Respondents Brief — Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation

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IN THE an —

Supreme Court of the Anited Statec

BLONDER-TONGUE LABORATORIES, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FOUNDATION,

AND

JFD ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

FOUNDATION.

Cuaries J. Merriam,

Wim A. MarsHatt,

Bast P. Mann,

Counsel for Respondent University

of Illimois Foundation.

Of Counsel:

Micnae. P. Bucx1o,

Merriam, MarsHatt, Suapmo & Kxosez,

30 West Monroe Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60603.

PAGE

ME civ cbbstecess Cibsdéeenccetscbecesecenees 1

AE EE ENED nc ics oncrsseetcnscevocssaeins 2

Summary of Argument .............0ccccccccccceee 4

Question No. 1 ........ccccescccccccscvccccccvecs 4

Question No. 3 ......sccccescccsccccvccncvcccccss 5

Ganstiete MO. 8 on. secessrccceccsccccccccssscces 6

Questiom Mo. 4 ....ccescsccccsvevcceccccccccccecs 7

Question NO. 5 .....sccccsccccescccccccscccceces 7

AvMUMOME 2 nose secccevccvescccccceccvecvcccceccs 8

Question 1 (re Triplett v. Lowell) ................ 8

A. The Triplett Rule Does Not Represent a Sub-

stantial and Unnecessary Burden on the Courts

OE 55 604405664 dnnk 4d406b000 46a cre cee 10

1. The Holding in Triplett Is Not an Exception

to the Doctrine of Res Judicata ............ 11

2. Relitigation of Patents After an Jnitial

Finding of Invalidity Does Not Represent

a Significant Burden on the Federal Courts 15

3. The Right To Be Heard Is Guaranteed by

i NE So. vahwescetesectsaysesess 17

4. Overruling the Triplett Rule Would Ad-

versely Affect the Current Process for

Sustaining Good Patents and Rectifying

Erroneous Holdings ....................+. 19

| B. The Triplett Rule Does Not Significantly Preju-

dice the Public’s Interest in the Elimination of

EE Sok kcckcStenebisasancsersees 19

Question 2 (re Retroactive Application of Change in

EE Es keke eualsanehvenns Eeabecee acess 21

li

Question 3 (re Isbell Patent) ..................05,

A.

B.

7A 2

G.

ee See eee onsenakude

The Matter of ‘‘Obviousness”’ ................

1. Log-Periodic Antennas ................0..

2. The Prior Art Does Not Teach the Invention

ee el UG ee err ee

3. The Isbell Invention Was Nonobvious .....

4. Unpredictability of Result Cannot Be Ig-

nored in Determining Nonobviousness ....

The Purported Publication of QER-2 .........

Purported Anticipation by the Prior Art ......

Infringement of the Isbell Patent ............

The Alleged Unenforceability of the Isbell

WE she kcddvavece wieebues ab60640NSS6keuae

Tb WiONTE DOU 3.0 + 60 snsedscescecenvas

Question 4 (re Fraud, Unfair Competition and Anti-

Pc cdeuasccdeh Sanam bsckanenbawavateduasues

POT CE Per TTT Urey eT Tree Terror ree

I a a re eee ela MAE Ae pe Ch Doge es fhe argh

AvutxHorities CITep.

Cases.

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245 U. S. 198

oe os a alogh | boo ee ee a cas

Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F. 2d 949 (7th Cir. 1955)....

B. G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F. 2d 20 (2d Cir.

AI ip BB RL Arps Bey om Ee A ie Gerth

Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & 8S. Co., 225

Ses es ee A KC Kea cbdcnen sear sensowksaweens

B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N. Y. 2d 141, 225 N. E.

2d 195, 278 N. Y. S. 2d 596 (1967) .............006.

48

49

50

14

iii

Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.,

i we daee Va pee eb beewareeasse ss 14

Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip. Inc., 318 F.

Supp. 122 (N. D. Til. 1970)..............2eeeeeee 15

Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366 (1909). 14

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 (1966) .6, 7, 23, 24, 49

Hamilton Labs., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F. 2d 584 (6th

Ce EN cea ance sav eeedsRaeds C4 d6éeecsunevnds 32

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)............... 17

Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F. 2d 158 (2d

a ee Ce veya 14

Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F. 2d

OS ee le ohn on duck nboncean 6 i05 is 55 x aces 18

Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653 (1969)........... 19, 23

Litchfield v. Crane, 123 U. S. 549 (1887)............. j1

Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U. S. 293 (1948)... 30

Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485

i veckinahedsnt wea yaeupascieskensines or 12, 15

Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co., 307 U. S. 243 (1939). 22

Nickerson v. Kutschera, 390 F. 2d 812 (3d Cir. 1968).. 14

Nickerson v. Kutschera, 295 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1969),

rev'd, 419 F’. 2d 963 (Sd Cir.)..........ccccccccees 13

Nickerson v. Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, 247 F.

ee 5 er 13

Application of Pantzer, 341 F. 2d 121 (C. C. P. A. 1965) 30

Postal-Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464 (1919). 17

Rains v. Jil-Mic, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 545 (S. D. N. Y.

sa aes obbcecceah ceehsi ies cee kcaeus 15

Republic Molding Corp. v. B. W. Photo Util., 319 F. 2d

SE es cy cue lee ccccananeblouesunes 42

iv

Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States, 168 U. 8. 1

COED: Gk hsnssdv kev idbdesunessacneungspnensiel 13

Ex parte Suozzi, 125 U. S. P. Q. 445 (P. O. Bd. of

BE, Fcc ces ccccnveseradess tnxema ess sennequs 41

Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc.,

SOS Fs ee ee Cre Os TI vnc sev ccvevessvecaes 14

Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372

PT Bs CR BED cee cc cdecvesvapordoves 14, 20, 22

Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elec,

Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308 (C. D. Cal. 1968).......... 13, 14

Application of Tomlinson, 363 F. 2d 928 (C. C. P. A.

DEE Shah sae hewnbeahadeubitssocscadticviure seus 46

Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638 (1936).......... 4, 5, 8-23

United States v. Adams, 382 U. S. 39 (1966)........ 23, 28

Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322

PE CEA iC hss velcesceceeuveuyeresenuees 19

University of Ill. Found. v. Winegard Co., 402 F. 2d

125 (8th Cir. 1968), affirming, 271 F. Supp. 412 (S. D.

RTT TT TTT Teer rere ET ET. 5, 8, 22, 24

Books and Periodicals.

Comment, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 63 Nw.

i ee ED obo Vin os 08535463400 eh 0000 bas 12

Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of

the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957) .. 12

Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Cauar.

Se SO og ceri vc vend bacaus ondbosaecvces 12

Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of

Estoppel, 45 Inp. L. J. 1 (1969) .........-.eeeeeee 12

~

Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of

Judgments, 35 Tunanr L. Rev, 301 (1961) ........ 12, 18

Vv

Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A Solution in Search of a

Problem?, 52 J. Pat. Orr. Soo’y 561 (1970)

Soans, Return to Robinson (1890), Whitehall Co.,

Northbrook, Dlinois (1970)

Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yarz L. J. 299

Restatement, Judgments § 41 (1942)

Restatement, Judgments § 93 (1942)

1B Moore, Federal Practice par. 0.412 [1] (2d ed. 1965)

1B Moore, Federal Practice par. 0.406 [2] (2d ed. 1965)

4A C. J. S. Appeal & Error § 626 (1957)

Constitution of the United States.

U.S. Const. art. I, §8

35 U. 8. C. § 103

35 U. S. C. § 282

U.S. Sup. Ct. Rev. R. 19

S. 1042 90th Cong., Ist Sess. § 294 (1967)

S. 1246 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)

Staff of Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-

rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.

2nd Sess., An Analysis of Patent Litigation Statistics

(Comm. Print 1961)

1969 Admin. Office of the U. S. Cts. Rep. ............

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Ocroser Term, 1970

BLONDER-TONGUE LABORATORIES, INC.,

Petitioner,

v8.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FOUNDATION,

AND

JFD ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

FOUNDATION.

STATUTES.

35 U. S. C. § 103

Conditions for patentability—Non-obvious subject matter.

A patent may not be obtained though the invention is

not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section

102 of this title, if the differences between the subject

matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such

ee

—o—

a mee een whe none — oe

that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious

at the time the invention was made to a person having

ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per.

tains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner

in which the invention was made. July 10, 1952, c. 950,

$1, 66 Stat. 798.

35 U.S. C. § 282

Presumption of validity—Defenses.

A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent

(whether in independent or dependent form) shall be pre-

sumed valid independently of the validity of other claims;

dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though

dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of estab-

lishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall

rest on the party asserting it.* * * July 19, 1952, ¢. 950,

§1, 66 Stat. 812; July 24, 1965, P. L. 89-83, § 10, 79 Stat.

261.

35 U. S. C. § 285

Attorney fees.

The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable

attorney fees to the prevailing party. July 19, 1952, «.

950, § 1, 66 Stat. 813.

STATEMENT OF THE UCASE.

We call the Court’s attention to the following errors

and/or omissions in Blonder-Tongue’s statement of the

case. The sections are labeled to correspond with those

in the brief of Blonder-Tongue (B-T).

In the Introduction to its Statement of the Case (B-T

Brief, p. 5), and indeed in many other portions of its

brief (note, in particular, pages 17-23), Blonder-Tongue

— a

3

alludes to its alleged deprivation of due process, arising

from the fact that the trial court refused on December 26,

1967 to grant it an additional delay in the start of the

trial, which had been postponed from October 23rd to

December 18, 1967 at the request of Blonder-Tongue (A. 6,

132). The trial actually started on December 28, 1967 (A.

7).

Blonder-Tongue’s argument in this regard was fully

considered and rejected by the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit (A. 55) and has not been presented to

this Court as a question for review.

With respect to the Mayes et al. patent (B-T Brief, p. 6)

there is no support for Blonder-Tongue’s statement that

the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed

“by holding that the University of Illinois Foundation

had indeed presented half-truths to the Patent office’’.

The sole basis for the finding of invalidity of the Mayes

patent was obviousness of the invention in view of the

prior art (A. 65).

