Appellants Brief — Schilb v. Kuebel

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Ter, 1970

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0-90

No. e¢49—~

JOHN SCHILB, et al.

Plaintiff s-Appellants,

US.

VINCENT P. KUEBEL, as Clerk ‘of Me ‘Circuit Court

of St. Clair County, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

SAM 8S. PESSIN, JOHN J. O'TOOLE,

25 Main Street, 111 West Washington Street,

Belleville, Illinois ‘62220. Chicago, Illinois 60602.

CORNELIUS F. DORE, JOHN C. CASTANES,

One North La Salle Street, 69 West Washington Street,

‘Chicago, Illinois 60602. Chicago, Illinois 60602.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants. — f

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INDEX

Opinions Below ........... 0... cc ccc cece cc cebeuee

Jurisdiction ©2222... . cee cece cee cece eee ceeeenues

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved . “3

Questions Presented ................... peeeues suns 3

Statement of the Case ............... 0.000. .0 cece 4

Summary of Argument :.............. Pave teesass 4)

Argument:

THE IMPOSITION OF STATUTORY BAIL

COSTS IN ILLINOIS CONTRAVENES AND

VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL.

PROTECTION OF THE LAWS CLAUSES OF -

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO-THE |

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIPED STATES... 6

. A. .

The Imposition Of Bail Costs On Only One Seg-

ment Of The Class Gaining Pretrial Release Con-

travenes And Violates The Equal Protection Of

The Laws Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment

To The Constitution Of The United States ...... ael

B.

- The Imposition Of Bail Costs On The Poor And

Non-Affluent While No Like Costs Are Imposed

On The Rich And Affluent Contravenes And Vio-

lates The Due Process And. Equal Protection Of

The Laws Clauses Of The Fourteenth Amendment

To The Constitution Of The United States ...... 13

il.

C.

The Imposition Of Bail Costs On An Innocent

Accused Contravenes And Violates The Due Proc-

ess Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment To The

‘Constitution Of The United States ..........-.-. 16

Conclusion ..........-. ccetecreeeenaaees vauneenees 19

a -

Appendicies:

Appendix A, Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-

stitution of the United States ............---- k

Appendix B, Article 110 of The Hlineis Criminal

Code [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, et seqg., Ch. 38, Par.

110-L ef S€Q:) cccxinsccees ee lil.

Appendix C, Senate Bill 2840, 88th Congress, Sec-

ond Session ........cccscce cc ccercccereeeeeees Xlv.

CasEs

Bandy v. U.S., 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) ....--..5-+. 6, 13, 15.

Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 4388 (1962) ..........-- 13

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) .....-.. 13

Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960) ........ wee LB

Giaccio'v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) ....6, 16, 17

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .....-.. 13 .

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1996) .....-. '.,.6, 13, 16

Milani v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 12 (1967) ......-- pobeee 13

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ........-----5 13

Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) ........ 6, 11, 12

Stack v. Boyle, 342 US. 1 (1951) .....----. ae 15

lii.

CoNSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Due’ Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment _

to the Constitution of the United States ........

a pesecaceeetanecesrnenesdy 8, 45,7 , 10, 13, 16, 19

Equal Protection of the Laws Clause of the Four-

_ teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

_ United States ....0 00 000., 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19

STATUTES

Bail Reform Act of 1966:

18 U.S.C. 3141-3152 ........... Faeatnesss ...8, 10, 15

18. U.S.C. 3146(a)(3) ......... re 9, 16

Senate Bill 1357 (89th Congress) ................ 8,9

Senate Bills 646, 647, 648 (89th Congress) ........ - 8

Senate Bill 2840 (88th Congress) ...%............ 8

Senate Bills 2838, 2839 (88th Congress) .......... 8

Article 110 of the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1963 et seq. Ch. 38, Pars. 110-1, ef seq.):

Section 110-2 +............ peteeee 4, 5, 7, 8 11, 12, 16

Section 110-7 ....0...... ooh Meee 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 17

‘Section 110-7(f) ..... eee ..:.2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 16

Section 110-8 2.0.0.0... cece cece eee. 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16

‘New Jersey (N.J.S.A. 2A: 152-18) ................. 12

Weta

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MIscELLANEOUS :

~ Aaministration of Bail in Philadelphia 102, U. Pa.

L. Rev. 1031 (1954) ......-. coe weet OF

Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and the .

Administration of Criminal Judicial Procedifre

(U.S.C. Cong. And Admin. News 1966) ....---- 15, 17

Beeley, The Bail System in Chicago (1927) ...---- \ i

Congressional Record (Vol. 112 Con. Ree. 89th Cpn- .

gress Second Session pp. 12488-12504) ......- 9, 10, 15

/ District of Columbia Bail Project—Georgetown Law

Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3, Spring 1965, pp, 679, 684 14

Freed and Wald, Bail in the United States (1964) .. 7

' TWlinois, S.H.A. Ch. 38, Sec. 110, Committee Com-

ments ..... gaguetseseeueagantes Laenews ee eaeuees 8, 15

National Commission on Law Observance and En-

forcement, Surveys Analysis 89 (19381) <,.c0s2925 7

National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, °

_ May 27, 1964 ..... be vewaeees eke yuweeeeeenes 13, 15

_~_Pound, Criminal Justice in Cleveland (1924) ....---. 7

Study of the Administration of Bail in New’ York

City, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685 (1958) ....----+++:: 7" =,

Weintraub, Why in Kings County? The Pleader 5-€ vA

(March 1938) ....----+e+eeeeees nave ee eewene ses dt

pik ne ia nies ee

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a in SHE | re

Supreme Court of the United States

a Octoser Term, 1970 . “©

No. 1412

JOHN SCHILB, et al, |

| ‘Plaintiff s-Appellants, .

VS.

VINCENT P. KUEBEL, as Clerk. of the Cireuit Court

of St. Clair County, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

N

Appeal fram the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

OPINIONS BELOW

The majority and dissenting opinions of thé Supreme

Court of Illinois (A. 30-47; Ree. 8)- are reported at 46

Ill. 2d 538; 264 N.E. 2d 377.

a a a

a ale ia S| WENGTVERS

JURISDICTION

This action was instituted by John Schilb, individu-

ally and for all others similarly -situate, who were

charged bail costs under Section 110-7(f) of the Tlinois

‘ Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963 ete. Ch. 38, Par.

