Respondents Brief — Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation
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IN THE an —
Supreme Court of the Anited Statec
BLONDER-TONGUE LABORATORIES, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FOUNDATION,
AND
JFD ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
FOUNDATION.
Cuaries J. Merriam,
Wim A. MarsHatt,
Bast P. Mann,
Counsel for Respondent University
of Illimois Foundation.
Of Counsel:
Micnae. P. Bucx1o,
Merriam, MarsHatt, Suapmo & Kxosez,
30 West Monroe Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603.
PAGE
ME civ cbbstecess Cibsdéeenccetscbecesecenees 1
AE EE ENED nc ics oncrsseetcnscevocssaeins 2
Summary of Argument .............0ccccccccccceee 4
Question No. 1 ........ccccescccccccscvccccccvecs 4
Question No. 3 ......sccccescccsccccvccncvcccccss 5
Ganstiete MO. 8 on. secessrccceccsccccccccssscces 6
Questiom Mo. 4 ....ccescsccccsvevcceccccccccccecs 7
Question NO. 5 .....sccccsccccescccccccscccceces 7
AvMUMOME 2 nose secccevccvescccccceccvecvcccceccs 8
Question 1 (re Triplett v. Lowell) ................ 8
A. The Triplett Rule Does Not Represent a Sub-
stantial and Unnecessary Burden on the Courts
OE 55 604405664 dnnk 4d406b000 46a cre cee 10
1. The Holding in Triplett Is Not an Exception
to the Doctrine of Res Judicata ............ 11
2. Relitigation of Patents After an Jnitial
Finding of Invalidity Does Not Represent
a Significant Burden on the Federal Courts 15
3. The Right To Be Heard Is Guaranteed by
i NE So. vahwescetesectsaysesess 17
4. Overruling the Triplett Rule Would Ad-
versely Affect the Current Process for
Sustaining Good Patents and Rectifying
Erroneous Holdings ....................+. 19
| B. The Triplett Rule Does Not Significantly Preju-
dice the Public’s Interest in the Elimination of
EE Sok kcckcStenebisasancsersees 19
Question 2 (re Retroactive Application of Change in
EE Es keke eualsanehvenns Eeabecee acess 21
li
Question 3 (re Isbell Patent) ..................05,
A.
B.
7A 2
G.
ee See eee onsenakude
The Matter of ‘‘Obviousness”’ ................
1. Log-Periodic Antennas ................0..
2. The Prior Art Does Not Teach the Invention
ee el UG ee err ee
3. The Isbell Invention Was Nonobvious .....
4. Unpredictability of Result Cannot Be Ig-
nored in Determining Nonobviousness ....
The Purported Publication of QER-2 .........
Purported Anticipation by the Prior Art ......
Infringement of the Isbell Patent ............
The Alleged Unenforceability of the Isbell
WE she kcddvavece wieebues ab60640NSS6keuae
Tb WiONTE DOU 3.0 + 60 snsedscescecenvas
Question 4 (re Fraud, Unfair Competition and Anti-
Pc cdeuasccdeh Sanam bsckanenbawavateduasues
POT CE Per TTT Urey eT Tree Terror ree
I a a re eee ela MAE Ae pe Ch Doge es fhe argh
AvutxHorities CITep.
Cases.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245 U. S. 198
oe os a alogh | boo ee ee a cas
Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F. 2d 949 (7th Cir. 1955)....
B. G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F. 2d 20 (2d Cir.
AI ip BB RL Arps Bey om Ee A ie Gerth
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & 8S. Co., 225
Ses es ee A KC Kea cbdcnen sear sensowksaweens
B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N. Y. 2d 141, 225 N. E.
2d 195, 278 N. Y. S. 2d 596 (1967) .............006.
48
49
50
14
iii
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.,
i we daee Va pee eb beewareeasse ss 14
Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip. Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 122 (N. D. Til. 1970)..............2eeeeeee 15
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366 (1909). 14
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 (1966) .6, 7, 23, 24, 49
Hamilton Labs., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F. 2d 584 (6th
Ce EN cea ance sav eeedsRaeds C4 d6éeecsunevnds 32
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)............... 17
Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F. 2d 158 (2d
a ee Ce veya 14
Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F. 2d
OS ee le ohn on duck nboncean 6 i05 is 55 x aces 18
Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653 (1969)........... 19, 23
Litchfield v. Crane, 123 U. S. 549 (1887)............. j1
Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U. S. 293 (1948)... 30
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485
i veckinahedsnt wea yaeupascieskensines or 12, 15
Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co., 307 U. S. 243 (1939). 22
Nickerson v. Kutschera, 390 F. 2d 812 (3d Cir. 1968).. 14
Nickerson v. Kutschera, 295 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1969),
rev'd, 419 F’. 2d 963 (Sd Cir.)..........ccccccccees 13
Nickerson v. Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, 247 F.
ee 5 er 13
Application of Pantzer, 341 F. 2d 121 (C. C. P. A. 1965) 30
Postal-Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464 (1919). 17
Rains v. Jil-Mic, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 545 (S. D. N. Y.
sa aes obbcecceah ceehsi ies cee kcaeus 15
Republic Molding Corp. v. B. W. Photo Util., 319 F. 2d
SE es cy cue lee ccccananeblouesunes 42
iv
Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States, 168 U. 8. 1
COED: Gk hsnssdv kev idbdesunessacneungspnensiel 13
Ex parte Suozzi, 125 U. S. P. Q. 445 (P. O. Bd. of
BE, Fcc ces ccccnveseradess tnxema ess sennequs 41
Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc.,
SOS Fs ee ee Cre Os TI vnc sev ccvevessvecaes 14
Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372
PT Bs CR BED cee cc cdecvesvapordoves 14, 20, 22
Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elec,
Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308 (C. D. Cal. 1968).......... 13, 14
Application of Tomlinson, 363 F. 2d 928 (C. C. P. A.
DEE Shah sae hewnbeahadeubitssocscadticviure seus 46
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638 (1936).......... 4, 5, 8-23
United States v. Adams, 382 U. S. 39 (1966)........ 23, 28
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322
PE CEA iC hss velcesceceeuveuyeresenuees 19
University of Ill. Found. v. Winegard Co., 402 F. 2d
125 (8th Cir. 1968), affirming, 271 F. Supp. 412 (S. D.
RTT TT TTT Teer rere ET ET. 5, 8, 22, 24
Books and Periodicals.
Comment, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 63 Nw.
i ee ED obo Vin os 08535463400 eh 0000 bas 12
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of
the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957) .. 12
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Cauar.
Se SO og ceri vc vend bacaus ondbosaecvces 12
Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of
Estoppel, 45 Inp. L. J. 1 (1969) .........-.eeeeeee 12
~
Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 Tunanr L. Rev, 301 (1961) ........ 12, 18
Vv
Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A Solution in Search of a
Problem?, 52 J. Pat. Orr. Soo’y 561 (1970)
Soans, Return to Robinson (1890), Whitehall Co.,
Northbrook, Dlinois (1970)
Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yarz L. J. 299
Restatement, Judgments § 41 (1942)
Restatement, Judgments § 93 (1942)
1B Moore, Federal Practice par. 0.412 [1] (2d ed. 1965)
1B Moore, Federal Practice par. 0.406 [2] (2d ed. 1965)
4A C. J. S. Appeal & Error § 626 (1957)
Constitution of the United States.
U.S. Const. art. I, §8
35 U. 8. C. § 103
35 U. S. C. § 282
U.S. Sup. Ct. Rev. R. 19
S. 1042 90th Cong., Ist Sess. § 294 (1967)
S. 1246 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)
Staff of Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.
2nd Sess., An Analysis of Patent Litigation Statistics
(Comm. Print 1961)
1969 Admin. Office of the U. S. Cts. Rep. ............
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
Ocroser Term, 1970
BLONDER-TONGUE LABORATORIES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v8.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FOUNDATION,
AND
JFD ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
FOUNDATION.
STATUTES.
35 U. S. C. § 103
Conditions for patentability—Non-obvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section
102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
ee
—o—
a mee een whe none — oe
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per.
tains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made. July 10, 1952, c. 950,
$1, 66 Stat. 798.
35 U.S. C. § 282
Presumption of validity—Defenses.
A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent
(whether in independent or dependent form) shall be pre-
sumed valid independently of the validity of other claims;
dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though
dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of estab-
lishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall
rest on the party asserting it.* * * July 19, 1952, ¢. 950,
§1, 66 Stat. 812; July 24, 1965, P. L. 89-83, § 10, 79 Stat.
261.
35 U. S. C. § 285
Attorney fees.
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party. July 19, 1952, «.
950, § 1, 66 Stat. 813.
STATEMENT OF THE UCASE.
We call the Court’s attention to the following errors
and/or omissions in Blonder-Tongue’s statement of the
case. The sections are labeled to correspond with those
in the brief of Blonder-Tongue (B-T).
In the Introduction to its Statement of the Case (B-T
Brief, p. 5), and indeed in many other portions of its
brief (note, in particular, pages 17-23), Blonder-Tongue
— a
3
alludes to its alleged deprivation of due process, arising
from the fact that the trial court refused on December 26,
1967 to grant it an additional delay in the start of the
trial, which had been postponed from October 23rd to
December 18, 1967 at the request of Blonder-Tongue (A. 6,
132). The trial actually started on December 28, 1967 (A.
7).
Blonder-Tongue’s argument in this regard was fully
considered and rejected by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit (A. 55) and has not been presented to
this Court as a question for review.
With respect to the Mayes et al. patent (B-T Brief, p. 6)
there is no support for Blonder-Tongue’s statement that
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
“by holding that the University of Illinois Foundation
had indeed presented half-truths to the Patent office’’.
The sole basis for the finding of invalidity of the Mayes
patent was obviousness of the invention in view of the
prior art (A. 65).
As to Question 4 (Fraud, Unfair Competition and Anti-
trust, B-T Brief, p. 7) the allegation that the Court of
Appeals ‘‘found deception in the procurement of the
Mayes patent’’ is without foundation. The court found
no fraud had been committed (A. 67) and found that the
failure to inform the Patent Office of what later proved
to be a prior publication served only to rebut the presump-
tion of validity of the Mayes et al. patent (A. 68).
