Motion — Washington v. General Motors Corp.

Supreme Court brief1971

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and substantial impact on the present motion. In the

memorandum, leave to file which is sought herein,

plaintiffs will show that the need for this Court to

exercise its original jurisdiction in order that the

plaintiff states may obtain any meaningful relief in

this litigation is even more urgent than appeared to be

when this case was argued.

For the above stated reasons the plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to file a supplemental memorandum after

argument should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Frepric 0, TAUSEND

Special Assistant Attorney

General

657 Colman Building

Seattle, Washington. 98104

March 2, 1972

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PLAT A og ated ds

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1971

No. 45 Original

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

GENERAL Morors CorporatTION, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum After Argument

This Court’s decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.

of California (No. 70-49, decided March 1, 1972) re-

inforees the need for this Court to exercise original

jurisdiction in this case. In Hawaii this Court held

that § 4 of the Clayton Act (the treble damage provi-

sion) is ‘‘netably different’? from §16 of the Act

(which provides for injunctive relief) in that the

former, although not the latter, requires a showing of

‘injury to business or property. The Court also held

that ‘‘the words ‘business or property’ * * * refer to

commercial interests or enterprises.’’ Id. p. 13. These

holdings have important consequences for the present

motion for leave to file a coraplaint,

ER a RR ETO 6 ENE SE te RRM

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Before Hawaii the retrofit relief sought here ap-

_ peared to be the most adequate relief potentially avail-

able to repair the damage done by the defendants’ anti-

trust conspiracy. In the light of Hawaii, moreover, it

is the only relief adequate to repair such damage. This

Court in Hawaii reaffirmed the breadth of § 16 of the

Clayton Act, including suits by states, while at the

same time narrowing the scope of treble damage

actions which states can bring under § 4.

The result is that the equitable remedy sought here

and the need for speed in order to obtain any adequate

relief are now even more urgent than they were when

this case was argued. As time goes on, the pre-1968

cars continue to pollute the air and thereby cause in-

jury for which, under Hawaii, treble damages are

largely not recoverable. Moreover, defendants’ incen-

tive to delay, already great,’ is further increased by

the substantial reduction in their exposure to treble

damages.

Of course, these arguments would be beside the point

if the retrofit remedy were obviously not feasible. On

that issue the recognition of the states’ right to sue on

behalf of itself and its citizens for injunctive relief

under §16 of the Clayton Act is highly significant.

For the powers of a court of equity are far more

1The number of cars which would be subject to retrofit is

reduced at an annual rate of approximately 8 million cars (a re-

duction in retrofit cost to the defendants of an estimated $160

million per year).

* This is not the same question as whether the retrofit remedy

will ultimately be deemed appropriate after proof of violation.

Resolution of the latter question would be premature, since the

case is presently before this Court on a motion for leave to file a

complaint.

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flexible where the state is seeking the injunction than

it would be if private individuals were suing as repre-

sentatives of a class. For, while this Court could not

fashion a decree which would directly require indi-

vidual users of pre-1968 automobiles to retrofit their

cars, that power is by no means necessary to make a

retrofit decree effective. The increased public concern

for a clean environment, the widespread public anger

over smog, and the fact that the defendants would be

required to pay for the devices and their installation

make it reasonable to expect that a great many citizens

in the 34 states before this Court would voluntarily

have their automobiles retrofitted. If, however, the

Court believed that the effectiveness of the retrofit

remedy would require more than the voluntary cooper-

ation of citizens, it has the power to impose on any

plaintiff state® the condition that within a reasonable

time it enact mandatory retrofit legislation. In Inland

Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 156 (1939),

this Court said:

““A Court of equity ‘in the exercise of its dis-

cretion, frequently resorts to the expedient of im-

posing terms and conditions upon the party at

whose instance it proposes to act. The power to

impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises

from, the discretion which the court has in such

cases, to grant, or not to grant, the injunction ap-

plied for. It is a power inherent in the court, as

* As far as the nationwide effectiveness of such a decree is con-

cerned, the 34 states now before this Court (plaintiffs and amici)

represent 75% of the total population of the United States

(152,524,192 people, resident population, 1970 census figures).