As to Question 4 (Fraud, Unfair Competition and Anti-

trust, B-T Brief, p. 7) the allegation that the Court of

Appeals ‘‘found deception in the procurement of the

Mayes patent’’ is without foundation. The court found

no fraud had been committed (A. 67) and found that the

failure to inform the Patent Office of what later proved

to be a prior publication served only to rebut the presump-

tion of validity of the Mayes et al. patent (A. 68).

Blonder-Tongue’s allegation (Brief, p. 7) that the Isbell

and Mayes et al. patents were ‘‘prosecuted together’’ in

the Patent Office is misleading. Like every other patent

application in the Patent Office, these were prosecuted in-

dividually. If Blonder-Tongue means to say that the periods

of prosecution overlapped, which is the case, then we have

no quarrel.

4

There is no support in the record for the allegations

made by Blonder-Tongue (Brief, p. 8) that the Isbell and

Mayes et al. patents were ‘‘used in widespread threats

and coercion in the marketplace’’; that JFD was guilty of

unfair competition in ‘‘hiring away, during preparation

for trial, petitioner’s key witness’’; or that ‘‘other acts

of unfair competition’? had been committed. The only

support for these charges is Blonder-Tongue’s own allega-

tions. Both courts that have considered them have found

no merit whatever in these claims (A. 68, 69, 84-88),

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

Question No. 1 (re Triplett v. Lowell).

The Triplett rule that a finding of patent invalidity is

not res judicata is based on and consistent with sound

legal principles which advance the public interest and

should continue to be adhered to. The arguments usually

offered in support of a change in the rule, namely, (1)

that relitigation of patents already held invalid represents

a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts, and

(2) that the rule prejudices the public interest in seeing

that invalid patents are eliminated, are not well founded.

The number of relitigated patents is so small as to be

insignificant, as shown by a 1961 study prepared for the

Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of

the Senate Judiciary Committee. This report showed that

during the 10 year period from 1949 through 1958, only

about 1% of the patent cases filed in that period involved

patents which were being relitigated after a prior deter-

mination of invalidity.

Similarly, the argument that relitigation of patents once

held invalid is against the public interest ignores the

equally important consideration that it is as much in the

5

public interest to uphold a good patent as to strike a bad

one. Because of the complex and intricate inherent nature

of the issue of patent validity, the Triplett rule affords a

desirable safeguard against erroneous findings of invalidity

which is in the best interest of both patentees and the

public.

Any change in the Triplett rule should be made only

after careful consideration and for compelling reasons.

In order to properly balance the sometimes conflicting in-

terests of patentees, accused infringers and the public,

while avoiding undue burden on the courts, any such change,

if considered necessary, should be made by Congress,

which is more flexible in its operation and in a better

position to conduct the comprehensive investigation which

the nature of the subject demands.

Question No. 2 (re Retroactive Application of Change in

Triplett Rule).

Even if the Court decides that the rule in Triplett

should be changed, it would be manifestly unfair to apply

the change to respondent in this case. The finding of

invalidity relative to the Isbell patent is even now not

yet final, since there is still pending before this Court a

petition for reconsideration of the denial of certiorari in

the Winegard case. Further, at the time respondent

initiated litigation against Winegard, Blonder-Tongue, and

others, it had every justification for believing that a finding

of invalidity in any one case would not be applied in any

other action. It would also be unfair for this Court to

change the Triplett rule and to hold that respondent is

barred by the Winegard litigation, and thereafter to hold

that the Winegard case was improperly decided, if the

Court agrees that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Cireuit applied an improper legal standard. The inequity

etieiientateete oe

which might result to respondent is a further reason for

suggesting that any change in the rule be made by legisla.

tive action, which is more flexible in setting up means for

avoiding such injustice.

Question 3 (re Isbell Patent).

The holdings of the courts below that Isbell’s invention

was nonobvious and hence valid under the standards set

out by this Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. §.

1, 17-18 (1966) is fully supported by the findings of fact

which these courts made. Even though the individual

elements of which Isbell’s antenna is composed were known

in combination with other elements, there was no basis

on which one skilled in the art would find it obvious to

first isolate the particular elements used by Isbell from

the prior art and then combine these elements as Isbell

did. Although there was a general theory which permitted

-a designer to design a ‘‘log-periodic’’ structure which

potentially might be frequency independent in operation,

the art itself recognized and the courts below found that

it was impossible to predict which structures made in this

manner would in fact have frequency independent prop-

erties. The number of log-periodic structures which could

be designed using the known active elements was countless,

and very few of the possible structures were frequency

independent. Moreover, none of the possible structures

could be singled out as having a greater likelihood of being

frequency independent than the others. Accordingly, it

was not obvious to test any one structure, such as that

made by Isbell, to determine if it had frequency inde-

pendent properties, on anything other than a blind trial-

and-error, hit-or-miss basis.

The holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

that the Isbell patent is invalid was based on an obvious-

7

to-try standard which is improper under the facts of this

case. Applying such a standard effectively destroys the

patent system, since any result, regardless of how un-

expected, nonobvious, or unpredictable, can be achieved,

at least theoretically, by a trial-and-error combination of

known elements.

Blonder-Tongue has not presented any persuasive reason

why the concurrent findings of the courts below should

be reversed.

Question 4 (re Fraud, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust).

No fraud was committed during the prosecution of the

Mayes et al. patent, as found by the Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit. If any trace of ‘‘unclean hands’’

resulted as a result of the prosecution of the Mayes

patent, it is confined to that patent alone and does not

affect the enforceability of the Isbell patent.

The courts below found that no conspiracy, acts of un-

fair competition, or antitrust violations were committed

by either of the respondents, without which there is no

basis for holding the Isbell patent to be unenforceable.

Question 5.

The trial court followed the procedure established by

this Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. for considering

the question of nonobviousness, even if its findings were

not explicitly set forth. The Court of Appeals had no

difficulty in affirming the propriety of the trial court’s

decision.

FN CANE CRE TN ENS = OCT

ARGUMENT.

QUESTION 1.

(re Triplett v. Lowell.)

In the case of Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638 (1936),

this Court held that a determination of patent invalidity is

not res judicata binding the patentee in subsequent litiga-

tion against a different defendant. The Court has re-

quested the parties in this case to address themselves to

the question of whether the above holding in the Triplett

case should be adhered to, and if not, whether the prior

determination of invalidity in the Winegard litigation

binds the respondents in this case.

While we agree with Blonder-Tongue that the Triplett

rule should not be reversed, we consider that the Court

has asked the parties to discuss both sides of the question,

and accordingly we will attempt to do so.

To summarize our position, we believe that the Triplett

rule should not be changed by this Court, for the following

reasons:

1. The rule of Triplett v. Lowell has been the law of

the land for many years, and during that time it has, in

our opinion, served well both the interests of the public

as well as those of patentees. Any change in the rule

should be made by Congress only after appropriate hear-

ings and for compelling reasons. The pertinent factors

to be considered in deciding whether the rule should be

changed are many and complex, and involve balancing the

rights of patent owners, accused infringers and the public

interest and establishing new procedures designed to pro-

tect these various interests while avoiding undue burden

on the courts. For this reason we suggest that any change

in the rule should be made only by the legislature, after full

and careful hearings of all the factors involved, and, if

desirable, with appropriate changes in venue and other

provisions which could not be made by this Court.

In this connection, it is of interest to note that Congress

has considered the matter several times since the handing

down of the Triplett rule, most recently in connection with

the ‘‘Patent Reform Act of 1967’’, from which the so-called

‘sin rem invalidity’’ clause was specifically deleted.

2. A change in the Triplett rule would make more

difficult the establishment of uniform rules and standards

for guidance of the lower courts in patent cases. Under

its usual procedure, this Court does not grant certiorari

in patent cases unless there are conflicting decisions of two

courts of appeals. Thus, if the Triplett rule were reversed,

no effective opportunity would be presented to this Court

to review the standards applied in the case of patent

actions brought originally in those circuits in which sub-

stantially all of the patents are held invalid.

3. Changing the Triplett rule would impose an unfair

burden on those who, like respondent here, entered into

multiple litigation relying on the Triplett v. Lowell doc-

trine. Proper means for avoiding individual injustice in

such cases can be more readily provided by legislative

action. If the Triplett rule is to be reversed, we submit that

the venue provisions relating to patent infringement actions

should also be changed to provide that all infringers may

be sued together in one action, without limitations as to

residence, place of business, or locale of acts of infringe-

ment. It is manifestly unfair to subject a patentee to a

game of legal ‘‘Russian roulette’’, in which he may lose all

his patent rights, yet stands to win only the right to take

the same chance against another defendant.

ee apne angre be

IT Le

10

In the present case, the Foundation was forced to bring

multiple actions, in the Eighth as well as the Seventh Cir-

cuits, not because it wished to multiply litigation, but be-

cause of a need to protect the patent. Under such circum.

stances, it would be highly unfair to bind a patentee if the

patent is held invalid in the first action, yet to leave him

vulnerable in the event his patent is upheld.

4. The arguments advanced for changing the Triplett

rule, on careful examination, are not well founded and do

not overcome the disadvantages which a change in the rule

would entail.

In general, the rationales propounded contra to the Trip-

lett holding fall into the following two categories:

A. Relitigation of patents which have previously

been declared invalid represents a substantial and

unnecessary burden on the courts and public.

B. Since the public is a silent but important party

in interest in all patent litigation, the Triplett rule

significantly prejudices the public’s interest in the

elimination of specious patents.

Each of the above arguments for changing the Triplett

rule will be separately evaluated in the following discussion.

A. The Triplett Rule Does Not Represent a Substantial

and Unnecessary Burden on the Courts and Public.

The argument that the Triplett rule is burdensome was

aptly presented by Judge Schnackenburg in his concurring

opinion in the case of Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F. 2d 949,

951 (7th Cir. 1955), wherein he stated:

‘*[A] suit testing the validity of a patent is not a pro-

ceeding in rem and hence Aghnides may litigate and

relitigate again and again the question of validity of

his patent as long as he selects a different defendant

in each of the infringement suits which he files, thus

11

avoiding the wholesome doctrine of res adjudicata.

This queer result is one which we are unable to avoid.

It is a situation which is particularly abhorrent when

considered against the backlog of untried cases which

clogs our federal courts. The latter are cases where

the litigant asks only for his day in court, not a plural-

ity of days in court as Aghnides is entitled to under

the existing law. The remedy lies not in our hands.

