Motion for Leave — Trbovich v. Mine Workers

47

MOTION FILED

“7 4

i 3

~-

~

Now )

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States 7 ,

Oc TOBER Term, 1971

No. 71-119

—j>__

James Day Hopesoy, Secretary of Labor,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

—and—

Mike TrBOVICH (Proposed Intervenor),

* Petitioner,

4

Unirep Mine Workers OF AMERICA,

| Defendant- Resaondent.

-

mas

MOTION F OR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AND BRIEF ~

on ” AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,

AMICUS CURIAE

Metvin L. WuLr

SanForp Jay Rosen

American Civil Liberties Union }

156 Fifth Avenue '

New York, New York 10010

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

ive

INDEX

| | ‘PAGE

Motion for Leave to File Brief of American Civil

Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae eee 1

Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus

CUTIAE naan = aa en eee 5

Interest of Amicus Curiae ... So eteSaeeesvneease tees 5

Question Presented ae Sueepeceeaen cere 5

Statement of the Case sevttnceceetensseeeeeneeeentnanecenttneeeeeetnqeet 6

ARGUMENT

II. Title IV should be interpreted to allow inter-

._ vention in appropriate cases, such as the present

BS eee eee Neale occas 11

CONCLUSION’ ooo.ceecececceeseeceeenee. Ste ecstatic a

. TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES

Cases: | a

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,

Ine. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 oe 15

Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 8, 9, 10

' Cascade-National Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas

Corp., 386 U.S. 129 satin oebeateasisinvece ented ice. 1D

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 91 S. Ct.

oC LL Ee ea ee: 9

Common Cause v. Democratic National Committeé,

D. Ct. D.C. Civ. Action 61-71 (1971) 15

| Formulabs, Ine. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th |

Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 945 11

PAGE

Hodgson v. Steelworkers, Local 6749, 91 S. Ct. 1841 ..: 16

International Union, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 ....15, 16

Office of Communication, United Chureh of Christ vy,

FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 0200... a 15

Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Erie Avenue Warehouse Co.,

. 802 F.2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1962) one cece eeeeealeeceeeeeeeee 11

Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 ool cceceeeeee nee 11-

Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258°F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 9

Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, 312 F. Supp.

538 (W.D. Pa. 1970) occ cece ceecceecceeccoeeceeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeee 10

Wirtz v. Local 153, = Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389

, _US. 463" ae ee en Se ne ee See 16

Constitutional Provisions:

United States Constitution

Article TID oo.c.ccecccccccceiccccccoccccecccccccececceccceceesteeccceeeeeeceee 14

Fifth Amendment 000.002.0000... .ece cece cece cece ececeeeeeeeceeeeceee 14

Rule: |

i) 181 Ae 1, eo ns re 25,141, 1517

Statutes: .

29 U.S.C. §431 (Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act of 1959, Title IT, $201) 20002... a7

29 U.S.C. §§482-483 (Labor-Management Reporting »

and Disclosure Act of 1959, Title TV, §§402-403) ....5, 6, 7,

8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17

Other Authorities:

Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-

tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,

66 Harv. Is. Rev. 1862 (1953) ee eeeeeeeeeeet. 14

Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before. .

Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev.

iA CLL cy 9 pee 10:10, 14

IN THE

ni ain Court of the United States

OcToBER Term, 1971

. No. 71-119

;

_JaMES Day Hopecson, Secretary of Labor,

Plaintiff-Respondent™

—and—

Mike TrBovIcH (Proposed Intervenor),

Petitioner,

—V.—

Unirep Mine Workers or AMERICA,

Defendant-Respondent.

<i

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AS AMICUS CURIAE

It is hereby respectfully moved pursuant to Rule 42 of

the Rules of this Court that the American Civil-Liberties

Union be granted leave to file the accompanying brief

amicus curiae in support of the petitioner.

