them, until there is

some questioning that would indicate their relevance.

The Special Master: I think they are relevant. I

will admit them.

[Tr. 7263] (TWA Exhibits 267A and 267B for

identification received in evidence as of this date.)

By Mr. Sonnett:

Q Referring to 267B, you note the statement therein,

do you not, that:

The Hughes Tool Company had purchased 45,917

shares of the common stock. This was out of the

portion made available to stockholders other than

Hughes and not subscribed for by Hughes.

Is that correct?

A. That’s true, plus the 170,900 shares which Merrill

Lynch bought for their account.

Q. Is it your understanding of the 1957 TWA financing

that the Hughes Tool Company was required to purchase

those 45,000-odd shares? A

A. I'd have to look at the prospectus again. I don’t be-

lieve they were, but I’d like to see the prospectus.

Q That is Exhibit 194.

A. They had to provide them with a minimum of $34

nillion, And I—and they had purchased the $34 million

A-1574

Woodfn—Cross

inimum. 'The 45,000 shares they didn’t have to Pick up,

if they didm’t want to.

The Special Master: That is the way I [Tr. 7264]

read it.

By Mr. Sonnett:

Q. Do you know the number of shares that Hughes pur.

chased through the exercise of rights which he had pur.

chased on the open market?

A. 170,000 shares, I would presume.

Q. 170,900?

A. 900 shares.

Q. Is that about right?

A. Yes, sir. I guess that—that’s the only way I know he

could have gotten them. Merrill Lynch bought the rights

and that would account in my mind for the offering being

as well subscribed as it was because it gave the rights some

value.

Q. Was he obliged under the financing to purchase the

rights?

A. Well, he was obliged to buy $30 million—up to $34

million worth. Which way he chose to do it, Mr. Sonnett,

I wouldn’t want to comment on, because whether that would

encourage other people to come in or not it was probably

helpful. Certainly they were unexercised rights that he had

to pick up or could pick up in addition to that.

Q. Could, not that he had?

[Tr. 7265] A. That he could, yes, 45,000. Nobody was

knocking the door down to take it all.

Q. That was not surprising in light of the then financial

situation of TWA in 1957, was it?

A. No, it wasn’t at all.

A-1575

Excerpts From Testimony at Damage Hearing

of Nathan S. Simat

{Tr. 75371 ° * * Q. Are you a member of any profes-

sonal society exercising disciplinary supervision over its

members ? ,

A. There are various professional societies to which I

belong, which exercise a small measure of disciplinary con-

trol over the members of the society, but I would not say

that I belong to any society that has either licensing prac-

ties or an examination practice or anything of that char- .

acter.

Q. What professional societies do you belong to, Mr.

Simat?

A. American Economic Association, American Statis-

tical Association, Institute of Management Sciences, several

others.

Q. Are there any others that you regard as relevant to

what you are doing here?

A. Yes. I belong to a Regional Planning Association

vhich I think covers the same kind of transportation matter

that is generally covered in this report. * * *

{Tr. 7708] * * * The Special Master: Are we

ready, then, to go ahead with Mr. Simat’s cross-

examination?

Mr. Hayes: I suppose the first step here—

Mr. Tenney: Is to move to strike it.

Mr. Hayes: (continuing)—would be to substitute

the corrected pages which havé been supplied for

the pages in the exhibits as originally presented.

That is Exhibits 271A and B for identification.

A-1576

Simat—Cross

All of the material that you required Mr. Simat tp

present has, according to Mr. Tenney’s letter, been

transmitted to plaintiff’s counsel, and in view of the

corrections, I think the best procedure would be to

consider the corrected pages substituted for the

original pages.

We have submitted the corrected pages. None

[Tr. 7709] of us, including our own office, has a copy

of the report with the corrected pages in lien of, and

we will endeavor to get copies for your convenience

whereby you will be ablé®o tell at a glance what the

original page was as well as the corrected page. We

just didn’t have the time to get that out before this

morning.

The Special Master: On that you are now offer.

ing—

Mr. Hayes: To substitute corrected pages for the

pages in the original report.

The Special Master: It will be received on the

same basis as the original submission.

Mr. Tenney: Mr. Brownell, may I be heard on

that?

The Special Master: Yes. “y.

Mr. Tenney: As I stated in my letter to you,

which defendants received a copy of on Friday, we

wish to renew our motion to strike the original

report, in which case there is no point in receiving

these changed pages in evidence.

I might start out by saying we disagree strongly

with Mr. Hayes’ statement that we have been given

what you said we were to be given.

(Tr. 7710] In aid of that motion, I would like,

first, a little additional voir dire of Mr. Simat, if!

may.

The Special Master: You may proceed.

A-1577

Simat—Cross

Mr. Hayes: I might call to your attention the

sentence in your letter to the effect that in the course

of the following weeks, most, if not all of the mate-

rial necessary to understand the data used and the

nature of the computations was finally made avail-

able. I am taking you at your word.

Mr. Tenney: I will explain that, Mr. Hayes.

Voir Dire Examination

By Mr. Tenney:

Q I imagine you realize, Mr. Simat, that you are still

mder oath, although you have not been resworn.

A. I understand.

Q You will recall your testimony in this hearing on

July 24, 1967. That was the day when I examined you on

the format and preparation of this report, Defendants’

Exhibits 271A and 271B, which I will call your report, and

I moved to strike it.

In recalling that testimony, do you wish to change any

of the testimony which you gave that day?

(fr. 7711] A. No.

Q. Specifically, you testified extensively that as source

material for your report—and I am talking about the report

it was originally filed—not about the report as you have

ww changed it—you testified that as source material you

wed TWA’s employees’ timetables, which are already in

evidence in this proceeding, corrected from certain filings

vith the CAB called transmission sheets, and you expressly

that you did not use the Official Airlines Guide. Cita-

tions for that are 7538 and 7542. ms

De you recall that testimony?

A. Yes.

Q Do you wish to change that testimony?

A No.

“a

A-1578 q

Simat—Cross

Q. Another specific instance, you testified quite exten.

sively about the so-called SLURP program and yon testi.

fied that this was used at Operations Research, Ine—ye

have called it ORI—and you were quite explicit about that

Do you wish to change that testimony?

A. I have since determined that Operations Research,

used not the version of the SLURP program that I thought

they were using, but a canned program which they obtained

(Tr. 7712] from IBM, which they had modified to include

certain features of the SLURP program. So I was mis.

taken in that respect.

Q. Would you care to give us the title of that canned

program?

A. No, I don’t have the title of the canned program. |

will be glad to furnish it to you.

Q. You also testified rather extensively towards the end

of that day that these operations were performed either

under your—

The Special Master: Read the citations for that

last point into the record also.

Mr. Tenney: It was explicitly covered at the

pages following page 7544.

The Special Master: Thank you.

By Mr. Tenney:

Q. You also testified towards the end of that day that

these operations were performed either under your super-

vision or by others with careful checks being made by you

For example, you talked about some hand-checking of

the computer work which I had the impression you per-

formed personally.

A typical example is at pages 7670 to 7672. I {Tr. 7712]

think there are others.

A-1579

Simat—Cross

Do you care to change your testimony on that?

Please remember, I am talking about your report as it

was originally filed, not as it has been changed or your try-

ing to change it now.

A. I frankly am not aware that I testified that I had

performed hand calculations personally. Hand calcula-

tions were performed by my organization.

If I testified to the effect that I personally performed the

hand calculations, I may have overstated my exact role.

I did perform some hand calculations, yes.

Q. Firgt, I would like to pursue the question of the Offi-

cal Airlines Guide and the employees’ timetables.

Mr. Simat, I have here—and I would like to go over in as

much detail as is necessary to make my point, but I don’t

think it will take a great deal of detail—the employees’

timetables effective January 10, 1961 for TWA, a copy of

the Official Airline Guide, showing the January 1961 time-

tables for TWA, and I would like you to look at Table I,

Book 1 of your computer printouts and find what you have

given us as the January 1961 timetables for TWA sched-

ules.

This is one that we looked at as a spot check.

(Tr. 7714] I would like you to examine them and see if

you can determine whether that schedule was taken from

the employees’ timetables or from the OAG.

I think you will find, because of the Convair 880 schedules

in January of 1961, that it quite clearly was taken from

the OAG.

A. Excuse me. May I have the flight number read back

again, please?

Q. Any Convair 880 flights.

A. Any one?

A-1580

Simat—Cross

Q. Any Convair 880 flights, or all.

A. What the comparisons indicate, that while there j

no Convair 880 flights shown in the Official Airline Guide

there are Convair 880—Convair flights shown in the en,

Ployees’ timetables and there are no Convair 880 flights

shown in our schedules here.

(Tr. 7715] * * * The Witness: May I point ont

in this connection, Mr. Tenney, that we have on re.

checking the schedule information transcriptions

found many errors and that we have, in fact, cor.

rected these errors, we believe, in our most reeent

runout of the schedule information.

And you will find in the revised data that informa.

tion for the Convair 880 schedules in this period js

reflected.

' (Tr. 7716] By Mr. Tenney:

Q. I am exploring the question of what your source

material was for your original report that you testified to

on July 24th, Mr. Simat.

‘A. Let me make this clear again, Mr. Tenney, that our

instructions were that the final source of all schedule in-

formation was the employees’ timetable.

This was the source to which all information was pre-

sumed to have been checked before it went into published

form.

Now we have found many errors, and apparently these

are included.

But let me also point out to you that before publishing

our previous report that we made every effort to ascertain

whether the errors in the schedule information were con-

sequential and our test checks indicated that the informa-

tion that we had transcribed if it was not entirely accurate

)

A-1581

Simat—Cross

was nevertheless very close to the actual experience of

TWA, and that revision of the information would not

result in any material changing of the findings and con-

dusions.

_ Mr. Tenney: We selected January of 1961 as a

~ spot check, because it was a logical place to expect

a difference between the employees’ (Tr. 7717] time-

tables and the OAG, because it was not until the

end of December 1960, that the defendants released —

to TWA any of the Convairs that they had been

holding up before.

When they were released it was necessary to take

urgent action to schedule the planes and naturally

the timetables were produced as fast as possible for

the employees. The OAG of course has a lead time.

So that we could check out—and it is perfectly

apparent that the OAG was used.

I would like to have this document—

Mr. Hayes: May I move to strike the sort of argu-

ment. If Mr. Tenney has any questions to address

to the witness I think he should address the ques-

tion and confine himself to the questions.

The Special Master: You may proceed.

Mr. Tenney: I would like this document which

was received on July 21st at 4:30 p.m, that is, the

Friday immediately before Mr. Simat’s previous

appearance here, with a very limited group of work

sheets that were then produced for us—I would like

this marked as TWA Exhibit 318 for identification.

It consists of 25 pages.

Mtr. 77181 ° * * Q. I show you TWA Exhibit 318 for

A-1582

Simat—Cross

Q. Will you look at page 2 of TWA’s Exhibit 318 for

identification and read into the record the first two sen.

tences, please?

A. “The purpose of this task is to prepare the schedule

of Trans World Airlines for analysis by a computer. The

necessary information will be taken from the Official Airline

Guide.”

Q. Do you wish to change your testimony as to the

source of the information contained in your report as far

as schedules go as it was originally submitted in this pro-

ceeding, Mr. Simat?

A. No, I do not.

This document was prepared at a very early stage. It is

essentially an internal document prepared to train people

who had no prior experience-with the transcription of sched.

ule information to correctly transcribe schedule informa.

tion.

_ Tr.-7719]_ We were at that time using for illustrative

purposes the Official Airline Guide because we had only a

limited number of copies of the employee timetable infor.

mation.

The entire set of instructions is cast in terms of Official

Airline Guide information which is in the same basic format

as employee timetable information.

The analysis that was prepared was to be checked and

ultimately conformed to the employee timetables, and this is

why we give the employee timetables as the source of the

information.

The correctness of the information is to be determined by.

comparison with the employee timetable and not with the

Official Airline Guide. .

That is the statement that I am making and that is the

statement that I wished to make earlier. All of the sched-

ule data were to have conformed by my instructions with

the employee timetable information. "

A-1583

Simat—Cross

And I might point out in this connection that it is not only

tree of the schedule information but also it is true of Form

ij information, that is, financial data, obtained for TWA

that we had at intermediate stages from time to time used

the ATA statistics for transcribing Form 41 oneness

rather than the Form 41 reports.

(ir. 7720] Ana the reason for this is that the Form 41

reports as available to us were in such terrible condition

that we were not able to work with them on a day to day

basis but again the instructions were that after all of the ©

transcription work was done, the information was tg be

checked back to the Form 41 reports which is the ultimate

source of the data.

So that then becomes the source of the report.

I do not regard the Official Airline Guide as the source

of the schedule analysis and the employees’ timetable is

the source of the schedule analysis.

Q We have here a copy of instructions by your office

that on their face direct the key punch operators to use

the Official Airline Guide?

A. These are not instructions to key punch operators.

These are instructions to our own people for the transcrip-

tion of information from a schedule to a work sheet which

is then submitted to the key punch operator for key

Q. Have you any copies of instructions to your people

calling for using the employees’ timetables? I seem to

reall that you testified that no copies of that sort of

instructions were retained.

| A. We do not normally retain copies of instruc-

{Tr, 7721] tions, of this sort.

A-1584

Stmat—Cross

It was by digging back through our files that we found

that we had an instruction manual in this degree of detail

The reason for preparing such a detailed instruction mannal

is that we were in fact dealing with inexperienced people to

whom a few oral instructions would have meant very little.

Q. Are you aware of any instance in which the OAG

differed from the employees’ timetables during the period

1959 through 1963 in which your Table 1, Book 1 of your

original computer printouts used the employees’ timetable

and not the OAG?

A. No. I haven’t made the complete check or compari-

son between the OAG and the employees’ timetable.

Mr. Tenney: Neither have we but we made a

spotcheck and the results of the spotcheck are now on

the record.

I offer in evidence TWA’s Exhibit 316 A and B,

317 and 318 for identification.

The Special Master: In the absence of objection

they will be received.

Q. You have indicated, I believe in an earlier [T.

7722] statement today, Mr. Simat, that in the course of

rechecking your work you found a number of errors.

I assume that those errors are the basis of the correc-

tions that have been proferred by Mr. Hayes this morning.

A. That is correct.

Q. When did you start finding out these errors, Mr.

Simat?