The congress could by legislation grant relief.’’

This position, while on its face appealing to both reason

and logic, fails on several grounds.

1. The Holding in Triplett Is Not an Exception to the Doctrine

of Res Judicata.

It should be carefully noted that this Court held in Trip-

lett that the doctrine of res judicata may not be pleaded as

a defense in a subsequent suit against a different defendant.

This is in effect merely an application of the so-called

‘“‘mutuality’’ rule which requires that a person who seeks

to claim the benefits of an adjudication upon any matter

decided in a prior action be a party or privy in the prior

adjudication sought to be relied upon. Restatement, Judg-

ments §93 (1942).?

The mutuality requirement applied in Triplett is deeply

rooted in the jurisprudence of the courts in this country.

As early as 1887 this Court noted in Litchfield v. Crane,

123 U. S. 549, 552, that ‘‘estoppels to be good must be mu-

tual.’’ Likewise, in the later case of Bigelow v. Old Do-

1. Comment d, example 10, to section 93 of the Restatement

applies the mutuality rule directly to the factual situation raised in

this case, that is:

“10. A brings an action against B for infringement of a

patent. B defends on the ground that the alleged patent was

void and obtains judgment. A brings an action for infringe-

ment of the same patent against C who seeks to interpose the

judgment in favor of B as res judicata, but setting up no

relation with B. On demurrer, judgment should be for A.’’

nS ENE ORE OEY NR Pee mot iee:

12

minion Copper Min. & S. Co., 225 U. 8. 111, 127 (1912), the

Court held, ‘‘it is a principle of general elementary law that

the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual.’’

Although the doctrine of mutuality has been criticized

by some writers,’ and a few courts have avowedly rejected

the doctrine,’ it appears, in reviewing the authorities gen-

erally cited as indicating an erosion of the doctrine, that

the courts in fact have been merely applying the doctrines

of stare decisis and comity in spite of their broad language

concerning the application of res judicata and rejection of

mutuality.

The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata and

the doctrines of stare decisis and comity is an important

one because application of stare decisis and comity, unlike

the strict mechanical rule of res judicata, allows the court

to examine the facts of the later-filed suit in order to deter-

mine whether they warrant relitigation of the issue decided

in a prior suit. Likewise, the doctrines of stare decisis and

comity allow the court to examine the rule of law applied

in the prior suit in order to insure that the needs of justice

have been fully met. As this Court stated in Mast, Foos ¢

Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485, 488-89 (1900) :

‘*Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice,

convenience, and expediency. It is something more than

mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the

2. See generally Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:

Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957);

Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Cautr. L. Rev. 25

(1965) ; Comment, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 63 Nw. U. L.

Rev. 209 (1968). It should be noted also that there is ample

authority urging the retention of the mutuality doctrine. See Von

Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yate L. J. 299 (1929); Moore &

Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuLANE

L. Rev. 301 (1961) ; Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of

Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 Inv. L. J. 1 (1969).

3. ‘‘[T]he doctrine of mutuality is a dead letter.’’ B. R.

DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N, Y, 2d 141, 147, 225 N. E. 2d 195, 278

N. Y. S. 2d 596 (1967).

13

opinion of others, since it has substantial value in secur-

ing uniformity of decision, and discouraging repeated

litigation of the same question. But its obligation is

not imperative. If it were, the indiscreet action of one

court might become a precedent, increasing in weight

with each successive adjudication, until the whole

country was tied down to an unsound principle. Comity

persuades; but it does not command. It declares, not

how a case shall be decided, but how it may with pro-

priety be decided. It recognizes the fact that the pri-

mary duty of every court is to dispose of cases accord-

ing to the law and the facts; in a word, to decide them

right... . Clearly it applies only to questions which

have been actually decided, and which arose under the

same facts.’’

Two recent patent cases are generally cited as abolishing

the mutuality requirement in the application of the doctrine

of res judicata. However, both of these cases, Nickerson v.

Pep Boys—Manny, Moe ¢ Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221, 224 (D.

Del. 1965), and Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Packard

Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 318 (C. D. Cal. 1968),

rested their decisions on the fact that no new evidence con-

cerning validity was presented by the patentee in the sub-

sequent suit. If the strict legal doctrine of res judicata or

collateral estoppel had been mechanically applied in these

ceases, the ‘‘new evidence’’ considered and discussed in both

of these cases would have been totally irrelevant. How-

4. See Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 62, 65

(1897). This mechanical application of estoppel to prevent the

introduction of new evidence in the subsequent suit brought by the

patentee has been used by a district court in only one instance to

date. In the case, Nickerson v. Kutschera, 295 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del.

1969), rev’d, 419 F. 2d 983 (3d Cir. 1969), the district court stated :

‘*But with all deference to the Courts which have made ‘new

evidence’ the controlling criteria in refusing to apply the doc-

trine of collateral estoppel to issues decided in a patent in-

fringement action, it would appear conceptually that this test

is irrelevant and contrary to controlling precedent in the field

of collateral estoppel generally.’’ 295 F. Supp. at 6.

14

ever, since these courts did consider the ‘‘new evidence”

issue, they were in effect according the prior decisions

comity, as explained by this Court in the above-mentioned

Mast decision, and which is specifically provided for in

Triplett. This line of reasoning has been followed in the

Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, wherein the ‘‘new evi-

dence’’ was evaluated in disposition of motions for sum-

mary judgment by one not privy to the previous litigation.

In the area of patent litigation, there is a special reason

why relitigation should not be automatically banned as

needless or redundant by strict application of the doctrines

of res judicata and collateral estoppel. As recognized by

Judge Learned Hand in Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183

F’, 2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950), the issue of patent validity is

‘‘as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom

as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts. . . .

If there be an issue more troublesome, or more apt for

litigation than this, we are not aware of it.’”

It is submitted that due to the intrinsic nature and com-

plexity of the subject, the first decision finding invalidity

can be quite wrong or based on an insufficient record or

presentation through no fault of the patentee.* The inflex-

5. ‘‘[T]he earlier decision may by comity be given great weight

in a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like

decree. ...’’ 297 U. S. at 642.

6. See Nickerson v. Kutschera, 390 F. 2d 812 (3rd Cir. 1968) ;

Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc., 356 F. 2d

442 (7th Cir. 1966); Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. Packard

Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308 (C. D. Cal. 1968).

7. As noted in Triplett (297 U. S. at 643-44), this Court has

several times held valid claims of a patent held invalid by a Circuit

Court of Appeals in an earlier suit brought by the patentee against

another defendant. See Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. 8.

366 (1909) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.,

220 U. S. 428 (1910); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245

U. S. 198 (1916).

8. See Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372

F. 2d 969, 977-78 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

15

ible and mechanical rule of res judicata is not appropriate

for this type of litigation. The more flexible and equitable

doctrines of stare decisis® and comity fully enable the courts

to properly give great weight to the prior finding of in-

validity while permitting review of any new evidence pre-

sented at the pre-trial and summary judgment stage, and

grant the courts of the various circuits the independence

contemplated by the Mast decision to insure that the ends

of justice have been fulfilled.”

@, Relitigation of Patents After an Initial Finding of Invalidity

Does Not Represent a Significant Burden on the Federal

Courts.

In 1961 the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and

Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee published

the most comprehensive study to date concerning patent

litigation in the federal district courts."° The study, cover-

ing the ten year period from 1949 through 1958, reported

that during this period a total of 6,057 patent suits were

commenced.” Of this number, only 62 cases (approximately

9. For a patent case involving application of stare decisis (i.e.,

the binding effect of a prior judgment in the same circuit), see

Rains v. Ju-Mic, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 545 (S. D. N. Y. 1969).

9a. It should also be noted at this point that under 35 U. S. C.

§ 285 (1954), a court has the power to award attorneys’ fees to a

defendant sued in bad faith for infringement of an obviously

invalid patent. See Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip., Inc.,

318 F. Supp. 122 (N. D. Ill. 1970). This section certainly mitigates

against any abusive relitigation of patents properly held invalid in

a prior suit against a different defendant.

10. Starr or SuscomM. on Patents, TRADEMARKS, AND CopPy-

RIGHTS, SENATE CoMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, 86TH Cona., 2p Szss., An

Analysis of Patent Litigation Statistics (Comm. Print 1961) [here-

inafter cited as 1961 Subcomm. Rep.].

11. Id. at 12 (Table 1). According to the most recent annual

report of the administrative Office of the United States Courts,

during the ten year period from 1959 through 1968 a total of

648,767 civil cases were filed in the U. S. courts; 7,875 of these

(approximately 1.2%) being patent cases. 1969 ADMIN. OFFICE OF

THE U. S. Crs. Rep.

ae .

|

|

14

1%) involved patents which were being relitigated after a

prior determination of invalidity.”

It is interesting to note that the majority of these subse-

quent suits were terminated without a second adjudication

of the validity of the patent.“ However, nine patents

did receive a redetermination on the merits concerning

validity,"* of which seven were found to be valid.

This study makes clear two compelling facts. First, the

number of patents which are relitigated after a finding of

invalidity is so small that the problem seems to be de

minimis. Of the total number of patent suits filed during

the period studied, only about 1% involved patents which

were being relitigated after an initial finding of invalidity.

The results of the study permit the conclusion that suits

involving relitigation of a previously determined invalid

patent represent, on the average, only one out of every

10,000 civil cases filed in the federal courts.

The second compelling fact demonstrated by the study is

that a substantial number of the patents which are reliti-

gated after an initial holding of invalidity are held valid in

the subsequent litigation. In fact, seven of the nine patents

which had their validity redetermined during the period of

the study were found to be valid. In view of the substantial

weigbt given by the district courts to a prior holding of

invalidity, this remarkable statistic tends to indicate that a

patentee will risk the expense of relitigation only where his

patent is of unusual merit and he is convinced, almost to the

point of certainty, of the error of the prior decision.

It is apparent from these figures that the mechanical

12. Id. at 19 (Table 16).

13. Id. at 19 (Note to Table 16).

14. Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A solution in Search of a

Problem?, 52 J. Pat. Orr. Soc’y. 561. 569 (1970).

15. 1961 Subcomm. Rep. 19 (Table i6).