Blonder-Tongue’s allegation (Brief, p. 7) that the Isbell
and Mayes et al. patents were ‘‘prosecuted together’’ in
the Patent Office is misleading. Like every other patent
application in the Patent Office, these were prosecuted in-
dividually. If Blonder-Tongue means to say that the periods
of prosecution overlapped, which is the case, then we have
no quarrel.
4
There is no support in the record for the allegations
made by Blonder-Tongue (Brief, p. 8) that the Isbell and
Mayes et al. patents were ‘‘used in widespread threats
and coercion in the marketplace’’; that JFD was guilty of
unfair competition in ‘‘hiring away, during preparation
for trial, petitioner’s key witness’’; or that ‘‘other acts
of unfair competition’? had been committed. The only
support for these charges is Blonder-Tongue’s own allega-
tions. Both courts that have considered them have found
no merit whatever in these claims (A. 68, 69, 84-88),
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
Question No. 1 (re Triplett v. Lowell).
The Triplett rule that a finding of patent invalidity is
not res judicata is based on and consistent with sound
legal principles which advance the public interest and
should continue to be adhered to. The arguments usually
offered in support of a change in the rule, namely, (1)
that relitigation of patents already held invalid represents
a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts, and
(2) that the rule prejudices the public interest in seeing
that invalid patents are eliminated, are not well founded.
The number of relitigated patents is so small as to be
insignificant, as shown by a 1961 study prepared for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. This report showed that
during the 10 year period from 1949 through 1958, only
about 1% of the patent cases filed in that period involved
patents which were being relitigated after a prior deter-
mination of invalidity.
Similarly, the argument that relitigation of patents once
held invalid is against the public interest ignores the
equally important consideration that it is as much in the
5
public interest to uphold a good patent as to strike a bad
one. Because of the complex and intricate inherent nature
of the issue of patent validity, the Triplett rule affords a
desirable safeguard against erroneous findings of invalidity
which is in the best interest of both patentees and the
public.
Any change in the Triplett rule should be made only
after careful consideration and for compelling reasons.
In order to properly balance the sometimes conflicting in-
terests of patentees, accused infringers and the public,
while avoiding undue burden on the courts, any such change,
if considered necessary, should be made by Congress,
which is more flexible in its operation and in a better
position to conduct the comprehensive investigation which
the nature of the subject demands.
Question No. 2 (re Retroactive Application of Change in
Triplett Rule).
Even if the Court decides that the rule in Triplett
should be changed, it would be manifestly unfair to apply
the change to respondent in this case. The finding of
invalidity relative to the Isbell patent is even now not
yet final, since there is still pending before this Court a
petition for reconsideration of the denial of certiorari in
the Winegard case. Further, at the time respondent
initiated litigation against Winegard, Blonder-Tongue, and
others, it had every justification for believing that a finding
of invalidity in any one case would not be applied in any
other action. It would also be unfair for this Court to
change the Triplett rule and to hold that respondent is
barred by the Winegard litigation, and thereafter to hold
that the Winegard case was improperly decided, if the
Court agrees that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Cireuit applied an improper legal standard. The inequity
etieiientateete oe
which might result to respondent is a further reason for
suggesting that any change in the rule be made by legisla.
tive action, which is more flexible in setting up means for
avoiding such injustice.
Question 3 (re Isbell Patent).
The holdings of the courts below that Isbell’s invention
was nonobvious and hence valid under the standards set
out by this Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. §.
1, 17-18 (1966) is fully supported by the findings of fact
which these courts made. Even though the individual
elements of which Isbell’s antenna is composed were known
in combination with other elements, there was no basis
on which one skilled in the art would find it obvious to
first isolate the particular elements used by Isbell from
the prior art and then combine these elements as Isbell
did. Although there was a general theory which permitted
-a designer to design a ‘‘log-periodic’’ structure which
potentially might be frequency independent in operation,
the art itself recognized and the courts below found that
it was impossible to predict which structures made in this
manner would in fact have frequency independent prop-
erties. The number of log-periodic structures which could
be designed using the known active elements was countless,
and very few of the possible structures were frequency
independent. Moreover, none of the possible structures
could be singled out as having a greater likelihood of being
frequency independent than the others. Accordingly, it
was not obvious to test any one structure, such as that
made by Isbell, to determine if it had frequency inde-
pendent properties, on anything other than a blind trial-
and-error, hit-or-miss basis.
The holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
that the Isbell patent is invalid was based on an obvious-
7
to-try standard which is improper under the facts of this
case. Applying such a standard effectively destroys the
patent system, since any result, regardless of how un-
expected, nonobvious, or unpredictable, can be achieved,
at least theoretically, by a trial-and-error combination of
known elements.
Blonder-Tongue has not presented any persuasive reason
why the concurrent findings of the courts below should
be reversed.
Question 4 (re Fraud, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust).
No fraud was committed during the prosecution of the
Mayes et al. patent, as found by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. If any trace of ‘‘unclean hands’’
resulted as a result of the prosecution of the Mayes
patent, it is confined to that patent alone and does not
affect the enforceability of the Isbell patent.
The courts below found that no conspiracy, acts of un-
fair competition, or antitrust violations were committed
by either of the respondents, without which there is no
basis for holding the Isbell patent to be unenforceable.
Question 5.
The trial court followed the procedure established by
this Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. for considering
the question of nonobviousness, even if its findings were
not explicitly set forth. The Court of Appeals had no
difficulty in affirming the propriety of the trial court’s
decision.
FN CANE CRE TN ENS = OCT
ARGUMENT.
QUESTION 1.
(re Triplett v. Lowell.)
In the case of Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638 (1936),
this Court held that a determination of patent invalidity is
not res judicata binding the patentee in subsequent litiga-
tion against a different defendant. The Court has re-
quested the parties in this case to address themselves to
the question of whether the above holding in the Triplett
case should be adhered to, and if not, whether the prior
determination of invalidity in the Winegard litigation
binds the respondents in this case.
While we agree with Blonder-Tongue that the Triplett
rule should not be reversed, we consider that the Court
has asked the parties to discuss both sides of the question,
and accordingly we will attempt to do so.
To summarize our position, we believe that the Triplett
rule should not be changed by this Court, for the following
reasons:
1. The rule of Triplett v. Lowell has been the law of
the land for many years, and during that time it has, in
our opinion, served well both the interests of the public
as well as those of patentees. Any change in the rule
should be made by Congress only after appropriate hear-
ings and for compelling reasons. The pertinent factors
to be considered in deciding whether the rule should be
changed are many and complex, and involve balancing the
rights of patent owners, accused infringers and the public
interest and establishing new procedures designed to pro-
tect these various interests while avoiding undue burden
on the courts. For this reason we suggest that any change
in the rule should be made only by the legislature, after full
and careful hearings of all the factors involved, and, if
desirable, with appropriate changes in venue and other
provisions which could not be made by this Court.
In this connection, it is of interest to note that Congress
has considered the matter several times since the handing
down of the Triplett rule, most recently in connection with
the ‘‘Patent Reform Act of 1967’’, from which the so-called
‘sin rem invalidity’’ clause was specifically deleted.
2. A change in the Triplett rule would make more
difficult the establishment of uniform rules and standards
for guidance of the lower courts in patent cases. Under
its usual procedure, this Court does not grant certiorari
in patent cases unless there are conflicting decisions of two
courts of appeals. Thus, if the Triplett rule were reversed,
no effective opportunity would be presented to this Court
to review the standards applied in the case of patent
actions brought originally in those circuits in which sub-
stantially all of the patents are held invalid.
3. Changing the Triplett rule would impose an unfair
burden on those who, like respondent here, entered into
multiple litigation relying on the Triplett v. Lowell doc-
trine. Proper means for avoiding individual injustice in
such cases can be more readily provided by legislative
action. If the Triplett rule is to be reversed, we submit that
the venue provisions relating to patent infringement actions
should also be changed to provide that all infringers may
be sued together in one action, without limitations as to
residence, place of business, or locale of acts of infringe-
ment. It is manifestly unfair to subject a patentee to a
game of legal ‘‘Russian roulette’’, in which he may lose all
his patent rights, yet stands to win only the right to take
the same chance against another defendant.
ee apne angre be
IT Le
10
In the present case, the Foundation was forced to bring
multiple actions, in the Eighth as well as the Seventh Cir-
cuits, not because it wished to multiply litigation, but be-
cause of a need to protect the patent. Under such circum.
stances, it would be highly unfair to bind a patentee if the
patent is held invalid in the first action, yet to leave him
vulnerable in the event his patent is upheld.
4. The arguments advanced for changing the Triplett
rule, on careful examination, are not well founded and do
not overcome the disadvantages which a change in the rule
would entail.
In general, the rationales propounded contra to the Trip-
lett holding fall into the following two categories:
A. Relitigation of patents which have previously
been declared invalid represents a substantial and
unnecessary burden on the courts and public.
B. Since the public is a silent but important party
in interest in all patent litigation, the Triplett rule
significantly prejudices the public’s interest in the
elimination of specious patents.
Each of the above arguments for changing the Triplett
rule will be separately evaluated in the following discussion.
A. The Triplett Rule Does Not Represent a Substantial
and Unnecessary Burden on the Courts and Public.
The argument that the Triplett rule is burdensome was
aptly presented by Judge Schnackenburg in his concurring
opinion in the case of Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F. 2d 949,
951 (7th Cir. 1955), wherein he stated:
‘*[A] suit testing the validity of a patent is not a pro-
ceeding in rem and hence Aghnides may litigate and
relitigate again and again the question of validity of
his patent as long as he selects a different defendant
in each of the infringement suits which he files, thus
11
avoiding the wholesome doctrine of res adjudicata.
This queer result is one which we are unable to avoid.
It is a situation which is particularly abhorrent when
considered against the backlog of untried cases which
clogs our federal courts. The latter are cases where
the litigant asks only for his day in court, not a plural-
ity of days in court as Aghnides is entitled to under
the existing law. The remedy lies not in our hands.
