Appendix — Schlanger v. Seamans

Supreme Court brief1971

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IN THE

Suprene Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 5481

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Petitioner,

vs.

ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.,

Secretary of the Air Force, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INDEX TO THE APPENDIX

Page

Relevant Docket Entries 5 = neath atedesaretele 1

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. tis 3

Exhibits siechreane Riba ech icles 0 cbiviaassacdsdabdakasien nica cesbSdoarinnd 10

Order Denying Writ ERS ERTL eI OS ae 40

Order of Court of Appeals, setting aside denial §-ss is 41

I a a 42

Order of Court of Appeals, staying petitioner’s removal ___ 43

SRL ar ey Te

ii INDEX TO THE APPENDIX

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum

Exhibit

Respondents’ Supplemental Memorandum _.

Exhibits .

Petitioner’s Motion in Opposition —

Memorandum

Marshal’s Returns SESE SO sisdadehiadiavidadeitiets

Order Denying Writ

Order of Court of Appeals, affirming denial ... -=-»»_»_>> =

EE ere a CT TE

Order of Court of Appeals, denying rehearing

Order of Court of Appeals, staying mandate

Order granting motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and granting petition for -vrit of certiorari

82

1969

Aug. 27

Aug. 28

Aug. 29

Sept. 2

Sept. 5

Sept. 10

Dec. 18

1970

Jan. 8

bo

10.

12.

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

File Petition of Herbert Phillip Schlanger for

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Enter and file Order that petition of Herbert

Phillip Schlanger for writ of habeas corpus is

denied.

File petitioner’s motion for rehearing.

File memo on motion for rehearing, by petition-

er’s counsel.

Minute Entry: Petitioners’ motion for rehear-

ing called. * * * It is ordered that said motion

is denied.

File petitioner’s Notice of Appeal

File certified copy of Order from the Court of

Appeals that the Order denying application of

appellant for a writ of habeas corpus is set

aside without prejudice and the cause is re-

manded to the district court for issuance of an

order to show cause and further proceedings

thereon.

Enter and file Order that the respondents shall

within 20 days from this date show cause why

the application for writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted or why a hearing should not be

held on the merits of said application, by filing

with this court such response as deemed appro-

priate. Further ordered that a copy of the veri-

fied application for writ of habeas corpus, along

with a copy of this order be served upon each

of the respondents and the U.S. Atty. by the

U.S. Marshal.

FELL ESOL IE OE NILE EI Saf PP

GUNTUR EN Oke ana

Jan.

Jan.

Feb.

Feb.

Feb.

Feb.

10

13

13.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

24.

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

File certified copy of order from the Court of

Appeals that appellees are stayed from remoy-

ing appellant, or ordering or causing his re-

moval, from the District of Arizona until pro-

ceedings in the district court pursuant to this

court’s mandate are completed, or until the fur-

ther order of the district court.

File respondents’ motion to dismiss, with

memo, and affidavits.

File respondents’ supplemental memo.

File applicant’s motion to set for trial, with

affidavit * * *.

File Marshal’s returns showing order and ap-

plication served upon Colonel Homer Baker, Dr.

Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Colonel Noel B. Red-

drick and US Atty.

Enter and file Order that the respondents’ mo-

tion to dismiss the petition for lack of juris-

diction is granted; that respondents are stayed

from removing petitioner from the District of

Arizona pending a timely appeal to the Ap-

peals court for the Ninth Circuit or until fur-

ther order either of this court or the Court of

Appeals.

File applicant’s Notice of Appeal.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civ-69-381 Phx.

[File Endorsement Omitted]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL.

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT

v.

Hon. Dr. RoBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air

Force, Colonel HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody

AFB, Valdosta, Georgia, and Colonel NoEL B. RED-

DRICK, Commander, AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State

University, Tempe, Arizona, RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—

Filed August 27, 1969

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, relator herein,

for his verified application for a writ of habeas corpus

respectfully alleges as follows:

1. This action is brought pursuant to the provisions

of 28 USC 2241 et seq.

2. Relator is being unlawfully detained and restrained

of his liberty in violation of the Constitution and laws

of the United States, as is more particularly alleged in

the remainder of this application.

3. Applicant is a citizen of the United States and is

a resident of the State of Arizona.

4. The Hon. Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the

AF and Colonel Homer Baker, Commander, Moody AFB,

Georgia, are the persons who are at present unlawfully

restraining applicant of his liberty, as is more fully

particularized herewithin. Col. Reddrick is the ROTC

commander at ASU.

5. On December 1962 applicant enlisted in the USAF

for a period of four years pursuant to the terms of a

od

OL OPS RIERA ER RIPE wel NAME CRIN T Cree 8

4

written agreement to which the court’s attention is re-

spectfully referred.

6. During 1965 applicant applied for entrance into

the Airman’s Education and Commissioning Program

(hereinafter referred to as the “AECP”’’) and in or about

October, 1965 was notified by the Air Force Institute of

Technology (hereinafter referred to as “AFIT’’) that he

had been accepted for participation.

7. On November 9, 1965 orders were promulgated

designating the applicant an “officer trainee” and reas-

signing him, effective on or about December 13, 1965, to

Arizona State University for enrollment as a student

under the AECP.

8. On December 8, 1965 applicant was discharged and,

on December 9, 1965, was re-enlisted for a period of six

years; this was accomplished solely that applicant might

meet the retainability requirement for participation in

the AECP.

9. The facts and circumstances leading to and culmi-

nating in the aforesaid unlawful detention have their

genesis in the illegal, arbitrary and capricious enforce-

ment of the aforesaid re-enlistment contract: the court’s

attention is specifically directed to its terms, conditions

and limitations.

10. The re-enlistment contract of December 9, 1965,

identified in paragraph 8 supra, was breached and ren-

dered void by the illegal, arbitrary and capricious acts

of certain Air Force offices, hereinafter identified; spe-

cifically the withdrawal of your applicant from the AECP

on June 17, 1968 in a manner contrary to USAF regu-

lations, directives and manuals, ignoring and violating

applicant’s rights to due process and on grounds which

were factually unsupported, wholly inapplicable and vio-

lative of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Consti-

tution of the United States.

11. Upon registration at Arizona State University a

graduation date of May 1968 was forecast and an edu-

cation plan outlining this proposed course of study was

submitted to and approved by AFIT,

12. In or about February, 1968 applicant submitted

to AFIT a revised education plan, necessitated by an ill-

5

ness which had disrupted applicant’s anticipated prog-

ress, calling for a revised graduation date of August,

1968.

13. After careful consideration and review of appli-

cant’s performance in the AECP to that date and the

request for an extension referred to in paragraph 11

supra, AFIT notified applicant, on March 25, 1968, of

its approval of his aforementioned request.

14. By statement dated April 8, 1968, annexed as

Exhibit 1 and not exhibited to applicant until in or about

December, 1968, recommending applicant’s withdrawal

from the AECP, Major Graham W. Rider, AFIT Liaison

Officer at Arizona State University, alleges that appli-

cant admitted to him that he “had been cutting classes

extensively ever since [applicant] had been [at the Uni-

versity]”; applicant denies ever having made such a

statement.

15. Applicant received, less than twelve weeks follow-

ing the extension approval referred to in paragraph 13

supra, a letter from Colonel Miles R. Palmer, Director,

Civilian Institutions Division, AFIT, dated June 17, 1968

(annexed hereto as Exhibit 1A) informing him that the

Commandant, AFIT, had withdrawn him from the AECP,

ordering him into a state of arrest and severely restrict-

ing his rights of free speech.

16. On June 22, 1968 applicant acknowledged receipt

of Colonel Palmer’s letter and requested clarification of

several points. Annexed hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true

copy of that acknowledgement.

17. Having received no reply to his aforesaid letter,

applicant sent a telegram, dated June 30, 1968 and an-

nexed as Exhibit 3, to Colonel Palmer again requesting

clarification and amplification of the stated reason for

his withdrawal (“lack of officer potential”) and the re-

straints imposed upon applicant’s liberty and freedom of

communication.

18. By letter dated July 5, 1968, annexed hereto as

Exhibit 4, Lt. Col. Franklin Blanton replied to appli-

cant’s telegram; thereupon, applicant requested by tele-

gram on July 12, 1968, annexed hereto as Exhibit 5, an-

swers to ten specific questions relating to the withdrawal

6

procedure, the methods used in reaching the decision to

withdraw him, and the consequences of the action.

19. By order dated July 10, 1968, annexed hereto as

Exhibit 6, applicant was reassigned to Moody AFB and

ordered demoted from his then current grade of E-5 to

E-3 and relieved of duty as an “officer trainee”.

20. The reply to applicant’s telegram of July 12, 1968,

annexed hereto as Exhibit 7, informed him of an alleged

inquiry which had heretofore been purportedly conducted

by the Professor of Aerospace Studies (hereinafter re-

ferred to as ‘PAS”), AFROTC Det 25 at Arizona State

University, its supposed purpose and the authority under

which it was allegedly conducted, to wit, AFR 120-3:

according to said reply, the inquiry was concerned with

applicant’s alleged “lack of officer potential [as demon-

strated] . . . by [applicant’s] not attending all scheduled

classes. . . .”

21. Applicant had no knowledge of any inquiry, hear-

ing, investigation or any other proceeding heretofore de-

scribed until receipt of Exhibit 7.

22. By letter forwarded on or about July 30, 1968

and annexed as Exhibit 10 applicant appealed to the

Commandant, AFIT, for a hearing into the facts of the

matter and for an opportunity to be heard on his own

behalf.

23. By letter dated August 27, 1968 and annexed as

Exhibit 11 the request for a hearing was denied.

24. By letter dated September 4, 1968, annexed hereto

as Exhibit 12, applicant applied through proper military

channels for a discharge and the Chief of Staff, USAF,

in a letter dated October 29, 1968 and annexed as Exhibit

13, stated that this request had not been favorably con-

sidered.

25. The inquiry, referred to in paragraph 20 supra,

could not have been legally or properly concerned with

the matter which it did, in fact, undertake to investigate:

section 1 of AFR 120-3, annexed hereto as Exhibit 8,

specifically exempts investigations into courts-martial

charges from its coverage; AWOL is a court-martial of-

fense (Article 86, UCMJ) and, by directive definition,

annexed as Exhibit 9, non-attendance at class is equiva-

lent to failure to report for duty, ie, AWOL.

7

26. Though AFR 120-3 requires that any inquiry con-

ducted under its provisions be held at an “echelon of

command compatible with an impartial, unbiased and

complete presentation of facts”, the PAS assigned re-

ponsibility for this inquiry had previously demonstrated

his partiality and bias by endorsing Major Rider’s letter

(Exhibit 14) on April 9, 1968, or approximately five weeks

prior to the inquiry, as follows: “I am familiar with

this case and concur with the recommendation.”

27. The reason given by AFIT for applicant's with-

drawal, i.e., “lack of officer potential”, was not a ground

for such a withdrawal in accordance with the directives

in force ai all times relevent to this proceeding. It was

added to the directive (the AFIT Student Manual) as

a ground on July 1, 1968, or two weeks after the actions

of the Air Force as specified above.

28. Since the aforementioned withdrawal applicant

has been awarded an Oak Leaf Cluster (covering the

period from December 7, 1965 to December 6, 1968) to

his Good Conduct Medal, the citation of which commends

his “exemplary behavior, efficiency and fidelity during

the period indicated”; hardly, applicant respectfully

points out, behavior consistent with AFIT’s allegations.

29. On the basis of the foreroing, applicant respect-

fully alleges that the USAF’s removal! of him from the

AECP, and the continuing restraint of applicant’s liber-

ties, was and is unlawful and violative of applicant’s

Constitutional rights in one or more of the following

respects :

LO LEE SEO LILES ELIE AY

FREE REE GRE NON LRN St

i. It was illegal, arbitrary and capricious (para-

graphs 15, 21, 23, 24 and 27)

ii. It followed proceedings prejudicial to the applicant

conducted under wholly inapplicable directives

(paragraphs 25, 26 and 27)

iii. The alleged reason was utterly without basis in

demonstrated fact (paragraphs 14 and 28)

iv. It was conducted in a manner contrary to USAF

regulations, directives and manuals (paragraphs

25, 26 and 27)

v. It violated applicant's rights to due process (para-

graphs 15, 19, 21, 23 and 27)

GOEL ELLIELILLL IMCL OE ILE LE EO LIE LT TE A NS GI

2

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asters eer woe

30. By virtue of the foregoing, applicant respectfully

submits that he is under no legal obligation to serve and

that the USAF has * » legal lien on his services and has

had none since June 17, 1968; and that since the USAF

illegally, unilaterally and without cause breached the re-

enlistment contract, referred to in paragraph 8 supra,

the continued enforcement of said contract constitutes an

unlawful detention and restraint of applicant’s liberty.

31. Applicant respectfully requests that upon this ap-

plication this court require the production of the records,

papers, affidavits and exhibits constituting the files and

records of applicant’s case.

$2. All administrative remedies have been exhausted

and no previous judicial application has been made for

the writ herein sought.

33. Applicant is currently temporarily assigned to

Arizona State University which is within the jurisdiction

of the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona; venue, it is therefore submitted, properly is laid

in this District.

Wherefore, applicant respectfully prays that this court

direct the respondent herein named to not remove the

applicant from this court’s jurisdiction pending a final

determination in this matter, and that a writ of habeas

corpus be issued, directing the aforementioned respondent

to show cause, if any he have, why applicant should not

be released from service and honorably discharged,

s/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger

Pro Se

1019 E. Lemon St.

Tempe, Az. 85281

9

All allegations contained in the foregoing application

are made on personal knowledge except those contained

in paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 25 and 26 which are based on

applicant’s information and belief.

/8/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of

August, A.D. 1969 at Tempe, Arizona.

/s/ (Mllegible}

Notary Public

My Commission Expires

Oct. 30, 1971

NS fen

10

EXHIBITS

Statement of Major Graham W. Rider; April 8, 1968

. Notification of withdrawal; June 17, 1968

Letter of acknowledgement; June 22, 1968

Telegram from applicant; June 30, 1968

Letter—reply to (3); July 5, 1968

Telegram from applicant; July 12, 1968

Reassignment orders; July 10, 1968

Telegram to applicant; July 17, 1968

AFR 120-3, p. 1

Paragraph 2-2, AFIT Student Manual

Appeal for hearing (4 pages)

Letter—reply to (10); August 27, 1968

Application for discharge (5 pages); September 4,

1968

Reply to (12:; October 29, 1968

11

EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GRAHAM W. RIDER

8 Apr 68

1. Attached to this letter are statements from two

officers which report on the conduct of Sergeant Schlanger.

Major Eatinger was my predecessor as Liaison Officer,

and Captain Miner is, and was on one previous occasion,

Chief of a team to which Sergeant Schlanger has been

assigned for administrative purposes. At the time I be-

came Liaison Officer (1 Feb 68), Sergeant Schlanger was

under medical care following an overdose of drugs taken,

presumably unintentionally, during final examination

week of the past semester. At that time I assumed,

wrongly, that AFIT was taking action to remove the

Sergeant from the program.

2. Upon discovering that no such action was being

taken, and upon learning that Sergeant Schlanger was

again failing to attend classes, I began an investigation.

Major Eatinger’s statement furnishes you with the requi-

site background for the case and establishes Sergeant

Schlanger’s history of failure to attend class. Medical

records regarding this case are maintained at Williams

AFB and can be made available upon your request to the

hospital commander there.

3. Little needs to be added to Captain Miner’s report

of his investigation. However, I did interview Sergeant

Schlanger on 2 April 68. His attitude was hardly that

of a loyal, responsible, non-commissioned officer. Fur-

ther, his appearance was disgraceful. He was wearing

a filthy jacket, there was no polish on his shoes, his

trousers were long overdue a pressing, and he required

a haircut. But it was his mental, rather than his physi-

cal condition, which was so out of line with Air Force

requirements. This statement is exemplified by his unique

distinction of AECP goals. He stated that he felt that

the Air Force had sent him here to get a degree; not

necessarily to get an education through attending classes

and doing his assignments. Though he may be intelligent

2

— |

PB LRG PDEA SERENA L GL LNELE SIAM GLIIEE EY BONE

Wi LEU PI OR BL

12

enough to accomplish the former without performing the

latter, I informed him that our primary goal in the AECP

was education and that the degree is considered to be

simple evidence of that accomplishment. Before the in-

terview was terminated he admitted that he has been

“cutting classes extensively” ever since he has been here,

Finally, when I advised him that I would recommend his

removal from the program, his only concern was over

whether or not AFIT would let him finish this semester,

He strikes me as the sort of person who enjoys trying

to “beat the system”.

4. Approximately ten percent of all AECP students

attend ASU. The presence of this man in their midst

is damaging to morale, to say the least. Sergeant Schlan-

ger has not shown the required loyalty to duty as a

student, and I cannot believe that he would perform

differently elsewhere in either a commissioned or a non-

commissioned status. I strongly urge you to remove this

man from the program immediately.

