Petition for Rehearing — Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States
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IN THE
| SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1969
STEPHEN S. CHANDLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA, Petitioner,
Vv.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT
OF THE UNITED STATES, Respondent.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR .
WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND/OR MANDAMUS
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Thomas J. Kenan
GEORGE, KENAN, ROBERTSON
é AND LINDSEY
3 Of Counsel: 1366 First National Building
’ George and Kenan Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
Counsel for Petitioner
: June 24, 1970
=
Washington, 0. C. . THIEL PRESS - 202 - 393-0625
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1969
No. 2 Misc.
STEPHEN S. CHANDLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
FOR. THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA, Petitioner,
ee: °
Vv.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT
OF THE UNITED STATES, Respondent.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND/OR MANDAMUS
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The petiticner herein respectfully moves this Court for
an order (1) vacating its denial of the Motion for Leave to
File Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus, en*
tered on June 1, 1970, and (2) granting the Motion. As
grounds for this petition, petitioner states the following:
1. The Court’s June 1, 1970 Opinion is not directed to
the issues raised in the motion for leave to file.
The petition before the Court, attached to petitioner’s
motion for leave to file, challenges an order thet issued
from the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, respondent
LEE NES LR TE I LL BEM TI PIT AI ER HT RE IN ET
ERIE TST tie eng wae Ee TTARILIS
eS arr
herein, on December 13, 1965. While the Judicial Council
on February 4, 1966 superseded the challenged order of
December 13, 1965 and later issued additional orders modi-
fying its February 4, 1966 order, the original order of De-
cember 13, 1965 is the only order challenged in the Mo-
tion for Leave to File and the only order before the Court
for review.
The record in this proceeding is voluminous. A great por-
tion of it is dedicated to an interpretation of the various
actions of the Judicial Council subsequent to its entry of
the original order of December 13, 1965 and subsequent to
the filing of this action. While petitioner may have re-
peatedly asserted that the Judicial Council was continuing
to act in violation of his rights and inconsistent with law,
the significance of all filings in this proceeding subsequent
to petitioner’s original motion was the establishment of the
melancholy fact that the subsequent actions of the Judicial
Council were wholly an attempt to deceive the Court by
glossing over its initial conduct with actions that might have
some better basis in law or fact. Unfortunately, the opinion
of the Court in denying petitioner’s motion and the Con-
curring Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan both placed emphasis
upon the superseding of the challenged order of the Judi-
cial Council and the subsequent actions of the Judicial
Council as if these actions somehow altered the nature of
this proceeding. It is submitted that none of the subsequent
actions of the Judicial Council have any bearing on this
case other than the light they might shed upon any ambi-
guities contained in the initial reasons stated by the Judi-
cial Council as justifying the issuance of its Order of De-
cember 13, 1965. Since these subsequent actions clearly
show that the Judicial Council twice altered its announced
grounds for taking the original action against the petitioner,
it is our contention that the record itself reveals, through
the Judicial Council’s inconsistencies, that the subsequent
actions of the Judicial Council are to be accorded no
weight in this proceeding.
Sia ta ad
re a
'
3
The second order of the Judicial Council, that of Feb-
ruary 4, 1966, and subsequent orders and actions have not
in any way impaired the reviewability of the motion for
leave to file, which challenges the original December 13,
1965 order of the Judicial Council, unless the Court is over-
ruling a well established rule of law concerning mootness of
issues, Which rule was only recently unanimously reaffirmed
by this Court on November 25, 1968 in United States v.
Concentrated, 393 U.S. 199, in which case the Court stated:
“The test for mootness in cases such as this is a strin-
gent one. Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly il-
legal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the
Courts would be conipelled to leave ‘[t]he defend-
ant . . . free to return to his old ways.’ United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629.”
Petitioner assumes the Court did not presume to overrule
this well established rule of law. Yet, the Opinion of the
Court, in denying petitioner’s motion, stated:
“In essence petitioner challenges all orders of the Ju-
dicial Council relating to assignment of cases in the
Western District of Oklahoma as fixing conditions
on the exercise of his constitutional powers as a
judge.”” (emphasis added).
2. The Opinion of the Court is based upon false assump-
tions of fact.
As stated above, the Opinion of the Court and the Con-
curring Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan place great emphasis
upon the actions of the Judicial Council subsequent to its
initial order and upon actions of the district judges of pe-
titioner’s court in the assignment of cases. Yet, unless the
Court is blind to the shotgun wedding nature of petitioner’s
participation in these later events and chooses to conclude
that he willingly acquiesced in these subsequent actions, the
reliance by the Court upon these subsequent events amounts
to its reliance upon facts foreign to the issues raised by pe-
titioner’s motion for leave to file. The Court should return
its attention to a consideration of the facts that were ac-
| tually before the Court.
