Reply Brief — Oregon v. Mitchell

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Uni

October Term, 1970

No. 46, Original

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff,

— y—

STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendant.

ANSWER and BRIEF FOR

THE STATE OF ARIZONA

GARY K. NELSON

Attorney General of Arizona

JOHN M. McGOWAN II

Special Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Defendant

Room 159 State Capitol Building

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Phone: (602) 271-4266

a OTR mT

Argument

I

CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE

FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS

BY ENACTING LEGISLATION WHICH SUPER-

SEDES STATE STATUTES, WHILE EXTENSIVE,

CAN BE UPHELD ONLY WHERE CONGRESS

POSSESSES A “SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COM-

PETENCE” NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE

NO DUTY IS IMPOSED ON ARIZONA TO REC-

TIFY THE INEQUITIES RESULTING FROM

PAST GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES OF OTHER

GOVERNMENTS BY THE FACT THAT UNFAIR-

LY TREATED MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS

MAY HAVE MOVED HERE ...

III

THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITU-

TIONAL VALIDITY WHICH APPLIES TO STATE

STATUTES WHICH FAIRLY AND REASONABLY

CLASSIFY CITIZENS. ARIZONA NEED SHOW

NO“COMPELLING INTEREST”

IV

ARIZONA DOES HAVE A “COMPELLING IN-

TEREST” IN MAINTAINING LITERACY AS A

VOTING QUALIFICATION, ASSUMING AR.

GUENDO THAT SUCH AN INTEREST MUST

ER ERE aS

THE REASONABLENESS AND NECESSITY OF

LITERACY AS A VOTER QUALIFICATION Is

FURTHER INDICATED BY THE USE OF THAT

CLASSIFICATION FOR PURPOSES OF NATU-

FRR IG A steciniicsiginnininicisialiignyeansnatnniens i =

VI

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

DOES NOT CONFER UPON THE CONGRESS,

EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY ANY REASONABLE

IMPLICATION, THE RIGHT TO SET THE NA-

TIONWIDE MINIMUM VOTING AGE AT 18

YEARS, OR ANY AGE OTHER THAN THE 21

YEARS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO IN THE

OE WEIS hahencenaiictnensnciasbcicnitonseniptniisbinnuiinnineiatiieiel 19

EEL ee Ce ee ET A 23

Baker v. Carr, 368 U.S. 196 (1962)

Carrington v. Rash, 300 U.S. 89 (1965)

Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701( 1969)

City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) 14, 19

Dennis v. United States, 171 F. 2d 986 (D.C. Fir.

1948)

Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921)

Evans v. Cornmaz, 398 U.S. 419 (1970)

Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285

(1969)

Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 6 10 (1968)

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383

U.S. 663 (1966)

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641( 1966)

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621

(1969) 14, 19,21

Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,

360 U.S. 45 (1958) 13, 16, 18,21

Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of New York

v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935) .. 16.

Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1874) 21

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316

(1819)

teynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)

Tignor v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141( 1940)

Tillotson v. Frohmiller, 34 Ariz. 394 (1928)

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)

Authorities:

Arizona Revised Statutes

TITTLE scttaiattisennacedaesscdnrrocegneonncnsanersneesh tenabenbahinbustanhehiaall

§ 16-101.A.5

Arizona Constitution

Art. 4, Pt. x § 3

Constitution of the United States

Fourteenth Amendment, § 2

Eighteenth Amendment

Nineteenth Amendment

Catt and Schuler

Women’s Suffrage and Politics (1926)

Ida Husted Harper

The History of Women’s Suffrage, Vol. V (1922)

Voting Rights Act of 1965

1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments

fir

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1970

No. 46, Original

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff,

a

STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendant.

ANSWER

The State of Arizona, defendant, for its answer to the

complaint heretofore filed in the above captioned cause,

admits, denies, and alleges as follows:

As to the first cause of action alleged:

I

Admits all of the allegations contained in the first

cause of action in plaintiff's complaint except that al-

legation contained in paragraph VI thereof which al-

leges that the continued enforcement of Sections 16-

101(A)(4) and (5) of the Arizona Revised Statutes in

conflict with Section 201 of the Voting Rights Act of

1965, as amended, is violative of the Constitution of the

United States, which allegation is specifically denied.

As to the second cause of action alleged:

bh

Admits all of the allegations contained in the second

cause of action in plaintiff's complaint except that

allegation contained in paragraph XII of the complaint

which alleges that the continued enforcement of the

age requirement for registration and voting contained

in the Constitution and Statutes of the State of Arizona

in conflict with Section 302 of the Voting Rights Act of

1965, as amended, is violative of the Constitution of the

United States, which allegation is specifically denied

Defendant specifically alleges that the enforcement of

Sections 201 and 302 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

as amended, against defendant is prohibited by the

Constitution of the United States.

Defendant, having fully answered the complaint herein,

prays this Court to enter a declaratory judgment that

Sections 201 and 302 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

as amended, are in violation of the Constitution of the

United States and unenforceable against defendant and

to render to defendant such other relief as it may be

entitled to in the premises.

GARY K. NELSON

Attorney General of Arizona

JOHN M. McGOWAN II

Special Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Defendant

October, 1970

n'

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff,

Vv.

STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendant.

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA

CONSTITUTIONALAND_.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to the provisions set forth in plaintiff's

brief, the defendant deems the following constitutional

and statutory provisions to be involved in this case:

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, in part:

“The House of Representatives shall be composed of

Members chosen every second Year by the People of

the several States, and the Electors in each State shall

have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the

most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. * * *”

3,

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, in part:

“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections

for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed

in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Cop.

gress may at any time by Law make or alter such

Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Sena.

tors. ee

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, in part:

“Section 2. * * * But when the right to vote at an

election for the choice of electors for President and

Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in

Congress, the £&xecutive and Judicial officers of a

State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is

denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state,

being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the

United States, or in any way abridged, except for

participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of

representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-

tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear

to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years

of age in such state.”

