Opinion — Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View

SUPREME COURT OF THE ; UNITED-STATES

No. 130.—Ocrosr Temi 968.

Christine: Sniadach, Petitioner, On Writ of Ne tiorari to

‘wv. ;

th Court f

Family Finance Conndiaiion of | pontiac . ,

ae Bay View et al. nM prea *

[June-9, 19699 ~

Mr. Justice Doves delivered the opinion of the

Court.

- Respondent instituted a garnishment actioi: against

petitioner as defendant and Miller Harris Instrumént Co.,

as her employer, as garnishee. The complaint’ alleged

a claim of $420 on a promisory note.. The garnishee

filed its answer stating it had wages of $63. 18 under its

control earned by petitioner and unpaid, and that it

would pay one-half to petitioner ‘as a subsistence allow-.

ance’ and hold the other half subject to the order of

the court. |

Petitioner moved that the garnishment proceedings be

dismissed for failure to satisfy the due process require-

ments of the Fourteenth endment. The ‘Wiséonsin

Supreme Court sustained tl lower state court in approv-

ing the procedure. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N. W. 2d 259.

The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari.

393 U. S. 1078.

| * Wis. Stat. § 267.18 (2) (a) provides:

“When wages or salary are a Ne Oe No Og

garnishee shall pay over to thd principal defendant on the date when

such wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence

allowance, out of the wages then owing, in the sum of $25

in the case of an individual without. dependents or $40 in the case

of an individual with dependents: but in no event in exceas of 50%

of the wages or salary owing. Said subsistence allowance shall be

vuumae eee

said garnishment action.”

Ct...

"8 Wis, Stat. § 267,04 (1).

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: Y FINANCE

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sidie the garnishee.

* peti se dee seaiel Shevinlaien

- She nonetheless claims that the Wisconsin garnishment ‘

procedure violates that due process required by the Four- ws

teenth Amendment, in that notice ‘and. an opportinity

to be heard are not. given before the in rem seizure of the

wages. What happens in Wisconsin is that the clerk |

of the court, issues-the summons at the request of the

creditor's. lawyer; and it is the latter who: by serving

- the garnishee sets in motion the-machinery whereby the -

_ Wages are frozen." They may, it ig true, be unfrozen if |

the trial of the main suit’ is ever had and the wage

ie Bip ans sing gaat But in the interim the wage

earner is deprived of his enjoyment of earned wages

without any opportunity to be heard and to tender any

defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise.

Such summary procedure may well meet the require- :

. “ments of due process in extraordinary situations. Cf.

. Fahey v. Mallonee,‘332.U; 8. 245, 253-254; Ewing v.

. Mytinger .& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600;

Ownbery vy. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 110-112; : Coffin Bros.

v. Bennett, 277 U.S.-29, 31: But inthe present case no _

- _ situation requiring special protection to a state.or creditor «~

interest is presented by’ the facts;.nor is the Wisconffin

statute’ narrowly drawn: to meet any such unusual con-—

dition. Petitioner “was ‘resident ‘of this Wisconsin ts

- » Community . and jn 0h pagers fuviaGietine was readily

* obtainable. ©

- The: question is not Ghether pe Wisconsin isw is a

| : wike law or unwise law. Oe concern. is not what ae

: * Wis. Stat. $207.07 (1)...

SNIADACH v. FAMILY FINANCE CORP. 3

__ losophy Wisconsin should or should not embrace. See

_ Green v. Frazier, 253 U:. 8. 233. We do not sitias a —

. guper-legislative body. In this case the sole-question is

whether there has been a taking of property without

that procedural due process that is required by the Four- oe

teenth Amendment... We have dealt over and again

with\ the question of what constitutes “the right to be

heard” (Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. 8. 208, 212) .

