Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
Supreme Court brief1967
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me Py J x . 5 - Law i
Jae 8 COURT, Uy Ge FILED
rh NOV 23 Joge
; IN THE JOHN F. DAViS, CLERK
supreme Egurt of th Gnited States
Ocroser TeRM, —
~ No. 794
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN»
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN
and R. E. CARROLL,
| Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF -APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ERnEst Porter, Mastin M. Lucente, ’
Kennet D. Barrows, -RicHarp H. Comrrrg,
604 Rio Grande Buildi Gzorce L. Saunpegns, Jr.,
11 South La Salle Street
Chicago, Illinois .
Attorneys for Petition
Denver, Colorado.
Siwotey, Austin, Burcess & Smrre
Of Counsel =
/
TWENTIETH CENTURY PRESS, INC.. CHICAGO 60606
PAGE
Opinions Below ................ ne ET ne ie
Fey tare ee ey Delaney ‘se. te
Questions Presented ............. Merete * epee 2
Statutes Involved .............. EOP e Perens 8
* - Statement CREAN ADL AMS RGA WROD SE DEK AREAHELA RE RGCAS 3
Conclusion NES CORGSSAARAROREORORERE DS RESET wARAR OOK 22
WL I sop 00545 va cceeekis ice revascheh 24
ME oki rictacs Pree eee 28
Appendix © 0.00... 0... WOE ae ee og
~ CITATIONS
Casrs
American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, —_
International, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) .. . 13
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Denver and Rio
Grande Western R. Co., 338 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1964) 4
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677
Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp.
MBM WB. TD. MOB oon ite ciinccncceencs paige 14
Chicago and North Westérn Ry. Co. y. Brotherhood of ~
Locomotive Engineers, 202 F. Supp. 277 (S.D. Ia.»
\ TE Shnsceadsuncbenskcisenge eens 13
Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railway Trainmen, 290 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1961) 5
Eastern Motor Express v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp.
426 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ....... : 13
Hayes v. Livermont, 279 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1960) .... 18°
Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frich, 132 F. Supp. 922
(BD. AY. TODD) nko sins ceconascaccs ae ee
Pure Oil Company v. Suarez, 384 18. ne ee 16
PAGE
Rutland Railway peonettion v. Brother hua of Lees:
motive-Engineers, 307, F.2d 21° (2d Cir. 1962) .
ee eee Ee ee girs 6, 9, 11, i4, i8, 29
"Sperry Products v. Assn. of American Railroads, 132
. F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942) opp aeeeegeeeseecees ,..8, 12, 18
Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 eceaeen ee 2%
United States v. U. S..Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364... Toe 2a
Whittier v. Emmet, 281 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1960) .... 18
: STaTUTES .
Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) eres | 3,5
§ 1391 of Title 28, United States Code............ <t
§ 1404 of Title 28, United States Code ...... ere ar
§ 1406 of Title 28, United States Code . osasseescess 18 -
is pr § <5!) SPST YeTeTETTETTTT TT Tees 14
Rule 52(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .3, 22, 28
: MIscELLANEOUS 7
Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 983 (1963) ............. eee ee ees 14
Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) ..........¢...5 13,18
_ Note, Federal Venue for Unincorporated Associations,
44 Calif. L. Rev. 130 (1956) .............-.ee eee. 14
| Thirty-First Annual Report of a Mediation
Board, June 30, 1965 ..........-.se sere eee e eee 3,13 |
IN THE
‘Supreme Court of the Bnited States |
Qctoser TERM, 1966
~~
No.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
‘ RAILROAD COMPANY, | :
| Petitioner,
V. A °
BROTHERHOOD: OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN
and R. E. CARROLL, |
oo Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The Denver ond Rio Grande Western Railroad Chen
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit entered in. this case on September 21, 1966. a
OPINIONS BELOW
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Order of Judgment of the District Court, which were not
officially reported, appear at pages 77-82 of the record. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix A, infra) has
not yet been officially reported.
- JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit was entered on September 21, 1966, and is appended
hereto as. Appendix A.’The petition of the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company for rehearing was
denied on October 24, 1966. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. In an action to recover damages for an unlawful
strike, is venue proper.as to the defendant. labor union, an
unincorporated association, in the judicial district where
the defendant labor union is doing business and in which
the unlawful strike occurred; or can the action be brought
only in another judicial district, some thirteen hundred
miles away, merely because the defendant labor union main- |
tains its principal office in the latter judicial district?
2. Was the decision of this Court in Steelworkers v.
Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965) on a question of diversity
jurisdiction intended, as the. Court below concluded, to
overrule the Second Circuit’s decision in Rutland Railway
Corporation v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 307
F. 2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 974, and.
other federal decisions holding that an unincorporated
association is a resident for venue purposes of the judicial
‘districts in which it is doing business?
3. Was it consistent or permissible for the Court below,
having purportedly: ruled on the basis of Steelworkers v.
Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965), to conclude that venue can ~
and must be laid at the unincorporated association’s princi-
pal place of business, i.e., Cleveland, Ohio? —
4. Where the General Chairman of a defendant labor
union participates in the authorization, institution and
conduct of an unlawful strike, may the Court of Appeals
-
nate a a = oD ni it Nara NE tas Nealon us al
set aside the judgment of the District Court holding the
General Chairman responsible, along with the union, for the
damages accruing from such a strike? :
STATUTE INVOLVED
The statutory provisions involved are § 1391 of Title
28, United States Code and Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil. Procedure. They are printed in Appendix
B hereto . i;
STATEMENT .
This action was brought by the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company (“Rio Grande”) against the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (“Brotherhood”), cer-
tain officers of the Brotherhood, and members of the
Brotherhood employed by the Rio Grande. The suit sought
to recover damages resulting from a strike by the Brother-
hood against the. Rio Grande ‘in violation of the provisions |
of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). The
‘Rio Grande is a corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Delaware. It owns and operates a railroad
system extending from Denver, Colorado Springs and
Pueblo, Colorado, to Salt Lake City and Ogden, Utah, with
numerous branches on those lines. Its principal place of
business is in Denver, Colorado, and 63 per cent of its
line of road is situated in Colorado (R. 68, 73).
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an unincorpo-
rated association which holds representation rights on most
of the railroads in the United States,! consists of a Grand
+The Thirty-first Annual Report of the National Mediation
‘ Board, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965, shows that the
Brotherhood represents one or more classes or crafts of railroad
employees on 91 railroads. This data is limited to “selected rail
carriers” dnd thus does not reflect fully the extent of the Brother-
hood’s representation rights. (Thirty-First Annual Report of
National Mediation Board for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965,
~ pp. 78-86.) fe
Ek OI ote Be er 6
4
Lodge with headquarters at Cleveland, Ohio, and subordi-
nate lodges located‘on the lines of such railroads (R. 7, 68).
The Brotherhood is the designated representative of train-
men employed by the Rio Grande. -As provided in the
Brotherhood’s Constitution and General Rules, the local
lodges on each railroad elect a General Grievance Com-
mittee and a General Chairman-thereof, for the purpose of
performing the Brotherhood’s representation functions
under the Railway. Labor Act (R. 5, 6). On the Rio Grande,
R. E. Carroll was the General Chairman at the time of the
strike involved in this litigation and-at the -time of the |
proceedings in the lower courts. Mr. Carroll maintains his
headquarters at Denver, Colorado: (R. 5-7, 10, 68-69, 92).
In accordance with the authority vested in him -by the _
provisions of the Constitution and General Rules ‘of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, General Chairman
Carroll submitted certain claims to the First. Division of
the National Railroad Adjustment Board on behalf of
employees of the Rio Grande, based on alleged violations
of the collective bargaining agreement between the Rio
- Q@rande and the Brotherhood (R. 78). Subsequently, the
National Railroad Adjustment Board issued awards 19372
and 19389 sustaining the claims (R..78). The Board
awarded a full day’s pay to each claimant for each occasion
on which it found’a violation of the agreement, despite the
fact that the claimants had suffered no monetary loss.
Because it was convinced that the payments called for by
the awards were- ‘arbitrary and unreasonable, the Rio .
Grande declined to comply with the awards.’ In such
1 In the enforcement actions instituted after the'strike in question
was found to be unlawful, the courts held that nominal damages,
‘rather than a full day’s pay, was the proper measure or damages
_ since the employees involved had not suffered any monetary loss as
as a result of the claimed violations of the agreement. Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 338
F, 2d 407 (10th Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972.
circumstances, an edioneemnied sethon is authorized by
Section 3, First(p) of the Railway Labor Act. The Brother-
hood, however, chose to attempt to. _— the Rio Grande
to comply with the awards by calling a strike.
On May 16, 1960, representatives of the Brotherhood
advised the Rio Grande that. the Brotherhood would call a-
strike on that day to-compel the Rio Grande to make the
payments called for bythe awards (R. 157-158). The strike «
commenced and lasted until some hours after the Unitéd
States District Court for the District of Colorado issued a —
temporary restraining order (R. 20, 93-94). The District
Court and the Court of Appeals ultimately held the strike to
have been in violation of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. -
§ 151 et seq.). See Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v..
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Colo., 1960), affirmed, 290 F.2d 266 ( 10th Cir. 1961), certi- ©
orari denied, 366 U.S. 966. This action was subsequently
brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado to recover damages accruing from diversions
ic of freight to omer railroads as a result of the unlawful
‘strike.
c Prior to the trial the Brotherhood moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds, among others, that venue was
‘improper (R: 9). This motion was denied by the District _:
Court on August 29, 1963 (R. 11). The District Court,
after a full trial on the merits, concluded that it had juris-
. diction of the parties and subject matter under 28 U. S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1337, and awarded the Rio Grande a judgment
of $37,988.37 against the respondents, having found that
because of the strike threat 274 carloads of freight had been.
diverted from the Rio Grande (R. 79-81). :
| - The Brotherhood appealed from the judgment entered
by the District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court, holding that Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc.,
ehceiimmameshodinanmadiaiaenaniamadeeieedaatiiimaneren se teed ate
ee
.
6
“82 U.S. 145% constituted “a rejection of the principle .
espoused by the Rutland case”, and that venue (1) did not
properly lie against an unincorporated association where
it did business but (2) was proper only at its principal
. place of business, which was Cleveland, Ohio. The Court
of Appeals also held that the record did not show that
_ R° B. Carroll, the General Chairman of the Grievance
‘Committee on the Rio Grande, had any responsibility for
the illegal strike. | ee os
_- REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in treating this Court’s
opinion ‘in Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, as .
a rejection of the venue principles established by prior deci-.
_ sions of the federal courts. .
The issue of proper venue, raised by motion before trial
"in the District Court, was decided by Senior Circuit J udge
- Phillips (R. 11). Relying on Rutland Railway Company
‘“y. Brotherhood. of Locomotive Engineers, 307 F. 2d 21 (2d
Cir. 1962), which is reproduced.as Appendix C hereto, the
District Court held that the Brotherhood was doing busi-
ness in Colorado and consequently was a resident of ..
Colorado for venue purposes. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that (1) this Court’s opinion in Steelworkers v.
Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145, was “a rejection of the principle
espoused by the Rutland case” and (2) that venue as to the
Brotherhood would thus be proper only at its principal
place of business, i.e., Cleveland, Ohio. (Appendix A infra, :
p. 29.) ° :
‘In the Steelworkers. ease, however, this Court was not
concerned with venue questions and did-not discuss or cite’
any cases dealing with venue principles. The issue pre-
sented. to this Court in the Steelworkers case, as this Court
stated it, was “whether an unincorporated labor union is to
\ be treated as a citizen for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction, without regard to the citizenship of its mem-
. bers”*(382 U.S. 145, 147). The lower court had held that for
diversity purposes, ‘the citizenship Of an unincorporated
association is that of each of its members. This Court
ed, rejecting the argument that an unincorporated
assogiation should be considered an entity and a citizen of
the state in which it maintained its principal place of busi-
ness. In reaching this result,gthis Court emphasized .the
fact that if an unincorporated association were treated as a
jural entity for diversity purposes with its citizenship
. determined as if it were a corporation, a considerable ex-
pansion of the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts would
_ inevitably follow. This Court, holding that only Congress
under. Article III of the Constitution can extend the juris-
diction of federal courts, decided that such “pleas for exten-
sion of the diversity jurisdiction.to hitherto uncovered ~*
broad categories of litigants ought to be made to the Con-
gress and not to the courts” (Id. at 150-151). In the present
_ case, jurisdiction is based on alleged violations of a federal
statute and the venue question thus does not involve an
expansion or contraction of federal court jurisdiction.
The holding of this Court in the Steelworkers case, that
ths citizenship of each individual member of an unincor-
porated association governs for diversity purposes has long
been recognized. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677. In the
_ Steelworkers case, this Court was thus adhering to a long
_ established principle applicable to unincorporated. associa-
tions. The federal courts, however, have distinguished
between the principles applicable when determining the
citizenship of an unincorporated association for diversity
jarisdiction and those relevant to a determination of the —
inhabitancy or residence of an unincorporated association
for .venue purposes. These different principles have co-
existed and there is nothing about the Steelworkers case .
which indicates any intent to change that situation.
— ee ee ee ee _ —
Insofar as venue problems are concerned, Sperry Prod- -
ucts v. Ass’n of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1942) cert. denied 319 U.S. 744, initiated the approach. fol-
lowed by the District Court in the present case. The court
in Sperry ,Produets was concerned with the inhabitancy of
an unincorporated association under a venue statute ‘appli-
‘cable to patent litigation. Judge Learned Hand approached
the problem by referring to the principles controlling such
an issue for purposes of jurisdiction, stating:
« ” . [I]n the matter of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, an unincorporated association is disregarded:
when for example jurisdiction depends upon diversity
of citizenship, it is the citizenship of the members alone.
which counts. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
2 Cir., 61 F.2d 115. Thus, for most purposes the law
- still looks at such associations as mere aggregations of
individuals.” (pp. 410-11.)
_ Judge Hand held, however, that different principles should.
determine the venue question before him, stating :
“Since, however, for the purpose of ‘suit it [United .
_ Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259.U.S. 344;
© Rule 17(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] has
come to regard them as jural entities, we can see no.
reason why that doctrine should not be applied con-
sistently to other procedural incidents than service of
process, and venue is one of such incidents. Certainly
that promotes simplicity, and, simplicity was one of
the conveniences which induced the original change,
Therefore in construing § 48-Jud. Code, 28.U.S.C.A.
§ 109, in its application to an unincorporated associa-
. tion it’ seems inevitable that we should attribute an
‘inhabitancy’ to it as though it were a single jural per-
son and not an aggregate.” (p. 411.)
Having thus emphasized that different principles apply
in determining inhabitancy of an unincorporated associa-
tion for Venue purposes as contrasted with determination
&
a
of citizenship for jurisdictional purposes, J udge Hand
went on to hold that an unincorporated association’ should
be-assimilated to a corporation in order to determine its
inhabitancy-for venue purposes. Following this approach,
the unincorporated association was held to be an inhabi- |
tant of the judicial district in which it maintained its prin-
cipal: place of business.
Although J udge Hand’s décigion involved the venue ne pro-.
visions of statutes relating to patent infringement actions,
federal courts applied his reasoning to the determination
* of questions arising under the general venue statute. Prior
to 1948 the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940))
provided that “no civil suit shall be brought in any district
court against any person ... in any other district than that
whereof he is an. inhabitant. ” Accordingly Judge Hand’s
discussion of the requirements of the patent statute was
equally relevant to the general venue requireménts.
The venue provisions of the United States Code were
amended in 1948. Paragraph (b) of § 1391, as amended,
merely rephrased the prior law. Paragraph (c), however,
extended venue over corporations from the state of itfcor-
poration, to any judicial district in which licensed to do
business or doing business.. Under paragraph (c) all of
these locations are regarded as the residence of the
——- (See Appendix B, p. 28.)
In Rutland Railway Corporation v. Brotherhood of Lo-
comotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), certiorari
denied, 372° US. 954, the court, following Judge Hand’s
~
opinion in the Spérry case in light of § 1391(c), held that.
_the residence of unincorporated. associations should be
“assimilated to the residence of — stating (at
Pp. 29-30, Appendix C, p. 41.)
“Since the residence of a -corpotation for venue ft
poses has been- expanded to include all thépjudicial
10
tricts in which the corporation is doing business, the
residence of¢&an unincorporated association for venue
‘purposes should likewise be expanded to include all
_ the judicial districts in which the unincorporated .en-
tity is doing business. We believe this accords with
the practical requirements of litigation involving unin-
corporated associations. If an unincorporated union
is carfying on sufficient activities in a particular judi-
cial district so’ that it is deemed to be doing business
- there, it usually will suffer no undue hardship if re- y
quired to stand suit there. If in certain instances the
defense of a suit in a particular district is peculiarly
oppressive, the association may always seek a transfer e
‘of the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
In reaching this result the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit was careful to note that “Venue in the federal —
courts is not a jurisdictional concept.” (307: F.2d 21, 29,
Appendix C, p. 40.) a
Thus the essential issue presented to the Court in the
_ . Rutland case was whether or not the process. initiated by
Judge Hand in the Sperry Products case should be con-
_tinued by applying to unincorporated associations the cor-
porate venue requirement of the Judicial Code as amended
‘in 1948, just as Judge Hand had applied such require-—
ments to unincorporated associations. prior to the 1948
amendments. As‘stated, the issue before ‘bis Court in the —
Steelworkers case did not involve any such question. This
Court did not cite.nor purport to disapprove of cases such
as the Rutland case involving venue determinations. In
substance and effect, this Court approved the prior deci-
sions relating to diversity jurisdiction and refused to -
‘attribute to unincorporated associations a citizenship apart
from the citizenship of at of its individual members. This
holding with respect to the citizenship of unincorporated
» associations is wholly irrelevant to the venue issue pre-
sented here. .
Lal
Oe ee nr ~> — . *
.
. § . i. il 7 s
Ifthe holding of the Court of Appeals in this case is
correct, it must be assumed that this Court in the Steel-
workers’ case overruled a- long line of cases without the
slightest reference to them and that it established basic
venue doctrine without any mention of the subject.. This
_Court’s opinion, however, indicates that it was most careful
_ to confine its holding to the precise issue before it. Thus,
this Court’s statement of the issue carefully limits it to a
determination of the citizenship of an unincerporated labor
union “for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction”
(382 U.S. 145, 147). its evaluation: of the arguments
advanced by counsel re senting the unincorporated asso-
‘ciation, the Court limitea itself to “the force of these
arguments in rélation to the diversity jurisdiction” (382
U.S. 145, 150).. The concluding paragraph of the Court’s
opinion emphasizes again that its decision is limited to the
status of unincorporated labor unions “for diversity pur-
poses.” We respectfully suggest that the decision by this
Court, affirming its‘prior determinations with respect to the
status of unincorporated associations for diversity pur-
poses, can not and should not be read to accomplish the
rejection of numerous cases and principles which have .
: prevailed for many years with rages to the. venue of
federal courts. .
(2) The decision of. the Court of Appeals vaneall con-
flicts with the decision of ‘the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Rutland Railway Corporation v. Brother-
~ hood of Locomotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962),
certiorari denied 372 U.S. 954. In the Rutland case (repro-
duced ‘as Appendix C hereto), ‘the Couxt held that venue .
~ for an unincorporatéd association is proper in any judicial
district in Which it does business. As shown by the fore-
.
o
going discussion, the reasoning in the Rutland case is based
upon Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Sperry Products v.
_ Ass’n of American R.R.’s, 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied 319 U.S. 744. The decision in the present case,
holding that venue as to an unincorporated association is
proper only where it maintains its principal place of busi-
ness, is obviously in conflict with the Rutland case. It is
- essential, therefore, that this conflict relating to an impor-
tant matter of procedure in the federal courts be resolved .
by this Court.
It is particularly significant that the conficting decisions
involve thessame basic facts and a common unincorporated
association. In the Rutland case, the Brotherhood‘of Rail!
road Trainmen was one of the four appellants raising the
venue question (307 F.2d 21 at p. 24). Moreover, the activi-
ties of the Brotherhood upon which the Court predicated
its conclusion that venue was proper, in Verinont are the
~game as those shown by the record in the present case. — im
" These activities were described by the Court in the Rutland
case as follows: .
“Turning tothe case’ before us, we hold that the
defendant brotherhoods were doing business in the
District of Vermont. They set up and maintained
_ grievance committees and other facilities among the
employees of the Rutland Railway in Vermont. They
organized a strike of railroad employees in Vermont.
They negotiated with the management of the plaintiff
railroad in Vermont. Therefore, we conclude that
venue for this.action in the District of Vermont was ~
proper and we affirm the order of the court below
denying the motions to dismiss.” (p. 30, “Appendix
C, pp. 41-42) Ds Se ' :
The Colorado activities of the Brotherhood also include a
General Grievance Committee with headquarters ‘at Denver, ~
a strike of railroad employees in Colorado, and negotiations
with the Rio Grande in Colorado (R. 92-94, 157-58).
ro “(24 ha.
~
eee es
13 .
,As matters now stand under the conflicting federal
decisions, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen may be
held accountable for an illegal strike in the judicial district .
in which it incurs such liability, if the scene.is laid in New
York, Vermont or Connecticut. But if the illegal strike
occurs in Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, or Utah, the plaintiff carrier must proceed to Cleve-
land, Ohio, in order to secure redress.’ It is most difficult,
therefore, to imagine a more fundamental conflict than that
presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals i in the
Rutland case, and the present decision.
- Moreover, the conflict is more widespread than indicated
. above since the principle articulated by the Rutland case
has been followed in other jurisdictions. The prevalance of
the Rutland -principle is indicated by the following cases:
American Airlines, Inc. v, Air Line Pilots Association, Inter-
national, 169 F. Supp. 777, 782, (S.D.N.Y., 1958); Ports-
mouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N-Y.,
~ 1955) ; Eastern Motor Express v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp.
426 (E.D.Pa.,.1956) ; and ——— Western Ry.-Co.
7 Brotherheod of Locomotive Engineers, 202 F. Supp. 277
(S.D:Ta., 1962). These cases are approved by Professor
Moore in 1 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed. ),p. 1508, where
the author states:
“The position taken = these courts is desirable and
there is a built-in protection from abuse contained in
28 USC § 1404(a). Although 28 USC § 1391 does: not
on its face’ apply to unincorporated associations, where
[as here] an unincorporated association carries on
multi-state activities, application of its principle is cer-
~ tainly justified.” eo ,
1 The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen holds_ representation
. Tights on railroads operating in all of these states, as shown by the
Thirty-First Annual Report of the National Mediation Board, pp.
78-86.
ERO VEN ete
ie 14
To the same effect see Note, Federal Venue for Uninedr:
porated Associations, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 130, 140 (1956) ;
Judiciat Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 983, 1080 (1963).
The only case since 1948 where it appears that a court
refused to follow the principle that ap unincorporated asso-
eiation should have the same venue as a corporation under
- § 1391(¢).is Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 167
F. Supp: 635 (S.D.N.Y., 1958). The Cherico case was later’
rejected, however, by the Court of Appeals for the same
circuit in Rutland Railway Co.v. Brotherhood of meni at
Engineers, 307 F. 2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1962).
A reading of the other post-1948 cases which superficially
appear to follow the proposition that an unincorporated
association only resides for venue purposes at its principal
’ place of business, shows that they failed to consider the
problem in light of § 1391(c) and that they merely relied
upon the decision in the Sperry case for this conclusion.?
With respect to unincorporated associations such as the
unjon here, which transacts. business in many states,” the
application of the principles of the Rutland case is.entirely
justified. The union here suffered no undue hardship be-
cause it was ‘required to stand suit in Colorado. There is
1 Section 1391(b) of the venue statute was seid by Public
Law 89-714, approved on November 2, 1966, by addition of the
italicized words in following quotation of.that Section: ©. . \
‘
as
‘,
“(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded =
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the
judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the
claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.”
The intended scope and application of the amendment is unclear.
In any event, the amendment does not resolve the conflict created by
the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the residence of unincor-
porated associations for venue purposes.
ee
15
a : built-in protection i in § 1404(a) of 28 U.S.8. for the union é
if in certain instances the defense of & suit is peculiarly
‘gppressive in a particular district. In the instant case, venue
is especially appropriate in the District of. Colorado, for the .
respondent’s‘ activities in question’ took place there, the
- Brotherhood concededly does business there, and respond-
ent Carroll resides there (R. 5, 6-5, 10, 92).
' (3) Even if the principles affirmed by this Court i in Steel-
workers v. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 are ¥elevant to venue
questions, the lower court’s resolution of what it described
as the vital venue issue in the present case is inconsistent
with the Steelworkers decision. The Court of —
- stated the question to be decided as follows :.
“Venue here depends upon whether. the Brotherhood
is held to reside within the judicial district of Colorado
or in Cleveland, Ohio, where its headquarters and prin-
cipal place of business i is located.” a A, infra,
p. 26.)
Apparently the court below resolved the issue thus posed
by deciding that the Brotherhood is a resident of Cleveland,
Ohio, where it has its principal place of business. This |
result, however, can only be reached by treating the Broth- -
erhood, an unincorporated association, as an entity and.thus
arriving at a result comparable to that reached by Judge
Learned Hand in the Sperry Products case. As the preced-
ing discussion shows, Judgée~ Learned Hand reached this
result by assimilating an unincorporated association to a
corporation. In the absence of such assimilation, the unin-
_ corporated association would be regarded as an inhabitant
or resident of the places inhabited by its members or at
which its members reside. J udge Learned Hand recognized
this consequence, stating: — |
_“. . . for most purposes the law still looks at such
associations as mere aggregations of individuals.” (132
F.2d 408, 411.)
;
nahin 2h neon note , supeeemeneenesee - — es :
. -
+
16
A similar result would follow from applying the rationale
of the Steelworkers case.to the venue problem here involved.
This Court in the Steelworkers case recognized that unless
it treated the unincorporated association as a corporation
for purposes of determining its citizenship, “the generally
prevailing principle that an unincorporated -association’s
citizenship is that of each of its members” would control for
diversity purposes (382 U.S. 145, 146). Consequently, if
- the decision of this Court in the Steelworkers case is con-
trolling, then the residence of the Brotherhood for venue
purposes would necessarily be the residence of each of its
members, not its principal place of business. Thus, the
Steelworkers decision can not possibly be used to arrive at
the result indicated by the court below. A proper applica-
_ tion of the rationale of. the Steelworkers decision would
require the court below or other courts that follow its rea-
soning to reject both of the alternatives posed in the state-
ment of the crucial issue quoted above (Appendix A, infra,
p. 26). Under the principles espoused in the decision
of this Court in the Steelworkers case, the residence of the
Brotherhood would not be Colorado or Cleveland, Ohio, but
would be all of the many states or judicial districts in which
its members reside. In the case df the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, which has members in virtually every
judicial district, venue would never be proper in a federal
eourt since there is no single district in which all of its
members reside.
Insofar as the views of this Court on the venue problem
in this case are concerned, the recent decision in Pure Oi
Company v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, is considerably more rele-
vant thari the Steelworkers decision. In the Pure Oil case
this Court had before it the venue requirements of the
Jones Act which provided that venue would be proper in the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which
t
his principal office is located. This Court stated the i issue
and its resolution thereof as follows:
' “Preliminarily, it should be noted that although this
provision is framed in jurisdictional terms, the Court
has held that it refers only to venue, Panama R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375. It is conceded that as enacted
and originally interpreted the statute would not author-
ize Florida venue in this instance, for corporate resi- _
dence traditionally meant place of incorporation, in i
. this case Ohio,.and Pure Oil’s principal office is in IIli-
nois. The Court of Appeals held, however, that residence
had been redefined by the expanded general venue stat-
ute, 28°U.S.C. §-1391(c) (1964 ed.), penned in 1948.
That statute provides:
“<A corporation may be sued in any judicial dis-
trict in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business, and such judicial .
district shall be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes.’ (Emphasis add-
ed.)
“If this definition of residence is applicable to the
Jones Act venue. provision, it is conceded that the
action was properly brought in Florida, where Pure’
Oil has transacted a substantial amount ‘of business.
We hold that this definition does so apply and that
venue in Florida was proper.” (pp. 203-204.)
This Court stated the controlling principle as follows:
“Although there is no elucidation from statutory his-
tory as to the intended effect of § 1391(c) on special
venue provisions, the liberalizing purpose underlying
its enactment and the generality of its language sup-
port the view that it applies to all venue: statutes
using residence as a criterion, at-least in the absence
of contrary restrictive indications i in any such statute.”
(pp. 204-205.)
The substance of this Court’s decision in the Pure Oil
case is that the more recent definition of residence for
venue: purposes contained in the general venue statute
‘should be applied to the venue requirement of the Jones
— Act, although the amendment to the general venue statute
does not expressly indicate an intent to thus amend the
requirements of the Jones Act. The same approach in the
present case would require the result reached by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Rutland case. The
essential effect of the Rutland case was to update the con-
cepts formulated by Judge Hand in Sperry Products to
make them consistent with the 1948 amendments, just as
the Pure Oil case updated the Venue provisions of the
Jones Act. . en
(4) The Court of Appeals clearly erred in setting aside
the findings of the District Court with respect to the lfa-
bility of respondent R. E. Carroll. The District Court’s
judgment. holding R. E. Carroll liable for the damages ac-
cruing from the unlawful strike was correct and should
have been affirmed by the court below. R. E, Carroll’s
responsibility for the strike in question is most conclu-
sively fixed by the documents of record relating. to .the
institution and cessation of that illegal withdrawal from:
service: With respect to the institution of the strike, coun-
sel for the Brotherhood stated that the strike was called
“pursuant to a letter that was sent to the railroad on
1 Assuming that venue was improper as to the Brotherhood at the
_ time the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the decision to —
’ dismiss the action was erroneous for the following reasons: (a)
There was a full trial on the merits and there is.no indication that
the Brotherhood was inconvenienced in ahy manner; accordingly,
if venue was improper this was at most harmless error. Whittier v.
Emmet, 281 F.2d 24-(D.C. Cir. 1960), 1 Moore, Federal Practice
‘(2d ed.), pp. 1964-1965. (b) ‘Pursuant to § 1406(a), the Court of
Appeals should have remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether, in the interest of: justice, the case should be
transferred rather than dismissed. Hayes v. . Livermont, 279 F.2d
818 (De. Cir, 1960).
ee
eR
19
May 16...” (R. 25). The crucial document thus identified _
is a letter addressed to the Rio Grande stating that “the
strike of brakemen is reset for 2:00 p.m., May 16, 1960”
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, R. 157-58). This letter emanating
from respondent Carroll’s Denver office, is signed. by two
individuals, R. H. McDonald, Vice President of the Broth-
erhood of Railroad Trainmen, and R. E. Carroll, General
Chairman of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. It is
clear from this document that the overall responsibility of -
the Brotherhood in the premises was shared by R. E. Car-
_ roll as the General Chairman of the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen and Mr. McDonald as a vice president of
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.
With respect to the termination of the strike, respondent
Carroll testified that he issued instructions “calling off the
strike” and that hé did that through “telephoning and -
sending the telegrams” (R. 93). It is clear from respondent
Carroll’s testimony on this subject that his authority in
the premises was primary and that his instructions were
final and determinative as to whether the strike was to.
continue or terminate. . Accordingly the District Court cor-
rectly found and concluded that respondent Carroll was
responsible for, and was liable for the damages resulting
from the unlawful strike.
The Court of Appeals suggested that since the local
chairmen were dismissed from the action, R. E. Carroll also
should have been dismissed (Appendix A, infra, p. 27).
Insofar as the local chairmen are concerned, there is no
evidence of record that they were responsible for institut-
. ing the strike in question. The significant difference in the
record between respondent Carroll’s situation and the situa-
tion of the local chairmen was, in fact, recognized by counsel
for the Brotherhood during the trial in the District Court.
At the time of the pretrial conference when the documents
_~
_— — — eis - i.
oe me ee + nee er ratio Be ener oe
20
referred to above had been produced, counsel for the .
respondents stated: -
“Any of deemnenin that have been produced would
only show that Mr. Carroll was the only one who had
any connection with it at all. ” (R. 33.)
At the conclusion of the trial in the District Court. the
_ preposed findings submitted by the respondents recognized
this state of the record.- Thus, proposed finding No. 7, _
mitted by respondents, was as follows:
“The Trial record does not sustain the allegations of
the complaint with respect to B. E. Roark, A. J.
Myers, J.. W. Crocker, M. C. Brown, Carl F. Ahrens, - .
N. E. Doolittle, and M. ©. Feather. These defendants .
a Nt ee ew
are not shown to have participated in any way in the
calling or-eqnduct of the strike nor is there any evi-
dence with reSpect to their beeen if any, with
the Brotherhood. ” (R. 69.) -
Respondent Carroll is not among the individuals listed 1 in
this proposed finding. yt os ne
Counsel for respondents emphasized both the absence of
any evidence or responsibility on the part of the. local |
chairmen and the undoubted responsibility of respondent
Carroll at the conclusion of the trial, as shown by the ae
following :
“The Court: There is another meter I think we.
might iron out here and now. The case is. against
the Brotherhood of Railroad Tréinmen and certain
named individuals.
“Now, with the exception of Mr. Carroll, I haven’t
heard any testimony about these other individuals.
“Mr. Cummings: That was briefed before Judge
Phillips, Your Honor; and—
~
“Mr. Highsaw: The question that was briefed before
Judge Phillips, Your Honor, was whether or not hav-
oe
21
ing named these people in the complaint they had
- properly stated a class action, but now we have had in
evidence and the record is closed: on the question of
the strike and I agree with you there is no evidence at
all that anyone had anything to do with this strike
other than the Brothérhood and Mr. Carroll, ....” .
(R. 155.) an at -
It is apparent, therefore, that at the conclusion of the
proceedings in the District Court. there was agreement
between all of the parties that responsibility for the strike
was that of respondent Carroll and the Brotherhood.
The Court below also suggested that respondent Carroll
“was not an officer of the union” (Appendix A, infra, p. 27).
- When respondent Carroll testified in this action he identi-
_ fied himself as “General Chairman of the General Griev-
ance Committee,,Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen on
_ the D&RGW” (R.2). An affidavit bY respondent Carroll
_ Teiterates his official capacity as “Chairman of the General |
Grievance Committee of the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-"
men for the Denver: And Rio Grande Western Railroad
System.” (R. 10.) sia. Seals
The Gerreral Grievance Committee, of which respondent
Carroll is the Chairman, is the agericy through. which the
Brotherhood functions insofar as its representation rights
on the Rio Grande are concerned and respondent. Carroll,
of course, is the head of that instrumentality. Perhaps ,
the clearest proof of the important official capacity which
respondent Carroll occupies in the Brotherhood. is the fact.
.that the basic collective bargaining agreement between the
Rio Grande and the Brotherhood is signed on behalf of the
Brotherhood by Carroll alone. There is no other Brother-
hood signatory to that agreement, which Carroll signed as
“General Chairman, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.” °
‘This agreement is referred to by the court below in a foot-
note of its Opinion (Appendix A, infra, p. 25). It is also
22 ‘ : a “RB
-
referred to by the Brotherhood in its suggested findings
(R. 68), and there are other references to it in the record
before this Court. |
This case was tried by the District Court without a jury.
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, in such cases the “findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.” This Court has stated in
United States v. U. S. Gypsum: Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)
that: ,
“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ en although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on ‘the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm con-
-viction ‘that a mistake has been committed.” |
We most respectfully submit that the entire evidence shows
that respondent Carroll is not only an officer of the Brother- .
hood but is the governing officer of that organization on the
Rio Grande. Accordingly the District Court’s determina-
tion that respondent Carroll was responsible for the dam-
ages caused by. the Brotherhood’s unlawful strike was
clearly correct and ,the action of the Court of Appeals in
setting it aside was erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
‘ —- Respectfully submitted,
Ernest Porter, — Martin M. Luoente,
Kennet D. Barrows, Ricuarp H. Compsrg,
7 7 Grorcr L. Saunpers, Jr., -
Attorneys for Petitioner
Siwiey, Austin, Burczss & Smita
Of Counsel
November 22,1966
23
State oF ILLINots ™ :
County oF Cook
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
Richard H..Compere, being first duly sworn, on oath
deposes and states that he has served the attached peti- °
tion for writ of certiorari upon counsel for respondent by
‘placing copies of the same in a United States mail box, with
first class air mail postage prepaid, addressed to:
Pup HorneEIn, JR. JaMEs L. Hicusaw, JR.
2007 Security Life Building Suite 620 Tower Building
Denver, Colorado 80202 Washington, D. C. 20005
ppoinseaion: iiad
' Subscribed and "SoRde | . }
before nie this . 2%: ay
of November, 1966.
NOTARY PUBLIC
24
| APPENDIX A
Filed United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
‘Sep. 21, 1966, Robert B. Cartwright, Clerk.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
_ TENTH CircuIT
Jury Term—1966
BROTHERHOOD: OF RAILROAD 9
TRAINMEN and R. E. CARROLL,
Appellants,
“ge =F oe
/
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE =
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
, Appellee. J
ar -
APPEAL
FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
-FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
James L. Highsaw, Jr. (Philip Hornbein, Jr., Hornbein
& Hornbein, and Mulholland, Hickey & Lyman on the
brief) for Appellants. |
Martin Lucente (Ernest Porter, Kenneth D. Barrows,
Walter J. Cummings, Jr., Richard H. Compere, and Sidley,
Austin, Burgess & Smith on the brief) for Appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, PICKETT and LEWIS,
Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Cireuit Judge. a,
Seeking - damages alleged to have resulted from an
unlawful strike, the Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
1 No. 8196
4
ne
25
‘ road Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of ‘business in Denver, Colorado, brought this tort
action against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,’
the chairmen of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
locals in Colorado, and R. E. Carroll, representing the -
Brotherhood on the Rio Grande as Chairman of the General
Grievance Committee. The trial court overruled the
Brotherhood’s motion to dismiss, which included an allega-
tion that venue of the action did not lie in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. Following a
trial, the local chairmen were dismissed from the action,
and judgment in the sum of $37,988. 37 was entered against
the Brotherhood and Carroll.. This appeal followed.
The National Railroad Adjustment Board made two
awards for the payment of money to the Brotherhood,
which the Railroad refused to pay. On May 16, 1960, at
2:00 P.M., a strike was called on the property of the Rio —
Grande for the purpose of compelling payment of the |
awards. At about 6:30 P.M. on the same day, a temporary
_ restraining order enjoining continuance of the strike was
served upon Carroll. A few hours later the strike was dis-
‘ eontinued over the entire system and never renewed.
‘Thereafter, holding the strike to be illegal, the district court
issued a preliminary injunction which became. permanent
on July 27, 1960. (185 F. Supp. 369, aff'd 294 F.2d 266).
Meanwhile, believing that a strike threat still existed,
several: shippers, principally Ford and its suppliers,
between May 19th and June 1, 1960, diverted freight ship-
ments from Rio Grande lines. It is for the loss of revenue
‘ caused ‘by these diversions that the district court allowed
recovery. , : , om
1 The Brotherhood was the duly certified representative under the
Railway Labor Act of certain employees of the Rio Grande, and at
all times during this controversy there was in effect a collective
,, bargaining agreement, _ .
At the outset, we are confronted with the contention that
venue of the action does not lie in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado. The venue statute, °
28 U.S:C. § 1391(b), states:
“A civil action wherein jurisdiction. is not founded
. solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only
’ in the judicial district where all defendants reside,
exeept as otherwise provided by law.”
Venue here depends upon whether the Brotherhood is held
to reside within. the judicial district of Colorado, or in
- Cleveland, Ohio, where its headquarters and principal place
of business is located. Seetion 1391(c) provides: .
_*A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in
which it is incerporated or licensed to do business or is
doing business, and shall be regarded as the residence
of such corporation for venue purposes.”
Relying upon Rutland Ry. Corp. v. B. of R. T., 2 Cir., 307
F.2d 21, and like authorities holding that ‘incorporated
asso¢iations, including unincorporated national labor unions,
should be treated as corporations,’ the district court upheld
venue. Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the Supreme
Court, in Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
while recognizing the validity of the reasoning in cases
like Rutland, held that an unincorporated labor union was
not yet in the same category as a corporation, and that if
such unions were to be treated as corporatiéns, the change
should be made by Congress and not by judicial determina-
2 The rule is stated in the Rutland case as follows:
“Since the residence of a corporation for venue purposes has
been expanded to include all the judicial districts in which the
corporation is doing business, the residence of an unincorpo-
rated association for venue purposes should likewise be ex-
- panded to include all the judicial: districts in which the |
unincorporated entity is doing business.”
27
tion. Although the court in the Bouligny case was discuss-
ing the diversity stafute, the holding was clearly to the
effect that unincorporated associations were basically —
different from corporations. It was a rejection of the
principle espoused by the Rutland case, gpon whith the
Rio Grande relies to sustain venue. For venue purposes,
the Brotherhood is not a resident of Colorado as required
by § 1391(b), and consequently, the complaint must be dis-
missed. _ . . ‘8
The Railroad suggests that even if venue did not exist
as to the Brotherhood, the proper procedure would be to
drop it from the case and let the judgment stand against.
Carroll, a Colorado resident. Carroll was Chairman of the
General Grievance Committee on the Rio Grande; he was
not an officer of the union. So far as the record shows,
- Carroll’s role in-connection with the strike was limited .
to sending the Railroad notice of fhe Brotherhood’s strike
decision and thereafter advising the local unions of the
issuance of: the restraining order. Carroll had no more to
do with causing the strike than did thé chairmen-of the
locals, and accordingly, he too should have been dismissed
.from-the action.® :
$ The trial court found only that Carroll was “General Chairman
of the General Grievance Committee of the Brotherhood on the
property of the plaintiff” and that he notified the local groups to |
eall off the strike after service of the temporary restraining order.
REVERSED. - |
es
eaten el
ete eet eT oie ee Rta AR me Linn Seelam sie
.
.
APPENDIX B
§ 1391 of Title 28, United States Code. Pertinent pro-
visions are: .
“(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded
. only on diversity of citizenship may, except as other-
wise provided by Jaw, be brought only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
“(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not”
founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be
brought only in the judicial district where all defend-
ants reside, except as. otherwise provided by law.
“(e) A corporation may be sued in any judicial dis-
trict in which.it is incorporated or licensed to do busi-
ness or is doing business, and such judicial district
shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes.”
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure :
“(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall .
find the facts specially and state separately its conclu-
sions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered
- pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing inter-
locutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which con-
stitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the-credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court |
adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
eourt. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed,
it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions
’ of law appear therein. Findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are unnecessary. on decisions of motions
~ under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as
provided in Rule 41(b). As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff.
March 19, 1948; Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.”
a ees a
. APPENDIX C
RUTLAND RAILWAY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE
“~ENGINEERS et al., Defendants-Appellauts. -
No. 259, Docket 26760.
United States Court of Appeals
Second Circuit.
Argued March 8; 1962.
_ Decided June 18, 1962.
Thomas Wm. Lynch, Rutland, Vt. (Clark, Carr & Ellis,
by Charles D. Peet, Donald L. Wallace, Harry F. Martin,
Jr., New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
: Philip H. Hoff, Burlington, Vt., Harold N. McLaughlin,
Harold: A. Ross, Cleveland, Ohio, Donald W. Fisher, *.
Toledo, Ohio (Harold C. Heiss, Cleveland, Ohio, V. C.
Shuttleworth, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Wayland K. Sullivan,
Cleveland, Ohio, Black, Wilson & Hoff, Burlington, Vt.,
Marshman, ‘Hornbeck, Hollington, Steadman & McLaugh-
lin, Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel), for defendants-appellants. .
Before WATERMAN, KAUFMAN and MARSHALL, |
Circuit Judges.
WATERMAN, Circuit Dolan:
. The four appellant labor unions, the Brotherhood of Lo-
comotive Engineers, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
'™men and Enginemen, the Brother (sic) of Railroad Train- -
men, and the Order of Railroad Conductors and Brakemen,
hereinafter referred to collectively as the defendant brother-
hoods, and the five individual appellants, each either a gen- |
30
eral or local chairman of one of the above-mentioned
brotherhoods, appeal from a judgment order of the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont, enjoin-
ing as of October 27, 1960, the unions, their members, and
agents from further striking, picketing or using any other
form of economic coercion in connection with a dispute
. which the plaintiff Rutland Railway Corporation had sub-
mitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the in-
junction to remain in effect until the Board had disposed
of the dispute. Mi
The strike began on September 16, 1960. It continued
until the injunction order was effective. Then, obedient
thereto, the workers went back to their jobs. |
7) .
- The Rutland Railway operations are divided into three -
subdivisions. One subdivision runs from the New Hamp-
shire bordér at Bellows Falls, Vermont, to Rutland, Ver-
mont, and is approximately 52 miles long. The main line
subdivision runs-northerly from the southwestern corner
of the State of Vermont through North Bennington, Rut- .
land, and Burlington, Vermont, to the northern tip of Lake
Champlain at Alburg, Vermont, a distance of about 155
miles. At Alburg the road proceeds westerly across north-
ern New York State through Malone and Norwood, New
York, to Ogdensburg} New York, a distance of one hundred
- twenty-two miles. Malone is halfway between Alburg and
Ogdensburg. Norwood, between Malone and Ogdensburg,
js 35 miles from the former and 25 miles from the latter.
The portion of the line from Alburg to Ogdensburg is
called the Ogdensburg Subdivision. |
On November 2, 1959, the-Rutland Railway, which had
been in financial difficulty, sent notices to thé general chair-
- men of the four defendant brotherhoods, as the duly rec-
ognized representatives of the Rutland’s operating em-
ployeés, to inform the labor organizations that the carrier
rs
on nines *
81) -
proposed, among other things, to ees all existing agree-
ments and rules which would prevent it from consolidating
and abolishing crew terminals, merging seniority districts,
-and éstablishing interdivisional runs.’ As part of a con-
1 The relevant part of - notices given by the. Rutland were os
y Sas ' e
“We hereby give notice, under our existing agreements and
pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, that
effective January 1, 1960, we propose to revise and supple-
ment such agreement or agreements in accordance with the
proposal set forth in ‘Attachment A’ appended hereto.
“RTTACHMENT A
“ROAD TRAIN "AND ENGINE SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS.
“A. Except_as hereinafter provided, eliminate all ments,
rules, regulations, interpretations, and practices, however estab-
lished, applicable to any class or grade of road aus or engine
service employees, ‘which
“(i) prohibit or impose restrictions on the right of the car-
rier to establish, move, merge or consolidate seniority districts.
“ (ii) prohibit or impose restrictions on the establishment or
operation of interdivisional, inter-seniority district, intra-divi-
sivnal or’ intraseniority district rums.
“(iii) prohibit or provide penalties for running crews
’ through established crew terminals, or - :
“(iv) provide for automatic release of erews upon arrival at
terminals or end of ruh, or when off 6f assigned territory.
_ “B. Establish a rule to provide that
“1. The carrier shall have the right to-establish, move, con-
solidate and abolish crew terminals, to merge and consolidate
seniority districts, and to establish interdivisional, intersenior-
ity district, intradivisional and intraseniority district ruks in’
assigned and unassigned service with the right to operate any
such run, whether assigned or unassigned (including extra
service), on either a’ one way or turnaround (including: short
turn-around) basis and through’ established crew _ terminals.
*® @¢.@
“2. No rule, regulation, interpretation or practice, how-
ever established shall me construed to in any way prohibit,
?
er
_
‘ .
sa be Rsk tn?
wa deeb iart - —_
>, eens ce ae .
— ot Ween
: 4 °
certed country-wide effort to initiate national discussion of
railroad problems most of the Class I carriers in the nation
also delivered similar notices to brotherhood officers.
The issuance of these notices was required by Section 6
of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat: 582 (1926), as amended,
45 U.S.C.A. § 156.2 At the tinte these notices were sent the
s
——— ——_————
‘
s
restrict or limit the provisions of paragraph ‘ of this rule
except. as provided in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
paragraph 2.
e @ e LS e e : e * w - e .
“(b) Before a run is established under the provisions of this
rule which the carrier does not now have the right to establish
without agreement with its employees, and which involves both
the establishment of a new home terminal for the class of serv-
ice involved and operation through an established crew termi-
nal or terminals for such class of service, the carrier shall give
notice to the general chairman e¢e
* «3 All. agreements, ruies, regulations, interpretations and
_ practices, however established, which conflict with the above
shall. be eliminated, except that existing rules and practices
considered by the carrier to be more favorable are preserved.”
2 The section reads:
“See,.6, Carriers and representatives of the employees shall
give at least thirty days’ written. notice of an intended change
in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working condi-
tions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference
between the representatives of the parties interested in such
intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days: after
the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the .
thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such
notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are
being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Media-
tion Board have been requested by either party, or said Board
_ has proffered its services, rat of pay, rules, or working condi-
tions shall not be.altered by he carrier until the controversy
has been finally acted upon, as required by section 5 of this
Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has
elapsed after termination of conferences without: request for or
proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.”
sony ee ws saat
1s eel inane aeme .> ane
Rutland Railway had collective bargaining agreements with
the brotherhoods. ; e
On November 30, 1959, -eouferences between representa-
tives of the Rutland and representatives of its employees —
were commenced in order-to consider the proposals con-
tained in the Section 6 notices sent November 2. The parties
failed to reach agreement on any of the proposals, and the
conferences were soon recessed. The railroad then dele-
gated authority to the Carriers’ Eastern Conference Com-
mittee to further confer on behalf of the Rutland, and the
labor representatives delegated their authority so t do to
the National Conference Committee of the four brother-
hoods.® :
The Rutland’s financial plight continued to.worsen. In
the first eight months of 1960 it was hauling 5300 carloads
of freight less than it was hauling in the comparable period
of 1959. Its operating revenues were $264,000 less than
those of the same period in 1959. Therefore the railroad’s —
board of directors met in the spring and summer of. 1960
3 The rep}ysentatives of the employees countered with -proposals .
“of their own, served by a Section 6 notice on September 7, 1960.
_ National conferences on these controversies were suspended when
the Presidential Railroad Commission was established on Novem-
ber 1, 1960. The President authorized and directed the Commission
“to investigate and inquire into the issues raised by the proposals ©
of the parties involved in the above-mentioned controversy’ with
the objective of making a report to the President, including ‘its .
findings and reeommendations with respect to the controversy, and
assisting in achieving an amicable settlement and agreement with
respect to issues in dispute between the parties.” The Commission |
rendered its report and recommendations on February 28, 1962. As
yet, no agreement between labor and nianagement has been reached
on the railroads’ proposals to change all rules*preventing consolida-
tion of crew terminals, merger of seniority districts and establish-
ment of interdivisional runs.
Si dretiwcisbitiiniind toes: . ete .
see have RT aeoes ben ene cnn a
?
nee «
in order to devise methods for combatting the company’s
financial problem: A plan was finally agreed upon whereby.
certain operating expenses. would be reduced by the aboli-
tion of several freight runs. _
On its Ogdensburg Subdivision, which stretched from .
Alburg, Vermont, to Ogdensburg, New York, the Rutland
had operated a total of four freight trains and two yard °
switchers: From east to west on the Ogdensburg Subdivi-
sion, there were terminals at Alburg, Vermont; Malone,
New. York; Norwood, New York; and Ogdensburg, New
York. Two of these trains operated daily in Opposite direc-
tions between Alburg and Norwood. The two other trains
operated out of Malone, one going to Ogdensburg and re-
turning each day, the other going to Alburg and returning
‘each day. Pursuant to the decision of its directors to reduce
the number of freight runs, the railroad posted bulletins on
September 8, 1960, announcing that beginning September
17 the four existing daily freight runs on the Ogdensburg
Subdivision were to be replaced by two, running daily be-
tween Alburg and Ogdensburg. in opposite directions. This
new schedule would reduce the number of jobs on the sub-
division by ten and would change the home terminals of’
some of the trainmen whose jobs were not eliminated.
On September 14 the railroad learned that its employees )
would strike in an attempt to prevent these new schedules
from becoming effective. On the morning of September
15 the brotherhoods, obviously referring to the schedule.
changes on the Ogdensburg Subdivision, telegraphed the
railroad that they would go on strike at 12.01 A. M., Sep-
tember 16 because “earrier cancelling 1957 and 1959 agree-
ments by bulletins and changing home terminals and:
running thru former terminal for certain local freight
crews.” The railroad replied in part as follows:
“Rutland Railway Corporation effective Sept. 17, 1960
will arrange train assignment to conform to the de-
Oo
~ - . Dib
= ete een ne Bite
ds of traffic. The change is not and cannot be shown
rm ave violated any rule or agreement as alleged. No
agreement has been violated and the carrier is merely
exercising its right to operate in an economical‘manner.
Conferences on this issue have hot been held on the
ey with the [brotherhoods].”
The operating employees punctually struck at the time indi-
cated by the brotherhoods’ telegram that the strike would
begin.*
“Meanwhile, another dispute was raging between the Rutland
Railway and its employees. This second dispute was only tan-
gentially related to the dispute spelled out in the text. In August.
1960 the brotherhoods asked for pay increases for the employees
‘whom they represented. A conference to negotiate this dispute
convened on August 30, eight days prior to the September 8
bulletin. The .president of the railroad explained to the. labor
representatives that the financial condition of the carrier made it
' impossible for management to meet the wage demands of the unions °
but he stated that if certain rule changes were agreed to by the-
unions the savings from these changes might permit increases in
ay. The changes proposed by the railroad were these >
Yi _ 1, Eliminate all arbitrarics. |
“ 2. Open closed yards—the only closed yard on this —
fr is Rutland yard, closed to trainmen (yardmen).
3. Dovetail rosters, each craft, Vermont and New York
‘divisions. . °
4. Make provisions ‘for operating road switchers. -
5. Provide for operation of. trains between assigned termi-
nals so that wage pay ments will equal the miles run and/or
an 8 hour day. .
- The brotherhoods contended at the district court hearing that a
spokesman for the management explained that change No. 5 meant
the running of trains through established home terminals, but the.
district court refised to make such a finding. The August 30 con-
ference ended without strecess. On September 7, 1960 (see footnote
3), the general chairman of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
served a Section 6 notice on the railroad asserting that the brother-
hood desired to change existing rates of pay and rules. On Septem-
.
86 3
Ten days later, on September 26, the railroad filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Vermont, asking the court to enjoin a further strike,
to order the defendants to comply with the procedural
requirements’ of the Railway Labor Act, and to award -
damages to the plaintiff.
To support its claint for an injunction the railroad, defin-
ing the disagreement with its employees to be whether the
management of the railroad had the right to rearrange
train runs and thereby reduce jobs and change crew. termi- _
nals without first negotiating the matter with the repre-
sentatives of its workers, promptly submitted the dispute
to the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the
“minor dispute” provisions of. the Railway Labor Act, -
§§ 2 Second, Sixth, 3, 44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926), as amended, .
45 U.S.C.A. §§ 152 Second, Sixth, 153. On October 7 the
defendants moved to dismiss the action because of improper
vente. This motion was denied on October 10. The
defendants then answered, and filed a countefclaim in
which they on their part sought an injunction preventing
the railroad from putting into effect the schedule of changes
set forth in its bulletins of September 8 until at least the
relevant procedures, provided by the Railway Labor Act
should have been exhausted. ,
After holding hearings on the merits of the respective
claims the district court issued an injunction enjoining the
strike. A consideration of the railway’s prayer for an
award of damages was: postponed to a later date. In its
_ opinion, reported at 188 F.Supp. 721 (D.Vt.1960), the .
ber 12, the railroad agreed to submit the union’s proposals to
national bargaining under the auspices of the National Mediation
Board. A National Mediator came to Rutland to mediate this dis-
pute over future wages. There was testimony at the hearing that the ©
Mediator’s work did not relate to the dispute over the bulletined
_ changes in train schedules on the Ogdensburg Subdivison.
7
court held that the dispute.out of which the strike arose
was a minor one, subject to the jurisdiction and decision
of the National Railroad Adjustment Board and that the
Section 6 notice of November 2, 1959, sent out by the Class
I railroads on the national level did not alter the minor
nature of this particular dispute over, the rescheduling of
freight runs. The court did not grant the defendants’
prayer for an injunction to prevent the railroad from effec-
tuating its rescheduling. The defendants appeal to this
court, seeking review of the district court decision adverse
to them.
The tian nals that the venue for this action
was not properly located in the District of Vermont; that
the controversy out of which this litigation arose was not
a “minor dispute” as the court below held, but a “major
dispute” under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) -
as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-163, and that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C_A. §§ 101-115,
deprived the court of jurisdiction to enjoin the strike. The .
appellee railroad asserts, on the other hand, that, the court
. below’was correct in determining the dispute a minor one
which permitted the carrier to proceed with its schedule
changes and ss nian that the employees desist from
_ Striking.
VENUE
Three of the defendant brotherhoods, the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, have their headquarters at Cleveland, Ohio. The
headquarters of the fourth brotherhood, Order of Railway
Conductors and Brakemen, are at Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Inasmuch as this action arises under the laws of ‘the
United States, namely, the Railway Labor Act, the relevant
venue provision of the Judicial Code is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) :
Surge Danses ene nies ve an roebigineitlin tel icin +s
38 .
- (b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not
founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be
brought only in the judicial district where. all defend- —
ants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.”
The brotherhoods assert that, since they are unincorpo-
rated associations, the proper venue for an action against
any one of them is only in the judicial district where its
principal place of business is situated.
In Sperry Prods., Ine. v. Association of Am. R. Rs., 132
F.2d 408 (2 Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744, 63 S.Ct.
. 1031, 87 L.Ed. 1700 (1943), involving the venue provision
for patent infringement actions, Judge Learned Hand dis-
cussed the concept of venue as it related to unincorporated —
associations. The venue statute there involved, 35 Stat.
1084 .(1909), 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940) (now 28 -US.C.
§ 1400(b) (1958) ), stated that any suit for patent infringe-
ment might be brought “in the district of which the defend- °
ant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defend-
ant * * * shall have committed acts of infringement and
have a regular and established place of business.” Judge
Hand stated that for venue purposes, as well as for other
procedural incidents, an unincorporated association should
be considered a jural entity, cf. United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570,
L.Ed. 975 (1922), and that the only practical approach
_/to the procedural problems created by actions involving
unincorporated associations was to assimilate their treat-
ment to that accorded corporations. Therefore, Judge
Hand concluded that an unincorporated association should
be considered “present” wherever it was-continuously car-
rying on a substantial part of its activities, since this was
the standard for the “presence” of corporations. However,
he hastened to add that being “present” in a district was
not tantamount to being an “inhabitant” of that district.
Again assimilating the situation:of the unincorporated en-
ee ee ee eres Cee nee ts
tity which has no place of incorporation to that. of the
incorporated entity, Judge Hand announced that the unin-
corporated entity was an “inhabitant” of the district of | its
principal place of business.
Although Sperry Prods., Inc. involved the venue provi-
sion for patent infringement actions, courts have applied
Judge Hand’s reasoning in that case to the determination of
questions that have arisen involving the general venue stat-
ute. Until the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948 there
was little difficulty in so doing because the general venue >
statute, 28 U.S.C, § 112 (1940), provided only that “no
civil suit shall be brought i in any district court against any
person * * * in any other district than that whereof ‘he is an
inhabitant * * *.” Thus J udge Hand’s discussion of where
an unincorporated association was an inhabitant was appli-
cable with equal force under the general venue provision as
it then existed. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
ete. v. Graham, 84-0.S. App.D.C. 67, 175 F.2d 802 (1948), ©
rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. “032 70 S.Ct. 14, 94 L.Ed.
22 (1949). .Cf. Darby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 73
F.Supp. 522 (E.D.Pa.1947). But see Thermoid Co. v.
United Rubber Workers, 70 F.Supp. 228 (D.N.J .1947). But
in 1948 the general venue statute was redrafted as 28
U.S.C. § 1391; and a subsection (c) was added. This sub-
section stated.
“(e) A corporation may be sued in any judicial dis-
trict in which it is incorporated or licensed to do busi-
ness or is doing business, and such judicial district
Shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes.”®
.
.
5 Another difference betweeit the new statute and the old one was
that the new one spoke in terms of “residence” instead of “inhabit-
ance”; but it is clear from the Reviser’s Notes to § 1391 that the
two terms were intended to be synonymous. H.R.Report 308, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. A147 (1947). ~
Bot AR. ners gti ew
40
Under the venue provision drafted in 1948 courts were
faced with the question whether they should follow Judge
Hand and hold that an unincorporated association resides
_ only at its principal place of business, or wifether the
process of assimilation which Judge Hand advocated should
be extended by assimilating the treatment of unincorporated
associations for venue purposes with the newly expanded
concept of corporate residence. ,
The cases are divided on this issue. Some courts have |
held that for determining venue an unincorporated associa- .
tion resides only at-its principal place of business. Brother-
hood of Locoinotive Firemen, ete. v. Graham, supra;
McNutt v. United Gas Workers, 108 F.Supp. 871, 876
(W.D.Ark.1952) ; Griffin v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 88 F.Supp.
552, 555 (N.D.111.1949) ; Salvant v. Louisville & N. R. R., 83
F.Supp. 391, 396 (W.D.Ky.1949) ; Cherico -v. Brotherhood |
of R. R. Trainmen, 167 F.Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.1958). Cf.
Hadden v. Small, 145 F.Supp. 387 (N.D.Ohio 1951). Other
courts have held that an unincorporated association may
be sued in any district in which it is doing business. Ports-
‘-mouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F.Supp. 922 (S.D.N-Y.
1955) ; American Airlines, Ine. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 169
’ F.Supp. 777 (S.D.N-Y.1958) ; Eastern Motor Express, Inc.
v. Espenshade, 138 F.Supp. 426 (E.D.Pa.1956). And-the
Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the matter.
Venue in the federal courts is nét a jurisdictional
concept. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1958) ; H.R.Report 308,
80th Cong., Ist Sess. A154 (1947) (Reviser’s Notes). We
should not think about it in the metaphysical terms which
have often been associated with considerations of jurisdic-
tion. Venue is a concept of convenience. See Neirbo Co. v.
_~» Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-168, 60
: S.Ct. 158, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939) ; Cohen-v. Commodity Credit a
Corp., 172 F.Supp. 803 (W.D.Ark.1959) ; Jacobson v. Indian- ©
*
~
41-.
apolis Power & Light Co., 163 F.Supp? 218 (N.D.Ind.1958) ;
The North River, 57 F. Sinn. 808 (E.D.N.Y.1944) ; Voge
v. Crown: Cork & Seal Co., 36 F. Supp. 74 (D.Md.1940). It
- should be treated in practical terms.\ See Sperry Prods., Inc.
v. Ass’n of Am. R. Rs., supra; American Airlines v. Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, supra. Congress hag stated in § 1391(c) that
the residence of & corporation for venue' purposes is not
only in the state wherein it is incorporated but also in the
places where it is licensed to do business and where it is
doing business. It is true that we would be reading into
28 U.S.C. § 1391(¢) words which are not there if we should
assert that that subsection states that it applies to unincor-
porated associations. See Cherico v. Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen, supra. But we do not find any manifestation here
of a congressional policy of expressio unius est- exclusio
altertus, and.so we follow the reasoning in Sperry Prods.
and assimilate the residence of unincorporated associations
_ under,28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) to that of corporations, 28° USS. C.
§ 1391 (ce). Since the residence*of a corporation for venue
- purposes has been expanded to include all the judicial dis-
tricts in which the corporation is doing business, the resi-
dence of an unincorporated association for venue purposes
should likewise be expanded to include all the judicial dis-
tricts in which the unincorporated entity is doing business.
We believe this accords with the practical requirements of
~ litigation involving unincorporated associations. If an unin-
corporated union is carrying on sufficient activities in a
particular judicial district so that it is deemed to be doing
business there, it usually will suffer no undue hardship if
“- required to stand suit there. If in certain instances the
defense of a suit in a particular district is peculiarly eppres-
sive, the Association may always seek a transfer of the action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
- Turning to the case before us, we hold that ‘the
- defendant brotherhoods were doing business in the Dis-
aeeeeeennemeeenetneeennna ene ee a eeeerere vs“ 49 mS
trict of Vermont. They set up and maintained grievance
committees and other facilities among the employees of the
Rutland Railway:in Vermont. They organized a strike of
railroad employees:in Vermont. They negotiated with the
‘management of the plaintiff railroad in Vermont. There-
. fore, we conclude that venue for this action in’ the District
of Vermont was proper and we affirm the order of the court
below oungeng thé motions to dismiss.
Mrnor ok Magor Dispute
We think that there are only two general questions pre-
sented by the issues of labor law involved in this case.
‘They are: First, is this a so-called “major” or “minor”
dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 44° Stat. 577, as
amended, 45 U,S.C.A. §§ 151-163 (1958)? Second, does the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 44°
101-115 deprive the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin
the striké? a
For either of these statutes to be -smanhtben, there
must be first of all a “labor dispute.” The Norris-La-
Guardia Act, § 13(c), 47 Stat. 73, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113(e),
defines a labor dispute as follows:
“(c) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any contro-
- versy concerning ‘terms or conditions of employment,
- or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of empley-
ment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.”
Section 2 of the ne Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926),
45 U.S:C.A. § 151a, sets out the disputes to-which it applies
as “all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions” and “all disputes growing out of grievances or .
out of the interpretation or application of agreements
G
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” In
Order of: R. R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.,
362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960), .the
Supreme Court explicitly-held that a labor dispute existed
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and implied that one
existed under the Railway Labor Act, when a railroad
sought to close.a number of its stations and thereby redtice
employment. The Court stated:
-“Plainly the controversy here relates to an effort
on the -part of the union to change.the ‘terms’ of an
existing collective bargaining agreement. The change
desired just as plainly referred to ‘conditions of em- -
ployment’ of the railroad’s. employees who are repre-
_ sented by the union. The employment of many of these
station agents inescapably hangs: on the number of
railroad stations that. will be ‘either completely aban-
doned or consolidated with other stations. And, in the
coll@&tive bargaining world today, there is nothing
- strange about agreements that affect the permanency
of employment. The District Court’s finding that
‘collective bargaining: as to the length or term of
employment. is commonplace,’ is not challenged.” ‘Ta.
at 336, 80 S.Ct. at 764.
a
Numerous other* courts have assumed the presence of.
labor disputes in similar situations. E. g., Hilbert v. Penn-
-sylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881 (7 Cir.), cert. Wenied, 368
. US. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961); In the Matter
of Hudson & M. R. R. -Co., 172 F.Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff’d sub nom. Stichman v. General Grievance Comm. of
the Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2 Cir™1959), i
cert. denied, Hatler v. Dawson, 361 U.S. 928; 80 S.Ct. 385,
4 L.Ed.2d 351 (1960). Cf. Butte A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 864, 80 S.Ct. 122, 4 L.Ed.2d 104 (1959).
The court below was correct when it found that. a labor dis-
pute relating to working conditions existed when the case
was heard on nee 20, 1960. r
44
. In order to avoid interruptions to transportation result-
ing frpm disputes over rates of pay, rules, or working con-
_ ditions, to provide peaceful and orderly procedures for the
settlement of these disputes, and to foster the organization
of employees, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A.*§ 151a, the
Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926. 44 Stat. 577, as
amended, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-163 (1958). The Act contem-
plates two types of disputes, major and minor, and pro-:
vides different procedures for handling each. See Railway
Labor Act § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A. § 151a,
' Hearings on H.R. 7650, before House Committee on. Inter-
state Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings on
S. 3266, before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, -
73d, Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Mr. Justice Rutledge in his
oft-quoted dpinion for the- Court in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. -
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945),
explained the distinction hetween major and minor dis--
putes under the Railway Labor Act:
“The first [major dispute] relates to disputes. over .
the formation of collective agreements or efforts to
secure them. They arise where there is no such agree-
ment or where it is.sought to change the terms of one,
and -therefore the issue is not whether an existing
agreement controls the controversy. They look to the
acquisition of rights for the-future, not to agsertion of
rights claimed to have vested in the past.
“The second class [minor disputes], ‘however, con-
:templates the existence of a collective agreement al-
ready concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no
effort ts made to bring about a formal change in terms
or to create a new one. The dispute relates either to
the meaning or proper application of a particular pro-
vision with reference to a specific. situation or to an
omitted case. In the latter event the claim is founded
upon some incident of the employment relation, or as-
_serted one, independent of those covered by the collec-
tive agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal in-
fo
45
juries. In either case the laine is to ighte accrued, 7
not mer¢ly to have new ones created for the future. ”
Id. at 723, 65 S.Ct. at 1290. é
See also Hearings -on. H. R. 7650, ella House Committee. |
on Interstate Commerce, 73d. Conf, 2d Sess. 47 (1934).
In ‘both types of disputes the Act requires that, as
a first step, the parties must make every reasonable
effort to settle their differences in conference. § 2 First,
Second, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152
First, Second. Elgin, J.& E. Ry. v. Burley; § supra at 724-725
and nn. 12, 18, 65 S.Ct. supra at 1290-1291. Major disputes
cbmmence with the i issuance of a notice known as “Section
_ 6 notice,” given by the party seeking to change. existing
agreements. §§.2 Seventh, 6, 44 Stat. 577, 582-(1926), as
amended, 45 U:S.C.A. §§ 152, Seventh, 156. In major dis-
putes, if settlement cannot be reached in conference, the
matter is referred to mediation under the auspices of the
National Mediation Board. § 5, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as
amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 155. If mediation fails, the Media-
tion Board proposes voluntary arbitration to the parties,
§§ 5, 7, 44 Stat. 580, 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A.
§§ 155, 157, a course of action neither party is required to
adopt. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.
R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 4138, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944).
Finally, if the President ‘of the United States desires, he
is empowered to set up an emergency board to investigate
and report to him with respect to the dispute. § 10, 44 Stat.
586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 160. “The parties aré
required to comply with each stage in the above-described
procedure before either may resort to self-help, and it is
the statutory: duty of the carrier not to alter rates of pay,
rules, er working conditions, i.e., to maintain the status
quo, until the Mediation Board we acted upon the dispute.
§ 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 156; see
Pas A tilltom oa EOED oe me MOE gt
et ete
46 —
Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572 (2 Cir:), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 635, 60 S.Ct. 1078, 84 L.Ed. 1404 (1940). Grand Inter-
nat¥onal Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Morphy, 109
F.2d 576 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 635, 60 S.Ct. 1078, |
84.L.Ed. 1404 (1940). However, the Act does not create
any tribunal having final authority to decide a major dis-
pute without the consent of both parties, and in such
disputes no provision in the Railway Labor Act prohibits
the workers from striking as soon‘as all of the procedures
for settling the dispute have been ‘exhausted without a
mutual’y satisfactory solution having been reached.®
The procedure under the 1926 Act for handling the
other type of dispute (the minor dispute) soon proved in-
effectual to produce peace in the railroad industry. Dead-
lock often resulted from the refusal by one side or the other |
to.participate in the voluntary local boards which the Act
contemplated as the source of decision in such disputes.
Moreover, in many cases in which boards were established
‘ no decision could be reached because of the equal number
of labor and management members on each board. These
circumstances produced an ever-increasing backlog of un-
resolved disputes. See Hearings on 8. 3266 before Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17,
6 Since the Railway Labor Act contains no provison to the con-
trary, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 101-115, operates to prevent the federal courts from enjoining
‘ strikes in major disputes, at least after the exhaustion of all of the
procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act for settling such
disputes. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
_ Ind. RR, 353 U.S. 30, n. 24, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957) ;
- Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. RB.R., 321 US.
50, 64 S.Ct. 418, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944) ; Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Chicago & N. W. R.R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 _ -
(1960). -
aw /
47 |
137 (1934). To eliminate these roadblocks, the statute was
amended in 1934 and the National Railroad Adjustment
Board was created, making it unnecessary for the parties
_ to set up local boards. § 3, 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A.
§ 153; H.R.Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3; S.Rep.
No. 1065, 73d Cong.,.2d Sess, 1, 2 2 (1934). Under this amend-
‘ment, if the parties fail to agree in conference, either side
‘may submit the matter to the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board. Procedures are provided for assuring that the
Board will not become deadlocked, and unless the Board’s
decision contains a monetary aivard the decision of the
Board is final and binding on the parties. § 3 subd. 1(i) |
(7) (m) (n), 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 ULS.C.A. ¢ 153 subd.
1(i) (2) (m) (n), see Union Pae. R. R. v. Price, 360 U.S.
601, 79 S:Ct. 1351, 3 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1959). See generally
Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A -
Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567 (1937).
Thus a system of compulsory arbitration of minor dis-
* putes was created by the 1934 amendment. Brotherhood
of R. R. Trainmen vy. Chicago River & Ind. R. R., 353 U.S.
30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957); California v. Taylor,
303 U.S, 553, 77 S.Ct. 1037, 1 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1957). See
Hearings on H.R. 7650 before House Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 58, 60, 81-82, 118
(1934); Hearings on S. 3266 before Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 35 (1934). To
effectuate these procedures for the conclusive determina-
tion of mimor disputes, courts have issued injunctions
against strikes by. the railroad unions. E. g., Brotherhood
of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. R., supra; |
In the Matter of Hudson & M. R. R, 172 F.Supp. 329
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Stichman v. General Grievance
Comm. of the Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2 Cir,
48
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 928, 80 S.Ct. 385, 4 L.Ed.2d
351 (1960).” ,
The defendants contend that the .present controversy
is a major dispute under the Railway Labor Act; and, there-
fore, their strike may not be enjoined, or, at least, may only
be enjoined for the short period of time necessary for the
exhaustion of. mediation and the other major dispute pro-
cedures. The railroad, on the other hand, claims that this is
a minor dispute; and, therefore, the strike must be enjoined
so that the issue between the parties can be decided with
finality by the Railroad Adjustment Board. We are called
upon to decide whether this dispyte is a major or a minor
. dispute, so that the parties then may go forward under the
applicable set of procedures sanctioned by the Railway
Labor Act. As Elgin, J.& E. Ry.v. Burley, supra, explained,
the difference between-major and minor disputes is that the
former relate to new agreements or changes in existing
contracts whereas the latter involve the interpretation and
the application of existing agreements. We readily recog-
nize that here, as in other areas of jurisprudence, the differ-
ence,-on the one hand, between the interpretation and the
application of an existing agreement, and, on the other
hand, a change in an original intended basis of agreement
is often a question of degree.
-In reaching for resolution of this problem of course we
must not place undue emphasis on the contentions or the
7 There is some doubt whether a federal court has power to issue
an anti-strike injunction in a minor dispute before the matter is
submitted to the Railroad Adjustment Board. Cf. Manion v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927, 77 S.Ct. 706, 1 L.Ed.2d 722
(1957); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881 (7 Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961). But inas- .
much as the Rutland Railway has submitted the present controversy
to the Board, we are not here faced with this problem.
49
maneuvers of the parties: Management will assert that its
position, whether right or wrong, is only an interpretation
or application of the existing contract. Unions, on the other
hand, in their assertions about the dispute at issue, will .
obviously talk in terms of change. Since a Section 6 notice
is required by the statute in order to initiate a major dis- .
pute, the labor representatives dre likely to serve such a
notice in any dispute arising out of any ambiguous situation
_so as thereby to make the controversy appear more like a
major dispute. Compare | Order of R. R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N. W. RB. R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d |
774 (1960). Or they may seek to bring the particular con-'
flict at issue within the bounds of an outstanding Section 6 .
notice that in reality does not relate to that dispute. See
Comment, Enjoining Strikes and. Maintaining. the Status
Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60 Colum.L.Rev. 381, 394-
397 (1960).
But, on the other hand, we should not in the process
of classifying this dispute as major or minor thereby also
adjudicate the merits of the controversy between the parties.
If this is a minor dispute, a decision on the merits of the
dispute is the function of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board; and if this is a major dispute the outcome of the
parties’ difference is to be determined by extra-judicial
forces and procedures. See Order of Ry. Conductors v.
’ Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 66-S.Ct. 322, 90 L. Ed.318 (1946) ; Nor-
folk & P. B. L. R. R. v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen,
248 F.2d 34 (4 Cir., 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct.
343, 2 L.Ed.2d 274 (1958).
The disagreement between the- Rutland Railway and
-its employees is not whether the train runs on- the
Ogdensburg Subdivision should be rescheduled, but, instead,
whether the railroad has the unilateral right to make those
changes without negotiating about them with the brother-
50.
hoods, Cf. Norfolk & P. B. L. R. R. v. Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen, supra; Missouri-K.-T. R. R. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 266 F.2d 335 (5 Cir., 1959), reversed
on other grounds, 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379
(1960). Whether it be a major or a minor dispute, the dis-
agreement is a dispute over the scope of the railroad’s man-
agerial prerogative. It is a major dispute if the present
agreements between the railroad and the brotherhoods con- —
tain express provisions contrary to the position taken by '
the railroad or if the clear implication of these agreements
is inconsistent with the railroad’s proposals. It is a minor ’
dispute’ if there is a clearly governing provision in the
present agreements, although its precise requirements are
ambf@uous; and it is also minor if what the railroad seeks
to do is supported by customary and ordinary interpreta-
tions of the language of the agreements.
The unions assert that the Section 6 notices of November
2, 1959, demonstrate ‘that this is a major dispute. These
“notices were issued pursuant to national handling and simi-
lar notices were issued by most of the other Class I railroads
in the country on the same day. Hilbert v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 290 F.2d 881. (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82
S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961). Conferences over the changes
referred to in those 1959 notices were still going on when
the Rutland bulletined the new schedules for the Ogdens-
burg Subdivision in September 1960.
However, we nete that the language in the Rut-
land’s notices was not necessarily inconsistent with the
railroad’s present contention that it has the right under its
existing agreements to change train schedules without nego-
tiation. The November 2, 1959 notices set out a procedure
for establishing new runs “which the carrier does not now
have the right to establish without agreement with its em-
ployees * * *” The notices also state:
51
ag, All agreements, .Tules, regulations, interpreta
tions and practices, however established, which conflict
with the above shall be eliminated, except that existing
rules and practices considered by the carrier to be more
favorable are preserved.”
‘ The Seventh Circuit, faced with the same notices in Hilbert.
v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra, held that the railroad’s Novem-
ber 2, 1959, Section 6 notices involved in that case did not.
turn a subsequent eontroversy over a proposed change in
certain home terminals of the road into a major dispute.
Cf. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Local 2013 of United R. R. Work-
ers, 178 F.Supp. 53 ( E.D.Pa.1959). We believe a similar
situation exists in the case before us. The Section 6 notices
created a major dispute, but the dispute so created was not
the dispute over which the Rutland’s employees went out
on strike ten and one-half months later. Although there is
an. apparent similarity between the changes proposed in
the notice given by the Rutland on November 2, 1959, and
the schedule changes which the railroad later made uni-
laterally, the court below found that the railroad in making
the September 1960 changes was not acting pursuant to the
earlier notices. We cannot say that the district court was
in error in so finding.
Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864, 80 S.Ct.
122, 4 L.Ed.2d 104 (1959), relied upon by the defendants,
is distinguishable from the present case. In that case ‘the
railroad issued Section 6 notices in which it first proposed
to allocate certain ore loading formerly done by yard crews
' to main line crews, and, failing to reach agreement with the
representatives of its workers thereon, it then proposed to
reduce the size of the yard crews from ‘five men to three
men. Since this second proposal, too, was unacceptable, the
railroad announced that the shipper would load its own ore.
The shipper was Anaconda Copper Company, which con-
ms aw : . w Sean «es
52 ;
veniently: happened to own all of the stock of the railroad.
The railroad asserted that since the shipper, instead of the
carrier, was going to load the ore, the road’s dispute with
its employees was at. an end, and therefore the strike in
‘which its employees were engaged should be enjoined. The
court held that the major dispute commenced by the rail-
road’s Section 6 notices continued, for the action taken by
the copper company should be imputed to its wholly-owned
subsidiary, the railroad. Thus the court there held that the
Section 6 notices related .to the controversy throughout.
That decision turned upon the specific facts -in that case
relating to the notices and the dispute. Similarly, in the >
present case, the significance of the Section 6 notices rests
to a large extent on what the Rutland Railway intended
when ‘it issued the 1959 Secton 6 notices and what the man- .
agement and the employees intended when they subsequently
‘became involved in the 1960 dispute. In the present case,
upon a set of facts different from those Butte, A: & Pac.
Ry., we have concluded that the controversy created by the
Rutland’s Seetion 6 notices was not the same controversy
over which its employees struck in September 1960.
The Rutland Railway points out several provisions in its
agreements with the defendant brotherhoods which, the rail-
road contends, demonstrate that it had the right to act as
it did. One such provision is Article 39(a), of its agreement
with the Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen: :
“(a) All vacant or new rung will be posted on the
-division on which they ocgur within five (5) days, to
close within five (5) days, and to’ be assigned to the
- ‘gldest bidder within ten (10) days, merit, fitness and
ability to be considered: In case of men being away
when run is advertised, when reporting for duty their
claims to the run will be considered if a junior man has
been assigned, if such claim, in writing, is made within
five (5) days.” oe aa .
=“ out of different terminals, schedules changed two (2)
The language of Article XXXVII(a) in‘the carrier’s a.
' ment with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Exffineers, an
that of Article 39(a) in the agreement with the Smut?
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, is essentially the
same-as in the article quoted above. Also Article 39(e) in
the agreement with the Conductors and Trainmen states:
““(e) When established runs are changed to operate
hours. or more, twenty (20) miles or more, or the lay-
over of such runs changed, they will be considered new
runs and bulletined as stich.”
The = also calls our attention to Articles 16 and 31
of its agreement wit the Conductors and Trainmen, Arti-
cles 17 and 51 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen agreement, and Article XVII in the agree-
ment with the Engineers. None of these provisionsby them-
selves alone bestow upon the railroad the right unilaterally
to change train runs and home terminals. But they are
some indication that each agreement, taken as a whole, °
implicitly recognizes such a right in the carrier.- As we said
earlier in the opinion, the present controversy is over the
extent of the railroad’s managerial prerogative. The scope’
of the management’s prerogative is often -not spelled out in
collective bargaining agreements, but the prerogative exists
implicitly to some extent. in all such agreements. See Cox
& Dunlop, Regulation of Collective. Bargaining by -the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 389, 401
(1950); Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 198 F.Supp.
402, 408-11 (S.D.Cal.1961).
The’ court below found that in general there had
been no negotiation in the past between the Rutland and its
employees over changes in train runs. This finding was not
clearly erroneous. Across the nation there seems to be no
uniform pattern in this matter; some railroads have more
"
.
pee nines Sh tl cet nit nae
o4
latitude to act unilaterally over changes of this sort than
. do others. See the Presidential Railroad Commission Re- —
port (Feb. 28, 1962) at 295.
a
In a number-of cases involving disagreements similar to ~
the one in the present case, courts have classified the dis-
putes as minor. In the Matter of Hudson & M. R. R.; 172
. F.Supp. "329 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom Stichman v. General
' Grievance Comm. of the Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen, 267 F.2d
941 (2 Cir., 1959), ‘cert. denied. Hatler v. Dawson, 361 U.S.,
928, 80 S.Ct. 385, 4 L.Ed.2d 351 (1960), see also cert. denied,
363 U.S. 843, 80 S:Ct. 122, 4 L.Ed.2d 104 (revision of runs
~ and use of multiple control cars reducing trainmen jobs) ;
Norfolk & P. B. L. R. R. v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen,
248 F.2d 34 (4 Cir., 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 914, 78
S.Ct. 343, 2 L.Ed.2d 274 (1958) (change of point for report-
- ing to work) ; Missouri-K.-T. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers, 266 F.2d 335 (5 Cir., 1959), reversed on
other grounds, 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L:Ed.2d 1379
_ (1960) (changes in intradivisional runs and away-from-home
terminals) ; Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881 (7
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.8. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96
(1960) (reassignment of Dienes from one terminal to.
another); Baltimore & O. R. R. v. United R.R. Workers,
271 F.2d 87 (2 Cir.,. 1959), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 364 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1609, 4 L.Ed.2d 1719 (1960)
(abolition of post of oiler.on diesel powered tugs).
_In the light of the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreements, the ‘prior conduct of the parties as
found by the trial judge and the decisions in analogous —
cases, we hold that the existing agreements involved here,
reasonably interpreted, may recognize implicitly/a right
in the gailroad unilaterally to make the changes which it
bulletined on’ September 8, 1960; therefore, we hold that
the ensuing dispute must be viewed by the courts as a minor
dispute. Whether the railroad does in fact have the rights
g
%
mateGiecmamnatet sn in ssc — . seat
55
-
‘it claims, or whether on further analysis it does not is for
the Board to determine; on the ultimate resolution of this
_issue we express no opinion. We only hold that for the
purpose of defining the extent to which a court. may inter-
vene and enjoin a strike the dispute in the present case
is to be considered minor as one involving the interpreta-
tion of existing agreements. -
. Our decision is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W.
R. R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960).
Besides concluding . in that case that a controversy over
a_railroad’s praposal to reduce the number of its stations
was a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Court ‘held that that disagreement between management
and labor involved a bargainable issue and that the contro- |
versy was a major dispute. We do not say that the issue
in the present case is not a bargainable one. We have’ no
doubt that the brotherhoods, upon the expiration of the
exisung agreements, may require the railroad to bargain
over future procedures for changing train runs and sched-
ules. We only hold that there is a sufficient indication that -
the existing agreements have preserved management’s right
unilaterally. to make the schedule changes management
intended to maké so as to require that the dispute be sub- —
mitted to the. National Railroad Adjustment Board, as
provided by the Railway Labor Act.
We are noteentirely certain what constituted the basis
in the Chicago & N. W. R. R. case for the Court’s other
conclusion that there a major dispute existed. Cf. Hilbert -
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881, 895 (7 Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961).
Probably the Court.was applying the traditional standards
for. distinguishing the two types of disputes, and, on the
facts. presented to it in that case, concluded that a major |
dispute was present. On a different set of facts we have
>
ee al ieieeeenennemen
56
found a minor dispute here. But perhaps ~-the Court in .
Chicago & N. W. R. R. was adding a new dimension to the
usual criteria for distinguishing major disputes from minor
ones, that of the magnitude of the effect on working con-
ditions which would result from ‘the proposal by the rail-
road. But even if the Court was adding this ingredient to
its analysis, which we doubt, the controversy before us is
still a minor dispute because the proposed schedule changes
on the Ogdensburg Subdivision would only affect very few
jobs. |
The court below did not condition its issuance of
the injunction against appellants on a requirement that the
railroad maintain the -status quo. It was certainly within
the court’s power to impose such a condition. See Brother- -
hood of Locomotive Enginers vy. Missouri-K.-T. R. R., 363
U.S. 528,80 8.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960) ; also United
R. R. Workers, ete. v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 364 U.S. 278,
* 89 S.Ct. 1609, 4; L.Ed.2d 1719 (1960). But likewise it was
in the court’s discretion to decline to impose conditions. 363
US. at 534-535, 80'8.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379. We find no
abuse by the court of its discretionary powers in this area.
INTERRELATION OF THE RaILway Lasor. AcT AND
THE Norris-La Guarpia Act
In general, the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115, passed in 1932, deprives
federal district courts of. jurisdiction to issue injunctions
against strikes by employees in labor disputes, § 4(a), 47
- Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 104(a); allows injunctions
to be granted against unlawful acts which will cause irre-
parable injury only under strict procedural requirements,
§ 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 107; and precludes
injunctive relief even when these stringent requirements |
are met if the complainant has failed to fulfill, on its part,
its legal obligations or has failed, on its part, to make rea- ©
57
sonable attempts to settle the labor dispute by négotiation,
mediation, or voluntary arbitration, §.8, 47 Stat. 72 (1932),
99 U.8.C.A. § 108. See 75 Cong. Rec. 4626, 4629 (1932);
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R..R. v. Switchmen’s Union, 292
F.2d 61 (2 Cir., 1961), certiorari denied 370 U.S. 936, 82
S.Ct. 1578, 8 L.Ed.2d 806. This statute embodies a policy
of fostering the resolution of labor difficulties. through the
interplay of private forces unhampered by judicial inter-
ference. See S.Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1932); .
H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932). The”
draftsmen of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had before them
the: 1926 provisions of the Railway Labor Act, which. in-
cluded most of -the present procedures for settling major
disputes, the provisions for disposing of minor disputes |
* through voluntary local boards, and Section 2 First and
Second, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A. §-152 First and
Second, which imposed on both management and labor the .
duty to confer over any dispute. All of these provisions
channeled, but did not eliminate, the operation of private
forces in the determination of labor disputes. See Brother-
hood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R.,°321 U.S.
50, 58-59, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944); ef. 75 Cong..
Rec. 4505-10, 4618-26, 5462-515 (1932). Subsequent labor
legislation, however, including the 1934 amendments to the
Railway Labor Act which provided for official adjudication
of certain labor disputes by the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, reflected a policy of interpositioning greater
governmental participation in labor relations. See Note,
Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia* Act to Other
Federal Statutes, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 354, 356 (1958). To ac-
commodate the differing policies underlying the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act is not an easy
task. In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago River
& Ind. R. R., 353 U.S. 30, 40, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 — 622
( 1957), the pacts Court stated:
58.
“e * * the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read
alone in matters dealing with railway labor disputes.
There must be an accommodation of that statute and
the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in
the enactment of each is preserved. We think that the
- purposes of these Acts are reconcilable.” —
On numerous occasions courts have issued injunctions in -
labor disputes despite the apparently categorical language
_ Of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. .In Virginian Ry. v. System
Fed’n 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937), .
a labor union which had been certified by the National
Mediation Board obtained an injunction against a railroad
commanding the road to deal with it and not to interfere
with the employees’ choice of a bargaining representative.
In a series of cases the Supreme Court has held .that rail-
road unions may be enjoined from showing discrimination
- in their representation of railroad employees. Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct.
. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187 (1944) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 70 S.Ct. 14, 94 L.Ed. 22
(1949); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343
‘US. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed. 1283 (1952); Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See
also Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct.
- 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944) (arising in a state ‘court where
Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable). See also Rail-
road Yardmasters of America v. Pennsylvania R. R., 224
F.2d 226 (3 Cir., 1953). See, generally, Chicago, R. I. &
Pac. R. R. v. Switchmen’s Union, supra; American’ Air-
lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 169 F.Supp. 777, 785-787
(S.D.N.Y.1958).
In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen-v. Chicago River
. & Ind. BR. R., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622
(1957), the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act did not preclude a federal court from enjoining a strike
° | 59 | -
which might defeat the effectiveness. of the National Ad-
justment Board’s authority to adjudicate a minor dispute.
The Court concluded first, that Congress had intended the
proceeding before the Adjustment Board to be a reasonable
substitute for self-help and second, that the earlier and
more general language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act should
give way to the later specific provisions of the 1934 amend-
ments to the Railway Labor Act. For cases in which lower
courts have enjoined strikes in such situations, see supra
at p. 2092. In the present case, as in the Chicagd River
case, a minor dispute is involved, the railroad has sub-.
mitted the matter to the Railroad Adjustment Board, -and
we follow the lead provided for us in that case and its
progeny. We hold that an injunction is properly issuable
in order to enforce compliance with the requirement of the
Railway Labor Act that a minor dispute is to be heard and
determined by the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, \-
457-459, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957) -
_ 8In 1960 the Supreme Court again spoke on the relationship
between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act.
Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R: R., 362 U.S. 330,
- 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 744 (1960). The Court held that Section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew jurisdiction from the fed-
eral court to enjoin the strike involved in that case. The Court
discovered no provision of the Railway Labor Act which made the
strike unlawful-and concluded that, there the dispute was a major
one. That case is distinguishable from the present one for the labor
dispute here is a minor dispute. -The Supreme Court ini Chicago &
N. W. R. R., though holding that the strike there could not be
enjoined, recognized that federal courts could enjoin strikes arising
out of minor disputes. 362 U.S. at 341,‘80_S.Ct. 761. Moreover, a
strike which would frustrate the procedures created by the Railway
Labor Act for the final determination of such disputes would be
unlawful. Cf. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. v. Switchmen’s Union, 292
F.2d 61 (2 Cir. 1961), certiorari denied 370 U.S. 936, 82 S.Ct. 1 578,
8 L.Ed.2d 806. - °
60
But what significance for the case before us have
Section 2 First, Second, and Sixth of the Railway Labor
Act and Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act? Section <.
_ 2 First and Second impose a duty on both parties to make ~~
every reasonable effort to settle a dispute, whether it be
’ major or minor, and, as a part of their efforts, to confer
over their differences.® Section 2 Sixth provides the pro-
cedure for calling a conference to discuss a..minor dispute.
These conferences are to take place before a submission
of the dispute to the Railroad Adjustment Board. § 3 First
(i), 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. §3 First (i); Elgin
J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed.
1886 (1945); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago’
River & Ind. R. R., supra at 33. The present Section 2
First, Second and Sixth were already part of the Railway
Labor Act when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed.
See Railway Labor Act § 2 First, Second, — 44 Stat.
_ 577 (1926).
Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states:
“No restraining order or, injunctive relief shall be.
granted to any complainant who has failed to comply
with any obligation: imposed by law which is involved
in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to
make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute
either by negotiation or with the aid of any available
9 These sections provide in pertinent part:
“First. It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, ;
agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort * * * to “
settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of oe
such agreements or otherwise, * * *.
“Second. All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its ,
or their employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, —
with all expedition, and in conference between representatives
designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the
carrier or nenes and by the employees thereof interested in
the ——
pn ne ere el me et nia ant GAS Air Nin Sait: Dee. tet Pence inhi anata
61. ;
governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary J
arbitration.”
Section 8 thus imposes two different requirements on one
who seeks injunctive relief in a labor dispute. He must
comply with all his legal obligations relevant to the dispute ©
and, further, he must make every reasonable effort to °
settle the dispute by the methods enumerated. Brotherhood
of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50,
64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed.534 (1944). This is known as the
“clean hands” provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See
75 Cong.Rece. 5464 (1932).1°
Since section 2 First, Second and Sixth of the Railway -
Labor Act were enacted before the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
the rule of thumb upon which courts too often rely that
; the scope of earlier and more general legislation must
always be reconsidered in the light of more speeifie pro-
visions appearing in subsequent legislation does not help
in deciding the present question. Moreover, the purpose -
of the Railway Labor Act, § 2 First, Second and Sixth and
the purpose of the “clean hands” provision of the anti-in-
junction statute are not so inconsistent that it i is impossible
to accommodate one to the other.
In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.
R. R., supra, the Supreme Court held that under section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act a railroad was not entitled
to an injunction against a strike because the road had
refused to submit to- voluntary arbitration, an available
10 The extent to which the Supreme Court has gone to enforce
compliance with this provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is seen
in Brotherhod of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321
U.S. 50, 64 §.Ct. 418, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944), in which the Court
reversed an order granting injunctive relief to a complainant that
had not complied with section 8, and this despite the fact that the
acts complained of had. caused violence.
method for settling the dispute there involved. In Butte
A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864,
80 S.Ct. 122, 4°L.Bd.2d 104 (1959) (alternative holding)
the:Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
anti-strike injunction had to be denied under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act because the railroad had abandoned the
procedures of the Railway Labor Act for settling the major
dispute in that case. Although both of these cases involved
major-disputes, we believe their treatment of the relation-
ship between section.8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
_the procedures set up by the Railway. Labor Act for settling
railway labor disputes is applicable to the case before us.
See Butte A: & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, supra, at n. 10, Cf. East Texas
Motor Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,*
163 F.2d 10 (5 Cir., 1947).™ |
Reading the relevant sections of the Railway Labor
Act together with the “clean-hands” provision of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and remembering that the dispute
here is a minor dispute, we observe that an applicant for an
injunction (1) must comply with all. legal: obligations
required of it including the making of every reasonable
effort to settle the dispute by conference and (2) must »
make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by nego-
11 In.Chicago, R.-I. & Pac. R. R. v. Switchmen’s Union, 292 F.2d
61, 66 (2 Cir. 1961), certiorari denied 370 U.S. 936, 82 S. Ct. 1578,
8 L.Ed.2d 806, it was suggested that a union which failed to com-
ply with the Railway Labor Act, § 2 First, Second might be subject
to an anti-strike injunction. The present case involves the converse
- situation. The railroad, perhaps, has failed to comply with those
___ provisions, and, therefore, under § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
* “5¢ its failure is shown, it may. be deprived of injunctive relief as
long as it continues in its dereliction. See also Long Island R. R. v.
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 185 F.Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
63 .
tiation."2 We are. not certain whether the draftsmen in-
. tended different concepts by the words “conference” and
“negotiation.” See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen -v.
Toledo, P. & W. R..R., supra, 321 U.S. at 61, 64 S.Ct. 413,
88 L.Ed. 534. However, we find that in applying these |
terms to the present controversy a distinction should be
drawn between the duty to negotiate and the duty to confer.
e construe “negotiation” to mean full-scale discussion and
disputation. We construe “conferring” to mean activity of
a similar type to negotiation But activity requiring a lesser
output of time and of energy: We must make this distine-
tion in the present case because of the nature of the issue
which divides the parties. The basic dispute is whether the
railroad under its existing agreement must negotiate before
it reschedules the runs on. the’ Ogdensburg Subdivision. If :
the railroad were required by statute to negotiate this
issue before it submitted the dispute to the Adjustment .
Board, the result would be to require the railroad to nego-
tiate with employee representatives over whether it should
negotiate with them—a solution sounding a lot like: an
exercise in theoretical logic. ‘We think in practice. it would
be virtually impossible for the parties to negotiate whether
they would negotiate about the rescheduling without actu-
‘ally negotiating about the rescheduling itself. Thus the
brotherhoods would immediately .achieve what they are
only entitled to obtain after adjudication of the dispute by
the Railroad Adjustment Board. Therefore, we hold that
* any requirement in section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
that a railroad negotiate before obtaining an injunction is
superseded by the statutory scheme in the Railway Labor
Act that gives the Adjustment Board the power to decide -
whether there should be any negotiation at all between
‘management and the brotherhoods.
13 Mediation and voluntary arbitration are only relevant for
major disputes. |
But in minor disputes involving the -scope. of the
managerial prerogative it must be that Section 2 First,
Sacond and Sixth of the Railway Labor Act together with
the Norris-LaGuardia Act impose some lesser duty on a
railroad. which seeks injunctive relief. Otherwise, in any
minor dispute in which a railroad can contend that the
_ question is one committed to managerial prerogative, the
vailroad will be tempted not to try to reach a private under-
- standing with the representatives of its employees, a result -
inconsistent with one of the fundamental policies of the
Railway Labor Act. See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. -
Toledo, P. & W. supra; Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz.
E. Ry., 198 F.Supp. 402 (S.D.Cal.1961). Therefore, we
hold that the relevant sections of the Railway Labor
‘Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. impose a duty upon a
railroad, short of negotiation, to take some reasonable
steps toward dispute settlement before it-can obtain an
anti-strike injunction. These lesser efforts are compre-
hended within the concept of “conferring.” It is not easy
to state exactly what the railroad must do in cases in which
it must confer but need not negotiate. In each case the
district judge must apply his experience and good sense
to the specific circumstances of the case. However, certain
minimum steps can be suggested for the usual case. Unfair
surprise should be avoided whenever possible. The repre-—
sentatives of management should meet with those of labor.
Each side should listen to the contentions of the other side
and each side should explain its position clearly and
honestly, but not for as long a time’ as is customary in
full-scale bargaining. In short, men of d faith must
in good faith get together in a sincere effart: to resolve
‘
their differences. Cf. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.
Toledo, P. & W.'R. R., at n. 18; Brotherhood of Ry., etc.
Clerks v. Atlantic Coast L. R. R., 201 F.2d 36, 40 (4 Cir.),
cert, denied, 345 U:S. 992, 73 S.Ct. 1131, 97 L.Ed. 1400
ee ee
- Nig Bad Cheapest F or aeons ~~ *
]
65
(1953); American Airlines, Tne’ v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n,
169 F.Supp. 777 -(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Long Island R. R. -v.
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmén, 185 F.Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y.
1960). See also N. L. R. B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-
“Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823
(1958) ; NL. R. B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct.
753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956) ; N. L. R. B. v. Insurance Agents’
_ International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 80 S.Ct. 419 L. Fid.2d 454 °
(1960). |
In the present case the’ district court made ne find-
ing whether the management of the railroad made the
good faith efforts which we have held to be a prerequisite — .
to the obtaining by it of injunctive relief. The telegram that
‘the railroad sent to the brotherhoods on September 15-
stated “Conferences on this issue have not been held on.the
property with the [brotherhoods].” However, the railroad
claimed at the hearing that its representatives met with
representatives of the brotherhoods on September 9 and on *
September 16. We cannot determine from the record alone, —
without the benefit of observing the witnesses, whether the
extent of these discussions met the standard we find is |
imposed by the Railway Labor Act.
If in fact the railroad has -failed to take ‘the osteps
required of it by the Railway Labor Act, it is not entitled
to injunctive relief against the strike of its employees. —
Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864, 80.
. S.Ct. 122, 4 L.Ed.2d 104 (1959). Therefore, we must.
‘remand the case for the district court to determine whether
the railroad made reasonable efforts to settle this dispute
in conference. See Pennsylvania R. R. v. Transport
Workers Union, 178 F.Supp. 30 (E.D.Pa.1957) (Finding
No. 15), appeal dismissed, 3 Cir., 278 F.2d 693 (1960). -If ;
ee
eee
66
the district court finds that the railroad has not done s0,
it should not issue the injunction until the railroad has
perfected its right to such relief by compliance with its
statutory obligation. *
Xr
We believe that this disposition accommodates the
‘ purposes of both statutes. Except for the creation of the .
Railroad Adjustment Board, the policy behind both statutes
is to facilitate the private settlement of labor disputes, see
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W, BR. R.,
391 U.S. 50, 58, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944) ; Dwelling-
ton v. Thompson, 91 F.Supp. 787 (D.Mo.1950), aff'd sub
nom. Rolfes v. Dwellington, 8 Civ, 198 F.2d 591 (1952).
Furthermore, it,cannot be said that this result subverts the
* jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment ‘Board
‘because efforts privately to settle & dispute -are required
‘by the Railway Labor Act itself before submission of the
dispute to the Adjustment Board. |
Our -decision is consistent with the: Supreme Court’s
ruling in Brotherhood. of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago.
River & Ind. R. R., supra. In that opinion, especially
‘at footnote 24, the Court concluded that because the Rail-
way Labor Act created the Railroad Adjustment Board to
decide the merits of minor disputes with finality, Section 8,
like the other. provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
- did not bar injunctive relief. But the Court did not address:
itself to the relationship of section. 8 to those provisions
of the Railway Labor Act which, without regard ta the
type of dispute involved ¢all for private conference in an
effort to adjust the differences between the parties prior
eto governmental intervention. Therefore, that decision is -
not relevant to this part of our opinion. See discussion in
Chicago R. I. & Pac. R. R. v. Switchmen’s Union, supra.
. ‘ 4
ow
-
a
| diane ei —S
% 67°
at 66, as to the scope of; the decision i in ™ iia River &
Ind. R. R. case.'*,
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not in- .
consistent with this opinion.
MARSHALL, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
With deference to my brothers, I deem the issues raised
by the present case to be of such importance that a state-
ment of my dissenting views is necessary. Because the
“Section 6” and contract termination notices served by
Rutland were also issued by most of the Class I railroads
in the country, the factual pattern before us is of national
importance. Much of what the majority says seems to me
not only well put but also quite correct. I do not disagree —
with their treatment df the venue problem, with most of
their general statements as to when a strike is legal or
illegal under the Railway Labor ‘Act, or with the assertion |
that a “labor dispute” is involved in this case. I strongly
disagree, however, with the result they reach and would
suggest that much of what they say is actually inconsistent
with that a
. The majority correctly states the principal issue ‘to Mee ry
‘whether the dispute between the parties was “major” or o
‘“minor” under the Railway Labor Act. That proposition,
however, is of such generality that it fails to pose the:prob-
- lems we must solve: ‘iy any meaningful fashion: The legal -
= dispute here involves two questions. First, what procedures
must a party to a. collective agreement in | the railroad in-
al
aotw os ee ne te ee “—-
18 The defendants also assert that the sejlrend § is not entitled to
an jnjunction because it has not complied with the non-statutory
duty of clean hands imposed on‘all who seek to- invoke ‘the juris- .
" . dietion of a court of equity. We believe that’ in the present case the
scope of this non-statutory obligation is no greater than the statu-
tory obligation imposed by Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
~~»
‘dustry follow in order:to terminate that agreement or any
part thereof?" Second, the termination having been accom-
plished, under what circumstances may the parties resort
‘to economic force?
>My position, briefly summarized, is that’ Rutland volun-
tarily terminated so much of the collective agreement as
. might be said to govern the establishment of new runs and
“the merging or wimination- of crew terminals and, then,
believing that it could not secyre what it desired through
the normal processes of collective bargaining, violated the
plain mandates of the Railroad Labor Act’s major dispute
ptocedures by ‘unilaterally changing certain runs and ter-
S minals. This action should have been enjoined by the Dis-
* triet Court. It does not follow that a strike to prevent such
- changes was justifiable, however, since, in my view at least,
a remedy in the courts .was available to the union and -
should have been resorted to. I would, therefore, have en-
joined both Rutland and the Brotherhoods from engag-—
ing in. self-help until exhaustion of the major dispute
" procedures. ; , }
"(The majority’s conclusion. is radically different. They
_ hold explicitly that the agreement insofar as it dealt with
the. establishment of -runs-and terminals was not termi-
nated and sub silentio that there was in fact no way in
_ which to terminate it. They enjoin the union’s use of eco-
nomic force, therefore, pending exhaustion of the drawn-
out minor dispute procedures and leave Rutland free to act
unilaterally.
1 This seems to me to be the principal issue in the case since. I
_ would agree that if the revelant contractual provisions had not been
terminated, the decision would be clearly governed by Brotherhood
of R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & eRy., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1
L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). , : c
@
69
The words “major” and “minor? have no intrinsic legal
significance. They are derived from the terminology of
railway industrial relations and are used judicially merely
as a shorthand way of referring to a distinction incorpo-
rated in the structure of the Railway Labor Act. The stat- -
‘ute, itself, however, does not use the words. The distinction
is of legal significance solely. because the Act establishes
mutually exclusive mandatory procedures to be followed in
resolving two different kinds of disputes.
Disputes involving grievances or contract interpretation
questions are to be handled under Section 3 First.2 Under. .
that provision either party may submit the dispute to the
appropriate Adjustment Board for a “final and binding”
decision on the meaning of the contract. A strike over dis-
putes properly submitted to the Adjustment Board may
be enjoined in order to protect the Board’s jurisdiction.
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.
-Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). And,
in appropriate circumstances, the enjoining court may con-
- dition the strike injunction upon preservation of the status
quo by management pending final adjudication by. the
Board. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d
-1435_-(1960).°
But labor contracts in the railroad a ‘ie not con-
tinue in force tn perpetuum unless both parties so desire.
- Like many — they are subject to termi-
—
245 U.S.C.A. § 153 First.
3 Even though the majority believes a minor dispute is hill,
does not discuss the applicability of that decision to this case.
Since I cannot agree this is a minor dispute, I shall also forgo dis-
cussion.
\
\
70 | \
nation and change, a process which, when - invoked by 3 a
party,‘ is characterized asa major dispute. -
While the ‘Act provides for compulsory arbitration of
°, minor disputes, it leaves the resolution of major disputes
. to freecollective bargaining and the use of economic force ©
subject only to certain mandatory procedural requirements.
Section 6° governs ‘the procedure to be followed in chang- —
* ing agreements affecting Working conditions. Any party
desiring such a change must give 30 days written notice to
the other party. Either party may then. request the serv-
ices of the Mediation Board or the Board may step in on
its accord under Section 5.° Under Section 6 “rates of pay,
rules, or working cohditions, shall not. be altered” until final.
action by the Mediation Board under Section 5. Section 5
prohibits changes in “rates of pay, rules, or working condi-
_tions or established practices” until 30 days after “the
Board has notified the parties of the failure of its media-
tory efforts. Section 10’ empowers the President to. estab-
\ lish an emergency board after the failure of mediation
efforts and provides “no change, except by agreement, shall °
be made by the parties'to the controversy in the conditions .
out of which the dispute arose” until thirty days after the
Board makes its report to the President. The legislative
history indicates that when the rail unions and. carriers
agreed upon these provisions, the unions surrendered their
right to strike pending exhaustion pf major dispute pro-
4 Presumably, a palpable breach of contract would be in violation
of Section 6, seé note 5, infra,.and accompanying text, which
requires 30 days written notice of an intended change in agree-
- ments and would therefore also create a major dispute. Cf. Rail--
road Yardmasters of America v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 224 F.2d 226
(3 Cir. 1955). ,
5 45 U.S.C.A. § 156.