A. We had actually instituted check procedures even

before the submission of our first report. We were har-

dling a great deal of information in a very short space of

time.

A-1585

Simait—Cross

While we were employing checking procedures that we

had every reason to believe would detect any substantial

efrors in the results, we were not sure at any point up to

the submission of the report that we had correctly entered

allof the detailed information.

For one thing, as I mentioned earlier, the status of the

source material is exceedingly poor. In working with the

Form 41 data for example, we were working with copies of

copies. The original work sheets, I am sure was a carbon

copy to start with.

We found that a number of numbers were totally unde-

dpherable. We found .in other cases that there had

{fr.7723] actually been slippage of lines, wherein the

i t of the figures and the stub were not entirely cor-

rect.’

And then there were cases where we just simply had to

throw up our hands in despair, we just couldn’t make out

the figures at all.

The employees’ timetable information was in similar

shape. We were working with reproductions of reproduc-

tions and the information was very difficult to read.

We also had a number of relatively inexperienced people

transcribing the information. That is the reason for the

detailed manual which we do not normally prepare in con-

uestion with the schedule transcription work that we do

internally. Because of the necessity for compiling the in-

formation quickly, we had to bring in people on a tempo-

mary and part time basis to actually*do the transcription

work, ’

Now, none of these circumstances is conducive to 100 per

cent accuracy.

80 while I knew of no specific errors at the time that we

Sbmitted our report, T was ready to wager that there were

smumber of errors in the basic information.

a

A-1586

Simat—Cross

We were also compelled by pressure of time to [Tr. 7724]

introduce checking procedures which were not 100 per cent

satisfactory in disclosing all of the errors.

__ For example, in checking the schedule information, we

used a sampling procedure wherein the work product of

individual personnel was checked, spot-checked. If an

error was found, that particular period, whatever it might

a was redone. There were some periods that were redone

o, three times until we were satisfied that we had them

mai accurate.

On a sampling basis of course, there is a certain amount

of error that will get by undetected.

This was true both of the schedule transcription data

and also of the cost transcription data although it was

essentially true we kept our more experienced’ people on

the cost data rather than the schedule data.

Q. Mr. Simat, I am asking you simply when you started

the process of discovering these errors and making this

revision? You have given us Thursday night 311 revised

pages which we count as making 5,945 corrections.

We are advised that all 14 volumes of the computer

printouts—that is one set—if you add that one to it it is

one set—that we have been working on for two months

have been rerun.

{Tr.7725] When did it come to your attention, Mr.

Simat, that you should commence this revision?

A. I have been trying to explain, Mr. Tenney, that we

have felt all along that further checking procedures were

required and that if we had the opportunity to perform the

further checks and to introduce somewhat more accuracy

into the calculations and into the basic data that we work

from that we would.

The checking procedures were initiated before the publi-

cation or before the submission of our previous report. We

A-1587

Simat—Cross

have been working on corrections on checking from that

point forward.

We have found it necessary to put aside from time to

time our work on the corrections in order to progress in

I might point out in this connection that for almost the

entire month of July and a good part of the month of

Angst we were busily producing information in connec-

tion with the original report, answering questions, compil-

ing the basic reports, making sure that everything was

appropriately cross-referenced so that the understandings

«to what went into the original reports would be com-

plete.

We were also proceeding during this period in [Tr. 7726)

the preparation of our critique on the aircraft disposition

program. This, too, consumed a good deal of the time and

effort in the shop during the months of July and August.

We have also at the same time been proceeding on what

Inow call Phase 2 which is the more detailed approach that

I previously outlined. And as you know, we encountered

quite a few difficulties in obtaining the basic information.

We have had people working on the sample forms, catalog-

ing the information that was submitted.

We are progressing as fast as we can in that area. And

il of this has taken time away from the’ checking proce-

dures. But we have been progressing in that area.

In July, early July, we hired largely for this purpose, I

night point out, Mr. William Wolf, who was formerly a

direetor of scheduling for Pan American, He has been

Sending virtually full time reviewing the schedule data.

___The Special Master: Is any further checking going

_ % now which might result in additional modifica-

_ Honst

Py

A-1588

Simat—Cross

‘The Witness: Not of the original report, no, We

have completed all of the checking.

{Tr. 7727] Q. While you were preparing all this infor.

mation which you were talking about in answering ques-

tions on the original report, supplying cross-references,

telling us how it was put together—which parenthetically of

course you knew was the result of the correspondence that

defendants’ counsel and we were engaged in throughout

this period—why did you not at any point inform us that

& major revision of that report was under way?

A. Well, for one thing, Mr. Tenney, I do not believe

that the revision is a major one.

The errors that we have corrected while they are numer.

ous are relatively insignificant. The final results have been

barely changed.

Unfortunately, the method of estimation that we used

is a chain method wherein if the first number is changed,

virtually every number from that point forward is changed.

But all of the changes with one or two exceptions have

been very, very minor. They have not as was pointed out

in the letter of transmittal significantly changed our esti-

mate of the profit and loss from the added jet services. We

are within 2 per cent or approximately 2 per cent of our

original estimate.

The Special Master: Do you agree to that {Tr.

7728] conclusion, Mr. Tenney?

Mr. Tenney: I believe that he has adjusted his end

results so that they are a small number of percentage

points worse from the TWA standpoint. I have no

means, none whatsoever, of having an opinion based

on checking as to the remainder of his statement,

but I doubt it very much.

The Special Master: What’s running through my

mind is if the changes are all insignificant with pot-

A-1589

Simat—Cross

sibly one or two exceptions, which I understood you

to say, whether we could not have those one or two

exceptions and disregard the insignificant changes in

the interest of saving time here without producing

significant results.

Mr. Tenney: I would be surprised if Mr. Simat

would be willing to stand on the mish-mash of his

original report, frankly. * * *

(Tr. 7883] * * * Q. So Table 8A, which is jam-packed

with things like that—I have a list here five pages long— -

Mach 3 speeds and so forth for marginal speed for 880

aireraft and other early jets—Table 8A should be disre-

garded, is that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. Well, I certainly didn’t rely upon it. If there is

some other use you can see for the information in Table 8A,

the information is there, but I would certainly not rely on

it for any estimating purposes.

Q. Then let us turn to Table 9 in the same volume. This

table is headed “Operating Statistics of Added Flights.”

I take it that this is a table that you did rely on, is that

correct, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes.

Q. Let us turn once again to the CV-880 aircraft, which,

onee again, is the first jet aircraft type.

The Special Master: Table 9, is it?

Mr. Tenney: Table 9, yes.

Q. Let us take a look at June to.July of 1962 in that

table, and if you carry it over to the extreme right- [Tr.

18843 hand column, you find the average bleck-to-block speed

of added trips, and I find that the 880 aircraft was then

traveling average for additional flights 1.11 miles per hour.

Is that a figure that you should pay much attention to

in considering added flights, Mr. Simat?

=

mS ha

ss

A-1590

Simat—Cross

A. I certainly wouldn’t pay much attention to it

Q. What really was the normal cruising speed, approxi.

mately, of the CV-880 aircraft?

A. Oh, it’s about 475 miles an hour.

Q. From February to March of 1962, it seems to have

been going 177.07 miles per hour. That is pretty near stall.

ing speed for it, isn’t it?

A. No. Let me point out to you that we are talking

about block-to-block speeds, and block-to-block speeds are

computed by dividing the miles flown by the block-to-block

time.

There is in every flight profile, as you know, Mr. Tenney,

an ascent and descent factor. There is also a taxiing factor.

There is also a waiting time. And it is quite conceivable

that speeds as low as 30 miles per hour are flown by jet

airplanes, when they are flown over short distances, And

the bulk of the time in-flight is consumed in getting up into

the air and coming down or {Tr. 7885] flying around in the

air, but not in cruising.

eT ves peli MIs iat ti ie tectec & xen

a distance of 30 miles with a DC-3 airplane than witha

Boeing 707 jet. Over such stage lengths, the block speed

of the Boeing 707 would be slower than the block speed

of a DC-3.

Q. By the way, I show you, Mr. Simat, Vol. I of the

Coverdale & Colpitts report, which is TWA 4C-1.

On page 2, you will see some cruising speed information

as to different types of jet aircraft. I think you will find

that the CV-880 is shown as having a cruising speed of 615

miles per hour. I think you said it is someplace in the

400s.

Would you care to change that?

A. Yes, I will change that. I think I was thinking in

terms of average speeds.

licdtjaciceda accceale

A-1591

Simat—Cross

Q, Since we are dealing with block-to-block speed, which

might well be lower than cruising speed, would you turn

to the next table which is “Aircraft Type B-70,” which is

the symbol for the 131 aircraft, and look at November to

December of 1963, and look across at that same average

block-to-block speed? - ~

The 131 was averaging a block-to-block speed of 1745

miles per hour. Would that be explained by the {Tr. 7886]

fight profile, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes, in fact, it would.

Bear in mind, Mr. Tenney, I think you are forgetting that

weare dealing with differences, the differences between the

number of flights operated in one month and the number

of flights operated in a second month, differences in the

number of hours per day that aircraft are operated and

differences in the number of miles.

In both examples that you have selected, you will note

that the number of added departures per day were quite

amall, We were not dealing with any material volume of

added operations, and—it is possible, conceivable that

where a change in operations involves the substitution of

operations to and from terminal areas where the waiting

time, the taxiing time, the ascent-descent time, the conges-

tion factors are less than they are at some of the more

highly congested terminal areas, that we will get changes in

the number of hours per added operation which we divided

by the—or divided into number of added miles per added

operation will provide block speeds of 1745 miles or even

something perhaps slightly larger.

However, these do occur in a distinct mjnority [Tr. 7887]

of eases. Over the entire period, I think you can count on

almost the fingers of one hand the number of cases where

the block speeds are that unusual—the computed added

block speed, I should say, is that unusual.

' ©

A-1592

Simat—Cross

Tt will happen. It happens arithmetically. If I can give

you another contrived example: if we were to add a fraction

of a flight in New York where the terminal time is very

high, we would get under such circumstances or tend to get,

I should say, very low added block speeds.

On the other hand, in adding fractions of flights to points

such as Fresno, where the congestion factor is very low,

we could very well get block speeds of this amount.

Q. Doesn’t this show that this concentration upon differ.

ences in an extrapolation from differences that you have

engaged in in deriving your data for this entire analysis

arithmetically, as you put it, inevitably produces wild sta-

tistics that you have then ground into your regression

analysis?

A. That is not so. The use of first differences or differ-

ences between one period and another will, for certain

ratios, produce fairlyywide differences, particularly those

ratios involving hours and miles.

4ITr. 7888] There is generally more stability to ratios

involving miles and numbers of aircraft departures, that is,

the ratios which are depending upon average hop, and over

a period of five years the resultant average relationships,

in my opinion, are satisfactory.

In almost every instance that we have been looking at,

the number of added aircraft, the number of added de.

partures are relatively small.

Q. I thought that you testified earlier that in you

regression analysis there was no weighting of these seg

ment-month statistics for the number of flights involved

but the change was always treated as equivalent to an}

other changes.

A. That is correct, we treated each month as a separat

and distinct entity.

A-1593

Simat—Cross

Q. If you take into account the extremely small values,

there are certainly quite a number of strange results

here.

{Tr. 78941 ° * * Q. There are, of course, throughout

these tables a number of operating statistics of added

fights, and then operating statistics of deleted flights that

are similar to the ones that I have called your attention to

that have block to block speeds that are out of line with any

possibility for a given airplane, that have lengths of hop |

that are surprising, to say the least.

They are, as you have explained, produced by the

arithmetical results of the study of what you have called

first differences here. But I think that you made it clear

mough that you think these results are sound in your

opinion and that you are willing to extrapolate from them

0 I won’t go over all these other details.

Do you still insist that the method of subtracting one

month from another month by type of aircraft and dividing

these mileages and departures and relying on the factorial

differences that you have got is a sound method of analyz-

ing how an airline will operate?

A. Let me first point out to you, Mr. nein (Tr. 7895]

that we did not use the block speed relationships in any of

our analyses programs in the form in which they appear

in the tables referred to by you.

The only information that we used in connection with

our analyses was the length of hop of added flights. And

Ido not believe that you dwelt too long on the length of

hop added flights or deleted flights. P

I do want to point out, however, that we did not use the

block speed relationships nor did we use the utilization

tationships in any further analysis.

Ido not feel that the information that we were required

‘tee for want of other information to establish the pat-

A-1594

Simat—Cross

tern of added flights is the best information that I can om.

ceive of for estimating how added airplanes would be used

It was, however, the best information available to us,

We worked with obvious problems insofar as we wei

information which was uncorrected for seasonal variations

in traffic demand.

If we had better information, we would use the better

information.

The estimating problem that we were confronted with

was to make the best estimate we could with the inform.

tion available on the stage lengths for which or [Tr, 789)

over which added jet aircraft would be operated or the

added jet aircraft would be operated or the stage lengths

from which jet—or piston aircraft would be deleted.

The best experiencé in my opinion as to what would hap-

pen with an additional injection of jet capacity is what did

happen when capacity was added. ~~

We were compelled by reason of not having the interml

records of TWA to use published records as to the schedul-

ing of aircraft. And we find in comparing the published

scheduling records with reports submitted by TWA to the

Civil Aeronautics Board that it is not always true that

when flights are scheduled with Convair 880 aircraft they

are operated with Convair 880 aircraft. We are also find-

ing or have found that it is not true that when flights are

scheduled with 131 aircraft that they are always operated

with 131 aircraft.

There are substitutions of aircraft which do not appear

in the schedule data. And for these reasons there is a cer-

tain amount of infirmity in the schedule information. (n

the other hand, there is nothing better—or was nothing bet-

ter available to us.

And as for the soundness of the conclusions {Tr. 7897]

that we have derived from the data, it is a fact that the

A-1595

Simat—Cross

sage length of jet operations decreased as jets were added.

Nothing will alter that fact.

The decline in stage lengths is occasioned by the addi-

tional jet capacity at lower stage lengths than those flights

that were operated before the addition.

This is a simple mathematical conclusion. If the flights

were added at the same stage length as those already oper-

sted, there would be no decline in stage length. It is

obvious that added flights were coming in during the period

at lesser stage lengths than the flights that were already

being operated.

We have used what we think is or was the best available

information to us to estimate the relationship between the

existing and added flight stage lengths, and I believe that

our estimates are reasonable. We were able—

The Special Master: Can I interrupt at this point?