110-7(f)) (App. B, iii-xinl).

The. complaint sought a declaratory judgment that

Section 110-7(f) violates the Due -Process and Kqual

Protection of the Laws Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States (A. 4-13;

Rec. C-2—C-8). The Circuit Court of St. Clair County, »

‘Illinois, specifically held Section 110- 7(f) of the Illinois

Criminal Code constitutional (A. 22-23; Ree. C-18). An

appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State of

Illinois which-on October 7, 1970, affirmed the aon of - -

_ the trial court (A. 30-44; Ree. 8).

A Petition for Rehearing was filed (A. 49; Ree. 10) sn

os thereafter, on December 3, 1970, the Petition was denied

(A>-50-51; Ree. 11) and the dissenting opinion of Justice

Thomas #.. Kluczynski and Justice Walter V. Schaefer

-. filed (A. 30, 44-47; Rec. 8). A Motion for Reconsideration

- of the denial of the Petition for Rehearing was denied |

on January 14, 1971 (A. 51-52; Ree. 13).

The Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the

United States was filed on February 12, 1971 (A. 54;

Rec. 16). The Jurisdictional Statement and Record were

filed and docketed on March 1, 1971, and probable juris-

. diction noted on April 26, 1971.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United

States to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of

Minois by appeal is invoked and conferred by 28 U.S.C.

3 :

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1257(2), for the validity of a statute of the State of Thi-

nois was drawn in question on the grounds of being re-

pugnant to the Constitution of the United States and

the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Mlli-

nois is in favor of its validity. ;

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This cause directly involves the constitutionality of the

bail cost retention provision of Section 110- 7(f) of Arti-

ele 110 of the-Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963

ete. Ch. 38, Par. 110-1 et seg.), in relation to the Due

Process ‘and. Equal Protection of the Laws Clauses of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States is appended hereto as Appendix. A.

Article 110 of the Llinois Criminal Code is appended

hereto as Appendix B.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The following questions relating to the Due Process

and Equal. Protection of the Laws Clauses of the Four- .

teenth Amendment to ‘the Constitution of the United

States are presented by this appeal:

1. . May a State i impose a bail cost on only one segment

of a class gaining pretrial release?

2. May a State impose bail costs ¢ on the poor and non-

affluent while imposing’ no like costs on the rich and

affluent? .

3. May a State impose a bail cost on the innocent?

casa ee

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Seventy Third General Assembly of the State of

Tllinois revised its statutory bail procedures by enacting

Article 110 of the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.

1963, Ch. 38, Par. 110-1 et seq.) (App. B, wii-xili).

Article 110 provides for the pretrial release of an ae-

* cused in one of three ways: his individual recognizance

- . (See. 110-2) (App. B, ii); by deposit of 10% of the full

: amount of bail (See. 110-7) (App. B, v-vii); 07, hy deposit

; of cash, stocks or bonds in the full amount of bail, or

pledging real estate in double the amount of bail (See.

110-8) (App. B, vii-xi). This statute further provides for

the imposition of a bail cost on those released on deposit

of 10% of bail (See. 110-7(f)) (App. B, vi).

John Schilb, a resident of Belleville, St. Clair County,

Illinois, was arrested on January 16, 1969 on two charges.

He gained his pretrial freedom by depositing $50.00 and

$25.00 and on June 6, 1969 was found guilty on one of

the charges and not guilty on the other charge. He paid

£5.00 and $2.50, or a total of $7.50 pursuant to the above

statutory. provision (A. 17-22; Ree. C-14—C-17).

On July 29, 1969, John Sehilb, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situate, as a class, filed a

Complaint, in Chancery in the Circuit Court of St. Clair

County alleging the bail cost retention provision of Seec-

tion 110-7(f) of the Illinois Criminal Code “.). .. is un-

constitutional and deprives said defendants (in criminal

proceedings) of their property without due process of

law, and in violation of equal protection of the laws con-

trary to the 14th Amerdment to the Constitution of the

- United States ... .” (A. 4-13; Ree. C-2—C-8).

%

4)

On January 6, 1970, the Circuit Court of St. Clair

County found the issues against the plaintiffs, and. “parti-

cularly finds Section 110-7(f) of the Criminal Code pro-

ceedings is constitutional.” (A. 22-23; Ree. C-18). A di-

rect appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Illinois

(A. 24; Ree. C-20), and on October 7, 1970, the decision

of the Trial Court was affirmed (A. 47-49; Ree. 9).

This appeal is from the aforementioned decision of the

Supreme Court of the State of Illinois (A. 54; Ree. 16).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Section 110-7(f) of the Criminal Code of Illinois (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1963, Ch. 38, Par. 110-7(f)) (App. B, vi) im- .

poses bail costs on those gaining pretrial release pur-

suant to the deposit of 10% of the full amount of bail

(See. 110-7) (App. B, v-vil). No like costs -are imposed

. on those gaining pretrial release on their individual re-

cognizance (See. 110-2) (App. B, iii), or those depositing

the full mount of bail in cash, stocks or bonds, or double

the amojint/in real estate (Sec. 110-8) (App. B, vii-xi).

John Sehilb, who paid costs pursuant to said statute,

individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situ-

ate, submit that the cost imposition provision of Section

110-7(f) gontravenes and violates the Due Process and

qual Protection of the Laws Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and

respectfully pray the decision of the Supreme Court of

Mlinois, holding the imposition of said bail costs consti-

tutional, be reversed for:

1. The imposition of, the bail cost on only one seg-

ment of the class gaining pretrial release creates an “in-

6

vidious discrimination” by imposing a burden on this seg-

ment while imposing no similar burden on others gaining

pretrial release. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) ;

9. The imposition of the entire burden of supporting

the Illinois Bail System on those persons gaining pretrial

release who are least able to afford it—the poor and non-

affluent (Bandy v. U.S., 81 S. Ct. 197. (1966) )—penalizes

that segment in a quest for justice due to their lack of

wealth, Griffin v. IWinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; and,

3. The imposition of bail. costs upon the innocent -vio-

lates the most rudimentary concept of Due Process (Giac-

cio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). .

=

ARGUMENT

THE IMPOSITION OF STATUTORY BAIL COSTS IN

ILLINOIS CONTRAVENES AND VIOLATES THE

_ DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE

LAWS CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND.

MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF = UNITED

| STATES.