The congress could by legislation grant relief.’’
This position, while on its face appealing to both reason
and logic, fails on several grounds.
1. The Holding in Triplett Is Not an Exception to the Doctrine
of Res Judicata.
It should be carefully noted that this Court held in Trip-
lett that the doctrine of res judicata may not be pleaded as
a defense in a subsequent suit against a different defendant.
This is in effect merely an application of the so-called
‘“‘mutuality’’ rule which requires that a person who seeks
to claim the benefits of an adjudication upon any matter
decided in a prior action be a party or privy in the prior
adjudication sought to be relied upon. Restatement, Judg-
ments §93 (1942).?
The mutuality requirement applied in Triplett is deeply
rooted in the jurisprudence of the courts in this country.
As early as 1887 this Court noted in Litchfield v. Crane,
123 U. S. 549, 552, that ‘‘estoppels to be good must be mu-
tual.’’ Likewise, in the later case of Bigelow v. Old Do-
1. Comment d, example 10, to section 93 of the Restatement
applies the mutuality rule directly to the factual situation raised in
this case, that is:
“10. A brings an action against B for infringement of a
patent. B defends on the ground that the alleged patent was
void and obtains judgment. A brings an action for infringe-
ment of the same patent against C who seeks to interpose the
judgment in favor of B as res judicata, but setting up no
relation with B. On demurrer, judgment should be for A.’’
nS ENE ORE OEY NR Pee mot iee:
12
minion Copper Min. & S. Co., 225 U. 8. 111, 127 (1912), the
Court held, ‘‘it is a principle of general elementary law that
the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual.’’
Although the doctrine of mutuality has been criticized
by some writers,’ and a few courts have avowedly rejected
the doctrine,’ it appears, in reviewing the authorities gen-
erally cited as indicating an erosion of the doctrine, that
the courts in fact have been merely applying the doctrines
of stare decisis and comity in spite of their broad language
concerning the application of res judicata and rejection of
mutuality.
The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata and
the doctrines of stare decisis and comity is an important
one because application of stare decisis and comity, unlike
the strict mechanical rule of res judicata, allows the court
to examine the facts of the later-filed suit in order to deter-
mine whether they warrant relitigation of the issue decided
in a prior suit. Likewise, the doctrines of stare decisis and
comity allow the court to examine the rule of law applied
in the prior suit in order to insure that the needs of justice
have been fully met. As this Court stated in Mast, Foos ¢
Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485, 488-89 (1900) :
‘*Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice,
convenience, and expediency. It is something more than
mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the
2. See generally Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957);
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Cautr. L. Rev. 25
(1965) ; Comment, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 63 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 209 (1968). It should be noted also that there is ample
authority urging the retention of the mutuality doctrine. See Von
Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yate L. J. 299 (1929); Moore &
Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuLANE
L. Rev. 301 (1961) ; Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of
Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 Inv. L. J. 1 (1969).
3. ‘‘[T]he doctrine of mutuality is a dead letter.’’ B. R.
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N, Y, 2d 141, 147, 225 N. E. 2d 195, 278
N. Y. S. 2d 596 (1967).
13
opinion of others, since it has substantial value in secur-
ing uniformity of decision, and discouraging repeated
litigation of the same question. But its obligation is
not imperative. If it were, the indiscreet action of one
court might become a precedent, increasing in weight
with each successive adjudication, until the whole
country was tied down to an unsound principle. Comity
persuades; but it does not command. It declares, not
how a case shall be decided, but how it may with pro-
priety be decided. It recognizes the fact that the pri-
mary duty of every court is to dispose of cases accord-
ing to the law and the facts; in a word, to decide them
right... . Clearly it applies only to questions which
have been actually decided, and which arose under the
same facts.’’
Two recent patent cases are generally cited as abolishing
the mutuality requirement in the application of the doctrine
of res judicata. However, both of these cases, Nickerson v.
Pep Boys—Manny, Moe ¢ Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221, 224 (D.
Del. 1965), and Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Packard
Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 318 (C. D. Cal. 1968),
rested their decisions on the fact that no new evidence con-
cerning validity was presented by the patentee in the sub-
sequent suit. If the strict legal doctrine of res judicata or
collateral estoppel had been mechanically applied in these
ceases, the ‘‘new evidence’’ considered and discussed in both
of these cases would have been totally irrelevant. How-
4. See Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 62, 65
(1897). This mechanical application of estoppel to prevent the
introduction of new evidence in the subsequent suit brought by the
patentee has been used by a district court in only one instance to
date. In the case, Nickerson v. Kutschera, 295 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del.
1969), rev’d, 419 F. 2d 983 (3d Cir. 1969), the district court stated :
‘*But with all deference to the Courts which have made ‘new
evidence’ the controlling criteria in refusing to apply the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel to issues decided in a patent in-
fringement action, it would appear conceptually that this test
is irrelevant and contrary to controlling precedent in the field
of collateral estoppel generally.’’ 295 F. Supp. at 6.
14
ever, since these courts did consider the ‘‘new evidence”
issue, they were in effect according the prior decisions
comity, as explained by this Court in the above-mentioned
Mast decision, and which is specifically provided for in
Triplett. This line of reasoning has been followed in the
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, wherein the ‘‘new evi-
dence’’ was evaluated in disposition of motions for sum-
mary judgment by one not privy to the previous litigation.
In the area of patent litigation, there is a special reason
why relitigation should not be automatically banned as
needless or redundant by strict application of the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. As recognized by
Judge Learned Hand in Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183
F’, 2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950), the issue of patent validity is
‘‘as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom
as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts. . . .
If there be an issue more troublesome, or more apt for
litigation than this, we are not aware of it.’”
It is submitted that due to the intrinsic nature and com-
plexity of the subject, the first decision finding invalidity
can be quite wrong or based on an insufficient record or
presentation through no fault of the patentee.* The inflex-
5. ‘‘[T]he earlier decision may by comity be given great weight
in a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like
decree. ...’’ 297 U. S. at 642.
6. See Nickerson v. Kutschera, 390 F. 2d 812 (3rd Cir. 1968) ;
Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc., 356 F. 2d
442 (7th Cir. 1966); Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Packard
Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308 (C. D. Cal. 1968).
7. As noted in Triplett (297 U. S. at 643-44), this Court has
several times held valid claims of a patent held invalid by a Circuit
Court of Appeals in an earlier suit brought by the patentee against
another defendant. See Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. 8.
366 (1909) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.,
220 U. S. 428 (1910); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245
U. S. 198 (1916).
8. See Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372
F. 2d 969, 977-78 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
15
ible and mechanical rule of res judicata is not appropriate
for this type of litigation. The more flexible and equitable
doctrines of stare decisis® and comity fully enable the courts
to properly give great weight to the prior finding of in-
validity while permitting review of any new evidence pre-
sented at the pre-trial and summary judgment stage, and
grant the courts of the various circuits the independence
contemplated by the Mast decision to insure that the ends
of justice have been fulfilled.”
@, Relitigation of Patents After an Initial Finding of Invalidity
Does Not Represent a Significant Burden on the Federal
Courts.
In 1961 the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee published
the most comprehensive study to date concerning patent
litigation in the federal district courts."° The study, cover-
ing the ten year period from 1949 through 1958, reported
that during this period a total of 6,057 patent suits were
commenced.” Of this number, only 62 cases (approximately
9. For a patent case involving application of stare decisis (i.e.,
the binding effect of a prior judgment in the same circuit), see
Rains v. Ju-Mic, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 545 (S. D. N. Y. 1969).
9a. It should also be noted at this point that under 35 U. S. C.
§ 285 (1954), a court has the power to award attorneys’ fees to a
defendant sued in bad faith for infringement of an obviously
invalid patent. See Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip., Inc.,
318 F. Supp. 122 (N. D. Ill. 1970). This section certainly mitigates
against any abusive relitigation of patents properly held invalid in
a prior suit against a different defendant.
10. Starr or SuscomM. on Patents, TRADEMARKS, AND CopPy-
RIGHTS, SENATE CoMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, 86TH Cona., 2p Szss., An
Analysis of Patent Litigation Statistics (Comm. Print 1961) [here-
inafter cited as 1961 Subcomm. Rep.].
11. Id. at 12 (Table 1). According to the most recent annual
report of the administrative Office of the United States Courts,
during the ten year period from 1959 through 1968 a total of
648,767 civil cases were filed in the U. S. courts; 7,875 of these
(approximately 1.2%) being patent cases. 1969 ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U. S. Crs. Rep.
ae .
|
|
14
1%) involved patents which were being relitigated after a
prior determination of invalidity.”
It is interesting to note that the majority of these subse-
quent suits were terminated without a second adjudication
of the validity of the patent.“ However, nine patents
did receive a redetermination on the merits concerning
validity,"* of which seven were found to be valid.
This study makes clear two compelling facts. First, the
number of patents which are relitigated after a finding of
invalidity is so small that the problem seems to be de
minimis. Of the total number of patent suits filed during
the period studied, only about 1% involved patents which
were being relitigated after an initial finding of invalidity.
The results of the study permit the conclusion that suits
involving relitigation of a previously determined invalid
patent represent, on the average, only one out of every
10,000 civil cases filed in the federal courts.
The second compelling fact demonstrated by the study is
that a substantial number of the patents which are reliti-
gated after an initial holding of invalidity are held valid in
the subsequent litigation. In fact, seven of the nine patents
which had their validity redetermined during the period of
the study were found to be valid. In view of the substantial
weigbt given by the district courts to a prior holding of
invalidity, this remarkable statistic tends to indicate that a
patentee will risk the expense of relitigation only where his
patent is of unusual merit and he is convinced, almost to the
point of certainty, of the error of the prior decision.
It is apparent from these figures that the mechanical
12. Id. at 19 (Table 16).
13. Id. at 19 (Note to Table 16).
14. Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A solution in Search of a
Problem?, 52 J. Pat. Orr. Soc’y. 561. 569 (1970).
15. 1961 Subcomm. Rep. 19 (Table i6).
