Appendix — United States v. Johnson

INDEX

Table of Contents

Vol. I

Page

RA ORR eT RR TIT TE ES 1

DOCKET ENTRIES WITH ORDERS OF

SEPEEEETTEE sgstisicusshibvcnsittahiahuesiseaulasiteitapeianinsdlebsbacidehosbentatine 30

TUR s GRIN EM IIN ccccccsvovesecscnincinphastiniwaseienbasajatbasbeciiats 48

MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST COUNT. ...............0000 52

MOTIONS TO DISMISS SECOND TO EIGHTH

SEEEMEIET ; scdedinhacanip etddnpaiininehiinlanemnddtdenmeameaniaiilemakimiicans 61

MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ...0..0.....c.cccccssssscssscecesececesees 74

CHARGE OF THE COURT TO THE JURY ................. 77

EXCEPTIONS TO CHARGER ...........cecccssesssesessssssssesesesees 110

IEA Ls PROCTDINGS ....cccccsocecseroverqonovoverescosesssesvsceseraes 129

UIE III? Selects pceoscbconuioonesesintbitncsovincesidimseliamicei 172

EE PINOT scscerctunnninensstonisonencameninnsonssceidettiicilesasidbadeh 205

ES 8 PEER RCT RS ons Ey 206

Se I III ai asiastnlsciniasoenvnsntaorigeniiicelbatiiianteienlciat 210

Frances Brown Kiernan MEARE BERT GRIN setae 253

Earl Kunkel

Page

I sca sesensnsnivvvreesveneeovrveneensesenense 265

i cicccesicecensstsenenteuevegnionweninsestervens 276

SE 277

I I I sci recsisesvecessesmnevscertevvtdestoneviossessente 294

RES I 341

NE I TI PE ocescececevceceniscusvorseenseocenccveccrsens 355

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF

FL 6) SEE 462

EEE SLE eC 466

Vol. IT

ss snireetenebantcubavinabanse 499

i custsabunnbusonivecncionnes 516

ee wantuiunnatuecnsuseins 532

id aceneceiendseusanieneenveveoseneevevevencveeers 539

a coniernenbtnnebunes 558

I cseedemneneonovbonvegees 748

i csetulivebsanensons 784

eee hiscreersneccenisescosievnvaceeertvereeussvesesenees 790

I snavspeunebveeensveveenses 806

lh chicredenneneneeneneswenewvenseoeis tess 809

Robert Francis Kennedy ...............ccccsescescssesesessescesesees 837

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT No. 86-b (Memorandum

submitted to Attorney General) ...........ccccccccccseeseeecseeees 895

SPEECH OF MR. JOHNSON IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES (Ex. 91) wu... ccecscsscssesceeees 931

EDLIN’S REQUEST FOR ish eleciameane TO

cc FL) ) a ... 938

MOTIONS OF EDLIN FOR A NEW TRIAL AND

FOR JUDGMENTS OF ACQUITTAL NOV............ 953

MOTIONS OF JOHNSON FOR JUDGMENTS OF

acini inedhinctoeceennibbenononesicimeeenoes 958

Page

MOTIONS OF JOHNSON TO STRIKE TESTIMONY 964

JOHNSON’S REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO

THE JURY .......s.:0e0002 arevimmninaiit 966

MOTION OF JOHNSON FOR JUDGMENT OF

ACQUITTAL NOV and MOTION FOR A NEW

TRIAL, cecscecesessssssssccececscscesessssnssserecerncncscscnsscsoresssseseneneneessoes 973

AFFIDAVIT OF BRENDA FERMOYLE ............:0000 984

MOTION OF JOHNSON BASED UPON ARGU-

MENT OF THE ASSISTANT UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY. o.....cccsssssssssssssssessesensesenensenensnsecencnenenenenensenenes 985

— PEARS TS

INDEX

epee Ne eS Re ee epee Ae eee oe

Appellee’s appendix consisting of portions of the record from

the United States District Court for the District of Mary-

ME ebtwndt pot ote sals ae aden sean eerd ahs tn aaees

Transcript of procecdings (excerpts) -___.._..--.-_.-_-_-_-

Government witnesses:

Testimony of:

Jackson D. Rains: Direct______....._.____-

Raymond J. Davis:

SE ne eee een

5 aa. no ink wad wise me aia hoslin

Mary B. Mitchell: Direct.__.-...-..______-

T. Lamar Caudle: Direct__.___......_.-____-

Louis D. Goldman: Direct__..__._...______-

Defense witnesses:

Testimony of:

Manuel Buarque:

Rudolph Carrico: Cross___....___-_-.-_--_-

F. DeSales Mudd:

William L. Robinson:

Direct (resumed) ---.--..--------------

Frank W. Boykin: Cross___---_-_----------

Oral argument on behalf of the Government by Mr.

MN Bhi ies a de ee Se eens dao eS

Argument by counsel during post-trial proceedings on

August 6, 1963 on alleged improper somment by

prosecutor in opening summation_----__----.------

I I Be oe S dae arcade baweedenewns acees

Order extending time to file petition for writ of certiorari___-

Order allowing certiorari__--.---.....---..----._---_-_._-

1)

Proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals for the

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT Oi MARYLAND

No. 26067 Criminal

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

THOMAS JOHNSON

FRANK BOYKIN

J. KENNETH EDLIN

WILLIAM ROBINSON

Baltimore, Maryland

April 1, 1963

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury for the District of Maryland charges:

(1) That at all times hereinafter mentioned THOMAS

F. JOHNSON was a member of the House of Repre-

sentatives of the United States of America, representing

the First Congressional District of Maryland.

(2) That at all times hereinafter mentioned FRANK

W. BOYKIN was a member of the House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America, representing the

First Congressional District of Alabama.

(3) That at all times hereinafter mentioned the Depart-

ment of Justice was a Department of the United States,

created, organized and existing by virtue of Chapter 150

of 16 Stat. 162, entitled ‘‘An Act to establish the Depart-

ment of Justice,’’ enacted by the Congress of the United

States on June 22, 1870, and charged with the responsi-

bility of enforcing the laws of the United States.