In a climate of criticism and growing discontent with

the operation of bail procedures. in this country in the

1920’s many public bodies, private foundations, and con-

cerned individuals undertook bail studies which dealt in

depth with needed reforms.’ However, it was not until

the early 1960’s that any corrective legislation was en-

acted.

The Seventy Third General Assembly of the State of

Illinois revised its bail procedure, in 1963, by enacting

Article 110 of the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.

1963, Ch. 38, Par. 110-1 et seg.) (App. B, iii-xiii) which

provides for the pretrial release of an accused:.

1. On his individual recognizance (Sec. 110-2) (App.

B, 111);

1. Pound, Criminal Justice in Cleveland (1924); Bee-

ley, The Bail System in Chicago (1927); National Com-

mission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Surveys

Analysis 89 (1931); Weintraub, Why in Kings County?

The Pleader 5-6 (March 1938); Administration of Bail

in Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1954); A Study

of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106

U. Pa. L. Rev. 685 (1958); Freed and Wald, Bail in the

United States (1964).

Dill.

8

2. By the deposit of 10% of the full amount of bail -

(See. 110-7) (App. B, v-vii);

3. By the deposit of cash, stocks or bonds in the full

amount of bail, or pledging real estate in double the

amount of bail (Sec. 110-8) (App. B, vii-xi).

In addition, Article 110 imposes a bail cost (Sec. 110-

7(f)) “to cover costs of handling hail costs and deposits”

upon those released under Section 110-7, but imposes no

like costs upon those released under either Sections: 110-2

or 110-8. |

y lUlinois does not afford General Recciity reports or

earings. compiled or conducted, preliminary to the en--

-actment of legislation. However, the reasons for the pass-

age of Article 110 can in part be deduced from the Con-

gressional ‘Record relative to similar bills which were

eventually enacted into law as the Bail Reform Act of

1966 (18 U.S.C. 3141-3152).

Certain pills (S 2838, S 2839, S 9840) were introduced’

into the Eighty Eighth Congress (1964), which were the

Federal counterpart of Article 110. Senate Bill 2840 (App.

C, xiv-xvi) provided for the retention of 10% of the 10%

of cash, deposit exactly as does Section 110-7(f) of the

Illinois’ Criminal Code. These bills were retained in Com-

mittee and the principles thereof were resubmitted in the

Eighty Ninth Congress (1965) as S 646, S 647, S 648, and

finally S 1357 as an expanded and omnibus bail reform

Scrate Bill 1357 embodied all of the substance of Arti-

ele 110 of the Illinois Criminal Code—with one significant

exception—that bill removed the 10% retention of the

2. Committee Comments, 1963 (Ill. S.H.A., Ch. 38, Sec

110-7, p. 316).

9

cash deposit to defray bail bond costs (18 U.S.C. 3146(a)

-(3)). Thus, under S 1357 bail costs were not to be im-

posed on anyone gaining pretrial ‘freedom.

The purposes for the passage of S 1357 are enumer-

ated within the Bill itself (Vol. 112, Con. Ree., Eighty

Ninth Congress, 2d Session, pp. 12499, 12500):

“FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

Sec. 2 (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) Present Federal bail practices are repugnant .

to the spirit of the Constitution and dilute the basic

tenets that a person is presumed innocent until prov-

en guilty by a court of law and that justice should

be equal and accessible to all;

(2) Pérsons reasonably expected to appear at fu-

ture proceedings should not be deprived of their lib-.

erty solely because of their financial inability to post

bail; ” ae -

(3) Respect for law and order is diminished when

the attainment of pretrial liberty depends solely upon

the financial status of an accused; |

(4) Bail practices which rely primarily on finan-

cial consideration inevitably disadvantage persons

~ and families of limited means;

(5) The high costs of unneéessary detention :im-

pose a severe financial burden on the taxpayers and

deplete public funds which could be better used for

other public purposes; ,

(6) Family and community ties, a job, residenee

in the community, and the absence of a substantial

criminal record; are factors more likely to assure the

. appearance of a person than the posting of bail; and

(7) Accused persons should not be unnecessarily

detained and subjected to the influence of persons

convicted of crimes and the effects of jail life; nor

10°

‘should their families suffer needless public derision

and loss of support.

(b) The purpose -of this Act is to revise the prac-

tices relating to bail to assure that all persons, re-

‘gardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly

be detained pending their appearance to answer

charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention

terest.”

These findings and purpose for the passage of the Bail

Reform Act of 1966 are. confirmed and fortified by the

‘ comments, articles and disertations contained in the Con-

gressional Record. (Vol. 112, Eighty Ninth Congress, 2d

Session, pp. 12488-12504). 7

It may be assumed that similar considerations led the

Seventy Third General Assembly of the State of Illinois.

‘to enact Article 110 of the Criminal Code. However, in

so doing the legislature created an anomaly in law for it

burdened one segment of the class: gaining pretrial re-

lease with the cost of supporting the administration of

the Illinois bail system. .

The imposition of this.bail cost upon those depositing

10% of bail under Section 110-7(f) is unconstitutional

for it contravenes and violates the Due Process and Equal

Protection of the Laws Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States, for:

A.} It imposes bail costs on only one segment of the

- class gaining pretrial release; . os

B.) It imposes bail costs on the poor and non-affluent

while no like costs are imposed on the rich and affluent;

C.) It imposes bail costs on the innocent.

serves neither the ends of justice nor the public in-

11

| A. | . _

The Imposition Of Bail Costs On Only One Segment

Of The Class Gaining Pretrial Release Contravenes And

Violates The Equal Protection Of The Laws Clause Of

The Fourteenth Amendment To The Constitution OF: a”

United States.

The Illinois General Assembly imposes the entire. bur-

den of defraying the administration of bail bonds and

deposits solely upon those who gain their pretrial release

by depositing 10% of bail pursuant to Section 110-7 of

the Illinois Criminal Code (App. B, v-vii).

No like costs are imposed on those released on their

_ individual recognizance (Sec. 110-2) (App. B, iii) or those

depositing the full amount of bail, stocks or bonds, or

pledging real estate in double the amount of bail (Sec.

110-8) (App. B, vii-xi). There are by necessity; however,

‘ eosts of administration attendant to each method of re-

lease; for as the defendants have stipulated “The actual

cost of administering the provisions of Section 110-7 and ©

110-8 are substantially the same, but there may probably

be a slightly greater cost of Section 110-8” (A. 21-22; Ree.