I don’t like to get too far out of tune with the devel-

opment of the case. I am quite puzzled at this point.

Do I understand that the effect of the shorter

stage lengths would be to increase your [Tr. 7898]

estimated costs of operation?

The Witness: That’s exactly right, sir.

The Special Master: I hope as we go along we

can keep this in mind. How can it be that two people

so expert in this field having the advantage of actual

operating figures can estimate the financial results

to TWA in the operation of a comparatively small

number of airplanes and come-up with a difference

of over $100 million in a five year period which is

over $20 million a year? ?

I hope somewhere along the line we could get a

summary so that I could focus on it while we are in

' the course of cross-examination here as to what are

A-1596 +

Simat—Cross

the categories of difference here, because just at first

blush it seems all out of line with me.

Mr. Tenney: Mr. Brownell, that is exactly what |

plan to do in the course of cross-examination. It is

quite a lengthy report and it has a lot of figures in

it. But I propose to go through the report section

by section, giving Mr. Simat as I believe I have

an ample opportunity to explain what he did: And

I believe that it will be quite apparent how he has

[Tr. 7899] come out with these diametrically Opposite

conclusions from the plaintiff’s experts here.

(Tr. 7917] ° * * By Mr. Tenney:

Q. In Book V of the computer printouts, Table 16, the

very first jet covered—

A. I believe it is the 880.

Q. 880. Have you found it?

A. Yes.

Q. Here I find that you have 34 samples for a study,

Mr. Simat, and once again the data are determinable from

the left-hand column, giving the’Y values and the right-hand

column giving the X values for your selected sub-case, and

once again can be plotted in the same way.

-{Tr. 7918] Is that generally correct? -

A. That’s generally correct.

Q. Have you attempted to plot this?

A. No, we have not made scatter diagrams of the infor-

mation on this table.

Mr. Tenney: I ask that this graph be marked as

TWA Exhibit 320 for identification.

A-1597

Simat—Cross

By Mr. Tenney :

Q Assuming that TWA Exhibit 320 for identification is

acorrect transcription graphically of the data set forth in

your selected sub-case on the 880s, and that the least squares

line, a8 there represented, is a correct representation graph-

ically of your selected equation, a statistician, do you con-

sider that equation a very good fit of the data?

A. If that were the only information available, I might

be somewhat disturbed about the strength of the relation- .

ship, but the information that you have plotted on the chart

isnot the only information available.

(Tr. 7919} I also had, available to me the information that

the Convair 880 stage lengths in actual experience decreased

as Convair 880 aircraft were added.

I had the relationships that we had fitted not only to the

Convair 880 equipment, but also for the Boeing 707s, 131Bs,

the 131s and the 331s, all of which yielded a characteristic

pattern that indicated that the marginal stage lengths, stage

lengths at which added operations were performed, were

substantially below the stage lengths of the existing opera-

tions at the time of the addition.

The relationships, moreover, are consistent among the

various types of jet aircraft.

They are not only supported—they not only support one

mother, they are also supported, I think, by the planning

expectations of TWA.

From our analysis of the TWA jet plans, we find that

in projecting the usage of aircraft about to be delivered,

that TWA’s plans staff similarly made provision in their

planning estimates for a decline in the average stage length \

of operations as the size of the fleet was built up. And this,

of course, again indicates that the marginal load factor, the |

load factor at which added services

were being’ performed |

whe: be performed, is lower than the average stage length.

A-1598

Simat—Cross

[Tr. 7920] So, taken alone, the relationship is not as

good as I would have hoped it to be. Taken together with

all other available information, the relationship yields g

consistent result which is consistent not only with other

relationships similarly derived for other types of aircraft,

but also consistent with experience.

The Special Master: May I ask a question right

there?

Would you go so far as to say in your own analysis

that the other observations and information which

you had in themselves was the basis of your final

judgment rather than the study that vou made here!

The Witness: That is exactly right.

As I indicated, we did not expect to obtain high

correlations from the use of the kind of information

that we used in these anlayses, because we knew we

were including seasonal distortions in the picture

and we just didn’t anticipate that the relationships

would be that good.

On the other hand, we did get relationships from

the analyses that were consistent with what we

expected to find, and these relationships, I might say,

are supported not only by empirical evidence, but

(Tr. 7921] I believe by sound business practice.

In the scheduling of aircraft, an airline would ordi-

narily use the first airplanes that it receives in those

uses which are the most profitable to it.

As additional aircraft are received, they will go

into the next most profitable uses, and so on.

In the industry today, and it was true in the 1959-

1963 period as well, the most profitable operations,

| were conducted in the longer haul stage a

Short-haul operations are y and they were in

the 1959-63 period, either unprofitable or relatively

— compared to longer haul o i

A-1599

Simat—Cross

So the relationships that we determined here were

relationships that we did expect to see. The problem

is simply one of measurement, attempting to find the

best measurement of the added stage length and it is

in this area that we expect that the supplemental

report will make a substantial contribution.

By Mr. Tenney:

Q. But, Mr. Simat, this is the only data you used in your

statistical analysis, isn’t it? None of the stuff [Tr. 7922]

you are talking about is involved in the statistical regres-

sion analysis in these printouts?

A. These are the only data that we used to establish the

precise relationship between the marginal stage length and

the added stage length, to test the principle of whether the

marginal stage length was, in fact, an amount below the

average stage length.

We considered considerable additional data, including

other information that appears in the IBM runs that have

been made available to you.

Q Is any of that additional data involved in the regres-

sion analysis that produced the equation that you have used

to determine stage lengths?

I would like a yes or no answer to that.

A. I believe I have already given—

Q I would like a yes or no answer to that.

A. To determine the exact relationship between added

stage length and average stage length that was used in our

estimates, we used no data, but the data contained i in these

analyses.

Q Isn't it entirely clear that | to any statistician—and,

of course, you are an expert gp es Mr. Simat—from

this plot that the relationship shown by that least squares

|

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{

\

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A-1600

Simat—Cross

line is statistically invalid and not as you [Tr. 7923] testified

in your direct testimony statistically valid?

I refer to page A5 of Vol. II of Defendants’ Exhibit 271

A. One of the biggest mistakes that a statistician cap

make is to accept the data that he is working with as being

beyond reproach.

A statistician must consider, in my opinion, the quality

of the information that he is working with at the time he

draws his conclusions.

It is customary practice among statisticians, for example,

to exclude certain observations, on the grounds that they

are atypical.

It is also a practice among some statisticians to weight

observations differently. Those which they accord more

standing to are weighted more heavily than those which

they feel are more nebulous, more tentative, perhaps sub-

ject to greater error are weighted less heavily.

I have already testified that we considered a number of

the observations here, those, for example, produced where

the traffic was either trending upward or downward, season

ally, to provide a distortion inthe relationships.

What we hope :to: have is a balance in the distor.

[Tr. 7924] tions. And I believe that we did, in fact, achieve

a balance.

We got on balance a ventions which was consistent

with what we would have expected on an a priori basis.

Q. I don’t see how you can have it both ways, Mr. Simat.

Either you are going to rely on history and not on a statis

tical analysis that you say you have determined to be

statistically valid—in that case we can talk about history

and we have no quarrel about history if history is used in

an Te way. | )

A-1601

Simat—Cross

But I do not see how you can refer to history to back up

a statistical analysis that you have testified—and you are

uder oath on this, Mr. Simat—

Mr. Hayes: He is quite conscious of the fact he

is under oath. Let’s not be Perry Masonish about

Mr. Tenney: It happens to be an important factor

here.

Mr. Hayes: Everything is important in this case,

Mr. Tenney.

Q. Mr. Simat, do you know of any instance in which a

statistician has represented an analysis as bad as this

(Tr. 7925] one as being statistically valid besides your own?

A. Yes.

Q. Name one.

A. In the first place, I do object to the characterization

of the analysis as bad.

There are a number of observations that are plotted on

the chart which is marked for identification as TWA 320.

They do not all have the equal value.

The fact is that a least squares line fitted to all of the

observations does show the kind of trend that we antici-

pated we would receive.

The fact that there are observations above and below the

line do not shake my confidence in a line, particularly since

Ido know from other information that the line that we

obtained is the kind of line that must have historically oc-

curred in the TWA experience.

The Special Master: That means you disregarded

this particular part of the study in reaching your

conclusion? Because this would appear to be con-

trary to your— |

A-1602

Simat—Cross

The Witness: No, we haven’t disregarded it, this

part of the study. We have used the relationship

shown here to determine the exact. mathematical

relationship between the stage length of added [Tr.

7926] flights and the average stage length. ‘We have

used it for that purpose only to find-a measure of

the relationship between the two results.

We have not used correlation in this case to test

whether the relationship is indeed valid, because

there is other information which I think is superior,

that indicates that we are dealing with a valid

correlation.

Now, I personally would have hoped for a more

defined relationship in the sense that the amount of

distortion present would be less than is here.

I believe that the way we have conducted the

analysis, we have balanced out upward and down-

ward distortions.

What I am saying in short is that I personally do

not place much weight on the correlation coefficient

that is derived from this particular relationship.

{Tr. 7928] * * * By Mr. Tenney:

Q. We have prepared in exactly the same way graphs

of the data set forth in Table 16 of the computer print-

outs in your preferred sub-case with respect to the other

two types of jets, as to which you have determined equa-

tions that are set forth and used in your report.

The equations themselves, of course, appear on page A7

of Vol. II of your report. The“data are derived from the

computer printouts.

tions with respect to these two Ty would be the same

it, Mr. Simat, that your bark to similar ques-

A-1603

Simat—Cross

as the answer to the questions that I have asked you on the

earlier charts. Would that be so?

A Yes.

Q. Keeping these computer printouts in front of you,

there is some additional information on these computer

printouts that I would like to examine.

I think that this table which I have had prepared in blank,

which can be filled out from data ip the computer print-

outs, may be helpful.

I show you the form of the table.

{Tr. 7929] Ignoring, for the time being, the latter two

columns, I would like ta refer to the computer printout and

determine with you what the figures would bé for the first

three columns that are blank in this form: .’..

To explain the left-hand two columns, if necessary, the

left-hand column simply identifies the aircraft-type, and the

next column sets forth the equation taken directly from

your page A7 of Vol. II of your report. It also, of course,

is derivable from the computer printouts.

The next three columns are the ones that I would like to

obtain the information called for.

Turning to the B-331, can you tell us what the R figure

is or coefficient of correlation for your preferred equation

in the B-331, Mr. Simat?

A. The figure is .24429.

Q. How about R??

A. .05968. ni

Q. How about the standard error?

A. 3906.831.

Q. The CV-880 comes a little earlier in the printouts, T

think you will discover. I wonder if we could get the same

inforthation for the C'V-880? |

A. The R is .17838.

fhe R? is 03182. |

ed

yee

. ’

A-1604

Simat—Cross

{Tr. 7930] The standard error is 931.694.

Q. Next on the B-131—

The Special Master: Is this for each plane? When

it says B-331, does that mean for each increase, each

plane added?

Mr. Tenney: This is the formula that Mr. Simat

has derived for use in determining the stage lengths

for added flights for B-331s throughout the period.

The Special Master: Generally?

Mr. Tenney: Generally.

The Special Master: I see.

By Mr. Tenney:

Q. On the 131, what is the corresponding information!

A. The R is .69148.

The R? is .47815.

The standard error is 2345.181.

Q. Then the B-131B, which is the last of the jets as to

which you have derived equations set forth in your report!

A. The R is .27594.

The R? is .07615.

And the standard error is 1864.768.

Q. Those standard error figures are all in miles, as

Tr. 7931] indicated in this table; is that correct, Mr. Simat!

A. Yes.

Q. Turning to the last two columns left blank in this

form that I have given you, the expression at the head of

the next-to-the-last column, 1 minus R?, I believe you defined

at our last session as the coefficient of nondetermination; is

that correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And that can be derived, can it not, by the arith-

metical subtraction of R*? from 1; is that correct?

A. Yes. } | é

A-1605

Simat—Cross

Q The square root of 1 minus R?, which is the expres-

sion at the head of the final column, we found at our last

session is the coefficient of alienation, I believe; is that

correct ?

A. Yes.

Q And as indicated by the form of the expression, once

the coefficient of nondetermination has been obtained, its

square root can be calculated and that will be the coefficient

of alienation; is that correct?

A. Yes. “

Mr. Tenney: It would save time, perhaps, if I

furnished everyone with those figures. They are

readily obtainable, of course.

{Tr. 7932] I would like to have the sheet which

Mr. Simat has been filling out marked as TWA

Exhibit 323 for identification.

Mr. Hayes: He did not fill it out. He was reading

the figures.

Mr. Tenney: In that case, I would like to have

this sheet which sets forth in the columns to which

Mr. Simat was referring identical figures to those

which he read.

On the last two columns, the figures are obtainable

by the mathematical compyteition, that. he has just

described. we

I would like that mar as TWA" Pxhibit 323 for

identification. Sa?

Mr. Hayes: You don't oat that The other one

would be 323.

Mr. Tenney: I withdraw that. I thought I would

be marking something that he had been marking, but

it is yar under|the circumstances.

|

i

e |e | . <

a

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| avery high coefficient of alienation, 96, whi | is far hi

A-1606

Simat—Cross

By Mr. Tenney:

Q. Referring to Arkin and Colton Statistical Methods

{Tr. 7933] Book, which we were referring to at our last ses.

sion, on page 85, I read the following:

“Just as the coefficient of correlation is a relative

measure of the degree of association between two

series, the coefficient of alienation is a comparative

measure of the lack of association.”

Do you agree with that statement, Mr. Simat!

A. Yes.

Q. Looking at TWA Exhibit 323 for identification and

looking at the extreme right-hand column, we find that the

coefficient of alienation for your formula as to B-33ls is

.96970, which is very nearly perfect alienation or nonass-

ciation, isn’t it, Mr. Simat?

A. What the formula indicates is that there is a con-

siderable amount of variance which is not explained by the

relationship.

As I have testified, I would expect that.

Q. You have even more perfect alienation for the CV-88

formula, do you not?

A. There is a higher coefficient of alienation, meaning

that there is more unexplained variance, yes.

Q. Even for the B-131, the coefficient of alienation or

the measure of nonassociation of the data that you have

been analyzing is greater than the coefficient of correls-

{Tr. 7934] tion, is it not?