’ “within the meaning of procedural due process. ‘See

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. 8. 306,

314. In the latfer case we said thait the right to be heard

‘has little reality. or worth unless one is informed that

the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether

to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” 339 U. S.,

_ at 314. In the context of. this cise the: question is

_ whether the interim freezing of the wages without a

chance to be heard violates procedural due process. 2

A procedural.rule that may satisfy due process for

attachments in general, see McKay v. MclInness, 279

U.S. 820,” does not, necessarily. satisfy procedural due

process in every case. The fact that a procedure would

pass muster under a feudal regime does not- mean it

gives necessary protection to all property in its modern *

forms. We deal here with wages—a specialized type of ”

property presenting distinct problems in our economit

= system. . We turn then to the nature of that property

‘and problems of procedural due protess.

A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a

‘taking which may impose tremendous hardship on wage

earners with families to support. Until a recent Act of -

-* Congress,‘ § 304 of which forbids discharge of employees

on the :ground that their wages have been -garnisheed,

| ce Over ‘and:

482 Stat. 146, het of May 2, 1968.

A “SNIADACH v. FAMILY FINANCE CORP.

beyond that was the great drain oi family income. As

stated by Congressman Reuss: * ey :

' “The idea of wage garnishment in advance of judg-

ment, of trustee process, of wage’ attachment, or

‘whatever it is called is a most inhuman doctritie.

It.compels the wage earner, trying to keep his fam- _.

ily together, to. be driven below the poverty level.” .

yee investigations. of the: - problem have disclosed

the grave injustices made possible by prejudgment gar- _

‘nishment. whereby the sole apportunity to be heard comes

after the taking. Congressman Sullivan,. Chairman of

. the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs who held

‘ extensive hearings on this and related problems stated :

_- “What we know from our study of this problem is

that in a vast number of cases the'debt is a fraudu--

lent one, saddled on a poor, ignorant person who is

trapped in any easy credit nightmare in which he is

' charged double for sémething he could -not pay for.

~even if the _proper price was called for, and then

- hounded into giving up his-pound of flesh, and being

' - fired besides.” 114 Cong. Rec. Pp. H 688 (1968).

The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is

_ enormous. , The ¢éreditor tenders not only’ the original

_ debt but the “collection fees”. incurred ody its attorne ¥

- in the. garnishment proceedings:

. “The debtor whose: wages are tied up by a writ of

garnishment, and who is usually in need of money, -

is in no position to resist demands for collection fees.

If the debt is small, the debtor will be under-eon--

siderable pressure to pay the debt and collection

: charges in order to get his wages back, If the debt

is large, he will often sign a new contract of ‘ ‘pay-

_ 5114 Cong. Rec., p. H688 (1968).

>

_ SNIADACH ». F. FINANCE CORP. °5

-ment sehedule’ which incorporates these additional ..

charges.” ° . \

Apart from those collateral ‘donsequinees, it appears

that in Wisconsin the statutory exemption granted the

wage earner’ is “generally insufficient to ween ‘the

debtor for any one week.” ® .

The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of ee 4,

Wisconsin type may. as a practical matter drive a wage- . ” |

earning family to the wall.* Where the taking of one’s

_ property ‘is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to = = «

conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing (cf. Coe

v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237.U. S,, 413, 423) this pre-

judgment ‘garnishment procedure violates the funda-

7 mental — of due _—— ee ae Fs

Reversed.

- 6 Comment, Wase antennas ir Sitiabieas Empirical _

Study; 43 Wash. L. Rev. 742, 753 (1968). And see comment, Wage: .

Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 ‘Wis. L; Rev: 759. ;

TS ee n. 1, supra.

8 Comment, — Garnichment # as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis.

- L. Rev. 7

*“For- a r - inan—enid hogeer owt of the wage of the.

affluent being attached ?—to lose part of his salary often means his-*

family will go. without the essentials. No man sits by while his

family goes hungry or without heat. He either files for consumer

bankruptcy, and tries to begin again, or just quits his job and goes

on relief Where is the equity, the common sense in such @ process?”

Congressman Gonzales, 114 Cong. Rec., p. H 690 (1968). For the —

‘impact of garilishment on personal bankruptcies see H. ——

No. 1040, 90th Cong., ee 20-21.

