Appendix — American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (No. 57)
Supreme Court brief1966
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APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION |
Civil Action No. 64 C 1442 f
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SAN FE RAILWAY COM-
PANY; CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COM- —
PANY; CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY COM-
PANY; CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD
“COMPANY: CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COM-
PANY; CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND: PACIFIC
RAJLROAD COMPANY; CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PA.
CIFIC’ RAILROAD COMPANY; THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY; GREAT NORTH-
ERN RAILWAY COMPANY; THE KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY; LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY
COMPANY; MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS RAILROAD COM-
PANY; MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY; NORTH-
ERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY; ST. LOUIS-SAN FRAN-|
cisco RAILWAY COMPANY; Sr. ‘LOUIS SOUTH WESTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY; S00 LINE RAILROAD COMPANY;
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY; UNION PACIFIC RAIL~
ROAD COMPANY; WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY; THE
WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY;
‘Plaintiffs,
¥.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION;
‘Defendants. .
August 20, 1965
Before Castle, Circuit Judge, —— and Decker, Dis-
trict Judges.
Julius J. Hoffman, District Judge. Piggyback service—
¢ 28
the movement of highway trailers on railroad flatears—
constitutes “probably the most significant recent develop-
ment in transportation’, in the opinion of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Because of the “explosive
growth” of this service in the past five years, the Commis-
sion in 1962 instituted on its own motion a proceeding to
. investigate the subject generally and “to explore new ap-
proaches” to its regulation. That proceeding culminated
in a Report-and Order of the Commission issued under the
title Substituted Service—Charges and Practices of For-
Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Serv-
ice), Ex Parte No. 230, reported at 322 I. C. C. 301-417,
dated March 16, 1964, rehearings dehied June 22, 1964,
and December 21, 1964. By this Report and Order, the
Commission promulgated eight rules intended. to regulate
trailer-on-flatear (TOFC) service. These Rules, herein
referred to simply as Rules 1 through 8, are officially des-
ignated and reported as Sections 500.1 through 500.8 of
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.
This suit was brought to enjoin and set aside the Com-
mission’s order on the ground that four of the eight rules
issued by the Commission are beyond its authority and un-
’ lawful.' Pursuant to Sections 2284 and 2321. through
2325 of the Judicial Code,? the matter has been tried be-
fore a threéjudge court. We conclude that the Commis-
sion’s order ‘must be set .aside.
—
-
: I,
’ The plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs are aligned as
five separate parties in interest, comprising three groups
of railroads, one railroad individually, and a group of
*A motion for a temporary restraining order was withdrawn
. when the Commission,-on its own motion, stayed the effectiveness
of its rules until further order.
*28 U.S.C. §§ 2284, 2321-2325 (1948).
ee i <d stnsaseiehiinaedenia me ualieeanindna eal
= = _ a o + = -_—— - -
29
freight forwarders. Far the defense, the American
Trucking Associations, Inc., and some of its members, the
Contract Carrier Conference, and the National Auto
Transporters Association all intervened to join as defend-
_ants with the Commission and the United States. Despite
this multiplicity, the several plaintiffs are agreed on the
main point of the railroads’ controversy with their rivals,
_ the truckers, and in their objections to the: Commission’s
new rules.
The primary issue to be decided is the validity of Rules
2 and 3, promulgated by the Commission in its proceeding
by a divided vote. Briefly glossed, they require a railroad
which offers TOFC service on an'open-tariff basis, that is,
to the regular shipping public, to make that service avail-_.
able on the same terms without discrimination to motor
carriers * acting in that capacity in hauling freight, and, -
as a corollary, authorize the motor carriers to substitute
this TOFC service of the railroads for their regular high-
way transportation by truck. In full, these rules provide:
500.2 Availability to all of TOFC service-—TOFC
service, if offered by a rail carrier through its open
tariff publications, shall be made available to any
person at a charge no greater and no less than that
received from any other person or persons for doing
-for him or them a like and contemporaneous service
in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions.
500.3 Use of open-tariff TOFC service by motor and
water carriers in the performance of economically
regulated transportation.—
- $8 These Rules apply equally to the use of railroad TOFC service
by common and contract carriers by water, as by motor vehicle. -
Since the issues are largely identical, they will be considered by
reference only to motor carriers extept where different legal prim
ciples apply to water carriers. So-called fishyback service—-the
movement of highway trailers by barge—was severed from this ~
- proceeding for separate treatment, as were the practices of motor
carriers of automobiles. Birdyback service is not involved,
wr
<a
‘
30
(a) Except as otherwise may be prohibited by these
rules, motor common and contract carriers, water
common and contract carriers, and freight forward-
ers may utilize TOFC service in the performance of
all‘or any portion of their authorized service through
the use of open-tariff TOFC rates published ~ a rail
carrier,
(b) Motor and water common carriers shall utilize
open-tariff TOFC service only if their tariff publica-
tions give notice that.such service may be utilized at
their option, but that the right is reserved to the
user of their services to direct that in any particular
instance TOFC service shal] not be utilized.
(c) Motor and water contract carriers shall util
open-tariff TOFC service only if their transportati
contracts and schedules make appropriate provision
therefor.
e(d) Tariffs of motor and water common carriers and
contracts and schedules of motor and water contract
carriers providing for the use of open-tariff TOFC
service shall set forth the points between which TOFC
service rhay be performed and the names of the rail
carriers whose TOFC service may be utilized.
-(e) Motor and water,common and contract carriers
utilizing open-tariff TOFC service in the perform-
ance of authorized transportation shall tender traffic
* to and receive traffic from rail carriers only at points
which the motor and water carriers are authorized to
serve.
These Rules break new ground. “To the present time,
‘the available TOFC service has been divided among five
categories or “plans” which have evolved from the car-
riers’ practices and the Commission’s rulings, As cap-
sulized in the Commission’s Report, the five plans involve
the following arrangements:
Pad
31
PLAN I
Railroad movement of trailers or containers of motor
common carriers, with the shipment moving on one -
bill of lading and billing being done by the trucker.
Traffic moves under rates in regular motor carrier
tariffs. |
PLAN II
Railroad performs its own door-to-door service, mov-
ing its own trailers or containers on flatears under
tariffS, usualky similar to those of truckers.
PLAN III .
Ramp-to-ramp rates based on a flat charge, regard-
less of the contents of trailers or containers, usually
. owned or leased by freight forwarders or shippers.
No pickup or delivery is performed by the railroad.
PLAN. IV
Shipper or forwarder furnishes a trailer or container-
loaded flatear, either owned or leased. The railroad
makes a flat charge for loaded or empty-car move-
ment, furnishing only power and rails.
PLAN V
Traffic moves generally under joint railroad-truck or
‘ other combination of coordinated service rates.
Either mode may solicit traffic for through movement.
It will be seen that these five plans can be classed more
simply into two groups: the open-tariff plans, numbered
II, III, and IV, available equally to regular shippers and
freight forwarders, but not to motor carriers; and the
joint intermodal plans, numbered I and V, available only
. to common carriers, and only through negotiation and vol-
32
untary agreement between the rail carrier and the motor
carrier. Thus motor carriers and ordinary shippers are
differently served under separate plans. Negativ ely, this
- separation has foreclosed motor common carriers from the
use of the three open-tariff plans. The prohibition im-
plicit in the plans was explicitly declared by the Commis
sion aghort while after motor carriers first were brought .
under federal regulation.* Since 1939, this ruling has
been reaffirmed in subsequent decisions and observed in
practice consistently down to the present time.’ The estab-
lished principle and its supportirig reasons have come to
be summed up in the abbreviated statement that it is re-
" pugnant to the Interstate Commerce Act for a motor car-
rier to act both as a carrier and a shipper as to the same
shipment.
The new Rules promulgated by a majority of the Com-
mission would work an abrupt departure from this estab-
lished principle and from the settled practice. Since joint
intermodal service of the kind provided by plans I and V
would be continued under new Rule 4, (49 C.F.R. 500.4),
the motor common carrier would enjoy the option of both
classes of TOFC service, and could choose either open-
tariff service without the railroad’s consent or cencurrence
if that rate should be more favorable, or the joint inter-.
modal service if the railroad in negotiation should agrée
to offer that at a lower rate. The railroads, presently free
to bargain with their highway comfetitors, would be
bound to accept whatever TOFC freight their rival car-
riers might choose to tender. These basic changes in the”
industry are not, however, inadvertent.“ The Commission
plainly avowed its purpose as “the reexamination of ex-
isting Commission precedents and pronouncéments” and it
specifically overruled those prior decisions which it found
_ * Substituted Freight Service, 232 1.C.C. 683 (1939).
_ *See Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 1C.C 92
(1954), and cases there cited.
ce
to be indistinguishable and absolutely irreconcilable with
its newer view, The issue of power is thus clearly drawn.
IL,
In reviewing the authority of the Commission to iasue
the Rules in question, we are confronted at the outset by
the duty to measure the administrative action solely
seek its own justification for the Commission's
rationalizations
The Commission bears a correlative duty to disclose dear
ly the grounds on which it acta’
Here we not say that the Commission's Report is «
model of cla ¥, guiding the court unerringly to the state-
tory source of the power The Rules are de
scribed in the Report as partly partly im-
posing billing and tariff requirements, and partly “to im-
. plement the broad provisions of existing legislation”. with.
out specification of which ground supports any
rule. In overruling its earlier decisions which
motor carriers from shipping their customers’
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“We are invested with no roving commission to carry out
” the policy of Congress... .”° _ |
It is unnecessary to decide, however, whither the f power
delegated in Section 12 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
authorizing the Commission “to.execute and enforce the
provisions” of the Act, confers such a general power to
make rules to meet changed conditions; The Rules in
question here must stand or fall. with the interpretation |
of the Act itself, regardless of altered circumstances in
the transportation industry. On one hand, Rules 2 and 3
“are simply declaratory of the command of Congess if the
Commission is correct in construing the Act to forbid rail- -
road discrimination against motor carriers in the services
_afforded,-and in interpreting the Act as imposing no
limits on the power of a motor carrier to avail itself of
_ substituted rail service in its authorized operations. On
the other hand, the Rules are invalid as in conflict with ~
Ahe Act, despite changed conditions, if the congressional
enactment is read to excuse the railroads from a duty-to
serve motor carriers equally with ordinary shippers, or to
. limit the authority of motor carriers to ship. their custo-
mers’ freight by rail. without, the railroads’ cOhcu currence.
. We turn first, then, to the snterpretation of the rélevant
statutes, upon the ich’s assumption that the ques-
' tions are open and may be treated as matters of first im-
pression. We will thereafter consider ‘the ‘effect of the
settled line of decision establishing an interpretation con-
ee ee sg
IIL
Bw
The only statute mentioned in‘ the Commission’s report |
which could supply affirmative support for Rules 2 and 3
“Cannes City Southern Ry. Co. v. Kansas City ee Co.
211 TC. C. 291, 804 (1935).
35
is Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act.’ Indeed, in
considerable part the Commission’s Rule 2 is merely a
paraphrase of that Section. We may accept, therefore, the
argument of counsel for the government, despite the ain-
biguity of the Report’s reference and, discussion, that the.
. Commission invoked Section 2 as authority for its Rules.
" Section 2 provides in full: : R
That «? any common carrier subject to the provisions
of this part shall, directly or indirectly, by any spe
ial rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge,
“demand, collect, or receive from any person or per-
‘Sons.a greater or less compensation for any service
rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of
. passengers or property, subject to the provisiéhis of
* this part, than it charges, demands,’ collects, or re-
.ceives from any other person or persons fox doing for
him or them a like and contémporaneous service in
‘the transportation of a like kind of traffic under sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions, such
common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust dis- —
crimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared
to be unlawful. | _
By its terms, this Section deals only with discrimination
in rates, and doéS not extend to a discriminatory refusal
_ to provide service at all. This limitation in scope is not a
legislative oversight, however. The next. succeeding Sec-
tion of the Act rounds out the carrier’s duty of equal
treatment, by forbidding discrimination or preferences in .
the service afforded, in the following terms:
Section 3(1). It shall be unlawful for any common
carrier subject to the provisions of this part to:make,
give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage to any particular person,’ company,
firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port dis-
trict, gateway, transit point, region, district, terri-
®49 U.S.C. § 2 (1887).
36
_ tory, or any particular description of traffic whatso-
ever; or to subject any particular person, company,
firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port dis-
trict, gateway, transit point, region, district, terri-
tory, or any: particular description of traffic to-any
undue or unreasonabie prejudice or disadvantage in
‘any respect whatsoever: Provided, however; That this
paragraph shall not be construed to apply to discrimi-
nation, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of
. any other carrier of whatever Gencription. +"
It appears, then, that the letter of the law singled out -
- bythe Commission as authority for its Rules offers no’
support, since the ostensible object and effect of those
Rules is not to eliminate discrimination in rates under
Section 2, but rather to compel the railroads to afford
TOFC service to motor carriers if it is provided for oth- ~
ers. The provision relevant to this purpose; Section 3, is
nowhere cited in the Commission Report: _ This flaw might
not be fatal if Section 3 provided the necessary founda-.
tion, since the two sections are plainly complementary
and to be read én pari materia. But Section 3, by its pro- |
visg, specifically excludes from its coverage “the traffic of |
any other carrier of whatever description.” -
Endeavoring to avoid the plain meaning of this proviso,
the government relies upon a portion of its complex legis-
lative history. The proviso was enaeted in 1940, when it
was adopted froma parallel provision of part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act, dealing with motor carriers,
which had been enacted in 1935. Tracing to this source,
the government points to a statement of Senator Wheeler, _
made in explanation df the language as used in this ear-
aby bill, tending to show th&t the proviso was intended to
fears that carriers. by competing modes might com-
ed of injury by reason of the low rates of the rival.”
- © Section 216(d), 49 US.C. §316(d) (1935)
1179 Cor. Rec. 5656. See,
.~ oom ; a
The Senator expresséd his opinion’ that the fears were not
well founded, however, because the basic command of the
section had in turn been borrowed’from Section 3 of part’
I (applicable to railroads) as originally enacted without
the proviso, and because that section had “always been
interpreted as covering unequal and unjust treatment by ~
a carrier of its patrons.” Reading: “pa ” as including
carriers who tender freight for shipment, the govern-
ment’s argument proceeds from this observation through
the tangle of cross-references to the conclusion that Sec-
tion 3 does protect carriers who. seek to use another car-
rier’s services since it is said that the proviso exempts
only discrimination against the traffic of other carriers
‘competing or parallel routes for the same business. The _
plaintiffs point ott in response that Senator Wheeler was
contrasting “patrons” with “carriers” in his remarks, so
the government's major premise—that carriers are “pa-
trons” in thé Senator’s thinking—is faulty.
- At best this legislative history is inconclusive. It : seems
clear that the Senator did not have in contemplation the
Status of the carrier that tenders freight to another; and
that his comments on this different bill provide only
oblique evidence of the meaning of the basic provisions
of Section 3(1), which had beén enacted nearly fifty years
earlier, or ‘of the meaning of its provise, enacted ‘by an-
other Congress five years later. This evidence of con-
- gressional intent is too slendef a reed to support a disre-
gard of the broad sweep of the words excluding from the .«
railroad’s obligation of equal service “the traffic of any
other carrier of whatever description.’
Practical problems which would arise under the Com-
“mission’s interpretation of Section 2 also militate against
~such a reading. Although the Report emphasizes the
value of coordinated, service by motor carriers and rail-
roads, the Rules promulgated would allow the motor car- —
_ Tier to use any open-tariff TOFC plan, including plan II
——,
%o
38
as : well as plan III. Vaier plan II there is. no coordina-
tion: the railroad provides complete door-to-door service,
with its own tractors and trailers. Thus the motor car-
rier in using it would abandon any pretense of perform- -
ing services as a carrier, and would function merely as
the customer’s agent in calling upon the railroad for its
seryices. Moreover, if the Act required railroads to serve -
mqtor carriers and regular shippers without discrimina-
tion, thére would be no warrant for confining the com-
_ mand to TOFC service. The trucker would be entitled to
compel the ‘railroads to carry notvenly the freight-laden
trailer but bulk cargo and boxcar freight as well. The
Rules announced, limited.as they are to TOFC shipment,
would. fall far short. of the need for guidance were the
’ novel interpretation of the Act to be sustained; the greater
need would be for-rules to govern the problem of. handling
. freight in other forms. And since Sections 2 and 8 of the
_ Act apply to the transportation of passengers as well as
. freight, the ission’s interpretation would open a
host of new problems concerning substituted service for
‘ passengers. Moreover, the Commission’s view of the Act
would appear to require intra-modal substituted service,
as pointed out by Commissioner Webb in his dissent, by
“which one railroad could shunt its unprofitable traffic onto
a competing railroad, or by which one motor carrier could
call upon another forthe, difficult hauls. Pressed to its
logical ultimates, the Act, in the Commission’s reading,
would it-a carrier which had received freight from
another #@ exercise the same right by tendering the same
freight immediately back to the original carrier. Such
examples, while remote, are not too extravagant to cast
doubt on the validity of the Commission’ 8 construction of .
the Act.
