Appendix — Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien

Supreme Court brief1968

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APPENDIX A

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION -

No. 873

‘evesrication OF PAssENGER STEAMSHIP

CONFERENCES REGARDING TRAVEL AGENTS

Decwwep January 30, 1964:

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION (JOHN HARLLER, Chair-

man; THos. E. Stakem, Vice Chairman; —

: ©. Barrert, Commissioner) :

This proceeding is a general investigation of the

‘ agreements and practices of two interrelated pas-

senger steamship conferences as those practices relate

to travel. agents. It is the first general investigation

to be held by the Commission or its predecessors in |

this area, and all of the. passenger lines engaged ‘in

the transatlantic trade and ‘their travel agents are

directly involved.

This. proceeding was instituted as a result of a

petition filed by the American Society. of Travel _

Agents (ASTA). The purpose of the investigation is

. to cotermaine whether. Agreement 120, the organic

werkt

.20:

of final action taken is filed with the Commission.

Neither the agenda of the meeting, a report of the

discussion of the members, nor any reference to pro-

posals discussed but not adopted is filed with the Com- .

mission. In general there appears to be a deliberate

conference policy to avoid government review of con-

ference -action. One of the lines referred in its cor-

respondence to the conference to ‘‘an understanding

‘ not to have too much official correspondence,” and

several references are made in the transcript of hear- .

ings to the statements by leading representatives of

conference carriers that no minutes could be taken or

published because of the existence of the US. anti-

trust laws. |

B. Tue Traven AGENTS

There are about 4,000 travel edna in the United .

States who represent the carriers of the two .confer-

ences. Approximately one-third of these are members

of ASTA. There are some 575 agencies in New York

alone.-In 1960, the 4,000-or-so travel agents were re-

_ sponsible for 80 percent of all trans-atlantic steamship

passenger bookings made in*the United States, exclu-

sive of tours. The conferences and their member lines |

acknowledge. that the travel agents constitute their ©

principal sales force.

‘The conference action relative to the apointanent

-.and control of travel agents is confined, with the ex-

ception of agencies located in department tores and

automobile clubs, which require conference approval

for appointment, to six so-called ‘‘Metropolitan Eligi-

ble List Territories.’”” The Metropolitan List Terri-

tories are those including and immediately surround-

ing’ New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los

. Angeles, and San Francisco.

The -agencies located in these Metropolitan List

-* Territories are generally small/in size, about 70 per- |

«4

cent having five ‘or fewer employees and half having

_ yearly net earnings under $5,000. There are basically

‘ two types of agents—‘wholesale’’. agents, who ar- -

range, sponsor, and conduct package tours, and “re-

tail” agents, who sell the packaged product, In addi-

‘ tion to the .7-percent commission the retail agent

receives from the TAPC, for the ocean passage, he is

- paid an additional 3-percent commission by the whole-

saler on those items in the package other than steam-

ship fare. Under a somewhat similar arrangement of

. the International Air Transportation Association, an

association of airlines in foreign commerce, the air- .

_ lines pay a 10-percent commission on the air transport )

segment. of tours. The wholesaler does not receive any, .

net remuneration from the shipline or airline in these

_eireumstances. His revenue comes from commissions

on the hotel and insurance facets of the tours. A large

majority of agents in Metropolitan List Territories

handle retail business exclusively. The agents who act

as “wholesalers” may also act as “‘retailers.”. The

great majority engage exclusively in the travel busi-

ness and practically all agents represent airlines as

well as steamship lines.

C. Specrric Practices or TAPC Avrecrixa TRavEn

-AGENTS |

1. Appointment

} . ‘G

7 Under the TAPC agreement the Hentonk Committee’

is responsible for the screening of agents in the Metro- |

politan List Territories, and exercises final authority are,

over all matters relating to the screening of agents

including fdetermination as to the placement of an ap-

. plicant on.the ‘‘Eligible List.”’ Under the terms of the

conference agreement, the member lines may appoint _.

agents only from those appearing on the Eligible List ~

for the particular metropolitan territory. The Control

Committee has eight members who each serve for a

ote | 22

term of 2.years. Two members are chosen to represent

the lines whose vessels are registered in ‘eountries: in

each of the following. areas:

~The North Atlantic Group which includes

Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and

Canada;

The Mediterranea, Group which includes coun-

tries bordering on the Mediterranean, Adriatic,

) and Black Seas’ (including Mediterranean

; France);

The U.S. Group which includes only the United

States; .

The Continental. Group which incluides any

country on the Continent of Kurope not classified -

above.

_ ‘The members in each group are selected by the

unanimous vote of the lines within the group. The

committee meets informally about every 6 weeks.

Votes are not ordinarily taken, and if a vote is taken

it is not recorded. No minutes of meetings are kept.

All‘actions ‘of the committee must have the unanimous

approval of the members. _ |

In the Metropolitan List Territories other than New

York, local subcommittees of the Control Committee

preliminarily determine the qualifications of appli-.

.. eants and forward their recommendations for agency

~ appointments to the Control Committee. Normally °

the .Control Committee accepts these recommenda-

tions. The procedures of the several local committees

are not uniform, even as to the Unanimity Rule, which

under the conference rules they are all supposed to

follow. However, votes are*taken and these are for-

warded to the Coritrol Committee. If a local committee

refuses to recommend an applicant, the application

itself is not forwarded to. the Control Committee.

Thus, in practical efféct each local subcommittee exer-

°

° ° . , i ° ,

-23

Bhai cises considerable power over an applicant in the

Metropolitan List Territory under its jurisdiction.

a. The Sponsorship Rule | "

An applicant for appointment as a travel agent usu-

_*.-.. ally communicates with the secretary of. the confer-

| ence, who, in turn, sends the information relative to

the applicant to all the member lines. The secretary

_- places the name. of the applicant on the agenda of the

Control Committee only if one or more of the member

lines show an interest in the particular applicant. If

‘no member line shows any_ interest in the applicant,

action on his application is ‘‘deferred,’’ and the appli-

cant, of course, may not be appointed an agerit by any -

of the member lines. ‘This requirement .of a show of

interest by a member line is referred to as the “spon-

sorship’’. practice (Sponsorship Rule). Although lines

. individually often interview prospective agents by the ©

’ | . use of questionnaires or of “travelers,” who are rep-

‘resentatives of the various member lines and who per-

*sonally visit applicants at their places of business, the

conference as a-body has no organized system for the

uniform gathering of information concerning each ap-

pliant. It is left to the “sponsoring” line to bring

forward such favorable information as the line deems

necessary to secure favorable action on the applicant.

The conference has.never officially. informed appli-

--eants of the Sponsorship Rule, some applicants learn-

ing of it through: the lines, others through ASTA,

Once “sponsored,” the applicant is then given con-

sideration by the Control Committee. If the applicant

“is not voted favorably upon by the Control Com-

“~ mittee, he is transferred to a ‘‘“Preferred List,” and

wa his ‘application is considered at subsequent meetings.

7 No application is denied outright, but applicants must

. often spend several years on the Preferred List before

securing the unanimous vote of the Control Commit-

24

‘ tee necessary for placement on the Eligible List’ Al-

_ though the Control Committee supposedly determines

whether or not to place applicants upon: the Eligible

_. List by the consideration of such factors as potential

ability to produce business, financial stability, business

character, location of business, and national origin of ©

the applicant in relation to national origin of the mem-

bers of the conimunity .in. which the applicant’s busi- ° ~

ness is located, these factors are not spelled out in the

conference agreement, rules, or elsewhere. Applicants

are not officially informed by the conference as*to the: .

Standards upon which they will be judged; however,

‘in some instances they may. obtain some idea of the |

standards..employed by the members of the Control

Committee from conversations with representatives.

of ‘the lines or from the information requested on the °

questionnaires ‘that some of the lines provide to some

applicants. The Commission has never been informed

. Of these standards. The record shows that the stand-

ards:have not been applied uniformly, and agents of- _

: ten have had to wait long periods of time before learn- —

'° ing of the standards. , a

, Although anyone ean-book passage on cOmmon ear-

Tiers, including agents not on the Eligible List, the

- lines are prohibited from appointing agents who have. °

._ not been approved unanimously ‘for the Eligible List

~ by the Control Committee and commissions for book-

ings made may not be paid by the. member lines to’

“s+, anyone ‘but appointed agents. While under the terms eee

of. the conference agreement commissions may be paid -

retroactively from appointment for 1 year’s bookings,

retroactive payment is not mandatory and is left: to

| the discretion of the individual line. Unappointed

agents find it difficult to make bookings as, lacking

prestige, they ‘are not always. able to obtain vessel

space, nor do they have ready ticket supplies, The

FEE ERE INTER, VELEN TY SGOT OR

.

SP ens 88 EPA ati CEG eae ci Dep ot

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ie A RS ii

.

record indicates that these factors coupled with un-

- certainty of commissions tend to cause unappointed

agents where Possible to divert passengers from

steamship ‘travel to air travel.

| b. The Quota System | ;

The TAPC agreement provides that; the ingiher of |

agencies shall be limited, with due regard being given

to the requirements of the traffic in various localities.

The agreement places the responsibility for the estab-

- lishment of these limitations with the Control: Com-

: mittee, and it has established quotas limiting the num-

ber of agents that can.be placed upon, the Eligible

©. List for each Metropolitan List Territory. The effect

of this’ provision is to prevent sponsored and other-

_ wise eligible agents from being placed on the lists.

Although agents are merely ‘{deferred” to the so-

called Preferred List rather than denied placement. ©

on the Eligible List, the deferral for extended periods .

is tantamount to a denial.

c. The Unanimity Rule

‘The requirement of a unanimous vote by the Con-

trol Committee has on many occasions prevented the

_ placement of. applicants on the ‘‘Eligible List.” The

record shows that as late as 1959, the local subcom-

mittee for Philadelphia declined to recommend an

appointment because of asingle ‘“‘nay’’ vote, despite

- eight votes cast in favor of the applicant. Similarly,

the Los Angeles local subcommittee in 1951 declined

four applications, of which three were approved by

majorities of eight. to two,.and orie was approved by

a majority of ‘nine to one. These actions caused the

retiring chairman :of the Los Angeles local subcom-

‘mittee to record in the minutes of that committee :.

the one or two negative votes, resulting in the’

pending applications being declined under the

* * “unanimous agreement” clause, is ex-

26

- tremely detrimental to the best interests of the

majority lines. Further that such negative votes .

may be cast. “‘on direct instructions” from prin-

cipals or are actually mischievous rather ‘than

cooperative -in intent. It is also -obvious that

the committee’s negative action in these cases

‘is being used: to advantage to the fullest pos-

sible extent by the Trans-Atlantic Air services.

Although all final decisional authority for place-

| ment on the Eligible List rests with the Control Com-.

mittee, and the local committees can merely _

vecommend, it should be borne in mind, as noted

above, that when local subcommittees reject appli-

eants, the applications ordinarily do not even come to

the attention of the Control Committee. ;

d. Other TAPC Selection Practices.

Conference rules forbid the appointment of agents

who are also freight forwarders, or ‘whose: places of -

business are in department stores and automobile

clubs. In’ the Metropolitan List Territory of, New

York, appointment is prohibited to agencies located in

the district south of Fulton Street in Manhattan

(Fulton Street Rule). The record shows.that these

‘rules have not been uniformly. applied. The rules re-

garding freight forwarders (Freight. Forwarder

Rule) and.agencies located in department ‘stores (De-

partment Store Rule) are grounded on the contention

- that the agent’s concentration on steamship bookings .

would be: lessened by the agent’s other activities. Un-

der its authority to waive the rule, the Control Com-

mittee has approved about 100 agencies in department

stores and 75 in automobile clubs. Also, the Fulton

Street Rule may be waived in exceptional cases.

There has been no uniformity of standard, however,

in handling any of these supposedly exceptional cases.

27

2. Control of hnandies a Appointment :

a. The Tieing Rule

Conference rules prohibit apnointed agents from

selling transportation on nonconference lines. All pas-

senger lines operating in the transatlantic trade are

menibers of TAPC. TAPC members carry 99 percent

of the passengers moving by water in this trade. The

only lines affected by the rule prohibiting sale of

tickets via nonconference lines are those freighter

services which carry a limited number of passengers

on their cargo vessels. Such carriers, like the TAPC

lines, must ‘rely on travel. agents for the sale of ocean

transportation. A main economic threat to the confer- —

ence lines is that of the air carriers, but the Tieing

Rule’ does not prohibit the agents from taps 3 trans-

atlantie travel via air. carriers. |

b. Sale or. Transfer of. Ageney or Change in 1 Officers

or in Address or Name -

The official conference rules require only that ap- _

-proval of the appointing lines be obtained prior to

the transfer, sale, or change of name or address of

- an agency. However, in practice, the .Control Com-

mittee has exercised authority over these transactions. -

Again precise standards have not been adopted, and

the vague standards which have been utilized have

not been uniformly applied. At one time, at least, it —

-seems to have been a matter of conference policy to

deny sale or transfer without going through termina-.

tion and. reappointment, -but this is’ uncertain. The

record contains several examples of eases in which a

majority of lines were unable to permit a sale or

change in personnel either because of the vague stand-

ards or the existence of the Unanimity Rule. Under

the Unanimity Rule it is possible | for a member of

the Control Committee representing a line which has

28

not appointed the. agency in question. to block a sale .

or transfer.

- ¢. Fines and Penalties sal te

Fines and penalties, called “liquidated damages”

by. the conference, are levied for breaches of confer-

ence rules by a Special Committee, the membership '

- of which is the same as that of the Control Committee.

No formal procedure has been adopted for determina-

* tion of the truth of alleged violations. While it

appears that the accused agent is afforded the right

to tell his side of the story, usually in writing, it does

not appear from the record that the agent is afforded

any kind of hearing, or any reconsideration of or

appeal from the decision of the Control Committee.

During the period from 1952 through 1960, the Special

‘Committee assessed. penalties against some 28 agents

totaling $3,500. oe hier ei

d. Bonding and Canceled Voyages

TAPC requires that agents who are appointed in

Metropolitan List Territories be covered by surety

bonds in amounts based on the expected sales of the

_ agent. A single bond covers one agént for the benefit

of all appointing lines. The premium of the bond is’

paid by the conference, but the agents pay. annual

fees in amounts which vary in different cities. These

fees help defray premium and other expenses of the

conference in administering its agency program. The-

conference lines are not required to be bonded, and

. on at least one occasion a member line was unable to

pay a commission because of financial difficultiés. On

other occasions, when sailings were canceled after

. bookings had been made, commissions were not paid

to the agents even though they had: fully performed

the service of booking the. passage and had nothing ~

- to do. with ‘the cancellation of the sailings. There.

Og

appears to be no conference regulation relating to the

payment of commissions on canceled voyages. How-

- ever, some: lines pay half commission, “her full com-

mission on canceled voyages.

e. Tenure and Cancellation of Eligibility

The conference rules provide that either an agent |

or its appointing line may terminate an agency at

any time. In addition, the Control Committee may

remove naines from the Eligible List if it finds a

breach of conference rules by the agent, unethical

‘business standards, an. inability on the part of the

agent adequately to create and stimulate the sale of -

transportation, or failure of the agent to effect the

sale of a sufficient number of bookings. In the years’

1957 through 1960, 19 agencies were terminated due

to an alleged insufficiency in the number of bookings

produced. by the agency and 17 for other reasons.

Four of the latter were subsequently reinstated.

No precise standards relative to what might consti-

tute a sufficient number of bookings: by an agent have

been set up. The local subcommittees have established

minimum booking requirements for approved agents

in their respective jurisdictions, but the standards —

were not considered absolute and the Control Com- —

mittee has on occasion exercised an ad hoc judgment

. ‘in the application of these requirements. In New..

‘York the minimum was set at 50 bookings per year

within the city limits and 30 in the suburbs. Twenty-

- five was the minimum in Philadelphia and Chicago,

30 in San Francisco, 10 in Los Angeles, and no mini-

mum was set for Boston. The. agents were not in-

formed of these standards. The Control: Committee

has exercised final authority in terminating the eligi-

“bility of agencies according to which, ‘‘Each case was

handled. on its own merits depending on the circum-

stances surrounding the case.’’ Agents have not been

30

-afforded a hearing or a right to have the action of

the Control Committee reviewed.

' The standards of performance and other grounds :

for: termination consist solely. of _ general:norms ~

quoted above. -

D. PRACTICES OF APC WITH icine TO LEVEL OF

‘ AGENTS’ CoMMISSIONS

As noted above, the TAPCO exercises authority 0 over —

all agency relationships.and practices at issue in this

proceéding except the level of agents’ commissions

which is the province of the APC. Under the APC

agreement, unanimous approval is required by the

membership of the APC before the level of commis-

sions paid to agents may be raised. Thus,.an increase

_in the level of commissions requires the affirmative

vote of the six.member lines which serve only Cana- .

‘dian ports. Meetings of the APC are conducted on an

. informal basis and a vote of the members is neither |

taken, recorded, nor filed with the Commission..The

conference records show. that from about October

1950, all lines have shown‘a willingness in principle

at least to increase the level of agency commissions.

However, in 1950 and in 1951 subcommittees of the

APOC were unable, because of the conference’s Una-

nimity Rule, to recommend a proposed increase in

- eommissions, although the majority .was prepared to

‘Increase the commission from 6. to 714.percent on

‘fall classes, all seasons.” The -1951 subcommittee-

. Stated that “while there was a strong majority in

favor of applying a 714-percent commission to all

classes throughout the year, it was not possible to —

reach ‘unanimous agreement,” and ‘‘it was, therefore, _

suggested that the matter be deferred for considera-

tion at-the statutory meeting in March 1952.” The

subcommittee did not have - power~ to take final

NP NOR A ARN

31

action, but its function was to recommend action to

‘the prineipals.

In 1951 the conference inne” the commission to

- Tp percent, except on passage booked during the high

_ volume summer ‘season where a 6-percent commission °

remained in effect. Proposals to increase commissions.

were taken up and action was deferred at meetings .

— in 1952 and 1953. A 1952 subcommittee noted that —

‘unanimity could not be reached on a proposal to ex-

tend. the off-season commission basis (Te percent) to.

bookings for seasonal sailings.” The question was

taken up again in 1956, when ‘the present commission

of 7 percent on. all bookings was established. Since

that time, representatives of travel agents have sought

increases in the commission levels but have been told

’ that commission levels have not been raised since 1956 |

because ‘the APC has had difficulty in achieving

unanimity.

Evidence adinesd by the conference demonstrates

that differences between members over agents’ com- -

missions are usually eliminated or compromised, the

minority giving way eventually to the majority. Con- ©

ference witnesses testified that neither a single mem-

ber nor a small minority has ever vetoed proposed

- conference action on commissions. It is impossible to »

tell from the conference’s sketchy minutes if this is

true. However, it is certain that under the present

Unanimity Rule a single member could veto an action

to increase agents’ commissions even though the action —

was desired by all the other members. The executives

of the American-flag lines which are members of APC

and who testified at the hearing, stated that because

the Americans were a minority in the conference, the

Unanimity Rule was necessary to protect their inter-

ests. The record indicates, however, that the Ameri-

can lines have often been in the vanguard for com-

266-241-678 ;

32

mission increases and as near as can be determined ~

have never blocked proposed increases. Under the con-.

ference agreements the decision to change the -UTia-

nimity Rule to a majority rule or some other rule that

_ would require the consent of less than the full mem-.

bership, would itself require the unanimous consent

of all conference members.

E. - DIVERSION’ OF PASSENGERS TO AIR CARRIERS

At present both air and ocean carriers pay 7 percent

commissions on regular point-to-point: bookings, and.

10 percent on their respective portions of so-called

foreign inclusive tours. It takes approximately three

or four times as much of an agent’s time to sell sea «

as compared with air space, and several years of ex-

perience are required to produce a really competent

steamship passage salesman. Because of this, appoint-

ed agents tend to push air rather ‘than sea travel. The

record indicates that one of the primary factors in

determining the level of commissions has been the |

competition of air travel.

THE EXAMINER’S DECISION

The parties agree that the initial decision of the ex-

aminer correctly disposes of most of the issues raised

in this proceeding. We summarize below those por-

tions of the decision to which no exception is taken: _

After a brief discussion in which he approved of the

‘ exercise of some conference control over travel agents

and noted that ASTA was also in favor of such con-

trol (Initial Decision, 49-50), the examiner adopted |

_ the following statement of Hearing Counsel as criteria —

for determining what constitutes a violation of section

15 of the Shipping Act, 1916:

Any provisions of TAPC Agreement No. 120

or APC Agreement No. 7840, or any regulations

or rules promulgated thereunder, which siete :

Pee

°

°

1 A AAI I Te cet sie

°

.

° ° 33

- travel agencies in the United States how ren-

dering complete and effective service both to’

passengers and to ocean carriers operate to the

detriment of the commerce of the United States.

All conference-imposed restraints which pre-+_

"vent the travel agent from properly performing

his function of selling ocean transportation for

. which no reasonable justification exists, should

- be eliminated by the Commission’s disapproval, :

cancellation, or modification of the subject | .

agreements * * *, (Initial decision, p. 52.) °

In addition to the above, the examiner further con-. —

cluded that ‘‘unreasonable restraints against qualified

- persons who seek to become travel agents would. also

be detrimental to commerce.”.

The examiner in light of these criteria then josie.

- ered the areas of interaction between the conferences

and: the travel. agents, discussed above in the factua?

statement, and reached the following conclusions: ®

A. TAPC Practices

1. Appointment

The conference (TAPC) has. failed to wale pub-.

- lish, and ‘promptly and consistently apply uniform

standards of background and qualifications in its

selection of applicants for placement on the list of

eligible agents in Metropolitan List Territories. This

failure is detrimental to commerce and contrary to

the public interest, within the meaning of section 15,

because it detracts from the ability and the willing-

ness of the corps of agents, or potential agents, to

.foster and sell steamship travel. Thus, the confer-

ence must adopt, publish and apply a set of uniform,

objective, standards in the screening of applicants

that are sufficiently precise, and well defined to give

adequate notice to applicants of the requirements.

No other standards should or-may be employed. The

- SF

Se ee PPI 15 OIRO

\

' 34

standards of eligibility must be published and made

_ available to all applicants in order to give meaning

and effect thereto and every applicant who. meets

them must be approved. Similarly, conference action —

on each application must be taken promptly and the

applicant notified promptly of the decision and the

reasons for whatever action is taken. These reasons

should not be stated: merely in general terms but

must relate specifically to the adopted standards -

of eligibility. .

Respondents have explicitly consented to révise

_ their agreements so as-to provide a set of uniform

- objective standards for screening applicants in the

- Metropolitan List Territories, sufficiently precise and

well‘defined to give applicants adequate notice of the

' requirements they must meet. Respondents have

further agreed to the publication of such standards

- and to prompt notification of the action taken with

respect to all applicants for appointment as agents.

a. The Sponsorship Rule

The Sponsorship Rule must be Sebsviitiniaad as it

has resulted in the exclusion from the Eligible Lists.

of qualified agents, to the detriment of commerce. .

Respondents have agreed to remove the ae east

Rule. ° ; ,

-b. The Quota System

‘The Quota System ‘must also be discontinued for

the same reason that requires discontinuance of the

Sponsorship Rule. The number of agents already on

the Eligible List has no bearing on the question of

the qualifications of a new applicant. If an individual

_ line has all the agents it feels that it requires, it is of

- course not required to appoint an agent newly placed

by the Control Committee on the Eligible List.

-Respondents have agreed to. remove the Quota

System.:

35°

¢. Other TAPC Selection Denpiline:

- .The Fulton Street Rule and the Department Store

_and Automobile Club Rules must be abolished, as

they..have resulted in the arbitrary exclusion of agents. .

to the detriment of commerce. The Freight Forwarder ©

Rule must be submitted to the Commission for ap-

proval. The Commission can then consider the pro-

. posal under its customary proceedures and after

obtaining the views of all interested parties make a

determination as to its validity under section 15. The

respondents have agreed to abolish the Fulton Street

Rule, the Department Store and Automobile Club

Rule, and they have further agreed to fil@the Freight

. Forwarder Rule with the Commission.

. 2. Control of Agencies After Appointment

a. Sale or Transfer of Agency or Change in Officers

.or in Address or Name

_ The*same administrative fairness must be afforded

when the conference considers an apnea for ap-

proval of the sale, transfer, or changejof the officers

of an agency that is required in reference to the con-

_ sideration of ‘original applicants and for the same

reasons. The conference rules must provide reasonable

standards in regard to the consideration of sales and_ .

' transfers and changes of officers, including adequate

notice of the standards to applicants, and an oppor-

tunity for the agent to be heard. The rules must

further provide for prompt. action in accordance with

the standards adopted and. for prompt noticé to the

agent of the action taken together with the reasons

therefor. A system of arbitration for review of con-

ference action will not be required as, in the case of

the screening of applicants, relief from arbitrary

conference action or other violations by the confer-

ence will be afforded upon complaint filed with hess e

-. Commission. - 3 i | :

= x in { ' . j

The respondents have agreed to. the ‘adoption and

application of reasonable standards regarding the

38 consideration of sales and transfers, and of changes

in name, address, or officers in appointed agencies,

including. procedures for notice thereof to applicants,

for opportunity to be heard and for — action. —

on such requests.

b. Fines and Penalties

The conference must adopt and apply definite

standards for the assessment of liquidated damages,

providing for adequate notice thereof and for oppor- ._

tunity of a¢cused agents to be heard, and for prompt

report to the Commission of any liquidated damages

assessed. Respondents have agreed to adopt and apply

definite standards for the assessment of liquidated

damages, providing for adequate notice théreof and .

for opportunity for accused agents to be heard, and

for prompt: report to the Commission of any damages

assessed.

. ¢, Bonding - } fe ; 7

Bonding of carriers against loss. of commissions

. caused by: cancellation of: voyages or line’ insolvency .

a is not. required. There: is no evidence that suitable

‘bonds are. available, and instances of financial failure

by the lines are very rare.

. d. Tenure and Cancellation of Hligibility |

_ . The conference must adopt and.apply definite ob-

: jective standards for cancellation of the eligibility

of agents. The agent against whom allegations are

made should be notified of the delinquencies with

which he is charged and afforded an opportunity to

confront those who made the charge and to adduce

evidence to refute it, or in the alternative a reason-

able time to correct the delinquency. The rules should.

require that the conference secretary. must be. in-

. .

SPIEL ARAM LP IATL TI LET I ET ATE

a

formed in writing of all cancellations by member.

lines individually including the reasons therefor, rec-“

ords of which must be kept for a reasonable time in

order to permit the Commission to assure itself that.

multiple cancellations of a particular agent are’ not °

being employed to circumvent the restrictions on

conference action. Respondents have agreed to adopt,

_ publish, and apply a set of definite objective stand-

‘ ards for the cancellation of the eligibility of agents,

‘and to the provision of a reasonable time after warn-

ing to correct delinquencies or adduce evidence to

refute them (except in the case of default by an — |

or the cancellation of his surety bond).

.” B. Secrecy oF ConFERENCE Action: VorTine

the conferences, they should be required to take and.

record the votes of the members, keep detailed minutes

of all matters coming before meetings, retain records

of meetings for a reasonable time and provide copies -

to the Commission. (Initial ‘Decision, 68-69.) Re-~

spondents have agreed to provide the Commission

with full minutes of meetings: indicating votes of the

member lines.

‘DISCUSSION’ AND CONCLUSIONS -

‘We agree that the examiner correctly ainvidied of

the foregoing issues and ‘we adopt his findings and_

conclusions thereon as: our own. We now turn to the

* . issues raised on review by the parties in k Cnet excep-

tions to the initial decision.

A. Tus Unanimity RvLE as APPLIED TO THE LEVEL

or Agrnts’ CoMMISSIONS é

The examiner found that there was no showing that .

the Unanimity Rule as applied to agents’ commissions

‘had operated to the detriment of the commerce of

Because of the public interest in the operations of ~~

é 38°

a the. United States, and that there was no showing

-. that a different voting rule would watts allowed

increased commissions.

In addition, he found that there pein at present

a substantial equilibrium between the “commissions.

. paid by the air and ocean carriers in this trade in

that both pay 7 percent on regular point-to-point . ;

bookings.’? He said it could not ‘be concluded -that .

the failure of the conference-to increase commissions.

as requested by the agents has led to a competitive.

disadvantage of the conference lines relative. to the

airlines. In the examiner’s view it was more. logical

to conclude that if the adoption of a majority rule

resulted in an increase in commissions, the’ airlines |

- might find it necessary to succumb to pressures from

the travel agents and meet this new. competition

-eaused: by the disparity in the commission rates by

- an increase of their own and thus begin’ leapfrogging

the steamship commission rate. The examiner further

conjectured that increases in fares would probably

follow, to the prejudice of the traveling public and

_. the detriment of commerce.

The record in this proceeding compels us to over-

rule the’ examiner on these findings and conclusions.

The record shows many instances in which the exist-

ence of the Unanimity Rule has blocked or at least

delayed the fruition of a desire on the part of a

maj jority of the lines .to increase. the levels of —

commissions” | °

Respondents’ arguments that the’ evidence selene

only to the desires of a subcommittee which did not

have the power to take final action is of doubtful |

value here. The determinations of the ‘subcommittee.

may not have been of the kind dictating final action, -

but they are apparently conditions precedent to any

| _ * ee seo. D of the Statement of Facts, supra :

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39

conference ‘action with respect to the level of com: _

missions. . Although it is. true that the principals. on

occasion took actions other than: those recommended.

by the subcommittee, these appear to have been in

'.. the nature of a watering down of actions favored by

at least a majority of the lines. There is no indication

from the record that the’ principals. ever instituted. ~

any action regarding agent’s commission levels with- -

out ‘the concurrence of at least. a majority of the

subcommittee. The record, moreover, affirmatively

‘shows that a. lack of unanimity on several occasions

prevented the subcommittee from even reporting the

positions of the member lines to the principals.

The effect of the Unanimity Rule on the actions of

the principals is of course rendered less clear because

of the conference’s ‘failure to keep complete minutes

of its meetings and to file them with the Commission.

By its own admission, the conference purposely,

_ adopted this practice because of its concern over the’

*.American antitrust laws. It is undeniable, however,

that under present conference procedures a single vote |

could block’ a proposal on commission matters. even -

though the proposal was favored by an overwhelming

majority of the member lines. .

The record clearly shows that agents tend to push

air travel rather than sea travel, mainly because it

takes considerably longer to handle the details of sea

travel. Time is money and the fact that the travel

agent. is able to sell more air than sea bookings in a.

given time period means, as ASTA correctly contends,

that the effective ommission rate. of the steamship

lines is lower than that of the airlines. Under this

reasoning the “substantial équilibrium’’ found by the

- examiner becomes superficial.

The record contains some evidence of instances in

which the diversion from sea to air passage has taken’

SANE OST oy RE reer a ee

lines themselves. They have realized this and have at- ,

40 2

place against the best interest of the prospective pas- |

_ sengers. However, this evidence related solely. to the _

activities of agents who were not appointed by the

conference lines: ‘While, it cannot be said these agents

ewed any duty to those lines, the fact remains that the

diversion was not in. the interests of- the conference

tempted to solve the diversion problem by proposals

to increase the level of agents’ commissions. But the

proposals have been blocked, delayed, or weakened

because of the existence of the Unanimity Rule. Per-

haps for economic reasons it is not feasible for the

lines to raise commission levels, at the present -time.

Nevertheless they should at-least be allowed to in-

crease commissions unhampered by the, veto power

_ inherent in the Unanimity Rule. should they desire to

do so.

There is no evidence in the record. indicating that

‘the airlines could or would increase their commission

level, or- would in fact need to do so, if the steamship

lines voted by majority rule or some other rule requir-

ing less than ‘unanimity to raise the commission level

on sea passage.

We feel. that the Unanimity Rule sisinie be discon- - —

- tinued as it applies to the deliberations of the subconi-

— BP NE OOO ILE MEE EONS Oe

GP CAO OX LEWLE IE LASALLE BELLA GAEL DB Sis vom

*

-mittees and’ of the principals on the levels of agents’

commissions. It is a regulation which prevents travel

agents in the: United States from rendering complete

. and effective service both to passengers and to ocean

carriers: It has in some cases prevented the principals .

‘from even considering the question of commission

levels and in others has defeated, or at least delayed

or. watered: down the desires of the majority of: the

lines to raise commission levels, thus placing the

steamship lines at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis

_ the airlines. We think the Unanimity Rule plainly |

ON STOMA BATS

, - <

operates to the detriment of the commerce of the

United States. :

B. Jurispicrion OveR THE LEVEL oF CoMMISsIONS

Pa TO TRAVEL AGENTS

The examiner who presided at the hearings excluded .

evidence relating to commission levels. The precise

reason for this is not certain, but it appears he either

believed the issue was not meant to be included in the

investigation or that our jurisdiction does ‘not extend’

.to the level of agents’ commissions. Subsequently,

Examiner Seaver refused to rule on the jurisdictional

question, as he found there was not in any event suffi-

. cient evidence in the record to Support a finding that

‘the present leve] of commissions is.so low as to be

detrimental to the commerce of: the United’ States.

_ The parties to this proceeding, however, have specifi-

cally raised the question of our jurisdiction in their.

exceptions and replies to exceptions and it seems to

‘+ wus it would be useful from a Pney standpoint to

deal with the question.

To begin with, it-is clear that. the order of investiga-

__ tion eneompasses all activities in which the confer-

ences engage affecting travel agents pursuant to the

agreements here under consideration, and the fixing

of the level. of agents’ commissions is one of such ac- .°

tivities. We also think it i8 clear that we have jurisdic-

tion over the level of agents’ commissions set pursuant

to conference agreements. We do not claim jurisdic- -

‘ tion to set the specific level of compensation. Nor may

we rule on the réasonableness of commissions fixed by -

-_ Individual carriers operating in our foreign com-

merce. What we are here concerned with is concerted

activity which is permissible solely by virtue of an

agreement approved under section 15: — section

‘provides in relevant part: .

\

: < v= 4 ——-, 7% a CNR OI en re ~ ?

se sets PRE NCI E E ETE IER IAG MELLIN DLL peer ery: See =

The Commission shall by order, after notice |

and hearing, disapprove, cancel or modify any.

agreement, or any modification or cancellation

thereof, whether or not previously approved by |

it, that ‘it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or

unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, |

imperters, or ports, or between exporters from

_ the United States and their foreign competitors,

or to operate to the detriment of the commerce

of the United States, or to be contrary to the |

— ere) ingest or to be in violation of this

Thus, the jurisdiction here involved is that ohtehs ‘

directs us to disapprove; cancel, or modify.an agree-

ment when the activities of the parties thereunder

are incompatible with any of these standards. If we

_ were to find that the respondents acting pursuant to

their respective agreements had in concert fixed com-

mission levels which were, for example, detrimental to

the commerce of the United States or contrary to the —

public ‘interest within the meaning of tection 15, we ~

would not only be authorized but would have the duty

. to. withdraw or modify our approval of the ages, |

_ ments under that section. :

Respondents argue that our jurisdiction does not

extend to the level of commissions because the com-

_ -missions are paid to persons not subject to the Act.

: Without considering whether under any circum-—

stances travel agents may be subject to the act,

respondents’ argument misses the point. Our jurisdic-

tion under section 15 is over agreements. Respond-

- .ents’ argument is necessarily: grounded on the premise

that the agreement regarding commission levels is be:

tween the agents and the carriers, which of course is

not the fact. It is between common carriers by water

- all of whom are subject to the Act. Our jurisdiction

PL GOT ew

extends to thé entire agreement and all of the activi-

ties thereunder and it necessarily embraces he very.

- - WS ET Ore

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, : :

: 43.

i, act of fixing the level of agents’ commissions. This

conclusion is by no means novel. The Commission and

-its predecessors have repeatedly asserted jurisdiction,

under section 15 over the concerted establishment of ©

the levels of brokerage paid to brokers by eonferences

operating pursuant to approved agreements. It has

been-repeatedly held, morever, that the use of con-

~ ‘ference power to invade or affect third party interests

is subject to regulation and control under section 15. _

.. Agreements and Pracivces Pertaining to Brokerage,

. 3,U.S.MAC. 170 (1949) ; Pacific Coast European Con-

: ference (Payment. of Brokerage), 4 F.M.B. 696 .

(4955) ; Practices and Agreements of Common Car- .

riers, 7 F.M.©. 51 (1962); Pacific Coast Port rt Hqual-

teation Rule 7 F.M.C. 623 (1963). : ;

C. THE PRESENT Levers OF AGENTS’ Commarssions |

. ASTA requests that we hold that the present level

'. of agents’ commissions is so low as to: be detrimental...

to the commerce of the United States. We are unable

‘to make such a finding upon the present record.

ASTA itself points out that before such a finding

- » could be. made, it would be necessary. to determine

.that the. present level of commissions is so low as to

be “unremunerative, noncompensatory, or a burden

' on ASTA’s other services” and hence detrimental to

commerce. Status of Carloaders and Unloaders, 2

U.S.M.C. 761, 773 (1946).

: - Although there are many general statements in. the

record by travel agents about the difficulty of operat-

ing at the present commission levels, we. agree with

hearing counsel and the examiner that the record in

this proceeding does. not support a finding that the

level: of commissions is unreasonably low. Hearing

_Courisel takes the position, with which the examiner

agreed, that the record “eontaihs no direct and reli-

ig

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44

able evidence” upon which to disapprove the present —

level. This is, we think, of particular. significance

_ whén it is borne in mind that (except for one minor ©

exhibit mentioned below, exhibit 106) the evidence.

upon which ASTA asks us to make a deterthination

isthat adduced by hearing counsel. _

The record does show a decrease in the veladive:

number of steamship bookings in relation to total

. bookings. But it is not established that the level of

commissions is the primary reason for this. The prob-

lem of diversion of passengers from sea to air does

~ exist, and it is a problem ‘which the lines have at-

tempted to solve by increasing the commission level.

But it is undisputéd that the enormous growth i in air

travel is largely attributable to factors. unrelated to

. the steamship passenger industry, such as the in-

- ereased seating capacity and speed provided ‘by the

» new jet aircraft, and the introduction of many new

foreign air carriers serving the United States.

' _ Exhibit 106, the only one which ASTA presses in

’ its brief which it claims is not covered by the evidence.

introduced by hearing counsel, merely shows the rapid

‘expansion of the airlines. It does not show that the

agents are being forced out of' ‘business or losing

money through the sale of sea bookings.

‘We do not imply that we feel the preserit. commis-

; : ‘sion levels are necessarily proper. We hold only that

on this record there is not a sufficient showing for us

td declare that’ such levels are detrimental to the com-

merce of the United. ts a or b adesed unlawful

- under séction 15.

D. Tue UNANIMITY RULE As It ited To SELECTING

ee AGENT APPLICANTS FOR. MevRoPOLITAN ELIGIBLE

'.- Lasts

* nthe examiner in his initial decision found that the

er Unanimity ERale, as mealies to the selection of agent

x applicants for the Eligible Lists in the Metropolitan re :

_ List Tetritories was so detrimental to the interests of

agents, or prospective agents, as to be detrimental to :

~ the commerce of the United States. He therefore con- . .

cluded that rule should be discontinued: Respondents

' _ except to this conclusion: ~ -

We feel that the examiner was correct. The. Una--

. nimity Rule has acted as an unreasonable restraint

- against qualified persons who seek to become travel

. agents. It has on several occasions prevented the Con-

trol Committee from even considering applicants for

. the Eligible Lists because of its use by local eommit-

, tees. It is capable of allowing one representative on ©

_ the Control Committee to ‘‘blackball’’ any applican

_ and exclude him from appointment by the rest of the

lines, though all of them may favor his selection: The

_ Tule has-been denounced by a chairman of a local

- , Committee as ‘‘extremely detrimental to the best in-

terests of the majority lines,” and it has been used.

on at least one occasion in an attempt by lines to

4rade votes. _ .. ah Teta

We hold that the Unanimity Rule must be discon-

‘tinued in all actions by the conference, both by local.

_ Subcommittees and the Control Committee, relating: to

the selection of agent applicants for the Eligible Lists. -

The rule, of course, is unnecessary to protect the free-

dom of individual lines in the actual appointment of

- their agents. since the individual lines are free to ap-

point or not, as they see fit, any applicant placed on

the Eligible Lists. ~ | : : :

. E. Tae Unanrmrry Rowe as Ir Appries to’ Vormxa

on AGcency Sates, TRANSFERS OR CHANGES OF’

- OFFICERS oR LocaTIons ~ ms ie ht

__ It is uncertain whether the examiner meant to out-

law the Unanimity Rule as its applies to agency sales,

transfers, or changes. of officers or locations. Hearing

: 46 ae

Counsel appear to feel that the examiner’s conclusions

against .the. Unanimity Rule extended to these mat-

: ters. In the interest of clarity we think a specific rul-

* ing should be made. — or Z.

Our opinion is that the Unanimity Rule’ must be

- ‘discontinued with ‘respect. to. sales, transfers, or

changes of agency officers or locations. It has the same

. ifjurious effect in this area that it has in the selection

- of agents for the Eligible Lists. The record shows

-that the Unanimity Rule has been instrumental in

' ‘allowing the veto of an agency transfer and makes it

possible for a member of the Control Committee

whose line has not appointed the agency in. question

to block a transfer or change in personnel. These con-

sequences. are. unreasonable restraints which deprive

- travel agents of the ability freely to. dispose. of prop-

erty rights and interfere unduly in the ,conduct of

their business. In our view, the Unanimity Rule is

contrary to. the public interest. It also may possibly

operate in séme instances. to the-detriment of the com-

merce of the United Staies. 3 ‘

F. THe Trewa Rue ise are tir ,

The examiner held that the so-called ‘“‘Tieing Rule,’’

' the conference ‘procédure which prohibits ‘appointed

agents from selling transportation on nonconference

-. lines,.was unlawful as the record did not @emonstrate

‘that it was necessary to promote stability in rates or

_ to combat destructive competition. Such tieing ar-

. Tangements generally run counter to antitrust\prin-

ciples. United States v. General Motors Corporation,

-, 121: F. 2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert, den. 314.U.S. 618,

and. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.,2d 142 (3d

Cir. 1936), cert: den. 305 U.S. 610. a)

Respondents object to the examiner's conclusions,

arguing that he applied strict. antitrust principles in

. . determining ‘the validity of the Tieing Rule. We think

; “J u : menetkenderemanna hs

Bs con en gon npmie tannin Sa i al aa RATT OY ROL a . .

47

ts respondents have misconstrued the examiner’s conclu-

- sions. He applied traditional Shipping Act concepts —

in determining that the rule was invalid. Section 15.

affords antitrust exemption to the parties to an anti-

competitive agreement when. that agreement is ap-

. proved by the Commission. Particularly where the

rights of third persons. are affected; this exemption

_ Should not be granted unless the purposes and policies. ‘.

of. the Shipping Act are thereby: furthered. As the .

that the’ conduct it legalizes under section: 15.does not

invade the prohibitions of the antitrust laws any more

than is: necessary to serve the purpdses of. the act.’

Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F. 2d 51. (D.C.

Cire 1954), cert: den. 347 U.S. 990 (1954): The ex-

aminer considered. those factors. which’ respondents

argue are the: proper: ones, namely rate stability. and

destructive outside competition, and he. weighed the:

restriction imposed:.on agents by. the Tieing Rule «

against: the: possibilities. were. the rule-abolished. He

* concluded, as we do, that no adverse - consequences:

would fiow from the abolition of the rule. . .

Respondents now admit that the Tieing Rule is not:

necessary to protect the conference from outside com- ~

petition, but claim that it is necessary to maintain

stability within the conference, .They argue that with~ .

out thé Tieing Rule. the conference would disinté- oe

. grate. The record, however, contains no evidence

demonstrating that anything of that sort will-happen.

We note that respondent lines operate Caribbean

cruises. without the benefit of a tieing rule and no

f

adverse consequences have resulted. — |

-G, Payment or. Commissions. on. STRIKE-CANCELED. —

Voyages is j

The examiner found that the conference, as a.collec-

‘tive practice, refused: the payment of. commissions om

ee eee es :

®

examiner: stated, “the Commission must make sure -

«

ry

Eg ee a aE, yer oe RS Pare a

48

voyages Voluntarily canceled. Finding such collective

actign to run counter to the interests of our foreign

_ commerce,’ he ruléd that the practice should be dis-

continued. ASTA supports this ruling and also urges

that it be extended to cover the case of voyages can-

celed because of a strike. 3

_ Respondents state, and we agree with them, that the

examiner erred in finding that the refusal to pay com- -

missions on canceled voyages was the result of con-—

ference action. There is nothing in ‘the record which ©

would indicate that collective action of the respondents

_ dictates the payment or nonpayment of commissions

on canceled voyages. There is testimony that some

lines pay half commission, others full commission, on

canceled voyages. Hearing Counsel, in the course of

_ the hearings, admitted that it “may be a fact’? that

there is no conference action with respect to commis-

sions on canceled voyages. SPAT a

| There is nothing in the conference agreement that

_ can bé disapproved with respect to these payments or

nonpayments. If some lines refuse to pay the commis-

sions, they may have reached: individual understend- -

ings with agents covering the matter. But in any

event, we cannot say on this record that the refusal is.

unlawful. : ele Sk aan ha he ;

H. Vorine sy Linzs Wutce Do Nor ENGAGE IN THE

| ForEIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON.

THE LeveL oF Commissions Par to THER

AGENTS IN THE Unitep States * ¥

_ The examiner found that “while unanimous. ap-

proval of the membership of APC would be required

to raise the rate of commission, at least seven of the

members engage in little or no service to or fromthe

United States.” His difficulty with the voting by lines

serving the contiguous Canadian trade was their

power to exercise, through the Unanimity Rule, a veto

ETT GETENTRY EDN IG LIT MURS HE RT GE LEFT ON

—LLLA TOGO LS IIT IN SE OT LI I

- 49

over matters affecting travel agents in the United

_ States. He ruled that “lines which do not engage in

_ the foreign commerce of the United States should not

be permitted to vote on the level of commissions be--

cause the compensation paid to agents here is none of

their.concern.”’ eee 3

Respondents contend that the examiner erred in this

ruling if it-was thereby intended ‘to exclude lines call-

ing only at Canadian ports from voting on levels of *

- commissions paid to their agents in the United States..

Both ASTA and hearing counsel state that. they have

no objéction to such lines voting on commission levels

if the Unanimity Rule is discontinued. Since we have

ordered the rule éliminated as it applies to the level of

commissions, the question reduces itself to one of

' whether the lines serving only Canadian ports should

_ be. denied any voice respecting the level of commissions |

paid to their agents in the United States. >.

It is sufficient for our purposes here*merely to say

that, with the Unanimity, Rule having been eliminated,

we have no objection to such lines having some voice

in commission matters, and that proposed solutions to

this ‘problem may be submitted with the ‘amended

agreements. It may be noted, also, that at least one line

serving only Canadian ports has indicated that it does

not desire to vote on commission levels for agents in

the United States. - SPEER

Our ultimate conclusion is that Agreement No. 7840

of APC and Agreement No. 120 of TAPC and the

rules adopted thereunder, insofar as they relate to

travel agents, are contrary to section 15 of the Ship-

ping Act in the respects and for the reasons noted °

" above and must be modified in accordance with this

decision. | eee ; ,

Respondents shall within 60 days submit to-us for

* review and approval proposed ‘modifications of the

50° o 34

agreements and rules consistent with this decision, as

. per our order attached. The views and comments of

interested parties will be invited upon the specific

language of the proposed modifications and the pro-

- ceeding will be held open pending further order of the |

Commission. | i fas

CoMMISSIONER PaTTERSON, concurring and dissent-

ing: :

Based on the record before me in this proceeding,

” my conclusions are as follows: cae!

First, I concur in the result reached in the preced-

ing report as to— . eer |

(1) The majority’s concurrence with the initial

decision of the examiner as summarized in its re~

port to show those portions as to which no excep-

_ tion is-taken.-It is understood that the respond-

ents have agreed to revise many of the provisions

objected to by the travel agents (first paragraph

under ‘““The Examiner’s Decision’’). __

- (2) The majority’s agreement with the exam-

iner on the requirement of unanimous consent in

_ Selecting among applicants for travel agerits sta-

tus to be placed on a list of eligible applicants for

" . ticket selling agencies (item (4) under “Diseus-

- cussion and Conclusions”). sine Be Ns

(3) The majority’s agreement with the exam-

iner on the requirement of unanimous consent in

voting on agency sales, transfers of agency loca-.

tions, or changes of officers (item (5) under “Dis-

- cussion and Conclusions”). © .

(4) The majority’s decision that there is noth- .

ing in the record to indicate that collective action —

_ of the lines dictates the payment or nonpayment

_ of commissions on canceled voyages {item (7)

under ‘‘Discussion. and Conclusions”). -

DPA EN, POT of ¢

61

(5) The majority’s decision not to “rule on

the interest which we feel it is necessary for a

line to have in the foreign commerce ‘of the

. United States before it can vote on the level of

_ compensation paid to its: agents here’’ (item (8)

. under “Discussion and Conclusions a

_ _ Second, I dissent from the Commission ’s majority

decisions as follows: ae :

« . (1) Disapproving, unless modified, of the

agreement to apply a unanimity rule to the level

of agents’ commissions . (item (1) under ‘“‘Dis-

_. ¢ussion and Conclusions”)... _ i: ea een

». (2) Disapproving, _unless— modified, “of the

— - agreement to prohibit travel agents from selling _

transportation on nonconference or independent -

carriers (item (6) under ‘Discussion and Con-

I wae

(3) Deciding that we have authority to regu-

late the level of commissions paid to travel agents

_ and that. we should take no action at this time

on the level of commissions (items (2) and (3)

under “Discussion and Conclusions’’),

As regards my “‘Second” conélusion as stated above,

the reasons for my dissent are advanced as follows:

__ INTRODUCTION

‘We are concerned with the approvability under

section 15 of the act of certain terms of the Trans- .

Atlantic Passenger Steamship ‘ Conference General

Agreement.adopted January 14, 1929, and as amended

to the latest approved amendment on March 13, 1961, .

and. with the Atlantic Passenger Steamship Confer-

encé Agreement dated London, February 12, 1946, ap- :

proved by a predecessor agency on August 29, 1946.

* — — a are ~ e

SOE Se ELIOT EY y . is , v

52

According ‘to the numbering; Agreement No. 120 has

been amended 76 times, and as of December 21, 1960,.

Amendment 120-76 shows 24 signatory members. No

amendments are in the record for Agreement No.

7840, which has 15 signatory members. Headquarters

of the former are in New York, and of the dattor, ih :

Folkestone, England, Great Britain. ‘|

The proceeding involving both agreements is called

_-a “general investigation” and was started by a pred-

‘.. ecessor. agency on November 2, 1959, after |

‘informal complaint on October 22, 1958, by the Amer-

ican Society. of Travel Agents, Ine., concerning cer-

tain practices of the Atlantic “Passenger er

Conference.

_As a result of this investigation, the sachusitiy has

decided that certain provisions of these agreements

now violate section 15 of the act, although before

the date of its report these provisions have been law-

- ful and predevessor agencies have been fully informed

of all revisions of these agreements. The agreements

relating to commissions waa are now —— to be

illegal are:

(1) Agreement ‘Wo. 120. Article. D. emgs

fares and rates of commission and all ‘conditions

relating thereto, shall be in accordance with the

provisions of the Atlantic Passenger Steamship .

Conference Agreement and the rules and regula-

tions adopted thereunder” (exhibit 1, p. 9).

(Agreement No. 120 does not control commis-

_ gions, but by this provision delegates the function

. to the- body operating under Agreement No.

7840.)

(2) Article. E. “Agencies. {a) The sintitien

lines shall confine the sale of their transportation

.to: (1) Line’s Own Offices. * * * (2) General

Passenger Agencies—i.e., agencies appointed by

be .

LER TEP PES A IIE ONE. SP EST FLM RIDIN E RPE LOL LL MEPL LOLOL LE AEG EE ISIE AE IIL IS IELTS ELLOS LL! AIELLO TT LEE a

F

—

—_—

53

aLine on a commission basis to control a specified -

territory in which sub-agencies are appointed who

must report to such agencies *.* *” Paragraph -

{e) of Article E prohibits a sub-agency “* * *

. from ‘selling passage tickets for. any steamer not

connected with the fleets of the member Lines for

which it. has been duly appointed * * * if such

steamer’ is operating in any competitive trans-

Atlantic trade * * *”? The member Lines agree

to use.a uniform “‘Sub-Agency Appointment |

- Agreement” . (Rule E-2). The prescribed terms

of such agreement obligate the agent “to ad-

_ here to and cémply with * * * the annexed -

- rules * * *”? Rule 5 annexed, called the tying -

_- Tule, provides that “the agent is ‘prohibited from

booking passengers for any steamer not connected

with the fleets of any of the member lines” and

otherwise closely follows the language quoted

above from paragraph (e). rar

(3) Agreement No. 7840. Article 6. “(a) Rates .

_ of Commission and Handling Fees which Member.

Lines may pay to their’ General Agents or

Sub-Agents ‘shall be established. by unanimous

‘agreement of the Member Lines” (exhibit 2,

p. 9). : os

_ DISSENT NUMBER (1)

The majority does not question the validity of

establishing rates by majority agreement or, as far

as I know, by some other ratio, but concludes that

the: “unanimous agreement?’ Obligation (the ex-

pression “unanimity rule as it applies to agents’

commissions” is used) is invalid under section 15.

_ I dissent from this conclusion’ and the disapproval

of the agreement under section 15 that results there-. -

. from. First, the reasons adduced do not support such

. a Cy REET EOC ES IEC

OT PRONE SON RCN EIN LELO IET LEN AOE OE EG BABI ES ? ‘

54

a conclusion; silt second, there are , other reasons

which support the unanimous agreement obligation in ~

article 6, paragraph (a), of Agreement No. 7840.

The two respondent conferences are successors of —

conferences in: th satlantic passenger steaniship

industry going bagk to 1879 or before. The North

Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference met for the first — 7

time on March 5, 1868, in New York. This confer-

_ ence’s: agreement of 1879 provided in clause 19 that

“‘all questions that may come before the Conference °

_ for. action, must be decided by the unanimous vote

of all members present, to be of any effect’”’ (exhibit

119). Unanimous consent clauses of one sort or :

another are in conference agreements of °1885, 1894,

| 1921, 1928, and 1930 (exhibit 119). The record

showed that commissions to subagents were originally

fixed at fixed dollar amounts per passenger depending

on destinations.

By Continental Conference mocking wag first held

in New York on May 4, 1885. The minutes of the.

meeting showed commissions to subagents were fixed.

The Atlantic. Conference’ was re-formed in 1921

after the First World War. Eight years later, in

1929, the formerly separate conferences of Mediter- .

_ Tanean, Continental, and North Atlantic lines joined .

in the one Trans-Atlantic Passenger Conference.

During all this time a unanimous consent was

required with respect to decisions affecting ‘each

member’s business affairs. One would that such

a long tradition behind an historically stablished .

business practice would require fairly compelling

reasons of public policy to overturn it at this late

date. A. review of the majority’s reasoning ‘is enough

to show this is far from the case.

. The majority’s significant reasoning opposing the

unanimity rule (or regulation) is in the following |

- discussion:

. %, "

fa,

55

It is a regulation which prevents travel agents

in the United States from rendering ‘complete

. » and*effectiye service both to Passengers and to

- .» oeean carriers. It has in some cases prevented:

_ the principals from even considering the ques-

tion of commission levels and in others has de-

feated, or at least delayed or watered down-de-

‘sires of the majority of the lines to raise com-

mission levels, thus placing the steamship lines.

at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the air-

-lines. We .think the Unanimity Rule plainly

operates to the detriment of the commerce of

the United States.

__ As I urlderstand the reasoning, preventing or delay-

ing consideration of commission levels, and delaying

the desires of a majority to raise commission levels

is thought to prevent. complete and effective service

‘and such a result is a detriment to commerce.

. To me, this is tantamount to saying that the obliga-

tion -has been effective ‘in preventing increased com-

missions. The obligation has had a deterrent effect ’

_. Within the conference, as the majority recognizes. z

Effectiveness within the conference is not the issue.

The effect of the obligation on the public and on our

commerce’ is the relevant test. The majority seems

to assume without the need to ‘prove that if it can

show the obligation allows “one single vote” to “block

@ proposal on commission matters even though the .

_ proposal was favored by an overwhelming majority

of the member lines,” then. it has automatically

shown public injury. This does not follow at all. Some

connection between cause and effect has to be shown. |

The effect of a veto threat is to cause injury to.

prs desiring a change, but not to commerce in

gehéral or to the public. Perhaps a casual link is

thought to be provided when it is said the lines

“should at least be allowed ‘to increase- commissions .

unhampered by the veto power inherent in the Una-

é

Td

56

nimity Rule should ey desire to he. so.’” Significance: ;

is given to this statement only the conclusion that

such a régulation “prevents travél agencies in the

United States from rendering complete and effective.

service both to passengers and ocean carriers * * *.”

/One can only | ‘speculate that the twice:mentioned |

mability to increase, rather than reduce, rates has

somehow prevented complete and. effective service,

but the way this happens as well as. the effect it

would have on thé carriers and on the traveling

public segment of our commerce should be clearly

shown. It is doubtful. much of a relation can be

- shown if it is based on increases, because the non-

unanimity rule makes it equally easy to reduce’ com-

missions. At the moment, travel agents seem to be

motivated by the apparent desire of many carriers

to raise commission percentages. This is only a

transitory economic factor. When we deal with a

matter of principle such as this, or with a historically

established general rule for conducting business, . we

ought to be governed by long-term’ economic factors.

The closest we get to a relation to commerce and the - |

public interest is the thought that steamship lines

are “at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the

airlines.” Even.this is referred to only as “some

evidence” and it “‘related solely to the activities of

agents who were not appointed by conference: -

lines ***.” Unfortunately, it is only a judgment

' that is not even supported by the most interested

_ parties, the ir adeeaerns carriers, much less the record -

_ herein.

Since the evidence of dation competition falls so

_. short of conclusively proving the point, it is said there

‘is diversion anyway and this is “not in the interests

_- of the conference lines themselves.’’ Changing choices .

as to the method of travel involve only speculation as

to the reasons for diversion, What causes the diver-

as ® a

°

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. °

cs Wena ae

sion ‘is only theory, is not supported, and is even

denied by the conferences. The airline diversion rea-

soning is at best inconclusive. ie eg

_ To-:the extent economics are relevant, this record is -

devoid of data showing the effect of a change in com-

missions either up or down on the respective parties

_ or on the public. Naturally, the travel agents want

more money, but we would have to know a great deal

more than.we can learn from this record as to the

effect of an increase on passenger fares: and on the

precarious competitive balance that now seems to exist.

between ocean and air transportation. Passenger

choices. would seem to be governed as much by con-_

venience and pleasure as, by economics or ‘passenger

agent activity... .

_ The second point is that: the better public-interest °

‘arguments, if anything, favor the validity of the

obligation to not change commission rate levels with-

out unanimous consent.’ The rule of group action by

majority vote actually strengthens the power of the

group, because it puts the full power and influence of _

all the members of the group behind an action affect-' |

ing the public even though some of the individual

members do not agree with the action. Less than all

the members have the ‘power to direct group action. |

A unanimity requirement, on the other hand, weakens

the group’s power to act by giving a power to prevent

: action by a veto over decisions. If antitrust law over- |

- tones are to be injected into our policy considerations,

then anything which -lessens the power of a group

,which makes dominating pricing decisions is to be

favored. U.S.-flag lines are a minority in most confer-:

ences, and the rule.enhances their power to influence

‘group decisions or to protect themselves from oppres-

fips einaaaekal Lyre gp errr

sion by the business’ needs of non-American lines. |

. Generally the business needs of non-American mem-

. ”

ig 58 2

Sica ae :

ber lines are dictated by more favorable cost consid-

’ . erations than our own. There is a serious question as

to whether the undoubted loss of flexibility of action

implicit. in a ‘unanimity. rule is overcome by the detri-

_ ments that may be caused by the economic power of @

group dominated wy majority votes of non-Américan

~ lines.

DISSENT NUMBER (2) |

The majority disapproves the so-called tieing rule

of article E. I dissent from this disapproval. —

Both article E of Agreement No. 120 and the re-

lated “rule” and prescribed terms of agency agree-

ment, with minor revisions and with the approval of

_our predecessors, have existed since 1933. Other forms

of tie obligation have existed even before then. The.

so-called Alexander report, which preceded the enact-

ment of the Shipping ‘Act, acknowledged that agree-

ments existing in 1913 provided: that: “*(11) Agents

- of the lines which are parties to the agreement shalt

not interest themselves in the booking of passengers

for new outside competing lines.” (Investigation of

Shipping Combinations Under House Resolution 587,

Hearings Before the House Committee on Merchant

Marine and Fisheries, 62d Cong., 5d sess. (1913), vol.

ep 4, pp.- 31-34 at p. 33.) The obligation and rule were -

not shown to have been disapproved between 1916 and

; .

PAA TERN QTR ARERR TS AURORE BORNE TIEEL ee IY, RTE PRATT, ENS PER RTs EAE GT STANT NONE

: / : ¥ in 5

1983, nor ‘Subsequently, so the .tieing obligation also

has long historic acquiescence behind it. One would

expect new factors and compelling reasons to overturn

~ guch an obligation after at least 48 year's of use in one

form or another, but this is not the case here either.

Against this background the majority refers to the

examiner’s statements that (1) there is no need for

the rule; and (2) “tieing arrangements generally run

counter to antitrust principles.” The majority says the

oO

respondents have misconstrued these statements. The

Peete Neo CERO TaN Or tes

.

. &®

_ further comment is made that the atititrust ‘‘exemp-

tion should not be granted -unless the purposes and

policies of the Shipping Act are thereby furthered.”

Qn the first point, the need or necessity test is not

expressly made a standard of approval or disapproval

under ‘section 15. Lack of eompetitive “need” or:

“necessity”, or becattse the agreements can be char-

acterized as “tieing” arrangements which *‘generally

run counter to antitrust principles,” may, have been

equated with detriment to commerce ‘as being against

the public interest, but the link is not. revealed.

The competitive necessity problem was not explored

nor developed in this record. Even assuming this to be

a valid test, the absence of any demonstration in this

record ‘proves -nothing; it simply is not a basis for

decision. If competitive necessity is to be a test, some

effort should have been made to develop the facts on .

the point. Without ghe facts, it is no wonder the rec-

ord “did not: dem te’’ anything. Since the burden

is on the Commission to approve unless we can show

detriment or contrariety with public interest, we. may

not invert the burden at the last minute and say the

respondent did not prove enough. It is up to the Com-

mission to do the proving and disproving on this issue.

-, The second point, that tieing agreements generally

run counter to antitrust principles and are-an anti-

competitive practice, is not’ established. There was

no exploration of what antitrust law might be appli-

cable to the facts herein. Some tieing agreements may

‘be contrary and some not, but it is necessary to

establish what type this one is and what. law applies

_ to it. Section 15 exempts agreements from these laws .

‘unless we-can bring the agreement within the ex-

pressly stated standards, which has not been ‘done

except for the majority’s effort to interpret ‘‘detri-

ment” or “‘publie policy” using a partial statement

\

3 e 5

. at e ae bid

oo eno eid TES a5 aes

60

ink Isbrandtsen Co., Ine. v. United States et al., 211

F. 2d 51 ¢D.C. Cir. 1951) at p. 57 (cert. den., 347

U.S. 990). The full statement is: “The condition

upon which such authority [to approve ,agreements

‘under section 15 of the Act] ‘is granted is that the

agency, entrusted with the public interest scrutinize

the agreement: to make sure that the conduct thus

legalized does not invade the prohibitions of the anti-

' trust laws any more than is necessary to serve the |

purposes of the regulatory statute.’’ The court equates

eonsistency with an antitrust prohibition (itself diffi-

cult to determine) with a “‘public interest’”’ standard.

- Sueh a standard was later put in section 15 in 1961

- hy Public Law 87-346 (75 Stat. 762). There is no

"way of telling which antitrust prohibition is to. be

used to test invasion, nor any way 8f balancing the

prohibition against the purposes of the act.

- Serutinizing the intercarrier obligation alone, it is .

impossible to say that the record and. briefing in this

ease establishes that this long-established and approved

agreement clearly invades the prohibitions of the

antitrust laws or to what extent. Absent ‘such a

demonstration ‘by the ‘Commission, seotion 15 compels

approval.

-The majority’s comment establishes as a standard

that approval of agreements under section 15 now.

involves a grant of an antitrust exemption privilege =

on condition that certain objectives are ‘‘furthered.’’

A test, such as furthering ‘“‘policies and purposes,’’

is not expressly prescribed in section 15 or elsewhere.

_ The agreement provision, as with any. other inter-

earrier agreement, must be approved unless the Com-

_ -mnission* can show it is detrimental to commerce,

unjustly. discriminatory or unfair as. between carriers —

- or ports or contrary to the public interest or otherwise

in vidlation of the Act..Detriment, contrariety, and

violation, not furthering, are the tests. :

PRE ELE: RR SMe FA TNE ET NPT IL! ATI EET IE BEV T SE Cer et Sie S eS ce eS TDR ners Rar are ee =n

61

The majority shows no connection betweén detri-

ments to commerce or contrariety with public interest

' and the necessity to combat destructive carrier com-

petition or furtherance of “regulatory purposes’”’ or

“purposes and policies’” of the act. Perhaps the con- ~

nection is implicit; but even with an implicit connec-

* tion we need a statement of how to measure stifling

of competition and of what the purposes and policies

thus set up as.measurements consist of, plus a‘ few

facts to be measured by the standard tests. Thé needed

tests cannot be determined from this record, much

less the facts. One ‘party recognized as much by falling ;

back on_illegality under section 14, subparagraph

“Third,” as interpreted in Federal Maritime Board

v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S. 481 (1958). Section 14 pro-

hibits a carrier from retaliating against shippers by

_ Certain methods because of specified reasons. The

Isbrandtsen interpretation of section 14 establishes

“a8 a violation a. contract requirement that a ‘shipper

not patronize independent on nonconference- member

carriers when such a contract is demanded. in a con- -

. text of being a “‘necessary competitive measure to

Offset the effect of nonconference competition,’”’ be-

cause in such circumstance the demand becomes a ~

“resort to other dis:riminating or unfair methods.”’

Such a context of offsetting needs and demands does .

not exist here. All that has been done is, by some:

reverse logic of negatives,.to argue that the absence

of a. showing of competitive necessity by the respond- ,

ent: conference carriers proves there is no need for

the rule and without Such need the rule is illegal,

and besides tieing agreements are generally illegal.

Whatever is relied on, We are again faced with the ~

necessity of supporting the burden of disapproval and

of not relying on deficiencies in the respondent’s case .

to support our burden.

. ; = t 2 r

>" Ge

For these reasons, I ‘dissent from the majority’s’

disapproval of the conference’s tieing agreement.

, “DISSENT NUMBER (3) -

The majority has reversed the examiner’s conclu-.

sion that no ruling should be made on the Commission

_ authority to regulate the levels of compensation paid

-. to travel agents by the carriers. This issue is entirely

outside the scope of the issues as defined by our prede- |

cessor agency, the Federal Maritime Board, in its or- ©

-- der of November 2, 1959: “to determine whether the

aforementioned Agreements :120 and 7840 should be

- disapproved, canceled, or modified, insofar as they re-

- late to travel agents in accordance with section 15 of

_ the Shipping Act, 1916.” Neither agreement sets levels

of compensation nor requires any disapproval, cancel-

lation, or modification of compensation levels. The

agreements only provide a procedure for deciding ~

how much or what percentage of the passage fare the -

members are willing to allow agents as compensation

.for the sale of tickets. The issue of levels was first

raised in the brief of the travel agents, which stated:

“Contrary to sweeping assertions of Conference coun-

sel, the Maritime Commission has both the right and

the responsibility to approve or disapprove the com-

_ mission level established by the collective action of the

' - respondents:’’ It is -possible that the level so estab-

lished might violate the Shipping Act, but such an :

issue is not before us and the record is totally inade-.. .

quate for such a serious decision. Here we are asked’

to pass on the reasonableness of rate levels and the |

majority says it is unable to make a finding that the -

“present level of commissions is so low as to be détri-

mental to the commerce of the.United States. The

most that is provided by the majority, therefore, 1 is a

volunteer a opinion —— what is thought to

. P eo

_ Bape reR En et Ree 2 pee PRBS Ort D> Cheer

TER Ee SN PN IE Mer MEMEO PE IIOP ON MP ENS m o. “art a PTF OL SOS ES rae ty < ree ™ ae nee ad t =

63

‘be our authority, but there is no realistic application . -

of the power because no change is made in the existing

levels. Absent an application of the power, vouchsafing:

the opinion is frivolous, Apparently, now that the de-

cision as to our jurisdiction’is out of the way, we are |

free to proceed later to decide on a satisfactory level —

of commissions set pursuant to conferénee agreements, .

in spite of the disclaimer of ‘‘jurisdiction to set the

specific level of compensation,”’ assuming a difference —

between these two types of jurisdiction. When this

time comes I anticipate the issue will be just as pres-

ent and unresolved as it is now and will necessitate a

decision with more practical issues at stake. N othing

is accomplished by a decision at this time. i

The examiner’s decision not to pass on the question

until more significant issues are at stake should be

sustained. __ yy ee a |

In concurring as to'the results in items (4) and (5)

of the majority report, I do not necessarily approve

the reasoning. The restraints imposed by the confer-

ence, whether by unanimity or any other percentage

of votes, on the travel agents’ freedom to enter busi- -

ness, sell their business, transfer ownership, or change

. Officers or locations, were not justified by amy eorre- |

sponding advantage to the traveling public. I would

decide without further proof that such freedom existed —

and that a restraint thereon by means of “‘eontrol’”’

committee clearances was against the public interest

unless justified as an effective protection for the pur-

chasers of tickets. These restraimts can not be justified

_@8 reasonably related to the production of business or

to an agent’s capacity to perform his sales funetions

‘for the public. The respondents’ carrier members may

refuse to enter contracts or terminate contracts with

agents they do not trust or consider to be improperly

located for the generation of sales, but this is quite

266-241—67——_-5 : . .

ERIM Patsy Ont STOTT RE Ree

64 .

- different from requiring prior consent to, or even

consultation about, business decisions of travel agen-

- gies. The intrusion is against the public interest.

ComMIssIONER Day, concurring and dissenting:

I eoncur with the results reached in the majority

. report in this proceeding as set forth under ‘‘First”

in the preceding opinion of Commissioner John S..

Patterson, and for reasons advanced by Commissioner

‘Patterson I aim in accord with the remainder of his

opinion..: _ ep ane | :

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

_ No. 873°

‘INVESTIGATION oF PasseNGER STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES

REGARDING. TRAVEL AGENTS

v

ORDER

. This proceeding having been instituted by the Com-

‘mission to determine whether Agreement No. 120,

‘Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, and

_ - Agreement No. 7840, Atlantic Passenger Steamship

‘Conference, should be disapproved, canceled, or modi-

fied pursuant to section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916,

"and: the Commission having this date made and en-

tered its report stating its findings and conclusions,

which report: is made:a part’ hereof by reference, and |

having found that said agreements in certain: respects

violate section 15 and must be modified, as set. forth

in said report:

. It is ordered, That the parties to Agreements Nos. .

120 and 7840, being. the member lines of the Trans- .

“Atlantic Passenger Steamship. Conference and the

Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, respec-

> RT OE ee ee ea RY Re RPO RPE RH IMO ol : THO A oe 5

Y ’ ” wee > THOW . eRe

65

tively, shall within 60 days from the date of this order

file with the Commission for its review and approval

under section 15 of the act, modifications of said

agreements and the rules thereunder consistent with

the said report; : rc

_ It ts further ordered, That this proceeding shall be

held open pending the Commission’s further order.

following its consideration of the modifications so filed

and the comments thereon which will be invited from

interested parties. -

By the Commission, January 30, 1964,

| WT tele aoc (Signed) ‘Tuomas List, .

rae | - Secretary.

Sat

\

Pn IP RB RN Re BRS oo £

PI ET ET IO ROE ETI ON OTE, rae

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