17
application of res judicata to foreclose subsequent suits on
patents held to be invalid may well result in more valid
patents being sacrificed than invalid patents being justly
suppressed. In any event, surely “‘the doctrine of judicial
finality is not a catch-penny contrivance to dispose of cases
merely for the sake of disposition and .. . [clearing] up
dockets... .’”*
Further, reversal of the Triplett rule would probably lead
to a flood of applications for reissue patents. The issues of
infringement and validity are so intimately associated that
one cannot be sure that a finding of invalidity is not really
based on a finding that the patent is invalid if stretched to
cover the defendant’s acts. Accordingly, patentees would
seek to protect their patents by having them reissued with
slightly narrower claims.
Any relaxation in the requirement for mutuality in the
doctrine of res judicata should, at the very least, insure
that some significant benefit will ultimately be achieved
toward lessening the case load in the federal courts, which
probably cannot be accomplished without a change in venue
rules to permit a patentee to join concurrent infringers
in the same action, and insure that the ultimate ends of
justice to the parties will not be thwarted. It is submitted
that reversing the Triplett rule will achieve neither of
these desired ends.
8. The Right To Be Heard Is Guaranteed by the Constitution.
It is a constitutional necessity that a person be afforded a
right to be heard before he is estopped on the basis of a
previous suit."* Therefore, by abandonment of mutuality as
16. 1B M Fevers, P . 0.412 [1], at 1811 (2d
oa. 1968). OORE, RACTICE par [1], a (
17. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940) ; Postal-Tel. Cable
Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464 (1918). See generally 1B Moore,
FeprraL Practice par. 0.406 [2] (2d ed. 1965).
18
a requirement for the application of res judicata, there stil]
remains the constitutional requirement that the patentee, in
order to be bound by the prior judgment of invalidity, must
have had his opportunity to be heard, his ‘‘day in court”’.
There is no question that the patentee has had his day in
court against the defendant in the prior suit holding in-
validity, and the judgment is conclusive between them.
However, the patentee has had no opportunity to be heard
in opposition to the defendant in the subsequent suit. As
Judge Goodrich stated in Hornstein v. Kramer Bros.
Freight Lines, 133 F. 2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1943), the con-
clusive effect of a prior adjudication should not:
‘¢... go so far as to make the finding in one man’s case
in a personal action a conclusion of ultimate truth. A
law suit is not a laboratory experiment for the dis-
covery of physical laws of universal application but a
means of settling a dispute between litigants. That
which is settled as a fact between them through a given
piece of litigation under the principles of res judicata,
binds only the parties themselves and those who are in
such relation to the parties as to be considered in
privity with them.’’
To contend that the patentee has had his day in court,
when the defendant in the subsequent suit uses the prior
defendant’s judgment finding invalidity against the pat-
entee, clearly begs the question: His day in court against
whom and on what issues? When the patentee was a party
to the prior suit in which a judgment of patent invalidity
was rendered, and the defendant in the subsequent suit was
a stranger to that suit, the patentee has no more had his
day in court against the sebsequent defendant than if the
subsequent defendant had been a party to the suit and
the patentee a stranger to it.’*
18. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 Tux. L. Rev. 301, 310 (1961).
19
4, Overruling the Triplett Rule Would Adversely Affect the
Current Process for Sustaining Good Patents and Rectifying
Erroneous Holdings.
Under the present practice of this Court, certiorari is
seldom granted in patent cases unless there is conflict in
the appellate court decisions,” so that in most instances a
patentee cannot expect to have an erroneous judgment of
invalidity rectified by this Court, unless he can try again
against a different defendant. It is therefore not uncommon
for a patentee who has met rebuff (like respondent here),
and who sincerely believes that an error has been committed,
to seek to sustain his grant in another court. As noted
above, this Court ‘‘ has several times held valid the claims
of a patent which had been held invalid by a Circuit Court
of Appeals in an earlier suit brought by the same plaintiff
against another defendant.’’ 2 riplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. at
643. If the res judicata effect of a judgment of invalidity
were expanded, the first court to adjudge that a patent
is invalid would, in effect, be the final arbiter for all rights
and duties flowing from that patent. To escape this objec-
tionable result of unilateral estoppel, in the interests of
justice, this Court would be forced to alter its normal prac-
tice and consider granting certiorari more readily in the
absence of conflicting decisions.
B. The Triplett Rule Does Not Significantly Prejudice the
Public’s Interest in the Elimination of Specious Patents.
In the recent case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653,
674 (1969), this Court reaffirmed the well-founded public
interest in the elimination of specious patents. The argu-
ment may be made that the Triplett rule, in allowing the
19. U.S. Sup. Cr. Rev. R. 19 (‘‘Considerations Governing Re-
view on Certiorari’’) ; Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref.
Co., 322 U. S. 471, 473 (1944) ; Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638,
644 (1936).
ener AA
20
relitigation of previously adjudicated patents, is contrary
to this public interest. This argument, however, ignores
the fact that it is equally in the public interest that a good
patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be definitively
stricken.”
As noted above, because of the intrinsic nature of the
subject, the issue of patent validity is a troublesome matter
involving greater than average uncertainty. For this
reason, it would be in the public interest in promoting the
progress of science ‘‘by securing for limited times to. . .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries,’™
to allow patentees a degree of protection against an errone-
ous decision at least equal to that afforded to the ordinary
litigant. Hence, making patent judgments an exception to
the general mutuality rule of res judicata would run di-
rectly against the policy of the constitutional patent pro-
vision.
In addition, a reversal of the Triplett rule would adverse-
ly affect the public interest in promoting and validating
good patents. The framers of the Constitution, Congress,
and practically every developed country in the world, even
those with a Communistic background, consider a strong
patent system essential to its continued progress. This
country, in particular, must rely to an increasing extent
on the native ingenuity of its people, now that its advan-
tages in natural resources have largely disappeared. It
is no answer to say that inventions will be made even with-
out the existence of a strong patent system. They may be
made, but in most cases cannot be promoted without pro-
tection. Who will spend the vast sums of money needed
to develop and test a new product, even one having vast
potential for promoting the common good, such as a new
20. Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372 F. 2d
at 978.
21. U.S. Constr. art 1. § 8.
21
medicine, herbicide, or insecticide, if he does not have some
assurance that he can recover the expenses of such testing
as well as those incurred with other products which fail?
Even the government cannot fill this role, since the gov-
ernment will finance only those developments which are
already advanced to the point where success seems reason-
ably certain.
Significantly, Congress has several times considered the
Triplett rule and has refused to disturb it. In its most
recent consideration of the subject, Congress has specifically
deleted from the original version of the ‘‘Patent Reform
Act of 1967’ this so-called ‘‘in rem invalidity’’ clause.”
Therefore, this Court should refrain from altering the
mutuality of res judicata rule enunciated in Triplett, a
doctrine based upon sound legal and constitutional grounds,
in view of the historical affirmative position taken. by Con-
gress concerning the subject.
QUESTION 2.
(re Retroactive Application of Change in Triplett Rule.)
Even if this Court decides not to adhere to its prior
holding in Triplett, the determination of invalidity in the
Winegard litigation should not bind respondent in this case.
It is the general rule that the doctrine of res judicata will
not apply where the prior judgment sought to be relied
upon is not a final judgment. Restatement, Judgments § 41
(1942). Since finality is not accorded a judgment until
affirmance in the event of an appeal, an appeal does not
automatically stay the enforcement of an order, ‘‘but it
does suspend the force of the order as a conclusive deter-
22. S. 1042 90th Cong., Ist Sess. § 294 (1967).
23. The most recent version of that Bill in Congress, which has
deleted the ‘‘in rem invalidity’’ clause, is S, 1246, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969).
mination of the rights of the parties.’’ 4A C. J. 8. Appeal
& Error § 626, at 422 (1957).
Thus, since the Winegard decision was on appeal to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals at the time the distriet
court decided this case, it could not operate as res judicata
as to any issues decided in the subsequent litigation against
respondent. In fact, the Winegard decision is not yet final,
since there is pending before this Court a petition by the
Foundation for reconsideration of the denial of a writ of
certiorari to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Oct.
Term, 1968, No. 993). In any event, both the Winegard
suit and this suit were filed almost simultaneously, and this
Court should not allow the accident of the first decision
to be filed to control not only the rights of the parties but
the jurisdiction of the district courts.
Another reason this Court should not bind respondent
in this case to the determination in the Winegard litigation,
is that, in the current state of the law, respondent Founda-
tion had every justification for believing that it would be
able to pursue its claim against different defendants regard-
less of the judgment rendered in the first suit to be con-
cluded. This had been the holding of this Court,* and
the practice of multiple suits in patent litigation has long
been recognized by the lower courts.% Consistent with this
understanding, respondent Foundation filed six patent in-
fringement suits in various courts against different defend-
ants. It would be grossly inequitable to now tell respond-
ent, at this stage, that defeat in the Winegard litigation
24. In addition to Triplett, see Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co.,
307 U. S. 243, 245 (1939).
25. See discussion in Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United
States, 372 F. 2d at 973-75.
23
now bars it from recovering in this action against peti-
tioner.*
Still further, respondent believes that the decision in
the Winegard case was based on a legal standard which is
contrary ‘> those established by this Court in Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U. 8.1; and U. 8. v. Adams, 383 U. 8.
39. Since the Winegard case is still not final, it would be
unfair for this Court to hold that respondent is barred by
the Winegard case and thereafter to hold that Winegard
was improperly decided. It would also be unfair to leave
the Winegard decision standing, if this Court agrees that
the decision was based on an improper standard of obvious-
ness, after having considered the matter.
QUESTION 38.
(re Isbell Patent.)
A. Due Process.
As a prelude to its argument on the validity of the Isbell
patent, Blonder-Tongue again complains of its alleged dep-
rivation of due process at the trial. As we pointed out
earlier, if Blonder-Tongue intended to make this alleged
deprivation a basis for its petition to this Court, it should
have presented it as a question for review. Because of its
failure to do so, this Court should ignore entirely the ex-
tended argument made on pages 17 through 23 of its brief.
We might add only that B-T has not challenged the find-
ing of the court below (A. 55) that no offer of proof was
made as to facts which would have been shown but for
the alleged lack of due process.