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| SUPREME count OF. THE. UNITED stars B

No. 190)—Ocrooes Tex, 08

i 43

‘9 . Sniadec, Petitioner, On. Wil of Certiorart to

ily Sinker oroisiied of. { mapa ane OF

a ee ep RUA ae

f Cs : Nis

: " soaptiensch . [June 9, 1960.1

——

°.7

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Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring. Yer ot eh

Particularly in light of my Brothet BLack’s dissent,

I think it not amiss for me to make explicit the precise

basis on which I join the Court’s opinion. ‘The “prop-. ”

erty” of which petitioner has been deprived is the use of '

the garnished portion of her wages during the interim

period between the garnishment and. the culmination ©

‘of the main suit. Since this deprivation cannot be

characterized as de minimis, she must be accorded the —

___usual requisites of procedural due’ ‘process: notice and a.

prior hearing.

The réjoinder which this stiteinicin' of position tine

‘drawn from my Brother BLack prompts an additional. —

word. ‘His and my divergence in this case rests,-I think, =

~~ upon a basic difference over whether the Due Process

_ Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits state action

by norms of “fundamental fairness” whose: content in ,

judicially derived not alone,

as my: colleague believes it should be, from the specifics

-of the Constitufion, but also, as I believe, from concepts

which are part of the Anglo-American legal heritage—

_ not, as my Brother Back continues to insist, “from _

mere. predilections of individual judges.

_ From my standpoint, I donot consider that the require- .

ments of “notice” and “hearing” are satisfied by the

% _ smAbACH, v FAMILY FINANCE. CORP, ts

i fet hat the petitioner wes sdvied of ths ‘araishnint

‘ =

eetmeat niO eens. shy Se tt int ape

permanently lose the garnished property ©

until —aaeeee lenary adverse adjudication of the under- ° °

lying claim against her, or by the fact that relief from

the garnishment may have been available in the ‘interim —

under less than clear circumstances. ‘Compare the ma-

’ Sority and dissenting opinions in the Wisconsin Supreme

/ Court, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 178, 154 N. W. 2d 259, 267. (1967).

Apart from special situations, some of which are, referred de

: to in this Court’s opinion, see ante, at 2, It i scam

process is afforded only by the- ‘of. “notice” and

“hearing” ‘which at establishing the validity, . F

or the probable. validity; of the underlying claim

against the alleged debtor before he be deprived of

> his property or its unrestricted think this.is ‘the

thrust of the past cases in this Court. See, e. g., Mullane

v. Central Hanover Bank &. Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313

| " _ —€1950) ; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S.

; County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385-386 (1908).* And

: I am quite unwilling to take the unexplicated per curiam

126, 1524153 (1941); United ‘States v. Illinois Cent. R. -

-Co., 291 U>S..457, 463 (1934); Londoner v. City &

a*

in McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1928), as vitiating .

or = aon these csfential elements of {ite ponte

©Thajes sau eter: Geitelglie tn tha Cfldet thet endining he depeived :

aM of property by summary administrative action taken before hearing

_When. such action is essential to protect a vital governmental

interest. See, ¢, g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339

U.,8.'594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. 8. 245 (1947); Bowles’

‘ y. Willingham, 321 U. 8. 503 (1944); North Amer. Cold Storage Co.

- *, . ™. City of Chicago, 211 U. 8. 306 (1908). However, no such

aati atoua ahha male eae nme meres

law. : . ?

"SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATIS. ae

aS ae

: . No. 130—-Octosen TxEM,. 1968,__

| Changing 2 ge , Petit On Whit of Cartioesti ta

: pcg ae .. the Supreme Youre a,

Family poration of Wisconsin. ° “ g

ee ee [June 9, 1969.) _

Mr. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

~The .Court -here holds diccaalit sak 4 Wisconsin

* statute permitting garnishment before a judgment has

been obtained against the principal debtor. The law, |

however, requires that notice be given to the principal |

defense ab the togilor boating sie tial of te onan Teo |

that iidicate that this Court has power to play so fast

and loose with state laws. - The arguments the Court |

_’ tnakes to reach what I consider to be its unconstitutional

/ eonclusion, however, shows why. it.strikes down this state .

law. It is because it considers a garnishment law of this

ge _kind to be bad state policy, a judgment I think the state

|. legislature, not this Court, has power to make. ‘The —

| : Court shows it believes the garnishment policy to be a

“ ‘most inhumane doctrine’ ”; that it “ ‘compels the wage

earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven

- below the poverty level’”; that “‘in a vast number of

cases the debt is a ‘fraudulent one, saddled on a poor,

ignorant person who is trapped in any easy credit night- 3

maré in which he is charged double for something he

could not pay for, even if the proper price was called for,

and then hounded. into giving up his pound of flesh, and

being fired besides.’ .”

Mie freing emotional rhetoric might ba very appro:

eat.

to Take against some phases of

priate for

ee Indeed, the quoted statements were

poe

: that State's arishiment awe But made ‘ins ‘Court

law. The arguments would also be

7 “Wisconsin’s law unconstitutional, they |

amount to’ whag I believe to be a plain, judicial usur-

_ pation’ of state legislative power power to decide what the

State’s laws shall ‘be. There. ‘is not one-word in our

s for Wisconsin's legislators to make against

Federal Constitution or of any. of ite Amendments and ..

not a word in the reporte of that document’s passage

. from which one can draw the slightest inference that we

have authority thus to try to supplement or strike down.

2 the State’s selection’ of its own policies. The Wisconsin - |

law is simply nullified by this Court as though the Court. |

had been granted a super-legislative power to step in

‘and frustrate policies of States adopted by their own

elected legislatures. The Court thus steps back into the %,

due’ process philosophy Which brought .on President

Roosevelt’s Court fight. Arguments can ‘be made for

_ outlawing loan sharks and installment sales companies ——

, but such a decision, I think, should be niade by state and

_ federal legislators, and not by this Court. - .

This brings me to the short concurring opinioy’ of my

> Brother Haran, which makes “explicit the precise basis”

a ___on which he joins the Court's opinion. That basis is:

tthe ‘property’ of which petitioner has been de-

. prived is the use of the garnished portion of her

-. ‘wages during the interim period between the gar-

‘nishment and the culmination of the main suit..

Since this deprivation cannot be. characterized ‘as de

‘¢ménimis, she must be accorded the usual requests of

een oe een notice and a prior hearing.”

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" SNEADACH 1 v. ‘PAMILY FINANCE corp. s

" Byery argumetit implicit in this summary statement of a4

fed oe een shed Berna

- satisfactorily in\ the opinion of the Supreme |

Court of Wis in this caso—an outstanding opinion

es pe geetsc eceng tine) 154 N. W. 2d

259. That opinion shows that petitioner was not re-\

quired to wait until the “culmination ofthe main suit,” °

| that is, the suit between the creditor and the petitioner...

In fact the case riow before us was not a final

‘ tion of thé merits of that controversy but was, in

accordance with well-established state court procedure, o

: the result of a motion made by the petitioner to dismiss —

the garnishment proceedings. With reference to my

Brother Hartan’s statement that petitioner's deprivation .

could not be characterized as de minimis, it is pertinent _

to note that the garnishment was sérved on her and her

employer on the same day, November 21, 1966, that she,

without waiting for » trial on the merits, filed’a

to dismiss the g t on December 23, 1966, which

motion was by the Circuit Court on April 38,

1967, snl if fo theb jodgnent whith, belo ws today.

The amount ‘of her wages held up by the garnishment ~

was $31.59. The amount of interest on the wages with-

held even if computed at 10% annually would have been

less than $3. Whether that would be classified as

de’minimus I do not know and in fact it is not material

to know for the decision of this case. —

_ «In the motion to dismiss, petitioner, according’ to the.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, asserted a “number of

' grounds based on injuries and deprivations which have |

been or are likely to be suffered by others but which she |

has not personally experienced.” 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154

N. W. 2d 159. .The court went-further and pointed out

that under Wisconsin law the court’ would not strike

-down & ew Ae | unconstitutional on the ground that some

a“

oe te SNIADACH vy. FAMILY FINANCE CORP.

