Appendix — North Carolina v. Pearce

Supreme Court brief1969

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

“

) ee the apy

| ova few %

ee

ay coe rh i n this PLEO that ‘th a goed ft

Saath jon oils — Yr soniadeiirg oper

£7 thy

pm ‘the —- ahi ity +i te woh a tear

. rate: cd weant t > Allevic ste, Moreover, the’ Courses

; genaitte prevent ive, fo: mulation » id eon Mae ater

tea a- £e oe oe tLe

fs ‘Coates 1 &. 4 re 1966)

“Jower | ig tir anda,” +, Ariens; BA

ie ae ate + % differant i eee EOS ith iA SRT

deaatin, ne ‘ ectid te 1K $61 is eae es /

capa Aeoiee pac Lecees Von . a

: 5: Lew a) .. : 3 : LH

CON? 2 3 Ls eS « . . “’ . ‘ s .

we reasangs ; noted abexwe asizi barter 2 nlihatent i

ancdedt Opin fens ia. Patior ¥. Nori Caroling, «

peiiaes 2 i G36 (4th ir. 1867), cert. del peed, 300 U. S. 93 pe aes

irae 198), Ae resperttatiy urge tha} the derision i eels Rieiiicct:

2 ope efitined. ;

» y “ te of -

* ; ez Epecwu rt ab Tet ae

- a -. . * é

LS Ee : = . / :

5 Ye. en 2 E - , : ~ % :

. wee ‘ Ww a 5 YY —— on .

if ; ss = t . . . : ¥ 2 i} 204) bo 4 w me ¥ AS: ALS axXk

he 4 ; are

: ‘Duk & Tavvrersit ¢

~ 4 3 > z * | + =, °

Sage i Seheol ef Law ‘ 3:

A . «

; ee oe ss ole

_s oe 3 ig ge Roe ; Dutra, Nort A TOs

- eee 4 * 2 *e * -

soi sas : iene eet Pe EE! SOR Ee 4 PE eS ¢

; - pitorney fot Amaci Curiae

se . : s

as

3 fs ie Wu. Se es ee

y s6FitthAvenus f oe

: Mage Sore, New York. oe ee eee

2OR ig aie ey”

Sait aren bd

°

“APPENDIX

- : Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

‘ For THE FourTH Circuit

(Argued February 6, 1967 ___ Decided June 14, 1967) -

oe i,

eee i

| Eppie W. Parton, ;

| Appellee, .

pee :

> Srare or Norra CAROLINA, ai kieatate one

| Appellant. .

| Before:

Sopetorr, J. SpeNcER BELL’. and WINTER, epee

— Circuit Judges.

ae.

~~

Sopevorr, Circuit Judge: ae

— aa

The question ‘raised by this appeal is whether a defen-

dant may be sentenced to’a longer term of imprisonment at .

his: second trial than he received after his first conviction,

vacated on constitutional grounds. bee

Unrepresented by counsel, the petitioner, Eddie W. Pat-

ton, was tried in October, 1960 and convicted of armed rob-

bery after a plea of nolo contendere, entered at the close

of the State’s evidence. He was sentenced to prison for

e

* Judge Bell participated in the hearing and concurred in the

‘disposition of ‘the case but died before the opinion was prepared.

Sowetd

a ie of twenty years. ‘No sibel was taken, but i in April

1964, Patton applied for a state post-conviction hearing,

‘and on the basis of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision

in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.

Ed. 2d 799 (1963), was awarded a new trial. : —

_ Patton remained in custody, and on February 17, 1965,

after tendering a plea of not guilty, he was again ‘convicted ;

by jury on the original indictment. This time he had the ass

sistance of counsel, who called the court’s attention to the.

fact that the defendant had been continuously imprisoned

from June 10, 1960 and had already served nearly five years-

» for the offense. Although the trial judge paid lip service to |

the idea of crediting Patton, with that portion of the initial

' twenty-year sentence already served, he actually increased

Patton’s’ punishment by. imposing, in effect, a twenty-five-

year sentence and then deducting five years for the time

served.’ Thus, as a result of secking and obtaining a new

trial, the prisoner, who originally would have been eligible

for parole in October. 1965, now, it is agreed, will not’ be- ~

come eligible. until February 1970.

Regardless of whether the action of the sentencing judge

"is verbalized as a twenty-year sentence without credit for.

the five years already served, or as a twenty-five-year sen-

tence with credit, the practical effect of the second judge’s

sentence is to compel the defendant to serve five years

longer to become eligible for sie than he would have —

1“The Court: Before I announce punishment, I will take into

consideration the fact that he has served four years, or nearly

five years.

ok ee ee : ”

“The Court: * * © I would give you five more years than what

I am giving , but I am allowing you credit for the time that .

you have se ed. Judgment of the Court is that the Defendant

be imprisonad in the State’s Prison for a’term of twenty aN

**e”

; a

been roqhited to serve had he n t asserted. his constitutional’

right to-a fair trial.