(signed)

GRAHAM W. RIDER, Major, USAF

Liaison Officer, ASU

Ist Ind

AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State University,

Tempe, Az. 85281

TO: Cemmander, AFIT

I am familiar with this case and I concur with the ree-

ommendation.

(signed)

ROBERT W. MCFADDEN, Colonel, USAF

Professor of Aerospace Studies

13

EXHIBIT 1A

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AU)

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 45433

[DoD Emblem}

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: AFIT-CI 17 June 1968

SupsJECT: Withdrawal from Air Force Institute of

Technology Program

To: SSgt. Herbert P. Schlanger

1001 East Lemon Street

Tempe, Arizona 85281

1. This letter is to inform you that the Commandant of

the Air Force Institute of Technology has withdrawn you

from the Airman Educational and Commissio®« . ro-

gram for having a lack of officer potential.

2. You are to accomplish the following actions:

A. Withdraw from school immediately if you have

not already done so.

B. Remain at your present resident address pending

receipt of transfer orders. Leave or pass will

not be authorized, except under emergency con-

ditions, until your orders are published.

C. Do not contact Headquarters USAF or any other

organization relative to your assignment.

D. Acknowledge receipt of this letter and your un-

derstanding of its provisions.

E. Furnish us one copy of a final education plan and

an official transcript as soon as possible.

3. You may expect information about your new assign-

ment within the next two to three weeks. You will be

advised of the specific assignment as soon as this infor-

mation is available to the Air Force Institute of Tech-

ER

PLONE MEY TPT OSG SIO IIE OF ELT Te ee,

Sa Se malo oe ee

14

nology and PCS orders will be furnished, as promptly as

possible.

/s/ Miles R. Palmer

MILEs R. PALMER, Colonel, USAF

Director, Civilian Institutions Div.

1 Atch

Blank Ed Plan

ec: AFIT Liason

Officer

PAS

Strength Through Knowledge

PRE OEOI anRIONEY pA NY ELIE ARAN RGSS SCONE nore cient i

15

EXHIBIT 2

From: SSgt. Herbert P. Schlanger 22 June 1968

Subject: Letter of Acknowledgement

To: Colonel Miles R, Palmer

Director, CID, AFIT

Wright-Patternson AFB, Ohio 45433

1. I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 17 June

1968 notifying me of my withdrawl] from AECP.

2. I do not understand the following, and require fur-

ther information:

A. What method and what criterion were used in

determining my “lack of officer potential”?

B. For what reason and under what authority are

leave and pass being prohibited?

C. Please clarify paragraph 2C of your letter.

D. Are there any formal methods of appeal from

this decision available to me?

3. Thank you.

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER, SSgt, USAF

>

A

:

=

ARTES CTL NE I IR

rh ———

16

EXHIBIT 3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE

TDPF TEMPE

COL MILES R PALMER DIR CIVILIAN INSTITU-

TIONS DIVN AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECH-

NOLOGY

SIR I HAVE AS YET RECEIVED NO COMMUNICA-

TION FROM YOU AS WAS REQUESTED IN MY LET-

TER OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT DATED 22 JUNE 68,

SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED IS THE FOLLOWING 1.

PLEASE INDICATE WHAT CRITERION WAS USED

IN DETERMINING MY QUOTE LACK OF OFFICER

POTENTIAL UNQUOTE 2. PLEASE INDICATE FOR

WHAT REASON AND UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY

LEAVE AND PASS AND BEING PROHIBITED 3.

PLEASE CLARIFY PARAGRAPH 2-C OF YOUR LET-

TER DATED 17 JUNE 68 THANK YOU

Date: C JUNE 30 834PMM

Check: 79 NL PDF 7 EXCFM FURN

Tel. No.: 966-7852

Dest’n.: WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO

Signature: S/SGT HERBERT P SCHLANGER

1002 EAST LEMON ST

TEMPE ARIZ 85281

CHG. TELE.

Cus: LATCHMEN E—SAME ADS.

. <a £ AOR PENDS OT OE A AMR SO NETS ROMEO RR NLP INR NCR

EXHIBIT 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AiR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AU)

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 45433 ;

[DoD Emblem] j

REPLY TO &

ATTN OF: AFIT-CI 5 July 1968

SuBJECT: Withdrawal From AECP ,

i

To: Sgt. Herbert P. Schlanger h

1001 East Lemon Street i

Tempe, Arizona 85281 i

1, Reference is made to your message of 31 June 1968.

Your letter of 22 June 1968 was not received. Your i

message constitutes acknowledgment of receipt of my let- :

ter directing withdrawal.

2. Your withdrawal from the AECP was directed by the ;

Commandant because of a lack of officer potential as dem- :

onstrated by your failure to attend scheduled classes. :

3, Leave and passes are not authorized because we expect :

reassignment instructions very soon. Normally, leave :

would be authorized in connection with travel to your j

next permanent duty station. ;

4. Paragraph 2E, my letter 17 June refers to the provi- é

sions of paragraph 7-14, Student Manual.

i

/s/ Franklin D, Blanton, &

FRANKLIN D, BLANTON, Lt. Col., USAF :

Chief, Scientific Education Branch t

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio i

t

'

Strength Through Knowledge f

18

EXHIBIT 5

TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE

TDPF TEMPLE ARIZ

COL MILES R PALMER 527 z

DIRECTOR CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

AIRFORCE INSTITUTE OF TECNOLOGY

1968 JUL 12 PM 8 55

SIR. REGARDING YOUR LETTER OF 5 JULY 68,

SEVERAL QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED,

PLEASE INDICATE:

1. MORE SPECIFICIALLY, IN WHAT WAY HAVE I

DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF OFFICER POTEN-

TIAL? 2. WHAT INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCT-

ED, WHO CONDUCTED IT, WHO WAS CONTACTED,

AND WHAT CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED IN

REGARD TO MY ALLEGED FAILURE TO ATTEND

SCHEDULED CLASSES? 3. UNDER WHAT AUTHOR-

ITY WAS LEAVE DENIED? 4, PLEASE CLARIFY

FURTHER THE REASON FOR WITHHOLDING PASS

PRIVILEGES. 5. PLEASE INDICATE UNDER WHAT

AUTHORITY THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN. 6. FOR

WHAT REASON AND UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY

AM I —— PROHIBITED FROM CONTACTING ANY

ORGANIZATION RELATIVE TO MY ASSIGNMENT?

7. WHAT METHODS OF APPEAL FROM THIS DECI-

SION ARE AVAILABLE TO ME, IF ANY. 8. WILL

YOU PLEASE SUPPLY ME WITH PHOTOSTATIC

COPIES OF ANY REPORTS, LETTERS OR COMMU-

NICATIONS RELEVANT TO THIS WITHDRAWAL

AND REASSIGNMENT, 9. PLEASE SUPPLY ME

WITH PHOTOSTATIC COPIES OF THE REGULA-

TIONS UNDER WHICH I HAVE BEEN WITH-

DRAWN. 10, PLEASE INDICATE WHAT MY RE-

. ie

19

MAINING SERVICE COMMITMENT IS. THANK

YOU.

Date: SG JUL 12 705PMST

Check; 169 NL PD F 7X CY FURN

Tel. No.: 966-7852

Dest’n.: WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO

Signature: STAF SARGEANT

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER

1001 EAST XXXX

LEMON ST TEMPE

ARIZ 85281

Cus.: EDWARD LATCHMAN

1001 E LEMON ST

TEMPE ARIZONA.

20

EXHIBIT 6

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with Para 6a, AFR 39-30, as amended. ,

S32, TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF CUPO OFFICIAL

JOHN J SANTORO, 24Lt, USAF

ra = CF 8 Ach FORCE SPECIAL ORDER HO.

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ae 3S INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AU) ipower 2273 ——

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vas DESTRIOUTION . 20. SLONATURE ELEMERT OF ORDERS AUTHCHTECATING OFF. Cae :

[~ TEAL.

- uae ee ‘

en dd

‘ “Xe JAMES L PITTS JR, Major, USA

Director of Administrative Service:

cvcat Of Adwlted war of modiliraréon POS ACCONPAN]UD-coutact your Last conmandor imacdiately for dustinetin

repert. ¢ 8O Port. PCS UNACCONTANIED cepondeato will coutact military deetallation whict arraaged trace, ioe

- Ks yestevetions. ie the eveet of general war report to the acarcet active military daotailetion as S003 «+ °

at 2)

—

——eEVEVUC0Ne

o> ese 8? Gad PREVIOUS COITION BIKA O& USED

EN EE, te ea Nahe MERE BS ee es

——_— AON NARS NERA RIN AG OR EIR ROSIER SNC 8

EXHIBIT 7

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

WU025 (L PFAO13) GOVT NL PD LUKE AFB ARIZ

JUL 17 1968

SSGT HERBERT P SCHLANDER

1001 EAST LEMON ST TEMPE ARIZ

AFIT CI

SUBJECT: WITHDRAWL FROM AECP. REFER-

ENCE IS MADE TO YOUR MESSAGE, 13 JULY. THE

FOLLOWING RESPONSES CORRESPOND TO YOUR

SIMILARLY NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS. 1. YOU

DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF OFFICER POTEN-

TIAL BY NOT ATTENDING ALL SCHEDULED

CLASES OF COURSES FOR WHICH YOU WERE

REGISTERED AT ARIZ STATE UNIV. 2. AN IN-

QUIRY INTO YOUR CLASS ATTENDANCE WAS

CONDUCTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF AFR

120-3 AT THE REQUEST OF THIS HEADQUARTERS

BY THE PROFEWSOR OF AEROSPACE STUDIES,

AFROTC DET 25.

BASED ON THE REPORT OF THAT INQUIRY AND

ON LETTERS FROM AFIT OFFICERS AT ASU, THE

COMMANDANT CONCLUDED THAT YOUR CLASS

ABSENCES DID IN FACT DEMONSTRATE A LACK

OF OFFICER POTENTIAL AND DIRECTED YOUR

WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PRA

7A, PG 3 AECP-4 AFM 50-5, JUL 67. 3. THE GRANT-

ING OF LEAVE IS GOVERNED BY AFM 35-22. 4.

LEAVE AND POSS PRIVELEGES ARE WITHHELD

FROM STUDENTS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWL FROM

AN AFIT PROGRAM TO INSURE THEIR AVAILA-

BILITY FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER IN CASE HQ

USAF DIRECTS AN EARLY REPORTING DATE

22

T

TO THE NEW DUTY STATION. 5. SEE PARA 3

ABOVE. 6. THE POINT OF CONTACT ON ASSIGN-

MENT MATTERS IS THE MEMBERS SERVICING

CBPO (AFIT-CBO IN YOUR CASE). PARA 1012, AFM

39-11 PROHIBITS SOLICITING OF ASSIGNMENTS,

7, THERE ARE OMSSTATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR

APPEAL OF THE COMMANDANTS DECISION TO

WITHDRAW YOU FROM THE AECP. 8. REPORTS,

LETTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS PERTAINING

TO YOUR WITHDRAWL MERELY FORMED THE

BASIS FOR THE COMMANDANTS DECISION. YOU

HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE DECISION AND OF

THE BASIS FOR IT. WE SEE NO REQUIREMENT

FOR COPIES TO BE PROVIDED. YOUR REASSIGN-

MENT WAS EFFECTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS

OF AFM 39-11. 9. AIR FORCE REGULATIONS AND

MANUALS CITED ABOVE ARE AVAILABLE AT

THE AFROTIC DET AND,/OR WILLIAMS AFB. 10.

PAGE 3 AECP-3, PARA 7:, AFM 50-5 PROVIDES

THAT ELMINESS COMPLETED THEIR SIX-YEAR

ENLISTMENT

MILES R PALMER, COLONEL, UASF DIRECTOR

CIVILIAN INSTITUTION DVISION AFB

(1050A)

23

EXHIBIT 8

*AFR 120-3

1-3

Air Force Regulation Department of the Air Force

No. 120-3 Washington, 11 October 1954

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

Administrative Inquiries and Investigations

Paragraph

Purpose and Scope

Policy

Definitions

Authority

Responsibilities

Investigative Procedures

Security Classification

Rights and Privileges

Privileged Status

OMAADNS Whe

1. Purpose and Scope:

a. This Regulation establishes policy and responsibili-

ties for all administrative inquiries and investigations

within the Air Force, except as indicated in b below. It

applies to all Air Force activities.

b. When incidents, accidents, or unusual occurrences :

requiring inquiry or investigaiion are not specifically or ,

adequately covered by other regulations, this Regulation

will apply. It will not govern investigations by the Office

of Special Investigations (OSI) or the air police; techni-

cal investigations of fires and aircraft accidents; investi-

ANT OTC RP: R

gations of courts-martial charges; investigations of prop-

erty survey officers; line of duty investigations: griev-

anees of civilian employees having other appeal rights; :

and other investigations governed by specific regulations. :

This Regulation may apply when an investigation re- :

quired by another regulation discloses facts or informa- :

tion beyond the scope of that particular regulation and

indicates the need for further investigation to protect

Be EE ae eee

= re 2 oe eee ©, = 3

the best interest of the Air Force, its individuals or

organizations.

2. Policy. Matters within the following areas will be

properly investigated by an echelon of command compati-

ble with a complete, impartial, and unbiased presentation

of facts:

a. Complaints and allegations indicating that rights of

individuals or groups of individuals have been trans-

gressed, or that the health, welfare, or efficiency of per-

sonnel have been unduly jeopardized. Such matters might

include living conditions, working conditions, individual

assignments, organizational inefficiency, improper super-

vision, misconduct, prejudice, and similar matters unless

limited by paragraph 1b.

b. Unusual incidents, and occurrences resulting in:

(1) Loss of life or injury to personnel.

(2) Considerable loss of or damage to Government

property.

(3) Publicity that might adversely affect Air Force

interests and prestige to a serious degree or

cause unusual interest in Air Force activities

on the part of other governmental agencies, both

foreign and domestic. Such incidents or occur-

rences, which may seriously impair the perform-

ance of the assigned mission, might include

windstorms, floods, fires, explosions, riots, un-

usual behavior, serious lack of discipline, and

low regard for laws, regulations, and customs,

local as well as military.

(4) Added by 120-3A.

e. Complaints of wrongs submitted by individuals and

based on the provisions of Article 188 UCMJ.

3. Definitions. The following definitions apply herein:

a. Inquiry-—A determination of the facts of a matter

by checking records, reviewing applicable directives, ex-

amining material evidence, and interviewing persons hav-

ing direct knowledge of the facts of a particular matter.

Such processes are generally adequate when the subject

of inquiry is not complex or of serious consequence and

EMRE SLE FINE i cre: pm PETA IRENE RL ES RRL ALAN ROR

—

25

the matter can be properly resolved through normal staff

actions and procedures.

b. Investigation—A determination of the facts of a

serious or complex matter. An investigation always re-

quires a written report and a written record of the action

taken by appropriate authority as a result of the investi-

gation. Investigations normally will be supported by ex-

hibits and sworn testimony of witnesses.

* This Regulation supersedes AFR 120-3, 11 April 1951, including

Change 120-3A, 10 October 1951.

26

EXHIBIT 9

Chapter 2

ADMINISTRATIVE

2-1. STATUS OF STUDENTS. Although you are not

in a familiar military environment, you must remember

that you are a member of the Air Force and will conduct

yourself accordingly. Your actions reflect directly on the

image of the Air Force. Civilian clothing will be worn

for class attendance, but the same standard of neatness

as that expected for the military uniform must be main-

tained. When participating in ceremonial functions, such

as commencement exercises, the Class A uniform will be

worn unless it conflicts with the established traditions or

rules of the college or university. The appropriate uni-

form will be worn when conducting official business at a

military installation or when flying.

2-2. ATTENDANCE AT SCHEDULED CLASSES. At-

tendance at scheduled classes is the direct counterpart of

reporting to duty or to a military formation under nor-

mal duty conditions. Each CID student is, therefore,

obligated to attend all scheduled classes unless he has

been excused from doing so. Permission to be excused

must be obtained from a Liaison Officer or from the ap-

propriate AFIT program monitor,

2-3. SIGN OUT RECORDS (PCS, PCA). You must

complete AFIT Form 17, “Sign In Record”, within 24

hours after completion of official travel, and forward it

to AFIT-PD. You will submit AFIT Form 17a, “Sign

Out Record”, to AFIT-PD upon departing PCS or Perma-

nent Change of Assignment (PCA) from your old duty

station (the civilian institution) if you are assigned to

a school where there is no AFROTC Detachment. Other-

Wise, you must sign out at the AFROTC Detachment.

