Motion — Washington v. General Motors Corp.
Supreme Court brief1971
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and substantial impact on the present motion. In the
memorandum, leave to file which is sought herein,
plaintiffs will show that the need for this Court to
exercise its original jurisdiction in order that the
plaintiff states may obtain any meaningful relief in
this litigation is even more urgent than appeared to be
when this case was argued.
For the above stated reasons the plaintiffs’ motion
for leave to file a supplemental memorandum after
argument should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Frepric 0, TAUSEND
Special Assistant Attorney
General
657 Colman Building
Seattle, Washington. 98104
March 2, 1972
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PLAT A og ated ds
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1971
No. 45 Original
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
GENERAL Morors CorporatTION, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum After Argument
This Court’s decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
of California (No. 70-49, decided March 1, 1972) re-
inforees the need for this Court to exercise original
jurisdiction in this case. In Hawaii this Court held
that § 4 of the Clayton Act (the treble damage provi-
sion) is ‘‘netably different’? from §16 of the Act
(which provides for injunctive relief) in that the
former, although not the latter, requires a showing of
‘injury to business or property. The Court also held
that ‘‘the words ‘business or property’ * * * refer to
commercial interests or enterprises.’’ Id. p. 13. These
holdings have important consequences for the present
motion for leave to file a coraplaint,
ER a RR ETO 6 ENE SE te RRM
2
Before Hawaii the retrofit relief sought here ap-
_ peared to be the most adequate relief potentially avail-
able to repair the damage done by the defendants’ anti-
trust conspiracy. In the light of Hawaii, moreover, it
is the only relief adequate to repair such damage. This
Court in Hawaii reaffirmed the breadth of § 16 of the
Clayton Act, including suits by states, while at the
same time narrowing the scope of treble damage
actions which states can bring under § 4.
The result is that the equitable remedy sought here
and the need for speed in order to obtain any adequate
relief are now even more urgent than they were when
this case was argued. As time goes on, the pre-1968
cars continue to pollute the air and thereby cause in-
jury for which, under Hawaii, treble damages are
largely not recoverable. Moreover, defendants’ incen-
tive to delay, already great,’ is further increased by
the substantial reduction in their exposure to treble
damages.
Of course, these arguments would be beside the point
if the retrofit remedy were obviously not feasible. On
that issue the recognition of the states’ right to sue on
behalf of itself and its citizens for injunctive relief
under §16 of the Clayton Act is highly significant.
For the powers of a court of equity are far more
1The number of cars which would be subject to retrofit is
reduced at an annual rate of approximately 8 million cars (a re-
duction in retrofit cost to the defendants of an estimated $160
million per year).
* This is not the same question as whether the retrofit remedy
will ultimately be deemed appropriate after proof of violation.
Resolution of the latter question would be premature, since the
case is presently before this Court on a motion for leave to file a
complaint.
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flexible where the state is seeking the injunction than
it would be if private individuals were suing as repre-
sentatives of a class. For, while this Court could not
fashion a decree which would directly require indi-
vidual users of pre-1968 automobiles to retrofit their
cars, that power is by no means necessary to make a
retrofit decree effective. The increased public concern
for a clean environment, the widespread public anger
over smog, and the fact that the defendants would be
required to pay for the devices and their installation
make it reasonable to expect that a great many citizens
in the 34 states before this Court would voluntarily
have their automobiles retrofitted. If, however, the
Court believed that the effectiveness of the retrofit
remedy would require more than the voluntary cooper-
ation of citizens, it has the power to impose on any
plaintiff state® the condition that within a reasonable
time it enact mandatory retrofit legislation. In Inland
Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 156 (1939),
this Court said:
““A Court of equity ‘in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, frequently resorts to the expedient of im-
posing terms and conditions upon the party at
whose instance it proposes to act. The power to
impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises
from, the discretion which the court has in such
cases, to grant, or not to grant, the injunction ap-
plied for. It is a power inherent in the court, as
* As far as the nationwide effectiveness of such a decree is con-
cerned, the 34 states now before this Court (plaintiffs and amici)
represent 75% of the total population of the United States
(152,524,192 people, resident population, 1970 census figures).