26. Unlike the licensor in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. 8. 653
(1969), it certainly cannot be said that respondents in this
“given the extent to which the . . . principle had been eroded by
our prior decisions, . . . could not confidently rely upon the con-
tinuing vitality of the doctrine.’’ 395 U. 8. at 674.
eae
24
B. The Matter of ‘‘Obviousness’’.
Applying the ‘‘basic factual inquiries’’ which this Court
set out in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 17-18
(1966) the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that the invention made by Isbell was non-
obvious, a conclusion which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit came to a contrary conclusion in the
Winegard case on essentially the same prior art, but with-
out the benefit of the testimony of Dr. DuHamel, whose
article and patent were the closest prior art, as to what was
obvious to him as one skilled in the art. We submit that
the Seventh Circuit properly applied the standard of ob-
viousness defined by this Court, while the Eighth Circuit
applied an improper standard.
The findings of fact made by the trial court relative to
Isbell’s invention, which were quoted with approval by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (A. 58-60), are
set out on pages 73-75 of the Appendix. The subject matter
of the invention is so highly complex and technical that we
consider it beyond the compass of this brief as well as that
of oral presentation to delve into all of the details of the
problems which faced the art and how these problems were
solved in a nonobvious manner by Isbell’s invention (A. 155-
166). Without departing from the facts found by the courts
below we will attempt here to highlight and amplify those
findings so as to indicate to this Court that the findings
were indeed based on substantial evidence.
As the trial court found (A. 74), the simplest antenna
which has been used for television reception is a simple
dipole, consisting of a pair of linear elements extending
from each side of a transmission line (R. 157). It is
characteristic of a dipole that it is narrowly receptive to
radiation of a single frequency. Accordingly, a single dipole
25
is not well adapted for use over a broad range of frequen-
cies. A seemingly obvious way of extending the range of
operation of a single dipole is to provide a second dipole
receptive to a different frequency and somehow to inter-
connect the two dipoles so that they work together (rather
than in opposition, which is also possible) to cover an ex-
tended range of frequencies (A. 163).
Building up the frequency coverage of an antenna in this
manner, piece by piece, is obvious to try, but one immedi-
ately finds that the obvious is unworkable (A. 163). The
difficulty arises from the fact that when the individual
active elements such as dipoles are brought into proximity,
they no longer operate in the same manner they would if
each element alone occupied the space. Each active element
influences and is influenced by every other active element
in close proximity. As a result, the performance of a
given antenna of any complicated structure cannot be pre-
dicted, even if the individual performance characteristics
of the elements are known, in the absence of a theory
which makes such prediction possible. In the absence of
such a design theory or method, one can only assemble
an antenna array and test its performance after construc-
tion rather than design the antenna beforehand with a
reasonable expectation that its performance will be as
expected (A. 165).
The art knew many individual active elements which
could be combined in various configurations to produce
antenna arrays of varying degrees of complexity. Some of
these elements, e.g., simple dipoles, folded dipoles, triangu-
lar dipoles, spirals, cones, horns, etc., are illustrated in the
exhibits introduced below (PX-30, A. 412, R. 308; PX-31, A.
413, 243; PX-32, A. 414, 246; PX-34, A. 415, 247; PX-36, A.
416, 248; PX-37, A. 417, 250; PX-38, A. 418, 251; PX-51, A.
427, 262) and are shown in the prior art (DX-1, A. 475, R.
> etal
26
235; DX-3, A. 477, R. 236; DX-4, A. 481, R. 236; DX-6,
A. 483, R. 238; DX-14, A. 510, R. 283). The configuration
of an element which might be used as an active element in
an antenna array is limited only by the imagination of the
designer. The permutations and combinations with which
these active elements can be combined is countless, so that
one could not even begin to try them all, even if he had the
time and could afford the expense. Unless, therefore, there
exists some theory which indicates that a particular com-
bination of elements will yield a given result with some
degree of assurance, the likelihood that a designer would
stumble on a particular configuration by chance is com-
parable to the likelihood that one could compose Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address by selecting words at random from a
dictionary.
1. Log-Periodic Antennas.
The antennas covered by the Isbell patent belong to a
class of antennas known as logarithmically periodic (log-
periodic) arrays, composed of repeating design units
(elements) called cells, which are generally of similar shape
but varying size (A. 166).
It is characteristic of a log-perfiodic antenna that its
response characteristics will be cyclic, repeating periodically
as the frequency is increased or decreased. The nature of
the response characteristics over one period is determined
by the properties of the design cell. If a design cell can be
found which, when combined into an array of cells, has
uniform characteristics over one period, it follows that the
antenna array will have uniform characteristics over its
entire design range of frequencies, i.e., it will have fre-
quency-independent performance (A. 166, 318, 320).
In this connection, the distinction between a log-periodic
structure and a log-periodic frequency-independent antenna
should be noted. Any structure composed of repeating cells
27
whose dimensions are related by a constant scale factor can
‘be said to be log-periodic in form, but would not necessarily
or even probably have frequency-independent characteris-
tics when used as an antenna (A. 166, 192, 238).
As the District Court found, the log-periodic design prin-
ciple was developed in 1954 (A. 74). Much difficulty was
encountered, however, in putting the principle to practical
use because of the problem of finding design cells having
constant performance characteristics over a period, which
would lead to frequency-independent performance. As a
result of this difficulty, only three or four frequency-inde-
pendent log-periodic antennas had been developed prior to
the time that isbell made his invention, even though many
attempts had been made by skilled antenna designers at the
University of Illinois and elsewhere (A. 232, 241, 267).
In view of the unpredictability of performance of an-
tennas of the log-periodic class, of which Isbell’s is one, the
courts below quite properly found that Isbell’s design was
nonobvious. Both courts were properly impressed by the
testimony of Dr. DuHamel, whose article and patent were
the closest prior art, that the Isbell approach was not one
which was obvious to him and that in fact that Isbell’s
result surprised him when he first learned of it (A. 269).
Dr. DuHamel’s testimony was not available to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and may well represent the
key to the different conclusions arrived at by the two Courts
of Appeals.
2. The Prior Art Does Not Teach the Invention of the Isbell
Patent.
With the exception of DuHamel patent 3,079,602 (DX-14,
A. 510, R. 283) and the DuHamel and Ore article (DX-6, A.
483, R. 238), none of the references cited by Blonder-Tongue
deals specifically with log-periodic antennas. Rather, all of
the references, with the exceptions mentioned, are pertinent
Ne
to Isbell’s invention only to the extent that these references
show some isolated constructional feature of Isbell’s an-
tenna, but in otherwise different combinations with other
elements. The K. O. antenna (DX-4, A. 481, R. 236) was
found by the trial court to be ‘‘significantly different from
a log periodic antenna’’ (A. 79).
The issue, of course, which is presented by prior art of
this type is whether it would be obvious to one skilled in
the art to isolate from each of the cited references a selected
portion of an antenna (not taught by the reference itself)
and to combine these isolated portions in the manner taught
by Isbell.
We submit that without the teachings of the Isbell patent
as a guide, it would have been impossible for one ordinarily
skilled in the art to select from the myriad of individual
antenna elements and the multitude of ways in which these
elements can be and have been combined, the precise con-
figurations covered by Isbell. The mere fact that the ele-
ments individually were old does not support a finding that
the combination is therefore unpatentable, since as this
Court said in United Siates v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 50:
‘**It begs the question, and overlooks the holding of
the Commissioner and the Court of Claims, to state
merely that magnesium and cuprous chloride were indi-
vidually known battery components. If such a combi-
nation is novel, the issue is whether bringing them
together as taught by Adams was obvious in the light
of the prior art.’’
3. The Isbell Invention Was Nonobvious.
The conclusion that the Isbell patent is valid is fully
supported by the findings of the courts below:
1. At the time of the invention, it coulld not be pre-
dicted which, if any, log-periodic structures would
operate in a frequency independent manner (A.
62, 75).
29
2. Dr. DuHamel, an expert in the field and the co-
inventor in one of the main references relied on by
Blonder-Tongue (DX-14, A. 510, R. 283) who was
working in the field of log-periodic antenna design
at about the same time, failed to achieve Isbell’s
construction because it was not obvious to him, and
moreover was surprised to learn that such a struc-
ture worked (A. 63, 64, 78, 268, 269).
3. None of the prior art references cited by defendant
teaches or suggests, alone or in combination, a log.
periodic array employing simple dipoles (A. 79,
256).
4. ‘*Secondary considerations’’ of commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
bolster the conclusion of nonobviousness (A. 78,
257).
Of these concurrent findings, Blonder-Tongue has attacked
primarily the one stating that the performance of log-
periodic antennas was unpredictable. Blonder-Tongue
attempts to argue the case de novo by reference to Quar-
terly Report No. 1 (DX-7, A. 496, 213), from which it has
lifted a small portion out of context without showing what
the quoted statement refers to specifically. The excerpt
quoted on pages 25-26 of its brief relates to a class of
antennas which are self-complementary (PX-55, page 18-14,
A. 429, 443, R. 347) and made of sheet metal, and these
statements are limited to such structures. The fact is that
Isbell’s dipole array does not fall into this self-comple-
mentary category (A. 63, 64), and its operation cannot be
predicted, as the art itself recognized and the courts found.
Further, Blonder-Tongue’s comments concerning Isbell’s
planned investigation of thin linear elements ignores the
fact that there are many varieties of log-periodic structures
having thin linear elements, most of which do not work (e.g.,
7 a ate aan
PX-36, A. 416, 248, 249; PX-37, A. 417, 250, 251; PX-38,
A. 418, 251, 252).
Blonder-Tongue’s attempt to characterize the opera-
tion of Isbell’s antenna as ‘‘predictable’’ is contradicted
by the prior art itself as well as by the findings of three
courts which have considered the matter (A. 62, 78, 94-95).
Moreover, the basis for B-T’s argument is taken out of
context and does not support the conclusion which B-T
would like this Court to accept.
4. Unpredictability of Result Cannot Be Ignored in Determining
Nonobviousness.