_ Patton applied in August 65 * the Distriet Court for

a writ of habeas: corpus, cgntending that a harsher sen-

tence following a second epnviction for the same offense,

‘after the initial convictioh kas been vacated on. constitu-

tional grounds, is a denial of due process of law; is incon-

sistent with the prohibition against double jeopardy; and

is a denial ‘of equal rotection of the law, The “District

Court held Patton ’s sentence unconstitutional on the ground

that the i increased toe violated the.due ‘process and _

equal 'prote ion clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

‘Patton v. orth (a olina, 256 F.. Supp. 225. ((W. D. N. C.

1966).

. i ; ef \

/ 1. Exhaustion of State Remedies —

[1] The State has misconceived the import of Patton’s .

arguments. It interprets his.contention to be that the sec-

_ ond trial judge, in imposing a more severe.sentence, was

- motivated by prejudice because of the defendant’s success-.

- ful attack on the initial conviction. The State’s position

on this appeal is that such - ‘an. allegation has never been

presented to the state courts, and it reasons that Patton

having failed to exhaust available state remedies or to show

that circumstances existed rendering the state process

ineffective to protect his rights, the District Court lacked

jurisdiction ‘under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Judge

carefully reviewed the relevant. North Carolina cases, how-

ever, and concluded that the effect of the opinions of the

state supreme court is to hold that & defendant is not en- |

titled to credit for time served and may receive an increased

’ sentence (unless the subsequent sentence. plus the time

already served under the invalid first sentence should ex-

*

26

ceed the statutory maximum). ‘We share the District |

Court’s view that si further résort to the North Carolina

courts would be futile, }t-is not required.* , .

oe -” TL. Due Process — .

ad

wis anaii rationale: traditionally offered for deny-

- ing eredit and permitting a harsher sentence at a second

trial is that the prisoner, by successfully. attacking his

initial conviction, has “voided” or “wiped out” all conse-

quences of that conviction—including the sentence imposed

by the first judge and any time served under that-sentence.* —

SBtate v. Weaver, 264 N.C, 681, 142 8. E. 2d 638 (1965) ;

State v. Slade, 264 N. Cc. 70, 140 8. E. 94 723 (1965); State v.

Anderson, 262 N. C. 491, 137 S. E. 2d 823 (1964) ; State v. White,

262 N. C. 52, 136 S. E. 24 205 (1964); State v. ‘Williams, 261

- N.C. 172, 134 §. E. 2d 163 (1964).

’ Our conclusion is strengthened by the recent decision in State ©

v. Pearce, 268 :N. C. 707, 151 gS. E. 2d 571 (1966), decided since

the District Court’s action. In that case, the defendant’s sentence

was increased following his second. conviction, even though “[t]heé

evidence on the new trial was not essentially’ different” from that

adduced at the origina) trial. ‘In his appeal to the state supreme

" . court, the. defendant relied on J udge Craven’s opinion here under

review, to support this argument that any increase in the punish-

ment imposed after a second conviction was in effect a penalty .

for seeking review of an invalid conviction, and a violation of his.»

constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, how-

éver, declined to follow that: opinion, stating - flatly that “(w]e

adhere to our former decisions.” Id. at 708, 151 §. E. 2d at 572. |

4 Plainly, the trial court regarded Patton’s successful attack on

his original unconstitutional conviction as 4 waiver of the benefit

of nearly five years’ imprisonment. ; .

“The Court: Are you referring about’ the. prior sentence

that was imposed on you! ie, é

Defendant: Yes, Sir.

‘The Court: That was wiped off. - .

- Defendant: Yes, I understand that. :

The Court: Mr. Patton, as your motion, because you moved .

that it be—and alleged and the Court found that your consti- -

ea 27

A

‘In State v. White, 262 N. C. 52, 136 S. E. 2205 (1964);

the North. Carolina Supreme Court stated that-a defendant

a

ig not enititled as a matter of law to credit against the

second sentence for time served under the original sen-

tence. The rationale of the decisions seems to be that -

the defendant in’ seeking and obtaining a new trial

must be deemed to have consented to a wiping out of

all the ant cited of the first trial. slog |

262 N. C. at 56, 136 S. E. 2d at 208 (Emphasis supplied.)

The principle of fair dealing which impels judges in pass-

ing,sentence to. take into account the time a defendant was

tutional rights had been violated upon your motion, and that

was all done away with. We are now confronted with a new

day. ” ¥ ‘. et

—« Oem noteworthy, however, that the North Carolina Supreme

. Court has, on occasion boggled at this Draconian doctrine. In

State v. Weaver,. 264 N. C. 681, 142 S. E. 2d 633 (1965), the

court quoted with approval from an opinion by the Massachusetts

Supreme Court, Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N. E.

2d 922, 35 A. Li R. 2d 1277 (1952), as follows ;

“It is hardly realistic to say that nine months in the State

prison amount to nothing—that since the petitioner ‘should not

_ have been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all.’

[Citation omitted.] Moreover, * * * the time served before

w the reversal of the sentence might in some other case be 80

- long that glaring and intolerable injustice would result if

the time served. on a first sentence should not be taken -into

. . aecount in imposing a second sentence. It is not even. tech-

' nicafly correct to say that the first sentence must now

deemed to have been a nullity. Jt was not a nullity when

was imposed or while it was being served.”