_ The amicus curiae filed a brief in support of the Petition ©

for Writ of Certiorari. Letters of consent were filed with

that-brief from the petitioner and the respondent-plaintiff,

’ the Secretary of Labor. By an oversight, consent was not

requested from the respondent-defendant, United Mine

Workers of America, and service was not made on counsel

r the respondent-defendant. As soon as this oversight

| noticed, counsel for the respondent-defendant was

2

served three copies of the Brief in Support of the Petition

for Writ of Certiorart by first class airmail on October

27, 1971. On, the same day counsel for the amicus curiae

contacted counsel for respondent-defendant, apprised him -

of the oversight, and requested leave to file the attached ~

brief in support of the petitioner on the merits. Consent

was declined. Consent was granted on behalf of the peti-

tioner and the respondent-plaintiff. These letters of con-

sent have been filed with the Clerk.

The American Civil Liberties Union is a nation-wide

“non-partisan organization with approximately 160,000 mem-

bers in the United States. It is engaged-solely in the de-

fense of those principles embodied in the Bill of Rights.

During its fifty-year existence, the ACLU has been con-

cerned with the special responsibility labor unions have to

maintain democratic standards. -In a mempbership ‘organi-

zation, the freedom of election and balloting i is the ultimate

and most important freedom in the democratie conduct and

control of the group. Hence, ACLU is especially concerned

that the election provisions of the Labor-Management Re-

‘porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Title IV, 29 U.S.C.

§$482-483 are interpreted and administered in such a way

as to most assure free and open union elections.

This case raises important questions concerning the

ability of union members to intervene in lawsuits brought

by the Secretary of Labor to enforce the provisions of

Title IV. It concerns, therefore, proper judicial .enforce-

ment of the statutory guarantee of free and open wnion

elections. It also involves compelling issues of fairness,

PTO

= - ¢f

not unlike those of due process of law. The issues in this * :

case go well beyond.the interesty of the direct parties to it.

In the attached brief, therefore, amicus curiae presents . =

argument to place the case in the hpoader context. i

Respectfully submitted, , yo oF

:

Metvin L. WuL¥ | i

SanForp Jay Rosen z

American Civil Liberties Union a

156 Fifth Avenue 1. 3

New York, New York 10010 &

_ Atiorneys for Movant. f

SENECA NEEL R ME SOL LOE NR YP AEE TERN NS

asteeuny

5a

ee,

WRRES /

| “ eg

In THE F

Supreme Court of the United States =

OcTOBER Term, 1971 | L i

No. 71-119 ie / be &

. <- ;

—_$—~——

BS te

JAMES ‘Day Hopecson, Secretary of Labor,

| Plant’ Respondent

, —and aa |

;

Mike: TRBOvICH (Proposed Intervenor), F

: | Pétitioner, e

SS 4

Unitep MINE Worters OF AMERICA, _ é

Defendant-Respondent. ‘ 4

. » 5°

.

. ‘BRIEF OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ’

' AMICUS CURIAE © Lf

'

Intevest of Amicus Curiae

The interest of aniicus curiae is ‘set forth in the pre-

ceding motion.

‘

~

- Question Presented

| Whether a member of a labor organization, who satisfies

all conditions for intervention of right under Rule 24(a),

FRCP, is entitled to intervene, on behalf of himself and

* other members desiring a new election of union officers,

in a civil suit brought by the Secretary of Labor under

. ‘the LMRDA, to set aside a union election.

Statement of the Case

This is one in a series of lawsuits brought or brought

about by the petitioner and others as a part of a coordi-

nated effort to reform and democratize one of the nation’s

‘largest labor unions, the United Mine Workers of Ameriea

(hereinafter referred to as UMW). The history of this

effort and of this lawsuit, is set out in some detail in the

Petition for Writ of Vertiorari, pp. 7-19. Suflice it to say,

this Court is asked to reverse the decisions of the courts

below denying the petitioner, Mike Trbovich, the right to

intervene in the present lawsuit. This particular suit was

brought by the Secretary of Labor, under Section 402())

of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as LMRDA), 20 USC.

Section 482(b), to set aside the UMW’s Dece mber 9, 1969,

election of International officers on grounds of massive

election irregularities.