A. That’s true, but from that one cannot conclude that

there is an invalid sa cas tard — mater the two

variables.

Q. The final jet that we have ete) we have once

i

A-1607

Simat—Cross\_ |

}

than any measure of association shown for your formula;

is that not correct?

A. That is correct, there is a considerable gmount of

mexplained variance. |

Q. Mr. Simat, do you wish to change your testimony as

set forth on pages A7 of Vol. II of your report to the effect

that you have determined that these formulas are statisti-

cally valid and a significant improvement in —

stage lengths if added jet flights?

A No.

° e * * -*

(Tr. 79781° ** Q. The historical average was 1844 miles

for B-131s during the year 1959, and your report has sta-

tistically determined that added flights would be at 1401

miles by the [T'r. 7979] use of your equation in part A of

Vol. II; is that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes.

Q. Referring to Ezekiel and Fox, page 24, a portion of

which we read into the record some time ago, you will recall

that Ezekiel and Fox suggests that the standard error of

an average or an estimate should be given together with it

asone method of indicating the statistical significance of the

average.

The standard error shown on TWA Exhibit 323 for your

B-131 equation is 2345 miles. So that if you were to follow

the practice suggested by Ezekiel and Fox, an appropriate

way of stating the mileage that you have estimated for

1959 B-131 added air flights would be, would it not, 1411

miles plus or minus 2345 miles?

A. Well, I don’t know that that’s an appropriate way

of stating it. And I agree that you should indicate a stand-

and error of the estimate. It could be one standard erro

onone side oth number, two Br sie errors, three stand-

,

a

A-1608

Simat—Cross

There is no single practice that is preferred.

But I don’t know what implication you are attempting to

obtain from all this. Whs.tever the standard error of the

estimate may be, what the equation yields is the [Tr. 7990)

most probable value of the marginal stage length.

Q. And if, as you suggested, you were to use two stand.

ard errors and follow the Ezekiel and Fox method of nota.

tion—you would only use two standard errors if you were

trying to emphasize your interest in accuracy—the notation

would be 1411 miles plus or minus 4690 miles, wouldn't it!

A. You understand, of course, that the standard error

is both to be added and subtracted. So that having arrived

at a figure of 1411 miles as the probable value, that what

the standard error is saying in effect is that you could sub.

tract from that figure as well as add to that figure.

And it could very well be that the true marginal stage

length is below the figure of 1411 miles that we have esti-

mated. It cuts both ways.

The Special Master: It would be somewhere be.

tween 0 and 4000 miles, roughly?

Mr. Tenney: It might be minus, sir, by his

analysis.

The Special Master: It might be minus down to

0? It might be plus up to 4000. Would that be right!

Mr. Tenney: I suppose so, sir. Some place [Tr.

7981] in that range.

The Witness: Well, the equation determines the

most probable value.

The Special Master: Yes, I understand.

* e s * «

{Tr. 8007] ‘ * * Q. Would you turn in your report,

Mr. Simat, to wae

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A-1609

Simat—Cross

Towards the bottom of the page you state:

“Selecting those city pairs where increases in jet

services were accompanied by decrease in piston ser-

vices, we correlated the amount of changes in jet

services with the amount of changes in piston serv-

ices for the various combinations of jet and piston

aircraft types involved.”

You go on to say that you did the same thing among piston

types, and you state that the correlations appear in Table ©

BV on page B-9.

What was the purpose of this analysis, Mr. Simat?

A. The purpose of the analysis was to ascertain whether

the introduction of jets displaced the piston (Tr. 8008] type

sireraft in rough proportions or whether the effect was

concentrated in one or another of the piston type aircraft.

In short, we were testing Mr. Wemple’s premises and

our own premise by this examination. |

If, in fact, the introduction of the jets affected only the

Tong haul piston aircraft, we would expect to find correlation

between the added jet services and the displaced piston

services only between jet aircraft and such aircraft as the

Lockheed 1649A.

We did, however, find that there was a strong correlation

between added jet services and displaced piston services

for all prevailing types of piston aircraft. And this we -

believe supports the validity or our estimate that where

ve have in estimating the distribution of piston miles dis-

placed by plane type allowed for proportionate declines, in

the piston miles operated by all types of aircraft.

Q' How was this analysis performed?

bi It was performed by selecting those city pairs and

er i = from one month to the next, where

b were increases in jet operations and decreases in

A-1610

Simat—Cross

piston operations with the particular types of airplanes

involved here.

{Tr. 8009] In other words, for the correlation between

Boeing 331s and Martin 404-202As, the R being for that

correlation .87, we selected all of those segments where

there was an increase in Boeing 331 service and a decrease

in. Martin 404-202A service in the same period, and we

correlated the amount of correspondence in the segments

between the amount of added Boeing 331 service and the

amount of retired or displaced Martin 404 service.

In short, if one mile of Boeing 331 service was added

and one mile of Martin 404-202A service was displaced, we

had a correlation between those two factors.

If it varied among the segments, then in some cases the

amount of added Boeing 331 miles might be five and the

deleted Martin 404 miles one, so that we had one for one

mile displacements, five for one mile displacements, ten for

one mile displacements and so on, the correlation would be

lower.

It was only when the displacement was on either a milé-

for-mile basis or some defined ratio that remained constant

among the various pairs of points that we got high correla-

tions and this—what’s set forth here is the result of those

regressions.

Q. Would these additions and deletions be on the same

segments?

{Tr. 8010] A. Yes.

Q. And in the same month?

A. And in the same month, yes.

Q. Since there are 60 months and well over 100 segments

served by TWA at all times during this period, you have

approximately—you have a minimum of 6000—actually I

think it is closer to 8000—segment months that you were

studying, is that correct?

A-1611

Simat—Cross

A. You would have to multiply that by another factor

to provide for the number of different combinations of air-

eraft that are under consideration.

Q. But each segment month is separately studied to

determine what combinations of aircraft you can find to

have changed in that segment month, is that—

A. That’s right.

And one particular segment month can provide as many

as ten eins of aircraft, ten or more, taking two at

a time.

Q. Where in the computer printouts is this analysis to

be found?

Actually, Mr. Simat, I think——

A. The basic data, of course, appear in Table VIII,

Q. The regression analysis to be found in Table XX

fTr. 8011] of Book V?

A. Also Table XXTI.

Q. Looking at your chart on page B-9, the first half of

it where you are showing correlation. between added jet

services and displaced piston aircraft services, there are 27

different correlation figures shown. __

Comparing them to the correlations that appeared orig-

inally on your unrevised page B-9 there really is very little

similarity. They are practically all changed. They aren’t

even all relating to the same pairs of aircraft types. _

Can you explain why these results were changed so very

much in your revision?

A. Well, in the first place, I don’t agree with your char-

acterization of the results. T think that both the unrevised

and revised data indicate the same general picture, and that

is the correlation between added jet services and deleted

piston services across the board for all types of piston

services,

A-1612

Simat—Cross

As to why there were changes, as you know there were

some errors in the original schedule analysis, and these

errors were corrected in the revised schedule analysis,

In some cases, the number of instances where we

{Tr. 8012] had an increase with one type of airplane and a

decrease with another type of airplane, these were dimin.

ished to the point of no return or were added and 80 we

have somewhat different results. ’

But the picture is in my opinion almost exactly the same

and the changes themselves are not material.

Q. In original page B-9 for these two particular aircraft

types you referred to a moment ago, the Martin 404 and

the Boeing 331, originally you showed a correlation coefii-

cient of 1.00.

Now, in the revised page you show a correlation coefii-

cient as you mentioned a moment ago of .87.

- Looking at Table XX of Book V where the regression

appears for this particular pair of planes, it is opposite

sign change M4 versus B30 is the heading—have you found

the table, Mr. Simat? ,

A. Yes, I have.

Q. How many samples is this based on?

A. Two.

Q. So that ont of the, say, 8000 segment months, there

were two segment months in which there was a change in

the service of opposite sign nature between Martin 404s and

Boeing 331s, is that correct?

A. That’s correct. .

(Tr. 8013] Q. Actually I was rather surprised in the light

of that number of samples at the change in the correlation

coefficient between 1.00 in your original and your revised .87.

With two samples, you only have two points, don’t you,

Mr. Simat?

A. That’s correct.

A-1613

Simat—Cross

q Isn’t it true that you can draw a straight line between

two points that passes perfectly through those two points

sneesarily ?

A. That’s certainly true.

@ What would the correlation coefficient of such a

straight line be with respect to those two points?

A 1.00.

Q Yet the correlation coefficient set forth in this table

is as you reproduce it in your report, .87, is it not?

A. That is correct.

Q. Can you explain this apparent anomaly, Mr. Simat?

A. The only way I can explain it and I would certainly

have to check into itis that the RHO which is printed out

here is a RHO corrected for the number of samples.

ffr.8018] * * * By Mr. Tenney:

Q Mr. Simat, just before lunch, we were talking about

Tables 20 and 21 of the computer printouts and their rela-

tion to the correlation set forth on page B-9 of Vol. II of

your report.

We had been talking about the particular relationship

between Martin 404s and B-331s and had noticed that there

was a sample size of 2 in Table 20 with a coefficient of cor-

tdation of .87.

On Table 21, which takes.in all sign changes for that same

pair of types, there is a slightly larger sample size.

Have you found the table, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes, I have.

Q The sample size there is 5, is it not? * * *

fTr.8019]° ** A. Yes, the sample size is 5.

Q. So that if you take all instances out of the 8000 seg-

ment months under study in which changes in both the 331s

A-1614

Simat—Cross

and Martin 404s occurred, there are 5 of which 3 had

changes in the same direction; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. It was only the other two that had changes in the

opposite direction that you had studied in Table 20 coming

up with a correlation coefficient of .87.

Now, when you take the remaining three into account in

Table 21, the correlation — is only .25; is that right,

Mr. Simat?

A. Yes.

Q. And R? is .06?

A. That is correct.

~ Q. To take the one that you were looking at a moment

ago that I inadvertently misled you to, the Martin 44

against the CV-880, you have a sample size there of 3,

(Tr. 8020] taking all changes into account in the 8000-seg.

ment months, is that right, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes. .

Q. And the coefficient of correlation there is .29 and the

R? is .08; is that right?

A. That’s right.

Q. Of those three samples, one involves changes in the

same direction. Table 20 only studies another case of a

sample size of 2 in opposite directions.

_ If you turn to Table 20 on that pair of airplanes, you

will find a coefficient of correlation .65, which, once again,

is surprising, since a straight line can be drawn between

the two points, but still considering the sample size and

the nature of the coefficient of correlation, is that a very

statistically valid relationship that you have determined!

A. No. |

A-1615

Sitmat—Cross

(Tr. 8064] By Mr. Tenney:

Q. The figures that we looked at on page 4-33 were only

for 1960, of course, and they only reflected the passengers

deleted because of the addition of that portion of the six

sdditional 331s that were put on domestic service in 1960,

which was an average of 1.4 aircraft.

If for 1960, for example, you wish to count all the pas-

vagers-that were deleted, piston, because of, according to

your study, the replacement of piston flights by jet flights,

you have to go to Part V, VI and VII.

In Part V, the figures are on page V-20. This relates

to the earlier delivery of CV -880s, twenty in number. Ex-

ase me. Early deliveries of the Boeing 331s and 131s. I

am sorry.

And the 1960 total of passengers deleted works out at

8371.

For the twenty CV-880s, that is Part VI, on page 6-18,

ud a large number of passengers are deleted in 1960. It

works out adding all these types together at 947,374.

In Part VII at page 7-19, still in 1960, for ten additional

S08, we have an additional 533,971 piston passengers de-

kted for a total in that year alone of 1,729,434 piston pas-

wagers that TWA is assumed to have [Tr. 8065] lost.

Totaling the corresponding tables for jet passengers

wided, you get 546,707, for a net loss of 1.2 million pas-

Doing the same thing for all others, coming up with a

grand total—none of these figures are added up and totaled

by year in your report—but totaling them up, we find that

in the five-year period TWA has deleted 5,102,206 piston

Passengers, but has only gained 2,041,515 jet passengers

for'’a net loss of over 3 million passengers.

A-1616

Stmat—Cross

Don’t you think that computing a net loss of over 3 mil.

lion passengers as the direct result of reequipping the air.

line with new, modern jet equipment is a little strange, Mr,

Simat?

A. Nota bit. As a matter of fact, my figures don’t en.

tirely agree with yours, but they are very close. And they

indicate that over the five-year period, according to our

estimates, there would be a decrease of approximately 13

per cent in total passenger originations of TWA, and a

decrease of 2.5 per cent in the total passenger miles flown

by TWA.

And if I again—I again call your attention to the statis.

ties which I cited earlier that indicated that be- [Tr. 8066]

tween 1959 and 1961 alone at a time when TWA added

approximately 1 billion seat miles to its operations with

jet airplanes, TWA suffered a loss of over 10 per cent in

the number of passengers which it carried, and I believe a

loss in the passenger miles—I haven’t checked that figure—

I will right now—

Q. You attribute this loss to the direct result of

equipment with jet aircraft, Mr. Simat?

A. There is a loss in passenger miles from a total of

4.6 billion to 4.25 billion, approximately, in a two-year

period.

And I do attribute this loss to the scheduling changes

which accompanied the introduction of the jet fleet.

As I pointed out, the replacement of piston aircraft miles

with jet aircraft miles in the longer stage lengths and the

increase in the absolute number of jet flights operated in

the longer stage lengths did not develop any material

amount of traffic.

On the other hand, the displacement of piston services

from the shorter stage lengths did have a material impact

A-1617

Simat—Cross

on the volume of traffic moving in the short-haul segments.

And it did decrease in absolute terms the n of pas-

sengers and passenger miles that [Tr. 806 re flown

over those segments, because the short-haul market is

extremely sensitive to the number of flights that are oper-

ated, the frequency of service and frequency of service was

eartailed and curtailed very markedly during this period.

Q. You believe that by TWA getting and putting into

service ten additional Convair 880s and about perhaps up

to one-third of six additional Boeing 331s that would have

been assigned to domestic service, plus the somewhat earlier

receipt of the aircraft, both the additional and the ones

that it did, in fact, receive—it is your opinion that this

would have had the direct result of TWA losing net some-.

thing in the neighborhood of 3 million passengers?

