Appendix — United States v. Standard Oil Co.

Supreme Court brief1966

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1965

No. 291

UNITED STATES, APPELLANT

vs.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

INDEX

Original Print

Record from the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Divi-

sion

Docket entries A

Information. ............................ rare ES 1

2

3

Defendant’s motion to dismiss information......

Stipulation SEC ee er POE Bees ated

Order granting motion to dismiss and dismiss-

ON MIG is a ss een ese esos nceres eee

Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the

| Be Rae eee eee nen neS

[ fol. A}

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-CrJ,

THE UNITED STATES

vs,

STANDARD OIL COMPANY

Fer U.S.:

Wm. J. Hamilton, Jr.

For Defendant:

Richard H. Miller of Mahoney,

Hadlow, Chambers & Adams,

Statistical Record

JS, 2 mailed 10-26-64 Clerk

JS. 3 mailed 8-26-65 Marshal

Violation Discharge gas into St, Docket fee

Johns River-Navigable waters

Title 83

See, 407

DocKET ENTRIES

Date

1964

Oct. 26 Information Filed.

Nov. 25 Notice of Arraignment on Dee, 4, 1964 at 9.30

A. M.

Dec. 38 Motion to Dismiss Information by Deft.

SLL EE AERO TYPE NA, RGIS SS IE ROE SEO IES

Pa

a

Arraigned and Plead Not Guilty

Continued to be set for Trial at a later date

WAM R-31

Notice of Hearing on Pending Motions on Feb. 16,

1965 at 10:20 A. M.

Notice of Trial on Mar. 8, 1965 at 9:30 A. M.

Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss BS

Continued for Term in open court BS

Stipulation between Parties.

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing

Information. R-32 BS

Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the

United States filed by United States

[Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing

paper omitted in printing]

| 3

[fol. 1]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-Cr-J

(83 USC 407)

[File Endorsement Omitted]

[Title Omitted]

INFORMATION—Filed October 26, 1964

The United States Attorney charges:

COUNT ONE

That on or about November 21, 1963, at Jacksonville,

in the Middle District of Florida, Standard Oi] Company

did discharge and deposit and did cause, suffer and pro-

cure to be discharged and deposited from and out of its

oil discharge terminal at the Standard Oil docks, 3117

Talleyrand Avenue, refuse matter, that is, 100 octane

aviation gasoline, into the St. Johns River, navigable

waters of the United States; in violation of Title 33,

United States Code, Section 407. |

EDWARD F. BOARDMAN

United States Attorney

By /s/ William J. Hamilton, Jr.

Assistant United States Attorney

_

4

{fol. 2]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-Cr-J

(33 USC 407)

[File Endorseraent Omitted]

[Title Omitted]

MOTION TO DISMISS INFORMATION—filed December 3, 1964

The Defendant, STANDARD OIL COMPANY (IN-

CORPORATED IN KENTUCKY), moves that the in-

formation be dismissed on the ground that it does not

state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the

United States of America.

MAHONEY, HADLOW, CHAMBERS & ADAMS

By /s/ Ear! B. Hadlow

Attorneys for Defendant

Post Office Box 4099

Jacksonville, Florida

[Certificate of service (omitted in printing) ]

—

(fol. 3]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-Cr-J

[File Endorsement Omitted]

[Title Omitted]

STIPULATION—filed March 24, 1965

The United States of America and Standard Oil Com-

pany, the defendant in the above-styled case, acting by

and through their respective undersigned attorneys, do

hereby stipulate and agree to the following facts, for the

purposes and subject to the limitations hereinafter set

forth:

1. On or about November 21, 1963, at Jacksonville,

Florida, certain employees of Standard Oil Company did

repair and clean a main, 8-inch line connecting one of its

bulk storage tanks at its Tallyrand plant with dock fa-

cilities.

2. At the completion of the repairing, cleaning and

airing-out of the line, employees of Standard Oil did refill

the line with 100-octane aviation gasoline which was then

stored in the bulk storage tank, and, because the main

shut-off valve at the dockside end of the line had been

accidentally left open, approximately 300 gallons of the

described gasoline spilled out of the open valve, onto the

dock, and thus into the St. Johns River, which constitutes

navigable waters of the United States. The shut-off valve

was closed immediately and the amount of the spill was

not such to impede navigation, to damage property or

to cause any fire or explosion.

[fol. 4] 3. Standard Oil immediately reported the matter

to the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and to the

United States Coast Guard. Thereafter Standard Oil

Company was charged, by information, with a violation of

Pa.