The petitioner was the ‘ampaign manager for the late

Joseph A. “Jock” Yablonski, who unsuccessfully opposed

the incumbent UMW president, W. A. “T ony” Boyle, in the

December 9, 1969 election. Pursuant to Section 402(a) he,

the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Section 482(a), on December 8,

1969, Mr. Yablonski filed timely charges with the Sucedite V

of Labor contesting the election on several grounds under

Title IV of the LMRDA. After the murder of Mr. Yablon- °

ski, and his wife and daughter, in January 1970, the peti-

tioner succeeded to the complaint. He filed a formal com-

plaint on January 20, 1970. Presently, petitioner is Na-

tional Chairman of the Miners for Democracy, a reform

party within the UMW.

. 7

On March 5, 1970, after conducting his investigation of

the December 9, 1969 election, the Secretary of Labor

brought the present lawsuit, based upon petitioner's com.

plaint, in the District Court for the District of Columbia.

In his first cause of action he alleged violations of Title IV

of the LMRDA. In his second cause of action, he alleged

violations of record keeping and reporting requirements

of Title Il of the LMRDA.

e”

On October 2, 1970, petitionér moved on behalf of him-

self and the Miners for Democracy, under Rule « Uda) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to inter-

vene as of right or, in the alternatiy e, for permission to

intervene under Rule 24(b).

Petitioner proposed additional allemtions and claims for

relief, all of which were encompassed within the complaint

filed with the Secret tary of Labor. The additional allega-

tions related to political manipulation of the UMW W el-

fare and Retirement Fund, perpetuation of paper or

“bogus” local unions, and the union's failure to provide

and make available to its members adequate information

about, and records of, its finances as required -by Section

201 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Section 431. As additional

claims for relief, the petitioner requested the District Court

to require: . (1) disbanding of tlie bogus locals; (2) instal-

lation of a Board of Monitors to oversee UMW financial

affairs; (3) publication of a finding that the incumbent

president breached his fiduciary duty to all members of

_the union by manipulating the Welfare and Retirement.

Fund for political adv antage; (4) establishment of rules

for conduct of a rerun election, or appointment of a panel,

to be paid for out of UMW funds, to establish and enforce

8

fair rules for a rerun election; and (5) granting of proposed

intervenor attorney fees and costs.

Intervention was denied by the District Court solely on

the ground that by according the Secretary exclusive power

to initiate suit under Title IV, Congress also precluded in-

tervention by aggrieved union members in such suits as

the Secretary decided to bring. In a per curiam order, the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the

denial of intervention.

ARGUMENT

I.

The rule of Calhoon vy. Harvey does not preclude in-

tervention in the Secretary’s suits to enforce Title IV.

» |

This Court has held that suits falling “squarely within

Title IV of the [LMRD] Act... are to be resolved by

the admitiistrative and judicial vincedunes set out i that

Title.” Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 141. With certain.

exceptions not relevant here, the statute

:

. sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title.

IV rights, by permitting an individual member to file

a complaint with the Secretary of Labor challenging

the validity of any election because of violations of

Title IV. Upon complaint the Secretary investigates

and if he finds probable cause to believe that Title 1V

has been violated, he may file swt in the appropriate

district court. Calhoon v. Harvey, supra, 379 U.S. at

140. .

9

According to this Court, Congress sought to accomplish

three goals through Title 1V’s exclusive enforcement ma-

chinery. (1) Individuals should not be permitted “to block

or délay union elections by filing federal-court suits for

violation of Title IV.” Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 140.

(2) “Reliance on the’ discretion of the Seeretary is in

harmony with the general congressional policy to al-

low unions great latitude in resolving their own internal

controversies . . . ” Calhoon vy. Harvey, supra at 140. .

(3) When unions fail to remedy election difficulties in-

ternally, Congress chose “to utilize the agencies of Gov-

ernment most familiar with union problems to aid in bring-

ing about a settlement through discussion before resort to

the courts.” Calhoon vy. Harvey, supra at 140-41. (Em-

phasis added.)