C-17).

All who are accused of a crime and gain release from

_ pretrial custody, under any of the aforementioned’ provi-

sions, are rendered a service by the Clerk of the Court.

The imposition of bail costs on only one segment of

that class, rendered a service by the Clerk, is in direct

conflict with the decision of this Court in Rinaldi v. Yea-

ger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). | | |

In Rinaldi, New Jersey, by statute, afforded all anabie

to purchase a transcript of théir criminal trials, a free

transcript for the’ purpose of appeal. New Jersey law

4 re NER

12

further provided that one incarcerated in the penitentiary

-after the affirmance of his conviction was required to re-

pay: the cost of said transcript. No corresponding bur-

den of repayment was imposed on parolees, probationers

or those given a suspended sentence. It should be noted,

additionally, though not raised in Rinaldi, the New Jer-

sey statute made no provision for the imposition of costs

on a successful appellant (N.J.S.A. 2A: 152-18).

In holding that the New Jersey statute created an “in-

vidious discrimination,” this Court stated in Rinaldi. (p.

308) : ‘

“The New Jersey law does not impose this financial

burden upon all who have been convicted in its

courts and whose appeals have been unsuccessful. It

requires no repayment at all from a man who has

received a suspended sentence or been placed on

probation, regardless of how high his: subsequent

_ earnings .may. be. It requires no repayment at all

from an unsuccessful appellant who has been sen-

tenced only to pay a fine. Instead, the law fastens the

duty of repayment only upon a single class of un-

successful appellants—those who are confined in in-

stitutions. We find that the discriminatory classifiea-

tion imposed by this law violates the requirements

of the Equal Protection Clause.”

Likewise, the Illinois law does not itnpose the financial. |

burden of bail costs on all who have been admitted to

bail. It requires no payment at all from a man released

on his individual recognizance (Sec. 110-2) or from a man

who has posted the full amount of cash, stocks or bonds,

or double the amount in real estate (See. 110-8). Instead,

the law fastens the duty of payment upon a single seg-

ment of the class gaining’ pretrial release—those who.

utilize Section 110-7—and thus creates an equally invidi-

“ous discrimination in violation of the requirements of

the Equal Protection Clause. —

13

The cost retention provision of Section 110-7(f) is

therefore unconstitutional and must fall.

B.

The Imposition Of Bail Costs On The Poor And Non-

Affluent Whibe No Like Costs Are Imposed On The. Rich

And Affluent Contravenes And Violates The Due.Process °

And Equal Protection Of The Laws Clauses Of The

Fourteenth Amendment To The Constitution Of The

United States.

This Court has consistently held that a person cannot

be penalized in a quest for Justice due to a lack of

wealth. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gideon v.

Wainwright? 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. Green, 363

U.S. 192 (1960); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ;

Douglas v. California, 372 US, 353 (1963); Coppedge v.

U.S., 369 U.S. 488 (1962); and Milani v. Illinois, 386 U.S.

12 (1967). |

In relation to the Griffin doctrine, Mr. Justice Douglas

in Bandy v. U.S., 81 S. Ct., 197 (1960) (bail application)

made it eminently clear that when discussing “richman-

poorman”, the poor man is not necessarily destitute, but

rather, a man without “enough property to pledge for his

freedom.” oo, ; .

This concept was recognized by former Chief Justice

Warren, who stated in relation to the proposed Bail Re-

form Act;of 1966 (National Conference on Bail and Crim-

-Inal Fusti¢e, May 27, 1964, pp. 12-13): |

“The a bills recognize. that poverty is a rela-

_ tive cdncept and that the poverty of the accused must

be me&sured in each case by referencé to the parti-

cular need or service under consideration:”

Povert therefore, in relation to bail, is Merely whether

one possesses sufficient assets to meet the bond set by the

Court. . (—

)

14

- “A vast majority of our criminal defendants are in-

digent by an reasonable definition”: (District of Columbia

Bail. Project—Georgetown Liaw Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3,

Spring 1965, p. 679), and authority establishes that as

the amount of bail increases the percentage of those able

_to . obtain pretrial release — decreases.’ As

- 3. District of Columbia Bail Project—Georgetown Law

Journal, Vol. 03, No. 3, Spring 1965, p, 684; -

POSTING BOND

“Table II demonstrates the decreasing ability of

defendants to post bond as bail amounts inerease.

.While 57 per cent of those defendants whose bonds

were set at $1,000 or less were able to post bond,

only 12 per cent of those whose bonds were set at

$5,000 or more were similarly able to obtain release. .

Table III, the ability to post bond by offense cate-

gory, is presented as a further illustration of this

point.

'PABLE II .

PERCENTAGE OF DEFENDANTS POSTING

ORIGINAL BONDS BY AMOUNT

Percentage

: Number of. Cases Posting

Bail Amounts | Bail Set Bail

$500 and under . 130 . 74%

- $600-$1,000 . - 796 —— . 84%

$1,500 143 «43%

$2,000 . 188 ; 34%

$2,500 212 35%

$3,000 78 21% -

$3,500-$4,500 7 49 20%

$5,000 1860 16%

_ $7,500. ay 23 4%

$10,000 & over 8 | 3%

Total Tt 1,863 42%”

15

- Justice Thomas E. luezynski and Justice Walter V.

Schaefer, in their Cissent in the instant case stated

(A. 45; Ree. 8): “This Court. must take judicial ‘notice

of the fact many defendants cannot afford to pay the full

amount Of bail.” Accord.‘ . ?

It was this concept of relative poverty which led: to

the passage of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, and

Article 110 of the Dlinois Criminal Code. These statu-

tory provisions enab!e those unable to afford the full

amount of bail to exercise their right to pretria] free-

dom (Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)); by depositing

10% of the full amount of bail. .

Since many defendants -in criminal cases simply lack

“enough property” to deposit the full amount of bail,

they have “no choice” but to deposit 10% or remain in-

carcerated and suffer the pitfalls attendant’ thereto.

Bandy v. U.S., 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960). Accord.’

4. Bail Reform Act of 1966 (18 U.S.C. 3141-3152) ;

Congressional -Record (Vol. 112; Con. Ree. 89th Congress,

Seeond Session pp. 12488-12505); S.H.A. Ch. 38, See. 110,

Committee Comments; Attorney General’s Committee on

Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Judicial Pro-

cedure (U.S.C. Cong. and Admin. News 1966); National

Conference’ on Bail and Criminal Justice, May 27, 1964.

0. Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and the -

Administration of Criminal Judicial Procedure, stated

(U.S.C. Cong. and Admin. News, 1966, p. 2299): “|,

Studies have shown that failure to release has other ad-

verse effects upon the accused’s preparation for trial, re-

tention of employment, relations with family, his attitude

_toward' social justice, the outcome of the trial‘ and the

severity of the sentence...”

16

Upon these non-affluent, Illinois imposes a bail cost

(See. 110-7(f)). No like cost is imposed by the Federal

Act (18 U.S.C. 3146 (a)(3)). In addition, Hlinois imposes

no bail costs on the rich or affluent who can afford the

full amount of bail (See. 110-8). Thus, those least. able

to afford it, the poor and non-affluent,. who have no

choice but to remain in jail-or deposit 10% of bail, are

unconstitutionally “penalized in a ‘quest for justice due

to a lack of wealth.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

C.

The Imposition Of Bail Costs On ‘An Innocent Accused

Contravenes And Violates The Due Process Clause Of

The. Fourteenth Amendment To The Constitution Of The

United States.

Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the imposi-

tion of bail costs pursuant to Section 110-7(f) of thé

Illinois Criminal Code (App. B, vi) is that these costs are

imposed upon an innocent person accused of a crime; who

is put to the expense, disgrace and anguish of a trial and

then found not guilty. He is then assessed a cost for ex-

ercising his right to release pending trial.

Tronically, one who gains pretrial release under See-

tions 110-2 (App. B, iii) or 110-8 (App. B, vii-xi) and is

found guilty is burdened with no cost whatsoever.

In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) costs

were assessed by the jury against a defendant, who was

acquitted of a misdemeanor, pursuant to a Pennsylvania

statute. This Court held that the statute was so vague

as to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

In the case at bar we do not have a vague statute.

Rather: it is explicit in the Illinois statute that the burden

fe RR ay oe phalaunce

17

to support the entire administration of the bail bond sys- |

tem in Illinois falls on those released pursuant to Section

110-7 of the Illinois Criminal Code—whether guilty or in-

nocent.

«

In Giaccio, Mr. Justice Stewart, in concurring with

the majority opinion of the Court, stated (p. 405):

a In the present case ft is enough for me that

Pennsylvania allows a jury to punish a defendant

after finding him not guilty. That, I thik, violates

the must rudimentary concept of due process of

law.” :

Mr. Justice Fortas concurred for the same reason.

It is submitted that the principle enunciated in the

aforementioned concurring opinions is the only reason-

able application of the Constitution of the United States

in relation to the present cause.

The exact nature of the cost imposed upon the, ac-

quittet defendant in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 US.

399, is not apparent from the opinion. However, if there

is any: question as to whether the bail cost imposed on

innocent defendants in the State of linois are costs at-

tendant to a criminal proceeding, one need but note the

statement from the Attorney General’s Committee on

Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice Pro-

cedure Report, (U.S. Cong. and Admin. News, 1966, p.

2299) :

“The present system of monetary bail would be ade- .

quate if all could afford it. The facts, however, are

to the .contrary..The rich man afd the professional

-eriminal readily raise bail regardless of the amount.

But it is the ‘poor man, lacking sufficient funds, who

remains incarcerated prior to trial. But the mere in:

carceration is not the only evil effect of the monetary

SLEERON LS

bel

ie at

EERE TTS VR Se BOE REO TOES

18

bail system. Studies have shown that failure to re-

lease has other adverse effects upon the accustd’s

_ preparation for trial, retention of employment, rela-

tions with his family, his attitude toward social

justice, the outcome of the trial, and the severity of -

the sentence. For example, in preparation for his

trial, the defendant who remains in jail does not have

the same access to his counsel as the man free on

hail. He is limited in his ‘ability to collect witnesses

for his defense. Often, he loses his employment, his

family may become the subjects of -welfare payments,

and in many instances in the Federal. system he -be-

edmes a financial burden to the Federal Government

in that the Federal Government reimbureses local

authorities when a defendant is incarcerated in a

local jail.” :

Thus, pretrial release is not only an integral element of

criminal justice, but perhaps the most important ele-

ment, and any costs imposed upon the exercise of the

right to bail is a cost attendant to the criminal proceed-

inf, and cannot constitutionally be imposed on an inno-

cent accused. . .

BE eo!

19 °

CONCLUSION

John Schilb, individually and on behalf of all persons

similarly situate, plaintiffs-appellants, have herein estab-

lished that the statutory imposition of bail costs in IIli-

‘nois contravenes and is in violation of the Due Process

and Equal Protection of the Laws Clauses of the Four-

teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States, and respectfully pray the decision of the Supreme

Court. of the State of Illinois be reversed. 7

Respectfully submitted,

SAM 8S. PESSIN, JOHN J. O'TOOLE,

25 Main Street, 111 West Washington Street,

Belleville, Illinois 62220. _ . Chicago, Illinois 60602.

CORNELIUS F. DORE, JOHN C. CASTANES,

. One North La Salle Street, 69 West Washington Street, |

Chicago, Illinois 60602. Chicago, Illinois 60602. |

Attorneys for Plaintiff s-Appellants.

ILI LE CALLEN NGO JOE PGP” Se:

. APPENDIX A

Amendment XIV a

Constitution of the United States

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the

United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make. or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-

zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive

any person, of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-

ess of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall he apportioned among

the several States according to their respective numbers,

counting the whole number of persons in each ‘State, ex-

eluding Indians not taxed. But when the right-to vote

at any election for the choice of electors for President

and Vice : ee of the United States, Representatives »

in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a. State,”

or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to

any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-

one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in.

_ any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,

or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall

be reduced in the proportion which the number of such

male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citi-

zens twenty-one years of age in such State:

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representa-

tive in Congress, or elector of President and Vice -Presi-

dent, or hold any office, civil‘or military, ander the United

States, or under any State, whd,. having: previously taken

an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the

bi.

United States, or as a member of any State legislature,

or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to sup-_

port the Constitution of the United States, shall have en-

gaged in. insurrection or rebellion against the same, or

given aid or cdmfort to the enemies thereof. But Con-

gress may by a vote of two- thirds of each House, re-

move such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United

States, authorized by law, including debts in curred for

payment of pensions and bounties for services in sup-

pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.

