Appendix — Hodgson v. Local Union 6799, United Steelworkers

Supreme Court brief1971

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 655

JAMES D. HODGSON, Secretary of Labor,

Petitioner,

—

LocaL UNION 6799, United Steelworkers of America,

AFL-CIO, et al.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

Relevant Docket Entries z$ 1

In the United States District Court for the Ceneral District

of California:

Plaintiff's Complaint bsnl bastion com eaneidiesspdinehibns 3

Answer of Local Union 6799 _......_-»»»- = 7

Answer of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO - 9

United Steelworkers of panemaieite AFL-CIO’s Motion to

Intervene and Order... tia 10

Answers to Interrogatories 12

Pre-trial Conference Order > 13

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of — iienplibdenaieadibach 34

ii INDEX

Opinion—United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit li

Judgment—United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

IIE sicinsstssapib iniedashesteietigiinaeinch-anclakiutdilaonbatianicanaindiniaeaaeLe

Order of Supreme Court — conned filed December

RV RRSER VTS GR oeanitY me Ue rd mS DEC Rr RAO

Evidence submitted to the District Court _ bpthathaeee

Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings... ===

Exhibit 2 Article VII, Section 9 of the Constitution

of the International Union of United Steel-

workers of America

Exhibit 5 Letter dated July 8, 1967 from Nicholas

D. Hantzis to the International Executive

Board; Letter dated May 10, 1967 from

Nicholas D. Hantzis to I.W. Abel, Presi-

dent of United Steelworkers of America;

Telegram dated May 9, 1967 from Mr.

I. W. Abel to Honorable Frank S. McKee _

Exhibit 6 Letter dated August 31, 1967 from Walter

J. Burke to Nicholas Hantzis; Report of

Commission, Re: Election Appeal and two

SINE ‘sesiishiiniciscinscscenitsincibipiditatona coset

Exhibit 7 Letter dated September 14, 1967 from

Walter J. Burke to Nicholas Hantzis __

Exhibit 8 Complaint of violations of Public Law 257,

86th Congress, dated October 11, 1967 and

filed with the United States office of Labor

Management by Nicholas Hantzis

Exhibit 9 Letter dated November 21, 1967 from

Henry A. Queen to I. W. Abel

Exhibit 15 Table showing Unions which have attend-

ance at Union Meetings as a Requirement

for Nomination to Local Union office ___

Exhibit L Letter dated February 29, 1960 from

John L. Holcombe to Honorable Robert W.

Kastenmeir =

Exhibit M Letter dated February 4, 1966 from Frank

M. Kleiler to George Ford.

Exhibit N Letter dated November 25, 1966 from

Samuel V. Merrick to Honorable Jonathan

Bingham

167

168

176

182

183

188

190

191

192

INDEX iii

Evidence submitted to the District Court—Continued

Exhibit O Letter dated October 12, 1967 from Frank

M. Kleiler to Woodrow W. Donald 196

Exhibit P Letter dated October 27, 1967 from Sam-

uel V. Merrick to Honorable Jack Ed-

wards 198

Letter dated December 5, 1966 from Frank

M. Kleiler to Honorable Jacod K. Javits 201

Exhibit T Excerpts from United States Department

of Labor LMRDA Interpretive Manual... 208

Exhibit

Exhibit U Letter dated December 11, 1962 from John

L. Holcombe to James L. Paradise -__...... 205

Exhibit V Letter dated December 5, 1963 from Frank

M. Kleiler to Frank W. Anulies — 207

Exhibit W (Rejected) Table of number of candidates

appearing on ballot in union elections in

which Secretary of Labor is challenging

application of meeting attendance require-

ment 209

Exhibit X (Rejected) Tables of number of candi-

date appearing on ballot for office of presi-

dent in last local union election held by

each local union with 500 or more members

in Steelworkers’ District 38 —.._...

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

Date

Filings—Proceedings

No. 68-326-EC in the United States District

Court for the Central District of California

1968

February 29

March 27

March 28

November 25

December 27

1969

January 15

January 27

February 3

March 25

March 26

April 21

April 28

Complaint under Labor Management Report-

ing and Disclosure Act, filed

Answer of Local Union 6799 of the United

Steelworkers of America, filed

Answer of United Steelworkers of America,

filed

Motion to interevene, filed

Order granting Motion to intervene, filed

Pre-trial conference held

Pre-trial conference order, filed

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

filed

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, filed

Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment;

Court denied Motion

Order of Court denying Motion for Summary

Judgment, Filed

Trial

Order finding in favor of plaintiff and against

defendant, filed

Date Filings—Proceedings

1969

May 22 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

filed

Order setting aside election of President and

ordering new election, filed

July 18 Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal, filed

July 23 Defendant’s Notice of Appeal, filed

Nos. 24,759 and 24,800 in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

1970

May 8 Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Judgment of the Court of Appeals

No. 655 in the United States Supreme Court

September 4 Petition filed

November 6 Brief in oppvsition filed

December 7 Order of Supreme Court granting certiorari

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Civil Action No. 68-326-EC

COMPLAINT under (Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act of 1959)

W. WILLARD WIRTZ, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, PLAINTIFF _

Vv.

LocaL UNION 6799, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO-CLC, DEFENDANT

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action under Title IV of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Act

of September 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 519 et seg., 29 U.S.C. 401

et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

Jurisdiction of this action is conferred upon the Court

by section 402(b) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 482(b)).

III

Defendant, Local Union 6799, United Steelworkers of

America, AFL-CIO-CLC, is, and at all times relevant to

this action has been, an unincorporated association, main-

taining its principal offices at 10344 East Holt Boulevard,

City of Ontario, San Bernardino County, State of Cali-

fornia, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

Defendant is, and at all times relevant to this action

has been, a local labor organization engaged in an indus-

try affecting commerce within the meaning of sections

3(i), 3(j) and 401(b) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 402(j),

402 (j)). y

Defendant is, and at all times relevant to this action

has been, chartered by and subordinate to the United

Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC, hereinafter re.

ferred to as the International, an international labor or-

ganization engaged in an industry affecting commerce

within the meaning of sections 3(i) and 3(j) of the Act

(29 U.S.C. 402(i) and <v2(j)).

Defendant, acting pursuant to the International Consti-

tution. the By-Laws for Local Unions and the Local Union

Elections Manual, issued by the International conducted

an election of officers on June 12, 1967. This election was

subject to the provisions of Title IV of the Act (29 U.S.C.

481 et seq.).

VII

At defendant’s regular meeting on July 11, 1967,

Nicholas D. Hantzis, a member in good standing of the

defendant, acting pursuant to and in accordance with the

Local Union Elections Manual, attempted orally to pro-

test the defendant’s election. His protest was ruled out

of order. On July 18, 1967, Hantzis filed a written pro-

test with the International Executive Board which ap-

pointed an International Commission to hear the protest.

On August 28, 1967, the Commission issued its recommen-

dation that Hantzis’ protest be denied. By letter dated

September 14, 1967, Hantzis was advised that the Inter-

national Executive Board had adopted the Commission’s

recommendation. On October 12, 1967, Hantzis, acting

pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of sec-

tion 402(a) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 482(a)), filed a com-

plaint with the plaintiff alleging violations of section 401

of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481) in the conduct of defendant’s

1967 election of officers.

—

Vill

Plaintiff investigated the said complaint and, as a re-

suit of the facts shown by his investigation, found prob-

able cause to believe that violations of Title IV of the Act

had occurred during the conduct of the aforesaid election

which had not been remedied at the time of the institu-

tion of this action.

By letter dated November 21, 1967, addressed to I. W.

Abel, International President, the defendant and the

International were advised of the results of plaintiff's

investigation. By letter dated November 22, 1967, Winn

Newman, Associate General Counsel of the International,

agreed that the time in which the plaintiff might bring

suit with regard to defendant’s aforesaid election be ex-

tended until January 11, 1968. By letter dated December

96, 1967, Winn Newman, Associate General Counsel of

the International, agreed that the time in which the

plaintiff might bring suit with regard to defendant’s

aforesaid election be extended until February 1, 1968. By

ietter dated January 30, 1968, Michael Gottesman, Asso-

ciate General Counsel of the International, further agreed

that the time in which the plaintiff might bring suit with

to defendant’s aforesaid election be extended until

March 1, 1968. :

(a) Defendant, in the conduct of the aforesaid elec-

tion, violated section 401(e) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481

(e)) by:

(i) denying its members in good standing a reasonable

opportunity for the nomination of candidates by the im-

position of an unreasonable qualification ;

(ii) denying its members in good standing the right to

be candidates and to hold office by the imposition of the

said unreasonable qualification, and by the non-uniform

imposition of such qualification ;

(iii) denying its members the right to vote for or other-

wise support the candidate or candidates of their choice

by the imposition of the said unreasonable qualification ;

(b) In the conduct of the aforesaid election, moneys

received by a labor organization by way of dues, assess.

ments, or similar levy, were <»ylied to promote the can.

didacy of Kenneth L. Rose for the office of president, in

violation of section 401(g) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 49)

(g)).

The violations of section 401 of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481)

found and alleged above may have affected the outcome

of the said election.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment:

(a) declaring the election conducted by defendant on

June 12, 1967, to be null and void;

(b) directing the defendant to conduct a new election

of officers, including new nominations, under the supervi-

sion of the plaintiff;

(d) for such other relief as may be appropriate.

/s/ Edwin L. Weisl, Jr.

EDWIN L. WEISL, JR.

Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Dzintra I. Janavs

United States Attorney

/s/ Harland F. Leathers

HARLAND F.. LEATHERS

Atcorney, Department of Justice

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CHARLES DONAHUE

Solicitor

GEORGE T. AVERY

Associate Solicitor

ALTERO D’ AGOSTINI

Regional Attorney

CORNELIUS S. DONOGHUE, JR.

Attorney

U. S. Department of Labor

Of Counsel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Title omitted in printing]

ANSWER OF LOCAL UNION 6799, UNITED STEELWORKERS

or America, AFL-CIO

Defendant, LOCAL UNION 6799, UNITED STEEL-

WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, answers the com-

plaint as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE

1. Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraphs III,

IV, V, VI, 1X and the third, fourth and fifth sentences

of Paragraph VII.

2. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient

to form a belief as to the correctness of the allegations of

Paragraph VIII and the sixth sentence of Paragraph

VIL.

3 Defendant denies each and every allegation of Para-

graphs I, II, X and XI, and the first two sentences of

Paragraph VII.

SECOND DEFENSE

Defendant and International were not afforded notice

of, or a reasonable opportunity to correct, the matters al-

leged in Paragraph X of the complaint, in that said mat-

ters were not made the subject of protest within the

Union; accordingly, as to such matters, the requirements

of Section 402(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) have

not been met, the Secretary lacks authority to bring this

action, and this Court lacks jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the complaint be

dismissed with costs to defendant.

DATED: March 26, 1968.

BERNARD KLEIMAN, Esq.

ELLIOTT BREDHOFF, Esq.

MICHAEL H. GOTTESMAN, Eso,

GEORGE H. COHEN, Esq.

WINN NEWMAN, Esg.

ARNOLD, SMITH & SCHWARTZ

By /s/ Jerome Smith

JEROME SMITH

Attorneys for Defendant,

— — 6799, United

teelworkers of America,

AFL-CIO

[Affidavit of Service omitted in printing]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Title omitted in printing]

ANSWER OF UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO

Intervening defendant, UNITED STEEL-WORKERS

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, answers the complaint as fol-

econ FIRST DEFENSE

Intervening defendant adopts, as its first defense, the

answer filed by defendant Local Union 6799, United

Steelworkers of Ameriea, AFL-CIO.

SECOND DEFENSE

The “meeting attendance” requirement challenged in

this action is contained in intervening defendant’s Inter-

national Constitution; is uniformly applied to each of the

more than 8,000 local unions affiliated with intervening

defendant; and is a “reasonable qualification uniformly

” within the meaning of Section 401(e) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. §481(e). The nominations and elections

at Local 6799 were conducted in accordance with all re-

quirements of the Act.

WHEREFORE, intervening defendant prays that the

complaint be dismissed.

DATED: March 26, 1968.

BERNARD KLEIMAN, ESQ.

ELLIOTT BREDHOFF, ESQ.

MICHAEL H. GOTTESMAN, ESQ.

GrorRGE H. COHEN, ES@.

WINN NEWMAN, EsQ.

ARNOLD, SMITH & SCHWARTZ

By /s/ Jerome Smith

JEROME SMITH

Attorneys for Defendant,

United Steelworkers of

America, AFL-CIO

[Affidavit of Service omitted in printing]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Title omitted in printing]

MOTION To INTERVENE

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-

CIO, moves pursuant to Rule 24(a), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, to intervene in this action as a party

defendant, and in support thereof shows as follows:

1. Movant is an international union, with which more

than 3,000 local unions are affiliated.

2. Movant’s International Constitution contains rules

and procedures governing the nominations and election of

officers in each of its affiliated local unions, which must be

followed by each of said local unions.

8. Defendant is a local union affiliated with movant,

and as such was required to implement the “meeting

attendance” requirement contained in movant’s Interna-

tional Constitution.

4. Movant has been informally advised by plaintiff that

Paragraph X(a) of the complaint herein is directed at,

and challenges the validity of, said “meeting attendance”

requirement.

5. Movant therefore has a direct interest in the out-

come of this action, for a decision favorable to plaintiff

would cast doubt on the validity of this provision of mov-

ant’s International Constitution, while a decision favor-

able to defendant would vindicate this provision of mov-

ant’s International Constitution.

6. Movant’s responsive pleading is tendered herewith.

WHEREFORE, movant prays that this motion be

granted, and that UNITED STEELWORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO, be granted intervention as a party

defendant.

DATED: March 26, 1968.

BERNARD KLEIMAN, ESQ.

ELLIOTT BREDHOFF, ESQ.

MICHAEL H. GOTTESMAN, ESQ.

GEORGE H. COHEN, ESQ.

WINN NEWMAN, ESQ.

ARNOLD, SMITH & SCHWARTZ

By /s/ Jerome Smith

JEROME SMITH

Attorneys for Defendant,

United Steelworkers of

America, AFL-CIO

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 28, 1968.

/s/ E. Avery Crary

United States District Judge

[Affidavit of Service omitted in printing]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Title omitted in printing]

ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES

e 5 = *

Interrogatory 14: Does the plaintiff contend that the

protest filed with the Union by Nicholas D. Hantzis on

July 18, 1967, afforded defendants fair notice that:

(a) Its nomination requirement, as set forth in Ar-

ticle VII, Section 9(c), might be invalid?

(b) Glenn Ross had improperly been declared ineligi-

ble?

(d) Any impropriety had been committed with respect

to Marvin Wright?

Answer to 14: No.

Interrogatory 15: Does the plaintiff contend that the

Hantzis protest called upon defendants to correct any or

all of the matters listed in Interrogatory 14 above? If go,

which ones?

Answer to 15: No.

* aa a *

WM. MATTHEW BYRNE, JR.

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. Brosio, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

/s/ DZINTRA I. JANAVS

DZINTRA I. JANAVS

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff

(Affidavit omitted in printing)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Title omitted in printing]

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE ORLOR

Following pre-trial proceedings, pursuant to Rule 16,

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 9

of this Court,

IT IS ORDERED:

This action was instituted by W. Willard Wirtz, Secre-

tary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, plain-

tiff, under Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting

and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. 481 et seq.) seek-

ing judgment declaring the election conducted by defend-

ant Local Union 6799, United Steelworkers of America,

AFL-CIO, null and void, and directing the defendant to

conduct a new election of its officers, including new nomi-

nations, under the supervision of the plaintiff. The is-

sues are raised by the Complaint and the Answers of de-

fendant Local Union 6799 and defendant by intervention,

the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO.

Jurisdiction of this action is asserted by plaintiff un-

der section 402(b) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 482(b}). Plain-

tiff has investigated the complaint filed with him on Oc-

tober 12, 1967 by NICHOLAS D. HANTZIS, a member

in good standing of defendant Local Union 6799 and has

found probable cause to believe that violations of Title IV

of the Act have occurred and have not been remedied.

Defendant admits that, rior to filing his complaint with

the plaintiff, Mr. Hantzis properly invoked his internal

union remedies and that his complaint to the plaintiff was

timely and properly file¢in accordance with section 402 (a)

of the Act (29 U.S.C. 482(a)), subject to Issue of Law

No. VIII A, infra. Within the time allowed by successive

waivers by the Associate General Counsel of defendants

of the sixty-day period provided in the aforesaid section

of the Act, plaintiff has brought this civil action against

defendant Local Union 6799 as an entity, in the District

Court of the United States for the Central District of

California, in which defendant Local Union 6799 has its

principal place of business.

