Brief for the Petitioners — Adams v. Illinois

Supreme Court brief1972

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, Supreme Court of the United kates

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THE STATE OF-ILLINOIS, |

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ON WRIT OF CERTIO TO THE SUPREME 7

he COURT OF ILLINOIS oe |

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EDWARD M..GENSON R. EUGENE PINCHAM

Santo J. VOLPE ‘840 East 87 Steet ee

-134 North LaSalle Street Gicseo, aoe |

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TABLE OF CONTENTS wow

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OPINION BELOW. ccc POC Fee |

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ..-:..... DEA ne

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED « le

STATEMENT ..::.. ene ry ee fae

SUMMARY OF snowman Te a iy ee

- ARGUMENT: — atts

Pi Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US. 1, la comptolaly api’ |

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Me retroactive .......%¢ AP Sh Py Soe

CONCLUSION - S052 SAE APRA CEE ig

Ree “TABLE. OF AUTHORITIES |

Arsenault v. Massachusetts, ee eee oer pee

"- Reten ©, Mendy, BOURGES i cia ec cosaes ese Blogs

| Chimel v. California, 39S U.S: 752 5 abies SNS Erg F

"Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US.1 (1970) ......:. BAGSETE ei

" Daegele v. Karisas, 375 US.1....... 0.056500 Ske pre

Douglas v. California, 372 US. BSS woe e enn y i ete eens. pest 6

Eikanich v. United States, US. 9 Cr. 1.3015. pices joe

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 ............ ae ec

: Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 ey oe ree BE TO

Geoee ©. Both, 306 UM, BIB nina aan neeneneanetig 2

Hamilton v. Alabama, SORE SF i oe foc. coc. ee ee

_ Johnson, v. New , 384 US. 719 Pace Cad 4 eine Mask

- Linkletter v. Walket\ 381 US, 618 (1965) ......'......555 3,4

Mapp v. Chil, 367 US. 643 «eee (sie aaa,

: Miranda v, Arizona, 384 US. 436 .:.......... Seer Est

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; | Prope ¥. Nea 118 I. App. od NBs: sees » es oes 8 am |

" Pedple.v. Smith,.108 Il. App. 2d 215 - oe Tree y

© Pickahimer v. Wainwright; 975 US. 2. sahesinih dsdvaevisiers 6

‘Stovall v. Denno, 388 | US. 293 . se. “. see 8 ie ifs agi . * . *i *ef.8 © 4

7 oa | United States v. Wade, 388 US. 218 . ‘i 7. y *ee vf . “as “ee. ee “al

c a3 | White v.’Maryland, 373 US. 59. ccs evee wee eee e os “re se 6

ee Williams v. United States, —_ US. 29Cr.L.3015....... 4

ee Mi relleneous: b ont. GGG ce “tad, he “aR eee

aie , - Retrogctivity in Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 lowa L..-

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2 -! “A Fi &

. | ONLWRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPRIME.

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the ee of. petitioner for pupil le of narcotics is

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eo "QUESTION PRESENTED }

© "The Court timited its grant of certiorari to the following ac

; ine question: .

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: " retroactive and/or applicable to a cause where, prior to trial,

Eathes A ees tO felbere t0 provide! counsel st’

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

: United States Constitution; Amendment VI:

_ “Tn all criminal prosecutions the accused shail enjoy

“the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for.

his defence.” eS ae

= United Statés Constitution, Amendment XIV, Seetion 1:

of

Weridt, a ji e Of the Circuit Court of Cook County; on

. No state shall make or enforce any law which

el audi bPbantinigir mentees ot citar :

of the United States;-nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty or property without due -

‘process Of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction: the ~~ — of the laws.”

> STATEMENT ee

: ad si on January 4, 1967, for the sale

‘narcotics and appeared before the ‘Honorable Kenneth

’ February 10, 1967 Ann. Sea scleral alm

re : 3: :

The “aid Grand | ory eae: RE oe ‘elke:

ment charging Petitioner with the tale of nareotics on Janu

ary 4, 1967. a

‘- Prior to trial Petitioner moved the trial aeage tg ad

able Jacques F. Heilingoether, presiding Judge, to dismiss

"the indictment on the ground. that his Constitutional guar- .

-_ antees under the United States Constitution,

VI arid XIV, had. been denied by the failure to-

ae counsel at the preliminary hearing, as aforesaid. In, support.