“But neither the United States nor any State shall assume

or pay any. debt or obligation incurred in aid of insur-

rection or rebellion against the United States, or any

claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all

such debts, obligations and slainis shall be held illegal -

and void.

Section 5. The €ongress shall have power to. enforce,

by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this - article.

lil.

APPENDIX B

ARTICLE 110. BATL

110—1. § 110-1. Definitions.) (a) “Security” is that,

wineli is required to be pledged | to insure the payment of.

bail.

(b) “Surety” is one who executes a bail bond and

binds himself to pay the.bail if the person in custody fails

to comply with all conditions of the bail bond.

— 110—2. § 110-2. Release on Own Secepniences When

from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion that

the accused will appear as required either before or after

conviction the accysed may be’ released on his own recog-

nizance. A failure to appear as: required by such recog-

nizance shall constitute an offense subject to the penalty

provided jin Section 32—10 of the “Criminal Code of

1961,” approved July 28, 1961, as heretofore and here-~

after amended, for violation of the bail bond, and any

obligated sum fixed in the recogrtizance shall be forfeited

and collected in accordance with sub-section (g)} of Sec-

tion 110—7 of this Code.

This Section. shall be liberally construed to effectuate

the purpose of relying@ipon criminal sanctions instead of

financial Toss to assure the appearance of the accused.

110—3. § 110-3. Issuance. of Warrant.) Bon’ failure to’

comply with any condition of a bail bond or recognizance

the court having jurisdiction at the time of such failure

may, in addition to any other ‘action provided by law, is-

sue a warrant for the arrest of the person at liberty on

bail or his own recognizance.

x,

<W

oe

ae ‘ i Vv.

110—4. § 110-4. Bailable Offenses.) (a) Ajl persons

shall be bailable before conviction, except wheh death is

a possible punishment for the offense charged and the

proof is evident or-the presumption great that the person

is guilt. of the offense.*

(b) A person charged with an offense for which death

is a possible punishment has the burden of proof that he ~

should be admitted o bail.

110—5. § 110-5. Determining the Amount of Bett) (a)

The amount of bail shall be:

(1) Sufficient to assure compliance 3 with the conditions

set forth 1 in the bail bond;

(2) Not -oppressive;

* -

(3) Commensurate with the nature Sof the offense

. charged;

' (4) Considerate of the past ‘criminal acts and conduct

of the defendant;

(5) Considerate of the financial ability of the accused.

(6) When 4 person is charged with an offense. punish-

able by fine only the amount of the bail shall not exceed

double the amount of the maximum penalty.

(c) When a ‘person has been eonvicted of ‘an offense

and only a fine has been imposed the amount of the bail

shall not exceed double the amount of the fine:

110—6..§ 110-6. Reduction or Increase of: Bail.)

(a) Upon application by the State or the defendant the

‘ eourt before which the proceeding is pending may in-

crease or reduce the Amount of bail or may alter the con-

‘ditions of the bail bond.

(b) Reasonable notice of such eppreeton by the de-

fendant shall be given to the State.

5

?

7 a - } |

: f : 7 - : Se

. :

(c) Reasonable nofice of such application by the State

Shall be given to the defendant, except as provided ‘in

subsection (d). a | | 5

(d) Upon yerified application by the State stating

facts or circumstances constituting ‘2. breach or a threat-

ened bréach of any of the conditions of the bail bond the

court may isshe a warrant’ commanding any peace officer

* to bring the defendant. without unnegessary delay before

the court for a hearing on the. matters set forth in the ap-

plication. At the conclusion, of tie hearing the court. may

-enter’an-order authorized by subsection (a).

110—7. § 110-7. Deposit of Bail Security.)

(a) The pgrson for whem bail has been set shall exe-

cute the bail bond and deposit with. the clerk of the

court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of =.

money equal to 10% of the bail, but in no event shall

such deposit be less than $25,

”

G4

(b) Upon depositing this sum the person shall be re- ;

leased from custody subject to the conditions of the bail Ae

bond. > . :

(c) Once bail has been given and a charge is: pending.

or is thereafter filed in of transferred to a court of com-

petent jurisdiction the latter court shall continue the -

original bail in that court subject tomthe provisions of

Section 110-6 of this Code. _ .

(d) After ‘eonviction the court may order that the

original bail stand as bail, pending appeal or deny, in-

crease or feduce bail. | “Se @

(e) After tHe entry of an: order by the trial court al-

lowing or denying bail pendmhg appeal either party may

apply to the reviewing court having jurisdiction or to a

Justice thereof sitting in vacation for an order increasing

e

°

P . .

ee ee , —_ = .

FBR ea INA RL Sass < ?

Vil.

or decreasing the amount of bail or Browne or denying

~bail pending appeal.

(f) When the conditions of the bail bond have been

performed andthe accused has been discharged from all

obligations, in the, cause the clerk of the court shall re-

- turn to. the accused, unless the court orders otherwise,

90% of the sum which had been deposited’ and shall re-

tain as dail bond costs 10% of the amount deposited.

—_ However, In no event shall the amount retained by ‘the

4 clerk as bail bond costs be less than $5.

>

=

3

%

Ai eis VERO EAL ALO AB LAI

¥

At the request of the defendant the .céurt may order

such 90% of defendant’s bail deposit, or whatever amount .

repayable to defendant from such deposit, to’ be; paid to.

defendant’s attorney -of record. .

Cbiorndisth i Kae vx:

(g) If the accused.does not comply with the condi-

_ tions of the bail bond the court having jurisdiction shall

pf enter an order declaring the bail to be forfeited. Notice —

7 of such order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith to

: the accused at his last know address. If the accused does

not appear and surrender to the court having jurisdie-

tion within 30-days from the date of the forfeiture or

within such period satisfy the court that appearance and

surrender .by the accused is impossible and without, his

; fault the court shall enter judgment for the State if the

| ‘eharge for which the bond’ was given was a felony ,or

i misdemeanor, or if the charge’ was quasi-criminal or t

fic, judgment for the political subdivision of the State

which prosecuted the, case, against the accused for the

amount of the bail and costs of the court proceedings.

The deposit made in accordance with subsection (a) shall

be applied to the payment of costs. If any amount of

- such deposit remains after the payment of costs it shall»

A. applied to payment of the judgment and transferred to

Ys Bk ite Sie oh,

Vil. .