'A. That is correct. I think the last thing that TWA

needed at this time was additional capacity. That was at

a time when the entire industry was having difficulties

incorporating the capacity which it had.

The earnings of all carriers were down and all carriers

show the same kind of decline in traffic.

IfI recall the period, the government was quite concerned

at that time about the amount of over-capacity and the air-

lines were furnishing a report to the Board at its request,

with special data indicating load factors of jet flights on

the major segments of the airlines. This [Tr. 8068] was

no bonanza period. :

Q. Going back to this table that you were referring to

inthe Handbook of Airline Statistics, looking at the origina-

tions—if that is the line that we should look at—line 19—

if you extend your examination from 1961, which is where

you directed our attention up to 1963, you do not find that

there has been a loss in passenger originations since 1959,

do you, but, instead, an increase in passenger originations?

+

A-1618

Simat—Cross

A. That is correct. And it took a very substantial

growth in the economy to produce that kind of an increase

in traffic.

Q. It is about a 500,000 increase in passengers net over

that five-year period; is that correct?

A. Are we still referring to TWA?

The Special Master: Yes, origination.

The Witness: Passenger origination. Excuse me,

I am looking at the wrong line here.

Let me point out that between 1959 and 1962 the

number of passenger originations on TWA in no

year exceeded the 1959 total. It was only in 1963

that we had the increase of 500,000 passengers.

And I should further point out in connection with

that that there was a very substantial gain in

(Tr. 8069] income levels and in economic activities

which accounts, in my opinion, for the general

increase in traffic during this period. .

It has nothing to do with the acquisition of

jets.° °°

(Tr. 8070] * * * By Mr. Tenney:

Q. Mr. Simat, the answers that you were giving, ex-

planations that you were giving a moment ago, lead rather

naturally into the consideration of load factors and other

matters that are discussed rather fully in your Part C,

which I think we can go into more fully tomorrow.

There is one question separate point still in Part B that

T would like to get before we get to Part C, and it is a

change of subject.

It deals with pages B-19 and B-20 of Vol. II of your

report.

A-1619

Simat—Cross

Qn these pages there appears a section or there com-

mences, I should say, a section headed “Number of Piston

hireraft Retired (Domestic and International Divisions).”

On those two pages which are both revised, there [Tr.

$71] are some changes indicated from the earlier version

of your report.

I wonder if you could explain to me why you made those

deletions ?

A. Simply because I goofed. I had intended to use a

method which would substantially understate the number

of piston aircraft retired, so that the eliminated deprecia-

tion and insurance costs would be low.

I found that I selected a method which maximized the

amount of depreciation and insurance costs that I elimi-

nated. It was just a mistake on my part. I don’t know how

Imanaged to mesmerize myself into thinking I had chosen

the conservative method, but I was wrong.

Q. When you had found out that you had not chosen the

conservative method, Mr. Simat, but had, instead, chosen

a method that would maximize, you decided to stick with

the maximization and change the description of it as con-

servative rather than the other way around; is that correct?

A. Idon’t believe I have categorized it as conservative.

Q You did originally?

A. I did originally, yes.

Q. And that is the substance of the deletion, Tr. 8072]

isn’t it? “

A. I fully confess to the error of my ways.

Q. If you had calculated the annual aircraft miles per

available aircraft for each of the years in question from

the actual data for that year, the result would have been

fewer aircraft miles per available plane and a larger num-

ber of so-called surplus aircraft than you have assumed,

would it not?

/

A-1620

Simat—Cross

A. Yes, if we had used the low utilization rates prevail.

ing as a result of the mothballing of piston aircraft, no

longer used or useful in TWA’s aircraft services or sched.

ule services, we would have ended up with a higher number

of surplus aircraft, yes, sir.

Q. ‘On page B-21 where the table appears in Which you

compute the number of surplus aircraft, actually all o

dates under the word “Years” really are meaningless, aren

they? Couldn’t they just as well be replaced by the year

1958, since it was 1958 data that you used?

A. Oh, I suppose we could eliminate some superfluous

numbers in the table.

The fact is that the last column, the annual aircraft miles

per available aircraft, is the figure that is used in calculat-

ing surplus aircraft. And the same figure was used for

each aircraft type for each year.

{Tr. 8073] And that figure is based upon 1958 experi-

ence. ees

{Tr. 8092] * * * Q. Turning, however, to TWA Exhi-

bit 330, which sets forth both jet capacity and piston capa-

city, it is true, is it not, Mr. Simat, that a piston séat offered

to the public on any market is, to some extent, a competi-

tion with every type of seat that is offered to the public on

the same market?

A. I don’t think there is any question about that. If

their services are operated in the same market, if they are

at all acceptable to the public traveling in that market, those

services do compete with all other services in the same

market that are similarly acceptable to the public.

Q. Consequently, it is relevant in determining the

increase in capacity that is being offered to the public,

based on your assumptions of increases in the number of

[Tr. 8093] jet seats offered, to take into account the overall

capacity including pistons; is it not?

A-1621

Simat—Cross

A, Only to the extent that there is a direct overlap in

eery market in which services are offered. That is, in

every market where there are jet services, there are piston

services. In every market where there are piston services,

there are jet services.

Also, if we are going to play the arithmetic game of

siding piston capacity and jet capacity as though they were

equal things, the results can be highly misleading, because

tile a pistén seat does compete with a jet seat, it does not

pete with a jet’seat on equal footing.

On TWA Exhibit 330 for identification the next to

ast column sets forth the net change for TWA alone, jets

and pistons, year by year, and that column certainly is deal-

ing with a.change in the same market, is it not, Mr. Simat?

A. No, it is not.

For that column to be accurate, we would have to have

the conditions that I just enumerated, a complete overlap

of the market where piston and jet services were being sup-

plied and complete comparability of jet and piston seats

interms of their appeal to the public.

{fr 81201 * * * Q. Page 403 of the 1965 CAB Hand-

book which I see that you are looking at gives a definition

of break-even passenger load factor which is very close,

almost exactly the one that you gave as your first definition,

and I assume is the definition that we should use in looking

at these tables. ' .

(Tr. 8121] I read that definition into the record just for

convenience.

“Break-even passenger load factor represents the

« number of passenger load factor points at which

“+ scheduled passenger revenues equal the cost of con-

ducting scheduled passenger service.”

A-1622 J

Simat—Cross

I think that is all I need to read for our present purposes

for the definition.

Using break-even load factors in that sense then, Mr.

Simat, what was the effect on the break-even load factors

of American trunk airlines of the introduction of jets into

their fleets? |

A. The general impact was to reduce break-even factors, _

Q. The break-even load factors for operations of jets

was lower than with pistons, was it not?

A. On the basis of overall averages, that is true.

In the shorter haul markets, the break-even load factor

on jet operations actually exceeds the break-even load fac.

tor on certain of the pistons. °

Q. That varies in accordance with the type of jets as

well as the type of pistons, does it not, Mr. Simat?

(Tr. 8122] A. It varies with the type of jets as well as

the type of piston.

It varies with the distance of operations.

It varies with revenue yield.

There are lots of variables in the break-even load factor.

Q. Page 403 of the CAB Handbook, 1965 CAB Hand-

book, which is the page that I see you have before you, gives

the average break-even load factor for the domestic trunk

lines generally as being for the year 1959, 57.5 per cent: for

the year 1960, 58.3 per cent; for the year 1961, 56.0 per cent:

1962, 51.3 per cent and 1963, 50.7 per cent.

Is that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. That’s what the figures say.

Q. Your Table C-VII at page C-17 of your report shows

1961 as the first year when the trunk line carriers had ap-

proximately as much jet capacity as piston capacity. Be-

fore that, there was more piston capacity. After that, there

was more jet capacity.

Is that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes.

A-1623

Simat—Cross

The Special Master: What year was that?

Mr. Tenney: 1961.

(Tr. 8123] Q. Generally, the sharp drop in break-even

lad factors following 1960 and for the next several years

has been attributed to the introduction of jets into service,

is that not correct, Mr. Simat?

The Witness: Excuse me. May I have that ques-

tion read back, please? I missed something.

The Special Master: Sure.

(The question was read.)

A Tam not sure that everyone attributes the decline in

break-even load factor to the introduction of the jets.

T certainly do.

The Special Master: Did or did not?

The Witness: Do.

Mr. Tenney: There is time, I think, perhaps, for

one more general question before lunch. It may save

a good bit of time if it proves possible to answer it

simply.

Q Can we agree, all else equal, that a passenger would

inal probability choose to travel by a jet rather than by a

piston, if he was given the alternative?

‘A. Tam sure we could agree on that, if we add a few

‘tore conditions. One is that the timing of the jet and pis-

ton services are acceptable to him; that the [Tr. 8124] num-

ver of stops or routing of the airplane is satisfactory, both

fm the standpoint of the jet and the piston services.

I don’t think there is any real doubt that a passenger

offered a choice of alternative services at convenient de-

patture times, offering him non-stop, where he wanted to

ro, that passenger would unquestionably choose the jet.

A-1624

Simat—Cross

(Tr. 8125] ° * * The Witness: I wanted to sup.

plement the last answer that I gave to state that I

was assuming, in making the answer, that the rates

for transportation on the jet and piston aircraft

were the same.

The Special Master: You mean the fares?

The Witness: Yes.

Cross examination (cont’d) by Mr. Tenney:

Q. Mr. Simat, if the break-even load factors decline

simultaneously, it is perfectly possible for a decline in

passenger load factors to be accompanied by an increase

in profits, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. American Airlines, at the end of 1959, is shown

by the ICAO Fleet Statistics, which appear in TWA

Exhibit 57, which is already in evidence—American Air-

lines, [Tr. 8126] as I say, is shown as having at the end of

1959 twenty-four jets in its fleet, all of them Boeing 707s.

I show you a photocopy of the relevant page of TWA

Exhibit 67.

Is that correct?

A. Are you asking me to vouch for the ICAO Sta-

tistics or simply to tell you whether the figures you quoted

are part of the statistics that you furnished me?

Q. Whether they are part of the statistics that I

furnished you.

A. Yes, there are twenty-four aircraft shown for

American Airlines as of the end of 1959. ;

Q. The corresponding table, still from TWA Exhibit 67,

in the ICAO Fleet Statistics as of the end of 1960, shows

that American Airlines had increased its jet fleet by an

additional ten Boeing 720 jets; is that correct?

A-1625

Simat—Cross

A, The same source shows that as of the end of 1960

American Airlines had thirty-four aircraft on hand, ten

df which were Boeing 720 aircraft.

Q I make that a 42 per cent increase in its jet fleet

from the end of the preceding year.

Referring to the 1965 CAB Handbook which you have

fore you, at page 144, American’s overall load factors

are shown as declining from 70.4 per cent in 1959 to 65.3

(Tr. 8127] per cent in 1960; is that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. I am looking.at a page 144, Mr. Tenney, and I see

sload factor of 60.5 per cent which is termed the overall

revenue load factor in 1959, and a load factor of 56.5 per

ent in 1960.

I think you were talking about a revenue passenger load

futor, not the overall load factor.

Q. Yes, I am incorrect. I did misspeak myself, Mr.

Simat. I intended to call your attention instead, as you

have indicated, to the total revenue passenger load factor

vhich in those years is 70.4 per cent and 65.3 per cent re-

sectively. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. The same handbook, 1965 handbook at page 403,

vhich we were looking at this morning, reports break-even

had factors, and for American they report the break-even

had factor—break-even passenger load factor, I should say

—as being 65.2 per cent in 1959, but 61.0 per cent in 1960;

is that correct?

A. Yes. .

Q Still in the same handbook at page 242, American’s

Tr, 8128] operating profit is reported, and its operating

profit in 1959 is reported as having been $24,518,000. It

tyed about the same, but rose slightly in 1960 to

721,000, according to this report.

Is that correct, Mr. Simat?

Yes.

A-1626

Simat—Cross

Q. So that American in the years 1959 to 1960 would

be an example of an airline whose passenger revenue load

factor declined while its profit stayed even or, indeed, in.

creased somewhat; is that correct?

A. That is correct. And I point out further that be.

tween 1959 and 1960, American Airlines added approxi.

mately 1.5 billion seat miles to its total operations. While

I do not have the figures for jet and piston service

separated, I would assume that the great bulk of the in.

crease, if not the entire increase, was increased seat miles

operated with jet aircraft. And having added 1.5 billion

seat miles during this period, American Airlines added a

profit of approximately $200,000 between 1959 and 1960,

The Special Master: Operating profit?

The Witness: Right.

(Tr. 8142]*** Q. In 1964, for Trans World Airlines,

the CAB 1965 Handbook at page 146 shows a revenue pas-

senger load factor of 56.4 per cent which has decreased

substantially from the years that we were looking at earlier

does it not?

A. Yes, and it is up considerably from the low point of

the period which was in 1962 when the load factor was

51.3 per cent.

Q. On page 403, the break-even passenger load factor

for TWA is shown as having declined to 48.9 per cent which

is substantially lower than it was during the years we were

looking at before, is that not correct?

A. Yes, it is down from the break-even load factor in

1959 and also from the break-even load factor in 1960.

(Tr. 8143] Q. On page 244, TWA’s domestic operating

profit for the year 1964 is shown at $50,892,000, is it not!

A. Yes.

A-1627

Simat—Cross

Q. So this, too, is an example of the fact that it is pos-

sible for load factors to decline while profits increase, is it

not?

A. I wish you would go back over those figures again.

It was my recollection that the load factor in 1964 was up.

Q. The load factor in 1964 was 56.4 per cent and the

comparison that I was drawing was with 1960 when it was

689 per cent.

So that over that period of time, there had been a de-

erease of 7.5 per cent in the load factor?

A. Yes, it is possible.

It is also possible to lose money in a rising load factor.

Q. You have explained both in your report and orally

that in your opinion not only did each addition of jet ca-

pacity produce a less than proportionate traffic increase, but

ilso that each decrease in piston aircraft capacity—that

with each decrease in piston aircraft capacity the loss in

piston traffic was more than [Tr. 8144] proportionate to

the reduced capacity. There, of course, I am quoting from

CI of your report.

Ithink that you have also here earlier today and yester-

day drawn the further conclusion that a net loss of airline

passengers over this period was the result, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

lindicated that the explanation of the loss in traffic was

‘sensitivity of the passenger travel market in shorter

‘sage lengths to frequencies of operations, that is, to the

wmber of flights available. With the curtailment of piston

tireraft services, the effect on traffic is quite marked.