III

The following facts are admitted and require no proof:

(1) Defendant Local Union 6799 is, and at all times

relevant to this action has been, an unincorporated asgo-

ciation maintaining its principal offices at 103% East

Holt Boulevard, City of Ontario, San Bernardino County,

State of California, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

(2) Defendant Local Union 6799 is, and at all times

relevant to this action has been, a local labor organiza-

tion engaged in an industry affecting commerce within

the meaning of sections 3(i), 3(j) and 401(b) of the Act

(29 U.S.C. 402 (i), 402(j) and 481(b)).

(3) Defendant Local Union 6799 is, and at all times

relevant to this action has been, chartered by and subordi-

nate to defendant in intervention, the United Steelwork-

ers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the

defendant International, an international labor organiza-

tion engaged in an industry affecting commerce within

the meaning of sections 3(i) and 3(j) of the Act (29

U.S.C. 402(i) and 402(j)).

(4) Defendant Local Union 6799 was chartered by the

defendant International on May 27, 1965, and had ap-

proximately 578 members as of April 1967.

(5) Pursuant to Article VII, Section 5 of the interven-

ing defendant International’s Constitution defendant L-

cal Union 6799 is deemed to have adopted, and did adopt,

the Standard By-Laws for Local Unions which were last

republished in January 1967 issued by the International.

(6) Defendant Local Union 6799, at all relevant times,

has been conducting its affairs under the aforesaid By-

Laws (as republished January, 1967); the Constitutions

of International Union, United Steelworkers of America,

—

AFL-CIO (adopted September 1964, and September 21,

1966) and the Local Union Elections Manual of the

United Steelworkers of America (as amended to January

7, 1967). The election provisions of the aforesaid By-

Laws, Constitutions and Elections Manual were, and are

now, subject to the provisions of Title IV of the Act.

(7) On May 18, 1967, Frank S. McKee, a Staff Repre-

sentative of the defendant International, sent the follow-

ing telegram to I. W. Abel, President, United Steelwork-

ers of America:

Local Union 6799 District 38, was chartered May

27, 1965. Contract with H. W. Loud Co., of Pomona

Calif., signed July 15, 1965. First regular local union

meeting scheduled and held in August 1965, Several

meetings were held between May 27, 1965 the date

the local union received its charter and August of

1965. In order that this local union will be in com-

pliance with Article VII, Section Nine of the Inter-

national Constitution would you please advise if the

eligibility to hold a local union office began with the

first regular local meeting held in August 1965 or

would it be necessary to count the meetings held

starting immediately after May 27, 1965.

(8) On May 9, 1967, I. W. Abel, President of the de-

fendant International, sent the following telegram to

Frank S. McKee:

REURTEL members of Local Union 6799 would have

to have credit for one half the regular meetings held

beginning August 1965 to meet the meeting attend-

ance requirement.

(9) On May 8, 1967, defendant Local Union 6799 con-

ducted two meetings for the purpose of nominating candi-

dates for the offices of President, Vice President, Record-

ing Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, Guide, In-

side Guard, Outside Guard and three Trustees. The elec-

tion of these offices was conducted on June 12, 1967. The

nomination meetings and election were subject to the pro-

visions of Title IV of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481 et seq.).

(10) To be eligible as a candidate, a member (a)

must have been in continuous good standing from the

time he joined Local Union 6799, (b) must have been

employed by H. W. Loud, Inc., and (c) must have at-

tended eleven of the regular monthly membership meet-

ings conducted by defendant Local Union 6799 between

August 1965 and April 1967, provided that a member

who failed to attend a meeting because his union activi-

ties or working hours prevented his attendance would re-

ceive credit as if he had in fact attended that meeting.

(11) Prior to January 1967, defendant Local Union

6799 held two meetings each month: one for the day

shift on the second Monday of each month scheduled to

begin at 7:00 P.M. and another for the swing-shift on

the second Tuesday of each month scheduled to begin in

various months at varying times between 12:30 A.M. and

1:00 A.M.

(12) In January 1967, defendant Local Union 6799

changed its swing-shift meetings to the second Tuesday

of each month scheduled to begin at 1:00 P.M.

(18) The swing-shift work hours are from 3:30 P.M.

to 12:00 midnight; however, a substantial number of

swing-shift employees frequently worked a 9-hour sched-

ule until 1:00 A.M.

(14) Twenty-one (21) regular monthly meetings were

scheduled to be conducted by defendant Local Union 6799

between August 1965 and April 1967. With respect to

each, separate meetings were scheduled to be held for

“day shift” and “swing shift” employees. The dates of

these meetings, with the number of members attending

each such meeting set forth in parentheses, were as fol-

lows:

August 30, 1965 (day shift), (51)

September 13, 1965 , (75)

October 11, 1965 “ PPG (58)

November 8, 1965 - Cia (67)

December 13, 1965 <s ae (49)

January 10, 1966 ™ mi ik (70)

February 14, 1966 ¥ aie (38)

March 14, 1966 5 my (60)

April 11, 1966 . citer (44)

May 9, 1966 - se

(42)

June 13, 1966 (day shift), (58)

July 11, 1966 a . a (48)

August 8, 1966 a ‘ (43)

September 12, 1966 4 a (28)

October 10, 1965 “ “ : (36)

November 14, 1966 ss “ ; (41)

December 12, 1966 “ ane (25)

January 9, 1967 “ ae (35)

February 18, 1967 66 “ . (19)

March 18, 1967 “ a (41)

April 10, 1967 ey * (55)

August 31, 1965 (swing shift), (44)

September 14, 1965 “ ; (36)

October 12, 1965 “ “ ' (17)

November 9, 1965 “ “ (58)

December 14, 1965 “ “ : (19)

January 11, 1966 “ wee (30)

February 15, 1966 “ oe . (24)

March 15, 1966 “ hen (28)

April 12, 1966 “ _ (22)

May 10, 1966 “ ap (25)

June 14, 1966 “ “ : (28)

July 12, 1966 “ * (81)

August 9, 1966 “ s (20)

September 18, 1966 “ o (18)

October 11, 1966 “ Miia (25)

November 15, 1966 “ af ( 5)

December 13, 1966 “ ae (10)

January 9, 1967 eee (18)

February 18, 1967 “ eat (17)

March 18, 1967 “ “ : (11)

April 10, 1967 “ “ : (14)

All meetings were held at Eagles Lodge, 103% East

Holt, Ontario, except that the August 1965 meetings were

held at Carpenters Hall, East Second Street, Pomona,

California.

(15) The swing shift meeting for November, 1966 was

scheduled to begin at 1:00 A.M. on November 15, 1966.

By 2:30 A.M., only five members had arrived and signed

the attendance register. Since the number of members in

attendance did not constitute a quorum, no business was

conducted.

The swing shift meeting for December 1966 was sched-

uled to begin at 1:00 A.M. on December 18, 1966. By

2:45 A.M., only five members had arrived and signed the

attendance register. Since the number of members in at-

tendance did not constitute a quorum, no business was

conducted. Between 2:45 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., as the

meeting hall was being closed, five additional members

arrived, and signed the register.

(16) Only thirty-six (36) members of defendant Local

Union 6799 attended at least eleven of the regular month-

ly membership meetings conducted by defendant Local

Union 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967. Of this

number nine (9) were incumbent officers of defendant

Local Union 6799.

(17) The only excuses for non-attendance at the regu-

lar monthly membership meetings conducted by defend-

ant Local Union 6799 for which credit would be given

were union activities and working hours.

(18) It is approximately a 15-minute drive from the

employer’s plant to the union hall of defendant Local Un-

ion 6799, where the regular meetings are generally held.

(19) The Election Committee as elected on May 8,

1967 to conduct the June 12, 1967 election was composed

of OTfO K. FEENSTRA (Chairman), KENNETH

EASTItN, TRIBUNE C. LIO, GLENN GREENLY, and

MARVIN WRIGHT.

(20) At the regular monthly memership meetings

conducted by defendant Local Union 6799 on May 8, 1967,

a total of forty-nine (49) members were nominated as

candidates, including twenty (20) members who declined

nomination at the meeting, and two (2) who declined

thereafter.

(21) After nominations were closed the Election Com-

mittee determined that four nominees were ineligible to

be candidates because they had neither attended eleven

meetings conducted by defendant Local Union 6799 be

tween August 1965 and April 1967 nor had sufficient ex-

cused absences to receive credit for having attended a

total of eleven meetings.

(a) George Pruneri, who had been nominated av a

candidate for the office of Trustee, was declared ineligible

because he had neither attended eleven regular monthly

membership meetings conducted by defendant Local Union

6799 between August 1965 and April 1967, nor had suf-

ficient excused absences to receive credit for having at-

—

tended a total of eleven meetings. Mr. Pruneri attended

five meetings conducted by defendant Local Union 6799,

between August 1965 and April 1967.

(b) Ray Mahan, who had been nominated as a candi-

date for the office of Treasurer, was declared ineligible

because he had neither attended eleven regular monthly

membership meetings conducted by defendant Local Un-

jon 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967, nor had

sufficient excused absences to receive credit for having

attended a total of eleven meetings. Mr. Mahan attended

six meetings conducted by defendant Local Union 6799

between August 1965 and April 1967.

(ec) Elmer G. Husmann, who had been nominated as a

candidate for the office of Trustee, was declared ineligible

because he had neither attended eleven regular monthly

membership meetings conducted by defendant Local Un-

ion 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967, nor had

sufficient excused absences to receive credit for having

attended a total of eleven meetings. Mr. Husmann at-

tended nine regular monthly membership meetings con-

ducted by defendant Local Union 6799 between August

1965 and April 1967.

(d) Glenn Ross, who had been nominated as a candi-

date for the office of Financial Secretary, was declared

ineligible because he had neither attended eleven regular

monthly membership meetings conducted by defendant

Local Union 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967,

nor had sufficient excused absences to receive credit for

having attended a total of eleven meetings. Mr. Ross at-

tended seven regular monthly membership meetings con-

ducted by defendant Local Union 6799 between August

1965 and April 1967: May 10, June 14, July 12, August

9, October 11, and December 13, 1966, and February 18,

1967. On these dates Mr. Ross worked the following

hours: 3:21 P.M. May 9 to 1:01 A.M. May 10; 3:25 P.M.

June 13 to 1:04 A.M. June 14; 3:23 P.M. July 11 to 1:05

A.M. July 12; 3:24 P.M. August 8 to 1:03 A.M. August

9; 3:19 P.M. October 10 to 1:01 A.M. October 11; 3:09

P.M. December 12 to 1:00 A.M. December 18; and 3:31

February 13 to 1:02 A.M. February 14.

Glenn Ross worked nine (9) hour shifts on the meet.

ing nights in November and December 1965 until approxt.

mately 1:00 A.M. Mr. Ross worked from 3:21 P.M. Jan.

uary 10, 1966, to 1:03 A.M. on January 11, 1966; from

3:12 P.M. on March 14, to 1:00 A.M. on March 15, 1966;

from 3:21 P.M. on April 11, to 1:05 A.M. on April 12,

1966; and from 3:21 P.M. on November 14, to 1:02 A.M.

on November 15, 1966.

(22) The following members were permitted to be

candidates in the June 12, 1967 election conducted by

defendant Local Union 6799, by virtue of the excused

absences granted them by the Election Committee.

(a) Ralph Bowman, who had attended five regular

monthly membership meetings conducted by defendant

Local Union 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967,

and who received credit for having attended an addi-

six meetings, was permitted to be a candidate for the

office of Recording Secretary.

(b) Jerry Wooten, who had attended nine regular

monthly membership meetings conducted by defendant

Local Union 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967,

and w ho received credit for having attended an addi-

tional three meetings, was permitted to be a candidate for

the office of Treasurer.

monthly membership meetings conducted by defendant

Local Union 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967,

received credit for having attended an additional five

meetings, and was permitted to be a candidate for ihe

office of Guide.

(d) Ed Poynter, who had attended eight regular

monthly membership meetings conducted by defendant

Local Union 6799 between August 1965 and April 1967,

and received credit for having attended one additional

meeting, was permitted to be a candidate for the office of

Outside Guard.

(23) The names of those declared eligible by the Elec-

tion Committee appeared on the printed ballot, and the

election was conducted as scheduled on June 12, 1967.

The details, office-by-office are as follows:

(a) President

The following persons were nominated as candidates for

president of defendant Local Union 6799: Don Redell,

Ken Rose and Nick Hantzis. Each was declared eligible

by the Election Committee, and each appeared on the

hallot. The election results were:

Rose 191 (elected)

Hantzis 147

Redell 59

(b) Vice President

The following persons were nominated as candidates

for Vice President of defendant Local Union 6799: Mel

Seruggs, George Hill, Loyd Cole, Hilton Willcox, Art

Todd, Virgil Steele, and Ralph Bowman. Hill, Todd and

Bowman declined the nomination. Each of the remaining

nominees—Scruggs, Cole, Willcox and Steele—was de-

cared eligible by the Election Committee, and each ap-

peared on the ballot. The election results were:

Scruggs 268 (elected)

Cole 47

Willcox 45

Steele 82

(ec) Recording Secretary

The following persons were nominated as candidates

for Recording Secretary of defendant Local Union 6799:

Ralph Bowman, Leonard Scandura and Tom Pipkin. Pip-

kin declined the nomination. Each of the remaining nom-

inees—Bowman and Scandura—was declared eligible by

the Election Committee, and each appeared on the ballot.

The election results were:

Bowman 282 (elected)

Scandura 150

(d) Financial Secretary

The following persons were nominated as candidates for

Financial Secretary of defendant Local Union 6799:

Glenn Ross, Ernie Crumpton and Otis Joiner. Ross was

declared ineligible by the Election Committee; Crumpton

and Joiner were declared eligible and appeared on the

ballot. The election results were:

Joiner 203 (elected)

Crumpton 187

(e) Treasurer

The following persons were nominated as candidates for

Treasurer of defendant Local Union 6799: Bill Hurd,

Tom Pipkin, Ray Mahan, Jerry Wooten and Walt Farm.

er. Farmer declined the nomination. Mahan was de

clared ineligible by the Election Committee; Hurd, Pipkin

and Wooten were declared eligible and appeared on the

ballot. The election results were:

Pipkin 161 (elected)

Hurd 135

Wooten 91

(f) Guide

The following persons were nominated as candidates

for Guide of defendant Local Union 6799: J. C. Scrog-

gins, Walt Farmer, Floyd Gibson, Dan Rodriguez, Jack

Cooper, Glenn Fulton, Pete Schiavoni. Scroggins, Farmer,

Rodriguez, Cooper and Schiavoni declined the nomina-

tion. Gibson and Fulton were declared eligible and ap-

peared on the ballot. The election results were:

Gibson 210 (elected)

Fulton 177

(g) Inside Guard

The following persons were nominated as candidates

for Inside Guard of defendant Local Union 6799: Arnett

James, Howard Reeves, George Ainsworth, J. C. Scrog-

gins, Wally Blades, Clint Brown and Orville Oertwig.

James, Ainsworth, Scroggins, Blades and Brown declined

the nomination. Reeves and Oertwig were declared eligi-

ble and appeared on the ballot. The election results were:

—

Reeves 253 (elected)

Oertwig 125

(h) Outside Guard

The following persons were nominated as candidates

for Outside Guard of defendant Local Union 6799: Ed

Poynter, Jack Cooper, Wendell Williams, Clarence Thom-

js and Gary Miller. Cooper, Williams and Miller declined

the nomination. Poynter and Thomas were declared

digible and appeared on the ballot. The election results

were:

Thomas 211 (elected)

Poynter 175

(i) Trustees

The Constitution calls for the election of three trustees

in each local. The following persons were nominated as

candidates for Trustee of defendant Local Union 6799:

Eugene Houghton, Frederick Burpee, Elmer Husmann,

Marvin Wright, Walter Farmer, Jack Ingram, Merle

Moore, Richard Mayer and George Pruneri. Wright,

Farmer, Ingram and Moore declined the nomination.

Husmann and Pruneri were declared ineligible by the

Election Committee. This left but three active candi-

dates—Houghton, Burpee and Mayer—each of whom was

declared eligible, and they were declared elected by the

Election Committee without the need for a vote.

(24)MARVIN E. WRIGHT was nominated as a can-

didate for the office of Trustee and declined. His payroll

records reflect that Wright worked overtime on regular

meeting nights in January, February, March, April, May,

June, July, September, October, November and Decem-

ber 1966.

(25) Between August 1965 and April 1967, the em-

ployees of Howmet Corporation, Aerosystems Division,

Loud Products, “omona, California, worked three shifts.