; \ °

the treasury of the municipal corporation wherein the

bond was taken if the offense was a violation of any

penal ordinance of a political subdivision of this’ State,

or to the treasury of the county wherein the bond was

taken if the offense was a violation of any penal statute.

of this State. The balance of the judgment may be en-

forced. and collected in the sane mmanner as a judgment

entered in a civil action.

(h) After a judgment for a fine and court costs or

either is eitered in the prosecution of: a cause in which.

a deposit had been made in accordance with subsection

(a) the balance of such deposit, after deduction of bail

bond costs, shall he applied to the payment of the judg-

ment.:

110—8. § 110-8. Cash, Stocks, Bond and Real Estate

as Security for Bail.) (a) In lieu of the bail, deposit pro-

vided for in Section 110—7 of this Code any person for

whom bail has heen set may execute the bail bond with

or without sureties which bond may be secured:

(1) By a deposit, with the clerk of the court, of an

amount equal to the required bail, of cash, or stocks and

bonds in which trustees are authorized, to invest trust

funds under the laws of this State; or

(2) Bygyeal estate situated in this State with unen-

cumbered equity not exempt | owned by the accused or

sureties worth double the\amount of bail set in the bond.

\N

b) If. the bail bond is-secured by eash or stocks and

bonds the accused or sureties shall file with the bond a

sworn:schedule which shall contain:

(1) A list of the stocks and bonds deposited deserib-

ing each in sufficient detail that it may be identified;

I a ns,

LOE EMT EE BET

:

PELE IPS, GEL IP LEAL EM ONL SE MEG

Neste POL DNS

Siete

yr Ou 9:

fe OR

\

WRAPS Ee PAE AERA eA ERE L RRA NE RNAI TGA ahi tteal awa BS 0d

TRASH SGT Lk INES S SRO NR SIRS NET EELS, * Rip NRO

"

. *

Vif.

(2) The markét value of each stock and bond;

(3) The total market value of the stocks and bonds

listed; |

(4) <A statement that the affinat is the sole owner of

the stocks and bonds listed and they are not exempt from

execution ; :

(9) A statement that such stocks and bonds have not

previously been used or accepted as bail in this State dur-

ing the 12 months preceding the date of the bail bond;

and

(6) A statement that such stocks and bonds are se-

curity for the appearance of the accused in accordance

with the conditions of the bail bond.

(c) If the bail bond is secured by re;

cused or sureties shall file with the b

ule which shall eontain:

estate ‘the ac-

id a sworn. sched-

(1) <A legal description of the reat estate;

(2) <A description of any and all-encumbrances on the

real estate including the amount of each and the holder

thereof;

(3) The market value of the unencumbered equity

owned by the affiant; .

(4) A statement that the affiant is the sole ownér of

such unencumbered equity and that it is not exempt from

P

execution ;,

(5) A statement that the real extate has not previous-

ly been used or accepted as hail in this State during the

12 months preceding the date of the bail bond; and

(6)* A statement that the retl estate is security for

the appearance of the accused in accordance with the con-

ditions of the bail bond.

ix’.

(d) The sworn schedule shall constitute ‘a material

part of the bail bond. The affidut commits perjury if in

the sworn schedule he makes a false statement which he

does not believe to be true. He shall] be prosecuted and

punished accordingly, or, he maybe punished for con-

tempt. - ;

(e) A certified copy of the bail bond and schedule of

real estate shall he filed immediately. by the court. in the

office of the registrar of titles or recorder of deeds ‘of the

county in which the real estate ix situated and the State

Shall have a lien oh such real estate from the time such

copies are filed in the office of the registrar of titles or

recorder of deeds. The registrar of titles or recorder of

deeds shall enter, index and record (or register as the

case may be) such bail bonds and schedules without re-

quiring any advance fee, which fee shall be taxed as costs

in the proceeding and paid out of such costs when collect-

ed.

(f) When ‘the conditions of the hail bond have been

performed and the accused has been discharged from his

obligations in the cause, the clerk of the court shall return

to him or his sureties the deposit of any cash, stocks or

bonds. Tf the bail bond has been secured by. real estate

the clerk of the court shall forthwith notify in writing

the registrar of titles or recorder of deeds and -the lien

of the bail bond on the real estate shall be discharged.

(g) If the accused does not comply with the conditions

of the bail bond the court having jurisdiction shall enter

an order declaying the bail to be forfeited. Notice of such

order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith by the clerk

of the court to the accused and his sureties at their last

known address. If the aceused does not appear and sur-

render to the court having jurisdiction within 30 days

1 MO A RCE RRR romancune

X..

- from the date of the forefeiture or within.such period sat-

isfy the court that appearance and surrender by the ac-

cused is impossible and without his fault the court shall

enter judgment for the State against the accused and his

sureties for the amount of the bail and costs of’ the pro- |

ceedings.

(h) When judgment is entered in favor of the State

on any bail bond the State’s Attorney shall. have execu-

tion issued on- the judgment forthwith and deliver same

to the sheriff to be executed by levy on the cash, stocks

or bonds deposited with the clerk: of. the court and the

real estate described in the bail bond schedule. The cash

shall be used to satisfy the judgment and costs and paid

into the treasury of the municipal corporation wherein .

‘the: bail bond was taken if the offense was a violation of °

“any penal ordifiance of a political subdivision of this

State, or into the treasury of the-county wherein: the bail

bond was taken if the offense was a violation of any

penal statute of this State. The stocks, bonds and real

estate shall be sold in the same manner as in execution

sales in civil actions and the proceeds of such sale shall ,

be used to satisfy all*court costs, prior encumbrances, if

any, and from the balance a sufficient amount to satisfy

the judgment shall be paid into, the treasury of the muni-

cipal corporation wherein the bail bond was taken if the

offense was a‘violation of any penal ordinance of a politi-

eal subdivision of this State, or into the treasury of the ©

county wherein the bail bond was taken: if the offense

‘was a violation of any penal statute of this State. The

balance shall be returned to the owier. The real estate so

sold’ may be redeemed in the same manner as real estate

- may be redeemed after judicial or execution sales in civil

actions. .

xi.