Another attack by Blonder-Tongue on the validity of
the Isbell patent is based on the legal distinction between
‘*predictability’’ and ‘‘obviousness’’. We grant that the
two concepts are not fully interchangeable and that the
standard for patentability expressed by this Court is
based on non-obviousness rather than unpredictability. We
submit, nevertheless, that predictability is a major factor
to be considered in resolving the issue. As the C. C. P. A.
said in Application of Pantzer, 341 F. 2d 121, 126 (1965):
‘*In other words, an invention can be said to be
obvious if one ordinarily «xilled in the art would
consider that it was logical to anticipate with a high
degree of probability that a trial of it would be suc-
cessful.’? (Emphasis added.)
In Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U. S. 293, this
Court held that the results of a mere routine investiga-
tion would not be unobvious even though the specific
result was unpredictable, when it was apparent to one
skilled in the art that ‘‘he should make the simple ex-
periment that was made here .. .’’. The investigation
involved in Mandel Bros. required only the routine substi-
tution of one compound for another, when the general na-
ture of the substituents was known and only one variable
31
had to be considered. In the present case the investigation
is not routine, since the number of variables and the possible
combination of these variables is practically unlimited.
At the time Isbell’s invention was made, there were no
guidelines which could be used to estimate success in the
design of a log-periodic antenna with any degree of proba-
bility, let alone with a ‘‘high degree’’. This is strikingly
illustrated by the fact that only three or four frequency
independent antennas were found prior to Isbell out of
many designs made by skilled designers (A. 232, 241) ; that
slight differences in construction had profound effects on
performance (A. 248, 249) ; and that no explanation for the
failure of some of the unsuccessful designs could be given
(A. 243).
Blonder-Tongue argues (Brief, p. 25) that ‘‘the only
real issue was the obviousness of trying or using Isbell’s
type of straight wire antenna; and as to this, Dr. Mayes
had to concede that most of them operated ‘satisfactorily’ ’’.
Blonder-Tongue’s reliance on the testimony of Dr. Mayes
in this respect is both misplaced and misleading, since his
statement referred solely and specifically to antennas having
Isbell’s structure (A. 317):
‘*Q. Were there a hundred attempts to achieve
operation with a structure of the Isbell patent, Plain-
tiff’s Exhibit 1?
A. With that specific structure, you mean?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I would say that there were quite a
number of models built. Most of them operated satis-
factorily.’’
The fact that the operability of Isbell’s antenna, after
it was conceived by Isbell, was proved by the construc-
tion and testing of a number of models thereof does show
that it was obvious to try Isbell’s structure, as Blonder-
Tongue implies.
guna ROR core neem
32
C. The Purported Publication of QER-2.
On pages 26-29 of its brief, Blonder-Tongue presents
the argument that the Isbell patent is invalid because of
the ‘‘publication of Quarterly Engineering Report No. 2
(QER-2) at the University of Illinois more than 1 year
prior to the filing date of the patent’’. It should be noted
that this issue is not fairly encompassed within the questions
presented for review by this Court nor does it play any
part in the conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Ap-
peals. Although this issue was covered in the Eighth Cir-
cuit, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit made any reference to this report
in their decisions. On the other hand, both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit
considered the question and found that no publication
occurred prior to May 5, 1959, on which date the report
was mailed to those persons on the distribution list (A.
57, 80, 81).
While we believe that Blonder-Tongue’s argument should
be ignored as not coming within the questions presented
for review, we will nevertheless briefly summarize our
position on this point. We have no quarrel with the law
which has been cited by Blonder-Tongue relating to the
facts. When the facts concerning the purported publica-
tion of a reference are ambiguous, however, as in the
present case, it is the intent with which the purported
act of publication is carried out which is controlling. As
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said in Hamilton
Laboratories, Inc. v. Massengill, 11 F. 2d 584, 585 (1940):
‘‘We think intent that the fruits of research be
available to the public is determinative of publica-
tion under the statute, whether the paper be printed
or typewritten, ...’’
33
Thus, the actual unrestricted deposit of a single copy
of a reference in a library evidences the intent on the part
of the publisher to relinquish his control over the publica-
tion and to make it thereafter available to the public.
Similarly, other acts evidencing the intention to publish,
which therefore constitute publication, are sale or exposure
to the public for sale or otherwise, and the announcement
of availability to the public.
The receipt of the printed copies of the Report in Miss
Johnson’s office on April 30, 1959 is an ambiguous fact
which does not establish publication. It should be re-
membered that Miss Johnson served a dual capacity at
the time. In addition to her main duties as Technical
Editor of the Publications Office, charged with seeing
that the reports emanating from the Department were
properly edited, printed, and distributed (A. 326, 327),
Miss Johnson also functioned as the custodian (‘‘librar-
ian’’) of a collection of publications which were kept pri-
marily for the convenience of members of the University
staff (A. 328). When the printed copies of QER-2 were
returned by the printer to Miss Johnson’s office on April
30, 1959, she received them in her role as Technical Editor
and not as custodian of the ‘‘local library’’. From the time
the report was so received on April 30, 1959, until it was
admittedly published by mailing on May 5, 1959, there is no
evidence to establish an intent to publish during the inter-
vening period. The printed copies of the Report remained
in wrapped packages as received from the printer (DX-22,
pp. 241-243, R. 289). There was no release of any copy to
the public, no announcement of availability, nor any actual
filing within the collection of the local library. There was
in short nothing that would establish any intent to publish
the report prior to May 5, 1959.
Blonder-Tongue’s argument that QER No. 2 was published
34
prior to March 5, 1959 is therefore seen to be based solely
on Miss Johnson’s testimony concerning the purported
‘‘availability’’ of this Report prior to its publication date
of May 5. That the Report was physically available is
conceded, but no evidence of an intent to publish is present.
Even Miss Johnson’s answer to the question whether the
Report would have been available to any member of the
public evidences equivocation. Her answers ‘‘Very likely”’
and ‘‘To my knowledge, yes’’ (DX-22, pp. 216, 217, R. 289)
indicate only that Miss Johnson was expressing her own
opinion as to the availability of the references, since any
action she might have decided to take in response to a
request for a copy of the Report could well have been
eountermanded by her superiors.
Mr. Lawlor, Miss Johnson’s immediate superior, testi-
fied that the policy of the Department was that the copies
of work reporting sponsored research, as in the present
case, be distributed first to those on the official distri-
bution list, and then to any others who were interested
(A. 329). Accordingly, it has not been shown that Miss
Johnson would have been free to distribute copies of the
Report to members of the public prior to the distribution
to those on the distribution list, in spite of her opinion
that the Report was available.
The burden of establishing that the Isbell patent is in-
valid by reason of the publication of QER-2, like any
attack on the validity of a patent, is on the proponent,
Blonder-Tongue (35 U.S. C. 282). We believe that Blonder-
Tongue has not met its burden and the findings of the
courts below that no publication occurred are fully sup-
ported by the evidence.
D. Purported Anticipation by the Prior Art.
On page 29 of its brief, Blonder-Tongue attempts in a
fanciful manner to show that DuHamel patent 3,079,602
(DX-14) represents a complete anticipation of Isbell’s in-
vention. Specifically, Blonder-Tongue refers to Figure 5
of this patent as showing the same structure as that of the
Isbell patent, ‘‘with the one exception that the dipoles are
triangular loops instead of straight wire’’ in view of the
fact that triangular loop dipoles, as well as the straight
wire dipoles used by Isbell, were both known. Granting
that triangular loop dipoles and simple straight dipoles
were both known to the art prior to Isbell’s invention in
simple structures such as shown in DX-2 (A. 475, 476),
as Blonder-Tongue contends, the issue then is whether the
substitution of one for the other in DuHamel’s structure
was obvious at the time that Isbell made his invention. The
evidence shows clearly that such a substitution was not
obvious.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence against Blonder-
Tongue’s position is the testimony of Dr. DuHamel, the
co-inventor of the patent on which Blonder-Tongue relies.
Dr. DuHamel testified during the trial that not only was
Isbell’s structure not obvious to him when his patent appli-
cation was filed, but also that he was surprised that Isbell’s
invention worked when he later heard of it, and was dis-
appointed with himself in not having also thought of it
(A. 269). Clearer proof that the Isbell structure was not
obvious to those skilled in the art can hardly be imagined.
Dr. DuHamel’s failure to arrive at Isbell’s structure is
understandable in view of the disclosure of his patent.
Although the DuHamel patent discloses that the angle be-
tween the booms of the antenna may approach 0°, there
is no teaching in this patent of the use of spaced dipoles.
Each of the triangular elements 51(e), 51(d), 51(c), etc.,
NORE. Me ow 8 RE ARN en ARON te ae o
age
in this patent is connected directly to its adjacent similar
elements. Accordingly, there is no spacing between ele-
ments and therefore the arrangement cannot suggest Is-
bell’s construction, in which the spacing between adjacent
dipoles varies from one end of the array to the other. Since,
in fact, each of the triangular elements is directly connected
to each of its neighbors, there is mo transmission line as
such, corresponding to that used in Isbell, and therefore it
cannot be said that the transmission line is transposed in
connection between adjacent elements, as in Isbell.
There is, moreover, no disclosure or teaching in the
DuHamel patent that his disclosed structures are made up
of dipoles, simple or otherwise (A. 288). Certainly, when
the structure is in the preferred form wherein the two
booms are angularly widely separated, the elements of the
structures are too far apart to operate as dipoles. In this
respect, see also the discussion of DuHamel and Ore’s log-
periodic structures in Jasik’s handbook (PX-55, p. 18-12,
A. 429, 441, R. 347), wherein they are described as non-
planar, which is the obviously preferred embodiment.
There is, therefore, no suggestion to one skilled in the
art that the triangular elements (not dipoles) having zero
spacing between adjacent elements should be replaced by
simple dipole elements of a variable spacing, in accordance
with the Isbell patent. Jn making this argument, B-T is
obviously using only hiudsight, in the light of the teachings
of the Isbell patent, rather than what would have been
obvious to one skilled in the art at the time.