- Id. at 685, (142 §. E. 2d. at 636. ¢Emphasis supplied by North

Carolina Supreme Court.) The: North Carolina. court added that

“(t]he hard fact of his [Weaver’s] actual service of sentence

* © © cannot be ignored.” Id. at 686, 142 8. E. 2d at 637. . Weaver,

however, was a case in which the second sentence imposed on the .

defendant was the maximum allowable under the statute, so that

added to the time already served undef the ‘invalid first sentence,

' the punishment exceeded the statutory maximum.

,

tet ide CRiarttoih wren eR Pie abl

- to seek redress.’ For this reason, the District Court de-

‘trates a prisoner

- a new trial: .

?

28

deprived of his liberty while awaiting trial, Dunn v. United

States, 376 F.-2d-191 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1967), insists even

- -more inexorably that he shall not be finessed dut of credit

for time he. was forced to serve undef an invalid sentence.

The trial and conviction may be ‘voided on, appeal, but the

time illegally exacted by the unconstitutional sentence is an

irreversible fact. It: is grossly unfair for society to take.

five years of a man’s life and then say, we now acknowledge

that this should‘not have happened, but we will set every-

thing right by refusing to recognize that it did happen: This

_is.an unworthy pretense. ‘Courts should not be astute to

fashion legal fictions to attain unjust ends.*

>The risk of a denial of credit or the risk of a greater

sentence, or both, on retria! may prevent defendants who

have been unconstitutionally convicted from attempting

-

ease

© Judge Edgerton, in King\v. United States, 98 F. 2d 291 (D. C. -

Cir. 1938) characterized as “in the vein of The Mikado” the gov-

ernment’s arguments that because the initial sentence was void,

an accused “has served no sentence but has merely spent time in

the penitentiary,” and, that ‘since the defendant “should not have

“been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all.” He

facetiously suggested as logical corollaries to such arguments that

the accused should also be “liable in quasi-contract for thé value

of his board and lodging, and criminally liable for obtaining them

by false pretenses.” Id. at 293-94. a

t Judge Craven himself has received a letter which vividly illus-

’s fear of obtaining an increased sentence following

“Dear Sir: pial :

... - Tam in the Mecklenburg County jail. Mr chose

to re-try me as I kneW he would.

. : * * * *# sfx

Sir the other defendant in this case was set free after serving

15 months of his sentence. I have served 34 months and

‘now I am to be tried again and with all probility F-will

f

?

| :

receive a heavier sentence then before as you know sir my .

Ya

.

29

~ elared that predicating Patton’s constitutional right to peti-

tion for a fair trial on the fiction that he has consented.

to a possibly harsher punishment, offends the due process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." It would confront’

_ , the prisoner with the unhappy choice of either abandoning ©

__ his constitutional right to a fair trial and serving out his

prisgn term under the invalid sentence, or éxercising that

right. under the hazard, in the event of a second conviction,

of being treated as though. the years of. imprisonment al-

‘ready Served had never occurred.

Zz

| N cts

sentence at the first trile was 20 to 30 years. I know it is

usuelly the courts prosedure to give a larger sentence when

' a new-trile is granted I guess this is to discourage Petitioners.

¥ Your Honor, I don’t want a new trile I am afraid of more

ime * * ®, .

7

Your Honor, I know you have tried to help me and God

knows I apreceate this but please sir don’t let the state re-try

me if there is any: way yer can prevent it. :

Very truly yours”

256 F. Supp. at 231 n. 7. (Italics omitted.)

7@ Cf. State v. Wolf, 46 N. J. 301, 306, 216 A. 2d 586, 590-591

(1966). There the defendant, convicted of first-degree murder

‘with a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, succeeded in

obtaining a reversal on the basis of certain errors (non-constitu-

tional in nature) committed at the trial. In holding that the State

was barred on retrial from again seeking the death penalty, the .

‘» Supreme Court of New Jersey found it unnecessary to decide

whether the double jeopardy clause of either the federal or the.

staté constitution,‘or the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment was applicable. The unanimous decision: was based —

instead on certain “procedural policies” which were “of the essence

of the administration of criminal justice.”

*That this is a very. real risk and not merely hypothetical is

indigated by an informal survey conducted: by the Duke Law

Journal which revealed that in 72% of the retrials occasioned by

the denial of counsel at the first trial, credit for time already

served was effectively denied. Note, Increased Sentence and De-

nial of Credit on Retrial Sustained Under - Traditional ‘Waiver

Theory, 1965 Duke, L. J. 395, 399 n. 25. joes

2

*

e 2 ~

er pail ¥ me Ne

.

.

r CeCTRRR ye Lid ey ahead

30 ©

[2] This is like. the “grisly choice” discountenanced in

Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d. 837.

(1963). “The law should not, and in our judgment does not,

place the defendart in such an incredible dilemma.” Green

v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. Ed. 2d

199 (1957).° North Carolina deprives the accused of the

constitutional right to a fair trial, then dares him to assert

his right by threatening him with the risk of a longer sen-

‘-ténce. It may not exact this price. Enjoyment of a. benefit

or. protection provided by law cannot be conditioned upon

_ the “waiver” of a constitutional right."