The regular hours of the day shift (exclusive of over-

time) were 7:00 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. Approximately 400

people worked on the day shift. The regular hours of the

swing-shift (exclusive of overtime) were 3:30 P.M. to

12:00 midnight. A substantial number (perhaps most)

of the employees on the swing-shift frequently worked

until 1:00 A.M. or 2:00 A.M. Approximately 200 persons

worked the swing-shift. The third shift consisted of

about seven or eight persons, who were in the plant dur.

ing the early morning hours when the other two shifts

were not present.

(26) The swing-shift monthly membership meeting

always ran until at least 3:00 A.M., and frequently later.

(27) It was the responsibility of the Election Com.

mittee to determine whether the members nominated at

the May 8, 1967 nomination meeting met the eligibility

requirements set forth supra in Paragraph III (10). Ip

order to determine whether nominees had attended or

were entitled to be given credit for having attended a

total of at least eleven of the regular monthly member-

ship meetings conducted by defendant Local Union 6799

between August 1965 and April 1967, the Election Com-

mittee took the following steps:

(a) First, it reviewed the attendance register main-

tained by defendant Local Union 6799, and tabulated

the number of regular monthly membership meetings

attended by each nominee. If the attendance register

indicated that the nominee had attended eleven or more

meetings, the Election Committee concluded that he was

eligible and conducted no further investigation.

(b) Second, if the attendance did not show that the

nominee had attended 11 meetings, the Election Com-

mittee reviewed the Company’s departmental overtime

records to determine whether the nominee had been work-

ing during meeting huors. If the total of meetings at-

tended, according to the attendance register, and meet-

ings excused because of working totaled eleven or more,

the Election Committee concluded that he was eligible,

and conducted no further investigation.

the four nominees for Local Union office whom it found

ineligible advising them of its determination and giving

them ten days to come forward and question the Election

Committee’s ruling. None of the four nominees for Local

Union office declared ineligible contacted the Election

Committee during the ten day period. i

(28) Defendant Local Union 6799 does not maintain

any records showing which members worked during reg-

ular monthly membership meetings. Such information is

available in the Company’s departmental files.

(29) Defendant Local Union 6799 did not prepare a

list of members who would be eligible to be candidates in

the June 12, 1967 election prior to the May 8, 1967 nomi-

nation meetings.

(30) An attendance register was maintained by de-

fendant Local Union 6799 outside the room where it con-

ducted its regular monthly membership meetings. Each

member was supposed to sign his name in this register

as he entered the meeting room. It was the responsibility

of defendant Local Union 6799’s Recording Secretary to

place the attendance register at the entrance to the meet-

ing room prior to the commencement of the meeting, to

collect the register at the conclusion of the meeting, and

to maintain it between meetings.

(31) The attendance register was the only official

record of attendance for purposes of determining eligi-

bility.

(2) Each member of defendant Local Union 6799 has

a dues checkoff card. Members were required to show

their dues checkoff card to the Outside Guard as evidence

of membership in order to be admitted to the regular

monthly membership meetings. -As a matter of practice

the Outside Guard punches each member’s card before

the member enters the meeting hall. The dues payment

card was not accepted by defendant Local Union 6799

or its Election Committee to establish a candidate’s eligi-

bility in its June 12, 1967 election of officers.

(33) Prior to June 12, 1967, there were no policies,

provisions, rules, regulations, by-laws, written or oral of

defendant Local Union 6799 and/or defendant Inter-

national, governing the giving of credit to members for

attending a regular monthly membership meeting (swing-

shift or day), if the defendant Local Union 6799 failed

to hold such a meeting. In ruling on the eligibility of

nominees, the Election Committee determined with re-

spect to the swing shift meetings for November 1966 and

December 1966 that, since these meetings were scheduled

and were never cancelled, and since the officers arrived

for the purpose of conducting the meetings, and since

those members who arrived to attend the meetings si

the attendance register, these meetings should be treated

the same as all other meetings.

(34) Defendant International Union did not advise

any candidates in defendant Local Union 6799’s June

12, 1967 election that the International Union’s office

facilities could be used to reproduce their campaign

literature. One candidate, Kenneth Rose, requested per-

mission to use such facilities to reproduce campaign liter-

ature, and his request was granted. No candidate, other

than Rose, requested permission to use the Internationa]

Union’s office facilities to reproduce campaign literature.

On December 27, 1967, defendant International Union

billed Rose $13.04 for its costs, broken down as follows:

2% reams, legal size, colored 20

wet. paper at $3.90 per ream — $ 9.75

2 stencils at 20 cents per stencil — 40

secretarial services for 1 hour

at $2.89 per hour — 2.89

$13.04

Rose paid the bill by personal check on December 28,

1967.

(35) Defendant Local Union 6799 did not re-open

nominations after its Election Committee had made its

determinations disqualifying certain members as candi-

dates in the June 12, 1967 eiection.

(36) The eleven officers of defendant Local Union 6799

listed supra in Paragraph III(9), constitute the local’s

Executive Committee.

(37) Subsequent to the June 12, 1967 election of offi-

cers, defendant Local Union 6799 ceasd conducting two

separate monthly membership meetiags—one for day

shift employees and one for swing shift employees. De

fendant Local Union 6799 now holds only one monthly

membership meeting—on Sunday at a time when the

plant is not operating. This change was made because

—

the members thought it would be more convenient to

hold only one meeting at a time at which every member

could attend.

(38) No member of defendant Local Union 6799 other

than Nicholas Hantzis challenged the election of defend-

ant Local Union 6799 before the International Executive

(39) On December 18, 1967, representatives of the

defendant International met with representatives of the

plaintiff. Included in the matters discussed at this meet-

ing were the following: the lawfulness of the meeting

attendance requirement as a qualification on the right of

defendant Local Union 6799’s members to be candi-

dates; the number of meetings for which Glenn Ross was

entitled to receive credit because of his working hours;

and the preparation of Ken Rose’s campaign letter.

(40) By letters dated November 22, 1967, December

26, 1967, and January 30, 1968, the defendants extended

the time within which plaintiff could institute this action.

(41) On January 30, 1968, representatives of the

plaintiff and representatives of the defendant Interna-

tional held further discussions concerning the lawfulness

of defendants’ meeting attendance requirement as a

qualification on the right of defendant Local Union 6799’s

members to be candidates for office in the June 12, 1967

election.

The reservations as to the facts recited in Paragraph

III above are as foliows:

Plaintiff objects to the admissability of the above stip-

ulated facts relating to the applicability of the election

provisions of the International Constitution, the By-Laws

for Local Unions, and the Local Unions Elections Man-

ual, to each of the approximately 3,500 local unions of

defendant International on the grounds that such facts

are not relevant or material to the issues involved herein.

Defendants cbject to the admissability of all the above

stipulated facts which relate solely to the matters alleged

in Paragraph X(a) of the complaint, on the ground that

the Secretary is not entitled to litigate such matters in

this lawsuit.

The following facts though not admitted are not to be

contested at the trial by evidence to the contrary:

None.

The following issues of fact remain to be litigated

upon the trial.

1. Whether the requirement that a member, to be

eligible as a candidate in defendant Local Union 6799's

June 12, 1967 election of officers, must have attended

at least one-half of the regular monthly membership

meetings conducted by the Union between August 1965

and April 1967, unless excused from attendance because

working or on union business, excluded the vast majority

of defendant Local Union 6799’s members from eligi-

bility for office.

2. Whether the requirement that a member, to be

eligible as a candidate in defendant Local Union 6799's

June 12, 1967 election of officers, must have attended

at least one-half of the regular monthly membership

meetings conducted by the Union between August, 1965

and April, 1967 unless excused from attendance because

working or on union business, is justified by the reasons

which prompted the defendant International Union to

impose it.

3. Whether the requirement that a member, to be

eligible as a candidate in defendant Local Union 6799's

June 12, 1967 election of officers, must have attended at

least one-half of the regular monthly membership meet-

ings conducted by the Union between August 1965 and

April 1967, unless excused from attendance because work-

ing or on union business, is justified by the responsi-

bilities of the Union office sought.

4. Whether the requirement that a member, to be

eligible as a candidate in defendant Local Union 6799's

June 12, 1967 election of officers, must have attended at

least one-half of the regular monthly membership meet-

ings conducted by the Union between August 1965 and

April 1967, unless excused from attendance because work-

ing or on union business, is comparable with the eligi-

bility qualificeiions imposed by other unions.

_—

5. Whether Glenn Ross was entitled to receive credit

for attending any or all of the regular monthly mem-

bership meetings conducted by defendant Local Union

6799 on November 9, 1965, December 14, 1965, January

11, 1966, March 15, 1966, April 12, 1966, and Novem-

her 15, 1966, by reason of his working overtime on such

ights.

"; Whether Ed Poynter was entitled to be given credit

for attending any of the regular monthly membership

meetings held by defendant Local Union 6799 between

August 1965 and April 1967 which he did not actually

attend and, if so, how many.

7, Whether a member is entitled to receive credit for

attending a meeting when he works beyond the scheduled

starting time of such meeting even though the meeting

did not begin until after his working hours were over.

8, Whether the members of defendant Local Union

6799 were provided adequate notice of the eligibility

qualifications at a time when they could have complied

with or met such requirements.

9, Whether, in practice, the meeting attendance re-

quirement contained in the Constitution, By-Laws for

Local Unions, and Local Union Elections Manual, have

precluded contests for local union office in the local unions

governed thereby.

10. Whether defendants were afforded notice of and

had a reasonable opportunity to correct the violations

alleged in plaintiff’s complaint.

VII

The exhibits to be offered at trial, together with a

statement of all admissions by the parties with respect

thereto, are as follows:

Plaintiff’s Exhibits

1, Letter dated October 12, 1967, from Mr. Nicholas

D. Hantzis, as filed with the plaintiff.

2. Letter dated August 31, 1967, from Walter J.

Burke, Secretary-Treasurer of the Uni‘ed Steelworkers

of America, to Mr. Nicholas D. Hantzis.

3. Report of Commission Re: Case #E-1079 Election

Appeal of Nicholas Hantzis, dated August 27, 1967,

4. Letter dated September 14, 1967, from Walter J.

Burke, Secretary-Treasurer of the United Steelworkers

of America, to Mr. Nicholas Hantzis.

5. A true copy of a letter dated November 21, 1967,

from Henry A. Queen, Chief, Branch of Elections and

Trusteeships, Office of Labor-Management and Welfare.

Pension Reports, United States Department of Labor, to

Mr. I. W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of

America.

6. Weekly Time Cards for GLENN ROSS for period

involved.

7. Department Overtime Attendance Records for

GLENN ROSS.

8. Corporation Weekly Attendance Cards for ED

POYNTER.

9. Department Overtime Attendance Records for ED

POYNTER.

10. Letter with attachment, dated December 26, 1967,

from Keith R. Geisert, Sub-District Director, District 38,

United Steelworkers of America, to Mr. Kenneth Rose.

11. Chart depicting analysis of attendance at union

meetings as a requirement for nomination and election

to local union office, as provided by the national union

constitutions and bylaws of the principal unions covered

by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959.

12. Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 6 and de-

fendant’s Answers thereto.

Defendants object to the admissability of any exhibit

listed above which relates solely to the matters alleged

in Paragraph X(a) of the complaint on the ground that

the Secretary is not entitled to litigate such matters in

this lawsuit.

Defendants’ Exhibits

A. The Constitutions of International Union, United

Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as adopted in Sep-

tember 1964 and September 21, 1966.

B. By-Laws for Local Unions, United Steelworkers of

America, AFL-CIO, as republished in January 1967.

_—

C. Local Union Elections Manual, United Steelworkers

of America, AFL-CIO, as amended to January 7, 1967.

D. Letter dated May 10, 1967, from Nicholas D.

Hantzis to I. W. Abel, President of the United Steel-

workers of America. ;

E. Letter dated June 18, 1967, from Mr. Hantzis to

the International Executive Board of the United Steel-

workers of America.

F. List of members nominated as candidates at de-

fendant Local Union 6799’s May 8, 1967 nomination

meetings.

G. A true copy of the ballot used by defendant Local

Union 6799 in its June 12, 1967 election of officers.

H. The official election results of defendant Local

Union 6799’s June 12, 1967 election of officers.

I. Chart showing meetings attended by each member

of defendant Local Union 6799.

J. The attendance register maintained by defendant

Local Union 6799 for the period August 1965 to April

1967.

K. The Minutes of the regular monthly membership

meetings and Executive Board meetings conducted by

defendant Local Union 6799 from August 1965 through

April 1967.

In addition to the above listed exhibits, defendants will

offer the following exhibits, copies of which will be pro-

duced by the plaintiff.

L. Letter dated February 22, 1960, from John L. Hol-

combe to the Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeir.

M. Letter dated February 4, 1966, from Frank M.

Kleiler to Mr. George Ford.

N. Letter dated November 25, 1966, from Samuel V.

Merrick to the Honorable Jonathan Bingham.

0. Letter dated October 12, 1967, from Frank M.

Kleiler to Mr. Woodrow W. Donald.

P. Letter dated October 27, 1967 from Samuel V.

Merrick to the Honorable Jack Edwards.

Q. Letter dated December 5, 1967, from Frank M.

Kleiler to the Honorable Jacob K. Javits.

Plaintiff objects to the admissability of defendants’

Exhibits, L, M, N, O, P, and Q, on the grounds that such

Exhibits are not relevant or material to the issues in-

volved herein.

Plaintiff and defendants have agreed that, if additiona]

exhibits are to be offered, they will jointly move the Court

to amend the Pre-Trial Conference Order.

Vill

The following issues of law, and no others remain to

be litigated upon the trial:

A. Whether the plaintiff may challenge the validity of

defendant Local Union 6799’s June 12, 1967 election of

officers on the basis of those matters alleged in Paragraph

X(a) of the complaint, which encompass the issues of

law set forth in paragraphs B, C, D, E, and F herein?

B. Whether the meeting attendance requirement im-

posed by defendant Local Union 6799 on members desir-

ing to be candidates in its June 12, 1967 election, is a

reasonable qualification within the meaning of section

401(e) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481(e))?

C. Whether defendant Local Union 6799 uniformly

applied its meeting attendance requirement in determin-

ing the eligibility of those members who were nominated

as candidates during its May 8, 1967 nomination meet-

ing?

D. Whether defendant Local Union 6799 by applying

its meeting attendance requirement as it did during the

1967 election denied its members in good standing a rea-

sonable opportunity for the nomination of candidates in

violation of section 401(e) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481

(e))?

E. Whether defendant Local Union 6799 by applying

its meeting attendance requirement as it did during the

1967 election denied its members in good standing the

right to be candidates and to hold office in violation of

section 401(e) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481(e))?

F. Whether defendant Local Union 6799 by applying

its meeting attendance requirement as it did during the

1967 election denied its members in good standing the

right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or

candidates of their choice in violation of section 401 (e)

of the Act (29 U.S.C 481 (e))?

G. Whether union funds were expended to promote the

candidacy of Kenneth L. Rose in violation of section 401

(g) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 481(g))?

H. Whether the violations, if any, which occurred

during defendant Local Union 6799’s 1967 election may

have affected the outcome of that election, and if so, for

what offices? -

The foregoing admissions having been made by the

parties, and the parties having specified the foregoing

issues of fact and law remaining to be litigated, this or-

der shall supplement the pleadings and govern the course

of the trial of this case, unless modified to prevent mani-

fest injustice.

DATED: Nov. 25, 1968.

/s/ E. Avery Crary

United States District Judge

Approved as to form and content:

Wm. MATTHEW BYRNE, JR.

United States Attorney

/s/ Carolyn M. Reynolds

CAROLYN M. REYNOLDS

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Bernard Kleiman

Elliot Bredhoff

Michael H. Gottesman

George H. Cohen

Winn Newman

Arnold, Smith & Schwartz

By /s/ Jerome Smith

Attorneys for Defendants

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(Title omitted in printing]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above-entitled cause having come before this court

for trial on March 25, March 26, and April 21, 1969, the

plaintiff appearing through its counsel, Wm. Matthew

Byrne, Jr., United States Attorney, Frederick M. Brosio,

Jr., Assistant U. S. Attorney, Chief, Civil Division, and

Dzintra I. Janavs, Assistant U. S. Attorney, by Dzintra

I. Janavs and by Cornelius Donoghue, Attorney in the

Department of Labor, and the defendants appearing by

their counsel, Michael H. Gottesman, Arnold, Smith &

Schwartz, by Jerome Smith, and Car] Frankel, the court

having considered the evidence, both oral and written,

and having read the written briefs and arguments, and

being fully advised in the premises, makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant Local Union 6799 is, and at all times

relevant herein, has been, an unincorporated association

maintaining its principal offices at 10342 East Holt Boule-

vard, City of Ontario, San Bernardino County, State of

California, and has been a local labor organization en-

gaged in an industry affecting commerce within the mean-

ing of sections 3(i), 3(j) and 401(b) of the LMRDA

(29 U.S.C. 402(i), 402(j) and 481(b)).