2-4. SIGN IN/OUT REGISTER. AFIT Liaison Officers

are responsible for maintaining a sign in/out register

for all personnel departing on and returning from TDY.

AF Form 1323, “Sign In/Out Register”, or a comparable

so a ec 3) ne ot

27

form, may be used for this purpose. You must notify

your Liaison Officer if you are confined to the hospital.

9-5. RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA. Upon arrival

at your duty station, and when a firm address is estab-

lished, complete and forward a new AF Form 246, “Rec-

ord of Emergency Data”, to AFIT-PD without delay.

Thereafter, whenever a change occurs in any item on this

form, a new AF Form 246 or 246a will be resubmitted.

2-6. DISPOSITION OF FILED RECORD GROUP. Upon

assignment of a student to AFIT, the orders issuing

agency is furnished instructions for disposal of the stu-

dent’s records as follows:

a. If the student is rated, the AF Form 5, “Pilot

Individual Flight Record’, will be hand-carried to the

operations officer of the base to which attached for flying

proficiency.

b. The Unit Personnel Records Group will be for-

warded to AFIT-PD and must arrive on or before the

Effective Date of Change of Strength Accountability :

(EDCSA) stated in the reassignment orders. *

ce. Health Record Group. Disposition will be made in f

accordance with paragraph 5-1, this manual.

d. Personal Clothing and Equipment Group. Person- E

nel on flying status should turn in AF Form 538, “Per- E

sonal Clothing and Equipment Record”, at the base to

which attached for flying. Other personnel should retain

it in their possession until needed in connection with

issuance of personal clothing or equipment. Upon reas-

PEP ORS

Et MY SMUD BAY ag 4 REI)

LOGOS TERETE QI 40

signment from AFIT, all students will hand-carry their é

AF Form 538 to their new duty stations. F

e. Personal Pay Record Group. Disposition will be ;

made in accordance with paragraph 4-2, this manual.

2-7. TELEPHONE CALLS TO THE AIR FORCE IN- t

STITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Except in emergency b

cases, permission to call AFIT must be obtained from the

5

he

&

;

bes “Gee et cas MR eS RARER en eae

; Se serra etal

ad

28

EXHIBIT 10

From: SSgt Herbert P. Schlanger

1001 East Lemon Street

Tempe, Arizona 85281

Subject: Request for Hearing and Reconsideration of

Withdrawal

To: Major General Ernest A, Pinson

Commandant, AFIT

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433

Dear sir,

The attached summary, originally intended for another

purpose, I feel fairly presents the reasons which lead me

to believe that I should be granted a hearing. That is

the request that I respectfully make, and I hope that, for

the good of the Air Force and of myself, you will see fit

to grant it. Thank you.

Respectfully yours,

/8/ Herbert P. Schlarger

HERBERT P, SCHLANGER

On 20 June 1968, I received notice (appendix 1) of

the Commandant’s decision to withdraw me from the

AECP. This action came abruptly, without notice, just

two (2) months prior to my scheduled graduation. The

reason stated for the withdrawal was that I lacked offi-

cer potential. I have been in the program since January

1966, when an education plan forecasting a graduation

date of May 1968 was submitted to, and approved by

AFIT, and had met all requirements of the program suc-

cessfully, up to at least March 25, 1968. This fact is

substantiated by my continued participation in the pro-

gram and is further reinforced by the fact that on 25

March 1968, less than three (3) months prior to receipt

of the order of 17 June 1968, HQ, USAF and AFIT

approved a revised graduation date of August 1968.

This revision was necessitated by an illness during De-

cember 1967 and January 1968 which disrupted the pro-

2a, nee. ae ae ee 7 SS AM \ “4

IESE LD TELA LO ANG ONLI TO A

29

jected course of study, Before this new graduation date

was approved I am informed, and believe, that perform-

ance in the program, including my officer potential, was

reviewed, and not found wanting.

The order of 17 June 1968 raises very serious ques-

tions including, but not limited to:

1. Whether paragraph 2B was intended, as it does,

to order me into a state of arrest, and if so, on

what “probable cause’, and

2. Why was I ordered (paragraph 2C) not to “con-

tact HQ, USAF or any other organization rela-

tive to (my) assignment”.

In attempting to obtain clarification of the order in

question, I first wrote to AFIT (appendix 3) and, re-

ceiving no reply from that headquarters, sought the aid

of legal counsel at Williams Air Force Base. After a

period of approximately a week I was informed that that

office had determined that they would not render me any

legal assistance in this case. After being denied counsel

I again requested clarification from AFIT (appendix 4)

and was informed that the “lack of officer potential (was)

demonstrated by (my) failure to attend scheduled classes.”

I can categorically assert that between 25 March 1968

and 17 June 1968 my class attendance conformed with

the regulations of Arizona State University governing

academic performance, and this is reflected in the concern

and suprise of the Dean of Students at my withdrawal

(appendix 8).

In examining the charge that I failed to attend sched-

uled classes, the most immediate question, it seems, is

how was this alleged misconduct demonstrated to the

satisfaction of the Commandant, It could not have been

as a reflection of my academic performance, since I am

maintaining a satisfactory average and will graduate

(now at my own expense) in August, as scheduled. It

cannot have been as a result of class attendance records,

since none of my professors took roll calls. AFIT im-

plies (appendix 7) that the results of an inquiry into

my class attendance substantiate the allegations made by

certain officers in the AFIT program at ASU. This in-

ACER enenceerun sogenty

SPIE

MOA PY IY!

30

quiry is of interest for two reasons, First, Major Halley,

the investigating officer, told me, when I inquired two

weeks ago, that he had contacted my professors and, for

the reason indicated above, the results of his inquiry were

“inconclusive’’.

The second point concerns the authority under which

this inquiry was conducted (AFR 120-3). It is contended

that my alleged failure to attend classes constitutes a

refusal to obey a lawful order—a court-martial offense,

AFR 120-3 specifically states that it does not govern the

investigation of courts-martial charges. Also, if such an

order had been given, and I had refused to obey it, and

this refusal had, in fact, been established then the failure

on the part of my superiors to promptly prosecute me

under the appropriate articles of the UCMJ is itself a

violation of the UCMJ. This cannot be the case. There-

fore, it seems inevitable that we must conclude that the

reasons given for my withdrawal do not stand up under

close scrutiny. This fact, and this fact alone, would indi-

cate that I am entitled to a hearing so that the truth or

falsity of the allegations can be ascertained,

But the question remains—why was I withdrawn?

What was it that convinced my superiors that I lacked

officer potential? Only one thing happened this spring

that was in any way different from past semesters—my

participation in an extra-curricular activity that caused

Major Rider, the AFIT liaison officer at ASU, to con-

demn my actions as “inappropriate”, to caution me that

I was getting in with “bad groups”, and to warn me

that my activities might lead to a court-martial. This

activity, my participation in the formation, and chair-

manship of the ASU Civil Rights Board was what ap-

parently marked me as failing “to measure up to the

high standards expected of Air Force officers’ (AFM

50-5). This group, accreditted to the campus of ASU,

engaged in orderly, lawful petition to redress grievances

and was effective in helping insure the civil rights of all.

The evidence strongly indicates that it was this ac-

tivity on my part, not any unsubstantiated “failure to

attend scheduled classes”, that led to my withdrawal

from the AECP. The coincidence in timing of the pub-

31

licity attendant to our CRB activities (see appendix)

and the dates of the approval of my extension (March)

and my withdrawal (June), the comments of Major

Rider and other officers regarding my participation, the

fact that AFR 120-3 does cover investigations concerned

with “unusual occurrences . . . resulting in publicity

that might adversely affect Air Force interests . . .”,

and the lack of any other demonstratable grounds for

such a withdrawal, all point to this conclusion.

I firmly believe that if legal counsel were allowed to

participate and advise me, and to make recommendations

to my commander, such counsel would find that I had

lived up to all prescribed standards, and an investigation

would show that during the period in question this ac-

tivity (civil rights) was the only one which resulted in

cautioning of me by my superiors,

I therefore respectfully request that, in the interest of

justice and noting the press of time, my case be investi-

gated immediately, that I be provided with legal counsel,

and a hearing be conducted to determine the truth and

validity of my statements.

wee

:

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3

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EXHIBIT 11

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR ForcE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AU)

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR Force BASE, OHIO 45433

{DoD Emblem}

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: AFIT-G 27 Aug 1968

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Elimination from the

AECP, SSet Herbert P. Schlanger,

AF 12671481

To: A1C Herbert P. Schlanger

3550th Pit Tng We (ATC)

Moody AFB Ga 31602

1, Your request for hearing and reconsideration of with-

drawal from the AECP is denied. Complete review of

the evidence presented in your case shows that you were

capable of attending classes in the Spring semester 1968,

but failed without authority to do so. This failure to

attend all scheduled classes followed a series of unex-

plained, unauthorized absences in preceding terms; ab-

sences about which vou were counseled by both your pro-

fessors and your AFIT Liaison Officer, Failure to attend

classes without excuse is behavior contrary to that expected

of an officer trainee.

2. Your activities with the Arizona State University

Civil Rights Board were not considered to be discreditable

in arriving at the decision to withdraw you from the

AECP. You were withdrawn for lack of officer potential

as demonstrated by unexcused absence from classes under

the authority vested in me by AFM 50-5. You have not

presented any new evidence to either deny or offer a

reasonable excuse for your absence from class. No useful

purpose would be served by a hearing,

ERNEST A, PINSON, Major General, USAF

Commandant

Strength Through Knowledge

EXHIBIT 12

From: SSgt Herbert P. Schlanger

3350 FMS

Moody AFB, Ga. 31601

Subject: Request for Discharge

To: Commander, Moody AFB, Ga.

Sir:

For the following reasons ! request that I be discharged

under the provisions of AFM 39-10:

1, I have served honorably in the U.S. Air Force for

a period of five (5) years, nine (9) months;

2. On 9 Dec 65 I was re-enlisted for a period of six

(6) years in order to enter the Airman’s Education and

Commissioning Program (AECP) ;

3. My selection for the AECP followed an extensive

evaluation of both my potential and attitude;

4. My withdrawal from the AECP was occassioned, it

is asserted, by my “lack of officer potential” and “poor

attitude”;

5. Both my “officer potential” and attitude were com-

mented on favorably by several recommending officers

prior to my entry into the AECP;

6. Therefore it seems logical to conclude that either:

a. The original evaluation of my qualities (i.e,

potential, attitude and abilities) was in error, or

b. AFIT erred in its evaluation which led to my

withdrawal;

7. If 6(a), then it is felt that I should be discharged

in accordance with the provisions of AFM 39-10, para 8,

since, through no fault of my own, I was re-enlisted for

a program for which I was ineligible;

8. If 6(b), then either:

a. I should be reinstated in the AECP, reimbursed

for all expenses incurred in concluding my

Lie

y nT

oan

CFTR NR Ne Re Ne an whe “ Pe eae ne ae i,

bachlor’s degree program, any salary lost due

to my impending administrative demotion be

made up, letters of retraction and correction be

sent to those civilians in contacts with whom

AFIT has impugned my character, the form 785

currently in my personnel file be suitably re-

vised, and I be permitted to attend OTS, or,

b. I should be discharged under the provisions of

AFM 39-10, para 80,

9. It might be contended that both evaluations were

correct, and that my withdrawal was made because of a

change of attitude on my part in the interim or an ac.

tion by me which indicated a “lack of officer potential”,

This conclusion cannot be substantiated and is, in fact,

demonstratably false. On 3 Mar 68 I requested that

AFIT approve a revision of my scheduled graduation

date (from May 68 to Aug 68) since an illness in Jan

68 had disrupted my course of study, This request was

granted on 25 Mar 68. Certainly this extension would

not have been approved had I demonstrated a “lack of

officer potential” or a poor attitude up to that time. Yet

less than ten weeks later I was withdrawn from the

AECP for those very reasons. It seems apparent, there-

fore, that no change in attitude or potential ‘if, indeed,

a person’s “officer potential” can change at ali) was noted

by AFIT in the period from Jan 66 (my entry into the

program) through Mar 68 (‘approval of the extension)—

a period of over two years. Yet just eight weeks prior

to my scheduled completion of the program I was abruptly

ordered to withdraw from school because I “lack officer

potential”; no specifics were given at that time and re

peated inquiries have resulted only in vague generalities

being offered by AFIT, in terms of clarification, leading

to reinforcement of my conviction that 6(b) is the cor-

rect conclusion to be drawn.

10, This being the case, we are left with 8(a) and

8ib) as alternative solutions, if action with justice and

reason is to be taken. It would seem that present cir-

cumstances render 8(b) the more preferable of the two.

35

11. If my request, contained herein, for an honorable

discharge or some other favorable administrative action

is denied, it is my intention to pursue all other remedies

available to me including, but not limited to, iitigation

in the federal courts.

Submitted on 4 September 1968.

s/ Herbert P. Schlanger

HERBERT P, SCHLANGER

SSgt, USAF

From: A1C Herbert P. Schlanger

3550 FMS

Moody AFB, Ga. 31601

Subject: Discharge Application—Additional Information

To: MPC (AFPMAKE)

Randolph AFB, Texas 78148

1. I will not attempt, at this time, to demonstrate the

falsity of AFIT’s charge that I “failed to attend all

scheduled classes” since (a) the burden of proof should

be assumed by the accusing agency and (b) it is virtually

impossible to prove that any student was in any particu-

lar class when, as in this case, the professors did not take

roll; certainly my circumstances at the present time make

this even more difficult. What the following shall attempt

to show is the weakness of AFIT’s contentions and the

arbitrary manner in which this case was handled.

2. I was withdrawn, allegedly, for “having a lack of

officer potential.”

a. This argument is weak as was demonstrated in

my original letter, and

b. “Lack of officer potential” was not among the

possible reasons for withdrawal from an AFIT

program as they were enumerated in the AFIT

Student Manual dated 1 June 1967. This phrase

was added to the list following my elimination

36

from the AECP—apparently as an ex post facto

justification of my withdrawal (Student Manual,

1 July 1968).

3. Paragraph 2B of Col. Palmer’s letter dated 17 June

1968 orders me into a state of arrest (as defined in Art.

9, UCMJ) without probable cause—a violation of Art.

97, UCMJ.

4. Paragraph 2C of that letter has been deemed (by at

least two military lawyers) to be an illegal order—

After I had inquired three times AFIT attempted to

justify the issuance of this order by citing AFM 39-11,

para 1012 as the authority; inspection shows, however,

that this paragraph does not apply nor does it confer

authority to so restrict communication.

5. I was denied legal advice and assistance by JAG at

Williams AFB, Az., HQ AFIT at Wright-Patterson AFB,

Ohio, and HQ AU at Maxwell AFB, Ala.

6. AFIT contends that “an inquiry into (my) class at-

tendance was conducted under the provisions of AFR

120-3 . . . by the Professor of Aerospace Sciences,

AFROTC Det. 25” ‘at Arizona State University). Ig-

noring, for the moment, the fact that AFR 120-3 does

not cover investigations of this sort, let us briefly exam-

ine the regulation. It states that investigations “will be

(carried oui) by an echelon of command compatible with

a complete, impartial and unbiased presentation of facts.”

It is difficult, in light of the association of AFIT officers

at ASU (including those making the accusations ‘to be

investigated) and the officers of the PAS office, to con-

sider the PAS as “at an echelon of command compatible

with a complete, impartial and unbiased presentation of

facts.” Further, the nature of this case would seem to

warrant an “investigation” rather than an “inquiry”

(AFR 120-3, para 3). The results of this “inquiry” must

also be questioned since, when I asked the investigating

officer (after I had been withdrawn) about the results,

he said his report had been “inconclusive”.

37

7. HQ AU (AUIG) responded to an inquiry I made

through a letter dated 3 Sept 1968 which attempted to

justify AFIT’s withdrawal action. Paragraph la of that

letter states that “the report was conclusive” but in no

way supports this contention. Perhaps AFIT and I differ

in our definitions of “counselling” but I don’t recall be-

ing “counselled by some of (my) professors.” Paragraph

1b simply restates the requirement for attendance. Para-

graph le refers to “counselling” by various officers. I

have been under the impression that at the two 1967

“counselling” (sic) sessions ! had satisfactorily explained

the absences that had occurred. As for Major Rider’s

assertion that I admitted to him “that (I) had been cut-

ting classes extensively ever since (I) had been (at Ari-

zona State University)” I can only say that I never made

such a statement. I should think that it would be obvious

that I would never make such a self-incriminatory state-

ment—even had it been true. Further evidence of the

inadequate nature of the “inquiry” is given by the—let

us say, at best, exaggerated—assertion that I “failed...

to attend the majority of the classes in which (I) was

enrolled.” Paragraph 1d reports that Major Rider felt

that I was not officer material. Paragraph le contains

another false allegation—this one asserting that I was

“maintaining a disgraceful personal appearance.” All I

can say to this is that this charge must never have been

looked into, even though it “contributed to (AFIT-CI’s)

decision to recommend elimination.” Given the oppor-

tunity I could produce scores of witnesses—including the

President of the University, the Dean of Students, mem-

bers of the faculty, clergymen and civic leaders—to re-

fute this damaging, untrue statement. Paragraph 2 does

not exist. Paragraph 3 refers to the aforementioned

“inquiry”. It makes mention of “records” of Arizona

State University from which information concerning my

alleged absences was obtained. It fails to specify what

particular records—perhaps because no records of class

attendance were kept. It should be noted, also, that this

inquiry was supposedly concerned with my attendance

during the Spring semester, 1968, and—contrary to the

implication of paragraph 3—I did not receive three “In-

Oe se

* FEEL GS POL ON SE EE

38

complete” grades that semester. Those grades of “I” were

received in the previous term because I was hospitalized

during the week of final exams. This is but one example

of the apparent confusion as to the focus of the inquiry.