*In Green, it was argued that the deferidant had “waived” the

benefit of his first trial, in which he escaped conviction for 4

higher offense, as a condition for appealing his conviction of the

lesser one. See United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.

2d 844, 859. (2d Cir. 1965), where an analogous argument was

rejected with the observation that it “ignore[s] the -elementary

psychological] realities” and presumes “a barter theory of fair-

ness”; and United ‘States v. Waiker, 346 FP. 2d 428 (4th Cir.

1965), declaring that a defendant’s motion to vacate his defec-

tive sentence could not be considered a waiv

“In reality, whatever his words to aces Walker obvi-

‘dusly did not desire to chance a greater term. If in law his

wish ‘to vacate’ embraced that unnatural decision, he should

not be held to it.” = -- . .

346 F. 2d at 431. :

The Supreme Court has on numerous oceasions articulated its

concern that access to post-conviction remedies be unfettered. See,

e.g., Fay v. Noia, supra; Douglas v. State of California, 372 U. S.

353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed. 2d 811 (1963) ; Green v. United States,

supra; Griffin y. People of State of Illinois, 351 U. S. 12,’ 76

S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956) ; Cichos v. State of Indiana,

385 U. S. 1020, 87 S. Ct. 699, 17 L. Ed. 2d 559 (Nov, 14, 1966)

-(Fortas, J., dissenting) ; United States v. Ewell, 383 U. s. 116,

- 126, 86S. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).

10 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U: S. 301, 85

S. Ct. 1493, 14 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1965) ; Griffin v. California, 380

U. S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14-L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965) ; Sherbert v.

Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963) ;

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1832, 2 L..Ed. 2d 1460

Sai Sse TART

31

Indeed, this circuit has already held it impermissible to

force upon an accused the risk of more severe punishment

asa condition for securing a constitutional right. In United

States v. Walker, 346 F. 2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965), the defen.

dant was initially sentenced in his absence. When he suc-

cessfully attacked the sentence 6n this ground, he was re-

sentenced to a tonger term. Judge Bryan, speaking for the

court criticized the trial judge’s disregard of the original.

- sentence: ae ee . :

| ; ce

“{TJhe-import of the [District] Court’s ruling was to

‘condition his baer a right to seek correction

upon the risk of another sentence, then unforeseeable

in nature and extent. Thus, though not so intending, the

Court potentially penalized him for asserting the privi-

&

lege. This the law forbids * * * . [Citing Green vy. -

United States, 355 U. S. 184, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. Ed. 24°

184. (1957).]

It [the second, harsher sentence ] -was, in sum, the

product of a procedure which could prove either de- |

terring or punitive of an insistence en Constitutional

privileges.” ™ ; f2

346 F. 2d at 430-431,

(1958) ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. y. Railroad Comm’n, 271

U. S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101 (1926). See also Van

Alstyne, In Gideon’s Wake: Harsher Penalties and the “Success-

ful” Criminal Appellant, 74 Yale L. J. 606 (1965) ; Note, Uncon-

' stitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960).

32 ma . a “

The District Court held that Patton’s punishment could

- not-be increased unless evidence justifying a harsher sen-

tence appeared in the record, and that the State must bear

the burden of showing that stich facts were introduced at

the second trial, since “where -the record disclose[d] no-

colorable reason for harsher punishment,” the effect would

be to inhibit the constitutional right-to seek a new trial.

256 F. Supp. at 236. We agree with the District Court that:

it is an impossible task for the prisoner to prove improper

motivation of the trial judge. It is equally impossible, and

most distasteful, for federal courts to pry into the sen- ‘

tencing judge’s motivation to ascertain whether vindictive-

ness played a part. achat ss

We do not think, howeyer, that a defendant’s rights are

-adequately protected even if a second sentencing judge

is restricted: to’ increasing’ sentence only on the basis of

- new evidence. We are. in accord with the First Circuit,

which has recently held that a sentence may not, be in-’

creased following a successful appeal, even where addi- °

tional testiniony has been intfoduced at the second trial.

“The danger that the government may succeed in ob-,

taining more damaging evidence on a retrial is just as

real as the danger, for ‘example, that the judge on his

own may wish to-reconsider, unfavorably to the defen-

dant, the factors which led to his original disposition.

We think that there must be repose not merely as to—

the severity of the court’s view, but as to the severity”

of the crime.” ***

32 One commentator has noted that the strongest reason for denial

of credit is the desire of courts to discourage appeals. Whalen, - —

Resentence without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection

of the Laws; 35 Minn. L. Rev. 239, 248 (1951).

12a Marano held flatly that it would be improper for*the court

to increase the sentence on the basis of additional testimony which .

Pies

e .

.

33

Marano v. United States, 374 F. 2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. Mar.

23, 1967). Contra, Starner v. Russell, 378 F. 2d 808 (3rd

Cir. May 25, 1967). - o

An analogy may be drawn between the solution arene

-by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S.

335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9'L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), in response to the

‘problems raised by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.'S.. 455, 62 S. Ct.