An additional _—— lies in the fact that.the Comunale: Jf
sion’s own Rules would appear to offend against its inter-
«pretation of Section 2. While motor carriers could de
mand TOFC ,pervice at the open-tariff rates offered to
a
39.
regular shippers, they would still bé authorized to enter
into agreements with rail carriers for joint intermodal ..
service under Commission Rule 4, at- rates fixed by pri-
vate negotiation and contract. The choice would seem to
be inconsistent with the Commission’s own justifying prin-
ciple as declared in its Rule 2, that: TOFC service should |
“be made available to any person’at a charge no greater |
and no less than that received from any’ other. per-—
son....” The effort to achieve equality rather produces
‘@ new inequality, since at least ugder the present prac-
_ tices carriers-and shippers are separately served, each
group at its own price. How far the Rules fall short of -
the announced objective of equal charges for all TOFC ©
. Service is emphasized by the Commission’s rejéction of .
two proposed rules which: would have fixed the open-tariff -
rate as. the maximum rate which the railroad ‘might re- _
ceive through private agreements for joint intermodal
service, and ‘which would have required the railroads to
treat all motor carriers equally; ag to services and rates,
. in its agreements for such joint intermodal service? If
the Commission were correct in its view that carriers and
regular shippers are equally “persons” within the mean-
ing of Section-2 of the Act, then that statutory prohibition
against a railroad’s receiving “from any person or persons —
a greater or less compensation for any service rendered”
than from ‘another, “by any special rate . . . or other’ de-
vice,” would ‘seem to require not only that carriers be
treated as well as shippers, but that shippers be treated
. a8 well as carriers, and each carrier as well as any other. -
In still another aspect, the Commission’s Rules counte-
nince an apparent discrimination which’ may be difficult
to reconcile with the interpretation of Sections 2 and, 3
’ Of the Act as fully applicable to motor carriers shipping
their customers’ goods by rail. By its Rule 3, the Com- « |
. @
12 The proposed rules, distributed in ‘the initial stages of the-pro- .
ceeding, are set forth, and rejected, at $22 I.C.C. 328.
40
_Inission permits motor common carriers to utilize open-
tariff TOFC service only betweén points on their author-
ized routes, and to tender traffic to railroads, or receive it
from them, only at. points which the motor carriers are
- authorized to-serve: Under Rule 5, motor common car-
riers are subjected to still another limitation, prohibiting
the.use of open-tariff TOFC as a means to serve by direct
. route points which the motor carrier is authorized to serve
only indirectly and circniitously, by combining route au-
thorizatiofs for other points. Since ordinary shippers are
subject to_none of these limits, the Rules do not achieve
that equality of service which the Commission would-re-
course, lies in’ the fact that a motor’ carrier which makes
_ use of. ‘open-tariff TOFC service is not merely an ordinary
- shipper, but is still a carrier subject to all limits imposed
_ by law on its authority. The Commiission itself thus rec-
ognizes that carriers and shippers are not equally and
indiscriminately “persons” entitled to the same service at
. the same rates under Sections 2 and 3 of the Act.
a eee ae a
. While we have-concluded that the Rules in question are
‘not authorized in their affirmative commands by Sections"
2 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, properly inter-
preted, there is a related but independent ground under
which these Rules. must fall. Even if the Act specifically
commanded the railroads to serve motor carriers and ordi-
: —_ shippers without discrimination, there would remain
aval the ion whether the motor carriers could lawfully
emselves of that service without violating their
caittiks with customers or exceeding the rights conferred
by the certificate of public convenience and necessity
which authorizes their operations. In other words, we are
- bound to consider the statutes regulating the operations
-of motor carriers as well as. those imposing obligations
upon the railroads. "
quire from its reading of Section 2. The answer, of. —
41
The internal structure of the Interstate Commerce Act
itself bears evidence of the limited authority. conferred. on
the carrier. Each mode of transportation is the subject
of a separate formal part of the Act: part. I deals with»
rail carriers; part II with carriers by motor vehicle; part
III with carriers by water; and part IV with freight for-
warders, The certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity or license appropriate for each mode of transportation
is, by its terms and by the internal logic of the legislation, |
Confined to transportation by that mode. “Thus the cer-’
tificate issued to a motor carrier constitutes a formal de-
termination of the public need for motor transportation,
regardless of the availability of other modes, and author-
izes the holder ‘to engage in for-hire transportation by
“motor vehicle”, not by rail or other modes, and on the
“public highway”.3*
When operation by another mode is permissible, specific
legislative exceptions have been created. Thus freight
. forwarders under part IV are specifically authorized to.
_' ship goods by means of common carfiers governed by
other parts of the Act. Such special exceptions mirror
the underlying statutory scheme-that limits the carrier in
each mode to transpo ation within and by that ae
absent special exception. = | %
These elementary observations make: plain the legisla-
tive plan that motor carriers shall perform their author-
ized services by motor vehicle unless shipment by. other
‘Modes is permitted by some specific statutory exception.
The only relevant statute which allows such substitution is
Section 216(c) of the Act.™ It provides: Pe
o
** Secs. 208(a)(1) and (c), 206(a)(1), 209(a)(1); 49 U.S.C.
$§ 808(a) and (c), 806(a)(4), 309(a)(1),
“Sec. 418; 49 U.S.C. § 1018, » ake
549 U.S.C. §816(c) (1935). :
.)
~——.
42
#“(c) Common carriers of nina by motor vehicle
_ May establish reasonable through routes and joint
_ rates, charges, and classifications with other such
_ carriers or with common carriers by railroad and/or
express and/or water.*. . . ‘In case of such’ joint
. rates, fares, or charges, it shall be the duty of the
carriers parties thereto to ‘establish just and reason-
able regulations and practices in connection there-
with, and just, reasonable,. and equitable divisions
thereof as between the carriers participating therein
which shall not unduly yal or prejudice any of .
, Such participating carriers. .
tt is agreed on all sides that this provision is permis- »
_ sive. In declaring that carriers “may establish” through .
routes and joint rates, Congress left the matter to volun-. |
tary agreement, and did not empower the Commission to .
require such cooperation or coordination. This literal in-
terpretation of Section 216(c) is reinforced: by compari-
son with other provisions of the Act which, as between
other classes of casriers, authorize compulsory through
routes: by Commission order.® |
In the proceedings before Ahe Commission and in this
“court, these, plaintiffs submitted that te require the rail-
roads to offer TOFC service equally to motor carriers
would constitute the compulsory establishment of through
routes in violation of the section. The Commission did
not dispute the two premises of the argument: first, that
the Commission is “without statutory. power indirectly to
require establishment of through motor or motor-rail
routes,” **-and second, that requiring railroads to offer
. open-tariff TOFC service to m carriers*would amount
’ to establishing compulsory de facto through routes. The
- %See Secs. 15(3), 1(4), Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. — .
§§ fa 1(4); United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.S. _
17 322 1.C.C. 801, at 334. * Ne |
o
7. | 43.
' Commission avoided the argument, however, by concluding
that no compulsion was involved in its Rules. The Re-
port states: ji eer
“However, to say that we would be requiring’ the -
- establishment of through routes merely by finding
that it is lawful for a motor carrier to use the open-
tariff TOFC rate of a rail carrier overlooks the fact
that such a finding would involve no compulsion what-
ever—either on rail carriers to hold out a TOFC
‘service or, if they do; on motor carriers to use it.
We find this argument to be without merit.” os.
The Commission’s position is at odds with reality. To
Say that the railroads are subject. to no compulsion so long
as they can avoid such through routes by abandoning all
TOFC service for anyone hardly preserves the free choice
- intended by the congressional direction that such carriers
“may establish” through routes. If the absence of com- —
pulsion is measured by the availability of alternatives,
here compulsion is absolute. Under Section 1(4) of the
Act, the railroad is bound “to provide and furnish trans-.
portation upon reasonable request therefor... ;” ”
With equipment available for TOFC service, the rail-
road is thus compelled by law to’ provide such service to
the general shipping public, and would then be compelled,
under th Commission’s Rule, to provide equal service to
motor carriers, with no alternative.at all. by
With the Commission’s gro ntenable, counsel for
_ the government and the Co ion have resorted -in this
court to new ‘grounds for avoiding the application of See-
tion 216(c) and its implicit prohibition - of compulsory
through routes.. This new position asserts that a through
route exists by definition only when two carriers join in ,
holding out the joint service. Since under the Commis-
"18 322 1.C.C. 301, 335.
7°49 U.S.C. §1(4)- (1887).
44
sion’s Rule'the railroad would not join in holding out such
service—and indeed would participate only by compulsion
—it is said that no through route is involved. By verbal
legerdemain, the rule against compulsory through routes
thus would be read out of existence, since the logic of the
argument carries the conclusion that whenever there is
compulsion there is no through route.
The want of reason in the position is exemplified by the
Commission’s holding that TOFC service as now pro-
vided under Plan I is authorized as a through route ar-
rangement under Section 216(c). The operative features
of that Plan are identical with the TOFC service contem-
plated by the Commission’s néwly promulgated Rule 3.
In each case the motor carrier has the option, subject to
a the shipper’s veto, to employ substituted rail service or to
haul the trailers over the highway. The shipper pays the
motor carrier’s rates upon motor carrier: bills, and the mo-
tor carrier is subject to limits on circuity and points of
service. The only difference between the two schemes is
the railroad’s consent under existing Plan I. If that Plan
is to be sustained as a voluntary through route under Sec-
tion 216(c),” then the Commission’s new open-tariff
TOFC service must be viewed as involving a compulsory
through route forbidden by the section.”*
2° None of the parties has challenged the validity of Plan I in
the proceedings before this court. The legality of the Plan is under
attack, however, in a separate suit pending in the District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Civil Action No. 4-355. -:
*1 Carriers by water, otherwise governed by the same principles
as motor carriers, must be differentiated on the matter of through
_ Toutes. By vitue of Section 15(3) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(3),
“the Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it -to be
-necessary or desirable in the public interest, after full hearing
upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, estab-
lish through routes . . , applicable to the transportation of passen-
gers or property by carriers by railroad subject to this chapter and
common carriers by water subject to chapter 12 of this title...” —
The Commission’s Report and Order make no reference to this sec-
45 -
n Moreover, the argument does not avoid the fundamental. — )
tion 216(c) is the exclusive statutory authority for the
use of rail transportation by motor carriers, the Commis-
sion’s Rule must qualify, if it is valid at all, as establish-
ing through routes under that section.
Vv.
Still another obstacle to the Commission’s Rules is posed
by the separate compfaint of the freight forwarders. They
assert that the Commission’s new Rules are invalid in so.
far as they would permit motor carriers to “utilize TOFC
. Sérvice in the performance of all or any portion: of -their
authorized service .... .”** The motor carrier would
thereby be permitted to confine its own service to the as-
sembly and consolidation of the shipment, leaving the ac-
tual transportation to the railroad, and would be acting
not as a carrier but as a freight forwarder. The Rules
thus run counter to the provisions of part-IV of the Act
which forbid any person to ‘act\as a freight forwarder
without a permit issued- by the Commission, and which
prohibit the issuance of such permit tora common car-
rier.“ In response, the Commission appears to haye con-..
cluded that so long as the motor carrier holds the requisite
>
tion as authority for the Rules promulgated, and its proceedings
~did not in any sense constitute the “full hearing” on the necessity
_ for through rail-water routes which is required by that section: -
Since the section is the exclusive method by which the Commission
may require joint rail-water service, and since its powers were not
exercised or its requirments met, the Rules are no more valid as
applied to TOFC services due water carriers than te motor car-
riers. wind
Rule 5003(a), 322 I.C.C, 413.
23 Sections 410(a)(1), (e), 49 U.S.C. 1010(a) (1), 1010(c).
46
authority, so that it could act as a carrier ow transport-
ing the shipment itself, it is acting in its capacity “as a
carrier” even though no carrier service is performed in.
fact.* The non-carrying carrier thus would not be sub-
ject to the statute prohibiting any person from perform-
ing the services of a freight forwarder without a license,
but would be excused by the provision exempting a person
who performs such services “as a carrier.” *
No reason is suggested why we should suppose that Con-
gress meant to allow a motor carrier to perform only the
services of,a freight forwarder, not as an incident to
furnishing ‘transportation, merely because ‘the carrier .
holds a bare unexercised authority to furnish transperta- ’
tion,. while at the same time Congress prohibited the li-
censing of motor earriers as freight forwarders.
The principal foundation for the Commission’s new
Rules is apparently summed up in its observation “We
can see no justification either from the standpoint of
legislative limitations or of policy considerations, for hold-
_irig that one carrier may in no circumstances ‘make use
of the services which another carrier holds out to the pub-
lic generally.” * The observation can be sustained only if
the motor carrier is permitted, chameleon-like, to change
its coloration to evade these statutory prohibitions, Thus,
to escape the Congressional denial of power to establish
compulsory through routes under Sec. 216(c), it is.
claimed that the motor carrier in using the railroad’s
open-tariff TOFC service is acting not as a connecting
_ carrier, but merely as a private person belonging to the
general shipping public. At the same time, to escape the
freight forwarder’s claim, ‘it is said that the motor car-
rier does the same thing not as_an aad member oe
% $22 I.C. C. 333, 335
35 Section 402(a) (5), 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (5).
26322 I.C.C., at 335.
~~
47
the general shipping public but as a carrier. To keep
faith ng erm , to give reasonable effect to its com-
mands, we o obliged to eschew word-play and to read
the statutes in the light and spirit of their purpose. The
policy explicit in Sections 216(c) and 402(a) (5), and im-
plicit in the structure of the Interstate Commerce Act as
a whole, does not allow a motor carrier to perform its au-
thorized service simply by tendering the shipment to the
railroad for transportation without the railroad’s ‘concur-
rence. This policy is reflected in the National Transpor-
tation Policy declared by Congress “to provide for fair |
and impartial regulation. of all modes of transportation ©
subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as
to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of
each ....”* This underlying purpose militates against
allowing rail carriers to invade the motor carrier field,”*
and its reason extends equally to the converse situation,
where motor carriers seek to exploit the inherent advan-
tages of rail transportation. .
VI
We have thus far approached the issues of statutory
interpretation as a matter of first impression. -Our con-
clusion that the Commission’s Rules exceed its powers un-
der the Interstate Commerce Act does not rest’ alone, how-
ever, upon our construction of that legislation. The
holding is supported and confirmed by the consistent and
repeated decisions of the Commission and the courts. Few.
of these opinions can be regarded as directly holding that
motor carriers cannot.legally avail themselves of the rail- _
roads’ open-tariff TOFC service without railroad concur- ~
7 Act Sept. 18, 1940, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1.
*8 American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 864 U.S.
1, 6 (1959) ; United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 340
U.S. 419, 481-2 (1961). |
- 48
rence. Nonetheless, they proceed upon premises which re-
affirm the statutory principles previously considered.
The Commission’s course of decision began before the
- enactment of part II of the Act, and before motor carriers
were subjected.to federal regulation. In Trucks on Flat-.
cars Between Chicago and Twin Cities, 216 I.C.C. 435 ©
(1936), the railroad had offered open-tariff service to mo-
tor carriers before the passage of part II; in a decision
handed down after the regulatory act had taken effect,
_ the Commission sanctioned the offering. It should be
noted, however, that the railroad had voluntarily offered
the service to attract the traffic of a motor carrier, and
that some five months later the railroad withdrew its
open-tariff offering and entered into a through-route, joint
rate arrangement with the motor carrier, approved in
Meter-Rail-Motor Tra;ic in East and Midwest, 219 1.C.C. —
248, ' |
‘Whatever implications of approval might be drawn
from the earlier decision were overruled three years later
in Substituted Freight Service, 232 I.C.C. 683 (1939).