2. Said defendant is, and at all times relevant herein

has been, chartered by and subordinate to defendant in

intervention, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-

CIO, hereinafter referred to as the defendant Interna-

tional, an international labor organization engaged in an

industry affecting commerce within the meaning of sec-

tions 3(i) and 3(j) of the LMRDA (29 U.S.C. 402(i)

and 402(j)).

3. Defendant Local Union 6799 was chartered by the

defendant International on May 27, 1965, and had ap-

proximately 578 members as of April, 1967.

4. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 5 of the inter-

vening defendant International’s Constitution defendant

Local Union 6799 is deemed to have adopted, | and did

adopt, the Standard By-Laws for Local Unions, issued by

the International.

5. Defendant Local Union 6799, at all relevant times,

has been conducting its affairs under the aforesaid By-

Laws (as republished January, 1967); the Constitutions

of International Union, United Steelworkers of America,

AFL-CIO (adopted September, 1964, and September 21,

1966) and the Local Union Elections Manual of the United

Steelworkers of America (as amended to January 7,

1967). The election provisions of the aforesaid By-Laws,

Constitutions and Elections Manual were, and are now,

subject to the provisions of Title IV of the LMRDA.

6. Article VII, Section 9, of the Constitution of Inter-

national Union, as relevant, provides:

“No member shall be eligible for election as a Lo-

cal Union Officer or Grievance Committeeman unless

“(c) He has attended at least one-half (4%) of the

regular meetings of his Local Union for thirty-six

(86) months previous to the June, 1967, election, un-

less his Union activities or working hours prevented

his attendance.”

This requirement is applicable to 3,700 Local Unions

in United Steelworkers of America.

7. Article IV, Section 5, of By-Laws for Local Unions,

as relevant, provides:

“No member shall be eligible for election as an Officer

or Grievance Committeeman unless

“(c) He has attended at least one-half of the reg-

ular meetings of his Local Union for 36 months pre-

vious to the election, unless his Union activities or

working hours prevented his attendance.”

Defendant took appropriate steps to notify members of

this eligibility requirement.

—

8. On May 8, 1967, Frank S. McKee, a Staff Repre.

sentative of the defendant International, sent the follow.

ing telegram to I. W. Abel, President, United Steelwork.

ers of America:

“Local Union 6799 District 38, was chartered May

27, 1965. Contract with H. W. Loud Co., of Pomona,

Calif., signed July 15, 1965. First regular local yp-

ion meeting scheduled and held in August, 1965,

Several meetings were held between May 27, 1965,

the date the local union received its charter and Ap-

gust of 1965. In order that this local union will be in

compliance with Article VII, Section Nine of the In-

ternational Constitution would you please advise if

the eligibility to hold a local union office began with

the first regular local meeting held in August 1965

or would it be necessary to count the meetings held

starting immediately after May 27, 1965.”

9. On May 9, 1967, I. W. Abel replied:

“REURTEL members of Local Union 6799 would

have to have credit for one half the regular meetings

held beginning August 1965 to meet the meeting at-

tendance requirement.”

10. Between August, 1965, and April, 1967, the em-

ployees of Howmet Corporation, Aerosystems Division,

Loud Products, Pomona, California, worked three shifts.

The regular hours for the approximately 400 day shift

employees were 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. The regular hours

for the approximately 200 swing-shift employees were

3:30 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, but a substantial number of

the swingshift employees frequently worked until 1:00

a.m. or 2:00 a.m. The third shift, consisting of about

seven or eight persons, worked during the early morning

hours.

11. Prior to January, 1967, defendant Local Union

6799 held one meeting each month conducted in two ses-

sions: one for the day shift on the second Monday of

each month, scheduled to begin at 7:00 p.m., and another

for the swing-shift on the second Tuesday of each month,

scheduled to begin in various months at varying times be

tween 12:30 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. In January, 1967, swing-

shift sessions were changed to 1:00 p.m., the second Tues-

of each month.

12. Twenty-one (21) regular monthly meetings were

scheduled to be conducted by defendant Local Union 6799

between August, 1965, and April, 1967. The dates of

these meetings, with the number of members attending

each set forth in parentheses, were as follows:

August 30, 1965 (day shift), (61)

September 13, 1965 - » (75)

October 11, 1965 aks ye

November 8, 1965 ee (67)

December 138, 1965 si ne (49)

January 10, 1966 a =e (70)

February 14, 1966 se (38)

March 14, 1966 os ae (60)

April 11, 1966 o 2 ee

May 9, 1966 a a (42)

June 13, 1966 <" ae (53)

July 11, 1966 a (48)

August 8, 1966 4 ie (48)

September 12, 1966 dine (28)

October 10, 1966 $3 ee (36)

November 14, 1966 “ oer (41)

December 12, 1966 - ae (25)

January 9, 1967 fi xe” (35)

February 13, 1967 ni ~ % (19)

March 13, 1967 2 no’ (41)

April 10, 1967 “ we” (55)

August 31, 1965 (swing shift), (44)

September 14, 1965 : — (36)

October 12, 1965 a igi (17)

November 9, 1965 - ane (58)

December 14, 1965 r a (19)

January 11, 1966 “ae (30)

February 15, 1966 - — (24)

March 15, 1966 ™ tee (28)

April 12, 1966 “s ae (22)

May 10, 1966 “ iat (25)

June 14, 1966 2 ae (28)

July 12, 1966 - <e (81)

August 9, 1966 2 Oe (20)

September 138, 1966 - . (18)

October 11, 196% = wee (25)

November 15, 1966 m =; ( 5)

December 13, 1966 Rahs (10)

January 9, 1967 . * (18)

February 18, 1967 «“ oF (17)

March 18, 1967 a ie (11)

April 10, 1967 * * (14)

13. On May 8, 1967, defendant Local Union 6799 cop.

ducted two meetings for the purpose of nominating can-

didates for the June 12, 1967, election.

14. To be eligible as a candidate, a member had to

a) be in continuous good standing from the time he

joined Local Union 6799, b) be employed by H. W. Loud,

Inc., and ¢c) have attended 11 of the regular monthly

meetings of defendant Local Union 6799 between August,

1965, and April, 1967. The only excuse provision actually

applied in the June 12, 1967, election of Local Union

6799 was the defendants’ work excuse provision. Since a

substantial number of the approximately 200 swing-shift

employees worked a nine-hour shift much of the time, it

is estimated that at least 12% of the swing-shift quali-

fied either through credits for overtime or by a combina-

tion of such credits and actual attendance. Since over-

time for the day shift employees would not extend until

or past 7:00 p.m., they could have attended the 7:00 p.m.

meetings, and therefore the work excuse provision was

not applicable as to them.

15. Only thirty-six (36) members of defendant Local

Union 6799 actually attended at least 11 of the regular

monthly meetings conducted between August, 1965 and

April, 1967. Nine (9) of these were incumbent officers.

15a. The meeting attendance requirement is designed

to increase attendance at meetings and insure candidates

who have demonstrated interest in union problems, are

familiar with them, and better qualified to serve as of-

ficers of the union. It is a reasonable requirement, be-

cause anyone who wanted to comply with it could have

complied by attending, or through the liberal work ex-

cuse provision.

16. The Election Committee as elected on May 8, 1967,

to conduct the June 12, 1967 election, was composed of

Otto K. Feenstra (Chairman), Kenneth Easin, Tribune

C. Lio, Glenn Greenly, and Marvin Wright.

17. At the meetings conducted on May 8, 1967, 49

members were nominated as candidates. 22 of these de-

clined nomination. Twenty-four met the eligibility re

quirements and three did not.

1g. Marvin E. Wright, nominated as a candidate for

the office of trustee, declined because he thought he did

not satisfy the attendance requirement, because he had

not attended any meetings and did not think he had suf-

ficient overtime to qualify for sufficient credits. Mr.

Wright testified that he had known that he had sufficient

overtime credits, as in fact he did, he would not have

declined the nomination. He testified also that prior to

being on the Election Committee, he did not know where

to check about possible overtime credits.

19. It was the responsibility of the Election Committee

to determine whether the nominees met the eligibility re-

irements of the union. To determine whether nominees

had attended or were entitled to be given credit for having

attended at least 11 of the regular monthly meetings.

The Election Committee first reviewed the attendance

lated the number of regular monthly meetings attended

by each nominee. If the attendance register indicated that

the nominee had attended 11 or more meetings, the Elec-

tion Committee concluded that he was eligible. If the at-

tendance register did not show that the nominee had at-

tended at least 11 meetings, the Election Committee re-

quested foremen to review the Company’s departmental

overtime records to determine whether the nominee had

been working up to or past the scheduled meeting start-

ing time. If the total of meetings attended, according to

the attendance register, and meetings excused because of

working overtime totaled 11 or more, the Election Com-

mittee concluded that the nominee was eligible.

20. Each member of defendant Local Union 6799 had

a dues check-off card, which he was required to show to

the Outside Guard to be admitted to the regular monthly

meetings. This card was punched before the member

entered the meeting hall. The Election Committee de-

cided, sometime after the nomination meetings of May 8,

1967, that this card would not be acceptable as proof of

a candidate’s having attended meetings, for the purpose

of determining whether or not the candidate satisfied the

union’s attendance requirement, and that the only record

acceptable for this purpose would be the Local’s attend-

———

ance register. The membership was advised of the above

sometime after the nomination meeting.

21. The attendance register was a looseleaf binder

and it was the responsibility of the Recording Secretary

to place it at the entrance to the meeting room prior to

the commencement of the meetings, to collect it at the

conclusion, and to maintain it between meetings. Bach

member was supposed to sign it as he entered the meeting

room and memers were reminded on several occasions to

do so. Two witnesses testified that they did not always

sign this register, but sometimes had only their member.

ship cards punched.

22. Neither defendant had any policy or instructions

as to how much overtime a member had to have worked

on a particular meeting night to receive credit for having

attended the meeting. After the nomination meetings of

May 8, 1967, the Election Committee decided that anyone

who worked up to or past the scheduled meeting time on

a meeting night, would be entitled to credit.

23. The defendant Local Union 6799 did not maintain

any records showing which members worked up to or

past the scheduled meeting starting time. Company’s de-

partmental files, maintained for the purpose of equalizing

overtime, however, show the time worked in hourly in-

crements. These records do not have to be kept for any

specific period of time, but some, covering the period in-

volved in the election, were still in existence at the time

of trial herein.

24. The Election Committee declared George Pruneri

and Elmer G. Husman candidates for the office of Trustee,

Ray Mahan, candidate for the office of Treasurer, and

Glenn Ross, candidate for the office of Financial Secre

tary, ineligible because they had neither attended 11 regu-

lar monthly membership meetings, nor had sufficient work

excuses to receive credit for having attended a total of

11 meetings. According to the attendance register, Mr.

Pruneri had attended five, Mr. Mahan had attended six,

Mr. Husman had attended nine, and Mr. Ross had at-

tended seven regular monthly meetings. Since Mr. Ross

had worked 9-hour shifts on six other meeting nights, he

was declared ineligible erroneously.

95, Although the Election Committee sent a letter to

each of the four nominees found ineligible, advising them

of said determination and giving them 10 days to ques-

tion it, none contacted the Election Committee within that

‘od. Elmer Husman did question the determination of

the Election Committee after the election, presenting his

punched membership card as evidence of having attended

sufficient meetings to qualify. Mr. Ross testified that al-

though he really did not want to hold office and therefore

did not question the Election Committee determination,

he would have run had he not been declared ineligible,

because too many people let George do it.

96. Defendant Local Union 6799 did not reopen nomi-

nations after the Election Committee had disqualified the

four nominees as candidates.

97. Ed Poynter, who had attended eight regular

monthly meetings between August, 1965, and April, 1967,

and who was not entitled to sufficient credits for overtime

work, was erroneously held eligible as a candidate for the

office of Outside Guard.

98. The errors made by the Election Committee in

holding Ross ineligible as a candidate and Poynter eligible,

were honest, unintentional mistakes and did not affect

the outcome.

99. The election was conducted on June 12, 1967, and

the details are as follows:

President

Don Redell, Ken Rose and Nick Hantzis were nomi-

nated as candidates for President. The election results

were:

Rose 191 (elected)

Hantzis 147

Redell 59

Vice-President

Mel Scruggs, George Hill, Loyd Cole, Hilton Willcox,

Art Todd, Virgil Steele, and Ralph Bowman were nomi-

nated as candidates for Vice-President. Hill, Todd and

Bowman declined the nomination. The election resuits

were:

Scruggs 268 (elected)

Cole 47

Willcox 45

Steele 32

Recording Secretary

Ralph Bowman, Leonard Scandura and Tom Pipkin

were nominated as candidates for Recording § :

Pipkin declined the nomination. The election results were:

Bowman 232 (elected)

Scandura 150

Financial Secretary

Glenn Ross, Ernie Crumpton and Otis Joiner were nom-

inated as candidates for Financial Secretary. Ross was

declared ineligible by the Election Committee. The elec-

tion results were:

Joiner 203 (elected)

Crumpton 187

Treasurer

Bill Hurd, Tom Pipkin, Ray Mahan, Merry Wooten and

Walt Farmer were nominated as candidates for Treas-

urer. Farmer declined the nomination, and Mahan was

declared ineligible by the Election Committee. The elec-

tion results were:

Pipkin 161 (elected)

Hurd 135

Wooten 91

Guide

J. C. Scroggins, Walt Farmer, Floyd Gibson, Dan Rod-

riguez, Jack Cooper, Glenn Fulton, and Pete Schiavoni

were nominated as candidates for Guide. Scroggins, Far-

mer, Rodriguez, Cooper and Schiavoni declined the nomi-

nation. The election results were:

Gibson 210 (elected)

Fulton 177

Inside Guard

Arnett James, Howard Reeves, George Ainsworth, J. C.

Scroggins, Wally Blades, Clint Brown, and Orville Oert-

wig were nominated as candidates for Inside Guard.

James, Ainsworth, Scroggins, Blades and Brown declined

the nomination. The election results were:

Peeves 258 (elected)

Oertwig 125

Outside Guard

Ed Poynter, Jack Cooper, Wendell Williams, Clarence

Thomas, and Gary Miller were nominated as candidates

for Outside Guard. Cooper, Williams and Miller declined

the nomination. Paynter and Thomas were declared eligi-

ble. The election results were:

Thomas 211 (elected)

Poynter 175

Trustees

The Constitution calls for the election of three trustees

in each local. Eugene Houghton, Frederick Burpee, El-

mer Husman, Marvin Wright, Walter Farmer, Jack In-

gram, Merle Moore, Richard Mayer, and George Pruneri

were nominated as candidates for Trustee. Wright, Far-

mer, Ingram and Moore declined the nomination. Hus-

man and Pruneri were declared ineligible by the Election

Committee. The remaining three candidates were declared

elected by the Election Committee without the need for a

vote.

30. Subsequent to the June 12, 1967 election, defend-

ant Local Union 6799 changed to only one-session monthly

membership meeting, held on Sunday when no members

were working.

31. Defendant International Union did not advise any

of the candidates that the International Union’s facilities

could be used to reproduce their campaign literature.

——y

Kenneth Rose, candidate for President, requested permis.

sion to use such facilities to reproduce campaign litera.

ture, and his request was granted. No candidate, other

than Rose, made a similar request. Rose reproduced three

different leaflets, and these were handed out at the plant’s

entrance gate on several occasions. A stack of leaflets was

placed near the time clock. Altogether, about 1200 leaf-

lets were prepared for Rose. Rose was billed on Decem-

ber 27, 1967, as follows:

24% reams, legal size, colored 20 wgt. paper

at $3.90 per ream — $ 9.75

2 stencils at 20 cents per stencil — 40

secretarial services for 1 hour

at $2.89 per hour —_— _2.89

$13.04

Rose paid the bill on December 28, 1967.

32. Nicholas Hantzis, a member of defendant Local

Union 6799, protested the June 8, 1967 election of said

Local at the July 10, 1967 regular swing-shift meeting,

and again before the International Executive Board by a

letter dated July 18, 1967. Hantzis did not challenge the

reasonableness of the defendants’ attendance requirement

in either protest, but did complain, among other things,

about the use of union facilities to prepare campaign

literature for presidential candidate, Ken Rose. In his

complaint to the plaintiff, dated October 11, 1967, Hant-

zis, whose protest had failed to obtain relief from the de-

fendants, complained again about the use of union facili-

ties for preparing Rose’s campaign literature, and ques-

tioned also the reasonableness of the attendance require-

ment.