17

application of res judicata to foreclose subsequent suits on

patents held to be invalid may well result in more valid

patents being sacrificed than invalid patents being justly

suppressed. In any event, surely “‘the doctrine of judicial

finality is not a catch-penny contrivance to dispose of cases

merely for the sake of disposition and .. . [clearing] up

dockets... .’”*

Further, reversal of the Triplett rule would probably lead

to a flood of applications for reissue patents. The issues of

infringement and validity are so intimately associated that

one cannot be sure that a finding of invalidity is not really

based on a finding that the patent is invalid if stretched to

cover the defendant’s acts. Accordingly, patentees would

seek to protect their patents by having them reissued with

slightly narrower claims.

Any relaxation in the requirement for mutuality in the

doctrine of res judicata should, at the very least, insure

that some significant benefit will ultimately be achieved

toward lessening the case load in the federal courts, which

probably cannot be accomplished without a change in venue

rules to permit a patentee to join concurrent infringers

in the same action, and insure that the ultimate ends of

justice to the parties will not be thwarted. It is submitted

that reversing the Triplett rule will achieve neither of

these desired ends.

8. The Right To Be Heard Is Guaranteed by the Constitution.

It is a constitutional necessity that a person be afforded a

right to be heard before he is estopped on the basis of a

previous suit."* Therefore, by abandonment of mutuality as

16. 1B M Fevers, P . 0.412 [1], at 1811 (2d

oa. 1968). OORE, RACTICE par [1], a (

17. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940) ; Postal-Tel. Cable

Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464 (1918). See generally 1B Moore,

FeprraL Practice par. 0.406 [2] (2d ed. 1965).

18

a requirement for the application of res judicata, there stil]

remains the constitutional requirement that the patentee, in

order to be bound by the prior judgment of invalidity, must

have had his opportunity to be heard, his ‘‘day in court”’.

There is no question that the patentee has had his day in

court against the defendant in the prior suit holding in-

validity, and the judgment is conclusive between them.

However, the patentee has had no opportunity to be heard

in opposition to the defendant in the subsequent suit. As

Judge Goodrich stated in Hornstein v. Kramer Bros.

Freight Lines, 133 F. 2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1943), the con-

clusive effect of a prior adjudication should not:

‘¢... go so far as to make the finding in one man’s case

in a personal action a conclusion of ultimate truth. A

law suit is not a laboratory experiment for the dis-

covery of physical laws of universal application but a

means of settling a dispute between litigants. That

which is settled as a fact between them through a given

piece of litigation under the principles of res judicata,

binds only the parties themselves and those who are in

such relation to the parties as to be considered in

privity with them.’’

To contend that the patentee has had his day in court,

when the defendant in the subsequent suit uses the prior

defendant’s judgment finding invalidity against the pat-

entee, clearly begs the question: His day in court against

whom and on what issues? When the patentee was a party

to the prior suit in which a judgment of patent invalidity

was rendered, and the defendant in the subsequent suit was

a stranger to that suit, the patentee has no more had his

day in court against the sebsequent defendant than if the

subsequent defendant had been a party to the suit and

the patentee a stranger to it.’*

18. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of

Judgments, 35 Tux. L. Rev. 301, 310 (1961).

19

4, Overruling the Triplett Rule Would Adversely Affect the

Current Process for Sustaining Good Patents and Rectifying

Erroneous Holdings.

Under the present practice of this Court, certiorari is

seldom granted in patent cases unless there is conflict in

the appellate court decisions,” so that in most instances a

patentee cannot expect to have an erroneous judgment of

invalidity rectified by this Court, unless he can try again

against a different defendant. It is therefore not uncommon

for a patentee who has met rebuff (like respondent here),

and who sincerely believes that an error has been committed,

to seek to sustain his grant in another court. As noted

above, this Court ‘‘ has several times held valid the claims

of a patent which had been held invalid by a Circuit Court

of Appeals in an earlier suit brought by the same plaintiff

against another defendant.’’ 2 riplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. at

643. If the res judicata effect of a judgment of invalidity

were expanded, the first court to adjudge that a patent

is invalid would, in effect, be the final arbiter for all rights

and duties flowing from that patent. To escape this objec-

tionable result of unilateral estoppel, in the interests of

justice, this Court would be forced to alter its normal prac-

tice and consider granting certiorari more readily in the

absence of conflicting decisions.

B. The Triplett Rule Does Not Significantly Prejudice the

Public’s Interest in the Elimination of Specious Patents.

In the recent case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653,

674 (1969), this Court reaffirmed the well-founded public

interest in the elimination of specious patents. The argu-

ment may be made that the Triplett rule, in allowing the

19. U.S. Sup. Cr. Rev. R. 19 (‘‘Considerations Governing Re-

view on Certiorari’’) ; Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref.

Co., 322 U. S. 471, 473 (1944) ; Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638,

644 (1936).

ener AA

20

relitigation of previously adjudicated patents, is contrary

to this public interest. This argument, however, ignores

the fact that it is equally in the public interest that a good

patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be definitively

stricken.”

As noted above, because of the intrinsic nature of the

subject, the issue of patent validity is a troublesome matter

involving greater than average uncertainty. For this

reason, it would be in the public interest in promoting the

progress of science ‘‘by securing for limited times to. . .

Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries,’™

to allow patentees a degree of protection against an errone-

ous decision at least equal to that afforded to the ordinary

litigant. Hence, making patent judgments an exception to

the general mutuality rule of res judicata would run di-

rectly against the policy of the constitutional patent pro-

vision.

In addition, a reversal of the Triplett rule would adverse-

ly affect the public interest in promoting and validating

good patents. The framers of the Constitution, Congress,

and practically every developed country in the world, even

those with a Communistic background, consider a strong

patent system essential to its continued progress. This

country, in particular, must rely to an increasing extent

on the native ingenuity of its people, now that its advan-

tages in natural resources have largely disappeared. It

is no answer to say that inventions will be made even with-

out the existence of a strong patent system. They may be

made, but in most cases cannot be promoted without pro-

tection. Who will spend the vast sums of money needed

to develop and test a new product, even one having vast

potential for promoting the common good, such as a new

20. Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United States, 372 F. 2d

at 978.

21. U.S. Constr. art 1. § 8.

21

medicine, herbicide, or insecticide, if he does not have some

assurance that he can recover the expenses of such testing

as well as those incurred with other products which fail?

Even the government cannot fill this role, since the gov-

ernment will finance only those developments which are

already advanced to the point where success seems reason-

ably certain.

Significantly, Congress has several times considered the

Triplett rule and has refused to disturb it. In its most

recent consideration of the subject, Congress has specifically

deleted from the original version of the ‘‘Patent Reform

Act of 1967’ this so-called ‘‘in rem invalidity’’ clause.”

Therefore, this Court should refrain from altering the

mutuality of res judicata rule enunciated in Triplett, a

doctrine based upon sound legal and constitutional grounds,

in view of the historical affirmative position taken. by Con-

gress concerning the subject.

QUESTION 2.

(re Retroactive Application of Change in Triplett Rule.)

Even if this Court decides not to adhere to its prior

holding in Triplett, the determination of invalidity in the

Winegard litigation should not bind respondent in this case.

It is the general rule that the doctrine of res judicata will

not apply where the prior judgment sought to be relied

upon is not a final judgment. Restatement, Judgments § 41

(1942). Since finality is not accorded a judgment until

affirmance in the event of an appeal, an appeal does not

automatically stay the enforcement of an order, ‘‘but it

does suspend the force of the order as a conclusive deter-

22. S. 1042 90th Cong., Ist Sess. § 294 (1967).

23. The most recent version of that Bill in Congress, which has

deleted the ‘‘in rem invalidity’’ clause, is S, 1246, 91st Cong., 1st

Sess. (1969).

mination of the rights of the parties.’’ 4A C. J. 8. Appeal

& Error § 626, at 422 (1957).

Thus, since the Winegard decision was on appeal to the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals at the time the distriet

court decided this case, it could not operate as res judicata

as to any issues decided in the subsequent litigation against

respondent. In fact, the Winegard decision is not yet final,

since there is pending before this Court a petition by the

Foundation for reconsideration of the denial of a writ of

certiorari to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Oct.

Term, 1968, No. 993). In any event, both the Winegard

suit and this suit were filed almost simultaneously, and this

Court should not allow the accident of the first decision

to be filed to control not only the rights of the parties but

the jurisdiction of the district courts.

Another reason this Court should not bind respondent

in this case to the determination in the Winegard litigation,

is that, in the current state of the law, respondent Founda-

tion had every justification for believing that it would be

able to pursue its claim against different defendants regard-

less of the judgment rendered in the first suit to be con-

cluded. This had been the holding of this Court,* and

the practice of multiple suits in patent litigation has long

been recognized by the lower courts.% Consistent with this

understanding, respondent Foundation filed six patent in-

fringement suits in various courts against different defend-

ants. It would be grossly inequitable to now tell respond-

ent, at this stage, that defeat in the Winegard litigation

24. In addition to Triplett, see Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co.,

307 U. S. 243, 245 (1939).

25. See discussion in Technograph Printed Cir., Ltd. v. United

States, 372 F. 2d at 973-75.

23

now bars it from recovering in this action against peti-

tioner.*

Still further, respondent believes that the decision in

the Winegard case was based on a legal standard which is

contrary ‘> those established by this Court in Graham v.

John Deere Co., 383 U. 8.1; and U. 8. v. Adams, 383 U. 8.

39. Since the Winegard case is still not final, it would be

unfair for this Court to hold that respondent is barred by

the Winegard case and thereafter to hold that Winegard

was improperly decided. It would also be unfair to leave

the Winegard decision standing, if this Court agrees that

the decision was based on an improper standard of obvious-

ness, after having considered the matter.

QUESTION 38.

(re Isbell Patent.)

A. Due Process.

As a prelude to its argument on the validity of the Isbell

patent, Blonder-Tongue again complains of its alleged dep-

rivation of due process at the trial. As we pointed out

earlier, if Blonder-Tongue intended to make this alleged

deprivation a basis for its petition to this Court, it should

have presented it as a question for review. Because of its

failure to do so, this Court should ignore entirely the ex-

tended argument made on pages 17 through 23 of its brief.