(4) That at all times hereinafter mentioned the Attor-

ney General of the United States was the head of the said

Sra tee§ ESET oN LAT BOI TR EA RL ENTLY EN INE IN Ry

URE _——

App. 2

Department of Justice, and was assisted in the perform-

ance of his duties by the Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(5) That at all times hereinafter mentioned FIRST

COLONY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ING.,,

was a corporation organized and existing under and by

virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland, with its prin-

cipal places of business at Prince Frederick and Elkton,

Maryland.

(6) That at all times hereinafter mentioned FIRST

CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCTA-

TION, INC., was a corporation, organized and existing

under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland,

with its principal places of business located at Prince

Frederick and Chevy Chase, Maryland.

A |

(7) That from April 27, 1961, until on or about Decem- |

ber 31, 1961, CHARLES COUNTY LAND COMPANY, |

INC., was a corporation organized and existing under and

by virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland, with its

principal place of business located at La Plata, Maryland.

(8) That from on or about May 2, 1961, until on or

about December 31, 1961, LEISURE CITY LAND COM-

PANY, INC., was a corporation organized and existing

under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Virginia,

with its principal place of business located at Brooke,

Virginia.

(9) That at all times hereinafter mentioned TENSAW

LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY was a corporation

organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of

the State of Alabama, with its principal place of business

at Mobile, Alabama.

(10) That at all times hereinafter mentioned J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN dominated and controlled the business

policies and operations of the said FIRST COLONY SAV-

INGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., and the said

FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-

;

WCEy irr opens

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App. 3

CIATION, INC.; that at all times hereinbefore mentioned

in paragraph 7 J. KENNETH EDLIN dominated and con-

trolled the business policies and operations of the said

CHARLES COUNTY LAND COMPANY, INC.; and that

at all times hereinbefore mentioned in paragraph 8 J.

KENNETH EDLIN dominated and controlled the busi-

ness policies and operations of the said LEISURE CITY

LAND COMPANY, INC.

(11) That at all times hereinafter mentioned WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON was counsel, legal advisor, a direc-

tor and an officer of the said FIRST COLONY SAVINGS

AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., and of the said

FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-

CIATION, INC.; that at all times hereinbefore mentioned

in paragraph 7 WILLIAM L. ROBINSON was a director

and an officer of the said CHARLES COUNTY LAND

COMPANY, INC.; and that at all times hereinbefore men-

tioned in paragraph 8 WILLIAM L. ROBINSON was a

director and an officer of the said LEISURE CITY

LAND COMPANY, INC.

(12) That at all times hereinafter mentioned FRANK

W. BOYKIN owned a substantial interest in the said

TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY and domi-

nated and controlled the business policies and operations

of the said TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY.

(13) That on November 17, 1959, an indictment was

returned in the United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Maryland, being numbered 25038 on the dockets

and records of the said Court and styled, ‘‘United States

cf America vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James W. Bridges, First

Colony Savings and Loan Association, Inc., a Maryland

corporation, Rosabelle Edlin and Jackson D. Rains,”’

which said indictment was pending in said Court at all

times hereinafter mentioned.

(14) That from on or about April 1, 1960, and con-

tinuously thereafter until on or about December 31, 1961,

oT RELY BFE TOSS TE, ESOS TLIO TS, pe seer as gr sas tate

App. 4

THOMAS F. JOHNSON,

FRANK W. BOYKIN,

J. KENNETH EDLIN, and

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON,

herein named as defendants, together with FIRST COL-

ONY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,

FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-

CIATION, INC., CHARLES COUNTY LAND COM-

PANY, INC., LEISURE CITY LAND COMPANY, INC.,

and TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY, herein

named as co-conspirators but not indicted, and with other

persons to the Grand Jurors unknown, did unlawfully,

feloniously, wilfully, and knowingly combine, conspire,

confederate, and agree together and with each other

within the State and District of Maryland and at various

other places to the Grand Jurors unknown, to defraud the

United States of and concerning its governmental func-

tions and rights hereinafter described, to wit:

(a) Of and concerning its right to have its business and

affairs, and particularly the transaction of the official

business of the Department of Justice, conducted honestly

and impartially as the same should be conducted, free

from corruption, fraud, improner and undue influence, dis-

honesty, unlawful impairment and obstruction.

(b) Of and concerning its right to have its officers and

employees, and particularly personnel of the Department

of Justice, free to transact the official business of the

United States unhindered, unhampered, unobstructed and

unimpaired by the exertion upon them of dishonest, cor-

rupt, unlawful, improper and undue pressure and jin-

fluence.

(c) Of and concerning its right to have the lawful func-

tions and duties of the defendants THOMAS F. JOHN-

SON and FRANK W. BOYKIN in their official capacities

as Members of the House of Representatives of the United

States exercised, perfurmed and administered free from

corruption, dishonesty and fraud resulting from their

Bok

Seni ec ener tune SSMS y Pe see a 2 ae

App. 5

personal and pecuniary interest in the success of J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN, WILLIAM L. ROBINSON, FIRST COL-

ONY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,

FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-

CIATION, INC., CHARLES COUNTY LAND COM-

PANY, INC., LEISURE CITY LAND COMPANY, INC.,

and TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY in

attempting to persuade the Department of J ustice and

officials thereof to cause the postponement of the trial of

the charges contained in the indictment hereinbefore de-

scribed in paragraph 13, and the eventual dismissal of the

said indictment.

(d) Of and concerning its right not to be deprived of

the faithful, loyal and eccnscientious services of the de-

fendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOY-

KIN in their official capacities as Members of the House

of Representatives and as Members of Congress, unin-

fluenced by corruption and by payments of money and

other valuable considerations to the said THOMAS F.

JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN by the said other

defendants and the said co-conspirators as compensation

for service rendered and to be rendered by said THOMAS

F. JOHNSON in behalf of the said other defendants and

the said co-conspirators in relation to matters pending

in the House of Representatives and for services rendered

by the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W.

BOYKIN before the Department of Justice in relation

to proceedings, charges and accusations in which the

United States is a party and directly interested.

(15) It was a part of said conspiracy that the said

THOMAS F. JOHNSON should, at the request of the

defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, render services, for compensation, to said

defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON and to co-conspirators FIRST COLONY

SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., and

FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-

CIATION, INC., to wit, the making of a speech, defending

a

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“7

App. 6

the operations of Maryland’s ‘‘independent’’ savings and

loan associations, the financial stability and solvency

thereof, and the reliability and integrity of the ‘‘commer-

cial insurance’’ on investments made by said ‘‘independ-

ent’’ savings and loan associations, on the floor of the

House of Representatives.

(16) It was a part of said conspiracy that the defend-

ants THOMAS F. JOHNSON, J. KENNETH EDLIN and

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON would cause to be reprinted

50,000 copies of the aforesaid speech, delivered by the

defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON, for distribution to the

public at large, to prospective depositors in the FIRST

COLONY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,

and the FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN

ASSOCIATION, INC., and to members of the General

Assembly of Maryland during its 1961 session.

(17) It was a part of said conspiracy that the defend-

ants THOMAS F. JOHNSON, FRANK W. BOYKIN,

J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

and others would meet from time to time to prepare and

discuss the contents of a memorandum to be presented to

the Department of Justice and officials thereof to attempt

to persuade the Department of Justice and officials

thereof to cause the postponement of the trial of the

charges contained in the indictment hereinbefore described

in paragraph 13, and the eventual dismissal of the said

indictment.

(18) It was a part of said conspiracy that the said J.

KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON and

the said co-conspirators would corruptly give and pay

money and other valuable considerations to the said

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN to

bring the prestige, weight and iniluence of their said

offices to bear upon officials of the Department of Justice

in order to promote the interests and desires of the said

J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

and of the said co-conspirators in relation to the indict-

ment hereinbefore described in paragraph 13.

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App. 7

(19) It was a part of said conspiracy that the said

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN

should, at the request of the said other defendants and

the said co-conspirators, render services, for compensa-

tion, to said other defendants and the said co-conspirators

in relation to said indictment, to wit, by interceding with

and exerting their official influence upon the officials of

the Department of Justice and bringing the prestige,

weight and influence of their said official position to bear

upon them and upon the Department of Justice in order

to obtain decisions and actions upon said indictment

which would be desirable, beneficial and advantageous to

said other defendants and the said co-conspirators.

(20) It was a part of said conspiracy that the defend-

ants THOMAS F. JOHNSON, FRANK W. BOYKIN and

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON would call upon, confer with,

write letters to, and make telephone calls to the Attorney

General of the United States and the Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, at

their offices in the Department of Justice to attempt to

persuade the Department of Justice and officials thereof

to cause the postponement of the trial of the charges

contained in the indictment hereinbefore described in

paragraph 13, and the eventual dismissal of the said in-

dictment, and as compensation therefor the defendants

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN

would receive money, promises and other valuable con-

siderations from the said other defendants and the said

co-conspirators.

(21) It was part of said conspiracy that the defendants

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN

would request Charles H. Z. Meyer, Supervisor, United

States Probation and Parole Service, Chicago, Illinois, to

come to the District of Columbia for the stated purpose of

assisting the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK

W. BOYKIN in a Congressional investigation involving

savings and loan associations, and particularly the back-

ground of the defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN and his

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App. 8

relation thereto, and that the defendants THOMAS F.

JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN would take Meyer

to the Department of Justice to attempt to persuade the

Department of Justice and officials thereof to cause the

postponement of the trial of the charges contained in the

indictment hereinbefore described in paragraph 13, and

the eventual dismissal of the said indictment.

(22) It was a part of said conspiracy that the defend-

ants J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON would form a corporation known as Charles County

Land Company, Inc., to take title to a tract of land in

Charies County, Maryland, in which TENSAW LAND

AND 'TIMBER COMPANY held a substantial proprietary

interest, and from which the defendants THOMAS F.

JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN would receive com-

pensation for their actions and services on behalf of the

defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON and the aforesaid co-conspirators, as more

particularly described herein.

(23) It was part of said conspiracy that the defendants

J. KENNETH EPDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

would form a corporation known as Leisure City Land

Company, Inc., to take title to a tract of land in Stafford

County, Virgina, in which TENSAW LAND AND TIM-

BER COMPANY held a substantial proprietary interest,

and from which the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON

and FRANK W. BOYKIN would receive compensation

for their actions and services on behalf of the defendants

J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

and the aforesaid co-conspirators, as more particularly

described herein.

(24) It was a part of said conspiracy that the defend-

ants J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON would pay the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN and

TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY the sum of

Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00), and

would offer and promise to the defendant FRANK W.

BOYKIN and TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COM-

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App. 9

PANY commissions and other valuable considerations as

an inducement for the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN

to use his influence as a member of the House of Repre-

sentatives in attempting to secure the postponement of

the trial of the charges contained in the indictment herein-

before described in paragraph 13, and the eventual dis-

missal of the said indictment.

(25) It was a part of said conspiracy that the said de-

fendants and co-conspirators would conceal the aforesaid

receipt of money, promises and other valuable considera-

tions by the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and

FRANK W. BOYKIN and would do such other and

further acts as they might deem necessary and expedient

to prevent the disclosure of the said receipt of money,

promises and other valuable considerations by the said

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN.

OVERT ACTS

In pursuance of and in order to effect the objects of said

conspiracy, the defendants and co-conspirators did do and

perform numerous overt acts, including the following, to

wit:

(1) During the period from on or about April 1, 1960,

to on or about June 30, 1960, the defendants J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN, WILLIAM L. ROBINSON and THOMAS

F. JOHNSON met in the Congressional office of defendant

THOMAS F. JOHNSON, the Woodner Hotel, and the

Congressional Hotel, in the District of Columbia, and dis-

cussed the contents of a proposed speech to be given by

the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON on the floor of

the House of Representatives.