Q The 1965 CAB Handbook at page 144 has Ameri-

an statistics, that is, American Airlines statistics, and at

mage 132 it has total domestic trunk statistics.

A-1628

Simat—Cross

Looking first at American and at the origination line

which I think you told us the other day was the best line to

look at, the line 19 as far as traffic goes, I find that in the

last pre-jet year, which was 1958, American’s originations

are reported as 7,191,000 and that in 1963 the last year

that we are concerned with in our study, at 8,402,000.

The intervening years I will read rapidly.

(Tr. 8145] 1959, 7,633,000.

1960, 8,080,000.

1961, 7,576,000.

1962, 7,998,000.

Over the period, is it not clear that American’s passenger

traffic increased significantly?

A. It is certainly true that over the period from 1958 to

1963, there was a significant increase in American Airline’s

traffic, and the traffic of every trunk line in the business,

Also, all the local service airlines, all of the international

carriers. And this increase was in large part the result of

a very substantial gain, in economic activity. ;

Q. It is also the period of the first five years in which

jet capacity was introduced by these airlines into schedule

service, is that not correct?

A. That is correct.

And let me point out to you, Mr. Tenney, that with re

spect to American Airlines’ passenger originations, between

the year 1959 and 1961, there was a decline in the absolute

number of passengers from 7,633,000 to 7,576,000.

And this was a period when American presumably, by

your count, had an edge in the number of jet aircraft.

{Tr. 8146] Q. The decline as we both know, for TWA

was greater, was it not?

A. Yes, but with a greater number of aircraft, American

Airlines, they should have shown, if I understand your

theory correctly, a substantial increase in passenger trafii.

A-1629

Simat—Cross

- [tis perfectly obvious that the jets that were added

between the years 1959 and 1961 did not add a single

passenger.

Q I would like to put-into the record the corresponding

fgares for domestic trunks as a whole from page 131 of the

(AB Handbook, again the originations line. For all domes-

tie trunks in 1958 there were 35,515,000 originations.

1959, 44,488,000.

1960, 45,184,000. -.

1961, 44,669,000.

1962, 46,759,000.

1963, 53,380,000.

The increase that those figures reflect you would attribute

tothe same factors that you attribute the increase in Ameri-

cah’s passengers, is that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. Tincreased—I attribute the increase in the [Tr. 8147]

total number of passenger originations and the much

greater increase in passenger miles I might point out to

a greater public acceptance of air transportation, part of

‘continuing trend, and further to a very substantial im-

provement in the state of the economy.

If you will take random data for the years 1965 and 1966,

you will see the increase in these two years is even more

immatic than anything that we had experienced before

ithout any substantial influx of jets.

Q Will you repeat that last part, please?

A. Without any substantial influx of jets.

@ On page C-II, you make the statement at the end

the first paragraph that in your opinion:

“A further addition of capacity by TWA or by

any other air carrier would have been even more

5 unprofitable.”

A-1630

Simat—Cross

Setting TWA aside for the moment, what do you mean,

Mr. Simat, when you use the phrase “even more unprofit-

able” in that sentence?

A. I have in mind that between 1958 and 1961, for ex.

ample, the airline industry added considerably to its invest-

ment in the form of jet aircraft, and yet the airline industry

as a whole did not experience [Tr. 8148] an increase in earn-

ings. In fact, there was a decreage in earnings.

So that for every dollar of investment added, there was,

in fact, a loss, an operating loss.

I am suggesting that if the capacity increase had been

any greater than it actually had been that the amount of

the profit lost would have been still greater.

I am further suggesting that it was not possible for any

major airline to have added capacity over and above the

capacity it already added at a profit.

Q. The fact is that American Airlines returned a profit

in its operations during every year of this period, did it

not? :

A. That is not the test.

The test is whether the additional investment in aireraft

and in capacity produced a net operating income over and

above the net operating income that would have been

experienced if they hadn’t added the capacity to the invest-

ment.

We are talking about adding capacity here, not maintain-

ing capacity.

Q. How do you know, Mr. Simat, what American would

have achieved if it had not added capacity during this

period?

{Tr. 8149] A. We have the figures for the earlier years

of the period.

I am not aware of any developments in the economy, in

the climate in which American Airlines and other lines were

A-1631

Simat—Cross

gerating, that would have caused a deterioration in profits,

asept the addition of capacity.

Q The fact remains, does it not, that American Air-

ines achieved a profit in each year in this period? That can

aly be answered yes, I think, Mr. Simat.

A. It is your question. I think the answer is yes. Let

ne check. .

American Airlines in each of the years from 1959 through

1%8 achieved a profit in domestic operations.

In international operations American Airlines lost money

n 1959, 1960, 1961.

Q I think you have already testified, Mr. Simat, that

fr American the international operations represented in

fe year that you selected to compare only two per cent

if the total, a relatively minor proportion, is that not cor-

ret?

A. The total revenues are not great, but that doesn’t

make the operations any less profitable.

(fr. 8150] Mr. Tenney: Would you read that back to

me!

(The answer was read.)

The Witness: I would point out to you, Mr. Ten-

ney, in this connection, that in the year 1964, Ameri-

can Airlines reported a net profit of $3,231,000 on

total international passenger revenues of $8,200,000.

By just crude calculations that appears to be close

to a 40 per cent return per dollar of passenger reve-

nue.

Q Mr. Simat, what would ‘have happened in your

inion to any airline that in 1959 through 1963 did not ac-

mize jets but simply continued to fly the pistons that it had

hem flying before?

| A. "There would have been some loss of traffic.

A-1632

Simat—Cross

Q. I thought you testified that there were no factors

that you were aware of in the economy during this period

that could have accounted for any losses other than the in.

crease in jet capacity?

A. Ibelieve that your earlier questions were directed to

the industry as a whole.

‘Q. No, they were not.

A. We are now talking about a single carrier.

Q. They were not. They were addressed to a single

(Tr. 8151 carrier, specifically in many instances American,

The same way your sentence on page C-II that I called your

attention to is addressed to a single carrier, an additional

capacity by TWA or by any other carrier. |

I am not talking about the industry. I am talking about

a single carrier. |

A. The record will speak for itself, but my recollection

is that the line of questioning that came up earlier had to

do with the state of industry and factors that would account

. for traffic developments within the industry as a whole,

Q. Let us go back to some of those questions then so that

we know what we are talking about.

We were talking at one point there about American Air.

lines. And we are talking about American Airlines in con-

nection with this sentence of page C-II of your report which

says and I quote only this part:

“A further addition of capacity by any other

carrier would have been even more unprofitable.”

I am inquiring as to how unprofitable the historic addition

of jet capacity was by a specific airline, in this case, Amer-

ican.

I call your attention again, as I did before, [Tr. 8152] to

page 242 of the CAB Handbook showing that American Air-

lines actually returned a profit throughout this period.

A-1633

Simat—Cross

A. Perhaps, Mr. Tenney, I can illustrate some of the

besic economics here with a rather simple numerical ex-

ample.

Let’s assume a situation where there are only two carriers

in the whole wide world and they operate between one pair

of points.

And let’s assume that each of the airlines is operating 100

seats in the market and each is carrying 80 passengers. The

load factor is in each case 80 per cent.

And by any break-even standards, this is a profitable load

factor.

Let us assume that things go on swimmingly in this vein,

mtil one of the two carriers decides that it might be desir-

able to add another flight and to obtain a bigger share of

themarket. So it does this. It adds another flight, another

100 seats.

It is now offering two-thirds of the capacity in the mar-

ket, and this should entitle it to two-thirds of the traffic.

There will be 300 seats in the market, instead [Tr. 8153]

of the 200 seats, 160 passengers, and the load factors will

be 53.3 per cent, probably in terms of just pure break-even

point, without considering return on investment and costs

of capital, an amount that is sufficient to recover the operat-

- ing costs of the operation for all carriers in the market.

However, what has the carrier that has added the addi-

tional flight wrought? He is now getting two-thirds of the

traffic, approximately 107 passengers, in lieu of the 80 pas-

sengers he was getting before. So he is adding 27 passen-

gers, but he has added 100 seats and the costs of 100 seats.

Bo by virtue of the addition of the flight, he has gained

% passengers, but he has lost a lot of money.

(Now, the operation may on an overall basis be profitable,

bat it is not as profitable to either carrier as it was before.

A-1634

Simat—Cross

To the carrier that has been stripped of the 27 passengers

that the adding carrier has acquired, he is losing the reve.

nue of the 27 passengers.

To the carrier who has added the capacity he is gaining

revenues of the 27 passengers but he is adding one heck of

a lot of costs.

[Tr. 8154] So nobody gains.

Q. The other carrier lost those passengers while not

doing anything at all, isn’t that correct, Mr. Simat?

A. That’s correct.

Now, let’s go through the arithmetic again and have the

other carrier recover some of those passengers.

We have our first carrier operating 200 seats now, and

the second carrier in the market has decided that he is not

to be outdone. So he adds another 100 seats in the market.

Now we have 400 seats in the market. We have 160 pas-

sengers divided two ways. That is 80 passengers per car.

rier. Divide that two ways, and that is 40 passengers per

flight. r

We are not operating all services at a load factor or 40

per cent.

The carrier has gained back the difference between 90

and—excuse me. Let me calculate that one out.

Mr. Tenney: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Witness: It has gained back the 27 passengers

and it has cost that carrier the cost of operating 100

seats to gain back that 27 passengers [Tr. 8155] and

it has lost money in the process.

Now, ask me should it have done what it did,

added the second 100 seats? The answer is no.

It was better off not operating the second 100 seats

than operating the second 100 seats.

A-1635

Simat—Cross

In other words, you do not correct mistakes by

making additional mistakes.

Q In that example that you just gave, Mr. Simat, you

made the comparison for the second carrier between—the

comparison as to what the second carrier achieved by add-

ing its jet between the number of passengers that it ended

wp with after these two successive additions of capacity in

the same market which was 80 to the figure that it would

have had, and, in fact, since you did it ina step process, did

for a time have, as a result of doing nothing while the first

carrier added its flight, and that is how you got the 27

additional passengers produced by its added flight, that is,

the second carrier’s added flight, is that correct? ;

A. That’s correct, yes. It is the difference between not

doing anything and doing something.

Q. Why did you not compare the number of passengers

thet it had at the very end of all of this operation with

the number of passengers that it had at the very beginning

of all of this operation, in which case it would [Tr. 8156]

have produced zero passengers by adding a flight?

A. Well, if you want me to make the comparison, I will,

but I don’t think it is appropriate. .

.Q It would be quite unsound to make that comparison,

wouldn’t it?

A. I can’t answer that question categorically.

If you assume a situation where one carrier is free to act

ind another carrier is not free to act, then the answer is

probably yes.

But if you assume a situation where all carriers in the

market are free to act, then I’m not sure what the answer is.

In other words, it is a question of whether you have to

yo account what the competitive impact of the action

be.

A-1636

Simat—Cross

Q. Iam trying to confine myself to the example that you

formulated which was as you explained deliberately simpli-

fied, but attempting to take into account competitive factors,

In the terms of your comparison of these two air carriers

who are the only two air carriers in the market and they

compete on this particular pair of cities, which is, of course,

a necessarily simplified assumption, but in terms of your

own example it would be [Tr. 8157] quite unsound, would

it not, to evaluate what the second carrier achieved by add-

ing its flight through a comparison of what it had before

there had been any increases, even by the first carrier

against what it had after both carriers had made their in.

crease? That would be an unsound comparison, would it

not?

A. That would be true. And it would also be unsound

for the first carrier in the market to have added the 100

seats without considering the possibility that the second

carrier in the market would add a like 100 seats. -

Q. The answer to my question was yes, was it not?

A. With my qualification, yes.

Q. I am going to get a straight answer to my question,

Mr. Simat. That’s not a qualification you just gave. It is

a volunteered statement about something the first carrier

you say should have taken into account. The answer to my

question was yes, was it not?

A. I think I’ve answered all of your questions, Mr. Ten-

ney.

Mr. Tenney: Would you read my question back,

please?

(The question was read.)

Q. I would like an answer to my question without

(Tr. 8158] any volunteered comment as to what the first

carrier ought to be thinking about while this is going on. |

A-1637

Simat—Cross

The Special Master: Give him an answer.

A. I believe I said it was true.

{Tr. 8165] * ** Q. In. 1959, as this table shows, TWA

flew 1,379,000,000 jet seat miles, according to your table, and

1,146,000,000 jet passenger miles, is that correct, in 1958?

A. Yes.

Q. The marginal load factor that we pointed out a

moment ago appears in your table opposite the year 1960,

bat actually you have applied this as the marginal load fac-

tor for 1959 in your computations, have you not?

A. That is correct. We have used the change between

1959 and 1960 to guide us in determining how additional

capacity operated in 1959 would be utilized.

(Tr. 8166] Q. Just to look ahead a bit, you do this in

each year, do you not? The marginal load factor that you

determine and put in your table opposite the year 1961 is

the one that you use for calculations of 1960 results and so

on down the line. 1962’s marginal load factor is used in

191. 1963 is used in 1962 and 1964 is used in 1963, is that

correct ?

A. That is correct.

Q. In 1960, before adjustment again, the figures shown

for available seat miles for TWA are TWA’s actual 1960

figures, are they not?

‘A. Yes.

Q. The same is true for revenue passenger miles shown

for 1960, actual TWA statistics, nothing assumed about

them, is that correct?

A. That’s exactly correct.

Q. The amount of the assumed capacity increase does

not come into your computations until after you have deter-

Ty

A-1638

Simat—Cross

mined this marginal load factor from the actual capacity

increase in the subsequent year, is that correct?

Mr. Hayes: I am sorry to interrupt—

A. Iam not sure I understand that question.

The Special Master: Read it back, please.

(Tr. 8167] (The question was read.)

Q. If that is confusing, I will try to restate it.

A. Well, I think I understand the question now.

The answer is that the amount of capacity increase is

something that is entirely: independent of the calculation of

the marginal! load factor.

Q. The amount of capacity assumed to be increased!

A. Or assumed to he increased, yes, sir.

Q. The assumed increased capacity for TWA which both

you and Mr. Wemple have used for the year 1959 can be

found on page V-VII in Volume I of your report. It is

Table V-F. I think as a matter of fact it may appear in

one of the tables we put in. I think TWA Exhibit 329 and

330 that we put in earlier this morning actually has that

figure. It has been the easiest way to look at it.