U.S. Const. amend XVIII, in part:

“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of

two Senators from each State, elected by the people

thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one

vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifi-

cations requisite for electors of the most numerous

branch of the State legislatures.”

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

While Arizona does not question Congress’ authority

to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the Four-

teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, this authority can

only be upheld when Congress possi'sses a “special leg-

islative competence” which has not been shown in this

case. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 and

Katsenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, carefully read, ex-

press the Court’s conviction that Congress had ample

factua! basis for its enactment of the Voting Rights Act

of 1965 and that the statute was carefully tailored to

remedy a particular constitutional ill.

There is nothing before this Court which indicates

that Congress has given the same attention and care to

the 1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments. Nothing ad-

vanced from the legislative history of the new Act

shows that Congress had knowledge of situations pecu-

liar to Arizona or any other state affected. For instance,

there is no indication that Congress considered the al-

most tota! lack of effective mass communication in

northern Arizona where the vast Navajo Reservation is

located.

The United States places great reliance on Gaston

County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, in support of the

proposition that if illiteracy is the result of racially

disparate educational opportunities, then any literacy

test operates unfairly. That reliance is entirely mis-

placed. The Gaston opinion clearly states, “We have no

occasion to decide whether the Act would permit rein-

statement of a literacy test in the face of racially

disparave educational or literacy achievemer‘s for which

the government bore no responsibilities.” 395 U.S. at

293, a. 8. Arizona cannot be held responsible for racially

disparate educational achievements caused by policies

of other governments. There is ample indication that

Congress, in deciding the wisdom of suspending all

literacy tests, was led to a similar mistaken reliance on

this overbroad reading of Gaston. This Court cannot,

under these circumstances, “perceive a basis upon which

Congress might predicate a judgment” that literacy as

a voter qualification served no legitimate state interest.

In considering the standard by which the statute ig t

be measured, we reizind the Court that there is a pre-

sumption of constitu.ional validity which applies t

statutes which fairly and reasonably classify citizens ang

therefore Arizona need show no “compelling” interest

While in voting rights cases, a higher standard has

apparently been inferred, it is to be noted that these

cases involved classifications which had the potentia]

of permanently disfranchising an identifiable minority.

Unlike color or sex, illiteracy need not be a permanent

condition.

Nor can it be argued that Arizona is attempting to

perpetuate illiteracy as a means of keeping any class

from exercising the franchise. On the contrary, over

70 percent of the total state budget is spent on education

at all levels. Home study courses, including televised

teaching, are available and encouraged in order to com-

bat illiteracy. Considering the negligible number of per-

sons who took advantage of the opportunity to pro-

visionally register under this Court’s order, disfranchise-

ment of illiterates has apparently become a de minimus

problem in Arizona. (Appendix).

Assuming arguendo that such an interest must be

shown, Arizona does have a “compelling state interest”

in literacy as a voter qualification. In addition to Ari-

zona’s interest in promoting the honest, responsible and

intelligent use of the ballot to insure meaningful elec-

tions, the direct government provisions of our State

Constitution indicate that Arizona has an especially valid

interest in literate voters. The Arizona Constitution pro-

vides for initiative and referendum measures to be di-

rectly voted on by the qualified state electors. The

Arizona Supreme Court long ago said that the voters

are thus exercising the legislative function. Tillotson Vv.

-Frohmiller, 34 Ariz. 394, 271 P. 867. Since the voter is

given substantial powers to legislate in Arizona, he must

be especially responsible and well-read in order to make

rational decisions. Holding Arizona voters to a minimal

standard — literacy — is therefore an especially valid

andcompelling state interest.

A further indication of the reasonableness and neces-

sity of literacy as a voter qualification is the use of that

classification for purposes of naturalization. If literacy

in English is nevessary to fully integrate foreign born

persons into the American political community, it is not

unreasonable to require the saime of United States

natives.

The Congress cannot, regardless of the circumstances

of a given case, or the demonstrated desire or need for

action by their constituents, pass a statute which alters

the plain letter of the Constitution of the United States.

The minimum age of 21 years for exercising the voting

franchise is engrafted into the Constitution by Section 2

of the Fourteenth Amendment and the several states

cannot be prohibited from setting and enforcing that

standard by congressional legislation enacted under

presumed authority of the Equal Protection Clause of

the same Fourteenth Amendment.

If a federal minimum age for voting is to be set at 18

years of age, or otherwise, it must be done through

Constitutional Amendment as provided for in Article V

of the United States Constitution.

ARGUMENT

I

CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE

FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMEND-

MENTS BY ENACTING LEGISLATION WHICH

SUPERSEDES STATE STATUTES, WHILE EX-

TENSIVE, CAN BE UPHELD ONLY WHERE

CONGRESS POSSESSES A “SPECIAL LEGIS-

LATIVE COMPETENCE” NOT PRESENT IN

THIS CASE.

Plaintiff relies principally on two opinions by this

Court, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, ang

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, in support of the

contention that the 1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments

were “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Equal

Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. While we do

not dispute the Court’s holdings in those cases, it must

be pointed out that they decided the constitutionality

only of an earlier enactment, namely the 1965 Voting

Rights Act. We further note that the opinions in both

those cases are very carefully written to express this

Court’s conviction that Congress had ample factual

basis for its enactment of the 1965 Act and that the

legislation was carefully tailored to remedy the par-

ticular constitutional ill.

For instance, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra,

the Chief Justice points out that “Congress began work

with reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination

in a great majority of the states and political sub-

divisions affected by the new remedies of the Act.”

383 U.S. at 329. The opinion also commends Congress’

accuracy, saying: “In acceptable legislative fashion,

Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic

areas where immediate action seemed necessary.”