In Calhoon, however, the Court was concerned only with

the exclusivity of the Title LV machinery, and the Secre-

tary’s control over enforcement, “before resort to the

courts,” Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 140-41. (Em-

phasis added.) Once the Secretary files his suit, a binding

determination has been made that the dispute is fit for

judicial resolution, and the Seeretarv’s exclusive control

ends.* Different considerations govern the question of who

may participate in the proceedings. As Professor Shapiro

observed, just because Title IV vests in the Secretary ex-

clusive authority to bring suit:

*Some courts have ruled that the Secretary’s control is never

absolutely exclusive, and that complaining parties under Section

402 “have a judicially enforceable right to demand that the Secre-

tary exercise his discretionary authority in a manner consistent

with the requirements of the Act an@not arbitrarily or capri-

ciously.”” De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381. 383 (D.D.C. 1969) :

Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705, 708 (S.D.N_Y. 1966). See

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park vy. Volpe, 918. Ct. 814 (1971).

10

?

[I]t need not follow that the complainant who starts

the machinery of the Secretary in motion nay never

intervene to protect his interest once’a case is filed.

That determination may well turn on a number of

factors quite separate from his standing to sue, includ-

ing the nature of his interest and the adequacy of the

protection afforded that interest by existing parties.

Shapiro, Sume Thoughts on Intervention Before

Courts, Agencies, and: Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev.

721, 726-27 (1967).

See Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, 312 F. Supp.

538, 539 (W.D. Pa. 1970), where a union officer whose elee-

tion was challenged by the Secretary’s suit was held to

have sufficient interest to justify intervention “to protect

lis property interests “—presumably in his job.

None of the policy considerations discussed in Calhoon

pertains once the Secretary has filed suit: (1) If any union

election is blocked or delayed, it is because the Secretary

has exercised his exclusive jurisdiction to bring suit. Inter-

vention by interested parties will not change that fact.

(2) Once the Secretary has filed suit, the time for “allow-

‘{ing] unions great latitude in resolving their own_inter-

nal controversies ... ” (Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at

140) obviously has ‘passed. (3) So has hope of “bringing

about a settlement through discussion before resort to the

courts.” Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 140-41. (1em-

phasis added.), Further, the legislative history of Title

IV amply supports an interpretation that allows interven-

tion. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 23-29.

11

Il.

Title IV should be interpreted to allow intervention

in appropriate cases, such as the present case.

Intervention is welcome, indeed invited, in federal civil

practice. Thus it is not at all unusual for parties who are

unable to bring suit to be empowered to intervene once

suit is brought. For example, this Court has long held in

diversity of jurisdiction cases that parties may intervene

even though they would have destroved federal court

diversity jurisdiction if they had originally been. parties.

Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236. See Formulabs, Inc. v. Hart-

ley Per Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375

U.S. 945; Pewnss eants R.R. Co. v. Erie Avenue Warehouse

Co., 302 F.2d 843, 845<(3rd Cir. 1962). According to Pro-

on Shapiro:

[T Jo decide whether a particular action may be brought

by this plaintiff against this defendant may require

a determination of whether the controy ersy is ripe for

adjudication, whether the parties before the court are

the real parties in interest, and whether the interests

asserted are sufficient to mobilize the judicial ma-

chinery. When one seeks to intervene in an ongoing

lawsuit, these basic questions have presumably, been

resolved; the disposition of the request, then, should:

focus on whether the prospective intervener has a

sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute

to the resolution of the controversy to justify his in-

clusion. Shapiro, supra, 81 Hary. L. Rev. at 726.

Intervention in civil actions in federal district court is .

governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

Stat Ba ERY oe ale

%

12

dure. It was most recently revised in 1966, seven years

after enactment of the LMRDA. According to this Court,

“some elasticity was injected” in Rule 24.by the 1966 amend-

ment. Cascade-National Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas

Corp., 386 U.S. 129, 134. In other words, intervention is to

be the rule, rather than the exception.

Rule 24(b) provides for permissive intervention by

claimants in several broad categories. Most pertinent to

this case, Rule 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of

right:

. when the applicant claims an interest relating

to the property or transaction which is the subject

of the action and he is so situated that the disposrtion

- of the action may as a practical matter impair or im-

pede his ability to protect that interest, unless the ap-.

plicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.