Resets em Rese a <TR ARORA AIOE! SOE AE TEP RENNES RPMS i aS SILOS ENT RIE EOS ETRE EL aM RENE

. 7

Title 33, United States Code, § 407, which states in part

that:

“It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or de-

posit, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, dis-

charged or deposited . . . any refuse matter of any

kind or description whatever . . . into any navigable

water of the United States.”

4. The 100-octane aviation gasoline which was acci-

dentally discharged into the St. Johns River was undi-

luted, unspoiled and unadulterated, and spilled directly

from Standard Oil Company’s main storage tank and

main delivery line running therefrom onto the docks and

into the river. Such fuel was sound, valuable and usable

material, in no way damaged or impaired in value prior

to the unintentional spillage thereof from the open valve

and into the navigable water.

5. The spilled gasoline was not salvaged by Standard

Oil Company and was dissipated into the river hy the

current, and by fire hoses and boat wakes of the Jackson-

ville Fire Department and the United States Coast Guard.

6. It is agreed by and between the parties that this

factual stipulation is submitted in this form for the sole

and single purpose of assisting the Court in making a

proper ruling in respect to and in disposition of the de-

fendant’s Motion to Dismiss Information heretofore filed

in this cause. Both parties reserve the right to file

another or supplemental stipulation of facts and to pro-

duce live testimony and exhibits in the event this cause

proceeds to trial.

[fol.5] ISSUE

The issue before the Court, accordingly, is whether or

not the United States of America has stated in its In-

formation facts sufficient to constitute an offense against

said United States of America, by alleging, in this re-

gard, that Standard Oil Company did discharge “refuse

matter” into navigable waters of the United States, which

refuse matter consisted of “100-octane aviation gasoline.”

%

_ ——

7

Respectfully submitted by and on behalf of the parties

hereto, at Jacksonville, Florida, this 23rd day of March,

1965.

EDWARD F. BOARDMAN

United States Attorney

/s/ William J. Hamilton, Jr.

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorney for the United States of

America

407 Post Office Building -

Jacksonville, Florida

MAHONEY, HADLOW, CHAMBERS & ADAMS

/s/ Earl B. Hadlow

Attorney for Defendant, Standard

Oil Company

P. 0. Box 4099

Jacksonville, Florida

—

[ fol. 6]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No, 64-298-Cr.J

| File Endorsement Omitted |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs,

STANDARD OL COMPANY

ORDER GRANTING MOTION To DISMISS AND DISMISSING

INFORMATION——March 26, 1965

On a prior date the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

(filed December 8, 1964) was argued and submitted by

counsel for the respective parties. Both government and

defense counsel were agreeable to the Court's considering

admitted facts in the disposition of the Motion to Dismiss,

At the Court’s suggestion, counsel agreed to submit a

written stipulation of facts to be considered by the Court

solely in connection with the Motion to Dismiss. The

case Was taken off the trial calendar for March 8 vo per-

mit this to be accomplished,

Formal Stipulation, dated March 238, 1965, was filed

by counsel for the parties March 25, 1965, and is con-

sidered by the Court in disposing of the Motion to Dis-

miss, The crucial facts now made to appear, in addition

to those alleged in the information, are these; By the

accidental failure to close a shut-off valve controlling a

line connecting the Defendant's bulk storage facilities at

its Talleyrand plant, Jacksonville, with its dock facilities,

about 800 gallons of 100-octane aviation gasoline was

permitted to spill out of the open valve onto the Defend-

|fol. 7] ant’s dock and from thence into the St. Johns

River, which constitutes navigable waters of the United

States, The shut-off valve was closed and the amount of

spill was not such as to impede navigation, to damage

—_7

property, or to cause any fire or explosion, The gasoline

so accidentally discharged into the river was undiluted,

unspoiled and unadulterated. It was sound, valuable and

usable material, in no way damaged or impaired in value

prior to the unintentional spillage from the open valve

and into the navigable waters, The gasoline was not

salvaged and was dissipated into the river by the current

thereof and by fire hoses and boat wakes of the Jackson-

ville Fire Department and the United States Coast Guard.