Nowhere in this report is one concrete fact mentioned.

8. The recommendations of me by officers prior to my

entry into the AECP are in my personnel file at the

CBPO, Moody AFB, Ga.

9. Enclosed is a copy of my request for a hearing which

was submitted to General Pinson. It contains much of

the information presented here, along with several addi-

tional points. This request was denied because, according

to the Commandant, a hearing would serve “no useful

purpose”.

10. I shall refrain from elaborating on what I am con-

vinced was the underlying reason for my withdrawal—

my participation in an extra-curricular activity which

Major Rider found objectionable. Despite AFIT’s de-

nials, the evidence still indicated that this was the major

factor in the initiation of elimination action.

11. In spite of repeated requests—both oral and written

—I have been denied access to the “evidence” presented

against me to AFIT. Had I been given an opportunity

I am confident that I could have refuted it.

12. If I can be of assistance in the clarification of any

aspect of this case please contact me. My duty phone is

extension 3836; my mailing address is PO Box 337,

Moody AFB, Ga. 31601.

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER

A1C, USAF

ec: Senator Jacob K. Javits

Representative William F. Ryan

Dr. John Morris

A ks

awe).

a te

pn isd

SEs

39

EXHIBIT 13

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

29 Oct. 1968

REPLY TO USAFMPC (AFPMAKE)

ATTN OF: RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS 78148

SuBJECT: A1C Herbert P. Schlanger, AF 12 671 481

To: Tech Tng Cen (CBPO-SA)

Keesler AFB, Miss 39534

Not favorably considered for the following reasons:

a. After careful review of the entire case file, it is

our considered opinion that Airman Schlanger was prop-

erly eliminated from the AECP.

b. Since Airman Schlanger received over two years of

college education, at essentially no expense to himself,

while drawing pay and allowances from the Air Force,

the Air Force is entitled to expect him to comply with

his December 1965 enlistment contract.

e.. This application cannot be considered as a petition

for a new forum before which he may contest the pro-

priety of his involuntary withdrawal from AECP. This

issue has already been contested, decided, appealed, and

sustained by Air University.

FoR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

/s/ Dale T. Sarrett

DALE T. SARRETT

Lt Colonel, USAF AF Fm 107 w/2 Atch

Directorate of Pers Ltr fr Amn Schlanger,

Program Actions undated, w/Atchs

Atch

tho ee bo

40

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. Civ. 69-381 Phx.

[File Endorsement Omitted |

[Title Omitted }

ORDER—August 28, 1969

The petition of Herbert Phillip Schlanger for writ of

habeas corpus having been submitted and the Court hav-

ing duly considered the same,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Herbert Phillip

Schlanger for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Saunders

v. Crouchley, 274 F.Supp. 505 (1967).

DATED August 28, 1969.

Wo. P. COPPLE

United States District Judge

41

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24826

[File Endorsement Omitted |

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPELLANT

Vv.

Hon. Dr. RoBeERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air

Force, COLONEL HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody

AFB, Valdosta, Georgia, and COLONEL NOEL B. RED-

DRICK, Commander AFROTC Det. 15, Arizona State

University, Tempe, Arizona, APPELLEES

ORDER—Filed December 12, 1969

Before: HAMLEY, BROWNING and CARTER, Circuit Judges

The order denying the application for a writ of habeas

corpus is set aside without prejudice and the cause is

remanded to the district court for issuance of an order

to show cause and further proceedings thereon.

FREDERICK G. HAMLEY

JAMES R. BROWNING

JAMES M. CARTER

United States Circuit Judges

OR EEN 5 ZETA phone

42

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. Civ. 69-381 Phx.

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER

vs.

Dr. RoBeRT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air Force,

COLONEL HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody AFB,

Valdosta, Georgia, and COLONEL NoEL B. REDDRICK,

Commander, AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State Univer-

sity, Tempe, Arizona, RESPONDENTS

ORDER—January 8, 1970

Petitioner having submitted herein an application for

writ of habeas corpus, and good cause appearing there-

from,

IT IS ORDERED that the respondents above named

shall, within twenty (20) days from the date hereof,

show cause, if any they have, why the application for

writ of habeas corpus should not be granted, or why a

hearing should not be held on the merits of said applica-

tion, by filing with this Court such response as you deem

appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of the veri-

fied application for writ of habeas corpus, along with a

copy of this order, be served upon each of the respond-

ents and the United States Attorney for the District of

Arizona by the United States Marshal.

DATED January 8, 1970.

Wo. P. CopPLe

United States District Judge

43

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24,826

[Filed Jan. 7, 1970, Wm. B. Luck, Clerk]

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPELLANT

v.

Hon. Dr. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.,

Secretary of the Air Force, ET AL., APPELLEES

CORRECTED ORDER

Appellees are stayed from removing appellant, or or-

dering or causing his removal, from the District of Ari-

zona until proceedings in the district court pursuant to

this court’s mandate are completed, or until the further

order of the district court.

JAMES R. BROWNING

United States Circuit Judge

ANT SCN nM: Ort AY.

—

44

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV-69-381-PHX-WPC

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER

vs.

Dr. ROBERT C, SEAMANS, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

MOTION TO DismIss—Filed January 27, 1970

COMES NOW the respondents in the above captioned

matter, appearing specially by Richard C., Gormley, As-

sistant United States Attorney, in response to Order to

Show Cause issued by this Court on January 8, 1970, and

respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the petition for

habeas corpus heretofore filed on the grounds that this

Court lacks jurisdictions.

DATED this 27th day of January, 1970.

RICHARD K, BURKE

United States Attorney

RICHARD C. GORMLEY

Assistant U. S. Attorney

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

It is well settled law that this Court should and must

find that jurisdiction exists first before entertaining any

proceeding. Bookout v. Beck, 354 F.2d 823 (CA. 9

1965).

An indispensable party in any habeas corpus proceed-

ing involving a serviceman is the Commander who has

custody of the petitioner. The petitioner, in Paragraph

4 of his application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleges

oe aks

45

that the Honorable Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary of

the Air Force, and Colonel Homer Baker, Commander

of Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, are the persons who

are at present unlawfully restraining him of his liberty.

As can be seen by the return of the United States Mar-

shal, neither of these persons were found within the con-

fines of the State of Arizona which comprises the geo-

graphical jurisdiction of this Court.

At the time the petition was filed in this district, the

petitioner was on leave status from the 3550th Air Base

Group, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. Attached to this

motion is an affidavit to that effect executed by the per-

sonnel records custodian of the aforementioned base.

It has long been established that the jurisdiction of a

United States District Court to issue a writ of habeas

corpus is limited to those cases in which the petitioner

is confined or detained within the territorial jurisdiction

of the Court. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948);

Duncan v. State of Maine, 295 F.2d 528 (C.A. 1 1961)

cert. denied 368 U.S. 998. It is likewise beyond argu-

ment that a person on active duty in the armed services

may be “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

$2241. Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (C.A. 3

1967) cert. denied sub nom; Brown v. Clifford, 390 U.S.

1005 (1968).

In the instant case Sergeant Schlanger was and is on

leave status from his Commander at Moody Air Force

Base, Georgia. It is therefore essential that any action

concerning his alleged detention be brought in the United

States District Court in the State of Georgia. Wurster v.

Perrin, 303 F.Supp. 480 (1969); Rudick v. Laird, 412

F.2d 16 (C.A. 2 1969), cert. denied 38 L.W. 3174.

Attached hereto is a copy of the decision of the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts

in the case of McKay v. Secretary of the United States

Air Force, Mise. No. 69-80-W. Also attached hereto is

a copy of the decision of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia in the same matter.

SP,

46

Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted

that the petition should be dismissed for want of juris-

diction over the person.

RICHARD K, BURKE

United States Attorney

RIcHARD C, GORMLEY

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Copy of the foregoing mailed this

27th day of January, 1970, to:

Sgt. Herbert P. Schlanger

2419 North Saratoga

Tempe, Arizona 85281

Captain Titsworth

Office of the Judge Advocate General

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona 85027

RICHARD C, GORMLEY

Assistant U. 8S. Attorney

STATE OF GEORGIA )

) AFFIDAVIT

COUNTY OF LOWNDES |)

Before me, BETTY R,. LANGLEY, a Notary Public in

and for said County, personally came LAWRENCE D.

McDONALD, IstLt, USAF, 328-38-7351 FV, Chief, Data

Control Section and the official personnel records custo-

dian of the military records of Sgt Herbert P. Schlanger,

FR 027-382-5213, 3550th Air Base Group, Moody Air

Force Base, Georgia, who, being duly sworn according

to law, deposes and says that the official military per-

sonnel records of Sgt Herbert P. Schlanger, FR 027-32-

5213, reflect his duty status from 4 June 1969 to 21 Sep-

tember 1969 as follows:

ha

be

47

FROM: THRU: STATUS: REMARKS:

4Jun69" 14Jun69 Leave 11 days leave

15 Jun 69 15 Jun 69 TDY 1 day travel as authorized

by AFM 213-1

16 Jun 69 22Aug69 TDY Attending school—68 days

23 Aug 69 19 Sep 69 Leave 28 days leave

20 Sep 69 20 Sep 69 TDY 1 day travel as authorized

by AFM 213-1

N/A Present Returned to Moody AFB

21 Sep 69** for Duty

* Date signed out

** Date signed in

The above 39 days of leave were taken in conjunction

with permissive TDY for the purpose of attending college

at Arizona State University. The two days of travel

shown above were computed in accordance with Table 5,

AFM 35-6. Sgt Schlanger was authorized 70 days TDY,

including two days of travel time based on available air

travel (Paragraph 4-5d, AFM 213-1).

Further, Sgt Schlanger is presently in a leave status

which commenced on 9 December 1969.

/s/ Lawrence D. McDonald

LAWRENCE D. MCDONALD

IstLt, USAF

328-38-7351 FV

Chief, Data Control Section

3550 Air Base Gp, Moody AFB, Ga.

SWORN TO before me and subscribed in my presence

this 16 day of January, 1970.

s’ Betty R. Langley

Notary Public

Georgia, State-At-Large

My Commission Expires May 7, 1973

_

NF er eee

a Pt

PG SP BOP AEF

er

48

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No, CIV 69-381 PHX WPC

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER

vs

Dr. ROBERT C, SEAMANS, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM—Filed January 30, 1970

On January 27, 1970, the Respondents appearing spe-

cially in the above captioned matter filed a Motion to

Dismiss. Attached thereto were certain exhibits. In fur-

ther support of the Motion to Dismiss, the Respondents

attach hereto a duly authenticated certification by Rob-

ert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, regard-

ing copies of extracts from the master personnel records

of Sgt Herbert P. Schlanger, 027-32-5213, the Petitioner

herein.

DATED this 30th day of January, 1970,

RICHARD K, BURKE

United States Attorney

RICHARD C, GORMLEY

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Copy of the foregoing mailed

this 30 day of January, 1970

To: Sgt. Herbert P. Schlanger

2419 N. Saratoga, Tempe, Arizona 85281

Captain Titsworth

Office of the Judge Advocate General

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona 85027

RICHARD C, GORMLEY

Asst. U. S. Attorney

er ale rH

49

Suited Diates \ > ef Srrvziza

DEPARTMENT OF TiS AIR FORCE

Hq USAF, Washington, D.C. 20 January | yg 70.

(ewe! ino

JEREBY CERTIFY that I am the Director of Administration, Departaent of the

aie Pee . and as such am the official custodian of all Air Force Records, I Durther

ce that the attached is a trae and exact copy of extracts from the Master

Perteam 1 Records of Sgt Herbert P, Schlanger, 027-32-5213.

Director of Administration

United States Air Force

D WSVULBY CERTIFY that Colemel John F. Rash, USAF . who

read fhe Fcegoing certificate, is the pirector of Adsinistration, Cnived Staves Air Force

. and

hete ha ee:tification as such, full faith 294 credit ave and ouzut to be given.

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55

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civ 69-381 Phx

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT

Vv.

Hon. Dr. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air

Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS

MoTioN—February 2, 1970

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, pro se in forma

pauperis, respectfully moves this court to dismiss respond-

ents’ motion of January 27, 1970 for the following rea-

sons, which are more elaborately set forth in the accom-

panying memorandum:

1. An attack on this court’s jurisdiction is precluded

by previous decisions in this case;

2. This court, as a matter of law and of fact, is the

proper forum in which this controversy should be heard.

Alternatively, the annexed memorandum is submitted

in opposition to respondents’ aforementioned motion and

applicant, then, requests that oral argument be heard at

the earliest possible time but in no case later than Febru-

ary 9, 1970.

Applicant further moves this court, should it sustain

respondents’ aforementioned motion, to continue in effect,

for a period of at least one week following said decision,

the injunction entered on January 6, 1970 in order to af-

ford applicant an opportunity to seek appropriate relief

from the Court of Appeals.

a a al a Sa aS na ee

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Pro Se

P.O. Box 276

Tempe, Az. 85281

Dated: February 2, 1970

Tempe, Arizona

EEE LORI TE POND PGS

EPR SIMI aM tS PRT IEe

OTT ERIN EEN MRE TS TIGER

56

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civ 69-381 Phx

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT

Vv.

Hon. Dr. Ropert C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air

Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OF Law—February 3, 1970

I. AN ATTACK ON THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION

IS PRECLUDED AT THIS TIME.

Respondent is precluded from attacking the jurisdiction

of this court in the instant matter by the theory of the

“law of the case”, 21 C.J.S. 195, et seq. This court, in

dismissing the application for the second time, said:

“. .. it appears, from the moving papers, that the

(applicant) is in the custody and under the orders

of the commander of the Moody Air Force Base in

Georgia, even though he may be in this area, and I

feel that jurisdiction for the matter is in (that)

a

thus raising the jurisdictional issue on its own motion.

In his brief in support of his appeal (Ninth Circuit,

Number 24,826), applicant quoted the court’s aforemen-

tioned remarks (p. 13) and noted that jurisdiction was

question. As respondent points out in his memorandum

(p. 1), and as this court has demonstrated by its action,

a court must in the first instance, in any proceeding, de-

termine that jurisdiction exists, Bookout v. Beck, 354

F.2d 823 (9 Cir, 1965). The Court of Appeals, having

the issue squarely before it, did just that; by considering

applicant’s argument and remanding “for issuance of

a show cause order and further proceedings” and then,

subsequently, entering an extraordinary order maintain-

ing petitioner’s presence in this district, that Court has

57

decided this issue in petitioner’s favor. Right or wrong, it

is that decision which has become the law of this case.

Further, a ruling of the Court of Appeals cannot be later

attacked in a lower court when, as here, there is an ab-

sence of any change in the circumstances of the case.

II. THIS COURT IS, AS A MATTER OF FACT AND

LAW, THE PROPER FORUM FOR THIS ACTION.

Respondent appends to his memorandum, without elab-

oration, a copy of Judge Wyzanski’s opinion in McKay v.

Sec’y of the Air Force, (D. Mass., 1969). Except insofar

as the opinion indicates that this court is, indeed, the

proper forum for this action, the case cited bears little ap-

plication to the one at bar. First it was pointed out that,

at the time of filing, no custody was being exercised.

While this holding is not undisputed by analagous cases,

eg., Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139, 148 (E.D. Pa.,

1952), custody in the instant case is clear. Applicant

herein was undisputedly subject to respondents’ orders;

that alone is sufficient custody, Jones v. Cunningham, 371

U.S. 236, 240 (1963). We need not discuss the alterna-

tive mentioned by Judge Wyzanski—the possibility of ap-

plicant being AWOL and, hence, not in custody—since

respondents’ return concedes that such was not the case

here. Finally it was held, in McKay, that the Massa-

chusettes district court was not the proper forum for the

action since, prior to the filing of the petition, McKay

had had no contact with that district. This fact was

central to the decision. In the instant case petitioner’s

contact with this district has been more than ample—

it has been oevrwhelming; indeed, “lack of contact”

could have been convincingly advanced as a defense

against this action had it been brought in any other dis-

trict in the United States.