1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942), and‘the issue here.* The Court

had earlier held in Betts :that whether the conviction of

an unrepresented-defendant was a denial of due process de-

pended upon whether “special circumstances” existed which

would, in a particular case, “constitute. a denial of funda-

mental fairness.” 316 U. S, at 462, 62'S. Ct.-at 1256. But

- in Gideon, there was forthright recognition that to require

such a showing, in an area in which the chance of undetect-

able prejudice is so great, was too heavy a burden to cast

_. upon an accused. The controlling point was not that the

_ absence of counsel necessarily prejudiced the defendant,

~ but that it created the opportumity for unfairness. For this

reason, the Gideon Court made the presumption of injury

irrebutable,

[3] Similarly, improper motivation characteristically

- a force of low visibility. In order to prevent abuses, the

fixed policy must necessarily be that the new sentence shall

not exceed the old. Seldom will this policy te in inade-

came out at the new trial, but suggested by way of dictum that in

some circumstances it might not be “inappropriate for the court .

to take subsequent events [as disclosed in a new pre-sentence

report] into consideration, both good and bad.” As to the dictum,

we do not agree, for the reasons déveloped ‘in the text of this

opinion.

- ER. Note, The Defendant’s Challenge to a Racial Criterion in

Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal

Protection, 74 Yale L. J. "919 (1965).

Ch esha es

we 2

a:

2

quate punishment. Against the -rare possibility of inade-

quacy, greater weight must be “giver to the- -danger. inherent

in a system permitting. stiffer sentences on retrial—that

the added punishment was in reaction to the defendant’s

‘temerity in attacking the original conviction. . Even the

_ appearance, of improper motivation is a disservice to the

administration of justice.

Ill. Equal Protection

‘The ‘equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-.

ment likewise compels a rule barring a sentence in excess

of the one invalidated, and this protection extends even

to one seeking to avail himself of a state’s post-conviction

remedies because of non-constitutional e errors in the origi-

nal trial.** eras

North Carolina strictly forbids an increase in a defen:

dant’s sentence after the trial court’s term has expired and

service of sentence has commenced.’® Thus the threat of

‘a heavier sentence falls solely on those who utilize the post-

conviction procedures provided by the State. If the State

wishes to institute a system permitting upward revision of

_sentences, it must proceed upon a rational basis in select-

ing the class of prisoners it will subject to this threat. It

may niot discriminate in this regard against those who have.

availed themselves. of the right to a fair trial. This

is an arbitrary classification offensive to the equal -protec-

4 See Whaley : v. North Carolin, 4 Cir., 379 F, 2d 221 (decided

this day).

BEg State v. Lawrence, 264 N. C. 220, 141 S. E. 2d 264

41965), "State v. McLamb, 203 N. C. 442, 166 S. E. 507 ote

State v. Warren, 92 N. C. 825 (1885).

+n,

Tey

: . 35 ,

tion clause.** As the court-appointed counsel for the defen-

dant has put it: !

“The risk of a harsher sentence is borne exclusively - if

by those who pursue some post-conviction remedy. Yet /

there is no reason to suppose that the original sen-

teuces of this group are any more likely to warrant:

review as a class than the sentences of other convicts

who are not subject to the same risk. The vulnerable

. 7° See McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 85 S. Ct.

283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964), which declares that classification

“must always rest upon some difference which bears a reason- .

able and just relation to the act in respect to which the classi-

fication is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily, and -

without. any such basis.” a:

Id. at 190, 85 S. Ct. at 287 [quoting from Gulf; C. & 8. F. R. Co. c

.Y. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155, 17 S. Ct. 255, 41 L. Ed. 666 (1897)].

See also, é.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457,77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L.

Ka. 2d 1485 (1957) ; Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U. 8S. 535,

62 8. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed: 1655 (1942). :

The issue has been phrased by one writer as follows :

“Is there any rational justification for punishing this defen-

dant substantially more than others who committed the same

offense; simply because this defendant’ was not given a fair °

trial or was not properly sentenced the first time?”

Whalen, sntence without Credit for Time Served: Unequal

Protection of the Laws, 35: Minn. L. Rev. 239, 245 (1951). (Italies

_ in original.) His answer is that

_ “there is no sound rationale for this treatment of an unfortu- —

nate class of criminal defendants. The injustice and illegality

of the treatment the defendant has received before his first

sentence began is no jtstification for diseriminating against

him at a second proceeding. *** - Bs: Sass

“It scarcely needs argument to show that the circunistance

that the defendant has received treatment in the first instance

which was violative of the Constitution is not a valid reason -

for making the distinction. Nor is it a policy congruent with

our constitution to permit courts to deny credit for time al-

— served, and thus discourage the use of review proce-

ures.” .

Id.‘ at 251.

~~

36

class appears to be quite equivalent to a class described

_ by race, right- handedness, 1 indigence, or some other fac-

tor equally irrelevant in any proper determination of

those whose sentences might appropriately be re-..