We might add only that B-T has not challenged the find-

ing of the court below (A. 55) that no offer of proof was

made as to facts which would have been shown but for

the alleged lack of due process.

26. Unlike the licensor in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. 8. 653

(1969), it certainly cannot be said that respondents in this

“given the extent to which the . . . principle had been eroded by

our prior decisions, . . . could not confidently rely upon the con-

tinuing vitality of the doctrine.’’ 395 U. 8. at 674.

eae

24

B. The Matter of ‘‘Obviousness’’.

Applying the ‘‘basic factual inquiries’’ which this Court

set out in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 17-18

(1966) the District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois held that the invention made by Isbell was non-

obvious, a conclusion which was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit came to a contrary conclusion in the

Winegard case on essentially the same prior art, but with-

out the benefit of the testimony of Dr. DuHamel, whose

article and patent were the closest prior art, as to what was

obvious to him as one skilled in the art. We submit that

the Seventh Circuit properly applied the standard of ob-

viousness defined by this Court, while the Eighth Circuit

applied an improper standard.

The findings of fact made by the trial court relative to

Isbell’s invention, which were quoted with approval by the

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (A. 58-60), are

set out on pages 73-75 of the Appendix. The subject matter

of the invention is so highly complex and technical that we

consider it beyond the compass of this brief as well as that

of oral presentation to delve into all of the details of the

problems which faced the art and how these problems were

solved in a nonobvious manner by Isbell’s invention (A. 155-

166). Without departing from the facts found by the courts

below we will attempt here to highlight and amplify those

findings so as to indicate to this Court that the findings

were indeed based on substantial evidence.

As the trial court found (A. 74), the simplest antenna

which has been used for television reception is a simple

dipole, consisting of a pair of linear elements extending

from each side of a transmission line (R. 157). It is

characteristic of a dipole that it is narrowly receptive to

radiation of a single frequency. Accordingly, a single dipole

25

is not well adapted for use over a broad range of frequen-

cies. A seemingly obvious way of extending the range of

operation of a single dipole is to provide a second dipole

receptive to a different frequency and somehow to inter-

connect the two dipoles so that they work together (rather

than in opposition, which is also possible) to cover an ex-

tended range of frequencies (A. 163).

Building up the frequency coverage of an antenna in this

manner, piece by piece, is obvious to try, but one immedi-

ately finds that the obvious is unworkable (A. 163). The

difficulty arises from the fact that when the individual

active elements such as dipoles are brought into proximity,

they no longer operate in the same manner they would if

each element alone occupied the space. Each active element

influences and is influenced by every other active element

in close proximity. As a result, the performance of a

given antenna of any complicated structure cannot be pre-

dicted, even if the individual performance characteristics

of the elements are known, in the absence of a theory

which makes such prediction possible. In the absence of

such a design theory or method, one can only assemble

an antenna array and test its performance after construc-

tion rather than design the antenna beforehand with a

reasonable expectation that its performance will be as

expected (A. 165).

The art knew many individual active elements which

could be combined in various configurations to produce

antenna arrays of varying degrees of complexity. Some of

these elements, e.g., simple dipoles, folded dipoles, triangu-

lar dipoles, spirals, cones, horns, etc., are illustrated in the

exhibits introduced below (PX-30, A. 412, R. 308; PX-31, A.

413, 243; PX-32, A. 414, 246; PX-34, A. 415, 247; PX-36, A.

416, 248; PX-37, A. 417, 250; PX-38, A. 418, 251; PX-51, A.

427, 262) and are shown in the prior art (DX-1, A. 475, R.

> etal

26

235; DX-3, A. 477, R. 236; DX-4, A. 481, R. 236; DX-6,

A. 483, R. 238; DX-14, A. 510, R. 283). The configuration

of an element which might be used as an active element in

an antenna array is limited only by the imagination of the

designer. The permutations and combinations with which

these active elements can be combined is countless, so that

one could not even begin to try them all, even if he had the

time and could afford the expense. Unless, therefore, there

exists some theory which indicates that a particular com-

bination of elements will yield a given result with some

degree of assurance, the likelihood that a designer would

stumble on a particular configuration by chance is com-

parable to the likelihood that one could compose Lincoln’s

Gettysburg Address by selecting words at random from a

dictionary.

1. Log-Periodic Antennas.

The antennas covered by the Isbell patent belong to a

class of antennas known as logarithmically periodic (log-

periodic) arrays, composed of repeating design units

(elements) called cells, which are generally of similar shape

but varying size (A. 166).

It is characteristic of a log-perfiodic antenna that its

response characteristics will be cyclic, repeating periodically

as the frequency is increased or decreased. The nature of

the response characteristics over one period is determined

by the properties of the design cell. If a design cell can be

found which, when combined into an array of cells, has

uniform characteristics over one period, it follows that the

antenna array will have uniform characteristics over its

entire design range of frequencies, i.e., it will have fre-

quency-independent performance (A. 166, 318, 320).

In this connection, the distinction between a log-periodic

structure and a log-periodic frequency-independent antenna

should be noted. Any structure composed of repeating cells

27

whose dimensions are related by a constant scale factor can

‘be said to be log-periodic in form, but would not necessarily

or even probably have frequency-independent characteris-

tics when used as an antenna (A. 166, 192, 238).

As the District Court found, the log-periodic design prin-

ciple was developed in 1954 (A. 74). Much difficulty was

encountered, however, in putting the principle to practical

use because of the problem of finding design cells having

constant performance characteristics over a period, which

would lead to frequency-independent performance. As a

result of this difficulty, only three or four frequency-inde-

pendent log-periodic antennas had been developed prior to

the time that isbell made his invention, even though many

attempts had been made by skilled antenna designers at the

University of Illinois and elsewhere (A. 232, 241, 267).

In view of the unpredictability of performance of an-

tennas of the log-periodic class, of which Isbell’s is one, the

courts below quite properly found that Isbell’s design was

nonobvious. Both courts were properly impressed by the

testimony of Dr. DuHamel, whose article and patent were

the closest prior art, that the Isbell approach was not one

which was obvious to him and that in fact that Isbell’s

result surprised him when he first learned of it (A. 269).

Dr. DuHamel’s testimony was not available to the Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and may well represent the

key to the different conclusions arrived at by the two Courts

of Appeals.

2. The Prior Art Does Not Teach the Invention of the Isbell

Patent.

With the exception of DuHamel patent 3,079,602 (DX-14,

A. 510, R. 283) and the DuHamel and Ore article (DX-6, A.

483, R. 238), none of the references cited by Blonder-Tongue

deals specifically with log-periodic antennas. Rather, all of

the references, with the exceptions mentioned, are pertinent

Ne

to Isbell’s invention only to the extent that these references

show some isolated constructional feature of Isbell’s an-

tenna, but in otherwise different combinations with other

elements. The K. O. antenna (DX-4, A. 481, R. 236) was

found by the trial court to be ‘‘significantly different from

a log periodic antenna’’ (A. 79).

The issue, of course, which is presented by prior art of

this type is whether it would be obvious to one skilled in

the art to isolate from each of the cited references a selected

portion of an antenna (not taught by the reference itself)

and to combine these isolated portions in the manner taught

by Isbell.

We submit that without the teachings of the Isbell patent

as a guide, it would have been impossible for one ordinarily

skilled in the art to select from the myriad of individual

antenna elements and the multitude of ways in which these

elements can be and have been combined, the precise con-

figurations covered by Isbell. The mere fact that the ele-

ments individually were old does not support a finding that

the combination is therefore unpatentable, since as this

Court said in United Siates v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 50:

‘**It begs the question, and overlooks the holding of

the Commissioner and the Court of Claims, to state

merely that magnesium and cuprous chloride were indi-

vidually known battery components. If such a combi-

nation is novel, the issue is whether bringing them

together as taught by Adams was obvious in the light

of the prior art.’’

3. The Isbell Invention Was Nonobvious.

The conclusion that the Isbell patent is valid is fully

supported by the findings of the courts below:

1. At the time of the invention, it coulld not be pre-

dicted which, if any, log-periodic structures would

operate in a frequency independent manner (A.

62, 75).

29

2. Dr. DuHamel, an expert in the field and the co-

inventor in one of the main references relied on by

Blonder-Tongue (DX-14, A. 510, R. 283) who was

working in the field of log-periodic antenna design

at about the same time, failed to achieve Isbell’s

construction because it was not obvious to him, and

moreover was surprised to learn that such a struc-

ture worked (A. 63, 64, 78, 268, 269).

3. None of the prior art references cited by defendant

teaches or suggests, alone or in combination, a log.

periodic array employing simple dipoles (A. 79,

256).

4. ‘*Secondary considerations’’ of commercial success,

long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,

bolster the conclusion of nonobviousness (A. 78,

257).

Of these concurrent findings, Blonder-Tongue has attacked

primarily the one stating that the performance of log-

periodic antennas was unpredictable. Blonder-Tongue

attempts to argue the case de novo by reference to Quar-

terly Report No. 1 (DX-7, A. 496, 213), from which it has

lifted a small portion out of context without showing what

the quoted statement refers to specifically. The excerpt

quoted on pages 25-26 of its brief relates to a class of

antennas which are self-complementary (PX-55, page 18-14,

A. 429, 443, R. 347) and made of sheet metal, and these

statements are limited to such structures. The fact is that

Isbell’s dipole array does not fall into this self-comple-

mentary category (A. 63, 64), and its operation cannot be

predicted, as the art itself recognized and the courts found.

Further, Blonder-Tongue’s comments concerning Isbell’s

planned investigation of thin linear elements ignores the

fact that there are many varieties of log-periodic structures

having thin linear elements, most of which do not work (e.g.,

7 a ate aan

PX-36, A. 416, 248, 249; PX-37, A. 417, 250, 251; PX-38,

A. 418, 251, 252).

Blonder-Tongue’s attempt to characterize the opera-

tion of Isbell’s antenna as ‘‘predictable’’ is contradicted

by the prior art itself as well as by the findings of three

courts which have considered the matter (A. 62, 78, 94-95).

Moreover, the basis for B-T’s argument is taken out of

context and does not support the conclusion which B-T

would like this Court to accept.