For 1959. I find that there was an assumed increase of

267.9 million available seat miles of jet capacity for TWA,

is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Your marginal load factor is determined in this table

based on a computation of the results of an addition in

available seat miles of 1.640 billion, is it not?

A. Yes.

{Tr. 8168] Q. Mr. Simat, the assumed increase in capa-

city in 1959 is only about 19 per cent of TWA’s actual 1959

capacity, but von have determined a marginal load factor

based on the results of an addition in capacity of, I think

it is, 118 per cent.

A-1639

Simat—Cross

Is that a proper method of computing what would have

occurred in 1959?

A. Yes, I believe it is a proper method of computing

what would have happened in 1959.

Q. Do you really think that you would have as much of

a drop in load factors from a 19 or 20 per cent increase in

capacity as you had from 118 per cent increase in capacity?

A. I think that we are within the range of capacity

inereases where the differences in the marginal load factors

are not material. -.

{Tr. 8225]** * Q. Mr. Simat, I notice that that correla-

tion between the B-131B and the B-720-B was by a fair

amount the highest correlation in your table on C-26, which

is taken from Table XX, and it is by a very considerable

amount the highest of the correlations between any two

pairs of aircraft that we have been discussing here when

the correlations are taken from Table XXI as well.

Can you tell us what in general TWA’s experience with

the 720Bs in its fleet was? How many were there, in gen-

eral when it did have them and what the circumstances were

when they left TWA’s fleet?

A. They were a total of four aircraft all told, and they

vere in service from July of 1961 through October of 1962.

The aircraft were leased to TWA. The figures T gave

ror were for domestic services. There is an {Tr. 8226]

indication, a footnote to the table that in 1961 .0O—excuse

m—0.1 aircraft were assigned to the International Divi-

sion.

Q. When did the Boeing 131B aircraft come into TWA’s

fleet ?

A. The first of the aircraft assigned to service came in

in April 1962.

=

Simat—Cross

A-1640

Q. By the time that the 720Bs were retired from TWA’s

service and the lease terminated, how many 131Bs approxi-

mately had come into TWA’s fleet?

A. In the last month in which there are any recorded

B-720Bs, there were on the average 1.8 such aircraft, and

in the s@#me month the number of available 131Bs in domes-

tic services is indicated as 17.6.

Q. What was the relationship in point of time between

TWA entering into the contract for the purchase of the

the 131Bs and its making the arrangements for the lease of

the 720Bs?

A. I can’t answer that question, Mr. Tenney.

Q. To put it more generally, is it not the case that the

720Bs were leased by TWA to fill in part the needs for jet

equipment during the period pending ‘the arrival of the

131Bs for which they made arrangements at approximately

the same time?

(Tr. 8227] Mr. Hayes: I object on the ground

that there is nothing in Mr. Simat’s testimony as to

this unless he knows as a matter of fact.

The Special Master: Do you know?

The Witness: I don’t know as a matter of fact,

no.

Q. If the 720Bs were leased as a stop gap measure pend-

ing the arrival of the 131Bs, that would tend to explain why

you would get a very high correlation between the additions

of 131Bs and the deletions of 720Bs, would it not?

A. If that were so, yes.

[Tr. 8290] * ** Q. Did that proportion in your opinion

increase, decrease or remain the same over the five year

period you have studied?

A-1641

Simat—Cross

A. There was a slight tendency for the proportion to

decrease over the five year period from which we concluded

that the factor, whatever it was for jet operations was

smewhat different from the factor of piston operations,

that the average jet passenger would tend to make fewer

intermediate stops than the average piston passenger.

At the beginning of the period, however, there were

several forces which required, if anything, more stops on

m the part of the jet passenger than the piston passenger

because the jets were operated over a limited number of

stage lengths or a limited number of markets. There was

wme tendency for passengers who might have used direct

fights to have rerouted themselves so as to [Tr. 8291] make

we of the jet aircraft involving a separate connection or an

additional connection over and above the connection that

they would have made if there were no jet services avail-

able.

The Special Master: Does that indicate there was

a strong passenger preference for jets during this

early period of jet operation?

The Witness: I think that where the jets were

available, the jets were obviously the preferred air-

craft. And where it was possible to make connec-

tion to jet flights and save time in the process, pas-

sengers would reroute themselves.

In those cases, of course, there would be no addi-

tional traffic created by reason of the rerouting. It

is simply a matter of passengers rerouting them-

selves.

And if rerouting involved an additional number of

miles flown, a passenger flying out of his way to make

_, the connection, this would have a depressing effect

~ On revenue yields. For the same amount of revenues

A-1642

Simat—Cross

that the airlines would collect, it would have to fly

the passenger a greater distance.

(Tr. 8328] * * * By Mr. Tenney:

Q. Page D-19, the next page has one thing that I found

just slightly puzzling, the top of page D-19 which is a

revised page.

The sentence says:

“They establish a relatively small spread between

the jet and piston aircraft percentages ratios as we

would expect and they establish a somewhat higher

percentage ratio for piston than for jet aircraft serv.

ices as we would further expect.”

And I notice that the revision on that page, the only revis-

ion was that you changed the word “lower” in the phrase

“somewhat lower percentage” to the word “higher” to make

it “somewhat higher percentage.”

Was that change a reflection of a change in your compn-

tations or a change in your expectations, Mr. Simat?

A. It was a change brought about by the clear light of

day.

As I recall my drafting of the original sentence, it was

some time around 2:30 in the morning, and sometimes I am

not at my best at 2:30 in the morning.

(Tr. 8329] Q. On page D-21, Table D-IX, we have what

you have headed “Recalculation of Estimated Net Added

Passenger Revenues to Determine the Amount of Overstate-

ment from the use of Faulty Passenger Revenue Yields,”

which is a lengthy table in terms of numbers of columns at

any rate, and the first three columns after the dates are

taken, according to your heading, from Mr. Wemple’s fig-

ures.

A-1643

Simat—Cross

After that, we are dealing with your computations.

Is that correct?

A. Well, in the case of column 5, the computations are

not mine. The computations were already prepared by the

Civil Aeronautics Board. They are the computations of

average passenger trip lengths which we derived from the

Handbook of Airline Statistics published by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board.

Q. So this is an actual average trip length of passenger

sdded miles, although you have headed it “Assumed Trip

length,” is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. The next column is headed “Actual Trip Length of

Passenger Added Miles.”

That is not an actual trip length, that is an assumed trip

length, isn’t it, Mr. Simat?

(Tr. 8330] A. That’s a calculated actual trip length of

the traffic that was added between 1959 and 1963, derived

directly from TWA’s experience.

To obtain this figure, we took the 1959 passengers carried

by TWA and the 1963 passengers carried by TWA and sub-

tracted one total from another to obtain the number of pas-

sengers added.

We took the 1959 passenger miles and subtracted those

asenger miles from the reported 1963 passenger miles to

letive the number of added passenger miles.

Then we derived the added passenger miles by the added

misengers to obtain the added distance over which the

dded passengers traveled. /

And that figure is 1453, which is what you would expect

the added traffic were largely carried in jet aircraft.

hi You have applied that 1453 in each of the five years,

through 1963, without any change, is that correct?

A-1644 sa

Simat—Cross

A. Well, the 1453 is the average for the 1959-1963

period, and for purposes of this calculation we have used

the period average and applied it to each of year of the

period.

Q. If you tried to compute this figure in the manner

[Tr. 8331] that you have described on an annual basis by

comparing each year with the next year, could yon do it?

A. It could be done. And I would anticipate that in lien

of the amount shown here of 1453 miles each year of the

period, we would have a decreasing series, where in 199

the trip length of added passengers was substantially

higher than the trip length in 1963. And if I carried the

calculations out on that basis, I think you would find that

the column headed “Mr. Wemple’s Overstatement of Net

Passenger Revenues in Miles” column 9, would be higher

for the years 1959 and 1960, somewhat lower for the years

1962 and 1963, and the total effect of introducing an annual

average trip length would be to increase the amount of the

overstatement from 4.6 to something higher.

Q. In 1960, as opposed to 1959, TWA had a decline in

revenue passenger miles. ,

There was also a decline between those two years in

originations.

You have the phenomena from 1960 to 1961.

If you applied your method in those two years to obtain

an annual figure, what kind of result would you get?

A. I don’t think you could apply the same method {Tr.

8332] to data for the years 1959, 1960 and 1961, since during

this period, as I have testified and as you have now stated,

there was an absolute decline in the amount of traffic carried

by TWA, notwithstanding the addition of considerable jet

capacity.

To make the calculations on an annual basis, I would—

for this period—I would go to the detailed information

A-1645

Simat—Cross

viiech has now been furnished us by TWA indicating the

mine trip length and the flight stage length of passengers

that were actually carried by TWA in jet services.

We now have the information we did not have earlier,

vhich enables us to get behind divisional averages and

totals.

From the information that we now have we are able to

mike a better approximation or a better estimate of the

average trip length of added traffic year by year for jet

sireraft. In fact, we can do this for each type of jet air-

plane.

Q If you performed this annual computation from 1959

t 1960 and 1960 to 1961 using the method that you de-

stibed and carried out the arithmetic, in spite of the fact

that TWA had a decline in those years in originations and

passenger revenue miles, by your method wouldn’t you come

out with a negative yield figure with TWA paying the [Tr.

$333] passengers to travel on it?

A. I think we have another version here of a parable.

It was once true, Mr. Tenney, that Capital Airlines had

anegative investment. In other words, it was on a deficit

inits investment account and it was also true that they lost

money for that year. And some witness divided the operat-

ing loss by the investment base which was negative and

concluded that Capital had the highest rate of return in the

industry.

The reason for that is when you divide one negative by

mother negative you get a positive. ~

Q. But doesn’t the fact that it cannot possibly be used

man annual basis during much of this period indicate that

this method that you have used to select a single figure

vhich you call actual trip length of passenger added miles

for each year of the five-year period is a completely un-

sound method ?

Not so, Mr. Tenney.

a

A-1646

Simat—Cross ‘

The obvious fact which you can observe from column 5 is

that the average trip length of passengers during this

period was increasing. It went from 892.6 miles in 1959 to

942.3 miles in 1963.

And algebraically I know of no phenomenon that [Tr.

8334] would explain that increase in average trip lengths,

save the fact that the added passenger traveled at a some.

what higher average trip length than the passengers that

we started out with in 1959.

In other words, to bring the average up you have to add

something at a higher value than the average.

There are varying ways of determining what the trip

length is of an added passenger. In those years where

there was an absolute decline in the volume of passengers

and passenger miles, algebra fails you.

However, there are ways of obtaining, even for those

years, the trip lengths of added passengers. And if you

look at the entire period from 1959 to 1963, it is possible,

using simple algebraic calculation, or arithmetic calculation,

I should say, to compute the average trip length of the

added passenger.

The figure that appears when you make that computation

is 1453 miles. That is the trip length which explains the

difference in the average trip length experienced by TWA’s

passengers between 1959 and 1963.

And to my mind, it is not an unreasonable figure.

Q. But to summarize, in part, this figure when you ap-

ply it in each year in this five-year period without change,

isn’t it true, Mr. Simat, that there is nothing fTr. 9335]

whatsoever actual about it; that it is instead an example

of a variable constant added to your work to come out with

a predetermined answer, otherwise known as the finagle

factor?

A-1647

Simat—Cross

A. It is certainly true, Mr. Tenney, that the 1453 miles

does not—is not the added trip length for each year of the

period. It is the average for the entire period.

And I have testified that if we determined as we now can

more accurately the figure for the added trip length for

wach year of the period, we would find that it is higher for

9, 1959, than it is for 1963, and that if we made the ad-

jastments in Table D-IX on that basis, that we would find

that the overstatement in Mr. Wemple’s estimates were

een greater than we estimdte in column 9 of the

table. eee

(Tr. 8400] °° * The Special Master: As long as

you were interrupted in your argument by me, Mr.

Hayes, let me ask you, suppose” Mr. Simat next

spring should [Tr. 8401] after more cross-examina-

tion, develop another theory which he thought was

even more accurate to express his views, how would

you feel about that?

Mr. Hayes: I think that if I were in your shoes I

would say you’ve had time enough to think up your

best one.

The Special Master: You think three bites is

enough?

Mr. Hayes: No, it is only two bites. The second

was merely correction.

The Special Master: The first and then revision

and substitution? | .

Mr. Hayes: The second is rot a bite.

The Special Master: Do you, Mr. Simat, look on

this as a substitution for your—what will be the

status of your present report if this report is al-

lowed?

A-1648

Simat—Cross

The Witness: I think I testified earlier and I still

feel that the revenue estimates produced by this

second round would be far superior and more reli-

able than the revenue estimates produced by the

first round.

The Special Master: Let me ask you, either you or

Mr. Hayes, whichever one decides, your pre- [Tr.

8402] sent report comes up with the idea that TWA

would have lost millions of ‘dollars if it had had these

additional planes. ee j

Do you think it is reasonable to expect that your

supplemental report will show that TWA would have

come up with some profit, that there would be $50

million difference between your present estimates—

60 million between your present estimate and revised

estimates? What help is it going to be to me to have

a supplemental report which shows that instead of

losing $60 million under these assumptions TWA

would have lost 70 million or 100 million or 30 mil-

lion or would have broken even, not had any profit!

That is really my problem.

Mr. Hayes: I think it amounts to this. You are

sitting as a master in a damage. hearing. What we

have so far tendered is merely a critique of plain-

tiff’s expert witness, with the reasons given as to

why in our expert’s opinion his assumptions can't

be accepted; and with adoption—with the applica-

tion rather to the plaintiff's expert’s methodology of

refinements that our expert thinks should be made

before it could be accepted.

The second report is ‘taking a new, fresh [Tr.

8403] look based not on divisional averages, not o

assumed data.

A-1649

Simat—Cross

For example, the assumption that Mr. Wemple in-

dulges with respect to how many flights there would

be in the International Division without telling us

where they are going to fly. He did not study that or

anything else, without telling us what areas they

would be put in or where they would be put in or

anything about them.

Now what is proposed is that on the basis of what

TWA actually did—

The Special Master: I understand that.

Mr. Hayes: —flight by flight—

The Special Master: Let me—

Mr. Hayes: To answer your question if I may—I

don’t think I have answered it—

The Special Master: I don’t think you have either.