33. On November 21, 1967, a representative of the

plaintiff wrote to I. W. Abel, president of defendant In-

ternational (plaintiff’s Exhibit 9), as relevant, as follows:

“The investigation thus far conducted established

probable cause to believe that the election conducted

by LU 6799 violated Title IV in the following par-

ticulars :”

“4 Members were denied their right to vote for

and otherwise support the candidates of their choice

in that a candidate was declared ineligible who in

fact did meet the candidacy requirements (401 (e) ).

3. A member was denied his right to be a candi-

date by reason of being improperly declared ineligible

by the Election Committee (401 (e)).

4. Members in good standing were denied the

right to be candidates and to hold office (subject to

Section 504 and to reasonable qualifications uniform-

ly imposed) in the application of constitutional re-

quirements which resulted in approximately 93.7%

of the active membership being ruled ineligible (401

(e) ).” * * _ =

“Money received by a labor organization by way

of dues, assessrnents, or similar levy was used to

promote the candidacy of the incumbent candidate

for president in that material and equipment fur-

nished by the International Union for the use of the

International Staff Representative was utilized to re-

produce campaign literature for the incumbent presi-

dent (401(g)).”

34. On December 18, 1967, representatives of the de-

fendants met with representatives of the plaintiff. Among

the matters discussed was the lawfulness of the meeting

attendance requirement as a qualification of the right of

defendant Local Union 6799’s members to be candidates,

the number of meetings for which Glenn Ross was en-

titled to receive credit because of his working hours, and

the preparation of Ken Rose’s campaign literature. On

January 30, 1968, representatives of plaintiff and the de-

fendants further discussed the lawfulness of the meeting

attendance requirement as a qualification on the right of

defendant Local Union 6799’s members to be candidates

for office in the June 12, 1967 election.

35. By letters dated November 22, 1967, December

26, 1967, and January 30, 1968, the defendants extended

the time within which plaintiff could institute this action,

and this action was ultimately filed on February 29, 1968.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1, This court has jurisdiction of the subject matter

and parties herein.

2. The Secretary of Labor may include in his com-

plaint, filed pursuant to Section 402 of the LMRDA,

violations disclosed by his investigation, even though said

violations were not raised by the union member in his

protests to the union, provided the Secretary gives the

defendant union a reasonable opportunity to correct the

violations, prior to filing suit. The defendants herein

had adequate notice that the Secretary in his Complaint

would question the reasonableness of their attendance

requirement.

8. Although a two-year rule might be more reasonable,

the three-year meeting attendance requirement of the

defendants is not an unreasonable candidacy qualifica-

tion under 401(e) of LMRDA.

4. Furthermore, the defendants’ meeting attendance

requirement as applied in the 1967 election of Local 6799

was not an unreasonable candidacy qualification under

Section 401 (e).

5. There was no violation of the requirement in Sec-

tion 401(e) that qualifications be uniformly applied, by

the wrongful qualification of Poynter and by the wrong-

ful disqualification of Glenn Ross as candidates, because

these were honest, unintentional mistakes on the part of

the Election Committee, and because Mr. Ross failed to

contest his disqualification prior to the election.

6. The monetary value of the union service or facilities

provided for the preparation of a candidate’s campaign

literature is unimportant as regards violation of Sec-

tion 401(g) of the LMRDA. Proof of any expenditure

of union funds on behalf of a candidate establishes a

violation of said section, and a prima facie case for the

Secretary that the violation may have affected the out-

come of the election.

7. The violation of Section 401(g) herein may have

affected the outcome of the 1967 election of Local Union

6799 as to the office of the President.

8, The 1967 election of Local Union 6799 should, there-

fore, be set aside as regards the office of the President,

and a new election for said office should be held, under

the supervision of the plaintiff.

DATED: This 16th day of May 1969.

/s/ BE. Avery Crary

United States District Judge

(Certificate of Service omitted in printing]

WM. MATTHEW BYRNE, JR.

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. Brosio, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

DzINTRA I. JANAVS

Assistant U. S. Attorney

1100 United States Courthouse

312 North Spring Street

Los Angeles, Cal. 90012

Tel.: 688-2443 or 2404.

Attorneys for Plaintiff.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Civil No. 68-326-EC

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, Secretary of Labor, United States

Department of Labor, PLAINTIFF

vs.

LocaL UNION 6799, United Steelworkers of America,

AFL-CIO, and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law made in this action,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-

CREED:

1. The June 12, 1967 election of defendant Local Union

= for the office of President, be, and is, hereby set

aside.

2. At a time to be agreed to by the parties to this ac-

tion, the defendant Local Union 6799 will hold a new

election for the office of President. Plaintiff will super-

vise the nomination, election and run-off election, if any,

for said office, in accordance with Section 402(c) of

LMRDA.

3, The Court will retain jurisdiction of this matter,

and after the aforesaid new election (and run-off elec-

tion, if any) for the office of President, upon certifica-

tion to the court by the Secretary of Labor, of the name

of the person so elected, the Court will, as provided in

Section 402(¢) of LMRDA, enter a decree declaring such

person to be the President of the defendant Local Union

6799.

DATED: This 16th day of May 1969.

/s/ E. Avery Crary

United States District Judge

Presented by:

Wm. MATTHEW BYRNE, JR.

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. Brosio, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

/s/ Dzintra I. Janavs

DzInTRA I. JANAVS

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24,759

No. 24,800

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, Secretary of Labor,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CROSS-APPELLEE

vs.

LocaL UNION 6799, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES, CROSS-

APPELLANTS

[May 8, 1970]

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Before: BARNES, KOELSCH and KILKENNY, Cir-

cuit Judges.

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge.

The Secretary of Labor brought this action in the dis-

trict court pursuant to § 402(b) of the Labor Manage-

ment Reporting and Disclosure Act against Local Union

6799, United Steelworkers of America, to secure judg-

ment setting aside an election of officers and directing

the Local to conduct a new election under supervision

of the Secretary.

That section authorizes the Secretary to commence and

prosecute such an action on timely complaint of a union

member who has exhausted the available internal reme-

dies afforded by the union whenever the Secretary, upon

an investigation, finds probable cause to believe that the

election was not in compliance with Section 401 of the

Act; Section 402(c) empowers the court to order a new

election if it finds the violation “may have affected the

outcome of an election.” *

The Secretary asserted three separate claims;

(1) that a rule of the International, applicable to all

locals, including Local 6799, prescribing qualifications for

candidate eligibility, exceeded the permissible limits of

provisions in Section 401(e) and tainted the whole elec-

tion thus, requiring a complete new election for all offi-

cers;

(2) that the eligibility rule (even if valid) was not

uniformly applied, as required by Section 401(e), to

prospective candidates for the office of Financial Secre-

tary, thus requiring a new election for that office;

(3) that the International had used union funds to

promote the candidacy of one of the candidates for the

office of President in violation of Section 401(g), thus

requiring a new election for that office.*

1 Section 402 (29 U.S.C. 482) provides:

“(a) A member of a labor organization—(1) who has ex-

hausted the remedies available under the constitution

and bylaws of such organization and of any parent body,

or (2) who has invoked such available remedies without

obtaining a final decision within three calendar months

after their invocation, may file a complaint with the

Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging

the violation of any provision of section 481 (section

401) of this title...

(b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if

he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this

subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he

shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint,

bring a civil action against the labor organization ...

to set aside the invalid election. . . .

upon the merits, the court finds . . . (2) that the violation

of section 481 (section 401) of this title may have

affected the outcome of an election, the court shall declare

the election .. . to be void and direct the conduct of a new

election under supervision of the Secretary and, so far

as lawful and practicable, in conformity with the consti-

tution and bylaws of the labor organization, . . .”

2 Section 401 (29 U.S.C. 481) provides:

“(e) In any election . . . a reasonable opportunity shall be

given for the nomination of candidates and every mem-

ber in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate

The district court allowed the International Union to

intervene and, after a hearing, held the election invalid

solely as to the office of president. Judgment was entered

ordering a limited new election. The matter is here on

the Secretary’s appeal and the uniom’s cross-appeal.

Appellees make a threshold objection to the considera-

tion of the Secretary’s appeal. They urge that the Secre-

tary lacked standing to assert the two Section 401(e)

claims upon which judgment went against him. Their

contention, in substance, is: that Section 402 of the Act

does not permit the Secretary to allege a particular vio-

lation of Section 401 in a suit to set aside an election

unless a union member first unsuccessfully protests that

violation to the union and that this statutory precondition

was not met. The Secretary, although conceding that the

union member’s protest was silent as to any 401(e) vio

lation, argues that this fact is immaterial; his position is

that Section 402 imposes no such limitation but permits

the Secretary to assert any violation of Section 401 dis-

closed by his own investigation evem though not so pro-

tested by the union member.’

The issue poses difficult problem: and any answer is not

entirely free of doubt; however, we are convinced and

therefore conclude that Congress intended to empower the

and to hold office (subject . . . to reasonable qualifica-

tions uniformly imposed)... .

(g) No moneys received by any labor organization by way of

dues, assessments, or similar levy, and no moneys of an

employer shall be contributed or applied to promote the

candidacy of an: person in an election subject to the pro-

visions of this subchapter. Such moneys of a labor

organization may be utilized for notices, factual state-

ments of issues not involving candidates, and other ex-

penses necessary for holding an election.

3The sole member-protest of the election to either the local or

international union was made by Nicholas Hantzis, a candidate for

the office of president of the Local; his protest concerned an alleged

diversion of union funds to defray expenses of Kenneth Rose, the

incumbent president, in conducting his successful campaign for

reelection. The Secretary acknowledged that this protest did not

afford the unions “fair notice” that the union’s candidacy eligibility

requirement might be invalid or that it was not uniformly imposed;

he further acknowledged that Hantzis made no demand on the

union to act on those matters.

Secretary to assert those violations that are fairly appar-

ent from a member’s protest to the union and no others.*

Section 402 is ambiguous. Its exhaustion of remedies

recondition logically suggests that the union must be af-

forded fair.notice of the purported wrong and a reason-

able time [“three calendar months” is the period desig-

nated in 402(a) (2)] to take corrective measures through

its own internal machinery before complaint may be filed

with the Secretary; * yet the section also provides that the

complaint (to the Secretary) may allege “any” violation

and the Secretary must bring a civil action to set aside

the invalid election within sixty days after receiving the

complaint. To allow the Secretary wide ranging power to

urge “any” violation would in effect nullify the exhaus-

tion requirement; not only might the union be completely

unaware of the asserted violation prior to the suit but,

even if the Secretary gives notice before filing suit, the

“three calendar months” period allowed for corrective ac-

tion by the union would be rendered virtually meaning-

less, However, if the broad language appearing in the sec-

tion is more narrowly construed, these inconsistencies dis-

appear and the several provisions become harmonious.°

Moreover, we believe the background and legislative his-

tory of the Act also support our construction. As said in

Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Association of

the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, 389 US. 463,

470 (1968) :

*Both parties rely on and quote extensively from Wirtz v.

Laborers Union, 389 U.S. 477 (1968). But in that decision the

Court declined to express an opinion on the subject, and was care-

ful to so note.

‘The Court’s observation in Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle

Blowers Association of the United States and Canada, 389 U.S.

468, 472 (1968) is relevant; “The stated commitment is to postpone

governmental intervention until the union is afforded the oppor-

tunity to redress the violation.”

Section 601 should also be noted. Although vesting the Secre-

tary with broad powers to conduct, on his own initiative, investi-

gations into union affairs, it does not authorize him to commence

an action even if his investigation leads him to believe a union is

violating the Act. He may only report the matter to interested

persons. Wirtz v. Laborers Union, 389 U.S. 477, 482, f.n.5.

——

“Title IV’s special function in furthering the overal]

goals of the LMRDA is to insure ‘free and demo.

cratic’ elections. The legislative history shows that

Congress weighed how best to legislate against re.

vealed abuses in union elections without departing

needlessly from its long-standing policy against yn.

necessar;; governmental intrusion into internal union

affairs. The extesive and vigorous debate over Title

IV manifested a conflict over the extent to which goy-

ernmental intervention in this most crucial aspect of

internal union affairs was necessary or desirable, In

the end there emerged a ‘general congressional policy

to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own

internal controversies, and, where that fails, to utilize

the agencies of Government most familiar with union

problems to aid in bringing about a settlement

through discussion before resort to the courts.’ ”'

We turn to the union’s appeal. The agreed facts fully

justify the district court’s finding of a union violation of

Section 401(g) with respect to the election for the office

of president. They disclose that the International donated

materials, secretarial help and the use of its facilities to

print advertising leaflets for Kenneth Rose, the Local’s

incumbent president, which Rose used in conducting his

successful campaign for reelection.

The expense was undoubtedly “minimal,” as appellees

argue, but it nevertheless reflected the outlay of a sensible

sum of union money. Indeed the International, shortly

after the Secretary began his investigation and made

known his interest in the matter, presented Rose a bill for

$13.04, which he immediately paid.

* Since we hold that an accommodation of the public interest and

union autonomy can best be achieved by requiring a member to

invoke a union’s internal remedies before the Secretary can act, we

deem it immaterial that in this case the Local had notice from the

Secretary of the two asserted violations for more than ninety days

before he commenced this action.

Neither are we persuaded by the Secretary’s argument, that

affirmance of the judgment ordering a new election for president

under the supervision of the Secretary, requires a present judicial

determination of the validity of the candidate-eligibility rule. If,

as we concluded, the issue is not properly before the court, an

opinion on that matter would be merely advisory.

The legislative history of the Act does not indicate that

Congress intended to place a limit on the amount that a

union might lawfully spend to aid a candidate for office

or that it mean to encourage troublesome factual disputes

over how much (or little) money constitutes a “de mini-

mus” amount; and the language of the provision itself is

clear and unambiguous. It provides in terms that “no

moneys” of a union shall be spent to promote the can-

didacy of any person for union office.

Likewise unconvincing is appellee’s argument that a

ynion is not in violation unless it grants the request of

one candidate for financial aid and rejects that of an-

other. Granted that the object of the section is to prohibit

discrimination between candidates and that this condition

would not exist if a union contributed equally to all can-

didates for a particular office, the inference is plain that

the unlikely probability of even handed union financial

aid to several candidates, as well as financial aid to an

individual candidate, is equally prohibited. Congress de-

clared in the second of the two sentences comprising the

provision that “Such moneys of a labor organization may

be utilized for notices, factual statements of issues not in-

volving candidates and other expenses necessary for the

holding of an election.”

We also approve, as not “clearly erroneous” the district

court’s companion finding that the violation “may have

affected” the outcome of the presidential election. The

financial aid was reflected in the form of three separate

campaign dodgers or pamphlets; in all some 1200 were

printed; obviously they were calculated to secure voter

support for Rose. Although the record does not disclose

the approximate number circulated and posted, it is clear

that many were. Whether they produced the desired re-

sult is of course impossible to determine, but proof of that

fact is not required. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Em-

ployees Union Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 505-8 (1968). How-

ever, it does appear that the number of dodgers was

double that of the Local’s membership and that Rose won

the election by a narrow margin. Thus it is not improb-

able that the financial aid “may have affected” the elec-

tion.

The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24759 24800

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, Secretary of Labor,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CROSS-APPELLEE

v8.

LocaL UNION 6799, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES, CROgs-

APPELLANTS

APPEAL from the United States District Court for

the Central District of California.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript

of the record from the United States District Court for

the Central District of California and was duly submitted,

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment

of the said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby

is affirmed.

Filed and entered May 8, 1970

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 655, October Term, 1970

JAMES D. HopGsoN, Secretary of Labor, PETITIONER

LocaL UNION 6799, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al.

ORDER ALLOWING CERTIORARI—Filed December 7, 1970

The petition herein for a writ of certiorari te the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

granted.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HoNORABLE E. AVERY CRARY, JUDGE PRESIDING

[Title omitted in printing]

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCKEDINGS

Place: Los Angeles, California

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

Wm. MATTHEW BYRNE, JR.

United States Attorney

By: DzINTRA I. JANAVS

Assistant U. S. Attorney

1113 U. S. Courthouse

Los Angeles, California

and

CORNELIUS DONOGHUE

Department of Labor

Washington, D. C.

For the Defendant:

ARNOLD, SMITH & SCHWARTZ

By: JEROME SMITH

6404 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California

and

MICHAEL H. GOTTESMAN

CARL B. FRANKEL

7542 18th Street, N.W.

Washington, D. €.

—

[5] OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF

THE PLAINTIFF

MRS. JANAVS: I am going to confine myself to a

very few remarks at this time, your Honor, because |

think the evidence, of course, will speak for itself.