E. Infringement of the Isbell Patent.
On pages 30-33 of its brief, Blonder-Tongue argues that,
regardless of its validity, the Isbell patent is not infringed
by Blonder-Tongue’s antenna structures. This argument
represents still another attempt by Blonder-Tongue to re-
37
view questions not properly before this Court. Only the
validity and enforceability of the Isbell patent are encom-
passed within the scope of the questions presented by
Blonder-Tongue for review. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that
Blonder-Tongue’s antennas were within the scope of the
Isbell claims and were therefore infringements. The ourts
in the Eighth Circuit expressed no opinion on this subject
since that action involved the non-analogous products of
another manufacturer.
As to Blonder-Tongue’s contention that its antennas do
not have coplanar elements, the District Court in the
Seventh Circuit found as a fact that ‘‘the Blonder-Tongue
antennas’ dipole elements are separated by not more than
1/18 wave-length, making them substantially coplanar’’ (A.
84), a finding which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
which held, ‘‘The District Court concluded these elements
are substantially coplanar, and we agree.’’ (A. 68.)
These concurrent findings of a fact of the most technical
nature should not be reviewed by this Court. The finding
is amply supported by the evidence, and it was not a basis
for the grant of the writ of certiorari by this Court.
F. The Alleged Unenforceability of the Isbell Patent.
Ignoring completely the findings of the courts below that
no fraud was involved in the prosecution of the Mayes et al.
patent, and that no acts of unfair competition or antitrust
violations in the marketplace had been committed either
by the Foundation or its licensee JFD, Blonder-Tongue
nevertheless alleges that the Foundation is guilty of un-
clean hands and; that therefore the Isbell patent should
not be enforced regardless of its validity.
Of the alleged unfair competition and antitrust violations
catalogued by Blonder-Tongue, only two represent activ-
me
ities in which the Foundation played any role and for which,
therefore, it might be held accountable. These are (1) the
purported fraud in the prosecution of the Mayes et al,
patent and (2) the purported impropriety of issuing news
releases concerning the litigation by the Foundation against
Blonder-Tongue.
As to the news releases, the District Court found (A.
86) :
‘*A review of the evidence demonstrates clearly that
such allegations are wholly without basis in fact.’’
Blonder-Tongue has not shown that the trial court’s find-
ing was not supported by the evidence presented in the
case. Every single one of the alleged violations set out on
pages 42 and 43 of Blonder-Tongue’s brief was considered
specifically by the trial court, who found no evidence what-
soever to establish the charges. Blonder-Tongue’s argu-
ment relative to these violations is based only on its
own allegations rather than on competent evidence in the
record.
In this connection, some of Blonder-Tongue’s allega-
tions are so widely divergent from the facts as to appear
to be deliberate misrepresentations. For example, at the
bottom of page 43 of its brief, B-T alleges that ‘‘the Dis-
trict Court found that suit had knowingly been brought
with improper ‘venue’ against Blonder-Tongue, with the
intended purpose of issuing throughout the trade . . . news
releases describing the litigation’ ’’ (Emphasis added). No-
where in the decision of the District Court is there any
finding remotely resembling this allegation. The fact is
that the action was instituted in the Northern District of
Illinois with proper venue against a distributor of Blonder-
Tongue’s products. Blonder-Tongue was named as a de-
fendant and served with process in the expectation, even-
tually justified, that Blonder-Tongue would appear volun-
tarily in order to defend its‘distributor. Blonder-Tongue’s
allegation that the suit was brought in this manner with
an ulterior motive and in furtherance of a conspiracy is
wholly unjustified and unsupported by the facts.
In a similar manner, all of the other allegations of
Blonder-Tongue in this regard are also unsupported. Since,
however, we believe that the issues will be treated in
detail in the brief of JFD we will comment on only the
issue directly involving the Foundation, namely, the pur-
ported misrepresentation to the Patent Office and its effect
on the enforceability of the Isbell patent.
At the outset it should be made abundantly clear that the
purported fraud which Blonder-Tongue claims was com-
mitted by the Foundation (contrary to the express finding
of the Court of Appeals in this regard) occurred during
the prosecution of the Mayes et al. patent, which is not
directly involved in the review before this Court. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the Mayes
et al. patent to be obvious over the art and concluded
that, although the failure to inform the Patent Office
of the prior publication detracted from the presumption
of validity of the Mayes et al. patent, it did not con-
stitute fraud. Blonder-Tongue now seeks to have this
Court overturn the finding of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, to find that fraud was in fact committed
on the Patent Office in connection with the Mayes et al.
patent and to hold as a consequence thereof that the Isbell
patent is unenforceable. It should be noted that the action
against Blonder-Tongue in the trial court was the first
instance in which the Foundation attempted to enforce
the Mayes et al. patent. The Foundation has accepted the
finding of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the
Mayes patent is invalid and has not sought further to en-
force it.
40
On the facts in this case, it has not been established that
the Foundation has been guilty of any acts which should
lead to a finding of unenforceability of the Isbell patent.
Whether the Foundation had been guilty of any wrong.
doing whatsoever with respect to the prosecution of the
Mayes et al. patent was at least arguable when the action
against Blonder-Tongue was commenced, in view of the
finding by the District Court that no duty to the Patent
Office was breached by the Foundation’s actions in the
Patent Office. The facts in this case do not evidence the
type of deliberate materia] misrepresentation to the Patent
Office as existed in the Hazel Atlas and Precision Instru-
ments Manufacturing Company decisions cited by Blonder-
Tongue.
There is no evidence whatsoever that counsel for the
Foundation knew, at the time the affidavit was filed in the
Patent Office, that a prior publication equivalent to that
cited by the Patent Office existed. Although Dr. Mayes knew
of the fact that such a report had been issued by the Uni-
versity, it is easy to see why, under the circumstances, he
did not call attention to the existence of the prior report.
The routine and periodic reports issuing from the an-
tenna laboratory did not fall within the category of ‘‘pub-
lications’’ as the term is commonly used in academic circles.
The reports did not have the characteristics of typical
printed publications such as books and journal articles
which are widely distributed and freely available. Rather,
the University of Illinois reports in question were circu-
lated only among a small group of individuals and organi-
zations named on the circulation list at the end of each
report (A. 211). In fact, under similar circumstances, re-
ports of this type have been held not to be ‘‘ publications”’,
even though there were no restrictions on the circulation
and the reports could well have been available to the general
41
public. See Ex parte Suogei, 125 U. 8. P. Q. 445, 447 (P. O.
Bd. of App. 1959) :
‘* At best, even assuming that there was no prohibition
against the author of the report, or the named or other
recipients of copies thereof, from giving copies or im-
parting information contained im said report to others
who would be classed as the public in general, this
would be merely permissive and would not show un-
equivocally that there was im fact any publication of
the report on the July 15, 1953 date here of concern.’’
(Emphasis added.)
Although Dr. Mayes knew that these reports had been
prepared, it cannot be said, and it certainly has not been
demonstrated, that he knew or should have known that they
had achieved legal status as ‘‘publications’’ at the time the
affidavit was made.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that no fraud had
been committed is clearly justified under the circumstances.
In any event, any consequences of the prosecution of the
Mayes et al. patent should be confined to that patent alone.
There is no basis for holding that the Isbell patent should
be held unenforceable by reason of the acts occurring dur-
ing the prosecution of the Mayes et al. patent. Regardless
of whether the Mayes et al. patent would now be enforce-
able, assuming it had been held otherwise valid, Blonder-
Tongue has given no reason why the Isbell patent should
now be held unenforceable, other than the incidental fact
that the applications were prosecuted ‘‘together’’ in the
Patent Office and the unsupported allegation that both pat-
ents were involved in a ‘‘conspiracy’’ to commit acts of
unfair competition and to violate the antitrust laws, con-
trary to the findings of the courts below.
In order to hold a patent unenforceable as a result of
‘“‘unclean hands’’, there should be some connection between
the alleged inequitable conduct and the patent. As the
ee mee ree
42
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said in Republic
Molding Corporation v. B. W. Photo Utilities, 319 F. 2d 347,
349 (1963) :
‘¢What is material is not that plaintiff’s hands are
dirty, but that he dirtied them in acquiring the right he
now asserts, or that the manner of dirtying renders
inequitable the assertion of such rights against the
defendant.”’
The only relationship which has been established, and in
fact the only relationship which existed between the Foun-
dation and JFD, was that of licensor and exclusive licensee,
The only area in which any type of joint activity concerning
the Foundation and JFD occurred was in the review of
JFD’s advertisements to insure that misleading statements
involving the name of the University of Illinois or the
Foundation were not made (A. 368-371, R. 740, 741, 742).
There is no evidence whatsoever to connect the Foundation
with any of the other activities set out at length at pages
41-62 of Blonder-Tongue’s brief, such as tie-in sales, raiding
of employees and patent mismarking. We believe that the
evidence in the case fully supports the findings of both
courts below that there is no persuasive evidence that any
act of unfair competition or antitrust violation was com-
mitted by JF'D, but even if this Court disagrees, there is no
basis for ascribing to the Foundation any responsibility
for JFD’s acts, or holding that a conspiracy existed be-
tween the Foundation and JFD. In the absence of such a
conspiracy, which might taint the Isbell patent, there is
no basis for holding the patent to be unenforceable.
43
G. The Winegard Decision.
Relying on substantially the same prior art as was con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the Isbell
patent invalid, saying that Isbell’s invention lacked ‘‘non-
obviousness as a matter of law for essentially the same
reasons set forth by the Court below’’ (A. 94). It is sub-
mitted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
correctly applied the standards which this Court has estab-
lished for deciding the issue of obviousness, while the
Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied those standards.
In holding the Isbell patent invalid, the trial court in the
Righth Circuit said (A. 112):
‘It is thus apparent that the Isbell antenna is a
combination of elements, all known in the prior art and
also that these known elements were combined in the
Isbell antenna in a manner dictated by a theory also
known in the prior art.’’
The theory referred to by the Court as known was stated
to be ‘‘the log-periodic method of designing frequency
independent antennas’’ (A. 112).