(2) Between on.or about April 1, 1960, and on or about

June 30, 1960, in the District of Maryland and in the Dis-

trict of Columbia, the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON and others prepared drafts of a proposed speech to

be given by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON.

SEEDERS! SALLE TRAP Tt AYA AR BTML A IS ITT

App. 10

(3) On or about June 20, 1960, the defendant WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON delivered a check drawn on his ac-

count at the Industrial National Bank of Miami, Florida,

in the amount of $500, to the defendant THOMAS F.

JOHNSON, payable to the defendant THOMAS F.

JOHNSON.

(4) On or about June 30, 1960, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON delivered a

speech on the floor of the House of Representatives.

(5) On or about July 5, 1960, in the District of Mary-

land, FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN

ASSOCIATION, INC., drew a check for $168.91, payable

to the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON.

(6) On or about July 6, 1960, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON caused and

directed the reprinting of 10,000 copies of the speech de-

livered on the floor of the House of Representatives on

June 30, 1960, by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON.

(7) On or about August 12, 1960, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON caused

and directed the reprinting of 40,000 copies of the speech

delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives on

June 30, 1960, by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON.

(8) On or about September 9, 1960, at Berlin, Mary-

land, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited

to his account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check

for $1,000.00, dated August 30, 1960, and drawn on the

account of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON at

the Industrial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(9) On or about November 4, 1960, the defendant WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON issued and delivered a check drawn

on his account at the Industrial National Bank of Miami,

Florida, in the amount of $300, to the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON, payable to Russell O. Hickman, Treasurer

for Tom Johnson for Congress Committee.

(10) On or about November 4, 1960, in the Dis-

RIE SN BE EG GENYES ERE TOL IIT NE TLL OE —

App. 11

trict of Maryland, the defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN

caused the FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND

LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., to draw a check in the

amount of $300, payable to the defendant WILLIAM L.

| ROBINSON, as reimbursement for the check described

in Overt Act 9.

(11) On or about January 13, 1961, at Berlin, Mary-

land, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to

his account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check

for $800.00, dated January 7, 1961, and drawn on the ac-

count of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON at the

Industrial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(12) On or about February 10, 1961, at Berlin, Mary-

land, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited

to his account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check

for $800.00, dated February 2, 1961, and drawn on the

account of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON at

the Industrial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(13) On or about March 2, 1961, at Miami, Florida, the

defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN reserved accommoda-

tions at the Eden Roc Hotel, for the defendant THOMAS

KF, JOHNSON.

(14) During the period from on or about March 3, 1961,

to on or about March 7, 1961, the defendants THOMAS

F. JOHNSON, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON met at Miami, Florida.

(15) On or about March 8, 1961, at Berlin, Maryland,

the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his

account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$800, dated March 6, 1961, and drawn on the account of

the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON at the Indus-

trial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(16) On or about March 24, 1961, the defendants

THOMAS F. JOHNSON, FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN, WILLIAM L. ROBINSON and others

met in the District of Columbia.

App. 12

(17) On or about March 25, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON,

FRANK W. BOYKIN, and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

called upon the Attorney General of the United States.

(18) On or about March 25, 1961, immediately after the

defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON, FRANK W. BOY-

KIN, and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON had called upon the

Attorney General of the United States, the defendants

THOMAS F. JOHNSON, FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN, WILLIAM L. ROBINSON and others

met in the District of Columbia.

(19) On or about March 28, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON caused

to be delivered to the Attorney General of tne United

States a memorandum together with a covering letter

addressed to the Attorney General of the United States.

(20) On or about April 3, 1961, at Berlin, Mar “land,

the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his

account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$800.00, dated March 31, 1961, and drawn on the account

of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON at the Indus-

trial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(21) On or about April 17, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON ealled

upon the Attorney General of the United States and the

Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart-

ment of Justice.

(22) On or about April 26, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN delivered

to the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN two cashier’s

checks, dated April 26, 1961, each for $125,000.00, payable

to TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY and

issued by the National Bank of Bethesda-Chevy Chase,

Bethesda, Maryland.

(23) On or about April 27, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, the defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN, WILLIAM

NRE ENT EY dere PO PES RAE —————————————————

_

App. 13

L. ROBINSON, THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK

W. BOYKIN caused and directed the incorporation of

CHARLES COUNTY LAND COMPANY, INC.

(24) On or about April 29, 1961, the defendants J.

KENNETH EDLIN, WILLIAM lL. ROBINSON,

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN

caused the sale of a certain tract of land in Stafford

County, Virginia, from TENSAW LAND AND TIMBER

COMPANY to LEISURE CITY LAND COMPANY, INC.,

for $3,000,000.

(25) On or about May 2, 1961, the defendants J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN, WILLIAM L. ROBINSON, THOMAS

F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN caused and

directed the incorporation of LEISURE CITY LAND

COMPANY, INC.

(26) On or about May 3, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK

W. BOYKIN called upon the Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(27) On or about May 4, 1961, the defendant FRANK

W. BOYKIN deposited in the United States mail a letter

addressed to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(28) On or about May 8, 1961, at Berlin, Maryland, the

defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his ac-

count in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$3,500.00, dated May 2, 1961, and drawn by FIRST CON-

TINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,

INC.

(29) On or about May 9, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited in

the United States mail a letter addressed to the Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of

Justice.

(30) On or about May 13, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN forwarded to

Pan.

RR a scgeoms or sss epee, ee Sr NREES

PRON ee, a ee

App. 14

the defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN a letter from the

Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart- .

ment of Justice.

(31) On or about May 15, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN forwarded to the

defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN a letter from the Attor-.

ney General of the United States.