The one thing I do wish to emphasize most at the open-

ing of this case is that the plaintiff, the Secretary of

Labor, is not in court today solely and primarily on be

half of one particular Union member or a number of

particular Union members, but, as has been stated by

the United States Supreme Court in the Local 125 case

we discussed at an earlier hearing, and Local 158, the

Glass Auto Blowers Union, but we are here to protect

the public interest in assuring free and democratic elec-

tions in Unions all over the country.

[6] In this particular case we are challenging one elec.

tion, and that is, the 1967 election of Local 6799 of the

United Steel Workers.

The defendant has challenged before and no doubt will

challenge again this morning sometime possibly the scope

of the plaintiff’s Complaint herein.

The law, I do not believe permits, and I don’t think

it should permit such a challenge in a case, such as here,

where adequate notice was given to the Union, certainly

by the Department of Labor, as to what investigation

was going on, basically what had been discovered and

what the Secretary was planning to allege in general

terms in his Complaint.

I think the Supreme Court case, which was cited by

both parties earlier, Local 125, in its language made it

clear that the Secretary should not be limited by the

specifications or the specifics of the Union members’ com-

plaint.

We pointed out that the Local 445 Engineers Union

case, the one cited in our footnote, a Second Circuit case,

also, as an aside,—it was not a direct issue there, it was

an aside—stated that the complaint to the Secretary had

raised the issue and where the Union had been given ade-

quaute notice of what to expect and had a chance to

remedy the challenged violations, that the [7] Secretary

could bring the action.

I think one other case, which we cited in our brief at

the time but which we did not discuss, and I would like

tp emphasize now because I think that is really most di-

rectly in poiat, is Wirtz v. Local 1622, the Northern Dis-

trict of California case. The citation was 285 Fed. Supp.

. that case the Secretary, in fact, brought a complaint

hased upon a violation which it discovered in its investi-

gation, which had not been raised by anyone any place.

I think the Court there also mentioned the Local 125 case,

decided by the Supreme Court.

It emphasized the purpose of the Act and the purpose

of the Secretary bringing the action and concluded that

there are certain rights that are basic enough and im-

rtant enough that even if the Union member may have

not been sophisticated enough and may not have had the

means available financially to discover, that if these vio-

lations are discovered that certainly the Secretary has a

right to litigate them.

‘As to the merits, I am not going to make any lengthy

statement at all. Our contention is that the requirement

of the defendant that a member must have attended 11

out of 21 meetings to be eligible as a [8] candidate in

the 1967 election is unreasonable, in the circumstances

of this case, as it will appear from the evidence and it

did violate Section 481(e) of the Act.

THE COURT: Who is to determine whether the re-

quirement is unreasonable? Is that an issue for the Court

co determine?

MRS. JANAVS: Yes, your Honor, that would be the

issue for the Court to determine.

THE COURT: In other words, the Court can review

all the rules that the Union has and then it is up to the

Court to determine whether the rules are fair, is that it,

. the bringing of a complaint by the Department of

bor?

MRS. JANAVS: Whether the rules were fair in the

circumstances that this particular Union was faced with.

It has to be considered in the context. In other words,

what possibility these people had to attend the meetings.

———

Was the meeting requirements justified by the alleged

purpose, for instance, in this case,—

THE COURT: Do you have any cases on this isgne

of the Court’s determination of the fairness of the

MRS. JANAVS: I believe the law itself so states,

[9] THE COURT: Does it? Point to the

or statute thet so provides, that it’s & matter for the

Court to determine. Maybe there is no issue on it.

Is there any issue on that, Counsel?

MR. GOTTESMAN: We agree the Court has to de

termine reasonableness. I think we disagree with how

broad the scope of the Court’s discretion should be in

making that decision.

THE COURT: Well, that is what I am interested in,

is the broadness of the scope of the Court’s discretion,

MRS. JANAVS: The Court would decide that issue

I think Section 482—29 U.S.C. 482.

THE COURT: 28 U.S.C.

MRS. JANAVS: 29 U.S.C. 482, Subsections (c¢) (1)

and (2), which reads as follows:

“(e) If, upon a preponderance of the evidence

after a trial upon the merits, the Court finds—

“(1) that an election has not been held within the

time prescribed by Section 401, or

“(2) that the violation of Section 401 may have

affected the outcome of an [10] election, the Court

shall declare the election, if any, to be void” and so

on.

I believe that this—

THE COURT: That doesn’t quite hit the point I’m

making inquiry to.

Anyway, we will see how it develops. As I understand,

so far as the election is concerned, there is a claim that

the requirement was too restrictive, but also that the re

quirement was not uniformly applied.

MRS. JANAVS: That is correct, your Honor. Those

are the two allegations we make in connection with the

meeting attendance requirement. :

In addition we aiso have alleged that there was viola-

tion of Section 481(g) of the Act, which prohibits out-

right and unconditionally, without stating any minimum

cost involved the use of any Union funds in support of

particular candidate.

THE COURT: Yes, I understand that. That is the

printing cost, the $13.00 and so forth.

MRS. JANAVS: That is right.

THE COURT: The issue there is whether it may

have affected the election, as I understand it.

MRS. JANAVS: Right. As te whether or not the

election may have been affected, our contention on that

point, of course, is if any one or a combination [11] of

these various violations assuming violations occurred, may

have affected the outcome, then, of course, the Secretary

is entitled to relief under the law.

As far as to what extent effective outcome has to be

proved by the Secretary, this, of course, I think was ex-

plained by the United States Supreme Court in Wirtz

v. Local 6, which is 391 United States Reports 492.

In that case the Court, in fact, said that if there had

actually been a violation which had been shown by the

Secretary, then a prima facie case had been made out, and

also the results would have been affected.

Unless the Union comes in and actually puts on proof

that that effect has been—that there has been no effect

the Secretary has made his case, because as a practical

matter it would be almost impossible in some of these

situations to put on evidence of that.

[12] OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF

DEFENDANTS

MR. GOTTESMAN: May it please the Court, Mrs.

Janavs has correctly anticipated that we will raise as a

preliminary matter a renewal of the motion which we

made for summary judgment earlier.

The Court may recall that we did raise the question

by a Motion for Summary Judgment. Whether the Gov-

ernment or the Secretary of Labor may bring a lawsuit

——

about matters which were not raised within the Union by

the complaining member.

THE COURT: Yes. Yes, I remember it so well.

MR. GOTTESMAN: At that time your Honor denied

the motion without prejudice to it being renewed at trial,

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOTTESMAN: Now, I would not undertake at

this point to have another full-blown argument on it, [

would like to—

THE COURT: I don’t want you to argue it now,

I have read these things again and I am going to proceed

now with the evidence.

(13] MR. GOTTESMAN: Now, proceeding to the, as

We see them, three issues which are to be tried here,

These are the three claims which the Secretary of Labor

makes about the conduct of this election.

The first and in our view the most important, because

of its implication for us on a nationwide basis, is the

claim that our meeting attendance rule is an unlawful

rule or an unreasonable rule.

Now, every time the plaintiff refers to the unreason-

ableness of the rule, the plaintiff Says, “unreasonable in

the circumstances of this case”.

We understand the plaintiff’s position to be that, with

respect to meeting attendance rule, you have to examine

exactly how it worked in the particular facts in the par-

ticular case, to decide whether or not it is [14] reason-

able.

That confronts the defendant International Union with

a very difficult dilemma. The Union has described in its

Constitution the meeting attendance rule. The provision

that in order to run for Local Union office you must have

attended half the meetings or had half excused absence.

The rule, as we look at it, is such a perfectly reasonable

rule. I suppose that is why we have lawsuits. The Union

wants to assure that those people who take Office in the

Union have had some knowledge about how the Union

works, what its problems have been, so they don’t come

in fresh as someone who has never paid attention to

Union affairs, and has acquired no knowledge of Union

he Financial Secre-

affairs and is suddenly—for example, »nd, responsible for

tary of the Union is covered by a bx doesn’t know the

handling large sums of money, and

slightest idea of what it is all about.nin the Union, the

The Union meeting has been, witjber, of course, can

best place for any member—any ment the affairs of the

come—to acquire some knowledge abo’ There is certainly

Union. They are held once a month. couple of hours.

no terrible imposition to go, it takes (15) all of the ac-

You sit there and you get reports of d what the

tivities of ee Union, all of the is ee

Union is all about. :

So the Union adopted the rule in it® International Con-

situation which says that in order % "Un for Local

Union office you must have attended alf of the meetings

during the preceding three years, J9 other words, you

must have gone on an average of one meeting every two

months.

Now, I might add that that rule was adopted at a

convention of the Union. Delegates were there from all

of the 3700 Local Unions. They voted to adopt the rule

and that is how it got into our Constitution.

Now we are confronted immediately with a very diffi-

cult dilemma, because the Secretary of Labor does not

say to us that the rule of our Constitution is unlawful

per se. He says, “I, the Secretary of Labor, am going

to undertake to examine, with respect to each of your

Locals, how the rule works in each yoyticylar item, and

if I think in the circumstances of thoy cicctios. it proved

to be unreasonable, then I am going t". © evn

Now, that obviously causes us * i om ge. WwW ,

use the Rule at all if there are goi dilemma. adem

where the Secretary is going to sue '"8 to be some ener

conduct our own trial in advance c US, because we can't

decide whether or not to use it therf every election and

sonable. e would be [16] rea-

So we think the rule really has ‘

broadly, and it really was before to be looked at more

broader. We think what is before thethis Court somewhat

the rule is reasonable in this case, 2 Court is not whether

is reasonable. but whether the rule

——

We think the determination is really the same determi-

nation, because we think you determine the reasonable.

ness of a rule by looking to the purposes that it serves

and whether those purposes are rational purposes. We

think here the Court’s discretion is somewhat narrower,

I think, than the Secretary of Labor contends. Neither

the Secretary nor the Court, under the statute, is set up

as a regulator of Union affairs. Indeed, Congress went

out of its way to say that it was prescribing very re

strained and minimal impositions on the way Unions’ af.

fairs are run.

As Congress put it, “We’re making the minimum ip-

trusion necessary to assure democratic Union affairs,”

Now, this Act we are under is the Landrum-Griffin

Act. It was adopted to cure what were found to be some

very terrible abuses, the way some Unions were conducted.

There is no suggestion in that Act that one [17] of

those terrible abuses was the Unions wanted some of

their members, by attending meetings to acquire some

knowledge of the Union before they ran for office. We

think it takes a rather strange construction of the statute

to conclude that this is one of those abuses.

Indeed, the evidence, we think, that Congress didn’t

intend to reach this kind of thing is that parenthetical

clause, following the phrase “every member shall be en-

titled to run for office” there is in parentheses “subject to

reasonable rules uniformly applied”.

I think the clear legislative history suggests this. Con-

gress was allowing Unions to have reasonable rules, but

it was not going to allow them to be arbitrary and to

let their friends run and not their enemies. That we

think is all this is about.

I might say there have been a couple of other cases in

which the Secretary has attacked meeting attendance rules

by other Unions. Those cases developed in a fashion so

completely different from ours that I really think you

can’t translate one to the other.

Those were cases where the Union has a very strenu-

ous rule. It pays the incumbent officers to attend meet-

ings, so they have got every incentive in the world to go.

When you look at the results, the only [18] people that

ify under the rule are the incumbent officers, so, in-

deed, they run unopposed on and on.

The Court said, in looking at that situation, “Well,

that is not what we call a very democratic situation. We

think that rule can’t be very reasonable.”

As we'll make clear here in this case every office was a

contested office. There were probably over 20 per cent of

the members of the Union, if not more, who had either

attended the meetings or were entitled to the credits.

There have been several elections since the one the Secre-

tary is challenging in this Union, and every one was a

contested election.

We have prepared some statistics we will introduce on

how this Union’s rule is applied in other situations, in

other Locals. With very few exceptions every election is

contested, a contested election. We just don’t think there

is anything very unreasonable about it. We will put on

some evidence about this. But that is basically our posi-

tion.

The second issue that the Secretary is raising is the

claim that the rule is not uniformly applied. Basically

the claim is really a two-prong claim. There is the claim

that one person did correctly and was found to be eligible,

and one person incorrectly was found to be ineligible.

Both of those occurred on calculated [19] arithmetical

computations, with five laymen in the Union serving as

its election committee, had to make in determining

whether people had met the meeting attendance require-

ment rule.

We think it is clear that one of the Secretary’s claims

is clearly wrong. We'll put on evidence of that. They

claim that one individual, who was entitled to be on the

ballot, was left off. We will put on, I think, substan-

tial evidence that will demonstrate the Secretary is just

wrong.

The other case, the person who got on and the Secre-

tary says shouldn’t have been on, I think we have deter-

mined the Secretary was right about that. There was one

man, an arithmetical error was made and he appeared

on the ballot and he probably should not have. Happily

—the same point of this lawsuit—he lost.

So though he didn’t belong on the ballot, the fact that

he was on the ballot did not affect the outcome. His

opponent won the election, in any event. So it seems to

us no relief is required for that problem.

* * * .

[26] NICHOLAS D. HANTZIS,

a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, having been

first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Mr. Hantzis, where are you employed?

A. Loud Division of Howmet Corporation, 887 East

Second, Pomona, California.

Q. Were you employed by the same company during

the period August 1965 through June 1967?

A. I was.

Q. And during this same period, August 1965 through

June 12, 1967, were you a member of Local 6799 United

Steel Workers of America?

A. I was.

Q. When did you first become a member of this Local?

A. In May of 1965 when the Charter was issued.

Q. Did you do any work in connection with organizing

this particular Local?

A. I did.

Q. Can you tell the Court, as briefly as you [27] can,

what you did along those lines?

A. Prior to the winning of the election I was one of

the original volunteer organizers when the election was

lost previous to the issuing of this Charter.

Q. During this same period we have been talking

about, August 1965 through June 12, 1967, you were

Recording Secretary of Local 6799, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. To your knowledge, from the time that this par-

ticular Local was organized, June 12, 1967, was the

Constitution or By-Laws of the Union distributed to its

members? This is the period from August ’65 to June 12,

1967.

THE COURT: You mean at any time during that

period ?

MRS. JANAVS: Yes.

THE COURT: Were the By-Laws and Constitution

distributed to the members?

THE WITNESS: I could say to my knowledge there

were some. The exact quantity and amount I do not

know.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

. Do you have any estimate as to how many might

have been distributed during that period?

A. The only ones I can positively say is the [28]

initial 12 issued to the Local under its Charter.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Excuse me.

You say the 12 that were issued to the Local under

the Charter. They were distributed, you say, those 12?

THE WITNESS: Those 12 were issued out to the

officers and the—

THE COURT: The officers and who? The directors

or—

THE WITNESS: —the—what it is? The Grievance

Committeemen.

THE COURT: The officers and Grievance Committee,

is that it’

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: How many members were there in the

Local in 1965, approximately, do you remember?

THE WITNESS: Approximately 575, 600.

THE COURT: And how many in 1967?

THE WITNESS: I think it was approximately the

same figure, up or down.

THE COURT: A few. All right. Go ahead.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Now, other than these officers and the Grievance

Committee getting these 12 copies, to your [29] knowl-

edge did any member of the Local who were not officers

or the Grievance Committee, were they given copies of

the Constitution and By-Laws?

A. I heard at a later date there were some distributed.

I personally have no knowledge—

Q. During that particular period or subsequent?

A. I'd say it was toward the latter part of that

period.

Q. As regards members trying to obtain access to

these copies—to the Constitutions or the By-Laws, ts

your knowledge did anyone—I am talking about in your

capacity as Recording Secretary—to your knowledge did

anyone attempt to obtain copies of the Constitution and

By-Laws?

A. There was one attempt by a number of men to

authorize one person to pick up some Constitutions and

this was denied. The members would have to attend

the meetings to obtain their own Constitutions.

Q. Do you know if Constitutions were ever distributed

to these people?

A. This I do not know.

THE COURT: I’m not quite clear. You say they

had to attend the meeting to obtain a Constitution.

[30] Were they distributed at the meeting? If someone

attended the meeting and asked for a copy of the Con-

stitution, were they given it, is that what you are say-

ing?

THE WITNESS: It is quite possible. To my knowl-

edge I had not seen this done.

THE COURT: I thought you said a minute ago that

they were told when asked for a Constitution, or this

person was when he asked for a copy of the Constitution

and By-Laws, he was told he would have to attend the

meetings to obtain one. Is that what you said?

THE WITNESS: That is correct. The people who

asked him to pick up their copy were to be informed they

would have to show up at the meetings, in order to obtain

a copy of the Constitution.

THE COURT: All right. Then the converse of that,

I assume, is that if they did attend the meeting they

could pick up a copy?