Sprinkled throughout the opinion are the references to

“what Congress knew” or “what Congress realized”.

Likewise, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, Mr. Justice Bren-

nan held that Congress’ enactment of § 4(e) of the 1965

Act granting the franchise to Puerto Ricans who have

successfully completed the sixth primary grade in an

American-flag school in which the language of instruc-

tion was other than English reflected “Congress’ greater

familiarity with the quality of instruction in American-

flag schools, a recognition of the unique historic rela-

tionship between the Congress and the Commonwealth

of Puerto Rico, an awareness of the federal govern-

ment’s acceptance of the desirability of the use of

Spanish as the language of instruction in Commonwealth

schools, and the fact that Congress has fostered policies

encouraging migration from the Commonwealth to the

States.” 384 U.S. at 658. It is obvious that the Court was

quite convinced that Congress considered ample evi-

dence to give them the “specially informed legislative

competence” necessary for them to impartially weigh

the competing considerations.

In the case at bar, plaintiff has put nothing before this

tribunal from which it can gain assurance that Congress

has given the same attention and care to the 1970

Voting Rights Act Amendments.

There is nothing advanced from the legislative history

to indicate that Congress had knowledge of situations

peculiar to Arizona or any other affected state. The

rather vague statement by Chairman Reymond Nakai of

the Navajo Tribal Council that New Mexico Navajos are

more likely to register than Arizona Navajos is not

substantiated by any statistics. (Plaintiffs brief, p. 46).

Nor is there any indication in the record that Congress,

while considering the wisdom of granting the franchise

to Arizona illiterates, had knowledge, for instance, that

in many areas of the vast Navajo Reservation in northern

Arizona there is practically no mass communications

media of any language which effectively penetrates the

area. There are no full time Navajo language broadcast

stations, television is practically non-existent except on

the fringes or by expensive cable hookup, and the only

Navajo newspaper, the Navajo Times, is printed in

English.

Under these circumstances, can this Court “perceive

a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment”

that Arizona’s literacy qualification did not fulfill a legi-

timate state interest in maintaining meaningful elections

through responsible and intelligent exercise of the bal-

lot? We think not.

Arizona is one of only sixteen states with a literacy

requirement. It would have been entirely feasible for

ei

Spree Er =

10

Congress to have held hearings in the states affected by

the new amendments in order to perfect its “s

informed legislative competence”. No such local hear.

ings were held. Instead, Congress enacted Sweeping

legislation which affected Arizona and other states

without any knowledge of special factors which pertain

to local elections. From its determination of the dis.

criminatory effects of literacy tests in some regions,

it appears that Congress inferred that such tests were

per se unfair and could serve no useful state interest,

We urge the Court to note the overbreadth of this

inference.

II

NO DUTY IS IMPOSED ON ARIZONA TO

RECTIFY THE INEQUITIES RESULTING FROM

PAST GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES OF OTHER

GOVERNMENTS BY THE FACT THAT UN-

FAIRLY TREATED MINORITY GROUP MEM-

BERS MAY HAVE MOVED HERE.

In plaintiffs brief, great reliance is placed upon a

broad construction of the opinion in Gaston County v.

United States, 395 U.S. 285. The United States Attorney

General has apparently construed the Court’s language

in that case to say, in effect, that if a member of an

identifiable minority has suffered educational] inequities

because of invidious discrimination by any state or po-

litical subdivision, the obligation to rectify this inequity

follows that person to any state to which he might

migrate. In short, if a Negro is illiterate because of

segregated schooling policies in his native state, it

becomes Arizona’s duty to “make it right” by granting

him the franchise if he moves here. While we express

no view as to the fairness of such a doctrine, we most

urgently point out that the Gaston opinion does not

admit of such a broad reading. Mr. Justice Harlan quite

carefully noted, “We conclude that... it is appropriate

for a court to consider whether a literacy or educational

requirement has the ‘effect of denying the right to vote

on account of race or color’ because the State or political

subdivision which seeks to impose the requirement has

maintained separate and inferior schools for its Negro

residents who are now of voting age.” (Emphasis added).

395 U.S. at 293. But then, just as carefully, Mr. Justice

Harlan states, “We have no occasion to decide whether

the Act would permit reinstatement of a literacy test in

the face of racially disparate educational or literacy

achievements for which the government bore no respon-

sibility.” (Emphasis added). 395 U.S. at 293, n.8.

The policy of the Court in adjudging the constitution-

ality of United States statutes is firm: “In the exercise

of that jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules, to which

it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a ques-

tion of Constitutional law in advance of the necessity

of deciding it; the other, never to formulate a rule of

constitutional law broader than is required by the pre-

cise facts to which it is applied.” (Emphasis added).

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21.

We further point out that Congress relied on this

erroneously broad reading of Gaston when considering

the enactment now in question. See House Hearings,

pp. 54-56 (testimony of Howard A. Glickstein); 221-225

(Attorney General Mitchell); Voting Rights Hearings,

pp. 184-188 (Attorney General Mitchell); 116 Cong. Rec.

2770 (daily ed. March 2, 1970, Senator Hruska). While

this Court stated in Katzenbach v. Morgan that “it is

not for us to review the congressional resolution of

these factors”, 384 U.S. at 653, judicial action is as-

suredly called for when erroneous factors are used in

thecongressional resolution.

In any event, this Court stated in Warren Trading Post

v. Arizona Tax Comm., 380 U.S. 685, that, “.. . in com-

pliance with its treaty obligations the Federal Govern-

12

ment has provided for roads, education and other ger.

vices needed by the Indians.” The Court concludeg

that, “. . . since federal legislation has left the State

with no duties or responsibilities respecting the reser.

vation Indians, we cannot believe that Congress intended

to leave to the State the privilege of levying this [state

privilege] tax.” 380 U.S. at 691-692. (Emphasis added).