Petitioner was assigned to within this district in Jan-

uary, 1966, pursuant to the terms and conditions of his

re-enlistment contract of December 9, 1965, for entrance

into the Airman’s Education and Commissioning Pro-

gram (AECP) at Arizona State University. He was

still assigned here when, in May, 1968 an unlawful in-

quiry into his conduct was allegedly conducted by military

authorities at ASU, and when in June, 1968—in an ac-

RB PIE SE

a ee a

API I ATR RNR GG

greg ¥

58

tion based on this and other unlawful acts—he was unlaw-

fully removed from the AECP. He was re-assigned to

ASU on temporary duty (TDY) in June, 1969 to com-

plete, at his own expense, his college education. While

petitioner concedes that his status was that of “delay en

route”, or “leave”, on the day that the instant applica-

tion was filed with this court, it was leave in conjunction

with the aforementioned TDY assignment, was authorized

in the orders originally promulgated regarding the as-

signment and in no way affects this court’s jursidiction.

At all times petitioner was subject to respondents’ or-

ders; he was sufficiently restrained for habeas corpus to

lieu and he was still at the place of his assignment.

On the issue raised by respondents’ motion, the opinion

in U.S. v. Flint, 54 F. Supp. 889, appended hereto, and

affirmed by the Second Circuit, 142 F.2d 62, is more to the

point. Applicant therein was inducted, transferred to the

Enlisted Reserve and sent home for two weeks furlough

before reporting for active duty. It was during those two

weeks—while he was free to go where and do what he

pleased—that he applied for habeas corpus. Respondent's

motion to dismiss, similar to the instant motion, was

denied on the grounds that the petitioner—even though

on leave—was sufficiently restrained.

In any event, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948),

cited by respondents, was specifically cited by applicant

in his appeal brief, in support of his position that juris-

diction was properly laid in this court—a position that

was sustained by the subsequent actions of the Court of

Appeals. In fact, the Supreme Court’s holding in Ahrens

left petitioner no choice but to file his petition in this

court.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that

respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

over the person of the applicant should be denied.

/s/ Seon ht ES

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Pro Se

P.O. Box 276

Tempe, Az. 85281

Dated: February 3, 1970

Tempe, Arizona

59

AFFIDAVIT

I, HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, attest to the

following:

1. That in the spring of 1969 I applied for and was

granted entrance into “Operation Bootstrap”—an Air

Force program which allows a qualified applicant to be

assigned in a TDY status to a university or college in

order to complete, entirely at his own expense, his de-

gree program. I further requested, and was granted,

fifteen (15) days delay enroute in conjunction with this

TDY assignment. The restraints imposed upon me during

both the period referred to as TDY and that of “delay en

route” were, for all practical purposes, the same.

2. I do not contect that August 27, 1969—the day that

my application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed—

was a day chargeable to me as leave; it was, however,

leave authorized in conjuction with the TDY and author-

ized in those TDY orders. Moreover, it fell between two

periods credited as TDY.

3. While not material to the instant issue, I contest

the statement of Lt. McDonald, in his affidavit annexed to

respondents’ motion, that I am currently on leave. I be-

lieve that the period from January 6, 1970 is not charge-

able as leave, since I am present in Arizona pursuant to

an order of the Court of Appeals. Further, I believe that

respondents acted wrongly and unlawfully in changing

iny status, with respect to my entitlement to pay and

allowances, on January 18, 1970.

4. I believe that, as a matter of fact and of law, this

court is the proper forum for the hearing of this con-

troversy. If the court is troubled by the technical distinc-

tion betwen my status when on TDY and when in delay

en route, I request that a hearing be held at which time

expert testimony on this and related points would be

taken.

5. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was made

aware, by me, of the issues raised by respondents’ motion

and, I believe, took them into consideration before enter-

ing its orders of December 12, 1969 and January 6, 1970.

PAS a RTM at Ses

6. I was at all relevant times, and am presently,

physically present within the District of Arizona.

/s/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER

Sworn and subscribed to before me this fourth day of

February, 1970 at Tempe, Arizona.

/s/ Olivia H. Birchett

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan.

23, 1972

OLIVIA H. BIRCHETT

61

an RETURN ON SERVICE OF WRIT RECEIVED

United States of America JAN 3.01970

District OF ATAz0M® UNITED S_ATES anon

i, a Sze

uerbert Paillip Schlanrer Clerk's No, iv. €9+38 Phx

vs.

or. Yobert C. a vr., Sec. of the *ir Force

‘olonel omer Baker, Comm. Moody AFB, /ald sta, WS. Marshal's No. 1141-?

‘olonel Yoel §. Yedirick, Comm. ATROTC Net. 25 Arizona State University Ai

Tenve, Arisona. SERVICE COMPLETED or ENDEAVOR TO SERVE

—

I hereby certify and return that I the annexed Crver ¢ & Applic: tion

on the therein-named _ .olonel Homer eg ttl ‘wpady ASt

(Name of company.

by handing to and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with (if endeavor—describe what was

done in endeavoring to serve) -olonel jomer Saker

(Name of individual or agent of company. corporation. ete |

personally at (if endeavor—show addresses where endeavors made)

Mis Office; “oody ayn, _V ,

Address Street number apartment number. rural route. ete |

Valtosta, Geornia in the said District

at 3330) wmm-pm.onthe — id day of Jar. , 1979

1 hereby certify and return, that on the day of . 19

I received the within : and that after

diligent search, I am unable to find the within named

within said district.

illier 1. “Martin wT.

teryMarshal.

poe —— Med SOE

5 vse — ™ CG: Mteine om Forme

Je3

SS

_patiert Puallar Lea

ves.

Be hebout C. cere

RETURN ON SERVICE OF WRIT

United States of America

District of — *h?:

Ir. ut a)

U.S. Marshal's No.

SERVICE COMPLETED or ENDEAVOR TO SERVE

Thereby certify and return that I aoe the annexed |" *?

on the therein-named

We wot

ret C. &

(Wee

(Name of individual cumpany. corporetian. ete |

, MERREN, - alan:

by Mandi wo and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with (if endeavor —describe what was

done in endeavoring to serve) © CSV ef 8)

Pe a t

certafic! :

lies

Lina mttre.

We Polc<Pet C,

(Name of individual or agent of company corporation ete

31 recayt

er 7? ‘

personally at (if endeavor—show addresses where endeavors made)

Yer]

(Address Street number. apartment number rural route etc

st

a&.m—p.m., on the Agta

day of

SERVICE NOT COMPLETED

I hereby certify and return, that on the

1 received the within

Date

day of

diligent search, 1 am unable to find the within named

Marshal's fees

Mileage

Totsfl «.---

t

in the said District

.

9 ’

and that after

within said district

Umithd States Marske!

/ a /

Deputy.

~~ © 7 e

104

63

re UN RETURNN ON SERVICE OF WRIT

Anitited States of America

District OF — Ar 20na

verbect 2 dllip Scalanger Clerk’s No. Civ. €)-301-Phix.

v8.

ur. Robert C. Sears cre ot oFl US. Marshal's No. 1141-P

SERVICE COMEPLETED or ENDEAVOR TO SERVE

Thereby certify and return that tI SAGERKA LR RTH the annexed Order

(Wee

on the therein-named C92 ie) “Coe? be Reddrick

(Name of individual, company. corporation. etc |

by handing to and leaving a true andd correct copy thereof with (if endeavor—describe what was

done in endeavoring to serve) ccop : .

dis © cocny of opplication otgeaked ite

COMPENy. Corporation. ete |

Colonel ttcel I. Redérich

personally at (if endeavor—show aaddresses where endeavors made) Room 302 A

Air Force ReQ.T.Cg Sadie A4%eizonn State Univessity

(Address Streyee: number. apartment number, rurel route. ete |

Tarps, oeeeeee in the said District

at 1:30 Xim.—p.m,, on the lots day of January . » BFR...

SEERVICE NOT COMPLETED

Date

1 hereby certify and return, thpat on the day of , 19 .

1 received the within and that after

diligent search, | am unable to fitng the within named

within said district.

J. Pat Mairia

Marshal's fees 3429 United States Marshal.

, ; 2 - - —

Mileage 2049 By Gia C aS

Vetale oc w= 8 Hgd Hrnest C. Tautinee | Deputy.

Pe ok Rie ne

Pe WA we BRAT ED PRES ORRIN r

AGEN AP RT ER ROSEY SORRY PNET NEY OEY:

= Se RETURN ON SERVICE OF WRIT

Gnited States of America

District of Ti souA

‘ferbert Pullip deilsgHer Clerk's No Civ. of <2. 1-Plix,

vs.

Dr. Robert C. Jeramens Jr. ct al. P

: U.S. Marshal's No. l1sl-P

SERV ICE COMPLETED or ENDEAVOR TO SERVE

I hereby certify and return that I ee pee the annexed rier

(Wrw

on the therein-named “nate? Stetes Attoracy

(Name of individual, campany. corporation. ete |

by handing to and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with (if endeavor—describe what was

done in endeavoring to serve) "2%" 9 Cory Of or liestion ot@rehet ith Michart

(Name of individual or agent of company corporation. ete

Cormley, *ssistaat '.o. Attorne;

. 60 EW Pet lFla-

personally at (if endeavor—show addresses where endeavors made) * °°" : “

(Address Street number apartment number rural route ete |

Phoenix, Ariz in the said District

c

at 2815 ‘aRi-p.m., on the Asta day of = Janusry , 22

SERVICE NOT COMPLETED

Date

I hereby certify and return, that on the day of +

I received the within and that after

diligent search, I am unable to find the within named

within said district

T.Pat “atrii

Marshal's fees 3,00 ‘\ ‘ /j Umted States a a

Mileage XX By (47% loweh ee

Jares A. Sehl

i wae Deputy.

ee nn ee sk a

10g

FERRI 2 SAWANT TR STIR Te Fe ET ES BE WEES

~

65

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. Civ. 69-381 Phx.

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER

vs.

Hon. Dr. RoBerT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air

Force, COLONEL HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody

AFB, Valdosta, Georgia, and COLONEL NOEL B. REpb-

DRICK, Commander, AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State

University, Tempe, Arizona, RESPONDENTS

OrRDER—February 10, 1970

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

alleging that he was being unlawfully detained in the

Air Force. The Court, sua sponte, denied the petition and

petitioner appealed. The United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit ruled that “The order denying the

application for a writ of habeas corpus is set aside with-

out prejudice and the cause is remanded to the district

court for issuance of an order to show cause and further

proceedings thereon.” Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s

order, this Court issued an order to show cause. Respond-

ents have moved to dismiss the petition for lack of juris-

diction, petitioner has opposed said motion, and both sides

have filed memoranda setting forth their respective posi-

tions. In addition, petitioner has moved this Court, should

it grant respondents’ motion, to continue to effect the in-

junction prohibiting petitioner’s removal from the Dis-

trict of Arizona so that petitioner may have an oppor-

tunity to appeal.

When the petition was filed, petitioner was on leave

status from Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. The petition

names the Honorable Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary of

the Air Force, and Colonel Homer Baker, Commander of

Moody Air Force Base, as those persons unlawfully re-

straining the petitioner. Neither can be found within the

confines of the District of Arizona.

REEF,

OE RE ES TAI LEE LE LOO EI ONG ET

RR NIA REDE RI 8 Sahn kn RS URN IN ae ee, Cee ee ee ne ee ee ee es ay

66

Title 28, § 2243, provides that “The writ . .. shall be

directed to the person having custody of the person de-

tained.” Under this statute, the appropriate respondent

is the person having immediate custody of the petitioner

and the capability of discharging him from custody should

the Court grant the relief sought. The proper respondent

“must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court

... [A| court does not have power to issue a writ [of

habeas corpus] unless the person is within reach of the

court’s process.” Wurster v. Perrin, 303 F. Supp. 480

(D.P.R. 1969). See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S,

Ct. 1443 (1948); Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283,

65 S.Ct. 208 (1944); United States ex rel. Rudick vy.

Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38

U.S.L.W. 3174 (Nov. 11, 1969); United States v. Dulles,

222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952,

75 S.Ct. 440 (1955); Jones v. Biddle, 181 F.2d 853 (8th

Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 784, 63 S.Ct. 856

(1943) ; United States v. New York State Division of

Parole, 239 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

When a petitioner is detained by the military, the

proper respondent is usually his commanding officer. E.g.,

Wurster v. Perrin, supra; see R Sokol, Federal Habeas

Corpus 82 (2d ed. 1969). And even assuming that the

Secretary of petitioner’s branch of service may be an

appropriate respondent, it is clear that when neither the

Secretary nor the commanding officer is within the terri-

torial jurisdiction of the District Court or within reach

of the Court’s process, the Court lacks jurisdiction. United

States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, supra; Wurster v. Perrin,

supra.

Here, neither the Secretary of the Air Force nor peti-

tioner’s commanding officer is within the territorial juris-

diction of this Court or within reach of this Court’s

process. Thus, it is apparent from the foregoing authori-

ties that this Court lacks jurisdiction.

Petitioner asserts, however, that since the Ninth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals considered his petition and re-

manded the case, it is now the “law of the case” that this

Court has jurisdiction. But petitioner apparently fails to

recognize that this Court’s prior order was set aside

SRE Teste CROMER ne Urre tarot naar estht nee ea

67

without prejudice to the rights of the parties. Thus, the

only law of this case at the time of remand was that this

Court issue an order to show cause. Therefore, peti-

tioner’s contention is without merit. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the respondents’ motion to dis-

miss the petition for lack of jurisdiction is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents are

stayed from removing petitioner from the District of

Arizona pending a timely appeal to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or until further

order either of this Court or the Court of Appeals.

DATED February 10, 1970.

Wo. P. COFFLE

United States District Judge

SINS 0 La RC CERRO RNRE Ae ET PRE ITH < — . a

aw ke Be ee Te NR RY

AMEE ELI WA tar Wet Se BRE

68

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[File Endoresment Omitted |

No. 25,525

ORDER—May 20, 1970

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER-APPELLANT

Vv.

Dr. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

Before: BROWNING, CARTER, and WRIGHT, Circuit

Judges

We have concluded that this case cannot be fairly dis-

tinguished from the recent decision of this court in Jar-

rett v. Resor, F.2d (9th Cir. January 23, 1970),

and that the judgment must therefore be affirmed. Appel-

lant’s motion citing respondents for contempt is denied.

JAMFS R. BROWNING

JAMES M. CARTER

EUGENE A. WRIGHT

United States Circuit Judges

Dated: May 20, 1970

Se ah

Herbert P. Schlanger

P.O. Box 276

Tempe, Az. 85281

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CA Number 25525

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT-APPELLANT

v.

Hon. Dr. RoperT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air

Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

PETITION FOR REHEARING (INCLUDING SUGGESTION OF

APPROPRIATENESS OF REHEARING EN BANC) —filed

June 3, 1970

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, pro se in forma

pauperis, respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing

of its judgment and order, entered on May 20, 1970, in

the above-captioned action affirming the district court’s

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; the Court has, ap-

rendering this action distinguishable from Jarrett v.

Resor, F.2d (9 Cir., 1970), which was relied

upon as the sole basis for affirmance. These facts clearly

establish that Sgt. Schlanger was “both physically present

in the court’s territorial jurisdiction and (was) detained

or held in custody within that jurisdiction”, ef. Rudick

y. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2 Cir, 1969); Jarrett v. Resor,

supra. The facts leading to this conclusion clearly man-

date a holding in line with Word v. North Carolina, 406

F.2d 352 (4 Cir, 1969), and Donigian v. Laird, 308 F.

Supp. 449 (D. Md., 1969), the vacation of the order and

judgment of May 20 and the remand of this case to the

district court for a hearing into the merits.

1 SR REE IR ARS RE RETIN MEDI R SRLIIT KONE WE RE ON hare

Ps OFS Mare Ps ha RTC ON

LO ak ar eo eee ES

FETE TY EERIE SN ET LTE A RIOTS BB Se vn 0!