Moreover, the remaining 16 states would undoubted! y seek to inter-
vene prior to the conclusion of this action.
Re SER IP cr. Toy
4
a court of equity, and has been exercised from
time immemorial.’’’ (Footnote omitted.)
The question whether the imposition of such a con-
dition. is just and proper is, of course, one of federal
law, specifically one of the application of § 16 of the
Clayton Act. Indeed, in their supplemental memo-
randum on the source of law, filed after the possibility
of this condition was suggested,‘ defendants concede
that the questions in this case relating to the antitrust
counts are covered by federal law.’ The question does
not cease to be such because it may involve a require-
ment that the state enact appropriate legislation. Cf.
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,
353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
Such a procedure.is customarily followed in legisla-
tive reapportionment cases where, since Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, it has been recognized to be
most desirable for the state to enact its own legislative
apportionment plan. In cases where that procedure is
followed the court of equity postpones entering a final
decree until the state has had reasonable opportunity
to act. If the legislature does act, the court then de-
termines, according to federal standards, whether the
new legislation comports with its original decision; its
*In his oral: argument, counsel for defendants asserted that
plaintiffs had conceded in the District Court that the retrofitting
remedy would be appropriate only if the plaintiff states enacted
legislation requiring retrofitting of used cars.. Plaintiffs made no
such concession. The entire statement of plaintiffs’ counsel, which
is completely consistent with plaintiffs’ position here, appears at
pp. 101-103 of the transcript of the District Court hearings which
has been submitted to this Court, and was in response to an argu-
ment made at Tr. 95-97.
5 Defendants’ Source of Law Memorandum at pp. 2-3.
5
final decree then depends on whether that federal
standard has been met. So here the Court could
fashion a decree which would give the states a reason-
able time to enact mandatory retrofit legislation. If
adequate legislation were not passed, the obligation of
- the defendants could be terminated or appropriately
modified.
Respectfully submitted,
FREDRIC ©. TAUSEND
Special Assistant Attorney
General
State of Washington
March 2, 1972
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WASHINGTON v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 109
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Syllabus
WASHINGTON er at. v. GENERAL MOTORS
. CORP. er AL.
‘ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT
No. 45, Orig. Argued February 28-29, 1972—
Decided April 24, 1972
\
Kighteen States have filed a motion for leave to file a bill of ‘eom-
plaint against the Nation’s four major automobile manufacturers
and their trade association, alleging a conspiracy in violation, of
the federal antitrust: laws, a common-law conspiracy in restraint
of trade to restrain the development of motor vehicle air polluti
control equipment, and a public nuisance in violation of state i)
federal common law. Those States seek an injunction, inter alia,
requiring the defendants to accelerate a research and develop-
ment program to produce effective pollution control devices and
pollution-free engines and to install anti-pollution equipment. in
all vehicles they manufactured during the alleged conspiracy.
Held; Though the Court has original but not exclusive jurisdic-
tion, it exercises discretion to avoid impairing its ability to admin-
ister its appellate docket. In view of the nature of the relief
requested and the availability of the federal district courts as an
alternative forum, the Court declines to assume jurisdiction. As
a matter of law as well as of practical necessity, remedies for air \
pollution must be considered in the context of local situations, :
making it advisable that this controversy be resolved in the appro-
priate federal district courts. Pp. 113-116.
Motions of North Dakota and West Virginia to be joined as ‘
parties plaintiff granted. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint
denied and parties remitted to other federal forum.
Doveuas, J., delivered the opinion df the Court, in which -all
members joined except Powe.t, J., who took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of the case.
Fredric C. Tausend, Special Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of Washington, argued the cause for plaintiffs. With
him on the briefs were Slade Gorton, Attorney Gen-
eral of Washington, William L. Dwyer and David G.
Knibb, Special Assistant Attorneys General; William
J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois, and Robert S.
Atkins and David C. Landgraf, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
PIAS NGS SRE 2 ge estar SARL AEE TNT
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