The Information here is brought under Title 38, U.S.C,

Section 407, which states in part:

“It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit,

or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged

or deposited... . any refuse matter of any kind

or description whatever . . . into any navigable water

of the United States,”

The information charges the offense in the statutory

language, referring to the substance discharged into the

river as “refuse matter”. The critical question is wheth-

er or not this valuable and entirely usable matecial may

be construed to fall into the description of “refuse mat-

ter”, This is so since the admitted facts at the least show

that the matter was “suffered” to be discharged,

The answer to this question seems to me to be found

[fol. 8] in U.S. v. The Delvalle, 45 F.Supp, 746, decided

by District Cater Circuit) Judge Wayne Borah in the

Eastern District of Louisiana of this Circuit June 24,

1942, There, as here, valuable and usable matter (fuel

oil in The Delvalle) was accidentally discharged into

navigable waters through the failure of a member of the

ship’s crew to completely close the shut-off valve,

Judge Borah’s Conclusions of Law were short and are

quoted herewith:

“Conclusions of Law,

“1. The statute in suit is a penal statute and

must be strictly construed,

2. The word ‘refuse’ is used in the statute in its

adjective sense, Webster's New International Die-

tionary, 2nd Edition, Unabridged, defines the ad-

as

10

jective, ‘refuse’, as follows: ‘Refused; rejected;

thrown aside or left as worthless or of no value;

worthless; useless.’

3. The oil involved in this proceeding was not re-

fused, rejected, or thrown aside or left as worthless

or of no value. It was not worthless nor unless. The

accidental discharge of valuable, usable oil, under the

circumstances set forth, does not constitute a throw-

ing, discharging, or depositing of refuse matter, and

is not a violation of the statute. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 407,

411 and 412.

4. The libel should be dismissed.

Let a decree be entered accordingly.”

Other cases are cited, Second Circuit, which might re-

quire a different conclusion. They are: The Colombo, 42

F.2d 211, and U. S. v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, Inc.,

195 F.2d 369. The Second Circuit said in the latter case:

“The spilled oil was certainly ‘refuse matter’; it

had escaped from the tank whither it could not be

{fol. 9] reclaimed; and for all useful industrial purposes

it had ceased to exist. The word, ‘refuse’, does not

demand that the material must have been deliberately

thrown away; it is satisfied by anything which has

become waste, however useful it may earlier have

been.”

Since the question is open in this Circuit, I am con-

strained to follow Judge Borah’s decision which to me

seems sound and well reasoned, based as it is upon the

dictionary definition of the term “refuse” not otherwise

defined in the statute. This is especially so since we deal

here with a penal statute which should be narrowly and

strictly construed. 7

In consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of the Defend-

ant Standard Oil Company is granted and the Informa-

tion is dismissed.

il

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Jacksonville,

Florida, this 26th day of March, 1965.

/s/ Bryan Simpson

Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

Copies mailed to:

EARL B. HADLOW, ESQ., P. O. Box 4099, Jacksonville,

Florida, 32201, Attorney for Defendant.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, (AUSA Hamilton), 407

Post Office Building, Jacksonville, Florida.

12

[fol. 10]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No 64-298-Cr-J

[File Endorsement Omitted]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF

Vv.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY, DEFENDANT

NoTIcE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES—filed April 26, 1964

I. Notice is hereby given that the United States appeals

to the Supreme Court of the United States from the order

and judgment of March 26, 1965, dismissing the infor-

mation which charged the defendant, Standard Oi] Com-

pany, with a violation of 33 U.S.C, 407.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 18 U.S.C, 3781.

II. The Clerk will please prepare a transcript of the

record in this case for transmission to the Clerk of the

Supreme Court of the United States, and include therein

the following:

1. Transcript of docket entries

2. Information

3. Motion to dismiss the information

4. Stipulation of facts to be considered by the Court

in connection with the motion to dismiss

5. Order granting the motion to dismiss and dismiss-

ing the information

6. This notice of appeal

Ls 4 r EY M él

13

III. The following question is presented by this appeal:

Whether gasoline which was permitted to spill out invo

navigable waters of the United States constituted “refuse

{fol. 11] matter” within the purview of 33 U.S.C. 407

prohibiting the discharge of any refuse matter of any

kind or description into the navigable waters of the

United States,

EDWARD F, BOARDMAN

United States Attorney

/s/ William J. Hamilton, Jr.

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated this 26th day of April 1965.

[Clerk’s Certificates to foregoing paper and transcript

omitted in printing. |

(oe. 3a} *°”

14

(fol. 13]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No, 291, October Term, 1965

UNITED STATES, APPELLANT

Vv.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida.

ORDER NOTING PROBABLE JURISDICTION—October 11, 1965

The statement of jurisdiction in this case having been

submitted and considered by the Court, probable juris-

diction is noted and the case is placed on the summary

calendar.

UV. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1965 791032 289

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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