(32) On or about May 15, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, FIRST SONTINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN

ASSOCIATION, INC., entered into a lease with the de-

fendant THOMAS F’. JOHNSON and his wife, providing

for the rental by FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS

AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., of a building owned

by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON and his wife

in Snow Hill, Maryland, at a monthly rental of $200.

(33) On or about May 22, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK

W. BOYKIN called upon the Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(34) On or about May 22, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON made a tele-

phone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(35) On or about May 23, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a tele-

phone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(36) On or about June 5, 1961, at Berlin, Maryland, the

defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his ac-

count in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$2,500.00, dated May 25, 1961, and drawn by FIRST CON-

ca SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,

INC.

(37) On or about June 7, 1961, in the District of Colum-

bia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a tele-

App. 15

phone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Jastice.

(38) On or about June 9, 1961, at Berlin, Maryland, the

defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his ac-

count in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$4,000.00, dated June 7, 1961, and drawn by FIRST CON-

TINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN. ASSOCIATION,

INC.

(39) On or about June 12, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and

FRANK W. BOYKIN called upon the Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(40) On or about June 13, 1961, the defendants

THOMAS F. JOHNSON and FRANK W. BOYKIN tele-

phoned Charles H. Z. Meyer, Supervisor, United States

Probation and Parole Service, Chicago, Illinois.

(41) On or about June 13, 1961, in Chicago, Illinois, the

defendant J. KENNETH EDLIN telephoned Charles

H. Z. Meyer, Supervisor, United States Probation and

Parole Service, Chicago, Illinois.

(42) On or about June 13, 1961, the defendants J. KEN-

NETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON met

Charles H. Z. Meyer in the Palmer House Hotel, Chicago,

Illinois.

(43) On or about June 15, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN, WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON, FRANK W. BOYKIN, and

THOMAS F. JOHNSON met with Charles H. Z. Meyer.

(44) On or about June 15, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN, WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON, FRANK W. BOYKIN and

THOMAS F. JOHNSON took Charles H. Z. Meyer to call

upon the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

Department of Justice, and other officials of the Depart-

ment of Justice.

App. 16

(45) On or about June 19, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(46) On or about June 23, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(47) On or about June 27, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and

FRANK W. BOYKIN called upon the Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(48) On or about June 28, 1961, at Berlin, Maryland,

the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his

account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$3,250.00, dated June 28, 1961, and drawn by FIRST CON-

TINENTAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,

INC.

(49) On or about August 1, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(50) On or about August 7, 1961, at Berlin, Maryland,

the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to his

account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check for

$2,000.00, dated August 4, 1961, and drawn on the account

of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON at the Indus-

trial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(51) On or about August 24, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(52) On or about August 24, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON called

upon the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

Department of Justice.

ORO IE PEELE DIN LET OME ANG SoHE TA MN ANOLE EIN TIE TERS: SOR sa a eT

App. 17

(53) On or about August 31, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(54) On or about September 7, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON ealled

upon the Attorney General of the United States.

(55) On or about September 8, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(56) On or about September 9, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(57) On or about September 14, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and

FRANK W. BOYKIN called upon the Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(58) On or about September 15, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON made

a telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-

nal Division, Department of Justice.

(59) On or about September 19, 1961, at Berlin, Mary-

land, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON deposited to

his account in the Exchange and Savings Bank a check

for $1,500.00, dated September 12, 1961, and drawn on

‘the account of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

at the Industrial National Bank, Miami, Florida.

(60) On or about September 20, 1961, in the District

of Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made

a telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-

nal Division, Department of Justice.

(61) On or about September 21, 1961, in the District

of Columbia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and

ss.

Rice en res OPEL ONS ARIE RID

Be, ns IPP te

App. 18

FRANK W. BOYKIN called upon the Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(62) On or about October 10, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON made

a telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-

nal Division, Department of Justice.

(63) On or about October 12, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(64) On or about October 13, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON called

upon the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

Department of Justice.

(65) On or about October 16, 1961, in the District of

Celumbia, the defendants THOMAS F. JOHNSON and

FRANK W. BOYKIN ealled upon the Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

(66) On or about October 18, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(67) On or about October 19, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN deposited

in the United States mail a letter to the Attorney General

of the United States.

(68) On or about October 20, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON called

upon the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

Department of Justice.

(69) On or about October 20, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Divisior, Department of Justice.

(70) On or about October 23, 1961, in the District of

REGAIN ASA OES CRIT SNL EE OER ae el ON A RR RINT LOR SPER NN OED

_—

App. 19

Columbia, the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(71) On or about October 23, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendants J. KENNETH EDLIN and

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON delivered to the defendant

THOMAS F. JOHNSON travelers’ checks in the total sum

of $3,000, issued by FIRST CONTINENTAL SAVINGS

AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.

(72) On or about October 25, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(73) On or about October 30, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

(74) On or about November 6, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN deposited

in the United States mail a letter to the Attorney General

of the United States.

(75) On or about November 21, 1961, in the District of

Columbia, the defendant FRANK W. BOYKIN made a

telephone call to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, Department of Justice.

United States Code, Title 18, Section 371.