By the very language of Warren Trading Post, Arizona

is brought within the exception provided for in Footnote

8 of the Gaston decision. As was determined in the

Warren Trading Post case, Arizona clearly has “no

responsibility” for the literacy or lack of it of a large

part of its citizens by virtue of federal responsibility.

True, as this Court said on June 15, 1970, in Evans y.

Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, the fiction of a “state within a

state” has been rejected and cannot now be revived

But it is the contention of Arizona that the plain words

of Warren Trading Post relieve it of responsibility and

give to the State of Arizona the protection of the Gaston

case.

Ill

THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITU-

TIONAL VALIDITY WHICH APPLIES TO STATE

STATUTES WHICH FAIRLY AND REASON-

ABLY CLASSIFY CITIZENS. ARIZONA NEED

SHOW NO “COMPELLING INTEREST”.

Not all classifications are a denial of equal protec-

tion. “To be sure, the constitutional demand is not 4

demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all

persons. ‘The Constitution does not require things

which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as

though they were the same.’ Tignor v. Texas, 310 US.

141, 147. Hence, legislation may impose special burdens

upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible

ends.” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309.

13

While it is true that “notions of what constitutes equal

treatment for purposes of the equal protection clause

do change”, as this Court pointed out in Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669, the

logic of the language of the Rinaldi opinion cannot be

disputed. There is a measurable difference between those

who can read and write and those who have not mas-

tered such basic skills. They are “different in fact”.

Barring some extraordinary circumstance, there is no

justification for requiring them to be “treated in law as

through they were the same”.

While the United States takes the view that extra-

ordinary circumstances, namely, invidious discrimina-

tion, are present, the plain truth is that, “Literacy and

illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as

reports around the world show.” Lassiter v. Northampton

County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 44, 51. While Arizona

does not deny that literacy tests have been unfairly ad-

ministered in some states, there is no allegation that this

state uses its literacy test in a manner designed to un-

fairly discriminate against any specified group. We

have already shown the fallacy of the United Siates’

reliance upon Gaston as a basis for any transferrable

responsibility for earlier inequalities and will not dwell

upon that further.

As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in his well-reasoned

dissent in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

383 U.S. 663, “The equal protection cases carefully

analyzed boil down to the principle that distinctions

drawn and even discriminations imposed by state laws

do not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as

these distinctions and discriminations are not ‘irrational’,

‘irrelevant’, ‘unreascnable’, ‘arbitrary’, or ‘invidious’.”

No serious claim has been made that Arizona’s classifi-

cation of voters by literacy falls into one of these cate-

gories. Unlike the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan, no

showing has been made that Arizona’s literacy test ef-

fectively disfranchises any identifiable minority.

14

“Of course it has always been recognized that nearly

all legislation involves some sort of classification, ang

the Equal Protection test applied by this Court is a

narrow one: a state enactment or practice may be

struck down under the clause only if it cannot be justi-

fied as founded upon a rational and permissible state

policy.” Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Katzenbach y,

Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 660.

Although it is suggested by the United States that be.

cause voting is a “fundamental liberty” a broader

standard should be applied in this case, Arizona agrees

with Mr. Justice Harlan that, “no such dual-level test

has ever been articulated by this Court... ”. 384 US.

at 661 (dissent).

The cases from which the so-called “compelling state

interest” standard is inferred have invariably dealt with

a classification which had the potential for permanent

disfranchisement. See, e.g. Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186;

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533; Carrington v. Rash, 380

U.S. 89; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701; City of

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204; Kramer v. Union

Free School District, 395 U.S. 621.

The rationale for the usual presumption of validity

given to statutes is that the Legislature is presumed to

reflect the will of the people as they speak through

their ballots. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395

U.S. 621. But when that voice is distorted through

malapportionment or invidious classifications drawn

along the lines of wealth or race, then the presumption

must fall and the restriction on the franchise must be

more closely examined. Without this safeguard, govern-

mental units could simply classify out of the voting booth

those voters who might oppose them, smugly relying on

the presumed constitutionality of the classification.

But such is not the case here. No attempt is made to

permanently disfranchise any class. Illiteracy, unlike

15

color or sex, need not be a permanent condition. Little

children are learning to read every day, just as are

adults in special education classes. Arizona expends

almost 70 per cent of the total state budget appropria-

tion on the state’s common and high schools alone.

Home study courses, including televised teaching, pro-

vide educational opportunities for those who can’t at-

tend regular classes. Considering the wide availability

of basic education, promoted and encouraged by Ari-

zona, those who cripple themselves by remaining

illiterate must be deemed to have done so by choice.

If Arizona citizens choose to remain illiterate, it is not

unfair for the state to refuse to register them as voters,

no more than it is unfair for a state to refuse to register

those who choose to live in another state.

We further point out that illiteracy is a problem which

has been largely solved in this country. The United States

enjoys one of the highest literacy rates in the world.

Arizona is no exception to this general rule. Upon the

order of this Court, Arizona allowed illiterates to regis-

ter provisionally pending the outcome of this litigation.

The availability of this provisional registration was

widely publicized by statewide news media, especially

broadcast outlets. Nonetheless, only eighteen illiterates

were registered under this provision. (See Appendix of

Affidavits).

In Maricopa County, Arizona’s most populous, only

twelve persons out of a total population of 962,918 took

the opportunity to register. This small turnout in the

face of both statewide and national discussion of the

issue can only be taken as an indication that the problem

of disfranchisement of illiterates in Arizona is de

minimus.

Thus, in determining the constitutionality of Ari-

zona’s statute, the Court need not scrutinize the classi-

fication as closely as is required to determine a “com-

pelling state interest”. As was stated in Harper v. Vir-

ginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 §. O

1078, “. . . under a proper interpretation of the Equal

Protection Clause states are to have the broadest king

_ Of jeeway in areas where they have a general consti.

tutional competence to act.”