THE WITNESS: This is the assumption I gathered

from conversation.

THE COURT: Did you ever see anybody receive a

copy there at the meeting, at a meeting?

THE WITNESS: No, sir, I did not.

THE COURT: As the Secretary, didn’t you have

copies of the Constitution?

(31] THE WITNESS: No, sir.

THE COURT: Who had them in their possession or

in their custody for the Local Union?

THE WITNESS: It would have been the President,

the Financial Secretary and Treasurer, who handled

these— , 3

THE COURT: And you only know 12 copies having

been received?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. As Recording Secretary you were present at most

of the meetings that were held by the Local during the

period August ’65 to June ’67?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you see anyone receiving a Constitution at any

of these meetings at which you were present?

A. I did not actually see that. I saw people with

Constitutions. Were they obtained them I do not know.

Q. Would those have been officers or Union mem-

bers?

A. I would say both.

Q. And as regards the By-Laws, did you see anyone

with By-Laws or obtaining By-Laws at that Union [32]

meeting that you were present at?

A. The only By-Laws to my knowledge received were

the general By-Laws received with the initial Charter.

Q. The 12 copies or so?

A. Yes.

(34) BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Now, to your knowledge, Mr. Hantzis, from Au-

gust 1965 to June 12, 1967, was there any record kept

for recording what members attended a particular meet-

ing?

A. Yes, there was a regular attendance record at

the entrance or the doorway.

Q. Now, would you describe what this attendance

record—is that what it was called, attendance record

or attendance register?

A. Register.

Q. Would you describe for the Court what this (35)

attendance register looked like, what it consisted of and

so on?

A. Normally consisted of ruled or lined paper that

was filled in by the members signing in as they entered.

This register was counted at the end of the meetings,

lined off, dated and the totals entered.

Q. Was it a bound book?

A. It was a loose-leaf binder that you entered the

registers through the holes punched in the paper.

Q. Was the whole binder placed on the table each

time?

A. No, ma’am, just the individual for that particular

meeting.

Q. Just a page was put by the door and everyone

would sign on this as they entered?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was everybody reminded to sign this register as

they entered by anybody at the door?

A. The guard or the guide would ask everyone to

please register.

Q. To your knowledge did people take this seriously

and did they always sign when they went to a meeting?

A. With a few exceptions, I imagine almost [36]

everyone did.

* . * ia

[88] THE COURT: All right. Who is the one—is it

either one of them that is in charge of this register?

Does a man sit there with the register in front of him

for the signing?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. The register is on a table

—in this case it was a shelf against the wal, and he

stands close by to remind everyone to sign it.

THE COURT: Anybody coming in, he reminds them

before they go into the meeting to sign the register?

THE WITNESS: That is correct.

THE COURT: All right. This man is an [39] officer?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

(41] Q. To your knowledge as of August 1965, which

is the first meeting that was actually counted for pur-

of eligibility, as of that date had the members

heen advised they would have to attend at least one

half of all the regular meetings in order to qualify as

a candidate, unless they were within one of the excuses

allowed by the Union?

A. Prior to August of 65 they were advised in a

general manner that those that attended the initial meet-

ings before and immediately following when we received

our Charter.

Q. To your knowledge there was no general notice

on the bulletin board, or anything of that type, advis-

ing everyone that they would have to attend one-half

of the meeting in order to qualify as candidates in the

[42] next election?

This is now August 1965, when the first counted meet-

ing was held.

A. Not to my knowledge. Being a newly chartered

Union we had no meetings so that there was at that

election no necessity of having attendance record; no

one attended anything.

Q. I believe you misunderstood my question.

I was trying to find out as of August 1965 or in August

1965, did anyone advise the members of this new Union,

new Local Union, that they would have to attend half of

the meetings for the next approximately two years, in

order to qualify as candidates in the 1967 election, which

would have been the next election?

A. Yes, this was stated at the meetings.

Q. This was stated at the organization meetings?

A. At the regular meetings at that time.

Q. August 1965?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge, was this same type of notice

posted any place or made known to the membership at

large, rather than just those who attended the meeting?

A. Approximately the month of May of 1966 I person-

ally made up a notice and posted it on all Union [43]

bulletin boards.

Q. This was in May of ’66, not when the Union was

first organized and had its early meetings in late 1965?

A. That is correct.

Q. So at the time you posted the notice in May of ’6¢

about the attendance requirement, this was almost less

than a year prior to the ’67 election, right?

A. That was the reason I posted the notice. There

were 13 remaining months which would have qualified,

under my interpretation, every man to be eligible for

office.

Q. In other words, if they had attended every meet-

ing that followed they could still make it?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Now, as regards excuses for non-attendance of

meetings, in order to get credit as if one had attended,

one of the excuses was working overtime, is that correct?

In other words, if a person worked overtime a meeting

night, under the Constitution and By-Laws they should

get credit for that meeting that took place that night,

is that correct?

MR. GOTTESMAN: Your Honor, I object. The ques-

tion is leading. I wouldn’t object to the fact that it is

leading but it misstates the constitutional [44] require

ment.

THE COURT: Is witat she said correct?

THE WITNESS: May I say it this way, sir: The

Constitution states that neither death or illness, you

must be working overtime or on Union duties to be ex-

cused.

THE COURT: So illness doesn’t excuse you?

THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. But overtime is one of the excuses, is that cor-

rect?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge were the Union members ever

advised how much overtime they would have to work on

a particular meeting night before they would get credit

for having attended a meeting that they did not attend

of working overtime?

A. No, ma’am.

MRS. JANAVS: That is all I have of this witness.

THE COURT: Cross examine.

(50) MR. GOTTESMAN: There are people working

almost all the time in the place.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOTTESMAN: So what the Union does each

month is it holds two meetings.

THE COURT: Two meetings.

(51] Mr. GOTTESMAN: Holds a meeting—originally

held a meeting in the afternoon or, around the latest,

the early evening for people that worked during the day,

ané then initially, at least, it held a meeting very late

at night, in the early hours of the morning, for the people

that worked until midnight.

* . . .

THE COURT: Did they cover the same business at

the swing shift meeting as the meeting earlier in the

day?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In attempting to explain

to ourselves, we arrived at the conclusion it was a split

meeting, not two separate meetings. It was the same

regular meeting, just two groups attending at different

times.

THE COURT: The swing shift meeting was, in effect,

a repetition of the meeting earlier in the day?

THE WITNESS: Yes, unless new business arose

from the swing shift members themselves.

[54] Q. Now, during the course of meeting that took

place, let’s start now with right after the Local (55)

Union was chartered or right at about the time the Local

Union was chartered, you mentioned that statements were

made at meetings about the importance of attending and

its relevance for eligibility, is that correct?

A. I did.

Q. Can vou tell us who made those statements?

A. To the best of my knowledge the staff representa-

tives, at that time Rex Parker, was covering the general

provisions of the Constitution and what membership

consisted of.

Q. Can you tell us in substance what he Said about

the meeting attendance rule?

A. I think he read it from the book, that it would re

quire 50 per cent of the meetings held.

Q. Did he also read the provision about excused ab-

sence if you were working during the meeting?

A. I don’t remember, but I would say from knowing

the man, yes, he would have read it in its entirety.

Q. Now, can you tell us approximately which months

these meetings took place in in which this happened, Rex

Parker read the constitutional provisions?

A. It would have been prior to the Charter and the

month immediately after and the following month, right

there while we were explaining, getting the word across

of what the organization consisted of.

[56] Q. This would be May or June of 1965?

A. Yes.

THE COURT: Are you saying it was May or June

of ’65 and also after August?

THE WITNESS: No, I said possibly J uly, also.

THE COURT: Oh, Tt see. How many times did he

read it, once or twice or three times, or do you remember?

THE WITNESS: I don’t recall.

THE COURT: More than once?

THE WITNESS: I can’t be positive of that, either,

sir.

THE COURT: Al! right.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Did you attend both the day meetings and the

swing shift meetings on these occasions when Rex Parker

did this?

A. I would say yes. One of the meetings was held for

the entire working group and I think the others were

split.

Q. Can you give us a rough estimate of how many

of the members attended the meetings during the months?

THE COURT: Those months?

—

7] BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

During the months of May, June and July, 1965.

I would say roughly two-thirds.

THE COURT: Two-thirds of the members?

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

_ That is two-thirds of all the employees?

A. A total—yes, sir.

Q. We might clarify one thing.

Does the membership of this Local Union consist ex-

dusively of the employees at this one company, H. W.

Loud Division of Howmet?

A. That is correct.

THE COURT: When you say two-thirds, we’re talk-

ing about roughly 350?

THE WITNESS: Roughly that total. That amount

in two meetings, or whatever the one was.

THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Now, subsequent to those initial meetings—I’m

talking now about August 1965 and forward from that

date—were there occasions at the regular Local Union

meeting when one or another of its officers again referred

to the meeting attendance requirement?

A. Undoubtedly at some time or other. I [58] my-

self or one of the other officers.

Q. You say “yndoubtedly”, do you recall such meeting

taking place in which such statements were made?

A. Let’s say I couldn’t tell you what meeting but I

know they were made at one meeting or another.

Q. Can you give us a rough estimate of how many

times during the period August of 65 through April of

‘67 such statements came up?

A. It would be a guess if I try te make an estimate.

Q. It was more than one or two times, I gather?

A. Say several, but—

Q. Now, you mentioned in some of these instances

it —. you as Recording Secretary who made the state-

ments

A. Most likely in reference to the legislative educa.

tional program when we came across this, yes.

Q. Can you tell us in substance what you said on the

occasions when you said it?

A. Roughly what the Constitution Says it is,

are required to make the meeting and not even death is

an excuse.

Q. Did you mention if they were working during the

meeting that is an excuse?

([59] A. I probably did, because that is in the context

of the entire—

Q. Incidentally, so we can clarify one thing, on direct

examination you said that the Constitution provides you

get credit for the meeting if you were working overtime.

That is not quite exactly precise, is it?

It provides you get credit for the meeting if you were

unable to attend because of working?

A. Because of your work schedule, or something of

that sort, yes.

[60] Q. During the period August ’65 to April ’67,

do you recall any officers other than yourself making any

statements at Local Union meetings about the eligibility

requirements for running for a Local Union office?

A. There were undoubtedly mention several times be

cause we would get into discussion about this and we

would emphasize—all the officers more or less emphasized

the requirements.

Q. Again the requirements being the 50 per cent

meeting attendance or working during meetings, is that

correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now, were there also statements made during that

same period with respect to the signing of the attendance

A. Everyone was requested to sign it several times.

I don’t recall exactly what the specifices were.

Q. There were mentions of the fact it should be

signed?

A. Yes.

From the floor or in the regu os

meeting from the chair, I assume,

A. Manly from the officers. ular discourse of the

Q. Were there any requests mad or from one of the

meetings to those in attendance to t:

bers who were not attending and en

ance at the meetings? de during [61] these

A. Normal procedure to start metalk with other mem-

try to get attendance up, yes. rcourage their attend-

_ Were such drives promoted

during the period August ’65 througiembership drives and

A. Let’s say or were attempte:

Q. You mentioned on direct that is Local :

I believe you said in May 1966, whe by Apri 67? —

to be posted * omy respect to the elifcg to be promoted

is that right t there came a time

A. I wrote and posted a notice * Ni

ment was such that after that mont.r it caused . —

been able to make the eligibility list. Sty requirements,

Q. In other words, someone whc :

a meeting before would now have to because the time ele-

order to— ath no one would have

A. That is correct. t.

That would not be true of tho had never attended

attended some, is that correct? o attend all of them in

A. That again depends. If he d

ther meetings—

What it ultimately resulted ithose who had already

to have attended so many meetings c

Q age is — irae didn’t attend any fur-

’ you recall—I gather yc

copy of that notice, 7 nee a in was he [62] needed

A. I may have. I wouldn’t kno . .

Q. You don’t have it with you over the entire period?

A. I do not.

Do you recall the substance om no longer have a

ally what it said? k

A. I think I tried to impart thew Where T have it

ganization was for the members qi here today

to participate you had to become ; ;

he idea that a labor or-

and “in order for you

> active.” You couldn’t

d wait. Anyone wishing

to do so would have to qualify himself by becoming eligi-

ble. That the deadline was as of that month, for those

who had not attended.

Q. Did you recite in the notice what the eligibility

requirements were?

A. It was copied verbatim from the book.

Q. Now, you also mentioned or talked a little bit

about copies of the Constitution of the International Un-

ion.

Did that Constitution set forth in it the [63] eligibility

requirements?

A. It does.

‘. You also referred to the general or standard By-

Ws.

Does that set forth the identical meeting attendance

requirement?

A. I think it does.

. Now, you told us there were 12 copies of the Con-

stitution that the Local received with the Charter.

A. That is right.

Q. And you also referred—and I got a little confused

—to the possible distribution of Constitutions at the meet-

ing.

To your knowledge did the Local obtain an additional

supply of Constitutions from the International Union?

A. Let’s say they were supposed to have been ordered

on a motion from the floor by the members.

It was said that they were already delivered and

passed out. This I had not seen myself.

Q. There was a motion on the floor to order a supply

of Constitutions from the International?

A. That is right.

Q. And you say it was said that they were, in fact,

ordered. I gather you personally don’t know whether

[64] they were ordered or not.

A. I could assume this because there was a check

issued for merchandise, but as to seeing the physical ob-

THE COURT: You were Secretary, weren’t you?

Who carried on the correspondence?

THE WITNESS: The correspondence was carried on

by the Secretary. But the ordering of supplies, and et

is handled by the Financial Secretary and officers.

THE COURT: The Financial Secretary?

THE WITNESS: Yes, or the Treasurer. I am not

too sure of that.

THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Does the Financial Secretary report to the Local

Union meetings the actions he has taken, in terms of

disbursing the monies of the Local Union?

A. Yes.

Q. So it would become incumbent upon him, if he

ordered the Constitutions and sent a check for them,

to so report to the Local Union members, isn’t that cor-

rect?

A. Right.

[65] Q. Did he give such a report in ‘he meeting you

attended?

A. He did.

Q. Subsequent to his reporting that he had ordered

them, do you recall any report that they had arrived?

A. Yes, there yas mention made they had arrived

and some had been distributed.

Q. To your knowledge were copies of the Constitu-

tion kept at the Local Union meetings so that people

could pick them up at the meetings?

A. Let’s say I was pretty busy. I imagine they were.

This was so stated.

Q. It was stated at the meeting?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Subsequent to the ordering and obtaining of Con-

stitutions, were there ever to your knowledge any com-

plaints by members that there were not sufficient Con-

stitutions for those who wanted them?

A. I don’t know about them saying there wasn’t

sufficient. There were some complaints that they did not

receive one.

Q. Is this the reference you made to on direct about

the people who were told to go to the meeting to get the

Constitution?

[66] A. There were some others besides those.

Q. Did they complain to you about that?

Q. Did you undertake to supply them with the Cop-

stitution?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there any complaints you received from people

who said they didn’t have a copy which was unfulfilled?

A. Yes, because the copies I obtained I couldn’t get

a quantity like that. I picked them up from other Locals

that had excess on hand.

Q. I gather there was a supply available at your

Local, isn’t that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were in possession of one of the officers,

other than yourself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you request some of those in order to give

them to people who asked you?

A. I think I got four or five, and then they were

gone.

Q. You say they were gone, the four or five [67] you

got?

A. I mean all the copies were out after that, there

were no more left.

Q. It was reported to you that the Union no longer

had copies?

A. That is right.

Q. Do you recall about when that was?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any estimate at all—

A. Sometime in the latter part of ’66, early part of

67, or whenever.

Q. So that you have some knowledge then that the

Union no longer has—or at that time no longer had

copies of the Constitution for distribution?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, during the time or beginning with the time

that you joined the Steelworkers Union and running up

yntil the time of the 1967 election, did you regularly

attend the Local Union meetings?

A. With the exceptions when I was excused or absent.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. With the exception of

the time you were excused or absent.

Can you give us some idea as to how many meetings

you did not attend?

[68] THE WITNESS: This could have been maybe

four or five at the maximum.

THE COURT: That you did not attend?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Over what period, now?

THE WITNESS: Over the period from ’65 through

THE COURT: August 1965 to June of ’67, is that

right?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir,—or from May of ’65 on.

THE COURT: You missed only four or five?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Can you tell us in general terms what took place

at those meetings?

I don’t want, obviously, a blow by blow. But what kind

of matters were discussed at the Local meetings and what

kind of business was conducted?

A. I read all communciations. Any action required

was taken. We discussed any business on hand, anything

the floor members brought up.

Q. Was there a Treasurer’s report at the Local Union

meeting?

A. Treasurer’s report, yes, sir.

[69] THE COURT: Each month?