-. of said motion, Petitioner set forth in full asin

transcript of the proceedings at the preliminary hearing

Dis tral court denied the moti to dain te tiictmont

~ and the cause proceeded to trial. RSG <

The evidence for the People of the State of Illinois was

’ exceptionally weak. It consisted almost entirely of “the

testimony of the alleged purchaser who was ‘himself a nar-

_ cotic addict, a previously convicted felon, a paid employee |

of the police department, and one who. had perjured him-.

“self before. the semie-Geind dury-iwith-aeipeak-to-kie tees > a

name) which indicted Petitioner. For several extended

periods of time this alleged purchaser was out-of the view — -

of the arresting police officers, at places unkfiown to them. —

No marked money nor narcotics were found in the posses-. -

_. sion of the defendant-petitioner, who took the stand and

denied the gileged $19.00 sale of narcotics. =

3 However, the trial court. chose. to believe the informer

and found the defendant-petitioner guilty and sentenced

-him to the penitentiary eters apkasteonehiggl

“years nor more than thirteen ( a peas:

"SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Not Gh

Under any: ‘relevant -test promulgated since Linkietter. P.

Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), Coleman ». Alabama 399

U.S. 1 (1970), should be accorded full pplicability and =

er to _ case at bar. a ee ee

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ARGUMENT

Linkletter v. . Walker, 381°U.S. 618, was the first decision |

gto deal with the problem: of the retroactivity of another —

_ decision of the Court (Mapp v- Ohio, ‘367 U'S. 643). :

According to Stoval v: Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (holding

‘ -- United States-v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, and Gilbert v. Cali-

fornia, 388 U.S. 265, of prospective application only), -

_““Linkletter established a three-pronged criteria for resolution

_ -Of the question of retroactivity:

“(a) The purpose to be served ‘by the new standards,

“(b) The extent of reliance by law enforcement -

- authorities on the old standards, and

| “(o) The effect on the administration of justice of.

"a retroactive application of the new standards.

- (388 U.S. at 297.) -

As we read Williams v. United States, and Elkanich .v.

- United States, __ U.S. __, 9 Cr. L. 3015 (decided April

- 6.1971, holding nonretroactive Chimel v. California, 395

U. S. init on relevant test of retroactivity_is whether:

. the major. purpose of new constitutional

doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal

trial which substantially impairs its truth-finding

function and so raises serious quesgjons about the

accuracy of guilty verdicts, in past trials... ..”

CUS. __, 9 CreL. 3017.)

If $0, the “new” constitutional doctrine “has been given —

complete. retroactive effect.” 9 Cr. L. 3017. )

Respectfully,:we submit that applying any of the above

tests to the case at bar, Coleman y.’Alabama, 399 U:S. 1,

should be held fully retroactive and applicable to the case

sub mene a | co -

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A. “THE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY

THE NEW STANDARDS” .

We are reluctant to label an accused’s right to’counsel at

the preliminary hearing a “new standard.” As delineated

“.below under B, petitioner takes the position that Coleman

. _ ¥, Alabama, 399 US. 1, decided nothing “new.” :

- But if we are in error on this atsessment, clearly the :

" purpose of the Coleman rule requiring. counsel ‘at the pre-

liminary hearing is to enhance. the integrity, of the fact

finding process. .We can not improve upon the ee a

‘ . Mr. Justice Brennan in Coleman stating the Court’s ns

for holding that, the hirer requires. coypeel 3 at the

preliminary hearing: |

. “Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the sealed

, nary hearing) is essential to protect the indigent

_ accused against an erronéous or infproper prosecu-

‘tion. First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and

. ¢ross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal

weaknesses in the State’s~case, that’ may lead the

magistrate -to refuse to bind the accused over.

Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of .

witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a -

&

vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination

of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve testi-

mony favorable to the accused of a witness who ,

does riot appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel : |

|

wate

can more effectively discover the case. the State has

. against his client and make possible the preparation

of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial.

Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the. pre-

liminary hegring in making effective arguments for

the accused on such matters as the necessity for dn .

wrk, abeenatcragrsis ig (90 S. * Ry

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in the fats case, wate tact aetioucs ot ena’

guilt was very weak (see Stagement) retroactive application |

is justified because the Coleman vy. Alabama Rule affects

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“the clear ae of. convicting the innocent.’ = _ Gohnson

v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-728.) .