Nor is there any question that Arizona has a “genera

constitutional competence to act” in setting reasonable

voter qualifications. “It has long been settled law that

the states have the power to prescribe reasonable and

nondiscriminatory qualifications for voting in federa]

as well as state elections.” Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp.

610 (1968). Literacy tests have never been deemed per se

discriminatory. Contrarily, it was held in Lassiter y.

Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 US. 4,

that the constitutionality of literacy tests as such is

clear.

In short, Arizona need show no “compelling state

interest” in requiring literacy as a prerequisite to voting.

It suffices to show a rational relationship of the statute

to a legitimate end.

The general rule was best stated in Metropolitan

Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Brownell, 294

U.S. 580 at 584, where Justice Stone said: “A statutory

discriminatio~ will not be set aside as the denial of equal

protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably

may be conceived to justify it.”

IV

ARIZONA DOES HAVE A “COMPELLING

INTEREST” IN MAINTAINING LITERACY

AS A VOTING QUALIFICATION, ASSUMING

ARGUENDO THAT SUCH AN INTEREST

MUST BE SHOWN.

Generally speaking, it can hardly be denied that pro-

moting the honest, responsible and intelligent use of

the ballot to insure meaningful elections is a com-

pelling state interest. But Arizona has an especially

compelling interest in requiring its voters to be literate.

The Arizona Constitution specifically reserves to the

voters the power to enact laws and constitutional amend-

ments and the power to review the acts of the formal

Legislature. The Arizona Constitution, Article IV, Sec-

tion 1 (1) states: “. . . [T]he people reserve the power to

propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and

to enact or reject such laws and amendments at the

polls, independently of the Legislature; and they also

reserve ... the power to approve or reject at the polls

any Act, or item, section, or part of any Act, of the

Jegislature.” The people acting under this section, are

exercising the legislative function. Tillotson v. Froh-

miller, 34 Ariz. 394, 271 P. 867. No statute in Arizona,

unless passed by a two thirds’ majority of the Legisla-

ture, becomes law for ninety days in order to give five

per centum of the qualified electors an opportunity to

refer to the people the statute in question. (Constitution

of Arizona, Art. 4 Pt. 1§3).

The voter, thus given substantial power to legislate

in our state, must be fully able to understand the text

of the laws he has the power to make or revise in order

to make rational and intelligent decisions rather than

choices based on emotion or on somebody else's inter-

pretation of the issues.

The vote of the uninformed or the illiterate counts

just as heavily as the carefully considered ballot of the

responsible and well-read voter who seeks to exercise

the legislative function reserved to him by the State

Constitution. The franchise is thus a potential danger

in the hands of those who do not fully understand the

implications of the laws they have the power to pass on.

“The ability to read and write . . . has some relation

to standards desigixu to promote intelligent use of the

ballot.” Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elec.

tions, 360 U.S. 44. We urge the Court to note that this

relationship applies a fortiori where, as in Arizona, the

voter is given substantial powers to exercise the legis.

lative function above and beyond the usual power of the

ballot.

Vv

THE REASONABLENESS AND NECESSITY OF

LITERACY AS A VOTER QUALIFICATION IS

FURTHER INDICATED BY THE USE OF

THAT CLASSIFICATION FOR PURPOSES OF

NATURALIZATION.

As Mr. Justice Harlan points out in his dissent to

Katzenbach v. Morgan, “It is noteworthy that the Fed-

eral Government requires literacy in English as a pre-

requisite to naturalization, 66 Stat. 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1423

(1964 ed.), attesting to the national view of its impor-

tance as a prerequisite to full integration into the

American political community.” 384 U.S. at 663.

Consider the curious posture of the law if foreign-born

illiterates are disfranchised while native illiterates are

allowed to vote. In light of the application of the Equal

Protection Clause to “any person” within the jurisdic-

tion of the United States, rather than applicability being

restricted to citizens, such a classification may well be

viewed as running afoul of the constitutional guarantee.

The possible result would be voting by aliens familiar

with neither American culture nor our democratic

governmental system.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES DOES NOT CONFER UPON THE

CONGRESS, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY

ANY REASONABLE IMPLICATION, THE

RIGHT TO SET THE NATIONWIDE MINIMUM

VOTING AGE AT 18 YEARS, OR ANY AGE

OTHER THAN THE 21 YEARS SPECIFICALLY

REFERRED TO IN THE CONSTITUTION.

At the outset, several matters should be made per-

fectly clear as to Arizona's position regarding Title III,

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, P.L. 91-285,

84 Stat. 314.

We are in complete agreement with the United States

that the legislative process is much better suited to de-

veloping what is admittedly an arbitrary standard of age

when everyone is constitutionally presumed to be old

enough to intelligently exercise the franchise, whether

heor she does so or not.

Arizona does not take issue with the factual deter-

mination of Congress concerning why the 18 year old

should be given the franchise, even though there will

always be individual citizens who will disagree with

those conclusions.

Nor does Arizona contend for a review or revision of

the decisions of this Court, both old or new, setting

forth standards for interpreting the power of Congress

in enforcing the provisions of the Federal Constitution,

particularly § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2

of the Fifteenth Amendment. E.g. McCulloch v. Mary-

land, 4 Wheat. 316; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383

U.S. 301; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641; Kramer v.

Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621; Cipriano v.

City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701; Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,

399 U.S. 204; Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419.

20

Insofar as is consistent with the preceding three

paragraphs, and so as to avoid as much as possible un-

necessary duplication of argument, Arizona adopts the

argument of its sister states of Oregon (No. 43 Original)

and Texas (No. 44 Original) as presented in their briefs

to this Court in those aforementioned cases now con-

solidated with this case for consideration of this iden-

tical question.