‘Here the Commission plainly held that a motor carrier:
could not lawfully substitute rail service for its authorized
highway service for a part of the linehaul. Although the
- decision emphasizes the necessity for publication’ of tariffs:
disclosing the manner of carriage, it- also requires that ~
such tariffs be published with the concurrence of the rail- ‘
road. In the absence of such concurrence, which would
establish a through route -at joint rates under Sec. 216
(c),”* the opinion declares that it is “repugnant to the
act” fer a motor carrier “to act as a common.carrier by
motor vehicle and as a shipper by rail as to the same serv-
ice... .”” This interpretation of the Act was followed
and affirmed in an unbroken line of decisions of the Com- |
2 49 U.S.C. §816(c).
- 80232 I.C.C., 690.
49 “
: *» »
mission in the intervening years, Such cases as Ringsby
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
263 1.C.C 139, 141 (1945); Savage Application, 265
I.C.C. 157, 167 (1947) ; and Movement of Highway Trail-
ers by Rail (the so-called New. Haven case) , 293 1.C.C. 93
(1954), are illustrative. For twenty-five years, until the
decision here under review, the Commission had adhered
: to this interpretation of the act directly in conflict with its
newly announced views, ag Et,
f
In the courts, a similar°principle is established in hold-
ings to the effect that a person who engages in transport-
ing goods for the general public by using open-tariff serv-
ice of common carriérs is not himself engaged as a com-
mon carrier by motor vehicle, so as to be entitled to a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity under the -
“grandfather” provisions of the Act, Acme Fast Freight,
Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. N.Y. 1940),
aff’d p.e. 309.U.S. 638; Ready Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 42 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. II. 1941), affirmed 314 US.
~ 580. -The relevant premise of the decisions is that the
authorized service of the common carrier by motor vehicle
under the law is transportation over the public highways
.by motor vehicle, not rail transportation by railroad: The
- cases would be distinguishable enly if we were Wiliing to
rule that the unexercised power to provide highway serv-
ice qualifies a person as a motor carrier even though he
provides transportation. solely by rail instead.
In the. Acme cuse, it was also urged that a joint service
arrangement might be valid outside the limits of Section. .
216(c) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 316(¢), a contention simi-
lar to that presented by counsel for the government here.
The court concluded as we have, that the provisions of
that section are the exclusive means for establishing joint
motor-rail through routes and joint rates, and that any
such. arrangement not in conformity with the section must
™,- .
eer emer
50:
fall." Implicit in that section is the Commission’s lack
of power to compel motor carriers arid rail carriers to pro-
vide coordigated: service, and it was-this lack of power
which justified permitting ilroads to: provide motor car-
rier service. incidental ‘and supplemental to their rail
transportation. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Park-
er, 826 U:S. 60, 7241945). See Fulda, Rail-Motor Com-
. petition: Motor Carrier Operations by Railroads, he Nw.
L. Rev. 156, 201 (1959).
Although it is settled that a common carrier may not _
discriminate against (or in favor of) another carrier ship- -
ping its own property for its own purposés,®? Sections 2
and 3 of the Act have never, so far as appears, been inter-
preted by the Commission or -the courts to require one car-
ried to perform service as a substitute for another car-
rier, gua carrier, as the Commission’s new rules would
command. In the face of this settled interpretation of
the Act. by the Commission itself as well as the courts, the
deference ordinarily due to the construction of the Act by .
the administrative agency responsible for its enforcement
is not called for. See All States Freight, Inc. v. New
York, New Haven ¢ Hartford Railroad, 379 U.S. 343
(1964) ; Atchison; Topeka and Santa Fe "Railway Co. v.
United ‘States, 209 F. Supp. 35; 41-42 (N. D. IIl. 1962) ;.
United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350-U.S. 383, 396 (1956).
Moreover," this settled interpretation of the Act has ©
been recognized and accepted by both the executive and
legislative branches. . In his Message to Congress Relative
to the Transportation System on April 5, 1962, the Presi-
-dent recommended legislative action to achieve precisely
—
*130 F. Supp. at 973.
a ®
2 1.C.C. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 225 U.S. 326 (1912). Freight
’ forwarders, not entitled to establish ‘through routes and joint rates
«@ With common carriers under the Act, are in the same position as
ordinary shippers and are thus protected from discrimination under
the Act. I.C.C. v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 220 U.S. 235 (1911).
i.
51
~the result of the Commission’s Rules here in issue.” Bills.
to effectuate this proposal were introduced both in the
Senate and in the House in 1962 and again in 1963.°*
Pending at the same time were bills proposed by the
Commission itself to achieve a similar objective by amend-
ing Section 216(c) of the Act to empower the Commission
to compel motor carriers and railroads to establish
through routes. Congress failed to enact any of these
proposals. While courts must take care not td%give undue
. Weight to legislative inaction, the fact that the President
- placed before the Congress a proposal predicated upon a .
specific interpretation of existing law cannot wholly be
ignored in -interfreting that law when Congress has re-
fused to make the suggested change. See Blau v: Lehman,
868 U'S. 408, 412-13 (1962); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 |
U.S. 598, 618 (1940); Ra
In conclusion, it appears that neither the specific provi-
sions of the Interstate’Commerce Act nor its geperal un-
derlying’ scheme confer authority upon the Commission to
compel railroads to provide open-tariff TOFC service to
motor carriers; on the contrary, the Act both in its spe-
cifies and general policy, forbid such compulsion. With
-the confirmation of this interpretation in an unbroken line
of Commission decisions, in judicial precedent, and in ex-
cutive and legislative understanding, there is no room for
the Commission to alter the settled Meaning. Like the -—
Commission, this court is foreclosed from indulgence in
* 83 H.R. Doc. No. 884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess: | am
**'S. 3242 and H.R. 11584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) and S..
' 1062 and H.R. 4701, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). It Should be noted
that each bill would have amended Section 2 of the Act not to pro-
hibit discrimination against.competing carriers generally and as to
all service, as the Commission’s reading would require, but merely
to prohibit discrimination‘in the transportation.of “loaded or empty
vehicles or shipping containers,” that’ is, TOFC service.
* S. 3510 and H.R. 12862, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962): S. 676
and H.R. 2088, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). aber |
=
¥
the: broad. formulation of wise transportation policy. Those
considerations belong to the Congress. We therefore hold
that Rules 2 and as promulgated by the Commission in
this proceeding, and Rule 5 in so far as it amplifies those
-Tules, are invalid and must be set-aside.
VIL
Two collateral matters remain for disposition. While .
the plaintiffs asserted principally the invalidity of Rules 2
and 3, they have also attacked Rules 5 and 7 promulgated
by the Commission in the same proceeding and order:
Rule 5 represents the Commission’s effort to assure that
TOFC service will not be misused by motor carriers as a
means of circumventing the limits of their certificates
- \eoncerning authorized routes. Since a motor carrier might
‘be able to link its separately authorized routes to create a
circuitous route between authorized points of service, and
utilizing TOFC service directly between: those points, Rule
5 permits motor carriers to use TOFC service “in lieu of
their authorized line haul transportation” only’if the rail .
distance is at least 85 per cent of the highway distance by
the authorized route** In so far as this Rule relates to
open-tariff TOFC service, it falls, pro tanto, with Rules 2
8¢ The Rule provides in relevant part:
500.5 Circuity limitations.—
. (a) Motor and water common carriers s shall not participate in
joint intermodal TOFC service which is to be provided in: lieu
of their authorized line-haul transportation, and totor and
water common and contract carriers shall not utilize open-tariff
TOFC service, where the distance from origin to destination
over the route including the TOFC movement is less than 85
per cent of the distance between such points over the motor or
water carrier’s‘authorized service route; provided, however, -
that the Interstate Commerce Commission may grant relief
from the provisions of this’ paragraph upon consideration of an
; secant petition.
53:
and 3.. The railroads have attacked its remaining appli-
cation to joint intermodal service as ambiguous and arbi-
trary, to the extent that it may control joint intermodal
service under existing plan V. We cannot agree that the
Rule is without ratiofial foundation. To the extent that
through routes are established end to end under plan V, -
the Rule by its terms has no application. Where the
TOFC service is used “in lieu of” the motor carrier’s line
haul transportation between points the motor. carrier”
could serve, we cannot conclude that the Commission was
fatally arbitrary in concluding that respect for the limits
of the certificates issued requires the imposition of cir-
cuity safeguards, whether the intermodal arrangement for
the substitution of TOFC service would be classed as plan
Tor plan V. — ee :
Finally, the plaintiffs have attacked the validity of Rule
7, claiming it to be arbitrary, ambiguous, and beyond the
Commission’s power. In substance, the Rule requires
publication in tariff form of the rates and rules governing
the leasing of equipment ( practically, highway trailers)
by a railroad or-its affiliate to any person using the rail-
road’s TOFC service. Literally, the Rule does not require
_ that the lease be for the purpose of TOFC shipment, but
only to a “person using” the railroads’ TOFC service. It
is plain from the objectives of the Commission as elabo-
rated in its Report, however, that ‘the Commission was
concerned with the leasing of trailers by the railroad for
use in its own TOFC service, as part of the total trans-
portation service supplied. This limited interpretation of
the Rule was specifically avowed by counsel for the gov-
ernment on brief and in oral argument. In. this reading,
the Rule would find support in Section 6(1) of the Act; .
requiring full publication of all charges and privileges or
facilities affecting the value of the service rendered to the
shipper, and by Section 1(3) (a), defining rail “transpor-
tation” to include. the instrumentalities of carriage, irre-
spective of ownership.
a \
Since the proceeding must be remanded to the Com-'
- mission in any event, for a general revision of the Rules
as a whole in conformity with these views, we will adopt
and accept this limited interpretation of Rule 7. The
Commission will have ancearly opportunity to clarify its
intent if a broader scope should be thought necessary.
Limited in this way, the Rule appears to be subject to no
invalidating objection.
A decree will be entered for the olaintifts consistent
with the foregoing conclusions.
‘
55 ,
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS .
EASTERN DIVISION
Civil Action No, 64 C 1442.
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RaILway Com-
PANY; CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD Com-
PANY; CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY Com-
PANY; CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD
COMPANY; CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN. RAILWAY Com- .
PANY; CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC
RAILROAD CoMPANy; CHICAGO, Rock ISLAND AND Pa-
. CIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY; THE DENVER AND Rio
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY; GREAT NoRTH-
ERN RAILWAY COMPANY; THE KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RaILway CoMPANY; LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY
COMPANY; MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS RAILROAD Com-
_ PANY; Missouri PaciFic RAILROAD COMPANY; NoRTH-
ERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CoMPANY; ST. Louis-SAN FRAN-
CIscO RAILWAY CoMPANY; ST. LouIS SOUTHWESTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY; Soo LINE RAILROAD COMPANY;.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY; UNION PACIFIC Rall-
ROAD COMPANY; WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY; THE
WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY; ,
. ; Plaintiffs,
Vv. | :
UNITED STATEs OF AMERICA; AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION :
ae Defendants.
DECREE
This: cause having come on for trial before the Court,
consisting of three judges convened pursuant to law, and -
the Court having heard and considered the evidence and
~ + 66.
the briefs and-arguments of counsel for the parties, and
having rendered and filed-its Opinion herein containing
‘its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and being fully
advised in the premises, itis. °
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. That the Report and Order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission entered in its proceeding numbered Ex
- Parte 230 and entitled Substituted Service—Charges and
Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight: Forwarders
(Piggyback Service), dated March 16, 1964, in so far as
it issues and prescribes Rules 2 and 3 contained therein
and designated as 49 C.F.R. 500.2 and 500.8, be and here-
by is set aside and annulled;
2. That the defendant Interstate Commerce Commission
be and-hereby is permanently enjoined and restrained.
from enforcing said Rules 2 and 3 contained in and issued
‘by the Report and Order aforesaid; and
3. That this proceeding be and hereby is - remanded to
the Interstate Commerce Commission for such further
proceedings, consistent with the Opinion and Decree of
this Court, as may be appropriate.
Dated this 20th day of August, 1965.
ENTER:
/s/ Latham Castle |
er Circuit Judge
/s/ J ulius J. Hoffman
District Judge
/s/ Bernard M. Decker
a | District Judge
57
APPENDIX B
STATUTES INVOLVED
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY ©
September, 18, 1940.] [49 U.SC., preceding §§ 1, 301,
901, and 1001.) It is hereby declared to be the national
transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair |
and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation
subject: to the provisions of this Act, so administered as
to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each ;
to promote safe, adequate, economical; and efficient service
and foster sound economic cohditions in transportation
. and the duly authorized officials thereof ; and to encourage
end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national
transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well
SPECIAL RATES AND REBATES PROHIBITED
Sec. 2 [As amended February 28, 1920, June 19, 1934,
and August 9, 1935], [49 U.S.C. § 2.) That if any
common carrier subject. to the provisions of this part
shall, directly oy indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, .
drawback, or other device, charge, demand; collect, or re-
ceive from any person or persons a greater or less com- ©
58
pensation for any ‘sevice rendered, or to be rendered,.in .
the transportation of passengers or property, subject to —
_the provisions of this part, than it charges, demands, col-
; lects, or receives from any other person or persons for -
( ing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service
in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions, such com-
mon carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimina-
tion, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be un-
lawful.
PREFERENCES; INTERCHANGE OF TRAFFIC;
TERMINAL FACILITIES “
Sec. 3. [As amended February 28, 1920, March 4, 1927, :
August 9, 1935, August 12, 1935, September 18, 1940, Au-
gust 2, 1949.) [49 U.S.C.'§ 3.] , (1) It shall be unlawful
for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
part to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, com-
pany, firm, corporation, association, locality, port,-port dis-
trict, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or.
any particular description of traffic, in any respect what-
soever; ot to subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gate- —
way, transit point, region, district, territory, or any par-
ticular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: Pro-
vided, however, That this paragraph shall not be con-
| strued to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvan-
~se
tage to the traffic of any other carrier ‘of whatever descrip-
- tion. ¥ 3
| . ° Pa ‘
*
59
RATES, FARES, AND CHARGES OF COMMON
CARRIERS BY MOTOR VEHICLE
Sec. 216 [August 9, 1935, as amended June 29, 1938, and
September 18, 1940.] [49 U.S.C. § 316.]
* * * .
_.(¢) Common carriers of property by motor vehicle may.
establish reasonable through routes and joint rates, charg-
es, and classifications with other such carriers or with
common carriers by railroad and/or express and/or wa-
ter; and common carriers of passengers by motor vehicle.
may establish reasonable through routes and joint rates,
‘fares, or charges with common carriers by railroad and/
or water. In case of such joint rates, fares, or charges it
shall be the duty of the carriers parties thereto to estab-
lish just and reasonable regulations and practices in: con-
nection therewith, and just, reasonable, and equitable di-
visions thereof as between the carriers participating there-
in which shall not unduly prefer or prejudice any of such
participating carriers, i
RS
—t-,
le aa all a al ital a
*
Served Apr. 3, 1964
|
OO
30144 = |
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
iar
Ex PARTE No. 230
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-CHARGES AND PRACTICES
_ OF FOR-HIRE CARRIERS AND FREIGHT FORWARDERS
(PIGGYBACK SERVICE)
Decided March 16, 1964 6
Upon notice of proposed rulemaking, rules and regulaticas:governing the
7 i practices of for-hire carriers of property, operating in imterstate or
foreign commerce and providing or participating in trailer-on-flatcar
sewice, prescribed. :
A table of contents to this report is contained in appendix V.
— Harry C. Ames, S.S. Eisen, James L. Givan, George H. Leonard,
F. N« Melius,’Jr., Giles Morrow, Theo. R. Schneider;. Leonard
te Stelzer, D. Robert Thomas, and Martin Whitten for various freight
forwarders and freight forwarder associations.
Peter T. Beardsley, Albert F. Beasley, James L. Beatty,
Walter N. Bieneman, W. H. Borghesani, Jr., Ferdinand Born,
Robert E. Born, R. Edwin Brady, Le Grand A. Carlston, Homer S.