SECOND COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland

further charges:

That on or about April 3, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a defendant,

being duly elected a Member of Congress, and after his

election and qualification as such and during his continu-

ance in office, acting jointly and in concert with FRANK

App. 20

W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, also named as defendants herein, the said

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counselling, com-

manding, inducing and procuring the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly

and corruptly did receive, directly and indirectly, from

the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, compensation in the sum of Eight Hundred

Dollars ($800.00), to wit, the proceeds of a bank check

bearing date March 31, 1961, being in the sum of $800.00,

payable to the order of Johnson and Johnson, and bearing

the name of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBINSON as

maker, which said check was drawn on the Industrial Na-

tional Bank of Miami, Florida, and was deposited in,

credited to, and final payment in the sum of $300.00 made

thereon to the account of the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON

at the Exchange and Savings Bank, Berlin, Maryland, on

or about April 3, 1961, the date and place of the receipt

of said check by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON

being to the Grand Jurors unknown, for services rendered

and to be rendered by him, the said THOMAS F. JOHN-

SON, before the Department of Justice of the United

States in relation to a proceeding, charge and accusation

in which the United States was a party and directly in-

terested, to wit: an indictment returned on November 17,

1959, in the United States District Court for the District

of Maryland, being numbered 25038 on the dockets and

records of said Court and styled, ‘‘ United States of Amer-

ica vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James W. Bridges, First Colony

Savings and Loan Association, Inc., a Maryland corpora-

tion, Rosabelle Edlin, and Jackson D. Rains,’’ and which,

as the said defendants then and there well knew, was

pending in said Court on April 3, 1961, the said services

consisting of interceding and conferring with officials

of the said Department of Justice, bringing the prestige

weight and influence of the said defendant THOMAS F.

JOHNSON’S official position to bear upon them, present-

ing assertions, arguments and allegations, and otherwise

<A GTOT, LE RL EE PS NRRL TOE AT I TET

App. 21

acting on behalf of the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON to influence and persuade the

said officials of the said Department of Justice in order to ob-

tain favorable decisions and actions in and upon the afore-

said proceeding, charge and accusation, to wit, the post-

ponement of the trial of the charges contained in the said

indictment and the eventual dismissal of the said indict-

ment.

United States Code, Title 18, Sections 281 and 2.

THIRD COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland further

charges:

That on or about May 8, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a defendant,

being duly elected a Member of Congress, and after his

election and qualification as such and during his continu-

ance in office, acting jointly and in concert with FRANK

W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, also named as defendants herein, the said

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counselling, com-

manding, inducing and procuring the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly

and curruptly did receive, directly and indirectly, from the

said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON, compensation in the sum of Thirty-five Hundred

Dollars ($3500.00), to wit, the proceeds of a bank check

bearing dated May 2, 1961, being in the sum of $3500.00,

payable to the order of Johnson and Johnson, and bear-

ing the name of First Continental Savings and Loan Asso-

ciation, Inc., as maker, which said check was drawn on the

National Bank of Bethesda-Chevy Chase, Bethesda, Mary-

land, and deposited in, credited to, and final payment in

the sum of $3,500.00, made thereon to the account of the

said THOMAS F. JOHNSON at the Exchange and Sav-

ings Bank, Berlin, Maryland, on or about May 8, 1961,

the date and place of the receipt of said check by the de-

App. 22

fendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON being to the Grand

Jurors unknown, for services rendered and to be rendered

by him, the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON, before the

Department of Justice of the United States in relation to

a proceeding, charge and accusation in which the United

States was a party and directly interested, to wit: an in-

diement returned on November 17, 1959, in the United

States District Court for the District of Maryland, being

numbered 25038 on the dockets and records of said Court

and styled, ‘‘United States of America vs. J. Kenneth

Edlin, James W. Bridges, First Colony Sav:ngs and Loan

Association, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Rosabelle

Edlin, and Jackson D. Rains,’’ and which, as the defend-

ants then and there well knew, was pending in said Court

on May 8, 1961, the said services consisting of interceding

and conferring with officials of the said Department of

Justice, bringing the prestige, weight and influence of the

said defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON’S official posi-

tion to bear upon them, presenting assertions, arguments

and allegations, and otherwise acting on behalf of the

said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON to influence and persuade the said officials of the

said Department of Justice in order to obtain favorable

decisions and actions in and upon the aforesaid proceed-

ing, charge and accusation, to wit, the postponement of

the trial of the charges contained in the said indictment

and the eventual dismissal of the said indictment.

United States Code, Tiiie 18, Sections 281 and 2.

FOURTH COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland

further charges:

Tha. on or about June 5, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a defendant,

being duly elected a Member of Congress, and after his

election and qualification as such and during his continu-

ance in office, acting jointly and in concert with FRANK

oe 25D pec tne torte! ARE GET ASL EL NOR va oy ee ee =

OS OR Rs IL TERY Re EOS RE EN URE ROE VAIL EAS SE ae RES LN LR Se eT Ne

_ —aa

App. 23

W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, also named as defendants lierein, the said

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counselling, com-

manding, inducing and procuring the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly

and corruptly did receive, directly and indirectly, from

the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, compensation in the sum of Twenty-five

Hundred Dollars’ ($2,500.00), to wit, the proceeds of bank

check bearing date May 25, 1961, being in the sum of

$2,500.00, payable to the order of Johnson and Johnson,

and bearing the name of First Continental Savings and

Loan Association, Inc., as maker, which said check was

drawn on the National Bank of Bethesda-Chevy Chase,

Bethesda, Maryland, and deposited in, credited to, and

final payment in the amount of $2,500.00 made thereon to

the account of the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON at the

- Exchange and Savings Bank, Berlin, Maryland, on or

about June 5, 1961, the date and place of the receipt of

said check by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON

being to the Grand Jurors unknown, for services rendered

and to be rendered by him, the said THOMAS F. JOHN-

SON, before the Department of Justice of the United

States in relation to a proceeding, charge and accusation

in which the United States was a party and directly in-

terested, to wit: an indictment returned on November 17,

1959, in the United States District Court for the District

of Maryland, being numbered 25038 on the dockets and

records of said Court and styled, ‘‘United States of

America vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James W. Bridges, First

Colony Savings and Loan Association, Inc., a Maryland

corporation, Rosabelle Edlin, and Jackson D. Rains,’’ and

which, as the defendants then and there well knew, was

pending in said Court on June 5, 1961, the said services

consisting of interceding and conferring with officials of

the said Department of Justice, bringing the prestige,

weight and influence of the said defendant THOMAS F.