There still remains the question of applicability of the

standards and principles to the case at bar. It is here

that principles and standards of constitutional inter-

pretation, as well as the findings of the Congress must

give way when faced with the language of the Consti-

tution itself. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides, in pertinent part:

“But when the right to vote at an election for the

choice of electors for President and Vice-President of

the United States, Representatives in Congress, the

Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the mem-

bers of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the

male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one

years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in

any way abridged, except for participation in re-

bellion, or other crime, the basis of representation

therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the

number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole

number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in

such state.”

The United States brushes aside this specific consti-

tutional acceptance of the age of 21 years as the mini-

mum age which can be enforced against the States by

the Federal Government with a one paragraph reference

to an earlier paragraph emphasizing that the Equal Pro-

tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to

voting matters (Brief for the United States, pages 73-75).

The only case cited is Dennis v. United States, 171 F.

ed 986 (CA. D.C.) for the proposition that the specific

machinery of reducing a state’s representation in the

Federal Congress has never been invoked. The logic or

jegal conclusion that would lead from there to the ulti-

mate conclusion that the amendment thus has nothing

to say of a constitutional nature concerning the minimum

age of citizens for exercising the franchise, escapes this

defendant.

The decisions of this Court, as has been pointed out

by Texas and Oregon, supra, are absolutely consistent

in leaving to the states the fundamental responsibility

placed there by the Constitution to establish, on a non-

discriminatory basis, and in accordance with the spe-

cific directions or prohibitions of the Constitution,

qualifications for the exercise of the franchise. E.g.,

Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra; Carrington

v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89; Lassiter v. Northampton County

Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45. The United States does

not dispute this general point.

It is clear that had Justice Douglas been writing for

the Court in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of

Elections, supra, in 1919, instead of 1959, he could well

have included sex, along with residency requirement,

age, and previous criminal record as obvious factors a

state could take into consideration in determining

qualifications for voters. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.

162.

Thus it was on August 26, 1920, with the Proclama-

tion by the Secretary of State, the 19th Amendment of

the Constitution was declared ratified. 41 Stat. 1823;

U.S. Const. Amend. XIX. The matter of universal male

suffrage was changed to universal suffrage in the only

way contemplated by the Constitution — by a subse-

quentamendment (U.S. Const. Art. V).

It goes without saying that the cry for women’s suf-

frage was as forceful and as fully documented as was

22

the case for the 18 year old vote. The matter was con.

tinuously debated for almost 40 years before an amend-

ment was proposed. Ida Husted Harper, The History of

Women’s Suffrage, Vol. V (1922); Catt and Shuler,

Women’s Suffrage and Politics (1926). Once proposed,

the amendment was quickly ratified by the requisite

number of states. 41 Stat. 362; 41 Stat. 1823, supra;

U.S. Const. Amend. XIX.

Even as late as 1962, the Congress felt compelled to

submit to the several states a constitutional amendment

to prohibit the imposition of a poll tax on the right to

vote for federal officers. U.S. Const. Amend. XXIV.

We cannot now question the wisdom of the framers

at the time either the original Constitution or the

Amendments were adopted. Their genius was such that

the document could be changed from time to time as

conditions required — not by Congress alone, but by the

people, through their elected representatives at both

the federal and state level. U.S. Const. Art. V, supra.

This Court put it very succinctly in its decision of

Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368:

“Thus the people of the United States, by whom the

Constitution was ordained and established, have made

it a condition to amending that instrument that the

amendment be submitted to representative assem-

blies in the several states and be ratified in three-

fourths of them. The plain meaning of this is (a) that

all amendments must have the sanction of the people

of the United States, the original fountain of power,

acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that

ratification by these assemblies in three-fourths of

the states shall be taken as a decisive expression of

the people’s will and be binding on all.” 256 US. at

374. < +

. Bi “y

23

All the decisions on construction and all the factual

reasons developed by the Congress, regardless of their

validity. in the abstract, or in cases other than ones

specifically covered by the Constitution itself, cannot

justify amendment of the letter of the Constitution ex-

cept by constitutionally dictated methods.

We thus face here the acid test of our system. Recog-

nizing an almost universally acclaimed failing in our

present governmental structure as regards the exten-

sion of the franchise to citizens between the ages of

18—21 years, can we still maintain the discipline neces-

sary to follow the Constitution as it is written, wherein

the remedy is clearly set forth? If we can, the people

will still continue to govern. If we fail here, it will only

be a matter of time till other clear constitutional “%»:»

ments will be similarly expeditiously abrogated. ~%..

end of constitutional government, as we know it, wiu

not be far behind.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States should

be denied the relief sought in its complaint herein.

Respectfully submitted,

GARY K. NELSON

Attorney General of Arizona

JOHN M. McGOWAN II

Special Assistant Attorney General

eee

ae

October, 1970

24

TTORNEY

STATE C? ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA

COUNTY OF GRAHAM

I, H. Lyle Grant, County Recorder in and for the County

= State aforesaid, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes

and saith:

In accordance with the agreement with the Attorney General

I allowed any person who could not read the Constitution of

the United States in the English language or write their name

or both to provisionally register to vote between October 24,

1970, and December 14, 1970.

Publicity regarding this was on all media, newspapers,

radio, and television so that all persons who were illiterate

who wished to register to vote would be aware that he could

do so during this period of time.

During this period no illiterate person in the County of

Graham, according to the preliminary figures of the 1970 Census, *

availed themselves of this support to gh oe register to

vote even though they could not pass the literacy test of the

State of Arizona.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this fifth day of

October, 1970.

LDhee

H. le Grant

Graham County Recorder

* The foregoing is based upon a 1970 county census of 16,327,

preliminary count.

25

®.

ve oe

TUCSON

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF ARIZONA

County of Pima

I, Ida tige Smyth, being first duly sworn upon oath,

deposes and says:

In accordance with the agreement with the Attorney

General, I allowed any persons who could not read

the constitution of the United States in the English

Language or write their name, or both, to provisionally

register to vote between August 24, 1970 and Sept. 14, 1970.