Mr. Hayes: That’s what I would like to do. This

is merely preliminary. --”

The Special Master; : “Right.

Mr. Hayes: I think from your position as a master

on a damage hearing you would want to know what

is the best estimate that can be made based [Tr. 8404]

on the actual facts regardless of what the result

would be. I can fully understand Mr. Simat sitting

here can’t tell you what is is going to come out with.

He has not finished it.

The Special Master: Let us take a couple of hypo-

thetical situations. Suppose Mr. Simat came ont

with the result in a supplemental report on his re-

fined figures that TWA would have lost $120 million

instead of $60 million, what difference as a practical

matter would that make in the case?

Mr. Hayes: I think as a practical matter that

would make this difference to you, that on a detailed

study assuming it stands up there couldn’t possibly

A-1650

Simat—Cross

be any award of damages here. There is nothing

to compromise.

The Special Master: Isn’t that true on the pres.

ent—

Mr. Hayes: We think the present report tends to

establish that the calculations put in by plaintiff are

not reliable, but the second report would show what

are reliable calculations and there would be a much

firmer basis for a conclusion by you that there

couldn’t possibly have been the damages claimed.

That is the big difference it [T'r. 8405] would make.

The Special Master: That would seem to throw

considerable doubt on your mind on the validity of

the present report. .

Mr. Hayes: No, it does not. I don’t at all even

suggest that there is any lack of validity in the pres-

ent report.

Iam thinking rather of a record that we must make

here first for you and then for the courts beyond,

and I am thinking chiefly of the best evidence for

this case. This is what I am driving at.

The Special Master: SoamI. I want to make it

very clear on the record that I in view of the large

amounts involved in this case, I want to give the

defendants more than what I think is reasonable time

to develop their expert testimony in this matter, and

I am trying to lean over backwards in that respect.

On the other hand, I recognize we have to come to

the conclusion some time.

You say that this should be the last bite, the third

bite. Mr. Tenney says the second bite is enough.

I realize there is tremendous cost to both [Tr. 8406]

sides involved.

A-1651

Simat—Cross

I still can’t quite get through my head why Mr.

Simat, having presented this report showing that

TWA would have lost $60 million on these assump-

tions as to why—and you stand on that report as

being the judgment—because Mr. Simat has said very

firmly that in his opinion even aside from the results,

his study has shown that he thinks that all the sur-

rounding facts and circumstances and background

support his conclusions. If his conclusions are ac-

cepted at face value, TWA not only has no case, but

as I said facetiously the other day, they owe Mr.

Hughes quite a lot of money.

But what I mean to say is that the gap is so wide

there, before you could come to a conclusion that

TWA was damaged, if you are going to accept Mr.

Simat’s testimony, that a ten per cent change in the

figures, 20 per cent, I believe, change in the figures

would still come to the same conclusion, that under

no circumstances is TWA entitled to any damages

here.

So I don’t want to waste your time or the plain-

tiff’s time or the Court’s time or anybody else de-

laying the matter for another year, six months to

(Tr. 8407] a year, as I think Mr. Tenney expressed

it, if I can’t see any possibility of there being a change

in your general conclusions.

Mr. Hayes: If I knew which I don’t, and I am not

inquiring because I have no right to make—

The Special Master: In other words, how can you

do anything except help TWA in a new report, by

showing that the loss wouldn’t have been as much

as you thought? Because it certainly won’t do much

» good as I see it at the moment to say TWA would

have lost 70 million instead of 60 million.

A-1652

Simat—Cross

Mr. Hayes: I couldn’t agree with you more, Mr,

Brownell. * * *

(Tr. 8431] * * * By Mr. Tenney:

Q. At the end of our session on Tuesday, Mr. Simat, we

had gone over some information as to Pan American and

other carriers, equipment position in 1959. I would like to

turn to the next year 1960.

You testified that by the end of 1959 Pan American had

received 21 jet aircraft, and that TWA had received four

of its international type B-331s.

Can you tell us what Pan American received in terms of

jet aircraft during the year 1960, mentioning types if you

have them available?

A. I have before me a summary table which does not

provide information as to the type of aircraft beyond a

general description of the manufacturer and the overall

model number.

And according to the figures that I have before me, as

of December 31, 1960, Pan American had 29 Boeing aircraft

of the 707 variety, and this was an increase of eight over

the number of aircraft it had on hand at the end of Decen-

ber 31, 1959.

Pan American further had 17 DC-8 aircraft, Douglas

aircraft, for a total of 46 aircraft. And the {Tr. 8432] 46

at the end of 1960 compares with a total of 21 aircraft at

the end of 1959, all of which were Boeing.

Q. I think perhaps you know this of your own know!

edge, Mr. Simat, even thongh the model numbers are not

set forth in greater detail in that table.

Of those eight additional Boeing 707 type aircraft re-

ceived by Pan American in the year 1960, it is true, is it

not, that three of them were Boeing 707-331s, originally

constructed to TWA’s specifications?

A-1653

Simat—Cross

A. It sounds right, Mr. Tenney, but I do not have the

fgares before me to confirm it.

Q Can you tell us how many additional intercontinental

type jet aircraft TWA received in 1960?

A. Again, I will have to.consult another source for that.

According to the figures before me, TWA had 19 Boeing

ureraft in 19—at the end of 1959, and a total of 27 at the

end of 1960.

That is a net gain of 8. I would have to consult another

wuree to determine the type numbers of those 8 aircraft.

Q I think that from the Coverdale & Colpitts report—

ind in fact I think we covered this on Tuesday—15 of those

tireraft in both years were Boeing 707-131s, not used in

transatlantic service.

(fr. 8433] So that all 8 of the increase in 1960 were of

the 831 type ?

A. Yes, that has been called to my attention as some-

thing that appears on page 10 of the Coverdale & Colpitts

report.

Q In 1960, therefore, Pan American took delivery of a

total of 25 additional jet aircraft nsable on its interconti-

wntal routes, while TWA took delivery of an additional 8

ora without regard to the specific manufacturers

or precise model numbers.

Yet on page E-5 of your report, it appears, does it not,

tat during 1960 TWA was able to increase its percentage

if available seats offered as compared to Pan American’s

wailable seats offered from 53 per cent to-72 per cent.

That is what vour table shows there, does it not, Mr.

Simat ?

A. Yes.

Q On Tnesday we put in TWA Exhibit 337 which gives

he ratio in a slightly different form as Pan American to

A-1654

Simat—Cross

TWA, and it shows that the ratio of transatlantic seats

offered by Pan American to those offered by TWA dropped

in 1960 to 1.39 from a figure in 1959 of 1.89, which is just

a different way of expressing the same [Tr. 8434] propor.

tion, is it not, Mr. Simat?

A. Yes.

Q. Doesn’t this change in the proportion of seats offered

between those two airlines at a time when Pan American

was taking delivery of far more aircraft than TWA was—

doesn’t this change in proportion indicate that Pan Ameri-

can found it necessary to use many of its jets on other

routes and could not concentrate on a competitive response

to TWA in the transatlantic market?

A. It could mean various things, Mr. Tenney.

It could mean that Pan American decided that the capac

ity in the transatlantic market was already excessive, and

that a further investment of equipment in the transatlantic

market would not have been economic for it.

Q. Do you see from these statistics any support for the

theory that Pan American in 1960 was engaging in com-

petitive response to TWA’s increase in transatlantic

service?

A. Yes, I note that between 1959 and 1960, Pan Ameri-

can increased its seating capacity in the transatlantic mar-

ket from 472,000 to 537,000, an increase of approximately

25 per cent.

Q. The approximate increase in TWA’s seats offered

from 1959 to 1960 was on the order of approximately 70

[Tr. 8435] per cent I make it by eye. It that about right,

Mr. Simat?

A. Your eye is pretty good. It is within 1 per cent of

what I caleulate on my slide rule.

T also note, Mr. Tenney, that the total number of TATA

passengers increased approximately 25 per cent between

1959 and 1960.

A-1655

Simat—Cross

Q. One of the assumptions that we are operating under

in all of these estimates is that six of the jet aircraft that

Pan American would have had at the end of 1960, that is,

thesix Boeing 707-331s that we have referred to would not

have been in Pan American’s fleet but would instead have

been in TW A’s fleet, is that not correct?

A. That is one of the assumptions, yes.

Q Moreover, an additional assumption that we are

making in these estimates is that delivery dates of these

sireraft as between Pan American and TWA would have

been reallocated with more of the earlier delivery positions

gong to TWA and fewer of the earlier delivery positions

going to Pan American, is that not correct?

A. If by these aircraft you mean aircraft of the Boeing

31 type, the answer is correct.

It is not, of course, correct with respect to [T'r. 8436] the

six aircraft.

Q If TWA with the historical proportion of aircraft

wvailable to it was in 1960 able to increase its percentage of

total available seats offered in transatlantic service as com-

pared to Pan American to 72 per cent, is it not reasonable

fo assume that our reconstructed TWA, as we sometimes

all it with six more jet aircraft of the proper type and all

fits aircraft of this type having their delivery dates some-

vhat affected in a favorable direction by that second

ssumption would have been able to schedule substantially

more proportionately jet seats as compared to a Pan Ameri-

am that under these same assumptions would have had

fewer aircraft on a somewhat slower timetable?

A The answer is not necessarily so, and maybe to make

it more precise, no.

The fact is that Pan American did have aircraft deployed

mother divisions which could have been switched to the

gay

A-1656

Simat—Cross

Atlantic Division. Pan American had various other options

on the operation of aircraft, all of which would have per.

mitted Pan American to increase its volume of service on

the transatlantic sector over and above the service that it

actually supplied in 1959 on the same sector.

{Tr. 8437] Q. In terms of jet aircraft, as opposed to

piston aircraft, what options did Pan American have that

would have made the conclusion I suggested a moment ago

an unsound one in your view?

A. My earlier statement did refer to jet aircraft. If]

didn’t make that clear, let me make it clear now.

Q. Then would you explain what the options were that

you referred to?

A. Well, during the year 1960, Pan American had a total

available fleet on the average of 32.4 aircraft, these are

four-engine jet aircraft, of which a total of 16.0 or some.

what less than half were deployed in the Atlantic Division.

That left a remainder of some 16.4 aircraft deployed in

other divisions which could have been deployed in the

Atlantic Division if need be.

In the same year, TWA had all told a total of 6.1 four-

engine jet aircraft assigned to its international services.

So there was on hand as far as Pan American was con-

cerned a substantial reserve of four-engine jet aircraft

which were available to be switched into the Atlantic Divi-

sion if management had so decided.

Q. But on our assumption, of course, that reserve would

have been substantially less by perhaps six aircraft?

(Tr. 8438] A. I referred, Mr. Tenney, to average num-

bers-of: aircraft for the entire year, and not the number

of airplanes on hand at the end of the year.

And I pointed out earlier that there are material differ

ences between the average numbers of aircraft available

during the year and the average numbers of aircraft—the

actual numbers of aircraft available at the end of the year.

A-1657

Simat—Cross

If, for example, every airplane in the fleet were received

on December 30th, the actual average number of aircraft

available during the year—and let us assume a fleet of ten

sirplanes is received on December 30th—it would be in the

order of 20 days divided by 365 or by quick arithmetic some-

thing about 6 or .6 or .7.

Q. Have you computed what the average number of air-

eaft during the year 1960 for Pan American would be if

you took into account the assumptions that we are operating

under?

A. No, Ihave not made that calculation, but I will. It is

a calculation that can be made from the receipt dates of

the airplanes after allowing for an inservice lag to put

the dates on all fours with the dates that are reported to the

Civil Aeronautics Board. There is, of course, a difference

in the counting of (Tr. 8439] aircraft days between the

information reported to the Civil Aeronautics Board and

the information maintained internally by TWA.

In the case of the Civil Aeronautics Board information,

- the starting date, the date when the meter started running

-maireraft days is the date that the airplane is placed in

wrviee, in transport service. It is not the date when it is

svailable for service.

And there is a lag which I would estimate is normally on

te order of approximately ten days between the in-service

date and the availability date.

Q I think perhaps there is another way that this can

be computed without much difficulty. .

Im’t it true that the amount of the annual average jet

ureraft available for service to Pan American would be

dereased by the operation of these assumptions in 1960

thould be the same as the amount by which the annual

aeee of airplanes of this type available to TWA in 1960

Ril

A-1658

Simat—Cross

was increased? We are just talking about the same air.

craft switched over and certain delivery assumptions,

Is that not correct?

Mr. Hayes: May I have that question, please?

{Tr. 8440] The Special Master: Read it back.

(The question was read.)

A. Yes, that’s approximately correct with the difference

that the method of counting aircraft days by the Civil

Aeronautics Board is a little bit different than the method

of counting aircraft days that is used in the Coverdale &

Colpitts report and used internally by TWA.

Q. I find on Exhibit D of Volume IV of the Coverdale

& Colpitts report the figure given of an additional 5.0 B-331

jet aircraft available for commercial service to TWA during

the year 1960, and that figure is given as an annual average.

So that while there might on the basis of the slight differ.

ence in computation that you refer be a slight difference

there, we are talking approximately about 5.0 aircraft

fewer on an annual average basis available to Pan Ameri-

can in 1960, are we not?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your opinion that Pan American in 1960 would

have allowed the effect of any equipment shortage that it

might have felt it had to be concentrated upon those parts

of the worldwide system other than the transatlantic routes!

(Tr. 8441] The Witness: May I have that ques.

tion read back?

(The question was read.)

The Special Master: Is that clear to yout

The Witness: I think it is clear to me now.

A. I don’t think there is much doubt that Pan American

if it felt it was suffering from an equipment shortage would

A-1659

Simat—Cross

have placed the bulk of its equipment in the Transatlantic

Division.

In point of fact, the Atlantic Division is where Pan

American first put its jets.

In the year 1959, for example, Pan American had on hand

during the year an average of 7.7 jets on a system-wide

basis. Of these 7.7, 6.3 were put in the Atlantic Division.

Q@ Wouldn’t Pan American be jeopardizing its world-

wide good will if it extended beyond a limited period of

time the period during which it did not offer adequate serv-

ie on it worldwide routes other than the North Atlantic?

A. I am afraid I don’t understand what you mean by

Pan American’s international good will.

fr. 8442] Q. Pan American’s routes are as you have

testified and as, of course, is on the record in other context

here worldwide and ha

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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