“viewed.” 7 =i

Not only is the dinitiension not a rational means for ef-

fectuating any legitimate state policy, but it also frustrates

the pursuit of post-conviction: remedies provided by the

State. Courts should be especiall? vigilant to protect access

to these remedies, rather than strive to fashion a doctrine

inhibiting the exercise of the right to review.”

. Van Alstyne,. In Gideon’s Wake: Harsher Penalties and the

“Successful” Criminal Appellant, 74 Yale L.-J. 606, 683 (1965)

' The instan does not confront us with the question of

whether the classification is reasonably related to a valid legislative

purpose. The distinction we are asked to hold unconstitutional is.

solely a judicial creation, and thus cannot claim the presumption -

in favor of a legislatively declared public policy. There can be no

‘ justificdfion, nor has the State offered any, for special treatment

- of this isolated class.’ Even if the State were to attempt to’ treat

as a ial class subject to increased penalties those as to whom

additional adverse information were discovered after the first sen-

tencing, the short answer, as we have shown, would be that this is

prohibited. As Judge Marshall said in United States ex rel.

Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844, 859 (2d Cir. 1965): -

“It is difficult to understand how the fundamental unfairness —

inherent in allowing a prosecutor to ‘do better a second time’

(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Brock v.. North Caro-

lina, supra, 344 U. S. [424] at 429, 73 S. Ct. [349], at 351,°

97, L. Ed. 456) is mitigated by conditioning this second chance

on a successful appeal by the accused.”

18 See Griffin v. People of State.of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76.

. §. Ct. 585, 590, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956), holding that even ’ though

- “a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide

appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all,” it cannot,

without vidlating the due process and equal protection clauses, .

grant appellate review in such a way that some convicted defen-

dants are discriminated against. This thought was further ampli-

fied by Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment:

aw

i

‘Even if the State’s policy is to prevent insubstantial ap- .”

peals, limiting the class to syccessful appellants would not

be a ‘rational means of accomplishing this purpose, since

it has too broad a sweep—chilling meritorious appeals as —

well as frivolous ones. The inequity of such a system is

—_

apparent when it is realized that only prisoners whose ap-

peals have been found meritorious are subjected to the peril

- of a higher resentence. Ironically, those whom the State

admits having initially denied a fair trial are the only

ones who stand to receive greater punishment. Thus, the

do not pyirsue post-conviction remedies might also have

been too leniently sentenced, and overinclusive, since not all .

bearing the risk (and thus deterred from attacking an un- —

constitutional convict

lightly.”

io mt class is both underinclusive, in that those who

IV. Double Jeopardy

[4] In view of the foregoing, ‘we need npt rest our de-

cision on’ double jeopardy grounds. We are persuaded,

however, that the constitutional protection against double

“(Neither the fact that a State may deny’ the right of appeal _

altogether nor the right of a State to make an appropriate |

classification; * *'* nor the right of a State to lay down con-

ditions it deems appropriate for criminal appeals, sanctions

differentiationg by a State that have no relation to a rational

policy of criminal appeal or authorizes the imposition ‘of con-

ditions that offend the deepest presuppositions of our society.”

351 U. S at 21-22, 76 8, Ct. at 592.- See also Douglas v. State of

Californs,°372 U. 8. 353, 365, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 24.811

(1963) (dissenting opinion). ©: \

** Tussman & tenBroek, The’ Equal Protection of the Laws, 37,

Calif. L. Rev. 341, 344.53'(1949). a |

>

n) were originally dealt with too.

ii o . 38

jeopardy would also be violated if an increased sentence or

‘a denial of credit is permitted on retrial.”

[5] Double jeopardy, rather than being a single doctrine,

‘is actually comprised of three separate though related

rules,” p rohibiting (1) reprosecution for the same offense

following acquittal,”.(2) reprosecution for the same offense

follows g conv ietion,” and (3) multiple punishment for the

e find ourselves in full accord with the Second Circuit in

United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844 (2d Cir.

* 1965), as to the resolution of the issue of whether the double

jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states.

That court concluded that at least certain of the policies militating

. agpinst placing a defendant twice in jeopardy are “incompatible

with due process of law.” Id. at 850. As that circuit found true

of the multiple prosecutions to which Hetenyi was subjected,

similarly, we think that the North Carolina practice of permitting

an accused, who has successfully appeaiod his conviction, to bear

the risk of an increased sentence :

“lijs that kind of double j Tonal eee [which] has subjected

him {to] a hardship so acute and shocking that our policy

will not endure it * * * [and] violate[s] those ‘fundamental

principles of liberty and justice which lie at %he ,base of all

our civil and political institutions.’”

Palko v. Connecticut; “302 U. S. 319, 328, 58 S. Ct. 149, 153, 82

L. Ed. 288 (1937).

21 See Ceaensek, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262 (1965). 2

22 United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 671/16 S. Ct. 1192, 41 .

L. Ed. 300 (1896). See Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 35 .

Cal. Rptr. 77 (1957), for the doctrine of “implied acquittal.” This

doctrine Ras been expanded to include punishment as well as degree

of offense. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77,

“ae

+ 386 P. 2d 677 (1963).

2 E.g., In re Nielson, 131 U. 8. i76, 9S. Ct. 672, 33 L, Ed. 118

(1889). -Cf. Downum v: United States, 372 U. S. 734, 83 Ct.