SY Rae eey

70

TABLE OF CASES CITED

(Alphabetically arranged)

Cases and citation page

Ahrens V. Clerk, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) 71, 77, 78

Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9 Cir. 1968) _. es 78

Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 Eee 72

Donigian v. Laird, 308 F.Supp. 449 (D.Md., 1969) _ 71, 72, 76

Hammond Vv. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 ik | re. 72

Jarrett Vv. Resor, F.2d —— (9 Cir. 1970) ---41, 72, 78, 74,

77, 78, 79

Jones V. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 RUD . Wiidee ee 72

Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) SRS et OR

Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2 Cir. 1969) ae 73

Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4 Cir. 1969) ...... 78

2 dah ga ghee ar nn te

ee ma aor SLI eR TUR en ANS A NNR eNO eee ca ecm nates

71

The points of law and fact relied upon are discussed in

the remainder of this petition under the following head-

ings:

I. SGT. SCHLANGER WAS ASSIGNED TO ARI-

ZONA AND WAS PRESENT IN ARIZONA AT

THE TIME OF FILING THIS ACTION PURSU-

ANT TO MILITARY DUTY ORDERS; HIS

LEAVE WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THAT

DUTY ASSIGNMENT;

II. ASSIGNMENT BY THE MILITARY TO A PLACE

FOR DUTY IS THE EQUIVALENT OF BEING

“HELD IN CUSTODY” AT THAT PLACE;

Ill. JARRETT V. RESOR DISTINGUISHED;

IV. DONIGIAN V. LAIRD ANALOGIZED;

Vv. EXTENSION OF THE JARRETT HOLDING TO

THIS CASE WORKS HARDSHIP UPON PETI-

TIONER, UNDERMINES THE PRINCIPLE OF

AHRENS VY. CLARK, AND CREATES A CON-

FLICT WITHIN THIS CIRCUIT AND BETWEEN

THE CIRCUITS; SUGGESTION OF APPROPRI-

ATENESS OF REHEARING EN BANC;

VI. SUMMARY

I. SGT. SCHLANGER WAS ASSIGNED TO ARIZONA

AND WAS PRESENT IN ARIZONA AT THE TIME

OF FILING THIS ACTION PURSUANT TO MILI-

TARY DUTY ORDERS; HIS LEAVE WAS AN IN-

TEGRAL PART OF THAT DUTY ASSIGNMENT.

The government concedes—indeed, asserts (appellees’

brief, p. 6) —that Sgt. Schlanger was “issued orders... .

authorizing seventy days’ temporary duty (TDY) in

Tempe, Arizona” and requiring him to return to Georgia

“at the conclusion of the TDY and 15 days’ leave.” There

is, therefore, no question but that Sgt. Schlanger was in

Arizona pursuant to USAF duty orders and that he filed

the action within the period covered by those assignment

orders. Further, it is apparent that the leave was au-

thorized “in conjunction with (the temporary duty)”,

onan’ PTE

ee

RACERS Hots

a —

72

(appellees’ brief, p. 2a), and was authorized by his as.

signment orders; moreover, the period characterized as

“leave” is contained between two periods which are char-

acterized as “temporary duty (TDY)”. Sgt. Schlanger

was still considered to have been assigned to Tempe,

Arizona during this leave period.

Additionally, the government cannot now fairly main-

tain that one cannot bring habeas corpus at the place of a

duty assignment which is temporary in nature. It was

argued in Jarrett, by the appellees, that the District of

Washington would have been a proper place for filing

once he arrived at his embarkation port there—the most

temporary of conceivable duty assignments.

II. ASSIGNMENT BY THE MILITARY TO A PLACE

FOR DUTY IS THE EQUIVALENT OF BEING

“HELD IN CUSTODY” AT THAT PLACE.

An element of custody is, of course, essential for relief

to be available through habeas corpus. The nature or ex-

tent of custody sufficient for habeas corpus has undergone

significant change in recent years, however, e.g., Jones vy.

Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); Peyton v. Rowe, 391

U.S. 54 (1968); Carafas vy. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234

(1968). Even in cases concerned with “custody” by mili-

tary authorities there has been a broader view develop-

ing in keeping with these holdings of the Supreme Court,

e.g., Hammond vy. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2 Cir, 1968);

Donigian vy. Laird, supra. Indisputably, if there is suf-

ficient military custody exercised over a reservist who

has never been on active duty (ef. Hammond, Donigian)

for habeas corpus to lie then there is, a fortiori, sufficient

military custody over anyone on active duty for the writ

to be available.

No court has ever held that a member of the military

on leave is not in custody within the meaning of 28

USC 2241, et seq. The only question is where one in the

military may file for relief at such a time, cf. Jarrett,

supra. Certainly when one is on duty the proper place

at which to file is the place to which he is assigned and

performs his duty. Logically, the place of his assignment

for duty is also the preferable place at which to file when

73

he is on leave from that duty assignment. Here, Sgt.

Schlanger was assigned to Arizona (i.e., was on duty in

Arizona) and was on leave within that duty assignment

when the action was filed.

A member of the armed forces who is assigned for

duty at a place is “in custody” at that place. This cannot

be reasonably questioned. As indicated, it logically follows

that custody—while on leave from any assignment—is

exercised at the place of that assignment and must be

contested at that place. It is uncontested that he assign-

ment herein was to Tempe, Arizona, that the leave period

was in conjuction with and a part of that assignment and

that Sgt. Schlanger was on temporary duty in Arizona

both prior to and after the filing of this action.

Ill. JARRETT DISTINGUISHED

“Lt. Jarrett was not (at the time of commencement of the

suit) being held in custody within the Northern District

of California”, Jarrett, supra, slip op. at p. 6

Sgt. Schlanger was, at the time of the commencement

of the instant action, in custody within the District of

Arizona by virtue of the orders assigning him to Arizona.

“A member of the armed forces who is voluntarily in a

place other than an assigned post is not in custody in

that place”, Jarrett, supra, slip op. at p. 6, quoting Rudick

v. Laird, supra, at pp. 20-21,

Sgt. Schlanger’s assigned post was Arizona State Uni-

versity, Tempe, Arizona. The “voluntariness” of a peti-

tioner’s presence at an assigned post is of no consequence.

Custody is exercised over him at that place of assignment.

A member of the military must be able to contest the re-

straints on his liberty even if he is granted a period of

leave from his duty assignment; it has been held (Jarrett,

Rudick, ete.) that the proper place to file such an action

is at the place of assignment. That is what was done in

the instant action.

“Lt. Jarrett. ... has never been assigned. . . . within

(the Northern District of California)”, Jarrett, supra,

slip op. at p. 6

OO DONE TIPLE L NOI IEE RAN

nN Re

LPT TESS EP

74

Sgt. Schlanger was assigned to within the District of

Arizona for a period of 85 days commencing on June 4,

1969; additionally, he had been assigned to Arizona State

University, Tempe, Arizona from January, 1966 through

July, 1968.

“(Lt. Jarrett) was free to go to (the Northern District

of California), but he was not required to do so.”, Jarrett,

supra, slip op. at p. 6

Had Sgt. Schlanger gone anywhere but to Arizona when

he was assigned to perform duty in Arizona he would

have been AWOL; he was required to be in Arizona.

Lt. Jarrett was, at the time of filing, enroute from Ft.

Knox, Kentucky, to a port of embarkation (McChord

AFB, Washington) for shipment to Vietnam. The loca-

tion at which he spent his leave was immaterial, in-

cidental to and had no nexus with his military orders.

Jurisdiction vested in the appropriate district of Ken-

tucky until such time as he arrived at McChord AFB;

then jurisdiction vested in the District of Washington.

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76

Under these circumstances, jurisdiction vested in the

District of Arizona—the District to which Sgt. Schlanger

was temporarily assigned—from the time he signed out

from Moody AFB until the time that he signed back in to

Moody AFB. In this case the location of the leave was

not incidental to the orders; there was a clear and direct

connection. There was an assignment in Tempe, Arizona.

Indeed, Sgt. Schlanger was in a temporary duty assign-

ment status immediately preceeding and immediately fol-

lowing the leave, which was spent in Tempe, during which

this action was filed.

IV. DONIGIAN V. LAIRD ANALOGIZED

Appellant commends to this Court’s attention the rea-

soning of Judge Northrop in his decision of Donigian y.

Laird, 308 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md., 1969), wherein he re

solved a jurisdictional issue in circumstances similar to

those of the present action. Lt. Donigian was attached

to no unit at the time of filing; Sgt. Schlanger was de-

tached from his unit. Lt. Donigian was attending, ap-

parently at his own choice and expense, Johns Hopkins

University; Sgt. Schlanger was attending Arizona State

University pursuant to orders of the military. Lt. Doni-

gian’s activities were “directed” from Ft. Benjamin Har-

rison, Indiana; Sgt. Schlanger’s from Moody AFB,

Georgia. In both instances, military control was exercised

over the petitioner from a point outside the state in which

they were. Judge Northrop held that:

“The Army seeks to exert control over Donigian in

Meryland. It cannot, then, avoid the jurisdiction of

this court merely because such control is exercised

from a point located outside this state. * * * The

overpowering factor in this inquiry is that the Army,

regardless of where its physical command is located,

is such a pervasive force that its effects are felt

wherever those under its command are stationed.” —

Donigian v. Laird, supra, at p. 453

Moreover, Lt. Donigian’s military contacts with the

District of Maryland were far more tenuous then those

demonstrated to have existed within the District of Ari-

77

as it relates to § —

= in inactive reserdee Schlanger. Donigian, after all,

tend the university dye, Status and was permitted to at-

the other hand, was ring that time. Sgt. Schlanger, on

Arizona State Univeroh active duty and was attending

igning him there. Fusity pursuant to USAF orders as-

assigned to Arizona thermore, Sgt. Schlanger had been

months immediately tate University for 36 of the 44

(January, 1966 throw"eceding the filing of this action

August, 1969). gh July, 1968; June, 1969 through

Beyond that, howe\ :

the decision in Donig{®” the government did not appeal

charged. It must ther@” when the Court ordered his dis-

ment feels that such ‘efore be assumed that the govern-

and that the jurisdic®” appeal would have been fruitless

was correct. Can the jonal reasoning of Judge Northrop

government maintain that the hold-

ing is acceptable in

ing ise helding on the Fourth Circuit while urging a

the Ninth?

Vv. EXTENSION OF

THIS CASE wo!r THE JARRETT HOLDING TO

TIONER, UNDRKS A HARDSHIP ON THE PETI-

AHRENS V. C}RMINES THE PRINCIPLE OF

FLICT WITHIN-ARK, AND CREATES A CON-

THE CIRCUITS THIS CIRCUIT AND BETWEEN

ATENESS OF FI: SUGGESTION OF APPROPRI-

sEHEARING EN BANC.

To apply the holdi

on leave cannot brin®g’ in Jarrett (i.e., that a petitioner

his assigned duty st habeas corpus at a place other than

dismissal of this acation) and contend that it supports

for lack of jurisdiction extends

the principle laid duon

and immediate consewn therein unreasonably. Its direct

not at the place to quence is to force a petitioner to file

some remote point which he is assigned for duty but at

military and technit which someone, designated by the

stationed. No consideally considered his “custodian”, is

vasive nature of m®ration is then given to the truly per-

inconvenience or dditary authority nor to the hardship,

petitioner in being mage which might be suffered by a

in order to contest forced to undertake extensive travel

him at his first locan unlawful restraint exercised over

ation.

PPE TE

RE

ne nd Rete Bee

— TEL EOE PRE OL OLN ONE LI GE BOOTS LPT ILI ERY.

; we 3 —

78

Moreover, since a petitioner is “in custody” at the

place to which he is assigned for duty, habeas corpus

must be seught in that district while the petitioner js

physically present, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).

The result of this Court’s earlier decision in this case is

to force a petitioner to go to a particular district in order

to create jurisdictional prerequisites; the holding in

Ahrens maintains that a petitioner’s presence, “in cus-

tody”, determined the proper district in which to bring the

action. (Amenability of respondents to process is pro-

vided by 28 USC 1391(e), as is pointed out in Donigian,

supra, and presents no real problem.)

This Court has adhered to the principle of Ahrens,

e.g., Ashley v. State of Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9 Cir,

1968). Other circuits, notably the Fourth, have taken a

broader view of the territorial jurisdictional requirement,

e.g., Word v. State of North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4

Cir, 1969). There it was held that prisoners held in

Virginia could properly attack North Carolina sentences

in either Virginia or North Carolina.

Therefore, if it is agreed that Sgt. Schlanger’s assign-

ment to Arizona placed him “in custody” in Arizona then

this Court’s earlier decision denying jurisdiction conflicts

with Ahrens and Ashley. Alternatively, if for some rea-

son it can be maintained that Sgt. Schlanger was “in

custody” in Georgia while he was assigned to Arizona,

then the decision is at odds with the trend in other

circuits and serves to work undue hardship on the peti-

tioner. In either case, it is suggested that the conflicts

and inconsistencies might most appropriately be resolved

by a rehearing en banc.

VI. SUMMARY

It has, it is respectfully submitted, been demonstrated

herein that:

(a) Jarrett is distinguishable from the instant action

by virtue of Sgt. Schlanger’s assignment by the

military to duty in Arizona and his presence in

that district, pursuant to military orders, at the

time of filing;

(b) Jarrett, therefore, is not controlling in the instant

case;

79

(c) There are cases (most notably Donigian v. Laird,

supra) in line with the holding urged by the ap-

pellant herein; this line is analogous to the instant

action and lends itself to an equitable resolution

of the jurisdictional issue; the government has

acquiesced and assented to this line of reasoning

without appeal;

(d) A finding in appellant’s favor would have applica-

cation only in the special circumstances of this case,

would avoid the conflicts noted, would not disturb

this Court’s holding in Jarrett and, in fact, would

reinforce and clarify the rationale underlying that

decision—habeas corpus relief must be sought at

the place to which one is assigned for duty.

Should the Court retain any doubt about the ramifica-

tions and inferences drawn from the facts relating to

Sgt. Schlanger’s assignment to Arizona, or about any other

relevant fact, this case should be remanded for a hearing

on respondents’ motion to dismiss, so that the issues might

be explored and resolved through testimony and evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully re-

quests that this Court set aside its order of May 20, 1970

and, in light of this petition, reconsider its decision; fur-

ther, appellant respectfully suggests that a rehearing of

this case might appropriately be made en banc.

Additionally, appellant respectfully requests that this

Court—should it deny rehearing or affirm its earlier

decision—maintain in effect its injunction of May 26,

1970 pending timely filing and disposition of a petition

for a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

PRO SE

Dated: June 1, 1970

Tempe, Arizona

Copy of petition mailed on June 2, 1970 to Mr. Robert

Kopp at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

/s/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger

BER SDA LR LCT I SWE

ERSTE aS EEA RSS RE Se a RS RES sr Kerns ee ee eee

IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 25,525

[File Endorsement Omitted |

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER-APPELLANT

Vv.

HONORABLE DR. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of

the Air Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

ORDER—June 17, 1970

Before: BROWNING, CARTER, and WRIGHT, Circuit

Judges

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted to

deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the sugges-

tion for a rehearing in banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for

in bance rehearing, and no judge of the court has requested

a vote on the suggestion for rehearing in banc. Fed. R.

App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion

for a rehearing in banc is rejected.

Dated: June 17, 1970

GR OT LEN BN EAE FAO RETIN OE FRBNY ST IN ih DESAI RINE TAS peas (PCN N

81

IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 25,525

[File Endorsement Omitted ]

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER-APPELLANT

Vv.

HONORABLE Dr. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of

the Air Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

ORDER

Before: BROWNING, Circuit Judge

The court’s order filed June 23, 1970, staying the issu-

ance of the judgment (mandate) to July 17, 1970, is

vacated.

It is now the order of this court that the issuance under

Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

of the mandate of the court in the above cause is hereby

stayed pending the filing, consideration and disposition

by the Supreme Court of the United States of a petition

for writ of certiorari provided such petition is filed by

the appellant herein in the Clerk’s office of the Supreme

Court on or before July 2, 1970. In the event the petition

for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay is to continue

pending the final disposition of the case by the Supreme

Court.

Provided appellant is still within the District of Ari-

zona, it is further ordered that this court’s order of May

26, 1970, staying the removal of the appellant from the

District of Arizona shall remain in effect until July 2,

1970, at 4:00 P.M. Pacific Standard Time.

JAMES R. BROWNING

United States Circuit Judge

Pee

SPE OTR ID IIE LOE IO IBY

WAKA

RPMS ESOT SII

82

No. 5481, October Term 1970

Vv.

ET AL.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

and the same is hereby, granted.

October 19, 1970

YoU. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1970

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER

410594

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air Force,

On petition for writ of Certiorari to the United States

On consideration of the motion for leave to proceed

herein in forma pauperis and of the petition for writ of

certiorari, it is ordered by this Court that the motion to

proceed in forma pauperis be, and the same is hereby

granted; and that the petition for writ of certiorari be,

364

PETITIONER’S

BRIEF

= 7 EE

FITFD

FILE COPY DEC 17 197

—— — E, ROBERT SEAL Se CLES

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970 :

Perrot POT PRTWTAT) :

No. 5481 4

RESPONSE NOT PRINTED

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Petitioner,

Vv.

NO rg et cot

ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of

the Air Force, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Herbert P. Schlanger, Pro se

P.O. Box 2?

Tempe, Arizona 85281

sais

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Es £665 Gh Ad46s 45454 RS SADA OC OSES ]

PCT Gokckenesstaced Meth eWan seat ebehas 2

QUESTION PRESENTED ................. preseeeees 2

EE ee a ae 2

Pe eee eee eee 5

rr ee ee ck ace sak Ace OAS 4 ead 6 O08 7

ARGUMENT:

EI 9

2. Subject matter jurisdiction: “custody” ............. 10

3. Subject matter jurisdiction: stating a claim .......... 1]

ee eee er eet eee ha kd hs 4 a8 14

5. Personal jurisdiction: reach of process. ... 2... 2.0... 16

i I IID gc vc a ab ua wannsceces 19

or aa i a ae 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)... ........ 8, 10,11, 15,19

Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) ... 2... 0.0. 0.48, 9

Donigian v. Laird, 308 F.Supp. 449 (D. Md., 1969) ....... 15, 20

Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424 (2 Cir., 1970)... 2.2.2.0... 20

George v. Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9 Cir., 1969) 2... ..000.. 19

Hammond y. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2 Cir., 1968)... ...... 10, 20

Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213 (9 Cir., 1970) ... 0.00000... 9

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)... ......... 9, 10, 20

Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920 (D. Mass., 1969) ...... 10, 20

Lohmeyer v. Laird, 3 §.S.L.R. 3072 (D. Md., 1970) . . . 10, 17, 18, 20

McKay vy. Secretary of the Air Force, 306 F Supp. 1252 (D.

UL Ci hve Se ee ee 20

pied s rrr

EEE ATEN AP ROO pi

nape

(ii)

Metz v. United States, 304 F.Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa., 1969) .....

Nelson v. Peckham, 210 F.2d 575 (4 Cir., 1954)... 0.2... 13,

Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953)... 2.2.2.0... 12,

Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)... 2.2.0.0 0 eee

Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948) ..........0......,

Silberberg v. Willis, 306 F.Supp. 1013 (D. Mass., 1969),

revised, 420 F.2d 662 (1 Cir., 1970) ............... 17,

United States ex rel. Meadows v. State of New York, 426

ok ik ea a OR et ie

United States ex rel. Rudick y. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2 Cir.,

FONT RG we ea dee i 40s whee non bE cc ake Cote.

Statutes:

Title 28, United States Code, Section i) eee SS Ge

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241 .._._. 3, 7,9, 10, 11,

Title 28, United States Code, Section PRS 3 Ack oe ea ae

Treatises and Reports:

2 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d Ed., pp.1210-11 ...........

2 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News Se eee ee ee 17-18,

Hansen, “Judicial Review of In-Service C.O. Claims,” 17

en MAM PE ea ae Ce ee ct ee

17

18

rf, 5

> BASS

x iS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 5481

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Petitioner,

7s,

ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of

the Air Force, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW

No opinions in this case have been reported. Contained

in the Appendix are the district court order of August 28,

1969 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction) (A. 40), the Court

of Appeals order of December 12, 1969 (remanding to the

district court for issuance of a show cause order) (A. 41),

the district court opinion and order of February 10, 1970

BRE ELIS LION PRBS Ea 8 Meet, cll

AOE GEOL FO GSR LIT IIT LOL YO TE BART. ag

% a

2

(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction) (A. 65), and the order

of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1970 (affirming the

dismissal) (A. 68). No evidentiary hearing has been held.

JURISDICTION

The order affirming the dismissal was entered by the

Court of Appeals on May 20, 1970. A timely petition for

rehearing (A. 69-79), including a Suggestion of the appropri-

ateness of rehearing en banc, was denied on June 17, 1970

(A. 80). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

July 2, 1970 and was granted on October 19. 1970. Juris-

diction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C

§ 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does a federal district court lack the power to inquire

into the lawfulness of restraints exercised over a petitioner,

who is a member of the armed forces, present in the

district pursuant to orders issued by his commander who

is in another state?

STATUTES INVOLVED

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391 (e):

i391. Venue generally

* * * * *

(e) A civil action in which each defendant is an

officer of the United States or any agency thereof

acting in his official capacity or under color of legal

authority, or an agency of the United States, may,

except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in

any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in

the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose.

or (3) any real property involved in the action is

situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real prop-

erty is involved in the action.

3

The summons and complaint in such an action

shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the

summons and complaint to the officer or agency as

required by the rules may be made by certified mail

beyond the territorial limits of the district in which

the action is brought.

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241:

2241. Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by

the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district

courts and any circuit judge within their respective

jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be

entered in the records of the district court of the

district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and

any circuit judge may decline to entertain an appli-

cation for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer

the application for hearing and determination to the

district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend

to a prisoner unless—

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the

authority of the United States or is committed

for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or

omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or

an order, process, judgment or decree of a court

or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Consti-

tution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and

domiciled therein is in custody for an act done

or omitted under any alleged right, title, author-

ity, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed

under the commission, order or sanction of any

foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity

and effect of which depend upon the law of

nations; or

TS A

y bye

IEEE GEE TSE REL IEE PSs ae

TARO I Re ees mae LAX

GE TOA NT Pr

4

(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to

testify or for trail.

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2243

2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision:

A court, justice or judge entertaining an applica-

tion for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith

award the writ or issue an order directing the

respondent to show cause why the writ should not

be granted, unless it appears from the application

that the applicant or person detained is not entitled

thereto.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed

to the person having custody of the person detained.

It shall be returned within three days unless for

good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty

days, is allowed.

The person to whom the writ or order is directed

shall make a return certifying the true cause of the

detention.

When the writ or order is returned a day shall be

set for hearing, not more than five days after the

return unless for good cause additional time is

allowed.

Unless the application for the writ and the return

present only issues of law the person to whom the

writ is directed shall be required to produce at the

hearing the body of the person detained.

The applicant or the person detained may, under

oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return

or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it

may be amended, by leave of the court, before or

after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the

facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice

require.

SSE

i)

ol

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 7, 1962, SSgt. Schlanger enlisted in the

United States Air Force. Three years later, on December 9,

1965, he re-enlisted for a period of six years, prior to, in

reliance upon and as required for his entrance into the

Airman Education and Commissioning Program (AECP)

for which he had been selected (A. 4, 33). The AECP is a

program which provides “undergraduate education, followed

by officer training and commissioning, for a_ selected

number of carefully screened, career-minded airmen at

selected civilian colleges and universities.” !

In January, 1966, Sgt. Schlanger entered the AECP and

was assigned to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, “with duty at

Arizona State University” (A. 7); that duty was, primarily,

the satisfactory completion of his degree program at the

University.2_ He was progressing satisfactorily when, in June

of 1968, ten weeks before his scheduled graduation, he was

summarily removed from the program, ordered to withdraw

from the University and placed in a state of arrest by AFIT

authorities in Ohio (A. 5, 13); he was, despite his requests,

denied a hearing or access to any evidence which might

have been used in reaching the decision to remove him

(A. 6, 18, 20, 28-31, 32). He was, additionally, informed

that there were “[no] statutory provisions for appeal of

the Commandant’s decision to withdraw [him] from the

AECP” (A. 22). Though he was removed purportedly

for having demonstrated a “lack of officer potential” by

allegedly cutting some classes (A. 6, 17), the removal was

precipitated by Sgt. Schlanger’s formation and leadership

of the Arizona State University Civil Rights Board—a

campus organization which sought to alleviate growing

racial tensions through mediation, communication and

recourse to legal remedies for solution of racial and ethnic

grievances arising on and around the campus (A. 30, 38).

1 “Guidebook for the AECP,” p.1 (AFIT, AU, WPAFB, 0).

2“AFIT Student Manual,” paragraph 1-7.

- aT

6

According to the petition (A. 4, paragraph 10; A. 8, para-

graph 30), it was these actions, ie., the removal of Sgt.

Schlanger from the Airman’s Education and Commissioning

Program (AECP) and the denial of a commission, which

breached and rendered void the re-enlistment contract.

Sgt. Schlanger appealed through command channels for

a hearing, access to evidence and re-instatement (A. 28-31):

while attempting to secure redress through these channels,

his status was changed from that of an “officer trainee,” he

was demoted and re-assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, to

complete the remainder of his six year re-enlistment in a

non-commissioned status (A. 20).

On May 28, 1969, having unsuccessfully exhausted his

administrative remedies and having been denied a discharge

(A. 33-39) and having, in the opinion of his military super-

iors at Moody AFB, performed his duties in an “outstand-

ing manner,”’? he was issued temporary duty (TDY) assign-

ment orders which assigned him to Arizona State University

to complete his degree requirements (under a different

program and at his own expense) (A. 47, 51). These orders

assigned Sgt. Schlanger to Tempe, Arizona, for a period of

85 days (June 4 through August 29, 1969), seventy days

of which were to be considered “duty” days and 15 as

“leave” (A. 47, 51).

On August 27, 1969, Sgt. Schlanger filed his application

for a writ of habeas corpus (alleging that, his re-enlistment

contract having been irremediably breached, he was being

restrained detained unlawfully) in the district court for the

District of Arizona. The action was immediately dismissed

by the court, sua sponte, on August 28, 1969 (A. 40)

and reconsideration was denied on September 5, 1969.

Sgt. Schlanger appealed, requested expeditious action and

>This characterization of the nature of SSgt. Schlanger’s service is

reflected in his performance reports, letters of recommendation and

recognition, and promotion to non-commissioned officer ranks (first

to sergeant and, more recently, to staff sergeant).

7

returned, as ordered, to Moody AFB, Georgia. Granted

leave in December, he argued his appeal before the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; an order was entered

setting aside the order dismissing the petition and the case

was returned to the district court for issuance of a show

cause order “‘and further proceedings thereon” (A. 41). An

order was subsequently entered which stayed the military

authorities from removing Sgt. Schlanger, or ordering or

causing his removal from Arizona (A. 43). Despite this

order, Sgt. Schlanger was informed that should he fail to

return to Moody AFB, Georgia, by January 18, 1970, his

pay and allowances would be terminated (which they were).

Later, Sgt. Schlanger was ordered by the respondents to

report to Shaw AFB, S.C., preparatory to shipment to

Southeast Asia; these instructions were suspended only -

after Sgt. Schlanger moved to have the respondents cited

for contempt of court.

Upon remand, the petition was again dismissed without

a hearing, on respondents’ motion, for lack of jurisdiction

(A. 65-68). An appeal was immediately taken, expeditious

action being requested. Following oral argument, the

Court of Appeals affirmed and, as noted, denied rehearing.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is now widely recognized that a member of the armed

forces is “in custody” within the meaning of Title 28,

United States Code, Section 2241. It also seems to be

beyond question that, when a serviceman is granted “leave”

from his duty assignment, he remains “in custody”’ during

that period. When a serviceman is physically present within

a district, and petitions for habeas corpus there, he is,

therefore, obviously “in custody” within that court’s juris-

diction. The court must, however, initially decide: (1)

whether he states a cause of action cognizable in a federal

district court, (2) whether the action is properly brought in

that particular district court, and (3) whether the court has

jurisdiction over the parties. In other words, the court

8

must find subject matter jurisdiction, venue jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction.

In this action, the lower courts had subject matter juris-

diction: Sgt. Schlanger is being restrained of his liberty by

officers of the United States Air Force under color of

authority of the United States. This custody is unlawful

since the re-enlistment contract, in accordance with whose

terms Sgt. Schlanger was serving, was breached and rendered

void by the USAF authorities; there is no valid enlistment

agreement in force at this time. Venue was properly laid

in Arizona since Sgt. Schlanger was present in that district

pursuant to military duty orders, the cause of action arose

in Arizona, all relevant witnesses and records not subject to

military custody and control were in Arizona and the

government was not inconvenienced by having to defend

the suit there. Venue and personal jurisdiction over the

respondents is conferred by Title 28, United States Code,

Section 1391 (e).

In Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), this Court

held that, except in the most unusual circumstances, the

presence of the petitioner within a district court’s territorial

jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to initiation of an

action for habeas corpus. In 1948, however, there were

very few potential petitioners who would have been unable

to name a proper respondent within the district in which

they were restrained; the expansion of the scope of the

Great Writ, with the changes in the nature and extent of

custody necessary for it to be available which have been

wrought by this Court through its recent decisions, has

created an entirely new class of petitioner. Since many of

these petitioners may not be subject to restraint by anyone

within the district in which they reside, there is compelling

reason to reinforce the holding of Ahrens: the Great Writ.

to fulfill its historic purpose as an easily accessible, expedi-

tious means of testing the lawfulness of restraint, must be

readily available in a forum convenient to the petitioner.

To require a petitioner, who like Sgt. Schlanger is subject

9

to restraint wherever he is, to travel across the continent in

order to contest that restraint is contrary to the spirit of

habeas corpus. Moreover, it is totally unnecessary when the

restraint complained of is imposed by an officer, agency or

branch of the United States since Title 28, United States

Code, Section 1391(e) provides for service of process in

this instance.

ARGUMENT

1. THE QUESTION DEFINED

The principle laid down by the Ninth Circuit in Jarrett

y. Resor, 426 F.2d 213 (1970), and extended to include

this action, presents some conceptual difficulties. Sgt.

Schlanger filed his petition while he was in Arizona, on

leave, following a duty assignment in Arizona and prior to

leaving Arizona for his base in Georgia; yet in dismissing

this action, the Ninth Circuit relied solely on Jarrett, supra,

which held that a member of the armed forces who is

“voluntarily at a place other than his assigned duty station

is not in custody at that place.”

If it is being suggested that Sgt. Schlanger was not in

custody at all at the time that the action was commenced,

then obviously an action in habeas corpus would not lie.

But, as has often been pointed out, this Court has through

its recent decisions (Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236;

Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234; Peyton v. Rowe, 391

U.S. 54), significantly altered the concept of the nature and

extent of ‘“‘custody”’ necessary before relief through habeas

corpus would be available. In line with these decisions, it

is now well-established that amenability to military orders

and control constitutes sufficient restraint for habeas

corpus.

If this tenet—that all military personnel are “in custody”

for purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241—is

accepted, then the question of which district or districts

have jurisdiction over this action is essentially one of venue.

10

Once the requisite “custody” is found, then the district in

which the petitioner is actually lawfully physically present

is always at least a permissible jurisdiction: he is in custody

within the juristiction of the court in whose district he is,

cf. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948): 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

2. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: “CUSTODY”

This Court has noted that habeas corpus has been

accepted as the proper vehicle for testing the lawfulness of

induction or enlistment into the armed forces, Jones y

Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240. Just as there is by now

no question that the restraints imposed on one’s liberty by

military service are sufficient for habeas corpus to be avail-

able to contest them, Hammond vy. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705,

710, it also seems beyond question that a member of the

armed forces remains sufficiently “in custody” for habeas

corpus to lie when he is granted a period of leave from his

assigned duties, e.g, Lohmeyer v. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3072;

Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920. While on leave

a serviceman remains subject to military regulations and

authority; his travel is restricted: he must secure permission

to engage in employment (R. 113): he is subject to sum-

mary recall. Moreover, the requirement that he return to

duty at a specific place by a specific date unarguably con-

Stitutes constructive custody. These are all restrains not

shared by the public generally, cf. Jones y. Cunningham,

371 U.S. 236, and they form a leash which binds the

serviceman wherever he is.

Since Sgt. Schlanger was lawfully in Arizona at the time

of filing, and was “in custody” on that date, then—in order

to sustain the proposition that he was not “in custody

within the jurisdiction of the district court for Arizona—it

must be assumed that, for purposes of habeas corpus,

custody attaches not to where its effects are felt but to the

place where the authority, resulting in those effects, is

exercised.

This interpretation, however, was explicitly rejected by

this Court in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), wherein

it was held that it was the petitioner's presence within the

territorial jurisdiction of the district court which gave the

court jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In that case, as

in the one at bar, the question of the proper respondent

was not reached; it was held that, no matter who the

proper respondent was, that action should have properly

been brought in New York since that was where the effects

of the restraint complained of were being felt, that is,

where the petitioners were in custody. In the instant

action, of course, Sgt. Schlanger did file his petition in

Arizona, while he was lawfully present in Arizona, com-

plaining of the restraints upon his liberty in Arizona.

3. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:

STATING A CLAIM

Beyond determining that it has subject matter jurisdic-

tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, i.e., that the petitioner is in

custody within its jurisdiction, a court must initially deter-

mine whether he states a claim on which relief can be

granted. This initial determination, from the face of the

petition, should, of course, be made in the light most favor-

able to the petitioner, cf. Townsend v. Sain, 365 U.S. 866

(1961): Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), but never-

theless it is apparent that Sgt. Schlanger states such a claim.

Though most servicemen seeking habeas corpus relief are

appealing to the civil courts from denials, by the military

authorities, of their discharge applications in which they

claimed status as “conscientious objectors” (which status

would entitle them to be discharged under existing regula-

tions),* Sgt. Schlanger alleges no such thing. To the con-

trary, it appears that he intended to make the Air Force his

“See generally, Hansen, “Judicial Review of In-Service Conscien-

tious Objector Claims”, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 975.

Pt) Oe Re ae as gy toe)

12

career as a commissioned officer.s The unlawfulness of

current restraints upon his liberty stems not from any

change of belief on his part, nor from any irregularity jn

his initial enlistment or re-enlistment, but from the failuye

and refusal of the USAF authorities to fulfill the terms and

conditions of his re-enlistment contract.

That re-enlistment was entered into in accordance with

the regulations governing the Airman’s Education and Com-

missioning Program (AECP) (AFM 50-5) and following the

issuance of written orders (which were to take effect only

if and when Sgt. Schlanger re-enlisted for Six years) which

designated Sgt. Schlanger aii “officer trainee” and assigned

him to the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) with

duty at Arizona State University, for participation in the

AECP (A. 4). Though there is little evidence in the record

at this time as to the effects of this re-enlistment and of

these orders on Sgt. Schlanger’s Status, and as to the terms

and conditions of the re-enlistment contract, it must be

assumed —as alleged and not controverted—that the primary,

if not the sole purpose of Sgt. Schlanger’s re-enlistment

was for him to obtain a commission and serve as an officer

(A. 4, 33).

As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, “Receiving a commission

is clearly not a matter of right; but granting it may be a

condition for retaining a person in the Army,” Orloff y.

Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 97 (1953). This formulation was

given effect the following year by the Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit when a doctor, inducted under the

Doctor’s Draft Act (which had been revised, in light of the

SAs previously noted, participation in the Airman’s Education and

Commissioning Program (AECP), for which Sgt. Schlanger re-enlisted,

is offered only to “carefully screened, career-minded airmen”, (em-

phasis supplied).

Though this was pointed out in dissent, it is nowhere even

implicitly disputed by the majority and is not inconsistent with the

Court’s holding, ie., that review of duty assignme.its cannot be

obtained through habeas corpus.

Rao

13

decision in Orloff, supra, to require the commissioning of

those drafted under its provisions), was refused a commis-

sion by the Army; the court ordered him discharged.

Nelson v. Peckham, 210 F.2d 575 (1954).

Certainly an inducement offered by the military (under

existing regulations and, in this case, through promulgation

of written orders whose execution is contingent upon the

re-enlistment} to entice a re-enlistment is no less binding

upon the government, once it is accepted, than the require-

ments of a statute. As the Attorney General has advised:

“Enlistments into the Army made under the

inducements held out by the laws of the United

States are ‘contracts’ and although the government

be a party, still the contracts ought to be construed

according to those well-established principles which

regulate contracts generally.” 6 Op. 187.

It is admittedly rare that the civil courts are asked to

review the obligations of the military under an enlistment

contract. More often than not, the courts will decline to

grant such review; since an enlistment is a contract which

changes the status of an enlistee, United States v. Grimley,

137 U.S. 147, most procedural or non-material irregularities

are insufficient to nullify the agreement. Furthermore, as

this Court has properly pointed out, ““* * * judges are not

given the task of running the Army,” Orloff v. Willoughby,

345 U.S. 83, 93. But here Sgt. Schlanger is not asking the

courts to review his duty assignments, nor any other matter

which must properly be left to the discretion of the

military authorities. The basic question is whether Sgt.

Schlanger was lawfully denied the status of a commissioned

officer, after having been induced to re-enlist by its offer.

Unless, inducements and promises by the military notwith-

standing, an enlistment gives the military carte blanche to

do what they will with an enlistee, then—if the denial of a

commission to Sgt. Schlanger was unlawful?—the restraints

"In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus, Sgt. Schlanger

contends that: (a) there was no basis in fact for his removal from the

We. a

Re Yet ene

eae nt

oe ae Sa

® Lee

ate. ws

upon his liberty in his current status as an enlisted man are

unlawful.

14

4. VENUE |

The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction ( “cus.

tody”) and venue is basic to this case. To hold that a

serviceman may bring a habeas corpus action only at some

particular place designated by the military authorities as his

“permanent duty station” and at which someone techni-

cally considered his “custodian” resides is to not only

ignore the 1 :lities of military service, but exalts form over

substance and does violence to the spirit and purpose of

the Great Writ.

Too, this policy may well create a judicial vacuum. In

the case at bar the government conceded (Respondents’

appeal brief, p. 8, fn. 5) that Sgt. Schlanger’s duty/leave

Status on the day of filing is not controlling,® and then

asserted:

“* * * even if * * * (Sgt. Schlanger] was not in

leave status but on temporary duty status in Tempe,

Arizona, jurisdiction is wanting. For * * * [he]

was never in the custody of the sole defendant

within the district court’s jurisdiction * * *."°9

commissioning program and for the denial of a commission, (b) that

he was removed as a direct result of his exercise of his first amend-

ment rights, and (c) the removal was based on proceedings prejudicial

to him, carried out in violation of Air Force regulations and violative

of the due process requirements of the fifth amendment.

Sit should be noted that the temporary duty orders assigning Sgt.

Schlanger to Arizona (A. 51) do not specify which of the 85 days are

‘duty” days and which are “leave.” This was a designation made, by

the military authorities, after Sgt. Schlanger’s arrival in Georgia in

September, 1969.

*Colonel Noel B. Reddrick, Commander, ROTC Det. 25, Arizona

State University. Although Col. Reddrick was not in Sgt. Schlanger’s

formal “chain of command,” he did, in fact, have authority over Sgt.

Schlanger both in his capacity as a commissioned officer and as the

commander of the only USAF organization at the place to which Sgt.

Schlanger had been assigned for duty, ie., Arizona State University.

15

A member of the armed forces, assigned to perform duty

at some place other than his “permanent duty station” (as

was Sgt. Schlanger during June, July and August, 1969), is

not free to travel; he cannot, without being A.W.O.L.,

return to his “permanent duty station.” (He may, in fact,

have only nominal contacts with that station. For instance,

Set. Schlanger was assigned to a “permanent duty station”

in Ohio for the entire period during which he was in the

Airman’s Education and Commissioning Program [January,

1966 through July, 1968] and yet he was never physically

in Ohio!) Since his presence, in custody, within the district

is a prerequisite to initiation of an action for habeas corpus,

cf. Ahrens v. Clark, supra, he is left without a forum even

though he is being restrained of his liberty within the juris-

diction of a district court.

Judge Northrop, of the District of Maryland, was faced

with a similar problem in Donigian v. Laird, 308 F.Supp.

449, and decided:

“The Army seeks to exert control over Donigian

in Maryland. It cannot, then, avoid the jurisdiction

of this court merely because such control is exer-

cised from a point located outside this state. * * *

The overpowering factor in this inquiry is that the

Army, regardless of where its physical command is

located, is such a pervasive force that its effects

are felt wherever those under its command are

stationed.’ Donigian v. Laird, at p. 453.

Indeed, the effects of being a member of the armed forces

are felt not only where those under military authority are

stationed but, since the military claims continuous jurisdic-

tion, they are felt at all times and at all places a member

may be.

In the case at bar, a defense of “improper venue” could

have—indeed, should have—been raised had Sgt. Schlanger

commenced the action in any district but Arizona. The

cause of action (his removal from the Airman’s Education

and Commissioning Program) arose in Arizona, cf. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(e)(2), he was a legal resident of Arizona, cf. 28

DIVO FPL LLL Tis THR ene y

16

U.S.C. 8 1391 (e)(4), he had been assigned by the military

to Arizona for 46 of the 62 months preceding the filing

of the action (July, 1963-April, 1965; January, 1966-July,

1968; June, 1969-August, 1969), he was lawfully present

in Arizona, having gone there pursuant to temporary duty

assignment orders, and he had not left the place of that

assignment (Tempe, Arizona) before filing his petition, after

completion of his duty; moreover, all relevant witnesses

and records which are not subject to control of the

respondents were in Arizona. Sgt. Schlanger’s assignment

to a “permanent [sic] duty station” in Georgia is wholly

incidental to this action and should not enter into consider-

ation. Furthermore, the government would be no more

inconvenienced by having to defend this action in Arizona

than they would in any other district. The military has

adequate representation in the district (as they do in all

districts) through the U.S. Attorney, any files are easily

transportable and there was no need to transport Sgt.

Schlanger anywhere—he was already in the district.

5. PERSONAL JURISDICTION; REACH OF PROCESS

While it is obvious that neither Dr. Seamans nor Colonel

Baker, the respondents alleged to be unlawfully restraining

Sgt. Schlanger, reside within the District of Arizona, this

does not deprive that court of jurisdiction over them. They

are being sued not as individuals, but as officers of the

United States; and although unti! 1962, under the then

existing provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), such officers were

amenable to suit only in the districts of their respective

official residences, this section was amended to add subsec-

tion (e) which provides, inter alia, that:

“A civil action in which each defendant is an

officer or employee of the United States * * *

acting in his official capacity * * * may * * * be

brought in any judicial district in which * * * (2)

the cause of action arose, or * * * (4) the plaintiff

resides * * *.”

17

The import of this change in section 1391 has been con-

sidered by Professor Moore, and he comments:

“* * * This subjection realistically broadens

venue in any civil action (not just mandamus pro-

ceedings) where each defendant is a federal officer,

* * * and is sued for acts done in his official capac-

ity or under color of legal authority; and provides

for extra-territorial service of process, if necessary,

in such an action.

* * * * *

“In brief, the Act added to but did not take

away subject-matter jurisdiction which the district

courts already had. * * * J/ts purpose was to make

it possible to bring a civii action in which each

defendant is an officer or employee of the United

States or any agency thereof acting in his official

capacity or under color of legal authority, or an

agency of the United States, in district cow :

outside of the District of Columbia * * *,°

Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., pp. 1210-121"

(emphasis supplied).

In addition to this authoritative interpretation of the

statute, the judicial trend has been to give effect to this

reading, e.g., Lohmeyer vy. Laird, __ F.Supp. __, 3

$.S.L.R. 3072, 3074 (D. Md., 1970); Metz v. United States,

304 F.Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa., 1969); Silberberg vy. Willis, 306

F.Supp. 1013 (D. Mass., 1969).

Habeas corpus has, of course, long been recognized to be

a “civil action,” e.g., Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174; Ex

parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, but, as has been pointed

out, habeas corpus is unique, Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.

286, 294, and there has been a lack of uniformity in the

application of the procedures used in civil practice to

habeas corpus proceedings, e.g., cases cited in Harris v.

Nelson, supra, fn. 1, at p. 289. There is no doubt, however,

that the federal courts may fashion appropriate procedures

for use in habeas corpus.

A reading of Senate Report No. 1992, 87th Congress,

2nd Session, to accompany H.R. 1960, 2 U.S. Code Cong.

DA aE LC ati) a ee

18

and Adm. News (1962), p. 1784, confirms the view that

subsection (e) of section 1391 is applicable to habeas

corpus, cf. Lohmeyer vy. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3072, 3074. As

Mr. Justice White wrote, while serving as Assistant Attorney

General, “Under [pre-1962] law, after one has exhausted

his administrative remedies, the final decision is generally

made by an official residing in the District of Columbia.

To challenge the legality of that decision, the officer resid-

ing in Washington must be sued in Washington. The

purpose of [section 2 of H.R. 1960] is to have officers who

live in the Capital subject to suit throughout the country to

the same extent that they can now be sued in the District.

in effect, then, this venue provision would do away with

the defense that a superior officer is an indispensible party

because, with a grant of venue, a superior officer can be

made a party.”” 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News (1962),

p. 2789.

This is precisely the situation in the present case. Sgt.

Schlanger has been denied a discharge by the Chief of Staff,

USAF, and by the Secretary of the Air Force. Under the

law (10 U.S.C. 88811; AFR 39-10), only the Secretary has

authority to discharge him and is thus an indispensible

party.

There is no suggestion in the legislative history of

H.R. 1960 that habeas corpus proceedings were to be

exempted from the provisions of the bill; the broadened

jurisdiction and venue provisions apply to “‘non-statutory”

judicial review proceedings, and the limitations of the

phrase “‘except as otherwise provided by law” were clearly

intended to apply only to actions controlled by other

explicit jurisdictional statutes, e.g., tax cases, Senate Report

No. 1992, supra. The Justice Department’s suggestion that

the venue provision of this bill should be limited to actions

brought under 5 U.S.C. 1009, the Administrative Procedure

Act, was not adopted and the language of the bill remained

broad, applying to any civil action.

19

6. EFFECTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

There are compelling reasons for this Court to apply the

intentionally broad language of 28 U.S.C. 8 1391 (e) to

actions such as the one at bar. In 1962, when H.R. 1960

was passed, as in 1948 when Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188,

was decided, it was a rare petitioner who could not name

a proper respondent within the district in which he was

being restrained. Commencing with Jones v. Cunningham,

371 U.S. 236, however, this Court embarked on an historic

expansion of the Great Writ’s availability. These recent

decisions have created “an entirely new class of habeas

corpus petitioners * * *,” United States ex rel. Meadows

y. State of New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2 Cir., 1970),

and have raised jurisdictional problems not hitherto encoun-

tered, e.g., George v. Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9 Cir., 1969)

(California district court had jurisdiction over habeas corpus

petition brought by a prisoner in California, attacking a

future sentence in North Carolina).

This “new class of petitioner” includes a member of the

armed forces, who is subject not to physical confinement

but to other, less tangible but no less real, restraints. These

restraints are imposed not by steel bars and concrete walls

but by the force of law. They are extant wherever he may

be, subjecting him to a remote control by his superior

officers in the military hierarchy.'® Failure to obey an

order, however received—in person, by mail, by telephone,

renders him liable to trial by court-martial. And this line

of authority forms a two-way street: the military cannot

purport to have jurisdiction over a person, twenty-four

hours a day, seven days a week, wherever he may be, and

simultaneously deny that he is in custody within the juris-

This “remote control” is readily evident in the record of this

case. The letter from Col. Palmer in Ohio to Sgt. Schlanger in Ari-

zona (A. 13) amply illustrates the “custody” exercised over a service-

man even from 2000 miles away. There is no doubt that Sgt.

Schlanger’s current commander possessed the same power to control

and restrain his actions at the time this suit was instituted.

a =

TOD AE SROORT NEI REM Ege te pe

egy

20

diction of whatever district court he may find himself, cf.

Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920; Silberberg v. Willis,

306 F.Supp. 1013; Lohmeyer yv. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3072.

(It is, perhaps, significant that the government filed

notice of appeal in Lohmeyer, but requested dismissal after

the Solicitor General declined to prosecute it.) If, as the

government asserted, Sgt. Schlanger was not in custody in

Arizona, why was an injunction necessary to prevent his

removal (A. 43)? (Similar injunctions were necessary in

Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213, Hammond y. Lenfest,

398 F.2d 705, Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920, and

Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424, among others.)

The lower courts should certainly be wary of forum-

shopping, as they apparently are. (It would seem that the

concern with avoidance of forum-shopping has led unneces-

sarily to a more restrictive attitude when confronted with

active duty servicemen than when petitions are presented

by reservists; compare Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213,

Rudick v, Laird, 412 F.2d 16, and the case at bar

[all active duty petitioners], with Donigian v. Laird, 308

F.Supp. 449 [D. Md., 1969], Hammond y. Lenfest, 398

F.2d 705 [reservist petitioners]). Moreover, the evils of

forum-shopping are hardly serious enough to require fore-

closure of access to all districts but that one in which

a serviceman’s ‘“‘permanent duty station” is located. Since

forum-shopping leads to considerations of venue, rather

than jurisdiction, the district court could exercise its discre-

tion and dismiss or transfer an action as having been

brought in a forum non conveniens; this was the result in

McKay v. Secretary of the Air Force, 306 F.Supp. 1252

(D. Mass., 1969), where the applicant came into the district

with little more than a suitcase and a petition, and had had

no prior contacts. More importantly, however, the Great

Writ “is not now and never has been a static, narrow,

formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand

purpose * * *,” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243.

To prevent an individual from filing in the district in which

ee:

en

*

ie

21

—

he is, is to add an arbitrary and unnecessary burden to the

shoulders of a petitioner.

This Court should formally recognize that a member of

the armed forces is (so long as he is amenable to the

control, orders and jurisdiction of the military authorities)

“in custody” at all times and at all places; considerations

of venue should determine the proper court in which to

bring an action in habeas corpus. Whatever rational criteria

are applied, though, it is clear that Sgt. Schlanger properly

brought this action in Arizona.

CONCLUSION

The district court for the District of Arizona had juris-

diction over the subject matter under 28 U.S.C. 2241, Sgt.

Schlanger has stated a claim on which relief can be granted,

venue was properly laid in Arizona, and the court had per-

sonal jurisdiction over the respondents, as officers of the

United States. For all the foregoing reasons, it is respect-

fully submitted that the judgments and orders of the courts

below should be reversed and the case remanded to the

district court for a hearing on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER

P.O. Box 276

Tempe, Arizona 85281

Attorney Pro Se

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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