I arranged for publicity on all media; Newspapers, Radio

and Television, so that any person who was illiterate

who wished to register to vote would be aware that he

could do so during this period of time. Ye this

period © number of people out of the total of 344,635

people in the County according to the preliminary

figures of the 1970 census availed themselves of this

opportunity to provisionally “iy teed to vote, even

though they could not pass the

State of Arizona,

Dated: Dah b. 197¢@ tere County Reporter

iteracy test of the

26

cama oarrTs

Comes

MOWARO H FALOIE

oats

COUNTY RECORDER

YUMA COUNTY

October 5, 1770

CARA HN. BETTS, being first fuly sworn upon oath, deposes

and seys: In accordence with the agreerent with the

Attorney Generel, I allowed any person who could not read

the Constitutton of the United Stetes in the english

1 age or wite their neme or both to provisionally

register to wote between August 2l;, 1970 and September

14, 1970.

I erranged for oublicity on el] medie; newspeper, radio

and television so thet any person who was illiterate,

who wished to register to vote would be aware that he

could do so during this veriod of time.

During this period then _of veovle

x none et ell

out of a totel of 60,077 people in the county according

to the preliminary figure of the 1970 Census eveiled then-

selves of this opvertunity to orovisionelly register to

vote even or, they could not vass the literecy test

of the State of Arizona,

ecorde

Subscribed end sworn to before me. this . day of Oct., 1970

by Cara N, Betts, County Recorder of Yum& Coun Arizone,

~Farbsre

Oy, iu , by 1€ AT AT

27

STATE OF ARIZONA )

) ss.

County of Yavapai)

Norma R, Marquart, Recorder of Yavapai County, Arizona, being first

duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: That in accordance with the

agreement with the Attorney General of the State of Arizona, I allowed

any persons who could not read the Constitution of the United States in

the English language or write their name, or both, to provisionally

register between August 24, 1970 and September 14, 1970, to vote in

Yavapai County, To affiant's knowledge, no persons availed themselves

of this opportunity to provisionally register to "o *

Ly

(

|i

My Commission expires August 18, 1971,

* The foregoing is based upon a 1970 county census of 35,869,

preliminary count.

28

OT 770 Al

APFPIDAVIT

be] >.

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) (Tot! OF aa

2 88.

County of Apache.)

VIRGIE B. HEAP, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes

and says: In accordance with the agreement with the Attorney

General, I allowed any persons who could not read the Constitution

of the United States in the English language or write their name or

both, to provisionally register to vote between August 24, 1970,

and September 14, 1970. I arranged for publicity by a letter to

all registration officers so that any person who wished to register

to vote could be aware that he could do so during the period of

time. During this period of time, two people out of a total of

32 ,237 people in the County according to the preliminary figures

of the 1970 census availed themselves of this opportunity to pro-

visionally register to vote even though they could not pass the

literacy test of the State of Arizona.

APACHE COUNTY RECORDER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of October,

1970.

(SEAL) otary c

My Commission Expires August 4, 1973.

“woo ober, 1970.

(eile,

OT 7 ‘70 AM

STATS OF ARIZONA, ATTORNEY G2

: ss. STATE OF ADIZONA

County of Navajo. )

JAY H. TURLEY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes

and says in accordance with the agreement with the Attorney

General I allowed any persons who could not read the Constitution

of the United States in the English language or write their name,

or both, to provisionally register to vote between August 24, 1970

and ee og 14, 1970.

Dio WeT

I,azzeanged for publicity on all media, newspapers, radio and

television so that any person who was illiterate who wished to

register to vote would be aware that he could do so during this

period of time. During this period / - number of people

out of a total of YE,IS! peopie in the county according to

the preliminary figures of the 1970 census availed themselves of

this opportunity to provisionally register to vote even though

Arizona.

they could not pass the literacy test of the Spate

ago County Recorder

Subscribed and sworn to before me this PA day of

ae Public, Mavajo County,

G; Arizona

’ My Commission expires:

Day A i8 ike

30

STATE OF ARIZONA)

) ss.

COUNTY OF PINAL )

I, SOPHIE M, SMITH, the duly elected and qualified County Recorder of

Pinal County, State of Arizona, being first duly sworn, on my cath depose and say,

By agreement vith the Attorney General of Arizona, and in compliance

with the order of the Supreme Court of the United States, I allowed persons vbo

could mot read the Constitution of the United States in the Englirh language, or

who could not write their name, or both, to provisionally register to vote betwen

August 24th, 1970, and September 14th, 1970. This was publicised in all sedis a

that any person who was illiterate and who wished to register to vote would be

aware that he could do so during this period.

During this period of time, 1 person out of 67,876 total population is

the county, according to the preliminary figures of the 1970 census, availed his.

self of this opportunity to provisionally register to vote, even though he could

mot meet the literacy qualifications as provided for by Arizona Statutes,

It should be noted in this context that this person was unable to write

his name and therefore was identifiable as an illiterate. Previously in this

county, the statutes have been interpreted to mean that the literacy qualification

was exactly that and nothing else. This meant that if a person could write his

name and was willing to subscribe on his oath that he met all qualifications,

imeluding the literacy qualification, he was considered so qualified.

Birth certificates were not required to be produced as proof of age,

and neither was actual testing of ability to read performed, as such testing

was not considered to be the duty of the Registration Officer. Accordingly,

it is possible and even probable that there are now registered in this county

persons who would be baffled by such words and phrases as "concurrence",

"emolument", or “domestic Tranquility", and therefore are not literate within

the strictest construction of the statutes,

Given under ay hand and seal this Sth day of October, 1970.

x. SMITH

County Recorder

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Sth day of October, 1970.

My Commission Expires tary Public.

May 3ist, 1973

31

AFELDAVITt

grate OF ARIZONA =)

) ss.