The petitioner satisfies all of the: requisites of Rule

24(a). (1) As the leader of a minority party within the

UMW, he claims a substantial interest in “the subject mat- °

ter of the action.” He is the present successor to Jock

Yablonski, and “the subject matter of the action” is the

legality of the December 9, 1969 UMW election in which

Mr. Yablonski unsuccessfully sought the presidency of the .

Union. He challenges that election; that challenge is the

crux of the lawsuit. (2) Unquestionably, “disposition of

the action” will “impair or impede” the petitioner’s “ability

to protect that interest.” Since the Secretary has “exclu-

sive” control over the decision to bring a lawsuit to enforce

Title IV, to all intents and purposes, “disposition of the.

action’ will result in final adjudication of the petitioner’s

°

13

interest. (3) The petitioner’s “interest is [not] adequately

represented by the existing parties.” The UMW is an ad-

verse party. And there is not merely a “difference of opin-

ion concerning the best method of handling the litigation”

between petitioner and the Secretary. Brief of the Secre-

tary of Labor in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, p. 11. The petitioner differs fundamentally

about whether certain ‘of the Union’s actions are unlaw-

ful, and as to appropriate remedy. In fact, the Secretary

has declined to allege three violations of the statute, or

to request several items of relief that the petitioner con-

siders crucial to:full adjudication of his interest and the

cause of action.

Thus the Secretary’s contention that the petitioner fails |

to meet the requisites for intervention as of right is un-

availing. Equally unavailing is the Secretary’s anxiety that

if the petitioner may intervene “the trial itself would in-

evitably be delayed and protracted by the additional issues

which petitioner seeks to interject.” Brief of the Secretary

of Labor in Opposition, p. 13. Some inconvenience always

results from adding parties to litigation; that is the price

of ever allowing intervention. This is a small price for the

vindication of a real party’s substantial interest. F urther,

this Court is not called upon in the present -appeal to pass

upon all of the issues involved in intervention.

When one is granted intervention, either as of right

or in the exercise of discretion, it does not necessarily

follow that he must be granted all the rights of a_

party at the trial and appellate levels, including full

rights of discovery and cross-examination, the ability

to veto a settlement of the case, and the right to appeal

from a final decision. It is both feasible and desirable

Are AS TINR IRN moe |

14

to break down the coneept of intervention into a mum.

ber of litigation rights and to econelude that a given

peyson has one or some of these rights but not all.

late land

Shfpire, supra, Ste Tanv. La. Rev. at 727) (footnotes

gmitted).

Resolution of these additiogal issues should awaitéhe mak-

ing of a trial reeord.

e

In cases like the present one, denial of the right to inter.

vene offends a healthy sense of fairness, and may raise

serious constitutional questions under the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment and Artiele TH. ('/.

Shapiro, supra, St Hany. b Treve at 726: fart, The Power

of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:

an Bavecreise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. lL. Rev. 1862 (1958).

Affirmative steps taken by the petitioner were jurisdic.

tonal requisites to the Seeretary’s cause of action. Seetion

402, LMRDA, PO UIS.C. $482. The interest being sued upon

is that of the petitioner, and those he represents, not that

of the Seeretary. The petitioner and those he represents

will teel the burden or gain the benetit of any resolution

of this lawsuit, not the Secretary. The petitioner and those

he represents are the experts. about the UMW and its elee-

tion processes (Petition for Writ of Certtorari, pp. 9-17,

35-37), not Che Seeretary. If the petitioner is foreclosed

from intervening, his “private” interest is forever sub-

‘merged and lost in the “pubhie™ interest. This lawsuit will

conclude the eleetion dispute and either vindieate or extin-

guish_ petitioner's interest. With the federal courts increas-

ingly enabling private parties to act as “private attorneys.

general” to enforce laws securing the public interest it

seems strange indeed to preclude interested private par-

¢

|

|

ye 1

15.

ties, like the petitioner, from intervening in public law-

suits: designed more to secure their interests than to secure

those of the publie. See, ee, Common Cause y. Dimocratic

National Committec, D. Ct. D.C Civ. Action 61-7] (1971):

Office of Communication, United Clhaarch of Christ vo FC,

359 IePd 994 (.C. Cir. 1966); see also, Association of

Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. y. Camp, 397

US. 150.