4. Unpredictability of Result Cannot Be Ignored in Determining

Nonobviousness.

Another attack by Blonder-Tongue on the validity of

the Isbell patent is based on the legal distinction between

‘*predictability’’ and ‘‘obviousness’’. We grant that the

two concepts are not fully interchangeable and that the

standard for patentability expressed by this Court is

based on non-obviousness rather than unpredictability. We

submit, nevertheless, that predictability is a major factor

to be considered in resolving the issue. As the C. C. P. A.

said in Application of Pantzer, 341 F. 2d 121, 126 (1965):

‘*In other words, an invention can be said to be

obvious if one ordinarily «xilled in the art would

consider that it was logical to anticipate with a high

degree of probability that a trial of it would be suc-

cessful.’? (Emphasis added.)

In Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U. S. 293, this

Court held that the results of a mere routine investiga-

tion would not be unobvious even though the specific

result was unpredictable, when it was apparent to one

skilled in the art that ‘‘he should make the simple ex-

periment that was made here .. .’’. The investigation

involved in Mandel Bros. required only the routine substi-

tution of one compound for another, when the general na-

ture of the substituents was known and only one variable

31

had to be considered. In the present case the investigation

is not routine, since the number of variables and the possible

combination of these variables is practically unlimited.

At the time Isbell’s invention was made, there were no

guidelines which could be used to estimate success in the

design of a log-periodic antenna with any degree of proba-

bility, let alone with a ‘‘high degree’’. This is strikingly

illustrated by the fact that only three or four frequency

independent antennas were found prior to Isbell out of

many designs made by skilled designers (A. 232, 241) ; that

slight differences in construction had profound effects on

performance (A. 248, 249) ; and that no explanation for the

failure of some of the unsuccessful designs could be given

(A. 243).

Blonder-Tongue argues (Brief, p. 25) that ‘‘the only

real issue was the obviousness of trying or using Isbell’s

type of straight wire antenna; and as to this, Dr. Mayes

had to concede that most of them operated ‘satisfactorily’ ’’.

Blonder-Tongue’s reliance on the testimony of Dr. Mayes

in this respect is both misplaced and misleading, since his

statement referred solely and specifically to antennas having

Isbell’s structure (A. 317):

‘*Q. Were there a hundred attempts to achieve

operation with a structure of the Isbell patent, Plain-

tiff’s Exhibit 1?

A. With that specific structure, you mean?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would say that there were quite a

number of models built. Most of them operated satis-

factorily.’’

The fact that the operability of Isbell’s antenna, after

it was conceived by Isbell, was proved by the construc-

tion and testing of a number of models thereof does show

that it was obvious to try Isbell’s structure, as Blonder-

Tongue implies.

guna ROR core neem

32

C. The Purported Publication of QER-2.

On pages 26-29 of its brief, Blonder-Tongue presents

the argument that the Isbell patent is invalid because of

the ‘‘publication of Quarterly Engineering Report No. 2

(QER-2) at the University of Illinois more than 1 year

prior to the filing date of the patent’’. It should be noted

that this issue is not fairly encompassed within the questions

presented for review by this Court nor does it play any

part in the conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Ap-

peals. Although this issue was covered in the Eighth Cir-

cuit, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals

of the Eighth Circuit made any reference to this report

in their decisions. On the other hand, both the District

Court and the Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit

considered the question and found that no publication

occurred prior to May 5, 1959, on which date the report

was mailed to those persons on the distribution list (A.

57, 80, 81).

While we believe that Blonder-Tongue’s argument should

be ignored as not coming within the questions presented

for review, we will nevertheless briefly summarize our

position on this point. We have no quarrel with the law

which has been cited by Blonder-Tongue relating to the

facts. When the facts concerning the purported publica-

tion of a reference are ambiguous, however, as in the

present case, it is the intent with which the purported

act of publication is carried out which is controlling. As

the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said in Hamilton

Laboratories, Inc. v. Massengill, 11 F. 2d 584, 585 (1940):

‘‘We think intent that the fruits of research be

available to the public is determinative of publica-

tion under the statute, whether the paper be printed

or typewritten, ...’’

33

Thus, the actual unrestricted deposit of a single copy

of a reference in a library evidences the intent on the part

of the publisher to relinquish his control over the publica-

tion and to make it thereafter available to the public.

Similarly, other acts evidencing the intention to publish,

which therefore constitute publication, are sale or exposure

to the public for sale or otherwise, and the announcement

of availability to the public.

The receipt of the printed copies of the Report in Miss

Johnson’s office on April 30, 1959 is an ambiguous fact

which does not establish publication. It should be re-

membered that Miss Johnson served a dual capacity at

the time. In addition to her main duties as Technical

Editor of the Publications Office, charged with seeing

that the reports emanating from the Department were

properly edited, printed, and distributed (A. 326, 327),

Miss Johnson also functioned as the custodian (‘‘librar-

ian’’) of a collection of publications which were kept pri-

marily for the convenience of members of the University

staff (A. 328). When the printed copies of QER-2 were

returned by the printer to Miss Johnson’s office on April

30, 1959, she received them in her role as Technical Editor

and not as custodian of the ‘‘local library’’. From the time

the report was so received on April 30, 1959, until it was

admittedly published by mailing on May 5, 1959, there is no

evidence to establish an intent to publish during the inter-

vening period. The printed copies of the Report remained

in wrapped packages as received from the printer (DX-22,

pp. 241-243, R. 289). There was no release of any copy to

the public, no announcement of availability, nor any actual

filing within the collection of the local library. There was

in short nothing that would establish any intent to publish

the report prior to May 5, 1959.

Blonder-Tongue’s argument that QER No. 2 was published

34

prior to March 5, 1959 is therefore seen to be based solely

on Miss Johnson’s testimony concerning the purported

‘‘availability’’ of this Report prior to its publication date

of May 5. That the Report was physically available is

conceded, but no evidence of an intent to publish is present.

Even Miss Johnson’s answer to the question whether the

Report would have been available to any member of the

public evidences equivocation. Her answers ‘‘Very likely”’

and ‘‘To my knowledge, yes’’ (DX-22, pp. 216, 217, R. 289)

indicate only that Miss Johnson was expressing her own

opinion as to the availability of the references, since any

action she might have decided to take in response to a

request for a copy of the Report could well have been

eountermanded by her superiors.

Mr. Lawlor, Miss Johnson’s immediate superior, testi-

fied that the policy of the Department was that the copies

of work reporting sponsored research, as in the present

case, be distributed first to those on the official distri-

bution list, and then to any others who were interested

(A. 329). Accordingly, it has not been shown that Miss

Johnson would have been free to distribute copies of the

Report to members of the public prior to the distribution

to those on the distribution list, in spite of her opinion

that the Report was available.

The burden of establishing that the Isbell patent is in-

valid by reason of the publication of QER-2, like any

attack on the validity of a patent, is on the proponent,

Blonder-Tongue (35 U.S. C. 282). We believe that Blonder-

Tongue has not met its burden and the findings of the

courts below that no publication occurred are fully sup-

ported by the evidence.

D. Purported Anticipation by the Prior Art.

On page 29 of its brief, Blonder-Tongue attempts in a

fanciful manner to show that DuHamel patent 3,079,602

(DX-14) represents a complete anticipation of Isbell’s in-

vention. Specifically, Blonder-Tongue refers to Figure 5

of this patent as showing the same structure as that of the

Isbell patent, ‘‘with the one exception that the dipoles are

triangular loops instead of straight wire’’ in view of the

fact that triangular loop dipoles, as well as the straight

wire dipoles used by Isbell, were both known. Granting

that triangular loop dipoles and simple straight dipoles

were both known to the art prior to Isbell’s invention in

simple structures such as shown in DX-2 (A. 475, 476),

as Blonder-Tongue contends, the issue then is whether the

substitution of one for the other in DuHamel’s structure

was obvious at the time that Isbell made his invention. The

evidence shows clearly that such a substitution was not

obvious.

Perhaps the most convincing evidence against Blonder-

Tongue’s position is the testimony of Dr. DuHamel, the

co-inventor of the patent on which Blonder-Tongue relies.

Dr. DuHamel testified during the trial that not only was

Isbell’s structure not obvious to him when his patent appli-

cation was filed, but also that he was surprised that Isbell’s

invention worked when he later heard of it, and was dis-

appointed with himself in not having also thought of it

(A. 269). Clearer proof that the Isbell structure was not

obvious to those skilled in the art can hardly be imagined.

Dr. DuHamel’s failure to arrive at Isbell’s structure is

understandable in view of the disclosure of his patent.

Although the DuHamel patent discloses that the angle be-

tween the booms of the antenna may approach 0°, there

is no teaching in this patent of the use of spaced dipoles.

Each of the triangular elements 51(e), 51(d), 51(c), etc.,

NORE. Me ow 8 RE ARN en ARON te ae o

age

in this patent is connected directly to its adjacent similar

elements. Accordingly, there is no spacing between ele-

ments and therefore the arrangement cannot suggest Is-

bell’s construction, in which the spacing between adjacent

dipoles varies from one end of the array to the other. Since,

in fact, each of the triangular elements is directly connected

to each of its neighbors, there is mo transmission line as

such, corresponding to that used in Isbell, and therefore it

cannot be said that the transmission line is transposed in

connection between adjacent elements, as in Isbell.

There is, moreover, no disclosure or teaching in the

DuHamel patent that his disclosed structures are made up

of dipoles, simple or otherwise (A. 288). Certainly, when

the structure is in the preferred form wherein the two

booms are angularly widely separated, the elements of the

structures are too far apart to operate as dipoles. In this

respect, see also the discussion of DuHamel and Ore’s log-

periodic structures in Jasik’s handbook (PX-55, p. 18-12,

A. 429, 441, R. 347), wherein they are described as non-

planar, which is the obviously preferred embodiment.

There is, therefore, no suggestion to one skilled in the

art that the triangular elements (not dipoles) having zero

spacing between adjacent elements should be replaced by

simple dipole elements of a variable spacing, in accordance

with the Isbell patent. Jn making this argument, B-T is

obviously using only hiudsight, in the light of the teachings

of the Isbell patent, rather than what would have been

obvious to one skilled in the art at the time.