1033, 10 L..Ed. 2d 100 (1963) (reprosecution barred followin is-

trial ‘due to actions of the government).

a

“ay fe

ae

. same offense.” In Green vy, United States, 355. U. S. 184, :

78'S. Ct. 221, 2.L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957), the Supreme Court

invoked the first rule, that an accused may not be reprose-

cuted for the offense of which he was acquitted at the first

trial. The Court held that the double jeopardy clause pre-

cluded a retrial for first-degree murder following defen-

dant’s successful appeal from his conviction of second-

degree murder, on the theory that the jury in the first

trial, by returning a verdict of second-degree murder, im-

pliedly acquitted him of the charge of first-degree murder.

[6] Ina footnote, the Green majority declared—without

further explanation—that Stroud y. United States, 251 U, S.

15, 40 S. Gt. 50, 64 L. Kd: 103 (1919), was “cleatly dis-

tinguishable.”* 355 U. S, at 195, n. 15, 78 S. Ct. 221,

* E.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872

- (1873).. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329. U. 8. 459,

462, 67 S. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422 (1947).

26 Justice Frankfurter, however, maintained that it was all but

impossible to distinguish the two. situations:

“As a practical matter and on any Basis of human values, it is

searcely possible to distinguish a case in which the defendant

is convicted of a greater offense from one in which he’ is-con-

victed of an offense that has the same’ name as that of which ©

he was previously convicted but @arries a significantly differ-

ent punishment,-namely death rather than imprisonment.”

” 355 U. 8. gen 38 S. Ct. at 237 . (dissenting opinion). The

urt

Supreme C of California, in People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d

482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P. 2d 677 (1963), agreed with Justice

Frankfurter that Stroud had been vitiated by Green. Justice —

Traynor, speaking for the majority, therefore held that an aceused

may not be given a more severe sentence on retrial. obtained after

@ successful attack on his first conviction. The rationale appears

to be that in fixing the punishment at imprisonment for life, the

defendant was “acquitted” of the death penalty and ‘hence was

protected by the double jeopardy prohibition from “retrial” on

the greater of the alternative punishménts, (The double jeopardy

- provision in the California constitution is substantially identical

to that of the Fifth Amendment, so that the court did not have

VeeleiesS

, p

\ . A

Pere See ‘ a a Pern . . 7

Serenity a RS IRIN nit alt SA tid Sing gpecbe a ani iw wegen g yin’

‘ .

? d “/ . .

— ¢ ,

ine ace non iy Smelt Ai has * Palatal RE TBS BF pais? Se

a

40

G

21, Ed. 24 199. There the defendant’ was retried for first

degree murder and sentenced to death, following reversal

of his prior conviction, for which he had received a sen:

| tence of life imprisonment. From a reading of the Stroud

opinion, it appears that the case was ‘argued. to the Court

on the theory that the defendant was put twice in jeopardy |

for the same offenge:merely by being retried on an indict-

ment for first degree murder.” There is no indication that

the Court was presented -with the argument that the risk’ -

of an increased. penalty on retrial violates the double

jeopardy. clause by being a double punishment for the same

offense. Stroud thus stands for no more than the well-estab-

lished proposition that the double jeopardy clause does not

entitle a defendant’ who successfully attacks his conviction |

.». to absolute immunity from reprosecution.”’ ;

“It, is clear, therefore, that the Court was concerned in |

Greénonly with that aspect of double jeopardy which pro-

e hi ; ; .

*

: ~~. + :

to determine whether the Fifth Amendment provision itself was

applicable.) sia,” ee

‘+ The California courts have not limited the application of the

double jeopardy provision. to-.cases in which the prosecutor has"

- * gought on the second trial to raise the punishment to the death

- penalty, but have also followed the-rule laid down in Henderson |

where longer prison ‘sentencés are involved. People v. Nanga-

‘Parbet Ali, 57 Cal. Rptr, 348, 424 P. 2d 932 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Mar.

3; 1967) ; In re Ferguson, 233 Cal. ‘App. 2d 79, 43 Cal. Rptr. 325 —

(1965). . . . ;

«

‘

26 The Court discussed only that aspect of double jeopardy which

protects a°defendant from a “second trial” and held that since’

the accused had himself appealed his conviction and sought a new

tfial,.he was, not entitled to invoke the double jeopardy provision

of the Constitution. 251 U. 8: at 18, 40 S. Ct. 50.

27 See, e.g. Bryan v. United States, 338 U. S. 552, 70 S. Ct.

317, 94 L. Ed. 335 (1950) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662,

16 S. Ct. 1192, 41 L. Ed. 300 (1896). -

«

-

. &

e 41.

hibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense, and was

not faced with the precise question’ that is before us—

whether a harsher punishment following retrial for the .

same offense is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.