A compelling precedent. in a closely analogous area SUp-

ports the right to intervene in Tithe IV actions. In Inter-

udtional Union, UAW yx. Scofield, 382 US, 205, this Court

decided that parties who are successful in unfair labor

practice proceedings before the National Labor Rela-

tions Board have a right to intervene in Court of Appeals

review proceedings. A basis for the Court’s decision was

the desire to conserve judicial energy, for under the

NLRA, the charging party might bring a second appeal if

the Board's decision were reversed, 382 U.S at 212. Never-

theless, the principle of Scofield is applicable to Title IV

actions, as is much of the Court’s analysis. Just as under

Title TV of the LM RDA, the scheme of the National Labor

_ Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA) places in the s0ard and

its General Counsel exclusive power over enforcement of

-the statute and prosecution of violations. Just as under

Title IV, the NLRA is silent with respect to the right of

a private par», who is successful in the administrative

. Process, to intervene in judicial review proceedings. Just

as under Title IV, in the NLRA, publie and private inter-

ests are “interblend[ed] in the intricate Statutory scheme.”

International Union, UAW y. Scofield, supra, 382 U.S. at

220. Yet in Scofield, the Court held in favor of interven.

tion, declaring: “To employ the rhetoric of ‘public inter-

2 Ne ee as

eet ot A.

eer

ere

ets

ASAE RENEY EAP MRP

~~

16 é

est,’ however, is not to imply that the publie right excludes

recognition of parochial private interests.” 382 U.S. at

ole.

Although the enforcement machinery established in Title

IV is exclusive, the provisions for enforcement are to he

construed generously, to assure vindication of “the inter-

ests protected by S401." (These interests are’ both public

and privaft.), Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers

Ass'n, 889 US. 468, 475. Hence this Court has held that an

intervening union election does not moot a suit brought by

the Secretary, to challenge a prior election (Wart: v. Local

£153, supra), and the Seeretary's cause of action under the

. statute is not limited solely to the allegations made in the

union member's complaint to the union and to the Seere-

tary, but may extend to matters of which the union had

constructive notice and opportunity to cure (Wirt: v. Local

125, Laborers’ Intl Crion, 389 U.S. 477). Last Term in

Hodason vy. Steelworkers, Local 6749, 91.8. Ct. E841, the

Court held that the Seeretary may litigate only those al-

leged violations which were raised by the complaining mem-

ber before his union. The claims which the Secretary may

raise are limited to those raised initially by the complain-

ing member betore his union, and brought to the Seere-

tary's attention by the complaining member, and not other

‘possible elaims which the Seeretarvy may discover in the

} * .

course of his own investigation. Thus the Court has, in

effect, recognized the “private” interest and not merely

the general “public” interest to. be enfcreed under Title IV.

The controlling precedents of this Court, therefore, lead

to the conclusion that when a union member-complainant

can expand upon the Secretary’s district court complaint

-

7 ” |

(without going beyond the charges filed with the Union and :

the Secretary) and thereby assure complete vindication of . k

all the interests protected by Title IV (see Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, pp. 35-37), he should be allowed to in. 7

tervene in the Secretary’s suit in a manner consistent with ;

‘Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This ;

analysis is fully confirmed by the legislative, history of ;

Title 1V. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 23-29. 4

. 5

/ CONCLUSION | f

Ho | .f

For the reasons set: forth in this brief, the Court |

should reverse the judgments of the courts below.- .

Respectfully submitted,

Me.vin L. Wutr ;

Sanrorp Jay Rosen ; :

American Civil Liberties Unton

156 Fifth Avenue

New York, New York 10010

Attorneys forsAmicus Curiae

November 1, 1971 | | \ Z