JOHNSON’S official position to bear upon them, pre-

ERA IEP AEM NTR ARE ROELBO IEE EI A FE LEGS S| BEF

App. 24

senting assertions, arguments and allegations, and other-

wise acting on behalf of the said J. KENNETH EDLIN

and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON to influence and persuade

the said officials of the said Wepartment of Justice in

order to obtain favorable decisions and actions in and

upon the aforesaid proceeding, charge and accusation, to

wit, the postponement of the trial of the charges con-

tained in the said indictment and the eventual dismissal

of the said indictment.

United States Code, Title 18, Sections 281 and 2.

FIFTH COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland

further charges:

That on or about June 9, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a defendant,

being duly elected a Member of Congress, and after his

election and qualification as such and during his continu-

ance in office, acting jointly and in concert with FRANK

W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, also named as defendants herein, the said

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counselling, com-

manding, inducing and procuring the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly

and corruptly did receive, directly and indirectly, from the

said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON, compensation in the sum of Four Thousand Dollars

($4,000.00), to wit, the proceeds of a bank check bearing date

June 7, 1961, being in the sum of $4,000.00, payable to

the order of Johnson and Johnson, and bearing the name

of First Continental Savings and Loan Association, Inc.,

as maker, which said check was drawn on the National

Bank of Bethesda-Chevy Chase, Bethesda, Maryland, and

deposited in, credited to, and final payment in the sum

of $4,000.00 made thereon to the account of the said

THOMAS F. JOHNSON at the Exchange and Savings

Megha EERE REE EE IEE IEP

_—

App. 25

Bank, Berlin, Maryland, on or about June 9, 1961, the date

and place of the receipt of said check by the defendant

THOMAS F. JOHNSON being to the Grand Jurors un-

known, for services rendered and to be rendered by him,

the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON, before the Department

of Justice of the United States in relation to a proceeding,

charge and accusation in which the United States was a

party and directly interested, to wit: an indictment re-

turned on November 17, 1959, in the United States District

Court for the District of Maryland, being numbered 25038

on the dockets and records of said Court and styled,

‘‘United States of America vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James

W. Bridges, First Colony Savings and Loan Association,

Inc., a Maryland corporation, Rosabelle Edlin, and Jack-

son D. Rains,’’ and which, as the defendants then and

there well knew, was pending in said Court on June 9,

1961, the said services consisting of interceding and con-

ferring with officials of the said Department of Justice,

bringing the prestige, weight and influence of the said de-

fendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON’S official position to

bear upon them, presenting assertions, arguments and

allegations, and otherwise acting on behalf of the said

J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON

to influence and persuade the said officials of the said

Department of Justice in order to obtain favorable de-

cisions and actions in and upon the aforesaid proceeding,

charge and accusation, to wit, the postponement of the

trial of the charges contained in the said indictment and

the eventual dismissal of the said indictment.

United States Code, Title 18, Sections 281 and 2.

SIXTH COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland

further charges:

That on or about June 28, 1961, in the District of Mary-

land, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a defendant,

being duly elected a Member of Congress, and after his

7 AR page » . .

RRA Ciaeeate, Brenna RPE ERLE shee ANT RRC

App. 26

election and qualification as such and during his continu-

ance in office, acting jointly and in concert with FRANK

W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, also named as defendants herein, the said

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counselling, com-

manding, inducing and procuring the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly

and corruptly did receive, directly and indirectly, from

the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L.

ROBINSON, compensation in the sum of Three Thousand

Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($3,250.00), to wit, the pro-

ceeds of a bank check bearing date June 28, 1961, being in

the sum of $3,250.00, payable to Johnson and Johnson,

and bearing the name of First Continental Savings and

Loan Association, Inc., as maker, which said check was

drawn on the National Bank of Bethesda-Chevy Chase,

Bethesda, Maryland, and deposited in, credited to, and

final payment in the sum of $3,250.00 made thereon to

the account of the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON at the

Exchange and Savings Bank, Berlin, Maryland, on or

about June 28, 1961, the date and place of the receipt of

said check by the defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON

being to the Grand Jurors unknown, for services rendered

and to be rendered by him, the said THOMAS F. JOHN-

SON, before the Department of Justice of the United

States in relation to a proceeding, charge and accusation

in which the United States was a party and directly in-

terested, to wit: an indictment returned on November 17,

1959, in the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, ,being numbered 25038 on the dockets and

records ef said Court and styled, ‘‘United States of

America vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James W. Bridges, First

Colony Savings and Loan Association, Inc., a Maryland

corporation, Rosabelle Edlin, and Jackson D. Rains,’’ and

which, as the defendants then and there well knew, was

pending in said Court on June 28, 1961, the said services

consisting of interceding and conferring with officials of

the said Department of Justice, bringing the prestige,

’

ARSENE EN LNG SRI OTINS IIE IETS YN BOE LILY IEEE INGLE SEAGIG IIE SOE ORES MW

—

App. 27

weight and influence of the said defendant THOMAS F.

JOHNSON’S official position to bear upon them, present-

ing assertions, arguments and allegations, and otherwise

acting on behalf of the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON to influence and persuade the

said officials of the said Department of Justice in order

to obtain favorable decisions and actions in and upon

the aforesaid proceeding, charge and accusation, to wit,

the postponement of the trial of the charges contained in

the said indictment and the eventual dismissal of the

said indictment.

United States Code, Title 18, Sections 281 and 2.

-

SEVENTH COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland

further charges:

That on or about August 7, 1961, in the District of

Maryland, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a de-

fendant, being duly elected a Member of Congress, and

after his election and qualification as such and during his

continuance in office, acting jointly and in concert with

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON, also named as defendants herein,

the said FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN

and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counsel-

ling, commanding, inducing and procuring the defendant

THOMAS F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully,

knowingly and corruptly did receive, directly and in-

directly, from the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON, compensation in the sum of Two

Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00), to wit, the proceeds of a

bank check bearing date August 4, 1961, being in the

sum of $2,000.00, payable to Johnson and Johnson, and

bearing the name of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON as maker, which said check was drawn on the Indus-

trial National Bank of Miami, Florida, and deposited in,

credited to, and final payment in the sum of $2,000.00

App. 28

made thereon to the account of the said THOMAS F.