— 645 ULS.C.A. § 155.
745 U.S.C.A. § 160.
ad Cabal “| ages i
end:
y
ipo oe
cedures in exchayge for a statutory provision restraining
management from disturbing the status quo. These
“freeze” or “cooling-off” provisions have been held'to be
enforceable by the courts. Grand International Brother-
NX
hood, ete. v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 576 (2 Cir., 1940); cert.
denied 310 U.S. 635, 60 S.Ct. 1078, 84 L.Ed. 1404 (1940) ;
’ Railroad Yardmasters Vv. Pennsylvania R. Co., 224 F.2d 226 x
(3 Cir., 1955). \
No provision is made, however, for ‘the compulsory reso-
‘lution of substantive issues in major disputes, and the par-
ties are free to resort to economic forte after exhausting.
the procedures. Chicago River, supra; at fn. 24; Order of
R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. €o., 362 U.S. 330,
_ 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d774 (1960). See also Chicago, Rock
’ Island and Pek. R..Co. v. Switchmen’s Union, 292 F. 2d 61
(2 Cir., 1961). )
: Within this legal framework. I fail to grasp new the .
factual pattern here presents the difficulties encountered by.
the majority. On November 2, 1959, Rutland served notice
. on the Brotherhoods “under our existing agreements and
pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act” that
it wanted a new contract, “efféctive J anuary 1, 1960,” which:
would in effect eliminate all “agreements, rules, regulations,
interpretations and practices, however established,” restrict-
ing the carrier’s right to establish new runs and which would
-also explicitly “{e]stablish a rule to provide that * * * [t]he .
carrier shall have the right to establish, move, consolidate
and abolish crew terminals * * * with the right to operate
8 67 Cong.Rec. 4524, 4588. See also comment, Enjoining Strikes
and Mamtaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor. aeiice 60
Colum.L.Rev. 381, 388 (1960). :
® Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co. v. Switchmén’ 8 Union, 292
F.2d 61, 66 (2 Cir. 1961).
10°67 Cong.Rec. 4648, 4650.
72
any * * * run * * * through established crew terminals.”
~ This was a 30 day notice of termination of all contractual
provisions, explicit or implied, relating to the establishment
of new runs and crew terminals. Rutland, by thus invoking
Section 6 of the Act, and the termination provisions of the
contracts, notified the Brotherhoods that it desired not only
to terminate all restrictive provisions, practices and even
all ambiguities as to the establishment of new runs but also
that it wanted an explicit provision incorporated in a new
agreement which would bestow upon it the absolute prerog-
ative to change crew terminals. Rutland thereby voluntarily
terminated the old agreement to this extent and invoked
the major dispute procedures. Having invoked-them, pre-
sumably it was bound by them. :
Nevertheless, on. September 8,- 1960, before exhaustion
of the major dispute procedures, Rutland announced that it
intended unilaterally to establish new runs thereby changing
certain: crew terminals and to operate these runs through
other established terminals. Since the major dispute pro-
cedures require that the carrier not change “working condi-
tions,” “established practices,” or the “conditions out of
which the dispute arose” until their exhaustion, Rutland’s
action was a plain violation of the Railway Labor Act."
11 Arguably, these provisions might be read ‘merely to mean that
the collective agreement, with all its ambiguities, is to remain in
a
foree pending exhaustion of the major dispute procedures. Under .
that view, minor disputes could occur during that period and might ~
involve the- subject matter of the major dispute. In such a case,
however, the union would sfill be free to strike over the issue after
_vexhaustion of the major dispute: procedures. A contrary holding
would mean that ambiguous terms in a collective agreement, would
not be subject to change through collective bargaining until their
meaning had been determined by the Adjustment Board. This
would effectively lengthen the term of the contract beyond the
intentions of the parties:and would prohibit clarification through ~
on i otis win dign Bee
73
The Brotherhoods called a strike because of the unilateral
changes announced by Rutland and were — by the
District Court. .
In reviewing that action, I should have thought the prin-
cipal question would be whether the union was free to strike
against Rutland’s illegal actions or whether the conduct of
both parties in derogation of the major dispute procédures
must be enjoined. On balance, I would have adopted the
- latter course both on the grounds that resort to the courts
is generally preferable to this kind of self help'* and on the .
further grounds that the “cooling off” — of the major ~
collective bargaining of those contractual provisions which need it
most. It would, moreover, seem directly contrary to the intent of
Section 6 which contemplates the proposal of changes in agreements
whenever the parties desire and ‘which -contains no provisions
restraining its use until an Adjustment Board decision has been
rendered on the meaning of the old contract. |
In any case, the préferable view is that changes in existing condi-
tions which are the subject of a major dispute are forbidden
whether or not they are arguably authorized by the collective agree-
ment. The “freeze” provisions carefully avoid reference to the
colletive agreement, but emphasize “working: conditions”. (Section
6), “established practices”.(Section 5), and “eonditions out of
which the dispute arose” (Section 10). This is in contrast to other
parts of the Act, and, indeed, Section 6 itself, which refer directly
to the “agreement” when necessary. Moreover, the legislative his-
tory of the statute shows the “freeze” provisions were intended to
enforce a “cooling off” period upon both labor and management in
the railroad industry. See Note 10, supra. But this policy cannot
be effectuated if management is allowed to take advantage of an »
ambiguous contract during the “freeze” to make changes in work-
ing conditions relating to the dispute. : Such action is far more
. likely to warm up the dispute than “cool it off. -
12 Cf, Bakery Sales Drivers Local 33, v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 68
S.Ct. 630, 97 L.Ed. 79 (1948); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306; 47
S.Ct. 86, 71 L.Ed. 248 (1926) ; but see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N. L.
” R.B., 350 U.S. 270, 76 S.Ct. 349, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956).
74
dispute procedures cannot be effectuated by allowing both
parties simply to do away with the Act. These problems
.| shave become irrelevant, however, for the majority has.con-
cluded that the dispute is minor. and must be resolved by
an Adjustment Board determination of the meaning of the
old agreement. | oi
-Qne reason asserted by the majority in support of this
result seems to be that the Section 6 notice was not suffi-
ciently broad to cover the matters in dispute. Two quota-
tions from the notice are set out, apparently only to do away
with restrictions.on the managerial prerogative to establish
new runs: The majority then finds there are no explicit
__yestrictions in the agreements, and, therefore, the Section 6
notice does not encompass this dispute. But i€ all this is
true, why did Rutland serve notices pursuant to Section 6
and the various contracts in the first place? Plainly, Rut-
land’s purpose was to eliminate the ambiguities'® in the
agreement which the majority admits exist and in fact relies
upon in sending this case to the Adjustment Board. I have
not found any language in the statute or policy behind it
which would prohibit or nullify this use of Section 6 in the
manner suggested by the majority. I believe that clarifica-
_ tion through collective bargaining of ambiguous contractual
' provisions is a most laudable purpose and should be encour-’
aged rather than hampered by the courts. Moreover, the —
majority inexplicably ignores paragraph B(1) of the notice.. -
That paragraph explicitly notifies the unions that Rutland
13 Existing ambiguities in a document cannot be cured. by the
continued silence of the parties. Obviously, therefore, Rutland’s
notice contemplated insertion of hew provisions which would either
affirmatively establish its prerogatives or would direct the Adjust-
ment Board to follow:a rule of construction whichi would prevent
“interpretations” from infringing on these rights. Either course
would require a new provision and a “change” in the existing
agreements. «
ante
ad no nates snteame
75
seeks to “Establish a rule to provide that * * * 1.-The Car-
rier shall have the right to establish, move, consolidate and
abolish ¢rew terminals * * *”. Surely a request to incor- ©
porate a comprehensive clause such as this must be said to
change an ambiguous contract or an agreement containing
no such explicit provision. That paragraph B(1) encom-
passes the dispute here is plainly evident, for the majority
itself states the present “disagreement * * * [is] whether
the management of the railroad had the right to * * * —
crew terminals.”
The majority states the “maior aninor™ distinction i in the
following fashion:
“Tt is a major dispute if the present agreements be-
tween the railroad. and the brotherhoods contain
express provisions contrary. to the position taken by
the railroad or if the clear implication of these agree-
. ments is inconsistent with the railroad’s proposals. It
is a minor dispute if there is a clearly governing provi-
sion in the present agreements, although its precise
requirements are ambiguous; * ° °.” 3
- While this might be a correct statement of the law in the.
absence of a Section 6 notice, I would suggest that it is
_ entirely erroneous once such a notice has been served. The
majority opinion itself at one point concedes that major
disputes commence with notice under Section 6. Moreover,
it must be so, for under the Railway Labor Act a party
is frée to terminate an ambiguous contract. in the hope of
making it explicit without going te an Adjustment Board
for a determination of its meaning. This is precisely what
Rutland attempted to do. The reliance placed by Rutland
and the majority upon the collective agreement is utterly.
inconsistent with the Section 6 notice, for Rutland intended
. by that notice to terminate and do away with the very
same contractual provisions which are now so strenuously
relied. upon. And,’ the inconsistency of relying on these
76
provisions is magnified since the notice was also based
upon the termination clauses of the same agreements. I
dare say that if this were a commercial contract with a
30 day termination provision, we would not show such
ey for one who invoked the termination procedures
but later claimed the agreement was still in effect when the
other party refused to meet his demands for a new contract.
a
- But the significance of today’s decision transcends the |
immediate and hopefully temporary problems of the Rut-.
land Railroad and its employees. There is much in the
majority opinion which implies there cannot be a major
_ dispute if the relevant agreement contains an “ambiguous,”
but “clearly governing”, provision, regardless of whether
a Section 6 notice has been served. The quotation in the -
preceding paragraph seems to be to that effect. Along the
samé lines, reiiwiice is placed upon “a number. of ‘cases
involving disagreements similar to the one in the present
case, [in which] courts have classified the disputes as
minor.” In all but one, however, there was no effective
Section 6 notice and, therefore, no effective termination of
the agreement.’* The Railway Labor Act establishes 4
14In the Matter of Hudson & M. R. Co., 172 F.Supp. 329 (S.D>
N.Y.1959), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Stichman v. General Griev-
~ ance Comm. of the Bhd. of R. Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2 Cir. 1959).
* eert. denied 363 U.S. 843, 80 S.Ct. 1608, 4 L.Ed.2d 1727 (1960)
’ (proposal to amend the agreement withdrawn) ; Norfolk & P.B.L.R.
y. Brotherhood of R. -‘Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4 Cir. 1957) cert.
denied 355 U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct. $43, 2 L.Ed.2d 274 (1958) (no section
6- notice) ; Missouri-Kansas-Téxas R. Co. v. Brotherhood: of Loco-
motive’ Engineers, 266 F.2d 335 .(5 Cir. 1959) rev’d on other
grounds 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1879 (1960) (no
section 6 notice) ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United R. Workers, 271
F.2d 87 (2 Cir. 1959) vacated and remanded on other grounds 364
U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1609, 4 L.Ed.2d 1719 (1960) (no section 6 notice).
Of the cases cited by the majority, only Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 290 F.2d 881 (7 Cir. 1961) cert. denied 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct.
‘
oe oi Ma .
.
77
system of free collective bargaining, Section 6 being an ©
integral part of that system. It is designed to allow either
party to terminate an agreement, whether or not its mean-
ing is clear, and bargain freely over new provisions subject
only to certain procedural requirements.’ To hold that
Section 6 is rendered inoperative if there is an ambiguous,
~ but clearly governing, ‘provisio# in the present agreements
is to give it an effect precisely opposite to that intended |
and to deprive the parties of their right to bargain freely. :
The dilemma created by the majority opinion is neatly
posed when it says, “(T]he brotherhoods, upon the expira-
tion of the existing agreements, may require the railroad
to bargain” over the issues in dispute. But the only man-
ner in which the existing agreements may’ “expire” is:
threugh notice pursuant to Section 6 by one of the parties,
since none ef these contracts contains a fixed expiration
date.45 Presumably, if the union had,.on. November 2, 1959,
issued a Section 6 notice stating its desire to “eliminate
all:: agreepents, rules, regulations, interpretations’ and ©
practices, Arowever established, allowing the carrier “to
- establish new runs without the union’s consent,” and to .
“establish a rule that the \arrier shall not have the: right
to establish, move, consolidate crew terminals or to oper-
——— x
-174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1960) ws aSection 6 notice. I would sub-
mit that decision is erroneous. ;
The majority omits one decision involving a dispute “similar to
the one in the present case.” Order of R. Telegraphers v. Chicago &
N. W. R. Co., 363 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960). A
Section 6 notice was involved in that case, and the Supreme Court
found it to be a major dispute. See Note 18, infra, and acdompany-
ing text. |
15 Each contract provided that it was to remain in effect until
changed in accordance with the Railway Labor Act. The thrust of .
the majority’s decision, therefore, is to eliminate the possibility of
termination and to restrict the freedom of the saad to bargain
collectively.
?
78
_ate any runs through established crew terminals, without |
.
the union’s consent” the majority’s ruling would not vary.*®
. Yet that is not significantly different from Order of R,
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 363 U.S. 330, 80
S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960), in which the Supreme |
Court ‘held that a major dispute existed... While the
majority is “not entirely certain” as to the basis .of that
. . decision, I would submit the governing consideration must
have been the Section 6 notice.’? Otherwise, the | uld
have been indistinguishable from the Court’s decjéion in
‘Chicago River, supra, and all the other cases .
followed it. KE. g. cases cited in note ‘14, supra. The most
profitable inquiry for the majority is not how to distinguish
Chicago and N. W. Ry. from this case but how to distin-
‘ guish it from all the cases finding minor disputes.. Viewed
from that perspective, the “uncertainty” vanishes. In any
ease, Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
_ Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 US.
oe
16 Since there is no explicit grant to the carrier of these rights |
and there is an ambiguous, but clearly governing, provision, the
majority’s criteria for determining that a minor dispute exists would
be satisfied. Surely the fact that the carrier gave the notice here
does not serve to distinguish the two cases. That factor, if any-
thing, would help the brotherhoods. :
- 47The majority is~drrect in stating that the magnitude of the
effect upon working conditions is not the governing factor. The
statute itself does not use the words major and minor and, there-
fore, provides no standards for judging the magnitude. Adoption -
of such a test would engulf ys in sterile inquiries such as when
does a little dispute on a big railroad become a big dispute on &
-Hittle railroad. On the’one hand, it might tip the tactical balance by
allowing management the protection of the equity arm of the federal
courts so long at it bit off a little at a time and did not attempt to
get everything in one gulp. On the other hand, a literal application
of major and minor might encourage the unions to strike over every
dispute simply to show how big it was. 7 :
6
fe
79.
864, 80 S.Ct. 122, 4 L.Bd.2d 104 (1959) is precisely on
point and explicitly supports my view of the statute. I
do not grasp how it may be disposed of simply by assert-
ing the facts are different.’* As for Hilbert v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 290 F.2d 881 (7 Cir...1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961), relied on by the.’
majority, I would decline to follow it since it also seems ©
based on the erroneous notion that Section 6 is inoperative
when the existing agreement is ambiguous
My reading of the statute and of subsequent judicial >
interpretations leads me to believe the majority has adopted
a view which does much violence not only to our policies of
free collective bargaining but also to traditional notions of
freedom of contract. I must, therefore, dissent. . |
18 Butte differs from our ruling in Stichman, note 14 supra, as to
the effect of a withdrawal of a Section 6 notice.’ The notice here, .
however, was not withdrawn. ©
4)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.