‘ Carpenter, Eldon R. Clawson, James I. Collier, W. Wilson
Corroum, Ray M. Cream, Paul M. Daniell, Francis P. Desmond,
George S. Diwon, Robert C. Dryden, J. F. Edell, Howell Ellis,
_ Marion M. Emery, W. B. Ewers, John S..Fessenden, F.H. Floyd,
. F. G. Freund, Robert Gawley, Harry L. Grubbs, Marvin Handler,
' James E. Haydon, Richard A. Heilprin, Harold G. Hernly, Thomas
J. Houser, Earl Hummer, Harry J. Jordan, 8S. Harrison > ‘Kahn,
Joseph E. Keller, .James K. Knudson, Houston Lynch, Jr.,
Carney -D. Matheson, Herman Matthei, Francis W: Mclnerny,
George D. Michalson, M. Bruce Morgan, Glenn F.-Morgan, Arlus
-C. Morris, Lloyd Ownbey, Jr., Guy H. Postell, Bryce Rea, Jr.,
G. M. Rebman, Roland Rice, Floyd M. Roach, William R: Rubbert,
- Reagan Sayers, Richard R. Sigmon, Louis E. Smith, R. P. Sohan,
Hugh M. Steinberger, Glenn W. Stephens, C. Austin Sutherland,
Clarence D. Todd, Edward G. Villalon, William M. Watt, Harvey
A. Welty, Gene F. West, James J..Williams, James E. Wilson, °
James W. Wrape, and Chester A. Zyblut for various motor carriers
and motor carrier associations.
Mice. . . . | _ £301
~
-302. + -\ INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION RE PORTS
John W. Adams, Jr., Margaret P. Allen, Curtis H. Betg, Harry N.
Babcock, John J. Burchell; James A. Bistline,, R. G. Bleakney,
Jr., Benson T. Buck, CharlesgW. Burkett, Jr., J. T. Clark, J. L.
Connor, Richard E. Costello, Robert W. Cronon, John A. Daily,
John C. es telson, Robert S. Davis, William E. Davis, C. H.
Dickman, per A. Dobbins, John H. Doeringer, Robert H.
esecheeay Paul R. Duke, J. H. Durkin, Urchie B. Ellis, J. D.
Feeney, James A. Gillen, E. D. Grinnell, Jr., Rene J. Gunning,
Carl P. Greeley, John W. Hanifin, “L.W. Hobbs: Bryce Hamilton,
Louis A. Harris, William P. Higgins, James W. Hoeland, Richard
A. Hollander, Eugene E. Hunt, J. H. Jester, Edmund J. Kenivy,
Jess Larson, Harry B. LaTourette, Roland J. Lehman, E. R.
Léigh, George M. Mariner, C. E. Martin, Amas M. Mathews, John
E. McCullough, W. D. McLean, Thormond A. Miller, William M.
Moloney, ‘P. G. Mullen, Robert F. Munsell, Walter J. Myskowski,
James W. Nisbet, Eldon S. Olson,.W. H. Parsons, C. Harold
Peterson, Earnest Porter, Gregory S. Prince, C. C. Rettberg, Jr.,
Wade M. Richards, Albert B. Russ, Jr., John F. Smith, John
MacDonald Smith, Robert H. Stahlheber, William A. Thie, Robert .
A. Thompson, L. E..Torinus, Walter G. Treanor, Ray M. Van
Hook, Harold Vikoren, Archie T.. Walters, Philip F. Welsh,
‘Edward K.Wheeler, Robert J. Williams, D.N. Zirkle, and Erle J. —
Zoll, Jr., for various railroads and railroad associations.
Paul J. Coughlin, John Mason, Andrew A. Normandeau, and.
Hugh H. Shull, Jr., for water carriers.
Theo. F.Behler, Harry Bradt, John M. Cleary, Ronald N. Cobert, .
-Paul Coyle, John F. Donelan, -Lestcr J. Door, Samuel W.
Earnshaw, Donald W. Fisher, Walter R. Frizzell, Benjamin G.
Habberton, Dan,F. Hart, John B. Hedges, Leonard A. Jaskiewicz,
Jess Larson, ‘John C- Lincoln, Dickson R. Loos, Sumner J.
McCollester, Clarence M. Mulholland, Clarke Munn, Jr., A. E.
. Norrbom, James E. O’Boyle, F. S. Partridge, Warren Price, Jr.,
Frederick M. Porter, Philip H. Porter, Aloysius F. Power, Theo.
R. Schneider, William R. Settgas, Louis R. Simpson, Charles W.
Singer, Hérold E.Spencer, James FE. Steffarud,.Warren H. Wagner,
_ Charles A.Washer, M.W>Wells, John C. White, and Sidney Zagri
for shippers or other interested parties.
John M. Agrey for Public Service Commission of North Dakota.
Harold C.Heublein for Public Service Commission of Wisconsin.
Charles W. Bucy, Carl R. Bullock, Joseph E. Quin, George A.
Robertson,and Clarence H.Williams for Department of Agriculture.
e a Me ; 822 1.C.C.
* ,
: ee SERVICE-PIGGYBACK 303
“John EB: Faulk, R. M. Hartsock, ok Clement z. Mayo for Depart-
‘ment of Defense.
William R. Pierce for Geaneal Serviece Ailes
John H. Fallon, Harvey Gobetz, and Asa J. Merrill for Bureau
of Inquiry and Compliance, Interstate Commerce Commission.
- REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ORAL ARGUMENT
' BY THE COMMISSION: .
_ This proceeding, instituted on June 29, 1962, on our own motion *
under the. authority of parts I, II, III, and Iv of the Interstate ° -
Commerce Act and section 4 of the Administrfffive Procedure Act, ;
constitutes this Commission’s first general investigation of what is
probably the most significant recent development intransportatiofi— ~
trailer-on-flatcar or piggyback service. The notice of proposed
rulemaking made it known that we intended this investigation to be.
broad in scope, encompassing every aspect of TOFC operations,
and that we intended -to explore new approaches to piggyback
service. Among the matters specifically mentioned in - notice
asa subject, for consideration was:
The extent to which motor carriers, water carriers, express anies and
freight forwarders should be permitted to use Plans II andIV open-tarifi/
rail rates and service in their operations.
It was also made clear that we intended to reexamine existing
precedents and practices, and that consideration would be given
to the adoption of rules and regulations which might be found
necessary to regulate coordinated and substituted service trans-
portation in the public interest.
The order instituting this proceeding. same as respondents all
. railroads, motor carriers, and water carriers of property, freight
forwarders,- and express companies operating im interstate
commerce, and authorized and directed our Bureau of Inquiry and
Compliance to participate: It also assigned- the matter for a
prehearing conference, which was held October 9, 1962, and at
which proposed rules, reproduced as appendix II hereto, were
distributed. Oral hearings have not been held, but representations, .
verified statements, and reply statements have been received
from numerous interested parties. The proceeding was assigned
to two hearing examiners who recommended adoption of the
regulations contained in appendix III hereto. Exceptions. to the
$22 1.C.C. :
304 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
~examiners’ recommended order and replies thereto have been
- efiled by the parties listed in appendix I, and we have heard oral
argument. Two‘issues, the practices of for-hire motor carriers
of automobiles and the practices of for-hire water carriers
providing ‘‘fishyback’’ service, were severed from the remainder
of the proceeding by order of November 12, 1963, for oral hearing
and separate handling.
The southern railroads have included in their exceptions motions
to strike certain portions of the verified statements filed by the
Bureau of Inquiry and Compliance and certain other parties.
They argue that the Bureau has overstepped its authorization,
_ contained in the order instituting this proceeding, to participate
in this proceeding ‘‘for the purpose of developing the evidence and
_ the. issues,’’ and that the other matter objectedto is irrelexant.or
incompetent as evidence. Also pending is a motion filed by the
same carriers on April 2, 1963, for cross-examination of the
Director of the Bureau of Inquiry and Compliance. The southern
railroads have obviously misunderstood the position of the Bureau
in this proceeding. It is a party like any other, arfd it was free to
introduce any evidence it saw fit. The Director of the Bureau did
not sponsor a verified statement, and has appeared in this
proceeding cnly as counsel. .There is no more reason to subject
him to cross-examination than any other attorney appearing ina
solely representative capacity. The other verified statements
objected to should, in our opinion, remain in the record. The
motions will be denied.
TRAILER-ON-FLATCAR CPRRA TIONS
If the subsequent discussion is to be enderarendsiite, a word
must be said at the outset about the nomenclature.of TOFC services.
. The varieties of services available are commonly referred to in
terms of five numbered plans. These designations: have attained |
general use in the transportation industry, and for the sake of
convenience we are using them in this report. They will be
discussed in greater detail later, but the following capsule
definitions were contained in the appendix to the order inationting
this ee _—
PLAN I -_
Railroad movement: of trailers or containers of motor common carriers, with —
the shipment moving on one bill of lading and billing being done by the trucker.
Traffic moves under rates in regular motor carrier tariffs.
ae 322 1.C.C.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGY BACK 305
PLAN II
Railroad performs its own door-to-door service, moving its own trailers or
containers on flatcars under tariffs usually similar to those of truckérs.
PLAN III
Ramp-to-ramp rates based on a flat charge, regardless of the contents of
trailers or containers, usually owned or leased by freight forwarders or
shippers. No pickup or delivery is performed by the railroad,
PLAN IV .
Shipper or forwarder furnishes a trailer or container-loaded flatcar, either
owned or leased, The railroad makes a flat charge for loaded or empty-car
= movement, furnishing only power and rails.
ws 3 ee ~
PLAN V
Traffic moves generally under joint railroad-truck or other combination of
coordinated service rates, Either mode may solicit traffic for through
movement, woe
The development and effect of TOFC service.~ Transportation
of loaded highway trailers on railroad flatcars is not a new
development, although ‘its growth has been explosive in the past
5 years. Nearly 40 years ago the Chicago, North Shore and
Milwaukee Railroad Company pioneered a ‘‘ferry truck’’ service
that was essentailly similar to today’s plan II piggybacking by the
railroads. Pressed by increasing independent motor carrier
competition, the North Shore in May 1926 inaugurated a new
service for merchandise traffic between Chicago and Milwaukee:
using carrier-owned 16-foot trailers and specially constructed
flatcars, it would provide a door-to-door delivery of less-than-
carload freight in trailer units requiring no transfer of lading en
route from shipper to consignee. This was a complete railroad
service at rail rates on rail bills of lading. At the outset this
service was performed at the same rates and charges previously
applicable to the various classes of merchandise transported, but
in February 1928 this rate structure was modified and a flat
all-merchandise rate, subject to a minimum weight and excepting
livestock and perishables, was published.
The prototypes of today’s plan I and planIII TOFC service were
developed on an experimental basis by several other railroads in
the early 1930’s. In these years the railroads were competing
$22 I.C.C. :
- < SN A Uy RS RRR The Img PN RR em eee
1) Nag ewepnpragerey xnes
. : } VA
306 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
A
with aggressive, rapidly expanding, if unorganized, independent
motortruck operators who were not subject to route or rate
regulation and who were able to provide extremely flexible
pickup, delivery, and accessorial services. . TOFC service at
this early date was designed to induce trucking companies to ship
their vehicles by rail instead of operating them over the highways:
Private shippers were. free-to use this service, but there is no
indication that they did so in any substantial volume at this stage
of TOFC development. The rail rates that were charged for this
service reflected substantially the average direct line-haul expense
of operating a truck over the shortést available highway routes
between the points served.
By tariff schedules filed to become effective inMarch 1936, the
Chicago Great Western Railway Company offered to transport
highway trailers between Chicago and St. Paul at.a flat charge of
_ $42.50 per loaded trailer, with a maximium lading of 20,000 pounds
per trailer and a minimum charge of $85 if fewer than two trailers
were tendered for shipment in a single day. This was an ‘‘open-
tariff service’’ intended to attract traffic from all highway
carriers, including for- hire motor carriers as well as private
shippers: operating their own trucks, and from freight forwarders.
This service was substantially different from existing less-than-
carload transportation because it did not include pickup, delivery,
loading, or unloading, .and it was essentially a ramp-to-ramp
operation, When part II of the Interstate Commerce Act became
effective_in 1935, thus making for-hire interstate motor carrier
operations subject to route and rate regulation, new tariff
arrangements were proposed to provide for joint rates between
the Great Western and the participating motor common carviers. |
The new schedules named motor-rail-motor rates between certain
authorized ‘‘grandfather” service points of the motor carriers
which were located beyond the Chicago and St. Paul ramp points.
The railroad would act only as an intermediate or “‘bridge”’
carrier; the motor carrier would originate and deliver the traffic.
The railroad would receive as its division of reve sub-
stantially the same per-trailer amount previously baer
the open tariff. These joint rates were allowed to become
effective.
The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company
instituted TOFC operations in 1937, offering an open-tariff service
to private shippers and motor contract carriers, and a ‘‘sub-.
stituted ‘service’’ to motor common ¢arriers, These TOFC
822 1.C.C.
oe .
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE- PIGGY BACK ' 307
»
' services were used almost exclusively by motor commoncarriers
under the latter arrangement, which was essentially the same as
present-day plan I service. In 1953 approximately 50,000 trailers
were ‘transported by the New Haven in this type of service.
The experience, however, of most railroads in TOFC operations
was very limited until 1954, the year in which this Commission
gave approval to a_ number of practices that were then slowly
developing. See Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 1.C.C.
93, the s0-called New.Haven case, Almost immediately.a number
of railroads inaugurated or expanded their planI and plan Il TOFC
operations. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for example, |
ica its plan II type of service in 1954 and it handled approxi-
mately 15,000 trailers in plan II during the last 6 months of that
| year. Its estimated total for plan II in 1962 was 55,000 trailers.
In 1955, the Pennsylvania transported about 17,000 trailers in |
plan I service, and that amount has grown to an estimated 80,000
trailers in 1962, Its first full year of plan III was 1959 when
10,500 trailers were handled. By 1961 that total had grown to
43,000 trailers, and its estimate for 1962 was 65,000 trailers.
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company started its
plan II service in 1955, and handled 193 trailers for total revenue
of $33,790. In@962 these totals for plan II operations had increased
to 6,712 trailers and $1.3 million in revenue. In 1960 it handled
46 trailers in plan I service for a revenue of $3,468. In 1961
. these totals for play I hadincreased to 1,771 trailers and $150,388
in revenue. Plan III was inaugurated in 1960 when 181 trailers
were, moved for $24,271 revenue. In 2 years its plan III totals
net to 8,618 trailers and approximately $1 million revenue.
re can little doubt that -piggybacking has been a decisive
factor in returningto the railroads a substantial volume of traffic .
that previously had been moving by other nmiodes of transportation,
private afd for-hire. e growth of plan I has meant a direct
growth in railroad participation in motor common carrier highway
traffic. For example, Consolidated Freightways, a motor common
carrier, has plan [ arrangements with 23 railroads providing for
service between 340 pairs of points. During 1961 it paid approxi-
mately $1 million to these railroads for their plan I TOFC
services, In the first 10 months of 1962, Consolidated Freightways
moved 7,878 trailers in plan I operations, and paid more than
$1.8 million to the railroads for thelr piggyback services, nearly
doubling the 1961 payment.
322 I.C.C. ,
NR I LS PEE IU PO Cty OMAR TN
/ )
H /
: ete ; {. :
308° -. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
The gréwth of plan III and plan IV TOFC service has also
meant diversion of highway traffic both from the for-hire motor
carrier industry and from individual Companies either engaging
in private carriage or planning to do so, The Eastman Kodak
_ Company markets a large volume of miscellaneous chemicals as
packaged freight from Rochester, N. Y., through seven sales
divisions throughout the country. It an use of plan III from
Rochester to. its midwestern division at Chicago in 1959; to its
South Dakota division and to Chambiee, Ga., in 1960; and then as
a return movement from a Midland, Mich.,. supply: point to
Rochester in 1960. During 1961 its traffic between these cities
totaled 24.5 millon pounds in plan III, and its 1962 tonnage was
expected to reach 40 million pounds. Before its use of plan III,
all of this traffic wad shipped “by motor common carrier. Its .
Chicago plant, for example, whichaccounts for the largest share,
is an off-track facility. Rail service to this branch house
previously was impractical because it involved local cartage and
transfer of lading, but ‘plan III raii service has turned out to be
practical and efficient.
A few years ago the Monsanto Chemical queenee had completed
an exhaustive survey of private carriage for its St. Louis plants,
and it was on the verge of going heavily into private motor
carrier _ operations. Its projected motor operating costs were
expected to be 35 cents a trailer-mile. One eastern.railroad
- Offered its pian III service at 50 cents a flatcar-mile, or 25 cents
per trailer-mile. Consequently Monsanto turned to plan III, and
it has since been shipping approximately 50 million pounds of
' package freight annually in plan III from its three St. Louis plants.
to its eastern rerritory between Philadelphia and Boston. About
15 years ‘ago all of this package freight went by rail, Starting at
that ‘time there was. a gradual shift to motor carriage and
ultimately motor common carriers handled essentially all the
traffic. This trend was reversed. decisively with Monsanto’s use
of plan III which now has become the primary method = movement
of this traffic.