Patton analogizes his situation to that in Green, assert-. _

ing that as Green was “impliedly acquitted” of the greater

degree of murder when he was convicted of the lessér de-

gree of that offense, similarly, Patton was “acquitted” of

any higher penalty when he was sentenced to twenty years’

imprisonment. And as the accused in Green was protected

by the double jeopardy clause from retrial for first degree

murder, by a parity of reasoning, Patton contends that the

double jeopardy clause protects him from being “retried”

_ for the penalty of which he had been “acquitted” at his first.

trial, namely, anything between the twenty years he actu- .

ally received and the statutory maximum. On retrial, he

_ asserts, he. could only be ‘given’ “up. to the degree of pun-

ishment of which he was originally convicted.” *

~ Defendant recognizes, and we agree, that to maintain

that he was “acquitted” at the first trial of any penalty:

greater than twenty years, is as much a fiction as that he

_ has “waived” the benefit of his initial sentence by appeal-

ing his conviction.” For this reason, we do not rest solely

on the “implied acquittal” doctrine, preferring to emphasize

a’ somewhat different. aspect of double jeopardy—the pro-

hibition against multiple punishment. See Ex parte Lange, -

- 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1873).°° It is this

8 Van Alstyne, ap. cit. supra, note 17, at 635. See Whaley v.

- North’ Carolina, 379 F. 2d 221 (decided this day). |

2° See ‘Part II, supra. oe oe ake

8° “Tf there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England

and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfuily punished . ~

for the same offence. And * * * there has never been any doubt -

a ae

42

aspect which has been consistently relied upon to prohibit —

an increase in a defendant’s sentence, once service has com-

-menced. E.g., Ex parte Lange, supra; United States v. -

_ Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307, 51S. Ct. 113, 75 L. Ed. 354 (1931) ;-

United States v. Sacco, 367 F. 9d 368 (2d Cir. 1966) ; United

“States v. Adams, 362-F. 2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Kennedy

v. United States, 330 F. 2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964).

We perceive no constitutionally significant distinction

between the increases prohibited in the. eases cited above

and an increase in punishinent following retrial. Thus,

unless a defendant is held to waive this double jeopardy

protection in seeking a new trial, a harsher penalty may

not be imposed. And we have already declared, in Part IT.

of this opinion, that we decline to predicate a prisoner’s

exercise of his right to seek a new trial on the fiction that

he has “waived” the bénefits of his initial sentence, because

of the restrictive effect this has on access to post-conviction

remedies.” ‘This is in accord with this circuit’s decision |

‘of * * * [this rule’s] entire and complete protection ofthe party

when a second -punishment is proposed ‘in the same court, on the

same facts, for the same statutory offence. ;

[T]he Constitution was, designed as much to prevent the

criminal from being twwe punished for the same offence as

being twice tried for 1.” |

85 U.S. at 168, 173, 21 L. Ed. 872. (Emphasis supplied.)

‘That the framers, were concernéd with multiple punishment is

indicated: hy the text of.the double jeopgrdy provision initially

proposed by Madison, cited in Green v. United States, 355 U. S.

184, 201-202, 78 S. Ct. 221, 231 (1957) (dissenting opinion of

Frankfurter, J.): “No person shall be subject, except in cases of

impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for ‘the

- game offence * * *.” (Emphasis supplied. )

31 The primary focus of the majority opinion in Green was not

on protecting the accused from reprosecution per se, but on ‘pro-

-tecting his access to post-conviction remedies. See United States

> Tees a Nien te Ny anette gnats nee

: ST gies. ’ 48

in United States v. Walker; 346 F. 2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965), -

that, in seeking correction of an erroneous sentence, a de-

fendant does not waive his double jeopardy right not to be

subjected to multiple punishment. See Walsh v. United

States, 374 F. 2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1967) and Ekberg v. |

United States, 167 F. 2d 380, 388 (1st Cir. 1948), discussed _

more extensively in Whaley v. North Carolina, 4 Cir., 379

F’, 2d 221 (decided this day). -

To summarize, we conclude that increasing Patton’s

punishment after the reversal of his initial conviction con-

stitutes a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights

in that it exacted an unconstitutional condition to the ex-

ercise of his right to a fair trial, arbitrarily denied him

the equal protection of the law, and placed him twice in

jeopardy of punishment for- the same offense. ‘

We affirm the District Court’s order to release the defen-

dant from confinement unless he is constitutionally resen-

tenced by the state court to a term not exceeding 20 years

from the date of_his original sentence, passed on October

26, 1960, with full credit for the time already served.**

~ Affirmed.’ 2

27 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Fortas, J.) :

“Although the decision in Green was premised upon the Double

Jeopardy Clause, its teaching has another dimension. Green

also demonstrates this Court’s concern to protect the right of .

appeal in criminal cases.”

ee also Van Alstyne, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 632. a J .

- See Note, 80 Harv. L. Rev: 891, 896-97 (1967), where this:

concept was developed with specific reference to the District

‘

Court’s decision in the present case.

v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 127-128, 86 §. Ct, 778, 780, 15 L. Ed. 24 |

3 Consequently, having now served nearly 7 years of his 20

year sentence, Patton is presently eligible to be considered for -

parole. See N..C. Gen. Stat. §148-58 -(Replacement vol. 1964),°”

which provides that a prisoner shall be eligible for parole after -

serving a fourth of a determinate sentence.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.