THE WITNESS: Each month.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. I meant to ask you, that notice that you posted

setting out the eligibility requirements—

A. The plant has seven Union bulletin boards. There

was one posted on each board.

Q. Now, are these seven bulletin boards the bulletin

boards then to which the Union posts any of the notices

of importance to its members in the plant?

A. Let’s say they are supposed to be. At times ad.

ditional copies are posted in other places.

Q. Now, is it a fact at every Local Union meeting a

reading of the Minutes of the last meeting and your read.

ing of the communications, there then follows a report of

the officers?

A. This is right.

Q. Is the first such report the report of the Financial

Secretary?

A. This sometimes varies, dependent.

Q. One of them would be—

A. One or the other.

Q. What would the Financial Secretary be reporting

about to them, to the membership?

A. The funds we had on hand and—I don’t [70] re

call the form. It’s a balancing of the books.

Q. Now, does he—is it he or the Treasurer who has

to get approval from the membership for the expenditure

of funds?

A. Everyone in the United Steelworkers has to have

approval before they can expend funds.

Q. So that to the extent there are expenditures to be

made during a given month or have been made and need

approval, are these submitted to the membership for their

approval at that meeting?

A. I'd say that the one report gives the list of checks

disbursed. Some of these are already disbursed. They

are voted on.

And then from the floor, during the course of the

meeting, there may be action taken to receive approval

from the members on next month’s or future disburse

ments.

Q. Can you tell us roughly how much money is being

handled by the Local Union on a monthly basis?

Are we talking about a few hundred dollars or are we

talking about several thousand?

A. You are talking in terms of thousands, when you

take the dues structure and 600 members. Roughly be

tween twelve and sixteen hundred dollars a month comes

to the Local from the International.

[71] THE COURT: Before we get too far away from

this, may I ask about these bulletin boards.

Are there any of those bulletin boards in the plant?

THE WITNESS: They are all in the plant.

THE COURT: They are all in the plant?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: All seven?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Not at the Union Hall?

THE WITNESS: No, sir, it is all within the plant.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Do you have any recollection at any given time

how large the treasury, the total treasury of the Union

might be?

MRS. JANAVS: Your Honor, I’ll object to that as

immaterial and irrelevant.

I think we are getting far afield.

THE COURT: What is the materiality of it?

MR. GOTTESMAN: Well, what I would like to show

_—and I could do it as easily with this witness as with

another—is, you know, the responsibilities of the officers

and what happens at the meetings which [72] would, in

fact, qualify or would be a relevant factor in determining

that someone would be qualified to run for office.

THE COURT: What does the amount in the treasury

have to do with that? That is the point.

MR. GOTTESMAN: I want to show this is not a de

minimus thing we are talking about.

They are debating expenditures—

THE COURT: He said about sixteen hundred dol-

lars a month they get from the International.

Is that from the dues? That is your share you get

back?

THE WITNESS: That is returned from the dues,

yes, sir.

THE COURT: That is your share you get back?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: I really don’t see—in view of the

objection, I will have to sustain it, unless you can show

me the materiality.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Are there on occasions debates about whether or

not certain expenditures of funds should be made?

A. Quite often.

[73] Q. These, I gather, are resolved by a member.

ship vote at that meeting?

A. Let’s say the majority of the time, yes, sir.

Q. Now, there is then something called the Treasurer’s

report. I am not sure I’m clear myself on the separation

of funds between the Financial Secretary’s report and the

Treasurer’s report. If you would help me on that I would

appreciate it.

A. Let’s see, one is a monthly trial balance and it

balances your book and brings it up to date, cash on hand,

cash received, cash expended, cash present at the end of

the month.

The other is a record of disbursements.

. As I understand the distinction, one of them ac-

tually holds and spends the money and the other one keeps

the books and accounts for it, is that correct?

That is probably too simplified.

A. Yes, this is basically, If I understand you, the

function laid out by the International.

Q. I gather it is sort of a system of checks and bal-

ances. At least two people, one of whom keeps the books

and the other of whom keeps the money?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, then comes, as I understand it,—or [74] at

some point in the meeting does there come a Trustees’

report?

A. Let’s say that at least every quarter there is one

and regularly whenever there is anything to report, yes,

Q. What are the Trustees reporting about, when they

report to the meetings?

A. The Trustees’ main function is care and keeping

of the property and auditing of the records.

Q. It is about those subjects they report at the

meeting?

A. Yes.

—

_ Does there come during the course of the meeting

a report of the International Representative or Staff

Representative?

A. Yes.

Q. Is he an employee of the Local Union or is he an

employee of the International?

A. An employee of the International.

Q. Can you tell us in general terms the range of sub-

jects about which he would be talking at a local Union

meeting?

MRS. JANAVS: I will object, your Honor, again on

the ground this is not material or relevant, because, as we

know already, a person could qualify even [75] without

having attended a single meeting, assuming they worked

overtime every meeting night.

THE COURT: I suppose this is general background.

You can cross examine him. You can ask him, does his

International say so and so and so and so, and let’s get

right to it.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Does the International Representative report to the

membership on the affairs in general of the International

Union and activities on a nationwide basis of the Union,

on the existence of strikes at other locations, collective

bargaining reports and results at other locations?

A. Not as a whole. Specifically as these circumstances

are of importance in his judgment.

Q. Does he also report on specific events relating to

your Local Union, such as the status of grievances that

are pending with the company?

A. He backs up or covers the Grievance Chairman’s

report.

Q. Then we have a report of the Grievance Chairman.

Is it the function of his report to describe to the mem-

bership the grievances which are then pending against

the company?

[76] A. That is correct.

. And these are grievances relating to alleged vio-

a by the company of the collective bargaining agree-

ment

A. This is correct.

Q. And are there, in fact, a number of such griey.

ances, as a matter of course, generally in progress, pend-

ing?

A. Almost everywhere, yes.

Q. And of course here?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there then on occasions standing committees,

such as the Finance Committee, Workman Compensation

Committee and the Welfare Committee and Safety Com.

mittee who report to the Union meetings about the spe.

cific subjects covered by their committees?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there a section of the meeting devoted to un-

finished business, in which pending matters before the

membership are debated and ultimately resolved?

| ee:

Q. And then is there a section of new business, in

which new matters which have arisen require member-

ship action which are discussed and resolved?

A. Yes.

[77] Q In your judgment, Mr. Hantzis, could a man

who had not attended the Union meetings assume the of-

fice of President or Vice President or Financial Secretary

of this Union and fulfill it competently?

MRS. JANAVS: Objection, your Honor. I don’t think

that one man’s opinion on this is particularly relevant or

establishes whether or not a person could.

I would assume it would depend on the individual in-

volved and I would think it would be for the membership

to decide when they vote for a particular office, whether

the candidate is qualified or is not qualified to hold the

particular office.

This is what the Supreme Court said in one of the

cases we cited, the membership should decide it.

MR. GOTTESMAN: In fact, your Honor, this is a

debatable fact. Our membership at our convention de-

cided it by voting to have the meeting attendance require-

ment. They voted that it was relevant.

THE COURT: Well, does it make any difference?

What would be the effect if he said, “No, I don’t think

he could” or if he said, “Yes, I think he could”?

-—

It depends on what he says that would affect your argu-

ment. You’d cast it aside if it were unfavorable and if

you thought it was favorable, why, you [78] would use

it. But I don’t really see what he thinks about it really

is going to control, is it?

MR. GOTTESMAN: OK.

THE COURT: That is something I have to deter-

mine, I suppose.

BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q. Mr. Hantzis, you were a candidate in 1967 for the

office of President, is that not right?

A. I was.

Q. Can you tell us who your opponents were?

A. Kenneth Rose and Donald Redell.

@. Were any other persons nominated for the office

of President at the Local Union meeting?

A. To the best of my recollection there was one dec-

lination, but I would have to verify that by checking rec-

ords.

THE COURT: Do I understand there were three

nominated?

THE WITNESS: Three nominees were accepted.

THE COURT: Yourself and—who is it, Mr. Rose?

THE WITNESS: Rose.

THE COURT: And who was the other one?

THE WITNESS: Redell.

[79] BY MR. GOTTESMAN:

Q@ When you say there was one declination, in other

words, there may have been another person whose name

was proposed but said he didn’t want to run?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Were there any candidates whose names were pro-

posed and who were ruled ineligible by reason of not sat-

isfying the meeting attendance requirement?

A. You are speaking now of the—

Q. Office of President.

A. Not to my knowledge.

[96] REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Mr. Hantzis, do you recall approximately when

this motion to order the Constitutions was made, what

month and what year, approximately?

THE COURT: Motion to what?

MRS. JANAVS: Motion to order the Constitutions,

THE COURT: You mean copies of them?

MRS. JANAVS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

THE WITNESS: I don’t recall. It would be in the

Minutes.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Do you recall at 3:1 approximately when it was

that this check was issued for the copies of the Constitu-

tions you testified about and the report made by the Fi-

nancial Secretary that this had been done?

A. It would have been within the subsequent months,

as the order was made, ordered and completed or de

livered.

Q. But you can’t say whether it was in ’67 or ’66 or

65?

A. I think it was ’66, I’m not positive.

Q. Sometime in ’66?

[97] A. It would have been toward the latter part of

the year.

Q. Excuse me. I'll rephrase it.

Now, was there a time when the Union officials in-

quired of the International Union as to how many meet-

ings a member of Local 5799 would have had to attend

in order to qualify as a candidate in the 1967 election?

A. I think that was the month preceding the election

itself or somewhere within a few days or even a week or

so of that time.

The question—I brought the question to the floor, that

they contact the International on it myself, and this was

shortly after nominations before the election.

——

Q. And the question was how many meetings would a

cular member of your Local have to attend in order

to qualify in that election, is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And do you know, did the reply from the {98} In-

ternational come shortly thereafter?

A. The reply was announced. I don’t recall seeing it

- It would be from August on of 1965.

Q. How many meetings would have to be attended

during that period in order to qualify?

A. The Constitution would stili hold good, 50 per

“Q. It would be the August meeting that would be the

first one to count?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. And this was approximately one month before that

actual election?

A. Between nominations and election, yes, sir.

Q. After nominations and before the election?

A. Yes.

(99) BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Now, getting back, you testified in May, June and

July of 1965 the Constitution might have possibly been

read by Mr. Parker at the Union meetings for those

months.

A. Yes.

- * * _

Q. Mr. Hantzis, the people that attended a meeting in

May, June and July of ’65, were there not a substantial

number of people that attended one meeting that also at-

tended the other meetings mentioned?

A. Yes.

Q. When you say two-thirds of members approximate-

ly attended these meetings, were you talking in terms of

the total number of people that attended all these [100]

meetings or are you talking about approximately 250 dif-

ferent members having attended?

A. The attendance at the meetings in May, June and

July of 1965 may have been different members, but there

LS ei es

were approximately two-thirds of the employees at each

of those meetings or the combined total of the meetings,

each month.

THE COURT: The average then?

THE WITNESS: The average for each month pres-

ent.

[102] Q. There was no established policy by anyone

[103] in writing as to what time a person—how much a

person had to work overtime in order to qualify for

credit, is that right?

A. It doesn’t state overtime per se. It says your em-

ployment—you must be on the job or working. You must

be working.

THE COURT: We are using overtime as working.

Use the word “working”. Maybe that is better.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. So there was no specific announcement or notice

given to the employees as to how late they had to work

to qualify for credit?

A. No.

[108] HENRY A. QUEEN

a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, having been

previously duly sworn, was examined and testified as fol-

lows:

a - o .

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Mr. Queen, you are employed by the United [109]

States Department of Labor, is that right?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q. What is your position with the Department of

Labor?

A. I am Chief, Branch of Elections and Trusteeships,

Office of Labor-Management, Welfare, Pension Reports,

U.S. Department of Labor, Washington.

earner |

_—_

In your work do you have any duties at all in

relationship to Union election investigations?

A. I do.

Q, Can you tell the Court what those duties are?

A. Well, put briefly, when we have word from our

feld offices that they have received a complaint from a

Union member, who has met the requirements of 402 (a)

(1) or (2) of the Labor-Management Requirement Dis-

Act of 1959 my branch in Washington begins to

follow the progress of the investigation of that case in

the field.

We have to be sure that the investigative results are

received in my office well in advance of the statutory

filing deadline. We try to get it in within 30 days of the

deadline.

Having gotten the results in, we give it an analysis and

evaluation, and then as soon as we are reasonably sure

of the Title IV violations, disclosed by [110] the investi-

gation, a letter is prepared for my signature, add

to the President of the parent body, with a copy to the

President of the concerned Local, in case of a Local in-

vestigation, and anyone else who migtt be an informed

person, like an attorney for the Local or President of the

District Council, and we notify them by that letter the

nature and kind of Title IV violations that have been

established, we think, as of that stage in the investigation

rocess.

: In the letter we ask for a reply by a certain date,

which is again in advance of the filing deadline.

Q. Now, with respect to Local Union 6799 of the

United Steelworkers, did you in the course of your work

receive a complaint, filed by any member of that Local

with the Department of Labor?

A. We did.

MRS. JANAVS: I wonder if the witness might be

handed Exhibit 8, please.

(Exhibit placed before the witness.)

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Mr. Queen, would you examine Exhibit 8, please,

and state if that is the complaint which in due course

arrived in your office?

A. This is the complaint that in due course [111]

was received in my office.

. All right.

MRS. JANAVS: At this time I would like w mark

for identification as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 a letter ad.

dressed to Mr. Abel, International President, from Henry

A. Queen.

THE CLERK: Pilaintiff’s 9 for identification.

(Document was marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 for

identification. )

MRS. JANAVS: May the witness be handed Exhibit

9 for identification, please?

(Exhibit placed before the witness. )

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Would you identify, Mr. Queen, what this docv-

ment is?

A. This is the summary of violations that I sent to

Mr. Abel on November 21, 1967, with a copy to the Presi-

dent of Local 6799, notifying them that the investigation

conducted up that point in Local 6799 had disclosed cer-

tain Title IV violations.

MRS. JANAVS: I would at this time offer Exhibit 9

in evidence, your Honor.

MR. GOTTESMAN: No objection.

THE COURT: 9 is ordered in evidence.

[112] (Document marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 was re

ceived in evidence.)

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Mr. Queen, as regard Exhibit 9, have you discussed

the violation alleged in that exhibit with any Union of-

ficials or attorneys for the United Steelworkers?

A. Yes.

Q. And can you tell us the first occasion that you had

any discussion with relation to the allegations made in

that letter with any such officials or attorneys?

A. Well, instead of replying by letter the Union of-

ficials asked for a conference back in Washington. That

_ —

conference was arranged. It was held on December 18th,

1967, in the office of the Assistant Secretary Thomas R.

Donohue.

. Do you recall some of the people that were repre-

senting the Union who were present at that meeting?

A. Yes, the Union was represented by Mr. Bernard

Kleinman, General Counsel, by Mr. Gottesman, by Mr.

Wynn Newman, an associate General Counsel and there

were several field representatives there whose names I

no longer recall.

You were present at this meeting for the Depart-

ment of Labor?

A. I was.

[113] Q. Do you recall any of the other people that

were there from the Department of Labor?

A. The Department was represented by Assistant Sec-

retary Thomas R. Donohue and nis deputy, John Shinn,

and Frank M. Klieler, Director of the Office of Labor-

Management—

THE COURT: Mr. Tyler or—

THE WITNESS: Klieler, your Honor.

THE COURT: How do you spell it?

THE WITNESS: K-l-i-e-l-e-r. Mr. Klieler and his

deputy, Mr. Leonard Lurie, L-u-r-i-e, and myself.

Now the office of the Solicitor was represented by the

Solicitor himself. His name is Charles Donahue. George

T. Avery, who is an Associate Solicitor. Miss Bea Block,

Chief of Litigation, and Mr. Robert Lagotta, who is an

attorney in the Solicitor’s office.

BY MRS. JANAVS:

Q. Do you recall what was discussed at this meeting,

as far as the alleged violations stated in Exhibit 9 were

concerned ?

A. Well, Assistant Secretary Donohue opened the meet-

ing by telling the Union officials that the Department was

concerned with the Steelworkers’ three-year meeting at-

tendance requirement, and reminded them at one [114]

time they had had a two-year meeting attendance re-

quirement.

—

And it seemed this one would be more apt to make it

more difficult for Union members to qualify for Union

office.

He also went on to say he was not making the point

that the meeting attendance requirement was unreason-

able per se, but in particular cases over 90 per cent of

the Union members had been unable to meet these meet-

ing attendance requirements.

In this particular case I think the percentage was some-

thing like over 93 percent had not been able to meet the

meeting attendance requir

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.