1S STINE AIR NALLY BORER SF LY, ,
OEP SE MES LTE TORE NEL NT IT
| 4
The original order of the Judicial Counci! isust be ac-
cepted at face value. The Court should carefully consider
the announced reasons stated by the Judicial Counc:l in
such order as justifying its action in stripping the petitioner
of all his judicial powers. There is no mention in such
order reciting a heavy caseload that petitioner was unable
or unwilling to bear. Yet, the later fabrication by the Judi-
cial Council of this theory is the escape hole through which
it slips. If this was the basis for the original Decernber 13,
1965 order, why was it not so stated at that time?
a he al ees —.
Only a@asual reading of the record in this proceeding re-
veals that the Judicial Council successively adopted three
different positions to justify its actidn against petitioner:
(1) Position No. One: the challenged order of Decem-
ber 13, 1965. The Judicial Council referred to the “atti-
tude and conduct of Judge Chandler” as they had particu-
lar regard to the business of his court. Reference was made
to the fact that during the past four years Judge Chandler
had been a party in both civil and criminal litigatie1 and
that one civil case was still pending. Reference was made
to the fact that two proceedings had been brought in the
3 U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to disqualify
him from handling specific litigation and that in one in-
stance he was ordered to proceed no further and that the
other proceeding was still pending. Finally, a statement
was made that
SAM i
“from a review of the entire situation pertaining to
Judge Chandler the Judicial Council finds that
Judge Chandler is presently unable, or unwilling, to
discharge the official duties of his office.”
Sige Peed ee oes SPD
This order against Judge Chandler was issued in a manner
shockingly ais aa with the principles of due process
of law.
(2) Position| No. Two: the January 13, 1966 Memoran-
dum For The Respondent In Opposition To The Applica-
tion For Stay. | This memorandum clearly departs from the
challenged Dect mber 13, 1965 order of the Judicial Coun-
ci! in that it advises the Court, through rather strong in-
nuendo, that the true reason the Judicial Council had acted
against Petitioner was that he was either insane or corrupt
or some other horrible situation existed. The statement is
made oy Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall that he had
personally examined materials in the files of the Judicial
Council and of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts in Washington and that
“without intimating any view of the ultimate merits,
he deems it appropriate to state to the Court his
conviction that the matter is one which warrants the
most careful examination.”
Solicitor General Marshall also stated that
“Public confidence in the federal judiciary would in- ,
evitably be impaired if Judge Chandler were to pre-
side over the District Court of the Western District.
while the question of his present unfitness to serve
in that capacity is under consideration.”
(3) Position No. Three: the March 17, 1966 Supplemen-
tal Memorandum For Respondent. In this document, the
Judicial Council again changed its position and stated that
it had been suppressing petitioner’s judicial powers all along
only in order to help him clean up a crowded docket, ac-
tion superficially more compatible with the provisions of
28 U.S.C. 137 ‘han with those of 28 U.S.C. 332.
Petitioner has always maintained that the Supplemental
Memorandum for Respondent was crammed with poppy-
cock and clearly revealed that the Judicial Council was not
candidly dealing with the Court. Should any party before
this Court, even a Judicial Council, that changes its posi-
tion three times be accorded the general presumption of
credibility due litigants?
The issue petitioner has been trying to present to the
Court for its consideration for over four years is the legality
of the initial December 13, 1965 order. Such issue has
never been mooted. The announced reasons in the initial
order for the action taken against petitioner are the only
6
reasons properly before this Court. Such order should be
taken at face value due to the demonstrated lack of credi-
bility of the Judicial Council in explaining its actions and
due also to the fact that orders signed by circuit judges are
supposedly well drafted and should be taken at face value
anyway. The Court, in its Opinion and Concurring Opin-
ion, did not address itself to the facts involved in this pro-
ceeding, which facts are wholly contained in the Petition
for Writ and have never been challenged or refuted by the
Judicial Council.
3. The jurisdiction question. Petitioner notes with re-
gret that the Court approaches the jurisdiction question
raised in this proceeding but turns away and alludes to the
difficulty of the question as one of the reasons the Court
should decline, in its discretion, to grant the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus or prohibition. Petitioner appreciates
the more careful consideration given this question by Mr.
Justice Harlan in his Concurring Opinion and hopes the rea-
sons set forth above will persuade him and others in the
majority to recommend a rehearing of this proceeding due
to the lack of legal significance of the Judicial Council’s ac-
tions taken subsequent to the order of December 13, 1965.
There was no question of a lazy or inefficient judge with
a large backlog of cases, as the Council tried to make it ap-
pear by its subsequent issuance of other Orders so suggest-
ing.
The district judge had no backlog of cases. His docket
was current. His cases were proceeding to final judgment
with dispatch as they had been for the preceding 22 years.