COUNTY OF MARICOPA )

PAUL N. MARSTON, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and

In accordance with the agreement with the Attorney General, I

allowed any persons who could not read the Constitution of the United

States in the English language or write their name or both to pro-

visionally register to vote between August 24, 1970 and September 14,

1970.

I arranged for publicity on all media: newspapers, radio and

television, so that any person who was illiterate who wished to register

to vote would be aware that he could do so during this period of time.

During this period twelve (12) people out of & total of 962,918 people

in the county according to the preliminary figures of the 1970 census

availed themselves of this opportunity to provisionally register to

vote, even though they could not pass the literacy test of the State

LL Messe

Paul 8. Marston

Maricopa County Recorder

Subscribed and sworn to before me trig Zadaay °

of Arizona.

1970.

Notary Public

My commission expires:

/

32

STATE OF ARIZONA, )

COUNTY OF MOHAVE. )

I, PECGY B. SMITH, Recorder of the County of Kohave,

State of Arisona, Leing first duly sworn upon oath depose

and says, in accordance with agreem nt with the Attorney

General I allowed any cerson who coul¢ not re.d the

Constitution of these United States in the Lnrlish language

or write their name or both, to provisionally re;ister to

wote between Aurust 24, 197C and Serterter LA, 1970,

During the perio? between Aurust 24, 197C and

Septez er 14, 1970 no person out of a total of 25,110

people in the county according to the preliminary census

of 1970 availed themselves of this opvortunity to

provisionally rerister to wote even though they could not

pass the liter.cr test of the Stace of Arizona.

witness ry hanc this 6th day of Octoter, 1°7¢.

PZ ¥

eft” ©. ~rith

Moh ve County ecorder

Su' seritec anc sworn to before me this éth cay of

Octoter, 197C, by Perm =F. smith.

otary Futlic

Ky Commission Expires:

STATE OF ARIZONA COUNTY OF COCONINO

Edna Mae Thornton being first duly sworn upon oath

deposes and activates out the agreement with the Attorney

General allowing any persons who could not read the

Constitution of the United States in the English language

or write their name or both to provisionally register to

vote between August 24, 1970 and September 14, 1970. I

arranged for publicity on all media, newspapers, radio

and television, so that any person who was illiterate,

who wished to register to vote would be arranged that

he could do so during this period of time.

During this period no people out of a total of 47,555

of people in the county according to the preliminary

figure of the 1970 census availed themself of this

opportunity to previously register to vote even though

they could not pass the literacy test of the State of

Arizona.

day of

My commission expires:

4 B/, 1974.

FLAGSTAFF, ARIZONA 8600! . PHONE 774-S01! EXT. 63 OR 64

nome om o 770M,

Lael

COUNTY OF COCHISE

OFFICE OF THE RECORDER ATTORNEY

MESREE, ARIZONA STATE OF ARIZON,

APPIDAVIT

State of Arizona } ss

County of Cochise October 5, 1970

asreresiest ite fanvagnetlont eien fae ftténee? Saveraly Sr tabi

accordance

any persons whe could not read the Constitution of the we baites States

in the lish language or write seeds Game oe beh, te Heep

register vote between August 24, 1970 andSeptember 14, 1970,

To the best of his Ay -4~ deputy Ay nny Be, Justice of the

Peace, or any employee Recorder away any other.

wise qualified person who wished to register.upon the basis of

illiteracy in any form. In other words, there was no one provisicn-

ally registered Cochise County. #

Cc)

ae SALW

3 0. Dixon

hise County Recorder

This instrument was eckhowledged before me this

rument, ath. er

State of Arisona ) ss

County of Cochise)

of Geteder 2 a

A awe Fin trnrh

herent wee hopaene EAT

* The foregoing 9 based upon a 1970 county census of 60,39) and an unoffir

ial 1970 voter registration of 19,960.

35

ATTORNEY GENERAL

I, DORIS PARKIN, being first duly sworn upon cath SHR CS UEP*

In accordance with the agreement with the Attorney General I silowed

my person who could not read the constitution of the United States

in the English language or write their neme or both to provisionally

register to vote between August 24, 1970 and September 14, 1970. I

arrenged for publicity on all media - newspapers - radio - T.V. so that

any person who was illiterate who wished to register to vote would be

qvare that he could do so during this period of time.

During the period NONE people out of a total of 28,412 people

according to the prelimary figures of the 1970 census availed thea-

selves of the opportunity to provisionally register to vote even

though they could not pass the literacy test of the State of Arizona.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5 day of October, 1970.

ee ew

My Commission Expires November 11, 1975.

36

COUNTY RECORDER

SANTA GRUZ COUNTY

NOGALES, ARIZONA, 85681

serous 3 See

STATE OF ARIZONA )

a8.

:

County of Santa Cruz )

I, G. ESPINOSA MORENO, being first duly sworn upon my oath

depose and say:

In accordance with the agreement with th+ Attorney General

I allowed any persons who could not read the Constitution of the

United States in the English language or write their names or

both, to provisionally register to vote between August 2), 1970

and September 14, 1970.

I arranged for publicity on all media, newspapers, radio and

television so that any person who was an illiterate and wished to

register to vote, would be awmre that he could do so during this

period of time.

During this period two (2) persons, out of a total of 14,500

according to the preliminary figures of the 1970 census, availed

themselves of this opportunity to provisionally register to vote,

even though they could not pass the literacy test of the State of

Arizona. Leabeiaan, Pave

Santa Cruz County Recorder

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nogales, Arizona, this 6th

day of October, 1970 by G. Espinosa Moreno.

Notary Public

AY GOKSSSC CORRES LY DTP P 79

ROBERT M,

ttorney Ger

State of Idahx

RIGHARD H,

ssistant Ati

State of Idahx«

Statehouse

ttorneys fo: