Appendix — Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien
Supreme Court brief1968
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APPENDIX A
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION -
No. 873
‘evesrication OF PAssENGER STEAMSHIP
CONFERENCES REGARDING TRAVEL AGENTS
Decwwep January 30, 1964:
REPORT
BY THE COMMISSION (JOHN HARLLER, Chair-
man; THos. E. Stakem, Vice Chairman; —
: ©. Barrert, Commissioner) :
This proceeding is a general investigation of the
‘ agreements and practices of two interrelated pas-
senger steamship conferences as those practices relate
to travel. agents. It is the first general investigation
to be held by the Commission or its predecessors in |
this area, and all of the. passenger lines engaged ‘in
the transatlantic trade and ‘their travel agents are
directly involved.
This. proceeding was instituted as a result of a
petition filed by the American Society. of Travel _
Agents (ASTA). The purpose of the investigation is
. to cotermaine whether. Agreement 120, the organic
werkt
.20:
of final action taken is filed with the Commission.
Neither the agenda of the meeting, a report of the
discussion of the members, nor any reference to pro-
posals discussed but not adopted is filed with the Com- .
mission. In general there appears to be a deliberate
conference policy to avoid government review of con-
ference -action. One of the lines referred in its cor-
respondence to the conference to ‘‘an understanding
‘ not to have too much official correspondence,” and
several references are made in the transcript of hear- .
ings to the statements by leading representatives of
conference carriers that no minutes could be taken or
published because of the existence of the US. anti-
trust laws. |
B. Tue Traven AGENTS
There are about 4,000 travel edna in the United .
States who represent the carriers of the two .confer-
ences. Approximately one-third of these are members
of ASTA. There are some 575 agencies in New York
alone.-In 1960, the 4,000-or-so travel agents were re-
_ sponsible for 80 percent of all trans-atlantic steamship
passenger bookings made in*the United States, exclu-
sive of tours. The conferences and their member lines |
acknowledge. that the travel agents constitute their ©
principal sales force.
‘The conference action relative to the apointanent
-.and control of travel agents is confined, with the ex-
ception of agencies located in department tores and
automobile clubs, which require conference approval
for appointment, to six so-called ‘‘Metropolitan Eligi-
ble List Territories.’”” The Metropolitan List Terri-
tories are those including and immediately surround-
ing’ New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los
. Angeles, and San Francisco.
The -agencies located in these Metropolitan List
-* Territories are generally small/in size, about 70 per- |
«4
cent having five ‘or fewer employees and half having
_ yearly net earnings under $5,000. There are basically
‘ two types of agents—‘wholesale’’. agents, who ar- -
range, sponsor, and conduct package tours, and “re-
tail” agents, who sell the packaged product, In addi-
‘ tion to the .7-percent commission the retail agent
receives from the TAPC, for the ocean passage, he is
- paid an additional 3-percent commission by the whole-
saler on those items in the package other than steam-
ship fare. Under a somewhat similar arrangement of
. the International Air Transportation Association, an
association of airlines in foreign commerce, the air- .
_ lines pay a 10-percent commission on the air transport )
segment. of tours. The wholesaler does not receive any, .
net remuneration from the shipline or airline in these
_eireumstances. His revenue comes from commissions
on the hotel and insurance facets of the tours. A large
majority of agents in Metropolitan List Territories
handle retail business exclusively. The agents who act
as “wholesalers” may also act as “‘retailers.”. The
great majority engage exclusively in the travel busi-
ness and practically all agents represent airlines as
well as steamship lines.
C. Specrric Practices or TAPC Avrecrixa TRavEn
-AGENTS |
1. Appointment
} . ‘G
7 Under the TAPC agreement the Hentonk Committee’
is responsible for the screening of agents in the Metro- |
politan List Territories, and exercises final authority are,
over all matters relating to the screening of agents
including fdetermination as to the placement of an ap-
. plicant on.the ‘‘Eligible List.”’ Under the terms of the
conference agreement, the member lines may appoint _.
agents only from those appearing on the Eligible List ~
for the particular metropolitan territory. The Control
Committee has eight members who each serve for a
ote | 22
term of 2.years. Two members are chosen to represent
the lines whose vessels are registered in ‘eountries: in
each of the following. areas:
~The North Atlantic Group which includes
Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and
Canada;
The Mediterranea, Group which includes coun-
tries bordering on the Mediterranean, Adriatic,
) and Black Seas’ (including Mediterranean
; France);
The U.S. Group which includes only the United
States; .
The Continental. Group which incluides any
country on the Continent of Kurope not classified -
above.
_ ‘The members in each group are selected by the
unanimous vote of the lines within the group. The
committee meets informally about every 6 weeks.
Votes are not ordinarily taken, and if a vote is taken
it is not recorded. No minutes of meetings are kept.
All‘actions ‘of the committee must have the unanimous
approval of the members. _ |
In the Metropolitan List Territories other than New
York, local subcommittees of the Control Committee
preliminarily determine the qualifications of appli-.
.. eants and forward their recommendations for agency
~ appointments to the Control Committee. Normally °
the .Control Committee accepts these recommenda-
tions. The procedures of the several local committees
are not uniform, even as to the Unanimity Rule, which
under the conference rules they are all supposed to
follow. However, votes are*taken and these are for-
warded to the Coritrol Committee. If a local committee
refuses to recommend an applicant, the application
itself is not forwarded to. the Control Committee.
Thus, in practical efféct each local subcommittee exer-
°
° ° . , i ° ,
-23
Bhai cises considerable power over an applicant in the
Metropolitan List Territory under its jurisdiction.
a. The Sponsorship Rule | "
An applicant for appointment as a travel agent usu-
_*.-.. ally communicates with the secretary of. the confer-
| ence, who, in turn, sends the information relative to
the applicant to all the member lines. The secretary
_- places the name. of the applicant on the agenda of the
Control Committee only if one or more of the member
lines show an interest in the particular applicant. If
‘no member line shows any_ interest in the applicant,
action on his application is ‘‘deferred,’’ and the appli-
cant, of course, may not be appointed an agerit by any -
of the member lines. ‘This requirement .of a show of
interest by a member line is referred to as the “spon-
sorship’’. practice (Sponsorship Rule). Although lines
. individually often interview prospective agents by the ©
’ | . use of questionnaires or of “travelers,” who are rep-
‘resentatives of the various member lines and who per-
*sonally visit applicants at their places of business, the
conference as a-body has no organized system for the
uniform gathering of information concerning each ap-
pliant. It is left to the “sponsoring” line to bring
forward such favorable information as the line deems
necessary to secure favorable action on the applicant.
The conference has.never officially. informed appli-
--eants of the Sponsorship Rule, some applicants learn-
ing of it through: the lines, others through ASTA,
Once “sponsored,” the applicant is then given con-
sideration by the Control Committee. If the applicant
“is not voted favorably upon by the Control Com-
“~ mittee, he is transferred to a ‘‘“Preferred List,” and
wa his ‘application is considered at subsequent meetings.
7 No application is denied outright, but applicants must
. often spend several years on the Preferred List before
securing the unanimous vote of the Control Commit-
24
‘ tee necessary for placement on the Eligible List’ Al-
_ though the Control Committee supposedly determines
whether or not to place applicants upon: the Eligible
_. List by the consideration of such factors as potential
ability to produce business, financial stability, business
character, location of business, and national origin of ©
the applicant in relation to national origin of the mem-
bers of the conimunity .in. which the applicant’s busi- ° ~
ness is located, these factors are not spelled out in the
conference agreement, rules, or elsewhere. Applicants
are not officially informed by the conference as*to the: .
Standards upon which they will be judged; however,
‘in some instances they may. obtain some idea of the |
standards..employed by the members of the Control
Committee from conversations with representatives.
of ‘the lines or from the information requested on the °
questionnaires ‘that some of the lines provide to some
applicants. The Commission has never been informed
. Of these standards. The record shows that the stand-
ards:have not been applied uniformly, and agents of- _
: ten have had to wait long periods of time before learn- —
'° ing of the standards. , a
, Although anyone ean-book passage on cOmmon ear-
Tiers, including agents not on the Eligible List, the
- lines are prohibited from appointing agents who have. °
._ not been approved unanimously ‘for the Eligible List
~ by the Control Committee and commissions for book-
ings made may not be paid by the. member lines to’
“s+, anyone ‘but appointed agents. While under the terms eee
of. the conference agreement commissions may be paid -
retroactively from appointment for 1 year’s bookings,
retroactive payment is not mandatory and is left: to
| the discretion of the individual line. Unappointed
agents find it difficult to make bookings as, lacking
prestige, they ‘are not always. able to obtain vessel
space, nor do they have ready ticket supplies, The
FEE ERE INTER, VELEN TY SGOT OR
.
SP ens 88 EPA ati CEG eae ci Dep ot
een,
ie A RS ii
.
record indicates that these factors coupled with un-
- certainty of commissions tend to cause unappointed
agents where Possible to divert passengers from
steamship ‘travel to air travel.
| b. The Quota System | ;
The TAPC agreement provides that; the ingiher of |
agencies shall be limited, with due regard being given
to the requirements of the traffic in various localities.
The agreement places the responsibility for the estab-
- lishment of these limitations with the Control: Com-
: mittee, and it has established quotas limiting the num-
ber of agents that can.be placed upon, the Eligible
©. List for each Metropolitan List Territory. The effect
of this’ provision is to prevent sponsored and other-
_ wise eligible agents from being placed on the lists.
Although agents are merely ‘{deferred” to the so-
called Preferred List rather than denied placement. ©
on the Eligible List, the deferral for extended periods .
is tantamount to a denial.
c. The Unanimity Rule
‘The requirement of a unanimous vote by the Con-
trol Committee has on many occasions prevented the
_ placement of. applicants on the ‘‘Eligible List.” The
record shows that as late as 1959, the local subcom-
mittee for Philadelphia declined to recommend an
appointment because of asingle ‘“‘nay’’ vote, despite
- eight votes cast in favor of the applicant. Similarly,
the Los Angeles local subcommittee in 1951 declined
four applications, of which three were approved by
majorities of eight. to two,.and orie was approved by
a majority of ‘nine to one. These actions caused the
retiring chairman :of the Los Angeles local subcom-
‘mittee to record in the minutes of that committee :.
the one or two negative votes, resulting in the’
pending applications being declined under the
* * “unanimous agreement” clause, is ex-
26
- tremely detrimental to the best interests of the
majority lines. Further that such negative votes .
may be cast. “‘on direct instructions” from prin-
cipals or are actually mischievous rather ‘than
cooperative -in intent. It is also -obvious that
the committee’s negative action in these cases
‘is being used: to advantage to the fullest pos-
sible extent by the Trans-Atlantic Air services.
Although all final decisional authority for place-
| ment on the Eligible List rests with the Control Com-.
mittee, and the local committees can merely _
vecommend, it should be borne in mind, as noted
above, that when local subcommittees reject appli-
eants, the applications ordinarily do not even come to
the attention of the Control Committee. ;
d. Other TAPC Selection Practices.
Conference rules forbid the appointment of agents
who are also freight forwarders, or ‘whose: places of -
business are in department stores and automobile
clubs. In’ the Metropolitan List Territory of, New
York, appointment is prohibited to agencies located in
the district south of Fulton Street in Manhattan
(Fulton Street Rule). The record shows.that these
‘rules have not been uniformly. applied. The rules re-
garding freight forwarders (Freight. Forwarder
Rule) and.agencies located in department ‘stores (De-
partment Store Rule) are grounded on the contention
- that the agent’s concentration on steamship bookings .
would be: lessened by the agent’s other activities. Un-
der its authority to waive the rule, the Control Com-
mittee has approved about 100 agencies in department
stores and 75 in automobile clubs. Also, the Fulton
Street Rule may be waived in exceptional cases.
There has been no uniformity of standard, however,
in handling any of these supposedly exceptional cases.
27
2. Control of hnandies a Appointment :
a. The Tieing Rule
Conference rules prohibit apnointed agents from
selling transportation on nonconference lines. All pas-
senger lines operating in the transatlantic trade are
menibers of TAPC. TAPC members carry 99 percent
of the passengers moving by water in this trade. The
only lines affected by the rule prohibiting sale of
tickets via nonconference lines are those freighter
services which carry a limited number of passengers
on their cargo vessels. Such carriers, like the TAPC
lines, must ‘rely on travel. agents for the sale of ocean
transportation. A main economic threat to the confer- —
ence lines is that of the air carriers, but the Tieing
Rule’ does not prohibit the agents from taps 3 trans-
atlantie travel via air. carriers. |
b. Sale or. Transfer of. Ageney or Change in 1 Officers
or in Address or Name -
The official conference rules require only that ap- _
-proval of the appointing lines be obtained prior to
the transfer, sale, or change of name or address of
- an agency. However, in practice, the .Control Com-
mittee has exercised authority over these transactions. -
Again precise standards have not been adopted, and
the vague standards which have been utilized have
not been uniformly applied. At one time, at least, it —
-seems to have been a matter of conference policy to
deny sale or transfer without going through termina-.
tion and. reappointment, -but this is’ uncertain. The
record contains several examples of eases in which a
majority of lines were unable to permit a sale or
change in personnel either because of the vague stand-
ards or the existence of the Unanimity Rule. Under
the Unanimity Rule it is possible | for a member of
the Control Committee representing a line which has
28
not appointed the. agency in question. to block a sale .
or transfer.
- ¢. Fines and Penalties sal te
Fines and penalties, called “liquidated damages”
by. the conference, are levied for breaches of confer-
ence rules by a Special Committee, the membership '
- of which is the same as that of the Control Committee.
No formal procedure has been adopted for determina-
* tion of the truth of alleged violations. While it
appears that the accused agent is afforded the right
to tell his side of the story, usually in writing, it does
not appear from the record that the agent is afforded
any kind of hearing, or any reconsideration of or
appeal from the decision of the Control Committee.
During the period from 1952 through 1960, the Special
‘Committee assessed. penalties against some 28 agents
totaling $3,500. oe hier ei
d. Bonding and Canceled Voyages
TAPC requires that agents who are appointed in
Metropolitan List Territories be covered by surety
bonds in amounts based on the expected sales of the
_ agent. A single bond covers one agént for the benefit
of all appointing lines. The premium of the bond is’
paid by the conference, but the agents pay. annual
fees in amounts which vary in different cities. These
fees help defray premium and other expenses of the
conference in administering its agency program. The-
conference lines are not required to be bonded, and
. on at least one occasion a member line was unable to
pay a commission because of financial difficultiés. On
other occasions, when sailings were canceled after
. bookings had been made, commissions were not paid
to the agents even though they had: fully performed
the service of booking the. passage and had nothing ~
- to do. with ‘the cancellation of the sailings. There.
Og
appears to be no conference regulation relating to the
payment of commissions on canceled voyages. How-
- ever, some: lines pay half commission, “her full com-
mission on canceled voyages.
e. Tenure and Cancellation of Eligibility
The conference rules provide that either an agent |
or its appointing line may terminate an agency at
any time. In addition, the Control Committee may
remove naines from the Eligible List if it finds a
breach of conference rules by the agent, unethical
‘business standards, an. inability on the part of the
agent adequately to create and stimulate the sale of -
transportation, or failure of the agent to effect the
sale of a sufficient number of bookings. In the years’
1957 through 1960, 19 agencies were terminated due
to an alleged insufficiency in the number of bookings
produced. by the agency and 17 for other reasons.
Four of the latter were subsequently reinstated.
No precise standards relative to what might consti-
tute a sufficient number of bookings: by an agent have
been set up. The local subcommittees have established
minimum booking requirements for approved agents
in their respective jurisdictions, but the standards —
were not considered absolute and the Control Com- —
mittee has on occasion exercised an ad hoc judgment
. ‘in the application of these requirements. In New..
‘York the minimum was set at 50 bookings per year
within the city limits and 30 in the suburbs. Twenty-
- five was the minimum in Philadelphia and Chicago,
30 in San Francisco, 10 in Los Angeles, and no mini-
mum was set for Boston. The. agents were not in-
formed of these standards. The Control: Committee
has exercised final authority in terminating the eligi-
“bility of agencies according to which, ‘‘Each case was
handled. on its own merits depending on the circum-
stances surrounding the case.’’ Agents have not been
30
-afforded a hearing or a right to have the action of
the Control Committee reviewed.
' The standards of performance and other grounds :
for: termination consist solely. of _ general:norms ~
quoted above. -
D. PRACTICES OF APC WITH icine TO LEVEL OF
‘ AGENTS’ CoMMISSIONS
As noted above, the TAPCO exercises authority 0 over —
all agency relationships.and practices at issue in this
proceéding except the level of agents’ commissions
which is the province of the APC. Under the APC
agreement, unanimous approval is required by the
membership of the APC before the level of commis-
sions paid to agents may be raised. Thus,.an increase
_in the level of commissions requires the affirmative
vote of the six.member lines which serve only Cana- .
‘dian ports. Meetings of the APC are conducted on an
. informal basis and a vote of the members is neither |
taken, recorded, nor filed with the Commission..The
conference records show. that from about October
1950, all lines have shown‘a willingness in principle
at least to increase the level of agency commissions.
However, in 1950 and in 1951 subcommittees of the
APOC were unable, because of the conference’s Una-
nimity Rule, to recommend a proposed increase in
- eommissions, although the majority .was prepared to
‘Increase the commission from 6. to 714.percent on
‘fall classes, all seasons.” The -1951 subcommittee-
. Stated that “while there was a strong majority in
favor of applying a 714-percent commission to all
classes throughout the year, it was not possible to —
reach ‘unanimous agreement,” and ‘‘it was, therefore, _
suggested that the matter be deferred for considera-
tion at-the statutory meeting in March 1952.” The
subcommittee did not have - power~ to take final
NP NOR A ARN
31
action, but its function was to recommend action to
‘the prineipals.
In 1951 the conference inne” the commission to
- Tp percent, except on passage booked during the high
_ volume summer ‘season where a 6-percent commission °
remained in effect. Proposals to increase commissions.
were taken up and action was deferred at meetings .
— in 1952 and 1953. A 1952 subcommittee noted that —
‘unanimity could not be reached on a proposal to ex-
tend. the off-season commission basis (Te percent) to.
bookings for seasonal sailings.” The question was
taken up again in 1956, when ‘the present commission
of 7 percent on. all bookings was established. Since
that time, representatives of travel agents have sought
increases in the commission levels but have been told
’ that commission levels have not been raised since 1956 |
because ‘the APC has had difficulty in achieving
unanimity.
Evidence adinesd by the conference demonstrates
that differences between members over agents’ com- -
missions are usually eliminated or compromised, the
minority giving way eventually to the majority. Con- ©
ference witnesses testified that neither a single mem-
ber nor a small minority has ever vetoed proposed
- conference action on commissions. It is impossible to »
tell from the conference’s sketchy minutes if this is
true. However, it is certain that under the present
Unanimity Rule a single member could veto an action
to increase agents’ commissions even though the action —
was desired by all the other members. The executives
of the American-flag lines which are members of APC
and who testified at the hearing, stated that because
the Americans were a minority in the conference, the
Unanimity Rule was necessary to protect their inter-
ests. The record indicates, however, that the Ameri-
can lines have often been in the vanguard for com-
266-241-678 ;
32
mission increases and as near as can be determined ~
have never blocked proposed increases. Under the con-.
ference agreements the decision to change the -UTia-
nimity Rule to a majority rule or some other rule that
_ would require the consent of less than the full mem-.
bership, would itself require the unanimous consent
of all conference members.
E. - DIVERSION’ OF PASSENGERS TO AIR CARRIERS
At present both air and ocean carriers pay 7 percent
commissions on regular point-to-point: bookings, and.
10 percent on their respective portions of so-called
foreign inclusive tours. It takes approximately three
or four times as much of an agent’s time to sell sea «
as compared with air space, and several years of ex-
perience are required to produce a really competent
steamship passage salesman. Because of this, appoint-
ed agents tend to push air rather ‘than sea travel. The
record indicates that one of the primary factors in
determining the level of commissions has been the |
competition of air travel.
THE EXAMINER’S DECISION
The parties agree that the initial decision of the ex-
aminer correctly disposes of most of the issues raised
in this proceeding. We summarize below those por-
tions of the decision to which no exception is taken: _
After a brief discussion in which he approved of the
‘ exercise of some conference control over travel agents
and noted that ASTA was also in favor of such con-
trol (Initial Decision, 49-50), the examiner adopted |
_ the following statement of Hearing Counsel as criteria —
for determining what constitutes a violation of section
15 of the Shipping Act, 1916:
Any provisions of TAPC Agreement No. 120
or APC Agreement No. 7840, or any regulations
or rules promulgated thereunder, which siete :
Pee
°
°
1 A AAI I Te cet sie
°
.
° ° 33
- travel agencies in the United States how ren-
dering complete and effective service both to’
passengers and to ocean carriers operate to the
detriment of the commerce of the United States.
All conference-imposed restraints which pre-+_
"vent the travel agent from properly performing
his function of selling ocean transportation for
. which no reasonable justification exists, should
- be eliminated by the Commission’s disapproval, :
cancellation, or modification of the subject | .
agreements * * *, (Initial decision, p. 52.) °
In addition to the above, the examiner further con-. —
cluded that ‘‘unreasonable restraints against qualified
- persons who seek to become travel agents would. also
be detrimental to commerce.”.
The examiner in light of these criteria then josie.
- ered the areas of interaction between the conferences
and: the travel. agents, discussed above in the factua?
statement, and reached the following conclusions: ®
A. TAPC Practices
1. Appointment
The conference (TAPC) has. failed to wale pub-.
- lish, and ‘promptly and consistently apply uniform
standards of background and qualifications in its
selection of applicants for placement on the list of
eligible agents in Metropolitan List Territories. This
failure is detrimental to commerce and contrary to
the public interest, within the meaning of section 15,
because it detracts from the ability and the willing-
ness of the corps of agents, or potential agents, to
.foster and sell steamship travel. Thus, the confer-
ence must adopt, publish and apply a set of uniform,
objective, standards in the screening of applicants
that are sufficiently precise, and well defined to give
adequate notice to applicants of the requirements.
No other standards should or-may be employed. The
- SF
Se ee PPI 15 OIRO
\
' 34
standards of eligibility must be published and made
_ available to all applicants in order to give meaning
and effect thereto and every applicant who. meets
them must be approved. Similarly, conference action —
on each application must be taken promptly and the
applicant notified promptly of the decision and the
reasons for whatever action is taken. These reasons
should not be stated: merely in general terms but
must relate specifically to the adopted standards -
of eligibility. .
Respondents have explicitly consented to révise
_ their agreements so as-to provide a set of uniform
- objective standards for screening applicants in the
- Metropolitan List Territories, sufficiently precise and
well‘defined to give applicants adequate notice of the
' requirements they must meet. Respondents have
further agreed to the publication of such standards
- and to prompt notification of the action taken with
respect to all applicants for appointment as agents.
a. The Sponsorship Rule
The Sponsorship Rule must be Sebsviitiniaad as it
has resulted in the exclusion from the Eligible Lists.
of qualified agents, to the detriment of commerce. .
Respondents have agreed to remove the ae east
Rule. ° ; ,
-b. The Quota System
‘The Quota System ‘must also be discontinued for
the same reason that requires discontinuance of the
Sponsorship Rule. The number of agents already on
the Eligible List has no bearing on the question of
the qualifications of a new applicant. If an individual
_ line has all the agents it feels that it requires, it is of
- course not required to appoint an agent newly placed
by the Control Committee on the Eligible List.
-Respondents have agreed to. remove the Quota
System.:
35°
¢. Other TAPC Selection Denpiline:
- .The Fulton Street Rule and the Department Store
_and Automobile Club Rules must be abolished, as
they..have resulted in the arbitrary exclusion of agents. .
to the detriment of commerce. The Freight Forwarder ©
Rule must be submitted to the Commission for ap-
proval. The Commission can then consider the pro-
. posal under its customary proceedures and after
obtaining the views of all interested parties make a
determination as to its validity under section 15. The
respondents have agreed to abolish the Fulton Street
Rule, the Department Store and Automobile Club
Rule, and they have further agreed to fil@the Freight
. Forwarder Rule with the Commission.
. 2. Control of Agencies After Appointment
a. Sale or Transfer of Agency or Change in Officers
.or in Address or Name
_ The*same administrative fairness must be afforded
when the conference considers an apnea for ap-
proval of the sale, transfer, or changejof the officers
of an agency that is required in reference to the con-
_ sideration of ‘original applicants and for the same
reasons. The conference rules must provide reasonable
standards in regard to the consideration of sales and_ .
' transfers and changes of officers, including adequate
notice of the standards to applicants, and an oppor-
tunity for the agent to be heard. The rules must
further provide for prompt. action in accordance with
the standards adopted and. for prompt noticé to the
agent of the action taken together with the reasons
therefor. A system of arbitration for review of con-
ference action will not be required as, in the case of
the screening of applicants, relief from arbitrary
conference action or other violations by the confer-
ence will be afforded upon complaint filed with hess e
-. Commission. - 3 i | :
= x in { ' . j
The respondents have agreed to. the ‘adoption and
application of reasonable standards regarding the
38 consideration of sales and transfers, and of changes
in name, address, or officers in appointed agencies,
including. procedures for notice thereof to applicants,
for opportunity to be heard and for — action. —
on such requests.
b. Fines and Penalties
The conference must adopt and apply definite
standards for the assessment of liquidated damages,
providing for adequate notice thereof and for oppor- ._
tunity of a¢cused agents to be heard, and for prompt
report to the Commission of any liquidated damages
assessed. Respondents have agreed to adopt and apply
definite standards for the assessment of liquidated
damages, providing for adequate notice théreof and .
for opportunity for accused agents to be heard, and
for prompt: report to the Commission of any damages
assessed.
. ¢, Bonding - } fe ; 7
Bonding of carriers against loss. of commissions
. caused by: cancellation of: voyages or line’ insolvency .
a is not. required. There: is no evidence that suitable
‘bonds are. available, and instances of financial failure
by the lines are very rare.
. d. Tenure and Cancellation of Hligibility |
_ . The conference must adopt and.apply definite ob-
: jective standards for cancellation of the eligibility
of agents. The agent against whom allegations are
made should be notified of the delinquencies with
which he is charged and afforded an opportunity to
confront those who made the charge and to adduce
evidence to refute it, or in the alternative a reason-
able time to correct the delinquency. The rules should.
require that the conference secretary. must be. in-
. .
SPIEL ARAM LP IATL TI LET I ET ATE
a
formed in writing of all cancellations by member.
lines individually including the reasons therefor, rec-“
ords of which must be kept for a reasonable time in
order to permit the Commission to assure itself that.
multiple cancellations of a particular agent are’ not °
being employed to circumvent the restrictions on
conference action. Respondents have agreed to adopt,
_ publish, and apply a set of definite objective stand-
‘ ards for the cancellation of the eligibility of agents,
‘and to the provision of a reasonable time after warn-
ing to correct delinquencies or adduce evidence to
refute them (except in the case of default by an — |
or the cancellation of his surety bond).
.” B. Secrecy oF ConFERENCE Action: VorTine
the conferences, they should be required to take and.
record the votes of the members, keep detailed minutes
of all matters coming before meetings, retain records
of meetings for a reasonable time and provide copies -
to the Commission. (Initial ‘Decision, 68-69.) Re-~
spondents have agreed to provide the Commission
with full minutes of meetings: indicating votes of the
member lines.
‘DISCUSSION’ AND CONCLUSIONS -
‘We agree that the examiner correctly ainvidied of
the foregoing issues and ‘we adopt his findings and_
conclusions thereon as: our own. We now turn to the
* . issues raised on review by the parties in k Cnet excep-
tions to the initial decision.
A. Tus Unanimity RvLE as APPLIED TO THE LEVEL
or Agrnts’ CoMMISSIONS é
The examiner found that there was no showing that .
the Unanimity Rule as applied to agents’ commissions
‘had operated to the detriment of the commerce of
Because of the public interest in the operations of ~~
é 38°
a the. United States, and that there was no showing
-. that a different voting rule would watts allowed
increased commissions.
In addition, he found that there pein at present
a substantial equilibrium between the “commissions.
. paid by the air and ocean carriers in this trade in
that both pay 7 percent on regular point-to-point . ;
bookings.’? He said it could not ‘be concluded -that .
the failure of the conference-to increase commissions.
as requested by the agents has led to a competitive.
disadvantage of the conference lines relative. to the
airlines. In the examiner’s view it was more. logical
to conclude that if the adoption of a majority rule
resulted in an increase in commissions, the’ airlines |
- might find it necessary to succumb to pressures from
the travel agents and meet this new. competition
-eaused: by the disparity in the commission rates by
- an increase of their own and thus begin’ leapfrogging
the steamship commission rate. The examiner further
conjectured that increases in fares would probably
follow, to the prejudice of the traveling public and
_. the detriment of commerce.
The record in this proceeding compels us to over-
rule the’ examiner on these findings and conclusions.
The record shows many instances in which the exist-
ence of the Unanimity Rule has blocked or at least
delayed the fruition of a desire on the part of a
maj jority of the lines .to increase. the levels of —
commissions” | °
Respondents’ arguments that the’ evidence selene
only to the desires of a subcommittee which did not
have the power to take final action is of doubtful |
value here. The determinations of the ‘subcommittee.
may not have been of the kind dictating final action, -
but they are apparently conditions precedent to any
| _ * ee seo. D of the Statement of Facts, supra :
se NN oe ioe ‘ . SYR EE A RE euerceyegpienpe tena NE
; aa 2 = . Poe ORS EO ~ en ia :
¢ 2
ad hl ae
Be ARIA 8 thio niece tne Kori La Snes...
oe er
39
conference ‘action with respect to the level of com: _
missions. . Although it is. true that the principals. on
occasion took actions other than: those recommended.
by the subcommittee, these appear to have been in
'.. the nature of a watering down of actions favored by
at least a majority of the lines. There is no indication
from the record that the’ principals. ever instituted. ~
any action regarding agent’s commission levels with- -
out ‘the concurrence of at least. a majority of the
subcommittee. The record, moreover, affirmatively
‘shows that a. lack of unanimity on several occasions
prevented the subcommittee from even reporting the
positions of the member lines to the principals.
The effect of the Unanimity Rule on the actions of
the principals is of course rendered less clear because
of the conference’s ‘failure to keep complete minutes
of its meetings and to file them with the Commission.
By its own admission, the conference purposely,
_ adopted this practice because of its concern over the’
*.American antitrust laws. It is undeniable, however,
that under present conference procedures a single vote |
could block’ a proposal on commission matters. even -
though the proposal was favored by an overwhelming
majority of the member lines. .
The record clearly shows that agents tend to push
air travel rather than sea travel, mainly because it
takes considerably longer to handle the details of sea
travel. Time is money and the fact that the travel
agent. is able to sell more air than sea bookings in a.
given time period means, as ASTA correctly contends,
that the effective ommission rate. of the steamship
lines is lower than that of the airlines. Under this
reasoning the “substantial équilibrium’’ found by the
- examiner becomes superficial.
The record contains some evidence of instances in
which the diversion from sea to air passage has taken’
SANE OST oy RE reer a ee
lines themselves. They have realized this and have at- ,
40 2
place against the best interest of the prospective pas- |
_ sengers. However, this evidence related solely. to the _
activities of agents who were not appointed by the
conference lines: ‘While, it cannot be said these agents
ewed any duty to those lines, the fact remains that the
diversion was not in. the interests of- the conference
tempted to solve the diversion problem by proposals
to increase the level of agents’ commissions. But the
proposals have been blocked, delayed, or weakened
because of the existence of the Unanimity Rule. Per-
haps for economic reasons it is not feasible for the
lines to raise commission levels, at the present -time.
Nevertheless they should at-least be allowed to in-
crease commissions unhampered by the, veto power
_ inherent in the Unanimity Rule. should they desire to
do so.
There is no evidence in the record. indicating that
‘the airlines could or would increase their commission
level, or- would in fact need to do so, if the steamship
lines voted by majority rule or some other rule requir-
ing less than ‘unanimity to raise the commission level
on sea passage.
We feel. that the Unanimity Rule sisinie be discon- - —
- tinued as it applies to the deliberations of the subconi-
— BP NE OOO ILE MEE EONS Oe
GP CAO OX LEWLE IE LASALLE BELLA GAEL DB Sis vom
*
-mittees and’ of the principals on the levels of agents’
commissions. It is a regulation which prevents travel
agents in the: United States from rendering complete
. and effective service both to passengers and to ocean
carriers: It has in some cases prevented the principals .
‘from even considering the question of commission
levels and in others has defeated, or at least delayed
or. watered: down the desires of the majority of: the
lines to raise commission levels, thus placing the
steamship lines at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
_ the airlines. We think the Unanimity Rule plainly |
ON STOMA BATS
, - <
operates to the detriment of the commerce of the
United States. :
B. Jurispicrion OveR THE LEVEL oF CoMMISsIONS
Pa TO TRAVEL AGENTS
The examiner who presided at the hearings excluded .
evidence relating to commission levels. The precise
reason for this is not certain, but it appears he either
believed the issue was not meant to be included in the
investigation or that our jurisdiction does ‘not extend’
.to the level of agents’ commissions. Subsequently,
Examiner Seaver refused to rule on the jurisdictional
question, as he found there was not in any event suffi-
. cient evidence in the record to Support a finding that
‘the present leve] of commissions is.so low as to be
detrimental to the commerce of: the United’ States.
_ The parties to this proceeding, however, have specifi-
cally raised the question of our jurisdiction in their.
exceptions and replies to exceptions and it seems to
‘+ wus it would be useful from a Pney standpoint to
deal with the question.
To begin with, it-is clear that. the order of investiga-
__ tion eneompasses all activities in which the confer-
ences engage affecting travel agents pursuant to the
agreements here under consideration, and the fixing
of the level. of agents’ commissions is one of such ac- .°
tivities. We also think it i8 clear that we have jurisdic-
tion over the level of agents’ commissions set pursuant
to conference agreements. We do not claim jurisdic- -
‘ tion to set the specific level of compensation. Nor may
we rule on the réasonableness of commissions fixed by -
-_ Individual carriers operating in our foreign com-
merce. What we are here concerned with is concerted
activity which is permissible solely by virtue of an
agreement approved under section 15: — section
‘provides in relevant part: .
\
: < v= 4 ——-, 7% a CNR OI en re ~ ?
se sets PRE NCI E E ETE IER IAG MELLIN DLL peer ery: See =
The Commission shall by order, after notice |
and hearing, disapprove, cancel or modify any.
agreement, or any modification or cancellation
thereof, whether or not previously approved by |
it, that ‘it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or
unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, |
imperters, or ports, or between exporters from
_ the United States and their foreign competitors,
or to operate to the detriment of the commerce
of the United States, or to be contrary to the |
— ere) ingest or to be in violation of this
Thus, the jurisdiction here involved is that ohtehs ‘
directs us to disapprove; cancel, or modify.an agree-
ment when the activities of the parties thereunder
are incompatible with any of these standards. If we
_ were to find that the respondents acting pursuant to
their respective agreements had in concert fixed com-
mission levels which were, for example, detrimental to
the commerce of the United States or contrary to the —
public ‘interest within the meaning of tection 15, we ~
would not only be authorized but would have the duty
. to. withdraw or modify our approval of the ages, |
_ ments under that section. :
Respondents argue that our jurisdiction does not
extend to the level of commissions because the com-
_ -missions are paid to persons not subject to the Act.
: Without considering whether under any circum-—
stances travel agents may be subject to the act,
respondents’ argument misses the point. Our jurisdic-
tion under section 15 is over agreements. Respond-
- .ents’ argument is necessarily: grounded on the premise
that the agreement regarding commission levels is be:
tween the agents and the carriers, which of course is
not the fact. It is between common carriers by water
- all of whom are subject to the Act. Our jurisdiction
PL GOT ew
extends to thé entire agreement and all of the activi-
ties thereunder and it necessarily embraces he very.
- - WS ET Ore
I LOLOL OG SER abe GALE BEALE RBA LIED LGR E ORE PALL I! LEELA RD LEME NL ALY wor
, : :
: 43.
i, act of fixing the level of agents’ commissions. This
conclusion is by no means novel. The Commission and
-its predecessors have repeatedly asserted jurisdiction,
under section 15 over the concerted establishment of ©
the levels of brokerage paid to brokers by eonferences
operating pursuant to approved agreements. It has
been-repeatedly held, morever, that the use of con-
~ ‘ference power to invade or affect third party interests
is subject to regulation and control under section 15. _
.. Agreements and Pracivces Pertaining to Brokerage,
. 3,U.S.MAC. 170 (1949) ; Pacific Coast European Con-
: ference (Payment. of Brokerage), 4 F.M.B. 696 .
(4955) ; Practices and Agreements of Common Car- .
riers, 7 F.M.©. 51 (1962); Pacific Coast Port rt Hqual-
teation Rule 7 F.M.C. 623 (1963). : ;
C. THE PRESENT Levers OF AGENTS’ Commarssions |
. ASTA requests that we hold that the present level
'. of agents’ commissions is so low as to: be detrimental...
to the commerce of the United States. We are unable
‘to make such a finding upon the present record.
ASTA itself points out that before such a finding
- » could be. made, it would be necessary. to determine
.that the. present level of commissions is so low as to
be “unremunerative, noncompensatory, or a burden
' on ASTA’s other services” and hence detrimental to
commerce. Status of Carloaders and Unloaders, 2
U.S.M.C. 761, 773 (1946).
: - Although there are many general statements in. the
record by travel agents about the difficulty of operat-
ing at the present commission levels, we. agree with
hearing counsel and the examiner that the record in
this proceeding does. not support a finding that the
level: of commissions is unreasonably low. Hearing
_Courisel takes the position, with which the examiner
agreed, that the record “eontaihs no direct and reli-
ig
° 5 . \
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— at a hi 2 PTE EOE > an ‘ és bs 7 to X “—< —— ee -
PRA ON LOSES ELIE CUES Fe Oh ea ;
-.
44
able evidence” upon which to disapprove the present —
level. This is, we think, of particular. significance
_ whén it is borne in mind that (except for one minor ©
exhibit mentioned below, exhibit 106) the evidence.
upon which ASTA asks us to make a deterthination
isthat adduced by hearing counsel. _
The record does show a decrease in the veladive:
number of steamship bookings in relation to total
. bookings. But it is not established that the level of
commissions is the primary reason for this. The prob-
lem of diversion of passengers from sea to air does
~ exist, and it is a problem ‘which the lines have at-
tempted to solve by increasing the commission level.
But it is undisputéd that the enormous growth i in air
travel is largely attributable to factors. unrelated to
. the steamship passenger industry, such as the in-
- ereased seating capacity and speed provided ‘by the
» new jet aircraft, and the introduction of many new
foreign air carriers serving the United States.
' _ Exhibit 106, the only one which ASTA presses in
’ its brief which it claims is not covered by the evidence.
introduced by hearing counsel, merely shows the rapid
‘expansion of the airlines. It does not show that the
agents are being forced out of' ‘business or losing
money through the sale of sea bookings.
‘We do not imply that we feel the preserit. commis-
; : ‘sion levels are necessarily proper. We hold only that
on this record there is not a sufficient showing for us
td declare that’ such levels are detrimental to the com-
merce of the United. ts a or b adesed unlawful
- under séction 15.
D. Tue UNANIMITY RULE As It ited To SELECTING
ee AGENT APPLICANTS FOR. MevRoPOLITAN ELIGIBLE
'.- Lasts
* nthe examiner in his initial decision found that the
er Unanimity ERale, as mealies to the selection of agent
x applicants for the Eligible Lists in the Metropolitan re :
_ List Tetritories was so detrimental to the interests of
agents, or prospective agents, as to be detrimental to :
~ the commerce of the United States. He therefore con- . .
cluded that rule should be discontinued: Respondents
' _ except to this conclusion: ~ -
We feel that the examiner was correct. The. Una--
. nimity Rule has acted as an unreasonable restraint
- against qualified persons who seek to become travel
. agents. It has on several occasions prevented the Con-
trol Committee from even considering applicants for
. the Eligible Lists because of its use by local eommit-
, tees. It is capable of allowing one representative on ©
_ the Control Committee to ‘‘blackball’’ any applican
_ and exclude him from appointment by the rest of the
lines, though all of them may favor his selection: The
_ Tule has-been denounced by a chairman of a local
- , Committee as ‘‘extremely detrimental to the best in-
terests of the majority lines,” and it has been used.
on at least one occasion in an attempt by lines to
4rade votes. _ .. ah Teta
We hold that the Unanimity Rule must be discon-
‘tinued in all actions by the conference, both by local.
_ Subcommittees and the Control Committee, relating: to
the selection of agent applicants for the Eligible Lists. -
The rule, of course, is unnecessary to protect the free-
dom of individual lines in the actual appointment of
- their agents. since the individual lines are free to ap-
point or not, as they see fit, any applicant placed on
the Eligible Lists. ~ | : : :
. E. Tae Unanrmrry Rowe as Ir Appries to’ Vormxa
on AGcency Sates, TRANSFERS OR CHANGES OF’
- OFFICERS oR LocaTIons ~ ms ie ht
__ It is uncertain whether the examiner meant to out-
law the Unanimity Rule as its applies to agency sales,
transfers, or changes. of officers or locations. Hearing
: 46 ae
Counsel appear to feel that the examiner’s conclusions
against .the. Unanimity Rule extended to these mat-
: ters. In the interest of clarity we think a specific rul-
* ing should be made. — or Z.
Our opinion is that the Unanimity Rule’ must be
- ‘discontinued with ‘respect. to. sales, transfers, or
changes of agency officers or locations. It has the same
. ifjurious effect in this area that it has in the selection
- of agents for the Eligible Lists. The record shows
-that the Unanimity Rule has been instrumental in
' ‘allowing the veto of an agency transfer and makes it
possible for a member of the Control Committee
whose line has not appointed the agency in. question
to block a transfer or change in personnel. These con-
sequences. are. unreasonable restraints which deprive
- travel agents of the ability freely to. dispose. of prop-
erty rights and interfere unduly in the ,conduct of
their business. In our view, the Unanimity Rule is
contrary to. the public interest. It also may possibly
operate in séme instances. to the-detriment of the com-
merce of the United Staies. 3 ‘
F. THe Trewa Rue ise are tir ,
The examiner held that the so-called ‘“‘Tieing Rule,’’
' the conference ‘procédure which prohibits ‘appointed
agents from selling transportation on nonconference
-. lines,.was unlawful as the record did not @emonstrate
‘that it was necessary to promote stability in rates or
_ to combat destructive competition. Such tieing ar-
. Tangements generally run counter to antitrust\prin-
ciples. United States v. General Motors Corporation,
-, 121: F. 2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert, den. 314.U.S. 618,
and. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.,2d 142 (3d
Cir. 1936), cert: den. 305 U.S. 610. a)
Respondents object to the examiner's conclusions,
arguing that he applied strict. antitrust principles in
. . determining ‘the validity of the Tieing Rule. We think
; “J u : menetkenderemanna hs
Bs con en gon npmie tannin Sa i al aa RATT OY ROL a . .
47
ts respondents have misconstrued the examiner’s conclu-
- sions. He applied traditional Shipping Act concepts —
in determining that the rule was invalid. Section 15.
affords antitrust exemption to the parties to an anti-
competitive agreement when. that agreement is ap-
. proved by the Commission. Particularly where the
rights of third persons. are affected; this exemption
_ Should not be granted unless the purposes and policies. ‘.
of. the Shipping Act are thereby: furthered. As the .
that the’ conduct it legalizes under section: 15.does not
invade the prohibitions of the antitrust laws any more
than is: necessary to serve the purpdses of. the act.’
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F. 2d 51. (D.C.
Cire 1954), cert: den. 347 U.S. 990 (1954): The ex-
aminer considered. those factors. which’ respondents
argue are the: proper: ones, namely rate stability. and
destructive outside competition, and he. weighed the:
restriction imposed:.on agents by. the Tieing Rule «
against: the: possibilities. were. the rule-abolished. He
* concluded, as we do, that no adverse - consequences:
would fiow from the abolition of the rule. . .
Respondents now admit that the Tieing Rule is not:
necessary to protect the conference from outside com- ~
petition, but claim that it is necessary to maintain
stability within the conference, .They argue that with~ .
out thé Tieing Rule. the conference would disinté- oe
. grate. The record, however, contains no evidence
demonstrating that anything of that sort will-happen.
We note that respondent lines operate Caribbean
cruises. without the benefit of a tieing rule and no
f
adverse consequences have resulted. — |
-G, Payment or. Commissions. on. STRIKE-CANCELED. —
Voyages is j
The examiner found that the conference, as a.collec-
‘tive practice, refused: the payment of. commissions om
ee eee es :
®
examiner: stated, “the Commission must make sure -
«
ry
Eg ee a aE, yer oe RS Pare a
48
voyages Voluntarily canceled. Finding such collective
actign to run counter to the interests of our foreign
_ commerce,’ he ruléd that the practice should be dis-
continued. ASTA supports this ruling and also urges
that it be extended to cover the case of voyages can-
celed because of a strike. 3
_ Respondents state, and we agree with them, that the
examiner erred in finding that the refusal to pay com- -
missions on canceled voyages was the result of con-—
ference action. There is nothing in ‘the record which ©
would indicate that collective action of the respondents
_ dictates the payment or nonpayment of commissions
on canceled voyages. There is testimony that some
lines pay half commission, others full commission, on
canceled voyages. Hearing Counsel, in the course of
_ the hearings, admitted that it “may be a fact’? that
there is no conference action with respect to commis-
sions on canceled voyages. SPAT a
| There is nothing in the conference agreement that
_ can bé disapproved with respect to these payments or
nonpayments. If some lines refuse to pay the commis-
sions, they may have reached: individual understend- -
ings with agents covering the matter. But in any
event, we cannot say on this record that the refusal is.
unlawful. : ele Sk aan ha he ;
H. Vorine sy Linzs Wutce Do Nor ENGAGE IN THE
| ForEIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON.
THE LeveL oF Commissions Par to THER
AGENTS IN THE Unitep States * ¥
_ The examiner found that “while unanimous. ap-
proval of the membership of APC would be required
to raise the rate of commission, at least seven of the
members engage in little or no service to or fromthe
United States.” His difficulty with the voting by lines
serving the contiguous Canadian trade was their
power to exercise, through the Unanimity Rule, a veto
ETT GETENTRY EDN IG LIT MURS HE RT GE LEFT ON
—LLLA TOGO LS IIT IN SE OT LI I
- 49
over matters affecting travel agents in the United
_ States. He ruled that “lines which do not engage in
_ the foreign commerce of the United States should not
be permitted to vote on the level of commissions be--
cause the compensation paid to agents here is none of
their.concern.”’ eee 3
Respondents contend that the examiner erred in this
ruling if it-was thereby intended ‘to exclude lines call-
ing only at Canadian ports from voting on levels of *
- commissions paid to their agents in the United States..
Both ASTA and hearing counsel state that. they have
no objéction to such lines voting on commission levels
if the Unanimity Rule is discontinued. Since we have
ordered the rule éliminated as it applies to the level of
commissions, the question reduces itself to one of
' whether the lines serving only Canadian ports should
_ be. denied any voice respecting the level of commissions |
paid to their agents in the United States. >.
It is sufficient for our purposes here*merely to say
that, with the Unanimity, Rule having been eliminated,
we have no objection to such lines having some voice
in commission matters, and that proposed solutions to
this ‘problem may be submitted with the ‘amended
agreements. It may be noted, also, that at least one line
serving only Canadian ports has indicated that it does
not desire to vote on commission levels for agents in
the United States. - SPEER
Our ultimate conclusion is that Agreement No. 7840
of APC and Agreement No. 120 of TAPC and the
rules adopted thereunder, insofar as they relate to
travel agents, are contrary to section 15 of the Ship-
ping Act in the respects and for the reasons noted °
" above and must be modified in accordance with this
decision. | eee ; ,
Respondents shall within 60 days submit to-us for
* review and approval proposed ‘modifications of the
50° o 34
agreements and rules consistent with this decision, as
. per our order attached. The views and comments of
interested parties will be invited upon the specific
language of the proposed modifications and the pro-
- ceeding will be held open pending further order of the |
Commission. | i fas
CoMMISSIONER PaTTERSON, concurring and dissent-
ing: :
Based on the record before me in this proceeding,
” my conclusions are as follows: cae!
First, I concur in the result reached in the preced-
ing report as to— . eer |
(1) The majority’s concurrence with the initial
decision of the examiner as summarized in its re~
port to show those portions as to which no excep-
_ tion is-taken.-It is understood that the respond-
ents have agreed to revise many of the provisions
objected to by the travel agents (first paragraph
under ‘““The Examiner’s Decision’’). __
- (2) The majority’s agreement with the exam-
iner on the requirement of unanimous consent in
_ Selecting among applicants for travel agerits sta-
tus to be placed on a list of eligible applicants for
" . ticket selling agencies (item (4) under “Diseus-
- cussion and Conclusions”). sine Be Ns
(3) The majority’s agreement with the exam-
iner on the requirement of unanimous consent in
voting on agency sales, transfers of agency loca-.
tions, or changes of officers (item (5) under “Dis-
- cussion and Conclusions”). © .
(4) The majority’s decision that there is noth- .
ing in the record to indicate that collective action —
_ of the lines dictates the payment or nonpayment
_ of commissions on canceled voyages {item (7)
under ‘‘Discussion. and Conclusions”). -
DPA EN, POT of ¢
61
(5) The majority’s decision not to “rule on
the interest which we feel it is necessary for a
line to have in the foreign commerce ‘of the
. United States before it can vote on the level of
_ compensation paid to its: agents here’’ (item (8)
. under “Discussion and Conclusions a
_ _ Second, I dissent from the Commission ’s majority
decisions as follows: ae :
« . (1) Disapproving, unless modified, of the
agreement to apply a unanimity rule to the level
of agents’ commissions . (item (1) under ‘“‘Dis-
_. ¢ussion and Conclusions”)... _ i: ea een
». (2) Disapproving, _unless— modified, “of the
— - agreement to prohibit travel agents from selling _
transportation on nonconference or independent -
carriers (item (6) under ‘Discussion and Con-
I wae
(3) Deciding that we have authority to regu-
late the level of commissions paid to travel agents
_ and that. we should take no action at this time
on the level of commissions (items (2) and (3)
under “Discussion and Conclusions’’),
As regards my “‘Second” conélusion as stated above,
the reasons for my dissent are advanced as follows:
__ INTRODUCTION
‘We are concerned with the approvability under
section 15 of the act of certain terms of the Trans- .
Atlantic Passenger Steamship ‘ Conference General
Agreement.adopted January 14, 1929, and as amended
to the latest approved amendment on March 13, 1961, .
and. with the Atlantic Passenger Steamship Confer-
encé Agreement dated London, February 12, 1946, ap- :
proved by a predecessor agency on August 29, 1946.
* — — a are ~ e
SOE Se ELIOT EY y . is , v
52
According ‘to the numbering; Agreement No. 120 has
been amended 76 times, and as of December 21, 1960,.
Amendment 120-76 shows 24 signatory members. No
amendments are in the record for Agreement No.
7840, which has 15 signatory members. Headquarters
of the former are in New York, and of the dattor, ih :
Folkestone, England, Great Britain. ‘|
The proceeding involving both agreements is called
_-a “general investigation” and was started by a pred-
‘.. ecessor. agency on November 2, 1959, after |
‘informal complaint on October 22, 1958, by the Amer-
ican Society. of Travel Agents, Ine., concerning cer-
tain practices of the Atlantic “Passenger er
Conference.
_As a result of this investigation, the sachusitiy has
decided that certain provisions of these agreements
now violate section 15 of the act, although before
the date of its report these provisions have been law-
- ful and predevessor agencies have been fully informed
of all revisions of these agreements. The agreements
relating to commissions waa are now —— to be
illegal are:
(1) Agreement ‘Wo. 120. Article. D. emgs
fares and rates of commission and all ‘conditions
relating thereto, shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Atlantic Passenger Steamship .
Conference Agreement and the rules and regula-
tions adopted thereunder” (exhibit 1, p. 9).
(Agreement No. 120 does not control commis-
_ gions, but by this provision delegates the function
. to the- body operating under Agreement No.
7840.)
(2) Article. E. “Agencies. {a) The sintitien
lines shall confine the sale of their transportation
.to: (1) Line’s Own Offices. * * * (2) General
Passenger Agencies—i.e., agencies appointed by
be .
LER TEP PES A IIE ONE. SP EST FLM RIDIN E RPE LOL LL MEPL LOLOL LE AEG EE ISIE AE IIL IS IELTS ELLOS LL! AIELLO TT LEE a
F
—
—_—
53
aLine on a commission basis to control a specified -
territory in which sub-agencies are appointed who
must report to such agencies *.* *” Paragraph -
{e) of Article E prohibits a sub-agency “* * *
. from ‘selling passage tickets for. any steamer not
connected with the fleets of the member Lines for
which it. has been duly appointed * * * if such
steamer’ is operating in any competitive trans-
Atlantic trade * * *”? The member Lines agree
to use.a uniform “‘Sub-Agency Appointment |
- Agreement” . (Rule E-2). The prescribed terms
of such agreement obligate the agent “to ad-
_ here to and cémply with * * * the annexed -
- rules * * *”? Rule 5 annexed, called the tying -
_- Tule, provides that “the agent is ‘prohibited from
booking passengers for any steamer not connected
with the fleets of any of the member lines” and
otherwise closely follows the language quoted
above from paragraph (e). rar
(3) Agreement No. 7840. Article 6. “(a) Rates .
_ of Commission and Handling Fees which Member.
Lines may pay to their’ General Agents or
Sub-Agents ‘shall be established. by unanimous
‘agreement of the Member Lines” (exhibit 2,
p. 9). : os
_ DISSENT NUMBER (1)
The majority does not question the validity of
establishing rates by majority agreement or, as far
as I know, by some other ratio, but concludes that
the: “unanimous agreement?’ Obligation (the ex-
pression “unanimity rule as it applies to agents’
commissions” is used) is invalid under section 15.
_ I dissent from this conclusion’ and the disapproval
of the agreement under section 15 that results there-. -
. from. First, the reasons adduced do not support such
. a Cy REET EOC ES IEC
OT PRONE SON RCN EIN LELO IET LEN AOE OE EG BABI ES ? ‘
54
a conclusion; silt second, there are , other reasons
which support the unanimous agreement obligation in ~
article 6, paragraph (a), of Agreement No. 7840.
The two respondent conferences are successors of —
conferences in: th satlantic passenger steaniship
industry going bagk to 1879 or before. The North
Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference met for the first — 7
time on March 5, 1868, in New York. This confer-
_ ence’s: agreement of 1879 provided in clause 19 that
“‘all questions that may come before the Conference °
_ for. action, must be decided by the unanimous vote
of all members present, to be of any effect’”’ (exhibit
119). Unanimous consent clauses of one sort or :
another are in conference agreements of °1885, 1894,
| 1921, 1928, and 1930 (exhibit 119). The record
showed that commissions to subagents were originally
fixed at fixed dollar amounts per passenger depending
on destinations.
By Continental Conference mocking wag first held
in New York on May 4, 1885. The minutes of the.
meeting showed commissions to subagents were fixed.
The Atlantic. Conference’ was re-formed in 1921
after the First World War. Eight years later, in
1929, the formerly separate conferences of Mediter- .
_ Tanean, Continental, and North Atlantic lines joined .
in the one Trans-Atlantic Passenger Conference.
During all this time a unanimous consent was
required with respect to decisions affecting ‘each
member’s business affairs. One would that such
a long tradition behind an historically stablished .
business practice would require fairly compelling
reasons of public policy to overturn it at this late
date. A. review of the majority’s reasoning ‘is enough
to show this is far from the case.
. The majority’s significant reasoning opposing the
unanimity rule (or regulation) is in the following |
- discussion:
. %, "
fa,
55
It is a regulation which prevents travel agents
in the United States from rendering ‘complete
. » and*effectiye service both to Passengers and to
- .» oeean carriers. It has in some cases prevented:
_ the principals from even considering the ques-
tion of commission levels and in others has de-
feated, or at least delayed or watered down-de-
‘sires of the majority of the lines to raise com-
mission levels, thus placing the steamship lines.
at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the air-
-lines. We .think the Unanimity Rule plainly
operates to the detriment of the commerce of
the United States.
__ As I urlderstand the reasoning, preventing or delay-
ing consideration of commission levels, and delaying
the desires of a majority to raise commission levels
is thought to prevent. complete and effective service
‘and such a result is a detriment to commerce.
. To me, this is tantamount to saying that the obliga-
tion -has been effective ‘in preventing increased com-
missions. The obligation has had a deterrent effect ’
_. Within the conference, as the majority recognizes. z
Effectiveness within the conference is not the issue.
The effect of the obligation on the public and on our
commerce’ is the relevant test. The majority seems
to assume without the need to ‘prove that if it can
show the obligation allows “one single vote” to “block
@ proposal on commission matters even though the .
_ proposal was favored by an overwhelming majority
of the member lines,” then. it has automatically
shown public injury. This does not follow at all. Some
connection between cause and effect has to be shown. |
The effect of a veto threat is to cause injury to.
prs desiring a change, but not to commerce in
gehéral or to the public. Perhaps a casual link is
thought to be provided when it is said the lines
“should at least be allowed ‘to increase- commissions .
unhampered by the veto power inherent in the Una-
é
Td
56
nimity Rule should ey desire to he. so.’” Significance: ;
is given to this statement only the conclusion that
such a régulation “prevents travél agencies in the
United States from rendering complete and effective.
service both to passengers and ocean carriers * * *.”
/One can only | ‘speculate that the twice:mentioned |
mability to increase, rather than reduce, rates has
somehow prevented complete and. effective service,
but the way this happens as well as. the effect it
would have on thé carriers and on the traveling
public segment of our commerce should be clearly
shown. It is doubtful. much of a relation can be
- shown if it is based on increases, because the non-
unanimity rule makes it equally easy to reduce’ com-
missions. At the moment, travel agents seem to be
motivated by the apparent desire of many carriers
to raise commission percentages. This is only a
transitory economic factor. When we deal with a
matter of principle such as this, or with a historically
established general rule for conducting business, . we
ought to be governed by long-term’ economic factors.
The closest we get to a relation to commerce and the - |
public interest is the thought that steamship lines
are “at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the
airlines.” Even.this is referred to only as “some
evidence” and it “‘related solely to the activities of
agents who were not appointed by conference: -
lines ***.” Unfortunately, it is only a judgment
' that is not even supported by the most interested
_ parties, the ir adeeaerns carriers, much less the record -
_ herein.
Since the evidence of dation competition falls so
_. short of conclusively proving the point, it is said there
‘is diversion anyway and this is “not in the interests
_- of the conference lines themselves.’’ Changing choices .
as to the method of travel involve only speculation as
to the reasons for diversion, What causes the diver-
as ® a
°
OOO EPONA LN NOEL EES ESE GARIN ALM OI PBR Pen OMY) ; PRO STR ACR AI Gp MONE RO a te ORE: TOMBE REP IRI RTE RM pee
. °
cs Wena ae
sion ‘is only theory, is not supported, and is even
denied by the conferences. The airline diversion rea-
soning is at best inconclusive. ie eg
_ To-:the extent economics are relevant, this record is -
devoid of data showing the effect of a change in com-
missions either up or down on the respective parties
_ or on the public. Naturally, the travel agents want
more money, but we would have to know a great deal
more than.we can learn from this record as to the
effect of an increase on passenger fares: and on the
precarious competitive balance that now seems to exist.
between ocean and air transportation. Passenger
choices. would seem to be governed as much by con-_
venience and pleasure as, by economics or ‘passenger
agent activity... .
_ The second point is that: the better public-interest °
‘arguments, if anything, favor the validity of the
obligation to not change commission rate levels with-
out unanimous consent.’ The rule of group action by
majority vote actually strengthens the power of the
group, because it puts the full power and influence of _
all the members of the group behind an action affect-' |
ing the public even though some of the individual
members do not agree with the action. Less than all
the members have the ‘power to direct group action. |
A unanimity requirement, on the other hand, weakens
the group’s power to act by giving a power to prevent
: action by a veto over decisions. If antitrust law over- |
- tones are to be injected into our policy considerations,
then anything which -lessens the power of a group
,which makes dominating pricing decisions is to be
favored. U.S.-flag lines are a minority in most confer-:
ences, and the rule.enhances their power to influence
‘group decisions or to protect themselves from oppres-
fips einaaaekal Lyre gp errr
sion by the business’ needs of non-American lines. |
. Generally the business needs of non-American mem-
. ”
ig 58 2
Sica ae :
ber lines are dictated by more favorable cost consid-
’ . erations than our own. There is a serious question as
to whether the undoubted loss of flexibility of action
implicit. in a ‘unanimity. rule is overcome by the detri-
_ ments that may be caused by the economic power of @
group dominated wy majority votes of non-Américan
~ lines.
DISSENT NUMBER (2) |
The majority disapproves the so-called tieing rule
of article E. I dissent from this disapproval. —
Both article E of Agreement No. 120 and the re-
lated “rule” and prescribed terms of agency agree-
ment, with minor revisions and with the approval of
_our predecessors, have existed since 1933. Other forms
of tie obligation have existed even before then. The.
so-called Alexander report, which preceded the enact-
ment of the Shipping ‘Act, acknowledged that agree-
ments existing in 1913 provided: that: “*(11) Agents
- of the lines which are parties to the agreement shalt
not interest themselves in the booking of passengers
for new outside competing lines.” (Investigation of
Shipping Combinations Under House Resolution 587,
Hearings Before the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 62d Cong., 5d sess. (1913), vol.
ep 4, pp.- 31-34 at p. 33.) The obligation and rule were -
not shown to have been disapproved between 1916 and
; .
PAA TERN QTR ARERR TS AURORE BORNE TIEEL ee IY, RTE PRATT, ENS PER RTs EAE GT STANT NONE
: / : ¥ in 5
1983, nor ‘Subsequently, so the .tieing obligation also
has long historic acquiescence behind it. One would
expect new factors and compelling reasons to overturn
~ guch an obligation after at least 48 year's of use in one
form or another, but this is not the case here either.
Against this background the majority refers to the
examiner’s statements that (1) there is no need for
the rule; and (2) “tieing arrangements generally run
counter to antitrust principles.” The majority says the
oO
respondents have misconstrued these statements. The
Peete Neo CERO TaN Or tes
.
. &®
_ further comment is made that the atititrust ‘‘exemp-
tion should not be granted -unless the purposes and
policies of the Shipping Act are thereby furthered.”
Qn the first point, the need or necessity test is not
expressly made a standard of approval or disapproval
under ‘section 15. Lack of eompetitive “need” or:
“necessity”, or becattse the agreements can be char-
acterized as “tieing” arrangements which *‘generally
run counter to antitrust principles,” may, have been
equated with detriment to commerce ‘as being against
the public interest, but the link is not. revealed.
The competitive necessity problem was not explored
nor developed in this record. Even assuming this to be
a valid test, the absence of any demonstration in this
record ‘proves -nothing; it simply is not a basis for
decision. If competitive necessity is to be a test, some
effort should have been made to develop the facts on .
the point. Without ghe facts, it is no wonder the rec-
ord “did not: dem te’’ anything. Since the burden
is on the Commission to approve unless we can show
detriment or contrariety with public interest, we. may
not invert the burden at the last minute and say the
respondent did not prove enough. It is up to the Com-
mission to do the proving and disproving on this issue.
-, The second point, that tieing agreements generally
run counter to antitrust principles and are-an anti-
competitive practice, is not’ established. There was
no exploration of what antitrust law might be appli-
cable to the facts herein. Some tieing agreements may
‘be contrary and some not, but it is necessary to
establish what type this one is and what. law applies
_ to it. Section 15 exempts agreements from these laws .
‘unless we-can bring the agreement within the ex-
pressly stated standards, which has not been ‘done
except for the majority’s effort to interpret ‘‘detri-
ment” or “‘publie policy” using a partial statement
\
3 e 5
. at e ae bid
oo eno eid TES a5 aes
60
ink Isbrandtsen Co., Ine. v. United States et al., 211
F. 2d 51 ¢D.C. Cir. 1951) at p. 57 (cert. den., 347
U.S. 990). The full statement is: “The condition
upon which such authority [to approve ,agreements
‘under section 15 of the Act] ‘is granted is that the
agency, entrusted with the public interest scrutinize
the agreement: to make sure that the conduct thus
legalized does not invade the prohibitions of the anti-
' trust laws any more than is necessary to serve the |
purposes of the regulatory statute.’’ The court equates
eonsistency with an antitrust prohibition (itself diffi-
cult to determine) with a “‘public interest’”’ standard.
- Sueh a standard was later put in section 15 in 1961
- hy Public Law 87-346 (75 Stat. 762). There is no
"way of telling which antitrust prohibition is to. be
used to test invasion, nor any way 8f balancing the
prohibition against the purposes of the act.
- Serutinizing the intercarrier obligation alone, it is .
impossible to say that the record and. briefing in this
ease establishes that this long-established and approved
agreement clearly invades the prohibitions of the
antitrust laws or to what extent. Absent ‘such a
demonstration ‘by the ‘Commission, seotion 15 compels
approval.
-The majority’s comment establishes as a standard
that approval of agreements under section 15 now.
involves a grant of an antitrust exemption privilege =
on condition that certain objectives are ‘‘furthered.’’
A test, such as furthering ‘“‘policies and purposes,’’
is not expressly prescribed in section 15 or elsewhere.
_ The agreement provision, as with any. other inter-
earrier agreement, must be approved unless the Com-
_ -mnission* can show it is detrimental to commerce,
unjustly. discriminatory or unfair as. between carriers —
- or ports or contrary to the public interest or otherwise
in vidlation of the Act..Detriment, contrariety, and
violation, not furthering, are the tests. :
PRE ELE: RR SMe FA TNE ET NPT IL! ATI EET IE BEV T SE Cer et Sie S eS ce eS TDR ners Rar are ee =n
61
The majority shows no connection betweén detri-
ments to commerce or contrariety with public interest
' and the necessity to combat destructive carrier com-
petition or furtherance of “regulatory purposes’”’ or
“purposes and policies’” of the act. Perhaps the con- ~
nection is implicit; but even with an implicit connec-
* tion we need a statement of how to measure stifling
of competition and of what the purposes and policies
thus set up as.measurements consist of, plus a‘ few
facts to be measured by the standard tests. Thé needed
tests cannot be determined from this record, much
less the facts. One ‘party recognized as much by falling ;
back on_illegality under section 14, subparagraph
“Third,” as interpreted in Federal Maritime Board
v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S. 481 (1958). Section 14 pro-
hibits a carrier from retaliating against shippers by
_ Certain methods because of specified reasons. The
Isbrandtsen interpretation of section 14 establishes
“a8 a violation a. contract requirement that a ‘shipper
not patronize independent on nonconference- member
carriers when such a contract is demanded. in a con- -
. text of being a “‘necessary competitive measure to
Offset the effect of nonconference competition,’”’ be-
cause in such circumstance the demand becomes a ~
“resort to other dis:riminating or unfair methods.”’
Such a context of offsetting needs and demands does .
not exist here. All that has been done is, by some:
reverse logic of negatives,.to argue that the absence
of a. showing of competitive necessity by the respond- ,
ent: conference carriers proves there is no need for
the rule and without Such need the rule is illegal,
and besides tieing agreements are generally illegal.
Whatever is relied on, We are again faced with the ~
necessity of supporting the burden of disapproval and
of not relying on deficiencies in the respondent’s case .
to support our burden.
. ; = t 2 r
>" Ge
For these reasons, I ‘dissent from the majority’s’
disapproval of the conference’s tieing agreement.
, “DISSENT NUMBER (3) -
The majority has reversed the examiner’s conclu-.
sion that no ruling should be made on the Commission
_ authority to regulate the levels of compensation paid
-. to travel agents by the carriers. This issue is entirely
outside the scope of the issues as defined by our prede- |
cessor agency, the Federal Maritime Board, in its or- ©
-- der of November 2, 1959: “to determine whether the
aforementioned Agreements :120 and 7840 should be
- disapproved, canceled, or modified, insofar as they re-
- late to travel agents in accordance with section 15 of
_ the Shipping Act, 1916.” Neither agreement sets levels
of compensation nor requires any disapproval, cancel-
lation, or modification of compensation levels. The
agreements only provide a procedure for deciding ~
how much or what percentage of the passage fare the -
members are willing to allow agents as compensation
.for the sale of tickets. The issue of levels was first
raised in the brief of the travel agents, which stated:
“Contrary to sweeping assertions of Conference coun-
sel, the Maritime Commission has both the right and
the responsibility to approve or disapprove the com-
_ mission level established by the collective action of the
' - respondents:’’ It is -possible that the level so estab-
lished might violate the Shipping Act, but such an :
issue is not before us and the record is totally inade-.. .
quate for such a serious decision. Here we are asked’
to pass on the reasonableness of rate levels and the |
majority says it is unable to make a finding that the -
“present level of commissions is so low as to be détri-
mental to the commerce of the.United States. The
most that is provided by the majority, therefore, 1 is a
volunteer a opinion —— what is thought to
. P eo
_ Bape reR En et Ree 2 pee PRBS Ort D> Cheer
TER Ee SN PN IE Mer MEMEO PE IIOP ON MP ENS m o. “art a PTF OL SOS ES rae ty < ree ™ ae nee ad t =
63
‘be our authority, but there is no realistic application . -
of the power because no change is made in the existing
levels. Absent an application of the power, vouchsafing:
the opinion is frivolous, Apparently, now that the de-
cision as to our jurisdiction’is out of the way, we are |
free to proceed later to decide on a satisfactory level —
of commissions set pursuant to conferénee agreements, .
in spite of the disclaimer of ‘‘jurisdiction to set the
specific level of compensation,”’ assuming a difference —
between these two types of jurisdiction. When this
time comes I anticipate the issue will be just as pres-
ent and unresolved as it is now and will necessitate a
decision with more practical issues at stake. N othing
is accomplished by a decision at this time. i
The examiner’s decision not to pass on the question
until more significant issues are at stake should be
sustained. __ yy ee a |
In concurring as to'the results in items (4) and (5)
of the majority report, I do not necessarily approve
the reasoning. The restraints imposed by the confer-
ence, whether by unanimity or any other percentage
of votes, on the travel agents’ freedom to enter busi- -
ness, sell their business, transfer ownership, or change
. Officers or locations, were not justified by amy eorre- |
sponding advantage to the traveling public. I would
decide without further proof that such freedom existed —
and that a restraint thereon by means of “‘eontrol’”’
committee clearances was against the public interest
unless justified as an effective protection for the pur-
chasers of tickets. These restraimts can not be justified
_@8 reasonably related to the production of business or
to an agent’s capacity to perform his sales funetions
‘for the public. The respondents’ carrier members may
refuse to enter contracts or terminate contracts with
agents they do not trust or consider to be improperly
located for the generation of sales, but this is quite
266-241—67——_-5 : . .
ERIM Patsy Ont STOTT RE Ree
64 .
- different from requiring prior consent to, or even
consultation about, business decisions of travel agen-
- gies. The intrusion is against the public interest.
ComMIssIONER Day, concurring and dissenting:
I eoncur with the results reached in the majority
. report in this proceeding as set forth under ‘‘First”
in the preceding opinion of Commissioner John S..
Patterson, and for reasons advanced by Commissioner
‘Patterson I aim in accord with the remainder of his
opinion..: _ ep ane | :
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
_ No. 873°
‘INVESTIGATION oF PasseNGER STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES
REGARDING. TRAVEL AGENTS
v
ORDER
. This proceeding having been instituted by the Com-
‘mission to determine whether Agreement No. 120,
‘Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, and
_ - Agreement No. 7840, Atlantic Passenger Steamship
‘Conference, should be disapproved, canceled, or modi-
fied pursuant to section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916,
"and: the Commission having this date made and en-
tered its report stating its findings and conclusions,
which report: is made:a part’ hereof by reference, and |
having found that said agreements in certain: respects
violate section 15 and must be modified, as set. forth
in said report:
. It is ordered, That the parties to Agreements Nos. .
120 and 7840, being. the member lines of the Trans- .
“Atlantic Passenger Steamship. Conference and the
Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, respec-
> RT OE ee ee ea RY Re RPO RPE RH IMO ol : THO A oe 5
Y ’ ” wee > THOW . eRe
65
tively, shall within 60 days from the date of this order
file with the Commission for its review and approval
under section 15 of the act, modifications of said
agreements and the rules thereunder consistent with
the said report; : rc
_ It ts further ordered, That this proceeding shall be
held open pending the Commission’s further order.
following its consideration of the modifications so filed
and the comments thereon which will be invited from
interested parties. -
By the Commission, January 30, 1964,
| WT tele aoc (Signed) ‘Tuomas List, .
rae | - Secretary.
Sat
\
Pn IP RB RN Re BRS oo £
PI ET ET IO ROE ETI ON OTE, rae
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