"person other than the challenger of that law might in

the future be: injured: by -its unconstitutional ‘part. It

; - would seem, therefore, that the great number of our-cases

holding that, we do not determine the. constitutionality — oe

of state statutes where the judgmént on them was based .

: 3 on state law would prevent qur passing is cage at. all.

‘The indebtedness of: petitioner was ced by a

promissory note, but petitioner’s affidavit in support of | ar

the motion to dismiss, according to the Wisconsin Supreme

‘Court contained no-allegation that, she is not indebted

. thereon to the Plaintiff. Of course if it had alleged that,

or if. it had shown in some other way that this was not a

~~ good-faith lawsuit against her; the Wisconsin opinion

shows that this could. have pe Se of the whole case on

* the summary motion. ss \;

-, Another: «of unconstitutionality, eccording to

the state , was that the Actgpermitted a ‘defendant

‘to pdést a bond ‘and secure the release of garnished’ prop-

--erty and that this provision _— equal protection of

the law. “to persons of low income.” With reference to

this ground, the W’sconsin court said: |

“Appellant has made no showing that-she is a en

of low income and unable to post a bond.” 37 Wis..

2d, at 167, 154 N. W. 2d, at 261. = ~

Another ground of unconstitutionality urged wamthet

since many employers discharged garnished employees |

for being unreliable, the law threatened the gainful em- —

ployment of. many wageearners. This contention the

Supreme Court of Wisconsin satisfactorily answered by

' saying that appellant had “made no owns that her

~ own employer reacted in.this manner.”

Another. ground challenging the state act, was that it

affords 10 days’ jjme to a plaintiff to serve the garnishee

‘summons and: cdmplaint on the defendant after service

of the summons ‘en the garnishee. This, of sane she

—

‘SNIADACH ‘i FAMILY FINANCE CORP. 5

could not raise. ‘The ‘Court’s answer to this was that

_ appellant was. served on the same- day as the garnishee.

The state court then. pointed out that the gdérnishment

~ proceedings did not involve “any final determination of ©

_ the title to.a defendant’s property but merely reserved

the status quo thereof pending. determination of the

‘principal action.” 37 Wis. 2d, at 169, 154 N. W. 2d, at

262. The court then relied on McInnes v. McKay, 127

Me. 110. That suit: related to a Maine attachment .

law which, of course, is governed by the same rule as.

garnishment law. See “garnishment,” Bouvier’s Law

_ Dictionary; see also Pennoyer ‘v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. ~

The Maine law was: subjeeted to practically the same

challenges that Brother Haruan and -the Court raise

against this Wisconsin law. About Cant law the Supreme

Court. of Maine said:

“But, although an attachment may, within the bread

_- meaning of the preceding definition, deprive one of

property, yet conditional and temporary as it is, and

part of the legal remedy and procedure by which

- the property of a debtor may be taken in satisfaction

of’ the debt, if judgment be. recovered, we do not

think it is the deprivation of property contemplated

by the Constitution. And if it be, it is not a de-

privation without ‘due process of law’ for it is a part.

of a process, which during its proceeding gives notice

_ ‘and opportunity for hearing and judgment of some

judicial or other authorized tribunal. The require-

_ ments of ‘due process of law’ and Jaw of the land’

. are satisfied.” » 127 Me. 110; 116.

quis This Court did not even consider the challenge: to the

ine law worthy of a Court opinion but affirmed it in

a. per curiam opinion, 279 U. S. 830, on the authority of

‘two prior decisions of this. Court. - See -also Standard

“Oil Co. v. Superior Court of New Castle County, 44 Del.