(i) No stocks, bonds or real estate may be used. or ac-

cepted as bail bond Security in this State more than once

in any 12 month period. As amended by act approved

July 31, 1967. L. 1967, p. , H.B. No. 862. -

- 110—9. § 110-9. Taking of Bail by Peace Officer.) When

bail has been set by a judicial officer ‘for a particular of-

fense or offender any sheriff or other peace officer may

take bail in accordance with the provisions of Section 110

—T or 110—8 of this Code and release the offender to ap-

pearance in accordance with the conditions of the bail

bond, the Notice to Appear or the Summons. The officer

shall give a receipt to the offender for the bail so taken

and within a reasonable time deposit such bail so taken

and within ia reasonable time deposit such bail with the

clerk of the court’ having Jurisdiction of the offense.

110—10. § 110-10. Conditions of Bail Bond.) (a) If a

person is admitted to bail before conviction the ‘eondi-

tions of the bail bond shall be that he will:

(1) Appear to answer the charge in the court having

Jurisdiction on a day certain and thereafter as ordered by |

the court until discharged or final order of the court;

(2) Submit himself to the orders and process of the

| court; and _ \

(3) Not depart this State without leave.

(b) .If the defendant is admitted to bail after convic-

tion the conditions of the bail bond shall’ be that he will:

(1) Duly prosecute his appeal;

(2) Appear at such time and place as the court may

direct;

(3) Not depart this State without leave. of the court

and

— —— ete

Se cated aeetthnapee

cy

X11.

(4) If the judgment is affirmed or the cause reversed —

and. remanded for a new trial, forthwith surrender to the

officer from whose custody he was bailed.

—110—11. § 110-11. Bail on a New Trial.) If the judg-

ment of conviction is reversed and the cause remanded

for a new. trial the trial court may order that the © ail

stand pending such trial, or ‘reduce or increase bai.

110—12. § 110-12. Notice of Change of Address.) A per-

son who has been admitted to bail shall give written no-

_ tice to the clerk of the court before which the proceeding

is pending cf any change in his address within 24 hours

after such change.

110—13. § 110-13. Persons Prohibited from Furnishing

Bail Security.) No attorney at law practicing in this State

and no official authorized to admit another to bail or to

accept bail shall furnish anv part of any security for

bail in any criminal action er any proceeding nor shall

-any such person act As surety for any accused admitted

to bail.

110—14. § 119-14. Credit for Incarceration on Bailable

Offense.) Any person incarcerated on a hailable offense

‘ who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is lev-

ied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit

of $5 for each day so incarcerated prior to conviction ex-

cept that in no case shall the amount so allowed or ered-—

ited exceed the amount of the fine.

110—15. § 110-15. Applicability of Provisions for Giv-

ing and Taking Bail.) The provisions of Sections 110-7

and 110-8 of this Code are exclusive of other provisions °

of law for the giving, faking, or enforcement. of bail. In

all cases where a person is admitted to bail the provi-

sions of Section 110-7 and 110-8 of this Code shall be

- applicable.

.

- ee

Lae AES I CRSP AMEE a: 5 LATS DAT SY STi BBR 5 i ic

, ”

X1ii. ;

However, the Supreme Court may, by rule or order,

. prescribe’a uniform schedule- of amounts of bail in speci-

fied traffic and conservation cases, quasi-criminal offenses,

and misdemeanors. Such uniform schedule mdy provide

.that the cash deposit provisions of Section 110-7 shall.

not apply to bail amounts established for alleged viola- ;

tions punishable by the fine alone, and the schedule may ;

further provide that in Specified traffic cases a valid Tlli-

nois chauffeur’s or operator’s license must be deposited,

in addition to 10% of the amount of the bail specified in

the schedule. As amended by act approved Aug. 14, 1967.

‘L. 1967, p. ——, S.B. No. 1168. _

/

Bea eae

RIT IN YS

my! a

mt PONS

PAS cy aes os seit i

CS. <eiwrsis woe:

COTE SAE Lg eid m2

X1v.

|” APPENDIX C_

88th CONGRESS .

2d Session

eee an S280.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES |

May 14 (legislative day, March 30), 1964

Mr. Ervin (for, himself Mr. ‘Hruska, Mr. Fong, Mr. Bayh,

Mr. Williams of New Jersey, and Mr. Johnson)/ intro-

duced the following. bilk; Which was read twice and. re-

ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

2 | A BILL~

To further implement the constitutional right to bail by

permitting persons admitted o bail to make a cash de-

posit with the court in leu ‘of providing securities or

other ¢ollateral security,

Be it enacted by the Senate and. Howes of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled, That (a) chapter 207 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new

section as follows:

93147. Cash deposit

“(a) Whenever the amount of bail has been fixed ‘in

the case of any person charged with an offense against

the United States, such person shall execute a bond for

his appearance, and, in lieu of providing other collateral

security or sureties, may deposit in the registry of the

court a sum equal to 10 per centum of the amount of bail

e’

xv. _*

so fixed. Upon the deposit of such sum such person shall .

be released from ‘custody subject tothe conditions of this

bond. , |

“(b) If there is no breach of condition of a bond given

by any person as provided in subsection a), the court»

‘ . ’ .

shall release sich person from the obligation of the bond,

but shall retain 10 per centum of the sum deposited by

sueh person to defray bail bond costs. The balance of such

deposit shall, no judgment for court costs and/or fine be-

ing entered against such person, be returned to him. In

the event judgment for court costs and/or fine is entered

against ‘such person, the balance of such deposit shall he

first applied t6 the payment of such judgment.’ |

“(c) If there is.a breath of condition of a bond given

by any person as provided in subsection (a), the court

shall declare a forfeiture of the full amount-of the bail

fixed in the case of such person. Notice of the forfeiture

shall be mailed to such person at his last known address,

and, if such person does not appear as required within

thirty days after-the mailing of such notice and the for-

feiture is not set aside by the court, the court shall render

Judgnient of default against such person in the full

amount of the hail. The court may direct that any such

forfeiture be set aside if, under all the circumstances, it

appears that justice does not require the enforcement

thereof. Any judgment of default against such person

shall he enforced by all available processes of the court,

and the amount deposited by such person in the registry

of the court shall be applied to the payment of eosts and

the halance thereof shall be applied. to the judgment.

“(d) Nothing in this section shall limit in any way

the application of section 3146 of this title to any per-

son.” | | ae

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Penwert

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7. V1.

(b) The. analysis of chapter 207 of title 18, United

States Code, is amended by inserting at the end thereof

the following: -

“3147. Cash deposit.”

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