E. Infringement of the Isbell Patent.

On pages 30-33 of its brief, Blonder-Tongue argues that,

regardless of its validity, the Isbell patent is not infringed

by Blonder-Tongue’s antenna structures. This argument

represents still another attempt by Blonder-Tongue to re-

37

view questions not properly before this Court. Only the

validity and enforceability of the Isbell patent are encom-

passed within the scope of the questions presented by

Blonder-Tongue for review. Both the District Court and

the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that

Blonder-Tongue’s antennas were within the scope of the

Isbell claims and were therefore infringements. The ourts

in the Eighth Circuit expressed no opinion on this subject

since that action involved the non-analogous products of

another manufacturer.

As to Blonder-Tongue’s contention that its antennas do

not have coplanar elements, the District Court in the

Seventh Circuit found as a fact that ‘‘the Blonder-Tongue

antennas’ dipole elements are separated by not more than

1/18 wave-length, making them substantially coplanar’’ (A.

84), a finding which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,

which held, ‘‘The District Court concluded these elements

are substantially coplanar, and we agree.’’ (A. 68.)

These concurrent findings of a fact of the most technical

nature should not be reviewed by this Court. The finding

is amply supported by the evidence, and it was not a basis

for the grant of the writ of certiorari by this Court.

F. The Alleged Unenforceability of the Isbell Patent.

Ignoring completely the findings of the courts below that

no fraud was involved in the prosecution of the Mayes et al.

patent, and that no acts of unfair competition or antitrust

violations in the marketplace had been committed either

by the Foundation or its licensee JFD, Blonder-Tongue

nevertheless alleges that the Foundation is guilty of un-

clean hands and; that therefore the Isbell patent should

not be enforced regardless of its validity.

Of the alleged unfair competition and antitrust violations

catalogued by Blonder-Tongue, only two represent activ-

me

ities in which the Foundation played any role and for which,

therefore, it might be held accountable. These are (1) the

purported fraud in the prosecution of the Mayes et al,

patent and (2) the purported impropriety of issuing news

releases concerning the litigation by the Foundation against

Blonder-Tongue.

As to the news releases, the District Court found (A.

86) :

‘*A review of the evidence demonstrates clearly that

such allegations are wholly without basis in fact.’’

Blonder-Tongue has not shown that the trial court’s find-

ing was not supported by the evidence presented in the

case. Every single one of the alleged violations set out on

pages 42 and 43 of Blonder-Tongue’s brief was considered

specifically by the trial court, who found no evidence what-

soever to establish the charges. Blonder-Tongue’s argu-

ment relative to these violations is based only on its

own allegations rather than on competent evidence in the

record.

In this connection, some of Blonder-Tongue’s allega-

tions are so widely divergent from the facts as to appear

to be deliberate misrepresentations. For example, at the

bottom of page 43 of its brief, B-T alleges that ‘‘the Dis-

trict Court found that suit had knowingly been brought

with improper ‘venue’ against Blonder-Tongue, with the

intended purpose of issuing throughout the trade . . . news

releases describing the litigation’ ’’ (Emphasis added). No-

where in the decision of the District Court is there any

finding remotely resembling this allegation. The fact is

that the action was instituted in the Northern District of

Illinois with proper venue against a distributor of Blonder-

Tongue’s products. Blonder-Tongue was named as a de-

fendant and served with process in the expectation, even-

tually justified, that Blonder-Tongue would appear volun-

tarily in order to defend its‘distributor. Blonder-Tongue’s

allegation that the suit was brought in this manner with

an ulterior motive and in furtherance of a conspiracy is

wholly unjustified and unsupported by the facts.

In a similar manner, all of the other allegations of

Blonder-Tongue in this regard are also unsupported. Since,

however, we believe that the issues will be treated in

detail in the brief of JFD we will comment on only the

issue directly involving the Foundation, namely, the pur-

ported misrepresentation to the Patent Office and its effect

on the enforceability of the Isbell patent.

At the outset it should be made abundantly clear that the

purported fraud which Blonder-Tongue claims was com-

mitted by the Foundation (contrary to the express finding

of the Court of Appeals in this regard) occurred during

the prosecution of the Mayes et al. patent, which is not

directly involved in the review before this Court. The

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the Mayes

et al. patent to be obvious over the art and concluded

that, although the failure to inform the Patent Office

of the prior publication detracted from the presumption

of validity of the Mayes et al. patent, it did not con-

stitute fraud. Blonder-Tongue now seeks to have this

Court overturn the finding of the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, to find that fraud was in fact committed

on the Patent Office in connection with the Mayes et al.

patent and to hold as a consequence thereof that the Isbell

patent is unenforceable. It should be noted that the action

against Blonder-Tongue in the trial court was the first

instance in which the Foundation attempted to enforce

the Mayes et al. patent. The Foundation has accepted the

finding of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the

Mayes patent is invalid and has not sought further to en-

force it.

40

On the facts in this case, it has not been established that

the Foundation has been guilty of any acts which should

lead to a finding of unenforceability of the Isbell patent.

Whether the Foundation had been guilty of any wrong.

doing whatsoever with respect to the prosecution of the

Mayes et al. patent was at least arguable when the action

against Blonder-Tongue was commenced, in view of the

finding by the District Court that no duty to the Patent

Office was breached by the Foundation’s actions in the

Patent Office. The facts in this case do not evidence the

type of deliberate materia] misrepresentation to the Patent

Office as existed in the Hazel Atlas and Precision Instru-

ments Manufacturing Company decisions cited by Blonder-

Tongue.

There is no evidence whatsoever that counsel for the

Foundation knew, at the time the affidavit was filed in the

Patent Office, that a prior publication equivalent to that

cited by the Patent Office existed. Although Dr. Mayes knew

of the fact that such a report had been issued by the Uni-

versity, it is easy to see why, under the circumstances, he

did not call attention to the existence of the prior report.

The routine and periodic reports issuing from the an-

tenna laboratory did not fall within the category of ‘‘pub-

lications’’ as the term is commonly used in academic circles.

The reports did not have the characteristics of typical

printed publications such as books and journal articles

which are widely distributed and freely available. Rather,

the University of Illinois reports in question were circu-

lated only among a small group of individuals and organi-

zations named on the circulation list at the end of each

report (A. 211). In fact, under similar circumstances, re-

ports of this type have been held not to be ‘‘ publications”’,

even though there were no restrictions on the circulation

and the reports could well have been available to the general

41

public. See Ex parte Suogei, 125 U. 8. P. Q. 445, 447 (P. O.

Bd. of App. 1959) :

‘* At best, even assuming that there was no prohibition

against the author of the report, or the named or other

recipients of copies thereof, from giving copies or im-

parting information contained im said report to others

who would be classed as the public in general, this

would be merely permissive and would not show un-

equivocally that there was im fact any publication of

the report on the July 15, 1953 date here of concern.’’

(Emphasis added.)

Although Dr. Mayes knew that these reports had been

prepared, it cannot be said, and it certainly has not been

demonstrated, that he knew or should have known that they

had achieved legal status as ‘‘publications’’ at the time the

affidavit was made.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that no fraud had

been committed is clearly justified under the circumstances.

In any event, any consequences of the prosecution of the

Mayes et al. patent should be confined to that patent alone.

There is no basis for holding that the Isbell patent should

be held unenforceable by reason of the acts occurring dur-

ing the prosecution of the Mayes et al. patent. Regardless

of whether the Mayes et al. patent would now be enforce-

able, assuming it had been held otherwise valid, Blonder-

Tongue has given no reason why the Isbell patent should

now be held unenforceable, other than the incidental fact

that the applications were prosecuted ‘‘together’’ in the

Patent Office and the unsupported allegation that both pat-

ents were involved in a ‘‘conspiracy’’ to commit acts of

unfair competition and to violate the antitrust laws, con-

trary to the findings of the courts below.

In order to hold a patent unenforceable as a result of

‘“‘unclean hands’’, there should be some connection between

the alleged inequitable conduct and the patent. As the

ee mee ree

42

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said in Republic

Molding Corporation v. B. W. Photo Utilities, 319 F. 2d 347,

349 (1963) :

‘¢What is material is not that plaintiff’s hands are

dirty, but that he dirtied them in acquiring the right he

now asserts, or that the manner of dirtying renders

inequitable the assertion of such rights against the

defendant.”’

The only relationship which has been established, and in

fact the only relationship which existed between the Foun-

dation and JFD, was that of licensor and exclusive licensee,

The only area in which any type of joint activity concerning

the Foundation and JFD occurred was in the review of

JFD’s advertisements to insure that misleading statements

involving the name of the University of Illinois or the

Foundation were not made (A. 368-371, R. 740, 741, 742).

There is no evidence whatsoever to connect the Foundation

with any of the other activities set out at length at pages

41-62 of Blonder-Tongue’s brief, such as tie-in sales, raiding

of employees and patent mismarking. We believe that the

evidence in the case fully supports the findings of both

courts below that there is no persuasive evidence that any

act of unfair competition or antitrust violation was com-

mitted by JF'D, but even if this Court disagrees, there is no

basis for ascribing to the Foundation any responsibility

for JFD’s acts, or holding that a conspiracy existed be-

tween the Foundation and JFD. In the absence of such a

conspiracy, which might taint the Isbell patent, there is

no basis for holding the patent to be unenforceable.

43

G. The Winegard Decision.

Relying on substantially the same prior art as was con-

sidered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,

the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the Isbell

patent invalid, saying that Isbell’s invention lacked ‘‘non-

obviousness as a matter of law for essentially the same

reasons set forth by the Court below’’ (A. 94). It is sub-

mitted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

correctly applied the standards which this Court has estab-

lished for deciding the issue of obviousness, while the

Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied those standards.

In holding the Isbell patent invalid, the trial court in the

Righth Circuit said (A. 112):

‘It is thus apparent that the Isbell antenna is a

combination of elements, all known in the prior art and

also that these known elements were combined in the

Isbell antenna in a manner dictated by a theory also

known in the prior art.’’

The theory referred to by the Court as known was stated

to be ‘‘the log-periodic method of designing frequency

independent antennas’’ (A. 112).