The records of the court, available to all, show that the
district judge disposed of an average of 201 Civil cases each
fiscal year from his appointment in 1943 to June 30, 1966,
six months after the Writ of Prohibition was entered, far
more than any of the other judges of the court during any
part of the 22 years. In addition he handled his propor-
tionate share of the criminal cases and all of the time-
consuming Bankruptcy Reorganization cases during the.
7
years 1956 tc 1965. Judge Chandler was Chief Judge dur-
ing this same ten year period and also handled the adminis-
trative matters of the court, which is also quite time-
consuming.
During the five years ending June 30, 1966, the court
records show that, with only two judges sitting in fiscal
year 1961, Judge Rizley disposed of 208 Civil and 112
Criminal cases and that Judge Chandler disposed of 219
Civil and 134 Criminal cases; that during the ensuing four
years ending June 30, 1966 the average of cases disposed
of was -
Judge Chandler 156 Civil 87 Criminal
Judge Rizley 102 Civil 51 Criminal
Judge Bohanon 80 Civil 115 Criminal
Judge Daugherty 86 Civil 98 Criminal
(Judges Bohanon and Daugherty, who are roving judges
with headquarters in Oklahoma City, handled business in
two other districts also. Photostatic copies of the complete
statistics as reflected by the official records of the Court
Clerk on file with the House Judiciary Committee are at-
tached hereto. If the Admiristrative Office of the United
States Courts had kept translatable statistics, its records
would have also reflected these facts.)
The foregoing statistics show conclusively the lack of
candor of the Judicial Council in its subsequent efforts to
promote a “‘heavy caseload”’ justification for its December
13, 1965 order (“Judge Chandler is presently unable, or
unwilling, to discharge efficiently the duties of his office;’’)
and for its February 4, 1966 order, where the Council
states on page 4 of the order:
“2. The Council is informed of the present and past
administration of the business within the Western
District of Oklahoma as revealed by the files and
records of the Clerk of the Western District, the re-
ports and analysis of the same by the Office of the
Administrator of the United States Courts, and by
this Council’s continuing review of the operations
of that Court.” (emphasis added).
be a
8
Yet the Court, in its denial Opinion, dwelt upon the later
orders entered by the Council, orders concocted in an ef-
fort to make it seem (contrary to the facts) that petitioner
had too large a backlog of cases and shouldn’t be assigned
any more cases until his backlog was disposed of. This was
a reliance upon matters not only foreign to this proceeding
but matters deliberately contrived ‘o mislead the Court.
In connection with the foregoing, the Court should be
reminded that the Council conceded th:t its February 4,
1966 and July 12, 1967 orders “restoring” the district
judge’s powers uid not moot the question of the legality of
the original Order of December 13, 1965. United States y.
Concentrated, 393 U.S. 199.
No wonder the Judicial Council did not justify, in its ini-
tial order, the stripping of Judge Chandler’s powers for in-
attendance to judicial duties. Petitioner urges Mr. Justice
Harlan and the others in the majority to disregard the case-
load smokescreen laid down by the Judicial Council, to
adopt Solicitor General Griswold’s and Mr. Justice Harlan’s
handling of the jurisdiction question and grant a rehearing
on the issues involved in this proceeding.
The Supreme Court had potential appellate jurisdiction
by virtue of Sec. 1651 (a) of the Judicial Code over each
of the 150 cases in which Judge Chandler was sitting but
refused to exercise it in violation of the time-honored pre-
cept expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in 1821 in-Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404, where he said
“It is most true that this court will not take jurisdic-
tion if it should not; but it is equally true, that it
must take jurisdiction if it should. * * * With what-
ever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may
be attended, we must decide it if it be brought
before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution.” [italics ours]
9
If the present judgment stands all United States District
Judges serve at the whim and caprice of Judicial Councils,
the Separation of Powers Concept is destroyed, the Consti-
tution scrapped
CONT LUSION
For the reasons set forth +hewe os well as those con-
tained in the Petiteom for Wis attached to his motion for
leave to file, petitiomer prays that the Court grant rehearing
of theorder of denial. vacate thet order, grant the petition
and review the December |). 1965 onder of the Judicial
Council and issue the Writ sought by petitioner for so many
years.
Respectfully submitted,
Thomas J. Kenan
Counsel for Petitioner
June 24, 1970
Certificate of Counsel
As counsel for petitioner, I hereby certify that this pe-
tition for rehearing is presented in yood faith and not for
delay and is restricted to the grounds specified in Rule 58(1).
Thomas J. Kenan
Counsel for Petitioner
ga brat}
PLO ASS EE, ET
SEI PORATION IEN GEE NON
TPIS
ELIE Sp LPIA, LATINO MINIT PLE AS IG TOR
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