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| 508,.02.4. 24 454, appeal dimised: 996 U. 8. 990;- |

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222, 227-228. - :

_ The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in upholding the

_ eonstitutionality of its law also cited a statement of our.

Court mede'in-Rothechild’v. Knight, 184 U. £ £ 334, 341,

oe [T]o what ‘actions the penasily ‘of ‘attachment may

be given.is for the = of a state to eeeemine

". nd its courts to decide... .”

: ee " Accord, Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln: Mine Operating

_ Co., 312 U: S. 183, 193, .

* "The Supreme Court of Wisconsin aie pointed out:

“The ability to place.a lien upon a man’s property

suchas to temporarily deprive him of its beneficial ,

use without judicial determination of proper cause — reed

dates back not only to medieval England but also /

_ to Roman times.”. 37 Wis. 2d, at 171, 154 N. W. |

2d, at 264.

i The State Supreme Court then ‘went on to point out a

statement made by Mr. Justice Holmes in en v.

_ Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22; 31: ies

“The Fourteenth Poe oy itself a ‘hisibrical :

_ st product, . did not for the states and sub-

*__ gtitute mechanical compartments of law all-exactly

~~ like. - If a thing hax been practiced for two hundred

years by common, consent, it will need a stronger

ease for the Fourteenth Amendment to effect it, as

is well illustrated by Owndey: v. at 256 U. S.

94, 104,112.”

The Owribey case was one of the two 0 cited by this Court

-in its per curiam. opinion affrmance of McInnes. v.

McKay, supra, sustaining the constitutionality of a

Delaware attachment law. And see Byrd v.. Rector, ||

112 W. Va. 192, oe 5 be :

‘SNIADACE : v. FAMILY FINANCE CORP. bf

Te can only. conclude that the Court i is today overruling

a number of its own decisions and abandoning the legal

_- customs and praetices in this country with reference ‘to

attachments and. garnishments wholly on the ground

"that the garnishment laws of this kind are based on-

unwise policies of government which might some time in

the future do injury to some individuals. In the first ©

sentence of the argument-in her brief, petitioner urges

that this Wisconsin law “is contrary. to public policy”;

the Court apparently finds that a sufficient basis for hold- _

ing it unconstitutional. This holding savors too much of ~

the “Natural Law,” “Due Process,” “Shock-the-con- -

science” test of what is constitutional for me to agree.to

the decision. See my dissent 1 in Adamson v. eden ‘

332 U.S. 46, 68.

: ADDENDUM.

-“ ‘The latest statement by my Brother HarLan on the .

power of this Court under the Due Process Clause to

' hold laws unconstitutional on the ground of the Justices’

view of “fundamental fairness” makes it necessary. for

me to add a few words in order that the differences

between us be made absolutely clear. He ‘now says —

. that the Court’s idea of “fundamental fairness” is derived -

“not alone . . . from the specifics of: the Constitution, _ $

but also .. . from concepts which are part.of the Anglo- —

American legal heritage.” This view is conssvent with ~

that expressed by Mr. Jutice Frankfurter in Rochin v.

California that due process was to be determined by

“those canons of decency and fairness which express the

notions of justice of English-speaking peoples. . . .”

342 U. S..165, 169. In any event, my Brother HaRLAN’s

“Anglo-American legal heritage” is no more definite than

the “notions of. justice of English-speaking peoples” or

the shock-the-conscience test. All of these so-called tests

— nothing more norNess than an implicit adop-

8 SNIADACH v. FAMILY FINANCE CORP.

tion: of Natural Law concept which uhder our system _

leaves to judges alone ‘the-power to decide what the

“’. Natural Law’ means... These so-called standards: do not

_ bind judges within. any boundaries that can be precisely

* marked or defined by words for holding laws unconsti-

_".. tutional: Oni the contrary, these tests leave them wholly

os _ free to decide what they are convinced is right and fair.

If the judges, in deciding whether laws are constitutional, __.

_ are to be left only to the admonitions of their own con-

sciences, why was it that the Founders gave us & written

Constitution at all?

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