If the trial court’s premise concerning the elements of the
Isbell antenna and the manner in which these elements were
combined had been correct, we would have no quarrel with
the court’s determination that the result must have been
obvious to one skilled in the art. The fact of the matter is,
however, that there was and is no ‘‘log-periodic method of
designing frequency independent antennas’’ but only a
method of designing log-periodic structures which poten-
tially have frequency independent properties, but which in
the vast majority of cases do not. It should be noted that
the ‘‘log-periodic method’’ (A. 94, 95, n. 3) does not itself
specify which elements should be used in constructing the
44
log-periodic structure or give any basis whatsoever for
predicting that any given element would be more likely
than any other element to achieve a structure having fre-
quency independent properties. The shape and form of the
elements to be combined in a structure following the log-
periodic method is limited only by the imagination of the
antenna designer. The ‘‘esoteric shapes of antennas, spirals,
cones, horns, ground planes’’ referred to by Blonder-
Tongue on page 24 of its brief, are illustrative of the many
elements used by skilled antenna designers in fruitless at-
tempts to produce frequency independent antennas, all of
which were log-periodic in form, and all of which failed to
perform in a frequency independent manner. The prior
art itself, at the time of Isbell’s invention and thereafter,
recognized the impossibility of predicting which of the in-
finite permutations of structures that could be made with
all of the elements available to a designer would have
frequency independent properties.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
the Foundation argued that the trial court’s decision was
incorrect, because it was based on an improper premise,
namely that the art knew how to design frequency inde-
pendent log-periodic antennas. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the Foundation’s argument, holding (A. 94, 95):
**On the face of the record, we must agree that this
finding is erroneous. The record discloses that the log-
periodic formula for antenna design was a recognized
theory within the calling. This formula is discussed in
the authoritative article by Drs. DuHamel and Ore
entitled Logarithmetically Periodic Antenna Designs,
published in March of 1958. However, as pointed out
by plaintiff, this same article discloses:
‘Unfortunately, no theory has been established
which even predicts the types of structures which
will give frequency independent operation.’
45
Jasik’s Antenna Engineering Handbook, a recognized
authority in the field, verifies on page 18:
‘It is not possible to determine a priori the fre-
quency independent type of log-periodic antennas’.
The record is clear that both plaintiff and defendant
experts agreed with this fact.’’
Having thus held that there was in fact no method which
could be used at the time of Isbell’s invention to design a
frequency independent log-periodic antenna, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held the invention to be obvious, say-
ing (A. 98):
‘‘The problem here was one of trial and error with a
combination of commonly used elements operating
within known principles of electronics and mechanics
to each achieve a desired result.’’
and (A. 99):
‘*Here again the evidence reflects that plaintiff did
nothing more than logical and mechanical experimen-
tation within suggested principles and design from the
existing art.’’
The court in essence held that in view of the availability
of the elements of which Isbell’s antenna is formed it was
obvious to combine them to produce Isbell’s invention, on
a hit-or-miss, trial-and-error basis.
The ‘‘obvious-to-try’’ test which was applied in effect by
the Court of Appeals in the Winegard case is both unrealis-
tic and contrary to statute (35 U. S. C. 103), which provides
that ‘‘Patentability shall not be negative by the manner
in which the invention is made.’’ This approach has further
been criticized by the courts. As Judge Learned Hand said
in B. G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F. 2d 20, 22 (2d
Cir. 1935) ;
‘All machines are made up of the same elements
* * * But the elements are capable of an infinity of
46
permutations, and the selection of that group which
proves serviceable to a given need may require a high
degree of originality. It is that act of selection which
is the invention... .’’
Similarly, in Application of Tomlinson, 363 F. 2d 928, 931
(1966), the C. C. P. A. rejected the argument that the inven-
tion involved only ‘‘routine experimentation’’, saying:
‘‘Our reply to this view is simply that it begs the
question, which is obviousness under section 103 of
compositions and methods, not of the direction to be
taken in making efforts or attempts. Slight reflection
suggests, we think, that there is usually an element of
‘obviousness to try’ in any research endeavor, that it
is not undertaken with complete blindness but rather
with some semblance of a chance of success, and that
patentability determinations based on that as the test
would not only be contrary to statute but result in a
marked deterioration of the entire patent system as
an incentive to invest in those efforts and attempts
which go by the name of ‘research’.’? (Emphasis in
original.)
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit effectively denies the patentability of all combina-
tions of known elements, since a desired result can readily
be imagined without any knowledge of how to achieve the
result and since a trial-and-error procedure can always be
employed using the known elements. The court’s rationale
could just as readily be applied to deny patentability of a
novel chemical compound having the unpre‘ictable prop-
erty of curing cancer or of growing hair on bald heads,
on the ground that since the chemical elements are known,
the result can be achieved in an obvious way merely by
trial-and-error experimentation with all possible combina-
tions of these chemical elements.
As another example of the obviously improper result
which the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
47
Circuit would reach, consider the difficulty which is still
encountered today, in spite of our technological progress,
in separating the segments of a grapefruit from the skin
and membranes. Even the tedious use of a knife to cut out
individual segments rarely produces satisfactory separa-
tion, while the use of a spoon causes the juice to spatter
about in a very disconcerting way. Imagine that an astute
inventor solved this homely but real problem by subjecting
the grapefruit to the action of ultrasonic sound energy
which ruptured the bonds between the grapefruit segments
and the membranes but did not fluidize the contents, thereby
permitting each segment to be separated cleanly and easily.
Such a solution to the problem would nevertheless be con-
sidered obvious by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, on the ground that both grapefruit and ultrasonic
sound are known and that such treatment could have been
made by trial and error ‘‘within known principles’’.
As Cyril A. Soans points out in his recent book, Return
to Robinson (1890), Whitehall Co., Northbrook, Ill. (1970),
page 51:
‘‘Dr. Anthony Deller, formerly chief patent counsel
for International Nickel Co. and the author of both
editions of Deller’s edition of Walker, says in the
Canadian Pat. Inst. Bulletin, Series 7, Vol. 15, De-
cember 1965, Page 27, that every day ‘more and more
capital is required’ to commercialize inventions, and
on Page 29 quotes Elihu Thompson as saying,
‘Publish an invention freely and it will almost
surely die from lack of interest, ... Patent it, and
if valuable, it will be taken up and developed into
a business.’ ”’
If the ‘‘obvious-to-try’’ criterion is accepted as the proper
standard of obviousness, the result would be the marked
deterioration or indeed the destruction of our entire patent
system, as the C. C. P. A. noted in the Tomlinson case
48
quoted above. If the mere fact that known elements are
intentionally combined renders a combination unpatentable
even though the result is unpredictable and the combina.
tion is made without a reasonable prospect for success,
then no discoveries will be patentable. Since the method of
arriving at an invention is of no importance (under 35
U. S. C. 103), even accidental discoveries of the greatest
merit would be considered obvious. Charles Goodyear’s
discovery of vulcanization of rubber, for example, would
have been considered obvious under the standard applied
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, since both
sulfur and rubber were known, as was the application of
heat. Surely the proper standard of obviousness is not as
broad as that envisioned by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
QUESTION 4.
(re Fraud, Unfair Competition and Antitrust.)
In support of its position that the Isbell patent should
be held unenforceable, Blonder-Tongue has accused the
Foundation and its licensee JF'D of several illegal activities,
including fraud on the Patent Office, tie-in-sales, patent
mismarking, improper news releases and false advertising,
all of which were considered and properly rejected by both
courts below. Of the accusaticns made by Blonder-Tongue
only two, the prosecution of the Mayes et al. patent and
the issuing of news releases concerning the litigation in-
volving the patents in suit, relate to acts which were carried
out by the Foundation. Both of these accusations have
been considered above in this brief (pp. 37-42).
With respec: to the charges directed primarily against
JFD, the courts below found none of them to be supported
by the evidence (A. 86, 69). Regardless, however, of whether
this Court agrees with the courts below on all aspects of
te =~ ——
49
Blonder-Tongue’s charges, there is absolutely no evidence
tying in the Foundation with any of the activities of which
JFD is accused and therefore no basis for ascribing to the
Foundation any liability therefor which might render
the Isbell patent unenforceable.
QUESTION 5.
Blonder-Tongue complains that the trial court failed
to follow the procedure set out by this Court in Graham v.
John Deere Co., as appropriate in treating the issue of
obviousness. It is not clear whether this Court intended
its described procedure as a mandatory part of a trial
court’s opinion rather than only a description of the type
of inquiry which the trial court should carry out in arriving
at its conclusion.
It is apparent that in discussing the validity of the
Isbell and Mayes et al. patents, the trial court did in fact
follow precisely the procedure which this Court has pre-
scribed. It is reasonable, further, to assume that the same
procedure was applied with respect to the Blonder patent
and that the abbreviated discussion of the court’s inquiry
results more from the quite obvious nature of the purported
invention rather than from any slighting of its duty to
analyze the prior art in the prescribed manner. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, although indicating that
its task would have been facilitated by a formal state-
ment of the trial court’s findings regarding the prior art,
nevertheless found no difficulty in affirming the correctness
of the lower court’s decision. Except perhaps with respect
to its form, the decision reached by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is eminently correct and
should be permitted to stand.
ree Nae oye RR
50
CONCLUSION.
For the reasons given above, this Court should continue
to adhere to the rule it set out in Triplett v. Lowell. The
advantages of this rule far outweigh any possible dis-
advantages, to both patentees and the public alike. If,
nevertheless, the Court feels that changes should be made,
such changes can be more flexibly handled by Congress,
With respect to the Isbell patent, the findings of the
courts below that Isbell’s invention was nonobvious over
the art and therefore valid should be affirmed by this Court,
None of the reasons advanced by Blonder-Tongue for find-
ing the patent invalid or unenforceable are persuasive. All
of the arguments which were made to this Court by
Blonder-Tongue were also made to the courts below, which
rejected them after careful consideration.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit should be affirmed in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
Cuar.es J. Merriam,
Wim A. MarsHa.,
Basi P. Mann,
Counsel for Respondent University
of Illinois Foundation.
Of Counsel:
MicHaz. P. Buck1o,
Merrmm, MarsHatt, SHapro & Kose,
30 West Monroe Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.