Moreover, the remaining 16 states would undoubted! y seek to inter-

vene prior to the conclusion of this action.

Re SER IP cr. Toy

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a court of equity, and has been exercised from

time immemorial.’’’ (Footnote omitted.)

The question whether the imposition of such a con-

dition. is just and proper is, of course, one of federal

law, specifically one of the application of § 16 of the

Clayton Act. Indeed, in their supplemental memo-

randum on the source of law, filed after the possibility

of this condition was suggested,‘ defendants concede

that the questions in this case relating to the antitrust

counts are covered by federal law.’ The question does

not cease to be such because it may involve a require-

ment that the state enact appropriate legislation. Cf.

J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964);

Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,

353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).

Such a procedure.is customarily followed in legisla-

tive reapportionment cases where, since Reynolds v.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, it has been recognized to be

most desirable for the state to enact its own legislative

apportionment plan. In cases where that procedure is

followed the court of equity postpones entering a final

decree until the state has had reasonable opportunity

to act. If the legislature does act, the court then de-

termines, according to federal standards, whether the

new legislation comports with its original decision; its

*In his oral: argument, counsel for defendants asserted that

plaintiffs had conceded in the District Court that the retrofitting

remedy would be appropriate only if the plaintiff states enacted

legislation requiring retrofitting of used cars.. Plaintiffs made no

such concession. The entire statement of plaintiffs’ counsel, which

is completely consistent with plaintiffs’ position here, appears at

pp. 101-103 of the transcript of the District Court hearings which

has been submitted to this Court, and was in response to an argu-

ment made at Tr. 95-97.

5 Defendants’ Source of Law Memorandum at pp. 2-3.

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final decree then depends on whether that federal

standard has been met. So here the Court could

fashion a decree which would give the states a reason-

able time to enact mandatory retrofit legislation. If

adequate legislation were not passed, the obligation of

- the defendants could be terminated or appropriately

modified.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDRIC ©. TAUSEND

Special Assistant Attorney

General

State of Washington

March 2, 1972

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WASHINGTON v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 109

\

Syllabus

WASHINGTON er at. v. GENERAL MOTORS

. CORP. er AL.

‘ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT

No. 45, Orig. Argued February 28-29, 1972—

Decided April 24, 1972

\

Kighteen States have filed a motion for leave to file a bill of ‘eom-

plaint against the Nation’s four major automobile manufacturers

and their trade association, alleging a conspiracy in violation, of

the federal antitrust: laws, a common-law conspiracy in restraint

of trade to restrain the development of motor vehicle air polluti

control equipment, and a public nuisance in violation of state i)

federal common law. Those States seek an injunction, inter alia,

requiring the defendants to accelerate a research and develop-

ment program to produce effective pollution control devices and

pollution-free engines and to install anti-pollution equipment. in

all vehicles they manufactured during the alleged conspiracy.

Held; Though the Court has original but not exclusive jurisdic-

tion, it exercises discretion to avoid impairing its ability to admin-

ister its appellate docket. In view of the nature of the relief

requested and the availability of the federal district courts as an

alternative forum, the Court declines to assume jurisdiction. As

a matter of law as well as of practical necessity, remedies for air \

pollution must be considered in the context of local situations, :

making it advisable that this controversy be resolved in the appro-

priate federal district courts. Pp. 113-116.

Motions of North Dakota and West Virginia to be joined as ‘

parties plaintiff granted. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint

denied and parties remitted to other federal forum.

Doveuas, J., delivered the opinion df the Court, in which -all

members joined except Powe.t, J., who took no part in the con-

sideration or decision of the case.

Fredric C. Tausend, Special Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral of Washington, argued the cause for plaintiffs. With

him on the briefs were Slade Gorton, Attorney Gen-

eral of Washington, William L. Dwyer and David G.

Knibb, Special Assistant Attorneys General; William

J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois, and Robert S.

Atkins and David C. Landgraf, Assistant Attorneys Gen-

PIAS NGS SRE 2 ge estar SARL AEE TNT

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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