Petitioner alsé submits that a second, but by no.means

“2

e : subordinate purpose npn egal Rule: is that: ©

“the Tight to counsel . . 80 fundgmental

- to our system of justice a désety. associated

with guilt determination that society, and=therefore

"the judicial system cannot.:accept a criminal judg-

» ment as final without the State being put to its full _.

- burden of proof by a trained adversary. See Gideon —

_ | » Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). Any ©

lesser standard places each individual as well as

‘democracy in jeopardy. Without the finding of legal ©

guilt beyond the most current standard of reason- :

_,able doubt, the validity of the conviction can never

be completely without doubt, making subsequent

- or continued incarceration improper.” Retroactivity —

_in Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 lowa L. Rev. ©

1309 (1969-1970). nef

ee tener

Alabama (999 US. 1) Rule mandate that the same be

<>iee Cerieer oF Tae: wetaance BY Lan ;

[ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES ON THE OLD

Stanpamse

Once again, we are reluctant to refer to pre-Coleman v. :

Alabama (399 U.S. 1) law as “the old standards.” This is

because -counselless preliminary hearing: took

‘place on February , 1967. ‘As of that Gate, law enforce-.

“ment knew or should have well-known, that the Constitu-

. tion fequired counsel at a trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

US. 335 (held retreattive in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375

. » US. 2); on appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 | -

"held ‘retroactive in Daegele v. Kansas, 375 US. 1); at an

t where prejudice existed, Hamilton v. Alabama,

8 J.S. 52; as well as ‘at ‘arraignment where no prejudice - ~~

rt Ae SP EA 59 (held retroac- sae

3)

‘we

oo ret tes Ra

tive in srserault v. ‘Massachusetts, 393 US. ‘§ 4966); in

. recidivist proceédings, Greer v. Betto, 384 US. 269. (1966):

and even ina police station, Miranda v.'Arizona, 384 U'S..

— 436 (1966) (held retroactive from the. date of. June 13,

1966; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. ‘719, 721). :

It is inconceivable that “law enforcement authorities” in i

PSA —— 1967. should recognize’ an accused’s bright .

i gine enpreneaa as relied updp the “old ,

standards” in February, 1967, .it must have been the long

discredited Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, standards.

_ Any supposed “reliance” by law enforcement authorities

_ on some nebulous “old standard” at least since Miranda +. .

se .. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (decided some eight (8). months |

prior to the denial-of counsel in the case.at bar). was volun-

* tary on their part and completely unjustifie dagen

- c. a

OF A. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE NEW. se

STANDARDS”

We come now to the real crux. tas its opinion in the cans

- at bar, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to hold Coleman

v. Alabama, 399 US. 1, retroactive because such would have

a “far reaching and grievous effect on the administration of

_ justice” to the result that “thousands of cases without

: doubt would have tobe reconsidéred in light ofthe new @&

requirement.” (263 N.E.2d at 494.)

That. is simply not the fact. Sey ee 7

It is hotabook law,.and-nb citation \is nocesaéry foe the

: proposition that if afi accused goes to trial and does not —

_' Object to a certain procedure or bit of evidence, he may .

not object for the first time on appeal. There may be, and

are “thousands” of convicted felons-who did not

: -. have‘adp inted counsel atfheir preliminary, hearing. But .

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orig Soe ene sommes Sten oF the right-to-counael at the

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— teria, cataday there-wasa ©

of the right to counsel at that pre-

proceedin, » Sugh is no different-from a failure to

SA A etedeialen ox sridence. ‘The.

Gokae Ge oblast a fe Gel wines the sonssod ba lawyer

preliminary hearing. —

“Our tesearch had “disclosed but six (6) Illinois’ cases,

vr cee a

_ other than the case at bar, where the issue was raised in the —

trial courts: People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553; People v.

| EAS ears 199 N.E.2d 33; People v.

108 Ill. App. 24 215, 247 N.E.2d 161; and People

fen

: v. O'Neal, 118 Ill. App. 2d 116, 254 N.E.2d 559; People

». Morms, 30 Ill. 2d 406, 197 N.B.2d 433,. and People v.

Bl. 2d 499, 259 N.B.2d 794. 4

_-All other defendants, by proceeding to trial with «lawyer

Uiiilit uy elias bade’ "ait Qcddoa ‘ta Coleman i. Ale-

: ‘bank er 4, should be hati retroactive to the case at’

bar.

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Tia Chives’ dpabiis ‘lake evidlai tha rdposition that.

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