At the present time the available _ statistical data on TOFC
’ operations and services teeny F Nation is not sufficiently
refined or reliable to demonstrate /authoritatively the precise
extent to which railroad successes with piggybacking have meant
actual diversions of traffic from competitive modes of transport.
But the examples of Consolidated Freightways, Monsanto, and
Eastman Kodak are typical of many others around the Nation, and
322 1.C.C.
- SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK » 309
the railroads generally are enthusiastically attempting to duplicate
experiences like ‘these, In 1957 a total of 57 cla&s I railroads
were participating in TOFC tariffs; in mid-1963 there ‘were 100
class [ roads doing so. ‘In 1955,;°32 railroads reported a total of
168,150 TOFC:carloadings, for a weekly average of 3,234, In
1959; 50 reporting railroads showed totals of 415,156 annual and
7,984 weekly average carloadings for TOFC. For 1963, 63
reporting railroads indicated continued growth to approximately
797,500 loaded TOFC cars, a weekly rate of enbmaiaCies: 12, 700
- loadings.
It is apparent, however, that substantial investments have been
made by the railroads and others in TOFC equipment. The New:
York Central has invested a total of almost $30 million, not
including its investment in Flexi-v anl terminals. The Seaboard
Air Line Railroad Company has invested $1,147,000 in 55 ramps;
The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company shows $2,800,000 .
invested in TOFC equipment:and ramps; The Atchison, -‘Topeka
and Santa Fe Railway Company shows $2.1 million invested in
piggyback facilities at Chicago, Los Angeles, and Oakland; The
- Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shows $2.6 mitton invested
in. TOFC trailers and freight cars, $670,000 in ramps, and
$186,559 in cranes; the Pacific Fruit Express ‘Company has .
$6,579,600 invested in TOFC equipment and in addition.its leased
equipment represents an investment of $2.8 million. thas placed .
orders for 200 additional 40-foot refrigerated trailers at a cost
of $2,470,000 making a total nnraaarian of approximately $12
‘million, °\
This record does not show how extensively commercial shippers
have invested in TOFC equipment but the investment of freight
forwarders is set forth. As of January 1, 1963, the freight
forwarders, represented in this proceeding, had an investment-
amounting to $10.5 million in trailers, tractors, and freight cars.
They also have annual obligations: in long-term leases dn freight
cars and trailers amounting to $1.6 million.
The five piggyback plans.— Plan I .TOFC service involves the
movement by railroad of loaded trailers or similar containers «ot
motor carriers, with the contents thereof moving on one bil). of
lading issued by the trucker. This substituted rail service is
l*e*Plexi-van’’ is a specialized type of TOFC equipment, -developed pri<
marily by the New York Central, and used by only a’few railroeds. Its
principal characteristios are a trailer with a demountable body and a specially
built, light-weight rail car which is designed to carry onl¥ Flexi-van trailers
and which may be side-loaded without the use of. the normal circus- -type ramp.
« $22 I.C.C.
-
. soeenenemne anenetntinaaeeeienadeaainateenarenimesemenaines iin iicansimeabeedmenainaniaeeiananann .
, 310 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
available. only between points Where theré is actually available
service by the motor carrier which substitutes rail for motor
service, The traffic moves on rates which are the same as the
trucker applies on its all-highway Service. The motor carriers
solicit the traffic for movement in their own trailers,wyhich, in
the absence of the shipper’s forbidding the use of. substituted rail
service, is tendered to the railroad for line-haul transportation.
The trailer is brought to the railroad ramp by the motor carrier
where it is placed onto the flatcar. The trailer is sealed and the
railroad has no knowledge of the traffic being transported, except
for the total weight of lading in each trailer. The railroad’s
compensation in such a meve is based upon a division of the
charges arrived at through negotiations between the twocarriers.
This division of charges is published as a division sheet but is
“not customarily made available to the shipping public nor is it
filed with the Commission. At destination the trailers are
unloaded from the flatcars ard delivered over-the-road to
destination by the motor carrier. So long as the motor common
carrier meets the financial responsibility and route authority
requirements, the participating railroads are generally willing
to share plan [I arrangements with any such motor carrier.
As previously rioted, the New a provided the frame-"
work of legal principles that has governed the renewed growth-and
interest in piggyback operations which began in 1953. There the
Commission defined the relationships of motor carriers, railroads,
and shippers involved in these trailer-on-flatcar services. , For
several years following the New Haven decision there _wete few
controversies within the industry about the scope of plan I TOFC -
services permissible under the various operating authorities of
the motor carriers. More ‘recently, however, with the vastly
accelerated utilization of TOFC Services, the whole concept of
plan I TOFC has anew been brought ' ‘into question, both on the
' point of its essential legality under the controlling statutes and
on the point of its economic desirability under regulation. At
_ the same time theré havé arisen a number of related questions
concerning the authority of motor carriers to engage in planI -
piggyback in specific ¢ircumstances,. such as the following:
whether motor carriers may interchange plan I piggyback traffic
at the point of origin of the traffic, with the railroad performing
the entire line-haul movement; ,whether a motor carrier needs
specific operating authority to * provide service ioor from the ramp
points at which it will interchange plan I traffic.with the railroad
322 I.C.C.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE- PIGGY BACK 311
? =. . a
‘performing the piggyback operation; whether the relative circuity
of the authorized service route of a motor carrier should be
considered as a factor in allowing that motor carrier to use
- railroad TOFC service between such points; and whether motor .-
.* contract carriers may participate in plan I TOFC to the same
extent as motor common carriers.
Under plan II, the railroad holds out to provide a complete-door-
to-door service under a single bilf of lading. Neither the shipper
nor the consignee intervenes in any way inthe overall transporta-
tion activities or does anything beyond tendering the shipment to
the railroad at origin or at the shipper’s loading dock. The-
railroad assumes full responsibility in the following respects:
providing the shipper with a-trailer; moving the trailer to, and”
placing it at, the shipper’s door for pickup; loading the freight —
into the trailer; moving the loaded trailer from -the shipper’s
dock to the rail -TOFC ramp, furnishing a tractor and driver;
supplying the rail flatcar; placing and securing the trailer onto
the flatcar; providing the ling-haul transportation from origin
ramp to destination ramp; unloading the trailer from the flatcar —
at ‘destination; moving the loaded trailer from the destination
ramp to consignee’s ‘store door, again furnishing a tractor
and driver; unloading the freight from the trailer; and finally
‘ removing the empty trailer.
The published rate which includes all of the above-mentioned
services to be performed by the railroad generally applies (a)
to a specific commodity or a group of specifit commodities; (0)
in straight or mixed carloads without mixture limitations; (c) in
a single trailer; and (d) subject to a rate per 100 pounds and a
minimum rate tailored to the specific commodity involved.
Under’ plan. III, the railroad furnishes only a transportation
service between its TOFC ramps. The only additionak service
the railroad performs in accordance with its tariff is placing
and securing the trailers onto the flatcars at the origin ramp
and the unloading of the trailers from the flatcars at‘the destina-
tion ramp. This service is offered to private shippers and freight ©
forwarders. The shipper using plan.III must assume the full
responsibility for the following: supplying its own trailer either
by ownership or through a lease arrangement; moving or arrang-
ing to move the trailer to the shipper’s dock for loading the freight
into the trailer; moving the loaded trailer from the shipper’s
dock to the railroad TOFC ramp, which means that the shipper
must arrange for the furnishing of atractor and driver; arranging
322 I.C.C.
eg
~
312 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS L
for the issuance of an appropriate bill of lading from the railroad
origin ramp to the railroad destination ramp; receiving the loaded.
trailer at the destination ramp; furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of the physical facilities for removing the trailer
from the destination TOFC ramp to the consignee’s store door;
untoading the freight from the trailer; and finally returning the
trailer, where leased, to the lessor.
Under plan III the published rate generally applies (a) .to freight,
all kinds; (5) in mixed carloads; (c) subject to specific mixing
rules and regulations; (d) in two-trailer lotsg.and (e) further
subject to a maximum load of 70,000 poundsat the flat charge per
-carload and irrespective of the mixture of freight involved. |
- Trip leasing of trailers from the railroads or their subsidiary
leasing companies has become commonplace with many shippers
and freight forwarders. At the present time the tariffs offering
plan III service do not include, in most instances, the leasing
charges, a statement of the amount of free time allowed for -load-
ing or unloading, detention charges, or protective service charges.
‘ Plan IV is comparable to plan III except that the shipper has
the additional responsibility of furnishing the railroad flatcar,
. including the loading and unloading of the trailers onto and off
the flatcar.
Plan V involves through motor-rail or motor-rail-motor
services at joint rates applicable only over the through route or
routes, Either mode may originate or deliver a plan V shipment,
and the traffic will move on either a rail or motor bill of lading
depending upon which carrier originates the shipment. In particu-
lar contrast to plan I operations, there need not be available
to the shipper an alternative all-highway. motor carrier service
between the points where the plan V joint rate is applicable.
Plan V coordination therefore is used either (1) where the rail
and motor carriers serve different areas and are combining their
services to perform a new service betweenorigin and destination;
or (2) where they are performing service over parallel routings
and are in effect, at least, substituting one mode of transportation
for the other for a portion of the line-haul.
Equipment leasing practices.— Many forms of leasing arrange-
ments have burgeoned forth in the past few years as part of the
accelerated growth of plans III and IV TOFC service. As seen,
these plans contemplate use of trailers or flatcaretrailer com-
binatior's owned.oy_provided by shippers, rather than the railroads,
Although some ghippers own such equipment, most do not; more-
322 1.C.C:
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGY BACK 318°
3 °
over, ‘those who do- find it gifficult or impossible to balance
their traffic so as to secure maximum economic use of equip- .
‘ment in TOFC service. Consequently, as TOFC service has
grown there has arisen the practice of trip-leasing trailers and
flatcars by individual shippers wishing to take adydntage of
the available,- minimal-service, ramp-to-ramp rail rates, and
of the fact that their responsibility for the trailer ceases at
_ the end of a one-way trip, thus eliminating the cost of dead-
heading an empty vehicle back home.
But it is not only the shippers who depend on lensed equipment.
Most of the class 1 railroads participating in TOFC supplement
use of théir own flatcars by leasing specially desi signed piggyback
cars from car companies, s@ch as Trailer Train Company, North
American Car Corporation, or General American Transportation
Co. In 1959 railroads. themselves owned two-thirds of the 6,835
railroad flatcars equipped for use in piggyback service. By
June 1963 this figure had dropped to less than 40 percent of the
total of 16,708 FC flatcars then in use. In its first full year
of TOFC_ operations, 1955, the Baltimore & Ohio operated a .
total of 75 piggyback flatcars. At the end of 1962 it has assigned |
approximately 450 flatcars to piggyback operations, about 175
’ of which were leased from the Trailer Train Company.
_ Some railroads lease or sublease their TOFC flatcars to freight
forwarders and private shippers. The Chicago, Milwaukee, St..
Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, for example, leased a Flexi-
van rail far and two trailers to an association of shippers in
Seattle on an experimental basis for 6 months in 1959. The
idannion thereafter used the railroad’s plan IV service between
Seattle and Chicago with ‘such satisfactory results that it has
itself directly purchased, or leased from manufacturers, a total.
of 5-Flexi-van rail.cars and 10 trailers. The Milwaukee also ©
occasionally leases TOFC flatcars to freight forwarders, .on
a round trip lease basis, when the forwarders need to supple-
ment their own equipment during peak periods of traffic. .
The Pacific Fruit Express Company is a carline company,
owned jointly by the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the
Southern Pacific Company, supplying a fleet of refrigerator
cars to certain railroads for movement of perishables. As .
of September 30, 1962, it owned 421 40-foot refrigerated trailers
and 50 85-foot flatcars for use in TOFC operations. It also
was operating an additional 200 85-foot flatcars under lease, and
as previously mentioned, it had ordered 200 more refrigerated ©
322 I1.C.C.
~
.
. 314 - INTERSTATE GOMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
Ye : :
trailers. This equipment was designed for transportation of.
‘ either perishable.or dry commodities, and was acquired in con-
templation of its being trip leased to shippers and freight forward-
ers on westbound shipments of dry freight as a return movement ~
for perishable traffic eastbound by. piggyback from west coast
origins.
The Pennsylvania Railroad does not directly own the prea
that it uses in its plan II operations, or that it makes available
to its shippers for plan III service, A wholly owned subsidiary
corporation, Excelsior Truck Leasing Company, Inc., supplies
all such automotive equipment in a flexible leasing arrangement.
Trailers, to be used in plan II TOFC service are leased to the
railroad. oh a long-term basis in which poolsof trailers are made
- available at strategic plan II terminals. Because inbound plan —
Il traffic to certain terminals substantially exceeded the out-
bound traffic and in order to make trailers available to indi-
vidual plan III shippers, the original arrangement was modified
in 1958 so, that ‘‘surplus” trailers at plan Il terminals-would .
be returned to the control of Excelsior. In turn, Excelsior would
make these trailers available to plan Ill patrons for one-way
trip leases on a first come, first servedbasis. In these situations
ordinarily the trip-lease forms are executed by employees of the
railroad acting. as agents for Excelsior. The railroad in turn
is given a credit against its monthly. leasing — ‘for the
shipper rentals from Excelsior.
These trailers are trip leased to individual shigpere only on
condition that they be used for specific pman III TOFC shipments
either to destinations on the Pennsylvania or to destinations on
certain other railroads which have agreed with it to specific
interline arrangements. As far as home-line destinations are
concerned, an effort is made to limit plan III trip rentals to
destinations where trailers are needed by the Pennsylvania for
plan II loadings.
'The written lease agreement between Excelsior and an individual
shipper does not specify the per-shipment charge, the free deten-
tion time, or the schedulesf charges applicable at the end of the
free time. These charges and practices are ordinarily explained
to a shipper'on its first inquiry, and are thereafter followed as a
part of a general: understanding governing subsequent shipments.
Excelsior charges a flatrental of $20 for conventional trailers
for plan III shipments to destinations local to the Pennsylvania,
and a graduated scale of rentals to destinations on certain foreign
322 I.C. C.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK 315
”
-
.
(
“lines. For example, a shipment to Atlanta from a Pennsylvania.
) Railroad origin point wouldmean a trailer rental charge of p ry
imately $30. At the foreign line destination, the trip lease would
terminate when the responsible shipper or consignee returned the
empty trailer to the Atlanta rail ramp. With termination of the
trip lease, responsibility for the trailer would revert to the
Pennsylvania, as between it and Excelsior, and the terminating
railroad in turn would be responsible to it for a per diem rental
of ‘the trailer. The terminating railroad, accordingly, would be
~ free to use the trailer in any arrangment it wished, paying the
Pennsylvania the agreed per diem rate.
The Louisville & Nashville operates a fleet of about 775 trailers
in its plan II and plan III piggyback operations. Of the number
about 350 are leased on an 8-year termfrom REA Leasing Corpo-
ration, and another 200 are available in pools assigned by .
REALCO to the L & N at principal points of use. It leases
24 refrigerated trailers from the Fruit Growers Express. L & N
also uses foreign line trailers which are unloaded on its line,
provided that there is a specific understanding with the other
railroad regarding use of the trailers for new loadings. L & N
instituted plan III service in June. 1960, and began its practice
of trip leasing trailers to individual shippers in February 1961.
It attributes to the development of trip leasing a great increase
in its plan III traffic volume. . ,
In practice, a shipper desiring to use L & N trailers in plan
III service approaches the road’s traffic department or one of its
freight agents with a request to lease two trailers. A trip lease
is prepared when the trailers are picked upat the rail ramp either
by the shipper with his own tractor or with that of a local cartage
company employed by him. The L & N does not use any affiNiated
trucking companies to perform this operation, but it will recom-
‘mend independent local operators to any shipper. Pa on
.- The L &.N.has been charging a minimum $20 rental for plan
III shipments to destinations local to its lines, with either)a first
morning or. sécond morning delivery. The time and date of start
and termination of the trip-lease are shown on the lease form, .
The lease itself Goes not specify the detention privileges and limi-
tations, but they are. verbally described to shippers. When.a
shipper picks up the trailers prior to 10 a.m. he must return
the loadéd trailers to the L & N ramp prior to 6 p.m. the same
day or else be subject toa $9 per day charge for ordinary’trailers
- or $12 per day for refrigerated trailers. At the destination
822 1.C:C. e .
316 - INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
, ; é
point the shipper is allowed free detention also until 6 p.m. on
the date of delivery, at which time the daily detention charges
begin to run. An individual shipper wishing to transport its own
trailers in L & N’s plan III service is free to do so, but then is
faced with the necessity of either paying for an empty return ship- .
ment of his trailers or acquiring a returnload of owned commod- .
ities.
One practice. ~engaged in by the L & N provides an interesting )
example of how a TOFC movement can change in midcourse ‘from .
one plan to another. At East St. Louis the L & N receives some
piggyback traffic — usually fresh meats and packinghouse products
— which has originated in plan II service on the lines of western
trunkline railroads. At East St. Louis, the trailers come under
the control of the L & N which becomes responsible to the con-
necting western railroad for per diem charges for the foreign
trailers, trip leases the foreign trailersto the shipper, and moves |
the trailers in plan III service generally to Atlanta or to Florida
destinations.
Perhaps. the ultimate in advantages to be gained from short-
term equipment leasing: is. to be found in the ‘‘return’’ trip
lease. The ordinary trailer trip lease involves a railroad, rail-
‘road affiliate, or independent company renting a vehicle toa
shipper for a one-way movement. It has already been pointed
out ‘that this arrangement carries with ‘it the understanding that
the shipper’s responsibility for the vehicle terminates atthe desti-
nation point so that it need not bear the cost of an unproductive
empty return movement. Under the return trip-lease arrange-
ment, however, the. railroad provides transportation under a
published plan III TOFC rate-of a loaded shipper-owned trailer
at the published rate from a given origin to destination; then
leases the trailer from the shipper after it has been unloaded at
destination; and then assumes responsibility for the return of
the trailer to the shipper at the origin point. The railroad, of
course, is free to use the empty trailer which it has leased for
any ‘legitimate purpose, but in normal practice it does not do so,
simply returning it empty to the shipper. The shipper, then,
has in effect had his trailer shipped back to him at something
better than no cost at all, for he has also received from the
railroad some nominal sum’ as ‘“‘lessor.’’ Although this provi-
- sion of. free transportation does not seem to be widespread, it
does occur in connection with certain types of TOFC operations.
322 I. C. C.
-
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-~PIGGYBACK 317
Accessorial services.—A fundamental concept of plan III service
and plan III pricing is that a shipper receives only basic ramp-to-
ramp rail transportation and must provide for himself all other
required facilities and services. Many railroads, however, supply
-a labor force to load or unload plan III trailers, either at no cost
to the shipper or at a negotiated price.. Some TOFC tariffs’
provide for the railroad’s performance of such accessorial serv-
ices, but others do not. As pertinent here, the Elkins Act (49 °
U.S.C, 41) requires regulated common carriers tofile and publish
all rates and charges and strictly to observe them until changed
according to law. It accordingly is unlawful for any person to.
' give or receive any rebate or concession as a result of which
any property — by any device whatever — will be transported at
a lesser rate or will provide any other special advantage than
that named in the published tariff.
During 1961 criminal proceedings were instituted under the —
Elkins Act against a number of railroads performing questionable
loading services. Essentially, in each case the defendant rail-
road was performing the loading of freight for particular ship-
pers into those shippers’ trailers, with the apparent understand-
ing that these trailers were: to be shipped under plan III-type |
tariff arrangements. The applicable plan III tariffs provided that
the loading of. freight into and the unloading of freight from the
trailers had to be, performed by the shipper, consignee, or their
agents, at the shipper’s expense. In fact, the railroads were
performing the loading or unloading functions, purportedly as the
agents for the shippers. The railroads’ tariffs did not provi->
for performance of the loading. or unloading functions or the
agency relationship.
In December 1961, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the
Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company were each fined $1,000 on
_ pleas of nolo contendere to criminal informations alleging that
they loaded trailers for plan III shippers in circumstances such
as those just described. However, in a. similar, stipulated
factual situation the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, on June 8,
1962, was found not guilty of the- Elkins Act violations charged.
Subsequently, similar criminal charges against the Santa Fe and --
the Burlington railroads were dismissed at the request of the .
United States attorney. The extent to which a railroad may con-
tract privately with a TOFC shipper for these and similar services
incidental to TOFC transportation has thus remained unsettled.
322 I.C.C.
318 INTERSTATE COMMERCE ( MMISSION RE PORTS
. Billing and assessment of charges.—Although all-rail TOF(
services held out by. the railroads throughout the country hav
been formed into relatively standardized tariff descriptions, ther:
is evidence of tonsiderable confusion and disagreement withii
the transportation industry 2s to ihe precise application of tarif
rules, as well as evidence that published charges are not alway:
collected. For example, as the applicable plan III rate is ofte:
_ based on a weight factor, it ‘would seem that the participatin;
railroad would assume responsibility for ascertaining the weight:
of the shipments tendered, either by actual weighing or throug}
some system of certification by the shippers. In fact the clas:
I railroads in the western district have: devised procedures fo
certification of weights of TOFC loadings, as part of their lon,
established bureau system of weighing and inspection. But i
has become clear in this proceeding that a number of majo
railroads participating in TOFC operations have not been deter-
mining TOFC shipment weights by any reasonably reliable methoc
or procedure, and therefore cannot know whether proper charges
are being assessed.
Many plan III tariffs provide a rate applicable to the tota
weight of two trailers moving from one shipper to one consignes
on one day on one bill of lading. This rule is often loosely applied
with the result that it has no consistent’ meaning which can be
relied upon as a certainty by all potential shippers. In some
instances the railroads will consider that the ‘‘tender’’ of twc
trailers in a given 24-hour period by a plan III shipper satisfies
the tariff requirement. In any event it isa frequent practice for
the railroads to dispatch loaded plan III trailers whenever receivec
at the rail ramp, with the result that trailers which are pairec
for billing and rate purposes as single-day shipments actually
are shipped on separate days for arrival at destination on dif-
ferent days. We have also been informed of the practice in certair
types of TOFC movements (particularly in those where there has
been a conversion from plan II to plan III en route from origina!
_consignor to ultimate consignee) for the railroad which is taking
up the plan III segment of the shipment to neglect to issue a re-
ceipt or bill of lading until the day or so after it has forwarded
the shipment. This type of delayed issuance ofa required shipping
document may constitute a violation of section 20(11) of the act,
and can open the door to improper preferences to favored shippers,
in violation of the Elkins Act.
aan 1.C.S.
sat saan
Te RN HAR HS Dee SO O OD C2
0 —
a ie ee ee) ee ee i ¢ ? on © ee, ©? De @? ee
o
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK 319
ra
\
\
A similar, perplexing problem for shippers and carriers has '
been interpretation of the ‘‘mixture’’ tariff rule applicable to
plan III transportation of ‘‘all-commodity”’ traffic. Ordinarily
this type of rule will provide that not more than 60 percent of
the weight of a total, two-trailer shipment may consist of,any
one commodity or article. One frequent variation of this tariff, rule
provides the alternative test; not more than 60 percent of the
total shipment or not more ‘than 60 percent of 70,000 pounds,
_. The. carriers do not seem to be applying any consistent approach
in determining whether commodities being shipped are the * ‘same’”’
commodity or article. In general, neither commodity classifica-
tions nor other. published listings are used to determine whether
the articles includéd in a single shipment are sufficiently dis-
similar to constitute different commodities for the purposes of
mixture rules, This state of affairs leaves a railroad free to
haul straight truckloads of high-rated commodities at hidden.
bargain rates should it choose to’ do so for a favored shipper. ©
- Bearing in mind the historic&al development of piggyback trans-
portation and its present-day problems—as well as its appealing
advantages—we shall now proceed to an examination of the
issues raised directly by the instant investigation.
THE PROPOSED RULES.
At the prehearing conference held in this proceedingon October
9, 1962, a series of proposed rules, reproduced as appendix II
hereto, was distributed. As noted atthattime, they were designed
to serve as aframework upon which rulesultimately to be adopted,
if any, could be developed. The proposed rulesrepresented some-
thing of a new approach to TOFC terminology as they attempted to
separate TOKC service, without regard to the five numbered plans
now in common use, into two more basic classes; ‘‘joint inter-
modal’? TOFC service which would include any piggyback service
performed jointly by a rail carrier and amotor or water common
- carrier; and ‘‘all-rail’’ TOFC service which would include any
piggyback service in which traffic moves exclusively at rail rates
and on rail billing.
The proposed rules were predicated upon the basic premise that
all persons desiring to use TOFC service shouldbe able to do so,
with the charges for the same services being equal to all users,
whether they be motor or water carriers, freight forwarders, or
privaté shippers. The proposed rules B-4, B-5, C-1, and C-2 in
322 I.C.C. .
o s
320 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS ~
particular were designed to implement this concept. Other impor-
tant aspects of the proposed rules included a requirement that a
-rail carrier providing all-rail TOFC service make specific
provision in its tariffs for all incidental and accessorial services
offered by it in connection therewith (rules C-1 and C-2); a pro- -
hibition against the publication of joint intermodal TOFC tariffs
covefing commodities the transportation of which is not subject
to economic regulation for their entire movement (rules B-2 and
C-7); a requirement that rail carriers providing joint intermodal
TOFC service ascertain whether their connecting motor or water
carriers hold appropriate operating authority (rule B-5); a require-
ment that where joint intermodal service is provided, the distance
over an intermodal route used by a railroad and a motor carrier
be not less than 90 percent -of the distance over the authorized
motor carrier route from origin to destination (rule B-3); a pro-
vision permitting joint intermodal TOFC service for the entire
line-haul movement (rule B-7); and a prohibition against the
leasing, directly or indirectly, by railroads or persons under
common control with railroads of highway trucks, trailers, or
semitrailers and rail cars to and from shippers or freight
forwarders (rule C-3). |
Section D of the proposed rules contained certain billing and
notification requirements. These would have included a require-
ment that TOFC service be provided only when the movement was
covered by a bill of lading and manifest with appropriate certifica-
tion of weights and contents of trailers (rules D-1 and D-2); a
regulation providing that two trailers would have to be tendered on
the~game day in order to qualify for a rate covering the trans-
portation of multiple vehicles (rule D-3); and a rule which in
effect permitted rail carriers to restrict the application of all-
commodity rates to shipments containing no more thana designated
percentage of a single commodity (rule D-5). ;
e
THE EXAMINE RS* RECOMMENDATIONS
The examiners, in their report and recommended order, find
a general need for the promulgation of rules and regulations
which would have the effect of fostering the orderly development
of TOFC service. The rules which they recommend be adopted
are set forth in appendix III tothisreport. The examiners recog-
nize the same general divisions of TOFC service into its ‘‘joint
intermodal”’ and ‘‘all-rail’’ aspects as do the proposed rules, but
322 1.C.c. °
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK — 321
they find the plan-numiber terminology useful and retain it. Plans
l and. V are defined specifically, and are grouped together as
**joint intermodal’’ service.
The examiners recommend that railroads performing all- rail
“TOFC service be required to publish in their tariffs all the rates,
charges, and rules connected with such service, including charges
for leasing of equipment, detention of trailers; accessorial
services, and pickup and delivery service if any such services are
offered. The ban on leasing of equipment by rail carriers and
their subsidiaries to or from shippers contained in the rules as
originally proposed would not be retained by the examiners.
They would, however, require that all charges for the leasing and
return of equipment be included.in the rail carrier’s tariff
publications. Also recommended for adoption were a number of
rules consisting largely of modifications of and improvements on
those originally proposed, all of which will be discussed later in
more ‘detail. te
Exceptions to the examiners’ recommended order and replies
to these exceptions have been filed by representative groups or
associations of, or by individual, rail, motor, andwater carriers,
freight forwarders, and shippers, and by our Bureau of Inquiry
and Compliance. In large part, the positions taken by the parties .
in. their exceptions, or in replying to the exceptions of others,
reflect those expressed in their representations and considered
at length by the examiners. Like the examiners’ recommendations,
their arguments can best be discussed in relation to the specific
topics treated below.
THE NEED FOR TOFC REGULATIONS
If there is one predominant theme that has run through the vast
majority of the many representations and pleadings filed in this
proceeding, and stressed by those participating in the oral argu-
ment, it is the desire for flexibility. Carriers and shippers alike
_ agree that TOFC hasalready established itself as an extraordinar-_
ily significant and valuable innovation on the transportation scene
and that it has an almost unlimited future ahead of it. Many of the
parties have arged that we take no action here which might have —
the effect of restricting the growth of piggyback, of forcing it into
any fixed mold, or of limiting in any way the inauguration and
development by the transportation industry—and particularly the
railroads—of new types of TOFC services and of new variations
on or applications of present services.
322 1.C.C.
wae as
322 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
There can be no doubt of the benefit which TOFC service has
already rendered the railroads in allowing them to recapture
traffic lost to competing modes of transportation, and especially
to private motor carriage. Also benefiting have been the motor
carriers, which have been provided with an opportunity, through
the use of plan I TOFC service, to obtain efficient line-haul trans-
portation and thus to help themselves even while their business —
helps their raih competitors; the freight forwarders, which have
been afforded an economical’ means for transporting the small
shipments | which they . consolidate; and—most important—the
shippers and the general public which ultimately reap the, benefits
of the increased efficiency and €conomy: that are invariably the
result of the combination of competing forces so that each operates
in the area where it functions best.
‘It is our purpose and our hope‘to encourage the growth of this
transportation phenomenon. Large-scale piggyback has had a
short history, but it is obviously no longer an infant. Perhaps we
might characterize it as a fast-developing teenager, healthy but
not without some growing pains. Looking back on some of our past
decisions—decisions which must necessarily affect the future of
TOFC service because they contain definitions or restriction$
which could hamper its logical deve'opment—it is apparent that
most of them were rendered during the infancy of this transporta-
tion prodigy, and some, like Motor-Rail-Motor Traffic in East and
Midwest, 219 I.C.C. 245, might almost be said to. have predated its
birth. The fact that these decisions were handed down before
anyone could have realized the important. place TOFC service was
destined to attain does not mean that ‘they reached erroneous
results, but it does mean that their pronouncements need to be
reexamined in the light of modern developments.
The assembling of the information necessary for sucha reevalu-
ation was one of the principal ‘reasons for our embarking on a
general investigation of piggyback operations, and the factual
material which has been introduced into this record, and which,
will be of great value to us inthe future administration of the act,
_ alone amply justifies this proceeding. The need for information
relating to TOFC service will, of course, be a continuing one if
‘ we are to remain propérly informed for the future, and-to keep it
flowing we have recently revised certain of our reporting require-
ments in docket No. 34364, Piggy back Traffic Statistics, to call for
_ the quarterly rons of TOFC traffic data by railroads, motor
322 I.C. C.
oe : | at
pretreat ceca tet
sages mode « ee a
OO ODO ae wee BD oe
= "399 1.C.C.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-—PIG6Y BACK . 323
and water carriers, freight forwarders, and the Railway Express
Agency. , -
‘In addition to ouf§desire to fill the gaps in available knowl-
_ edge about TOFC operations, there had arisen, shortly before this
proceeding was begun, certain immediate and pressing problems
which required solutions. For example, National Auto. Trans-
porters Assn.—Declaratory Order, 91 M.C.C 395 (the NATA case),
had presented anew the questions whether contract carriers should
be allowed to use TOFC service—a question answered in. the neg-
ative in the New Haven case, supra; whether interchange of TOFC
traffic between rail and motor carriers should be allowed at
other than common poinf&S of service—an issue which had been
treated earlier in Gilbert Carrier Corp. Extension—Kearny, N. J.,
72 M.C.C. 204; and how the certificates,. peculiarto carriers of
motor vehicles, limiting service to initial or secondary movements
should be interpreted vis-a-vis piggyback operations. Gordons
Transports, Inc., V. Strickland Transp. Co., 318 I.C.C, 395, had
raised again the problem, firstconsideredin Substituted Rail Serv-
ice by Red Ball Transfer. Co., 52 M.C.C, 75 and 303 I.C.C, 421, of
the use by a circuitous motor carrier ofa more direct rail TOFC
' service between authorized points. The propriety of the extensive
practice of leasing trailers for use in TOFC service between rail
carriers or their affiliates and shippers, and the apparent oppor-
tunities for rebates and discrimination afforded by this practice,
had been called to our attention by our field employees. The need
to deal consistently with the problems presented in each of these
Situations was instrumental in persuading us that a proceeding —
‘Such as the instant one was necessary.
The information that we have received from the parties and the
arguments which we have read and heard: make it apparent that
there are many differences of opinion as to the wisdom and the
correct application of some of our past decisions. This proceed-
ing affords the opportunity to explore the areas in which the dif-
ferences exist. Also, there have been revealed some abuses in the’
performance of piggyback service: To cite a single example, it is
clear that some railroads, in spite of the fact that their rates for
transporting loaded trailers in TOFC service are based on maxi-
mum weights, make no. attempt to ascertain the actual weight
of the shipments tendered to them and are failing to collect
their published charges. .
We think that the record clearly supports the conclusign that it
would be in the public interest to lay down, through formal rules,
SN ee bE SNORE Anes reery sonal iene Seeaisinted aoe
a“ 324 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
2
‘
‘ certain guidelines for TOFC service and practices. .We visualize
these. rules as an aid in furthering, not restricting, the. growth of .
_ piggyback, as providing some standardization of industry practices,
and as a means of insuring that this recent and valuable trans-
pottation development is made available to all persons who are
able to make effective use of it. .Some of the rules to be adopted
here are simply interpretive, but we think itwelI to have summar-
ized and assembled in convenient form the various requirements
of thé Interstate Commerce Act as they relate to piggyback
operations.. Other rules take the form of tariff and billing require-
ments. Still others may be said to implement the broad provisions
of existing legislation. A few of the ‘parties challenge the legality
of our prescribing rules—particularly of the last-mentioned kind—
but we think we have ample authority to take such action. Under
parts II, III, and IV of the act, we are given a general rulemaking
power by: sections 204(a)(6), 304(a), and 403(a), respectively; and
. _in section 12. we are ‘‘authorized and directed to exécute and
~~ enforce’’ the provisions of partI. The Courts have recognized our
rule-making authority. See, for example, Assigned Car Cases, 274
U.S. 564, 575. et seq. (1927), which arose under what is now part
I of the act; American Trucking Assns. V. United States, 344 U,S,
298,-308-13 (1953), which/arose under part II; and United States Vv.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.S, 612, 616 (1945) in which the ante
Court pointed out that the act, since its inception— ;
=
has contained broad language to indicate the scope of the law. The very com-
' plexities of the subjéct have necessarily causedCongress to cast its regulatory
provisions in general terms. Congress has, in general, left the contents of
these terms to be spelled out in particular cases by administrative and judicial
action, and in ‘the light of the Congressional purpose to foster an efficient and
fair national transportation system. ,
The proposed rules distributed to the parties at the prehearing
conference contained several ideas which appeared to,many to be
both radical in approach and stultifying inneteffect. Particularly
criticized have been rule C-3 which would have flatly prohibited |
the leasing of trailers for use in TOFC service; rule B-4 which |
would have required that the charges received by a rail carrier |
under a division of. revenues for performing part of a joint
intermodal TOFC movement could be no greater than its.com-
pensation for performing all-rail service between the same points; _
and the statement in the material accompanying the draft df the
proposed rules to the effect that they did not contemplate the use —
322 I.C.C.
SOE ER PN CS RHO FH MERE Ba NES SNOT 78 he 1g a ee me te ANNE NPAT CIS KRDO PY eee a pan . =
x
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-—PIGGY BACK * 325
of TOFC service by motor .contract carriers. Proposed rules
- such as these were largely designed to drawas much comment as
possible from various components of the transportation industry
to the end that we might obtain as much assistance as. possible
from every faction in making our final determinations. The
response has demonstrated that they have served this purpose well.
We cannot help but be aware thay‘ the development of TOFC
transportation is not at a standstill, and that whatever we do here
will not be the final and definitive wordon all the ramifications of
piggyback service. KH any of the regulations to be adopted here
should prove in practice to have the unwanted effect of in any way
hampering the flexible development and free use of TOFC sérvice,
we feel sure that this fact will promptly be called to our attention
- by the affected carriers o~ shippers so that appropriate remedial
erage can be taken.
° ; DEFINITIONS
; Z
_ Part A of the proposed rules contains suggested definitions for.
three terms: ‘‘Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC).service,’’ ‘‘Joint
intermodal TOFC service,”’ and ‘‘All-rail TOFC service.” The
plan-number terminology is not used at all in the proposed rules,
but it is immediately apparent to those accustomed to thinking of
- piggyback services. in this way that ‘‘joint intermodal’’: TOFC
service includes what has come ‘to be called in the industry plans
I and V, while all-rail TOFC service includes plans II, III, and IV
and variations thereof. The-examipers used the plan- number
terminology throughout their report, and in their recommended
rules they provided definitions for plans I and V.
We agree with the examiners, and with virtually all the parties,
that~the five numbered plans have become firmly ensconced in
transportation language, and we are certain thatthe various TOFC
services will continue to be referred to in such terms regardless
of what we do here. At the same time, we think that the grouping
of these different services into two major classifications—inter-
modal service, in which traffic moves pursuant to a negotiated .
agreement for the division of revenue between carriers of dif-
ferent modes, and all-rail, or open-tariff, TOFC service, in which
only a rail rate is involved—represents a genuine and useful dis-
tinction. In the rules which we are adopting here, this distinction
is retained, but we see it as,one which simply exists as a neces-
Sary element of TOFC service, not as one which has to be, or
should be, imposed by definition.
' 322 1.C.C. , : ee ae
CAPER REARS aR GAN SMM EEO AERP EN MLR EET coke dictemsaieieainie MNT EF het Ee ’ . PRE TT 2 ae eee
2 > . ~ . ——~ “= — — - et ne + he ;
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326 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS:
Moreover, we do not ‘think it advisable to attempt a formal
definition of plan I or plan V TOFC service. Again the distinction
between them is a real one; and it is convenient to refer ‘to the
different types of intermodal service by these handy and well-
recognized terms. We are, obviously, using them inthis report.
But while they represent-a convenient form of shorthand, their
, use is not essential to the explication of TOFC regulations, One
' of the few parties commenting on the proposed definitions in
its exceptions, the Southern Railway System, takes the position
‘that the definitions contained in the examiners’ recommended
rules 2 through 5 are unnecessary and could lead to confugion.-
We are inclined to agree. The attempt specifically.to define cer-
tain types of TOFC operations could well prove futile, as well as
‘unnecessarily restrictive, in view of the industry’s demonstrated
capacity to develop new services and variations on old ones. The
ryles to be adopted, then, will contain a formal definition only of
TOFC service itself.
TOFC service would have been defined in proposed rule A-1 as
follows:.
. “Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) service’? means the transportation, in interstate
‘ or foreign commerce, of any freight-laden highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer
(or the container portion of any highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer having.
a demountable chassis) on a rail car, and/or the return transportation, in
interstate or foreign commerce, of any empty highway truck, trailer, or semi-
trailer (or the demountable container portion thereof) of a rail car.
° . 2) “
The examiners pointed out.that the meaning of ‘‘return transporta-
tion’”” might be subject to more than one interpretation, and they
recommended the following modification of the definition, in their
rule 1; ;:
“Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) service’? means the transportation, in interstate
or foreign commerce, of any freight-laden or empty highway truck, trailer, or
semitrailer (or the container portion of any highway truck, trailer, or semi-
trailer having a demountable. chassis) on a rail car.
On exceptions, the Western Railroads contend that this form of the
_ definition might also create interpretive problems as it could be
construed to include the transportation of new trucks and trailers
shipped by a manufacturer and not actually being used in perform-
ing piggyback service. They propose an alternative form of the
definition which, we believe, meets this objection and clearly and
adequately defines TOFC setvice. We shall, therefore, adopt it,
with minor modifications, as our rule 1:
322 I.C.C.
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=4 0A WS tl au 4 x ¥ . a ee — - ~ . .
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? * SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK - 327
1 Definition of TOFC service.— Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) service means
the transportation on a rail car, in interstate or foreign commerce, of (@) any
freight-laden highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer (or the container portion
of any highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer having a demountable chassis); or
(b) any empty highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer (or the container portion
of any highway truck, trailer, or. semitrailer having a demountable chassis)
when such empty equipment is being transported incidental to its prior or sub-
sequent use in TOFC service ,as defined in subparagraph (a) of this section.
-~
Several of the parties object that the examiners’ recommended -
rules as a whole, and particularly the definitions contained in
rules 2, 3, and 4, fail to provide for the use of TOFC service by
water carriers subject to part ill of the act. There,is now some
use by such carriers of TOFG service in lieu of authorized water
service between certain Florida ports. It was certainly not our
intention in instituting this proceeding to preclude the continuance
of such operations, and the rules to be adopted will make provision
for the use by water carriers of piggyback service. Operations of
_this kind should not be confused with those in which water carriers
transport their own or other carriers’ or shippers’ trailers or
containers by water in so-called fishyback service. That. portion
of the instant proceeding involving the latter type of service has
_been separated from the other issues involved herein for individual
treatment and oral hearing by order entered November 12, 1963.
OPEN-TARIFF TOFC SERVICE
Every TOFC service necessarily involves the participation ofa
railroad which performs certain line-haul transportation. This ~
fact, so obvious that it may seem banal to draw attention to it,
is of fundamental importance in any consideration of either the
practical or legal aspects of piggyback operations. So too is the
further proposition that because TOFC operations involve the
rendering of a rail service, they also involve the earning of some
compensation by a rail carrier and the provision, through some
form of tariff publication, for transportation charges, at least a.
portion of which will ultimately be received by a rail carrier.
There are only two ways in which a rail carrier can provide
for receiving compensation for its transportation services. Itcan
through tariff publication establish charges, which must be just
and reasonable, for a particular service to be rendered, or it can —
enter into joint-rate arrangements with other carriers and estab-
$22 1.C.C. -
328 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
lish divisions, which must. also be just and reasonable, of the
charge established jointly for the through service. The proposed
rules, in attempting to achieve the endthat TOFC service be made
available to all at equal charges, took an approach which would
have required that the divisions received by a rail carrier pro-
viding joint intermodal service could not exceed any all-rail TOFC
rate maintained by the rail carrier for like services. Proposed
‘rule B-4 would provide: . | :
The railroad or railroads providing TOFC service jointly with motor or
water common carriers shall receive no greater compensation or charge for
its or their portion of the total intermodal movement than it or they would
receive under any all-rail TOFC terminal-to-terminal rates or charges
maintained for like service between the same points.
Also, proposed rule B-5 would have required any rail carrier pro-
viding joint intermodal TOFC service with any motor or water -
carrier to do so indiscriminately with other such carriers. This
rule reads as follows:
Any ~sailroad which provides TOFC service jointly with any motor or water
- common carrier shall not refuse to enter into a like arrangement with other
motor or water common carriers under similar circumstances and conditions,
except that such railroad shall have the duty of ascertaining whether the con-
necting motor or water carriers hold appropriate authority to transport the
involved commoditiés, If the connecting motor or water carriers do not hold
such authority, no ‘joint intermodal TOFC service shall be performed with
respect thereto.
The. hearing examiners rejected both these proposed rules, 2
and we think that they were correct indoing so. We do not believe
that it would be practical to attempt to control by a rule of general
applicability the level of compensation to be received under divi-
sion agreements which are, by nature, private contracts negotiated
by individual carriers. We are, nevertheless, still concerned with
the concept of equal TOFC charges for all underlying the proposed
_rules. For this reason, in the notice setting this proceeding for
oral argument, another approach was suggested, andthe parties
were asked to discuss ‘‘Whether, and under what circumsgances or
requirements, TOFC service provided under an ‘open tariff’ can
- and should be made available to everyone (including freight for-
2¥hey did, howevez, recommend adéption, in their rule 9, of the substance
of the second portion of proposed rule B-5 requiring rail carriers to ascertain’
whether connecting motor carriers hold appropriate authority to join in TOFC
service. This matter will be discussed subsequently.
322 I.C.C.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK 329
warders, express companies, ‘and common and contract motor and
water carriers, exempt or regulated). ys
‘It is the concern of the rail carriers that should motor carriers:
be given the: opportunity to utilize TOFC service at the open-
tariff rate for their line-haul movements, they will be in a posi-
tion to divert traffic from all-rail TOFC service.. Those support-
_ ing the extension of open-tariff TOFC service to other carriers
point, on the other hand, to the obvious fact that whenever such
service is used, whether by private shipper, freight forwarder,
or competing carrier, the immediate result is revenue for the.
railroad. Why, they ask, should a railroad object to receiving
additional business? The only concrete, practical answer to this
query by any railroad party to this proceeding is that there may
be situations in which a TOFC open-tariff rate between two given
points is established, for competitive reasons, at a particularly
low level, and that by using TOFC service between two such points
a motor carrier could take advantage of the favorable rate in
the performance of part of its line-haul transportation and thus
‘provide service at points beyond those named in the TOFC ¢oriff
at a lower rate than, and thus to the ultimate detriment of, the
railroad.
It is argued by some that the use of open-tariff TOFC peeriee-
by carriers would be in contravention of the st&ted national
transportation policy ‘‘to provide for fair and impartial regulation
Of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this
Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent
| advantages of each * * *.’”* The Western Railroads, for example, in
their reply to exceptions argue that meter carriers would thus
be able to ‘“‘exploit’’ the railroads’ ‘‘acknowledged ‘inherent
advantage as the nation’s low-cost line-haul carrier of goods for
great distances,’’ and that this ‘‘inherent advantage would be sub-
, Merged, to be used’as a means by which motor carriers could
_ establish their primacy in surface transportation.’’ What they
overlook is that all TOFC service is inherently bimodal in that its
basic characteristic is the combination of the inherent advantages
of rail and motor transportation: the railroad’s ability to provide
efficient line-haul transportation of huge volumes of freight for
great distdnces at high speed; and the motor carrier’ s ability to
provide door-to-door, and if necessary job- or farm-site, pickup
and delivery. TOFC could even be said to be trimodal, because
added to the two factors already mentioned is its ability to com-
bine in a type of container service many smiall shipments—a
322 I.C.C.
3
: 4
YY
330 | INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
type of service which has become associated with the business of
the freight forwarder. :
‘It should not be forgotten in considering the arguments advanced
here ‘that all three—rail carrier, motor: carrier, and freight
forwarder—are even today providing, through the use of piggy-
back, services which in physical characteristics are substantially -
similar. Any one of the three can offer a transportation service
which includes door-to-door pickup and delivery, movement -of
loaded trailers between a shipper’s premises and a rail yard,
and line-haul transportation of the loaded trailers by rail. The
railroad does this under its plan II TOFC tariff; the trucker does
it under plan I, in which it is encouraged by the railroads (all
railroads participating in this proceeding except the Southern
Railway System favor continuation of plan I); and the freight
forwarder does it through use of plans III and IV rail tariffs.
We think that the rail carriers’ fear that the free use of open-
tariff piggyback service by motor carriers would end in the
elimination of the inherent advantage of rail transportation is mis-
placed. On the contrary, it seems obvious to us that the inherent
advantages of each mode of transportation can be given freest play
through the highest degree of coordination, and that encourage-
ment’ of such coordination is in the public interest. We might
also note that the presidential transportation message of 1962
asked that all carriers be assured the “‘right to ship vehicles
or containers on the carriers of other branches of the transporta-
tion industry at the same rates avai! .oletonon-carrier shippers,”’
so that the various carriers would be placed ‘‘in a position of
- equality with freight forwarders and other, shippers ‘in the use of
the promising and fast-growing piggyback and related techniques.”
Those protesting against the legality df the use by a carrier
of open-tariff TOFC service point to a line of our decisions in
which we concluded that it was ‘‘repugnant to the act’’ for a per-
son to act as both a carrier and a shipper which respect to the ©
same service. That such was stated in a number of cases can-
not be disputed, but it should also be noted that when this pro-
ceeding was instituted, one of its stated goals was the ‘‘reexami-
nation of existing Commission precedents and pronouncements
governing coordinated and substituted Service transportation.”
It is. argued, however, that this longstanding and consistent
administrative interpretation of the act must be deemed to have
received the effect of law and that we are precluded from
changing it. Cited as supporting this general rule are United
322 1.C.C.
Pe
ba
ns
~
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-—PIGGY BACK , 331
tates v. Leslie Salt Co., 350U.S. 383 (1956); Helvering v. Winmill,
05 U.S, 79 (1938); and Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry, Co.v.United States,
09 F, Supp. 35 (1962). Certainly, were we summarily to reject
ast Commission holdings and attempt somehow to penalize some
ndividual party subject to our jurisdiction for engaging in-a
ourse of conduct in which he had followed those holdings,-the
rinciple enunciated in the cited cases would be applicable. We
o not, however, understand the courts to have taken the inflexible
osition that an administrative agency, even if it-has followed a
onsistent ,line .for some time, cannot, ‘when faced with new
evelopments or an appreciably changed factual picture in the
egment of the national life which it is charged with regulating,
lter its past interpretation in a formal proceeding such as this
here rules having future effect are to be issued. When cogent
easons and thé public interest compel it, even a consistent and
enerally unchallenged administrative practice may be overturned.
ompare Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, ,
15 (1933)..