If the trial court’s premise concerning the elements of the

Isbell antenna and the manner in which these elements were

combined had been correct, we would have no quarrel with

the court’s determination that the result must have been

obvious to one skilled in the art. The fact of the matter is,

however, that there was and is no ‘‘log-periodic method of

designing frequency independent antennas’’ but only a

method of designing log-periodic structures which poten-

tially have frequency independent properties, but which in

the vast majority of cases do not. It should be noted that

the ‘‘log-periodic method’’ (A. 94, 95, n. 3) does not itself

specify which elements should be used in constructing the

44

log-periodic structure or give any basis whatsoever for

predicting that any given element would be more likely

than any other element to achieve a structure having fre-

quency independent properties. The shape and form of the

elements to be combined in a structure following the log-

periodic method is limited only by the imagination of the

antenna designer. The ‘‘esoteric shapes of antennas, spirals,

cones, horns, ground planes’’ referred to by Blonder-

Tongue on page 24 of its brief, are illustrative of the many

elements used by skilled antenna designers in fruitless at-

tempts to produce frequency independent antennas, all of

which were log-periodic in form, and all of which failed to

perform in a frequency independent manner. The prior

art itself, at the time of Isbell’s invention and thereafter,

recognized the impossibility of predicting which of the in-

finite permutations of structures that could be made with

all of the elements available to a designer would have

frequency independent properties.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

the Foundation argued that the trial court’s decision was

incorrect, because it was based on an improper premise,

namely that the art knew how to design frequency inde-

pendent log-periodic antennas. The Court of Appeals

agreed with the Foundation’s argument, holding (A. 94, 95):

**On the face of the record, we must agree that this

finding is erroneous. The record discloses that the log-

periodic formula for antenna design was a recognized

theory within the calling. This formula is discussed in

the authoritative article by Drs. DuHamel and Ore

entitled Logarithmetically Periodic Antenna Designs,

published in March of 1958. However, as pointed out

by plaintiff, this same article discloses:

‘Unfortunately, no theory has been established

which even predicts the types of structures which

will give frequency independent operation.’

45

Jasik’s Antenna Engineering Handbook, a recognized

authority in the field, verifies on page 18:

‘It is not possible to determine a priori the fre-

quency independent type of log-periodic antennas’.

The record is clear that both plaintiff and defendant

experts agreed with this fact.’’

Having thus held that there was in fact no method which

could be used at the time of Isbell’s invention to design a

frequency independent log-periodic antenna, the Court of

Appeals nevertheless held the invention to be obvious, say-

ing (A. 98):

‘‘The problem here was one of trial and error with a

combination of commonly used elements operating

within known principles of electronics and mechanics

to each achieve a desired result.’’

and (A. 99):

‘*Here again the evidence reflects that plaintiff did

nothing more than logical and mechanical experimen-

tation within suggested principles and design from the

existing art.’’

The court in essence held that in view of the availability

of the elements of which Isbell’s antenna is formed it was

obvious to combine them to produce Isbell’s invention, on

a hit-or-miss, trial-and-error basis.

The ‘‘obvious-to-try’’ test which was applied in effect by

the Court of Appeals in the Winegard case is both unrealis-

tic and contrary to statute (35 U. S. C. 103), which provides

that ‘‘Patentability shall not be negative by the manner

in which the invention is made.’’ This approach has further

been criticized by the courts. As Judge Learned Hand said

in B. G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F. 2d 20, 22 (2d

Cir. 1935) ;

‘All machines are made up of the same elements

* * * But the elements are capable of an infinity of

46

permutations, and the selection of that group which

proves serviceable to a given need may require a high

degree of originality. It is that act of selection which

is the invention... .’’

Similarly, in Application of Tomlinson, 363 F. 2d 928, 931

(1966), the C. C. P. A. rejected the argument that the inven-

tion involved only ‘‘routine experimentation’’, saying:

‘‘Our reply to this view is simply that it begs the

question, which is obviousness under section 103 of

compositions and methods, not of the direction to be

taken in making efforts or attempts. Slight reflection

suggests, we think, that there is usually an element of

‘obviousness to try’ in any research endeavor, that it

is not undertaken with complete blindness but rather

with some semblance of a chance of success, and that

patentability determinations based on that as the test

would not only be contrary to statute but result in a

marked deterioration of the entire patent system as

an incentive to invest in those efforts and attempts

which go by the name of ‘research’.’? (Emphasis in

original.)

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit effectively denies the patentability of all combina-

tions of known elements, since a desired result can readily

be imagined without any knowledge of how to achieve the

result and since a trial-and-error procedure can always be

employed using the known elements. The court’s rationale

could just as readily be applied to deny patentability of a

novel chemical compound having the unpre‘ictable prop-

erty of curing cancer or of growing hair on bald heads,

on the ground that since the chemical elements are known,

the result can be achieved in an obvious way merely by

trial-and-error experimentation with all possible combina-

tions of these chemical elements.

As another example of the obviously improper result

which the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

47

Circuit would reach, consider the difficulty which is still

encountered today, in spite of our technological progress,

in separating the segments of a grapefruit from the skin

and membranes. Even the tedious use of a knife to cut out

individual segments rarely produces satisfactory separa-

tion, while the use of a spoon causes the juice to spatter

about in a very disconcerting way. Imagine that an astute

inventor solved this homely but real problem by subjecting

the grapefruit to the action of ultrasonic sound energy

which ruptured the bonds between the grapefruit segments

and the membranes but did not fluidize the contents, thereby

permitting each segment to be separated cleanly and easily.

Such a solution to the problem would nevertheless be con-

sidered obvious by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit, on the ground that both grapefruit and ultrasonic

sound are known and that such treatment could have been

made by trial and error ‘‘within known principles’’.

As Cyril A. Soans points out in his recent book, Return

to Robinson (1890), Whitehall Co., Northbrook, Ill. (1970),

page 51:

‘‘Dr. Anthony Deller, formerly chief patent counsel

for International Nickel Co. and the author of both

editions of Deller’s edition of Walker, says in the

Canadian Pat. Inst. Bulletin, Series 7, Vol. 15, De-

cember 1965, Page 27, that every day ‘more and more

capital is required’ to commercialize inventions, and

on Page 29 quotes Elihu Thompson as saying,

‘Publish an invention freely and it will almost

surely die from lack of interest, ... Patent it, and

if valuable, it will be taken up and developed into

a business.’ ”’

If the ‘‘obvious-to-try’’ criterion is accepted as the proper

standard of obviousness, the result would be the marked

deterioration or indeed the destruction of our entire patent

system, as the C. C. P. A. noted in the Tomlinson case

48

quoted above. If the mere fact that known elements are

intentionally combined renders a combination unpatentable

even though the result is unpredictable and the combina.

tion is made without a reasonable prospect for success,

then no discoveries will be patentable. Since the method of

arriving at an invention is of no importance (under 35

U. S. C. 103), even accidental discoveries of the greatest

merit would be considered obvious. Charles Goodyear’s

discovery of vulcanization of rubber, for example, would

have been considered obvious under the standard applied

by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, since both

sulfur and rubber were known, as was the application of

heat. Surely the proper standard of obviousness is not as

broad as that envisioned by the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals.

QUESTION 4.

(re Fraud, Unfair Competition and Antitrust.)

In support of its position that the Isbell patent should

be held unenforceable, Blonder-Tongue has accused the

Foundation and its licensee JF'D of several illegal activities,

including fraud on the Patent Office, tie-in-sales, patent

mismarking, improper news releases and false advertising,

all of which were considered and properly rejected by both

courts below. Of the accusaticns made by Blonder-Tongue

only two, the prosecution of the Mayes et al. patent and

the issuing of news releases concerning the litigation in-

volving the patents in suit, relate to acts which were carried

out by the Foundation. Both of these accusations have

been considered above in this brief (pp. 37-42).

With respec: to the charges directed primarily against

JFD, the courts below found none of them to be supported

by the evidence (A. 86, 69). Regardless, however, of whether

this Court agrees with the courts below on all aspects of

te =~ ——

49

Blonder-Tongue’s charges, there is absolutely no evidence

tying in the Foundation with any of the activities of which

JFD is accused and therefore no basis for ascribing to the

Foundation any liability therefor which might render

the Isbell patent unenforceable.

QUESTION 5.

Blonder-Tongue complains that the trial court failed

to follow the procedure set out by this Court in Graham v.

John Deere Co., as appropriate in treating the issue of

obviousness. It is not clear whether this Court intended

its described procedure as a mandatory part of a trial

court’s opinion rather than only a description of the type

of inquiry which the trial court should carry out in arriving

at its conclusion.

It is apparent that in discussing the validity of the

Isbell and Mayes et al. patents, the trial court did in fact

follow precisely the procedure which this Court has pre-

scribed. It is reasonable, further, to assume that the same

procedure was applied with respect to the Blonder patent

and that the abbreviated discussion of the court’s inquiry

results more from the quite obvious nature of the purported

invention rather than from any slighting of its duty to

analyze the prior art in the prescribed manner. The Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, although indicating that

its task would have been facilitated by a formal state-

ment of the trial court’s findings regarding the prior art,

nevertheless found no difficulty in affirming the correctness

of the lower court’s decision. Except perhaps with respect

to its form, the decision reached by the trial court and

affirmed by the Court of Appeals is eminently correct and

should be permitted to stand.

ree Nae oye RR

50

CONCLUSION.

For the reasons given above, this Court should continue

to adhere to the rule it set out in Triplett v. Lowell. The

advantages of this rule far outweigh any possible dis-

advantages, to both patentees and the public alike. If,

nevertheless, the Court feels that changes should be made,

such changes can be more flexibly handled by Congress,

With respect to the Isbell patent, the findings of the

courts below that Isbell’s invention was nonobvious over

the art and therefore valid should be affirmed by this Court,

None of the reasons advanced by Blonder-Tongue for find-

ing the patent invalid or unenforceable are persuasive. All

of the arguments which were made to this Court by

Blonder-Tongue were also made to the courts below, which

rejected them after careful consideration.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit should be affirmed in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Cuar.es J. Merriam,

Wim A. MarsHa.,

Basi P. Mann,

Counsel for Respondent University

of Illinois Foundation.

Of Counsel:

MicHaz. P. Buck1o,

Merrmm, MarsHatt, SHapro & Kose,

30 West Monroe Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60603.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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