So far as we have been able to danetine: ‘the first time the
ommission made the definite statement that a person could not
-t_ as both carrier and shipper as to the same service was in
@ 1939 decision in Substituted Freight Service, 232 I. C.C, 683.
hat proceeding’ arose soon after the beginning. of Federal
-gulation of interstate motor carriage andewas directed toward
stermining whether certain special permissions granted as atem-
rary measure to permit continuance of substituted service
‘rangements of a type prevalent prior’ to the effective date of
irt Il of the act should be renewed. The special permissions
lowed publication of tariff rules which in turn provided for the
ibstitution of motor for rail, water\ for rail, and rail for
ater service. They did not require motor common carrier
erating authority as a prerequisite for the substitutionof motor
rvice for rail or water service; they permitted Substitation
the carrier’s option, without giving the shipper a negative
tion; and they did not call for the identification of the parties
rticipating in the substituted service or of the routes to be used
erein. The Commission concluded that the special permissions
ould not be renewed, and in doing so made three specific findings:
) that the service substituted for common carrier service is it-
lf common carriage and cannot be performed by- motor vehicle
the absence of appropriate motor common carrier authority, (2)
at the substitution of one form of transportation for another ~
322 I.C.C. mines -
*,
~
332 INTERSTATE COMMER COMMISSION REPORTS
\
!
where the ‘ shipper ptherwise directs would be a breach of the
_ contract of_ carriage, and (3) that the routes over which sub-
stituted service is performed and the parties performing it
_ must be fully set forth in lawfully filed. tariffs. Certainly, we
would not dispute any of these findings; in fact, we shall incorpo-
rate them in the.rules to be adopted.
“The statement that a person may not act as both carrier anc
shipper as. to the same service appears first at page 688 of the
- report in Substituted Freight Service, supra. The Commissior
there noted that the substituted . service practices of the easterr
rail carriers differed from most others in that these railroads
utilized ‘‘so-called contract carriers’* in such service, and that
they “‘argue that neither they nor such tontract carriers are or
should be required to act as common carriers. by motor vehicle
. in their relation to the public.’” The report then states, withou'
explanation or supporting precedent; ‘‘But they cannot act as
‘common carriers by rail and shippers by motor -vehicle as tc
identically the same service.’’ Later, on page 690, in discussing
‘an arrangement whereby Consolidated ,Freight Lines, Incorpo-
rated, substituted rail service for its authorized motor service
between Minneapolis, Minn., and asian ol Mont., the Commissior
said; :
It appears that between these points it acts asa semanade or shipper ani
assembles the traffic tendered by the individual shippers isto carload lots
paying the railroad the carload rate between Minneapolis and Terry and assess
ing the individual shipper or consignee its less-than-truckload rate betwed
primary origin and destination. But for itfo act as a common carrier by moto:
vehicle and as*a shipper by rail as to the same service is just as repugian
to’ the act as the reverse situation of the eastern rail carriers, although i
this instance it appears that it actually has common-carrier rights betwee!
Minneapolis and Terry. :
Considering the limited nature of the ultimate findings ir
Substituted Freight Service, supra—that is, that service substitutec
for common carriage must itself be common carriage and that the
tariff publications alowed under the special permissions were
legally insufficient—it is not clear to us why the underlying con-
clusion that.a person may not be both shipper and carrier wit
a, respect to the same service was necessary to the determinatior
of the case. A. contrary result had previously been reached ir
1936 “in Trucks) on Flat Cars between. Chicagd and Twin Cities
216 [.C.C, 435. There the es Great Western Railroad hac
322 I C. Cc.
’ SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK = 333
;' wiht. prior to the passage of part II: of the-act, an open-
tariff TOFC rate Which was primarily: designed to attract the
traffic of a motor common carrier, Keeshin Motor Express
Company. The rate was approved, and the Commission commented,
“at page 444, ‘“‘We have here a published tariff, and a motor
carrier would have the same right to make shipments thereunder .
as any other member of the body politit.’’ -Later, when motor
transportation was made subject to our regulation, th»> making
possible the filing of joint motor-rail rates, the Great Western
“and Keeshin joined in publishing such rates, which wer approved
in Motor-Rail-Motor Traffic in East and Midwest, 219 I.C.C, 245.
The Great Western stated at that time that its intention was to
-withdraw the open-tariff. rates previously approved, but the
Commission in no way indicated that such a tariff gould not be
used as originally. proposed; that is; by.motor gommon carriers.
Nor did it inSubstituted Freight Service, supra,either specifically:
overrule or attempt to: distinguish Trucks on)Flat Cars between
Chicago and Twin Cities, supra.
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the Com-
mission in Substituted Freight Service, in saying that a person
could not ‘be shipper and carrier as to the same service, did not
intend to proscribe the kind of substituted service originally in-
tended by thet
carrier service is-.substituted for another through the use of an
open-tariff rate of the carrier performing the substituted service—
provided that proper notice is given in the tariff publication of the
carrier using the substituted service. What this language was
directed‘ at, as we understand it, was the use of open-tariff
Servite by a carrier not acting in its proper role of carrier,
but acting instead as a shipper or forwarder. Such a-situation
might occur were a carrier to tender a shipment to. another
carrier for transportation to a: point ft cannot serve or over'a
route it cannot use, or without providing in its tariffs for the
substitution. Consistent with this interpretation is the fact. that
the report characterizes Consolidated’s operation between Minne-
apolis and Terry as that ofa forwarderor shipper. Presumably, had
Consoligated, through an appropriate tariff publication of the kind
)
reat Western and Keeshin in which one common. .
prescribed in. Substituted Freight Service, held out ‘its Service
as a motor cayrier, through the use of substituted service, the
arrangement would have received the same approval as did the
original Great Western-Keeshin proposal. rye \.
$22 1.C.C. | , ibtic ;
‘
<\
page 688 it is said:
¢.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS
. r)
.We think that certain other language in the report in Su bstituted
Freight Service, supra, also tends to support this conclusion. At
.
.
_In either event, where the substitution service consists of a combination cf line-
haul movements. by’ rail and motor, it is in legal effect a joint service, nc
matter by “what other name it may be designated. Under the act and our regu-
lations theréunder, it is fundamental that the service covered by publishec
rates, the routes over which it is performed, and the names of the carrier:
performing the service must be set forth definitely in the governing tariffs
for the information of the shipping public, interested carriers, and the
regulatory body, in order to insure the effective and fair administration re)
the act.
Again it should. be noted that the emphasis is placed upon the
proper publication and notice to the shipping puntic, and age
there is ho rgquirement that what*is called a ‘‘joint service”
can only be performed under joint rates and not pursuant to a
properly published substitution arrangement using the open-tarift
rates of the underlying carrier. Admittedly, certain. of our
decisions, including Ringsby Truck, Lines, Inc.V. Atchison, T.&S
F. Ry. Co.,263 L.C.C, 139, 141, Savage Application, 265 I.C.C, 157,
167, and the New Haven case, supr@, have followed a contrary
interpretation of the Substituted Freight Service case. Weare now
‘of the opinion, however, that these decisions, although'we do not
doubt that when made they represented sound conclusions, are
incorrect in the light of this. record and current conditions. Twe
other decisions cited by tise opposing the use of open-tarift
TOFC service by motor carriers, . Greer Broker Application
23 M.C.C, 417, and Stone’s Erp, Inc., Common Carrier Application
32 M.C.C. 525, are consistent with our present interpretation of!
Substituted Freight Service, supra.
Another argument which is advanced by a number of the parties
is that.any intermodal operation in whjch transportation services
are performed by two or more carriers will necessarily result
in the creation of a de facto through route. Because we. are
without statutory power directly to require the establishment re)
through motor or motor-rail routes, this argument continues,
we are also without power indirectly to require their establish-
.ment by compelling rail. carrier's to. provide open-tariff TOFC
service to other carriers. It is, of course, well estabjished that
what isa through route is a matter of fact, and that a througt
’ route may be found. to exist in the absence of a joint rate or any
other express arrangement between the carriers involved. Den-
322 1.C. CL
o ee i ath: bea
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK 335
°
ver & R. G. W. R--Co., V. Union Pac. R. Co., 351 U.S, 321 (1956);
Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S, 549 (1952); and Hausman
Stéel Co. v. Séaboard Freight Lines, Inc.,*32 M.C.C, 31, 37, and °
cases cited ‘therein. However, to say that'we would be requiring:
4 the establishment of through routes merely by finding that it is
lawful for a motor: carrier to use the open-tariff TOFC rate of
a rail carrier overlooks the fact that such a finding would involve
no complision whatever—either on rail. carriers to hold out a
TOFC service or, if they do, on motor carriers to'use it. We
find this argument to be without merit. °
We can see no justification, either . from the standpoint of
| legislative limitations or of policy considerations, for. .holding
| that.one carrier may in no circumstances make use of the services
which another carrier holds-out to the public generally. So long
as the first carrier.is operating qua carrier and gives the public
proper notice through its. tariffs, it can substitute anether’s
service for its own in this way. Of course, should the first
carrier hold out to perform what may amount only to assembly
and distribution services at points, and should it use the under-
lying tranSportation of the second carrier between points, which
it cannot itself serve in a practicable manner, it weuld no doubt
be found to be operating not as a carrier but as a freight for-_
warder as defined in section 402(a)(5) of the act. Where it does*
have the requisite authority, it may perform such service not as
a forwarder but as a carrier because section 402(a)(5) defines
freight forwarder as any person performing forwarding services
other than as a carrier su dject to pgrts I, ll, or Ill of the act. We
are aware of no other legal impediment to the use of an open-
tariff service by any carrier, whether common or contract, anu
whether or not subject to our regulatory jurisdiction. ;
Section 2 of the act requires rail carriers subject to part I
to make ‘“‘like and contemporaneous -seryice in the transportation
of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar cir@umstances
and conditions’’ available to any person at a charge no greater
and no less than that received from any other. person. It might be
argued, however, that © service provided for a competitor could
stances and conditions’’ as that provided for private shippers.
Whether two or more transportation services were performed
“under substantially .‘similar circumstances and conditions’’
would be a matter of fact to-be determined in each individual
case as it arose, but we see no reason why the fact that the user
322 I.C.C.
not be said to.be performed “under substantially similar circum;: —
336 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS ~
e : .
of a service was another carrier rather than a private shipper
would compel the conclusion that dissimilar circumstances and
conditions were present. In Louisville &N.R.Co. v. United States,
282 U.-S, 740, 753 (1931) the Supreme-Court, in upholding a finding |
of the Commission that transportation by railroads of private
passenger cars owned by other Pailroads. at other than published
tariff rates was unlawful, refused to recognize any distinction
between the transportation of cars owned by railroads-and pri-
vate shipper s. The Court ‘noted: that all such cars are hauled
between the same points, on the same line, in the same or like
trains, and in the same manner. This is equally.true of the
transportation of loaded highway trailers in TOFE service. “See
also Wagehouse Co. V. United States, 283U.S. 501; 511-12 (1931).
_Some...rail. carriers..are. apprehensive lest they be fotced.to
offer TOFC service to possibly financially irresponsible motor
carriers, thus running the risk that they i not, be paid for
‘ their services gy, that. they would be required! to handle unsafe:
motor vehicles. dbviously, a railroad would be free to deal with
a motor carrier wishing to use open-tariff TOFC service just
as it deals with any private shipper. Thus, .the rail carrier,
through a ‘tariff rule such. as Rule 9 of the Uniform Freight
Classification, can require that an insolvent or financially un-
reliable motor carrier prepay freight charges, or it can provide
that shipments not be surrendered until such charges afe paid.
-Also, it is clear that it would not be in the public interest to
ment. Rule 6(b), adopted subsequently’ in?this report, will deal
with this matter.
We conclude that when TOFC service is offered by a rail
carrier to the public generally, there’ is nothing to preclude its
use by motor or water common or contract carriers, in liéu of
their all-highway operations in the performance of authorized
allow, much less to require, any carrier a oe unsafe equip-
transportation between authorized service points, or by for-hire
carriers engaged in transportation whichis exempt from economic
regulation. To the extent that this conclusion differs from ‘that
expressed in any of our previgtis decisions, including the New
Haven case, supra, such decisions are heréby a@verruled. The
following rules.will be adopted to reflect this: conclusion;
2 Availability toall of TOFC service.~TOFC service, if offeredby a rail carrier
through its open-tariff publications, shall be made available to any.person at a
-charge no greater and no less than that received from any other person or
persons. for — for him or them a like and Cipletperenstas service in the
: 7 322 a C.
Lt . > REAR: SQ ES ere Bony ves
‘ SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-PIGGYBACK i. 337
. : ae
wae ww wewTaime Sw aS =
: ‘ emanated of a like kindof traffic under substantially similar circumstances .
and conditions, ‘
3 Use of open-tariff TOFC service ie motor and water carriers in the per-
formance of economically regulated trans portation.
(a) Eggert as otherwise may be prohibited by these rules, motor common and
contract carriérs, water common and contract carriers, and freight forwarders
may utilize TOFC service in the performance ‘of all or any portion of their
authorized service through the use of open-tariff TOFC rates ence bya
il carrier. ; 4
b) Motor and water.common carriers shall u utilize open-tariff ‘TOFC services
pis if their tariff publications give notice such service may be utilized
at their option, but that the right is reserved to the’ r of their services to
direct’ that in any particular instance TOFC service utilized,
(c) Motor and water contract carriers shall utilize opeti-tariff TOFC service
only if their - -transportation contracts and schedules make appropriate pro-
vision theréfor.
4 _ “@y Tatiffs of motor and Water’ céinimon cafriers and contracts and schedules
of motor and water contract carriers providing for the use of open-tariff~
TOFC service shall set forth the points between which TOFC service may .
be performed and = names of the rail carriers whose TOFC service may .
} be utilized,
JOINT INTERMODAL SERVICE
Having concluded. that there is neither legal nor policy bar to
the use by motor and water carriers of open-tariff TOFC service
proffered by rail carriers generally, and that: such use should be
allowed in the public interest, we come next to a consideration of °
“the proper status and scope which joint intermodal TOFC service
should possess in the broad pattern of piggyback regulation and
service. Initiallys it must be noted that no one questions that
voluntary coordination between the several modes 0 transport
should be encouraged and promoted to the fullest extent possible
in the interests of both the carriers \and the shipping public. Nor
does anyone assert that there is anything improper or unlawful |
} with respect to properly published, through-route and joint-rate
] arrangements among the various modes of carriage. Rather, what
is challenged\by certain of the parties herein is whether certain
Operations and services, and the tariffs embracing: rates and
charges therefor, properly fall: within that class of coordinated“
intermodal service which is allowable under the act. In order to
examine this issue in its proper perspective, it is necessary to”
review hriefly the legal growth and development of that kind of
Piggyback service which embraces_the participation of both sana
and motor common carriers.
$22 1.C.C. ‘
Fe nes PERRI NI EIY F . , “ : — : : —
°
Ce
-and points on the route of such railroad. This protestant claims * * * that joint
* ‘the one hand, and a poigt on a rail line,.an the other, We have frequently
reasonable, * * *
As many considerations bear ieee the feasibility and practicability of such |
338 °. 7 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS .
hte,
Prior to August 1935, when part II of the Interstate Commerce
Act became law, the motor carrier industry, was not subject to» ‘i
Federal regulation and such carriers, therefore, could utilize the
services of railroads as could any shipper. Trucks on Flat Cars
Between Chicago and Twin Cities 216 1.C.C. 435. Part Il of the | .
act, however, subjected” motor carriers to economic regulation
_ by this Commission, and section 216(c) thereof provided in specific
terms that, motor common carriers may establish reasonable
through routes and joint rates with*rail carriers. Shortly there-
after, the Chicago Great Western Railroad Company and certain
motor common Carriers proposed motor-rail-motor rates between
Chicago and various points east thereof, on thd one hand, ang, on
the other, Mingeapolis-St. Paul, Minn., and certain points in con-
tiguous territory. The ‘proposed rates were of the same amount
as the corresponding all-highway rates published by the partici-
_ pating motor ‘carriers, and the rail service of the Great Western
was to be performed (substituted) between Chicago and St. Paul.
These rates were approved by the Commission in November 1936,
in Motor-Rail-Motor Traffic in East and Midwest, 219 1.C.C, 245,
_the first reported Commission decision dealing with the subject
of. coordinated service by rail and regulated motor common car-
riers. The Commission stated, at pages 272-73:
i
One. of the protestants tontends that the ‘proposed routes are inconsistent
with the provisions éf section 217(a), w
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