JOHNSON at the Exchange and Savings Bank, Berlin,

Maryland, on or about August 7, 1961, the date and place

of the receipt of said check by the defendant THOMAS

F. JOHNSON being to the Grand Jurors unknown, for

services rendered and to be rendered by him, the said

THOMAS F. JOHNSON, before the Department of

Justice of the United States in relation to a proceeding,

charge and accusation in which the United States was a

party and directly interested, to wit: an indictment re-

turned on November 17, 1959, in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Maryland, being numbered

25038 on the dockets and’records of said Court and styled,

‘‘United States of America vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James

W. Bridges, First Colony Savings and Loan Association,

Inec., a Maryland corporation, Rosabelle Edlin, and Jack-

son D. Rains,’’ and which, as the defendants then and

there well knew, was pending in said Court on August 7,

1961, the said services consisting of interceding and con-

ferring with officials of the said Department of Justice,

bringing the prestige, weight and influence of the said

defendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON’S official position to

bear upon them, presenting assertions, arguments and

allegations, and otherwise acting on behalf of the said

J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON to

influence and persuade the said officials of the said De-

partment of Justice in order to obtain favorable decisions

and actiens in and upon the aforesaid proceeding, charge

and accusation, to wit, the postponement of the trial of

the charges contained in the said indictment and the

eventual dismissal of the said indictment.

United States Code, Title 18, Sections 281 and 2.

EIGHTH COUNT

And the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland

further charges:

That on or about September 19, 1961, in the District of

Maryland, THOMAS F. JOHNSON, herein named a de-

‘Athah Ss as Td lade cies esas hide al Ala Me a

—

App. 29

fendant, being duly elected a Member of Congress, and

after his election and qualification as such and during his

continuance in office, acting jointly and in concert with

FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON, also named as defendants herein,

the said FRANK W. BOYKIN, J. KENNETH EDLIN

and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON aiding, abetting, counsel-

ling, commanding, inducing and procuring the defendant

THOMAS F. JOHNSON so to act, unlawfully, wilfully,

knowingly and corruptly did receive, directly and in-

directly, from the said J. KENNETH EDLIN and WIL-

LIAM L. ROBINSON, compensation in the sum of Fifteen

Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), to wit, the proceeds of a

bank cheek bearing date September 12, 1961, being in the

sum of $1,500.00, payable to Johnson and Johnson, and

bearing the name of the defendant WILLIAM L. ROBIN-

SON as maker, which said check was drawn on the Indus-

trial National Bank of Miami, Florida, and deposited in,

credited to, and final payment in the sum of $1,500.00

made thereon to the account of the said THOMAS F.

JOHNSON at the Exchange and Savings Bank, Berlin,

Maryland, on or about September 19, 1961, the date and

place of the receipt of said check by the defendant

THOMAS F. JOHNSON being to the Grand Jurors un-

known, for services rendered and to be rendered by him,

the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON, before the Department

of Justice of the United States in relation to a proceeding,

charge and accusation in which the United States was a

party and directly interested, to wit: an indictment re-

turned on November 17, 1959, in the United States District

Court for the District of Maryland, being numbered 25038

on the dockets and records of said Court and styled,

‘‘United States of America vs. J. Kenneth Edlin, James

W. Bridges, First Colony Savings and Loan Association,

Ine., a Maryland corporation, Rosabelle Edlin, and Jack-

son D. Rains,’’ and which, as the defendants then and there

well knew, was pending in said Court on September 19,

1961, the said services consisting of interceding and con-

ferring with officials of the said Department of Justice,

tee

Nia

Coe SRE. APIA PONE NN 20° EEE AMT Se NN MTEL OT

App. 30

bringing the prestige, weight and influence of the said de-

fendant THOMAS F. JOHNSON’S official position to

bear upon them, presenting assertions, arguments and

allegations, and otherwise acting on behalf of the said

J. KENNETH EDLIN and WILLIAM L. ROBINSON to

influence and persuade the said Officials of the said De-

partment of Justice in order to obtain favorable decisions

and actions in and upon the aforesaid proceeding, charge

and accusation, to wit, the postponement of the trial of

the charges contained in the said indictment and the

eventual dismissal of the said indictment.

United States Code, Title 18, Sections 281 and 2.

A TRUE BILL:

/s/ JOSEPH D. TYDINGS,

United States Attorney

DOCKET ENTRIES

1962

Oct. 16—Indictment for Viol. U.S.C., Title 18, Sees. 371;

281; and 2, filed. (Conspiracy to defraud the United

States; Compensation to Member of Congress in matters

affecting the Government; Aiding and Abetting).

Oct. 16—Requests of United States Attorney for issu-

ance of Bench Warrant as to each Defendant, Recom-

mendations as to Bails and Orders of Court (Northrop,

J.) thereon, filed.

Oct. 1i6—Bench Warrant Issued as to Defendant Thomas

F. Johnson (Cepi on Bail—17-Oct.-1962).

Oct. 16—Bench Warrant Issued as to Defendant Frank

W. Boykin (Executed 18th October, 1962).

Oct. 16—Bench Warrant Issued as to Defendant J.

Kenneth Edlin (Executed 18th October, 1962).

SUT IGE RMIT MEE SATE comeniseng case oc ea RM RMSE FM IIR ERI BILLA OR RM AI ————

App. 31

Oct. 16—Bench Warrant Issued as to Defendant Wil-

liam L. Robinson (Executed 18th October, 1962).

Oct. 17—Order (Northrop, J.) reducing bail as to De-

fendant Thomas F. Johnson to the amount of Five Thou-

sand Dollars, ($5,000.00), filed. (See paper No. 2).

Oct. 17—Recognizance, as to Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson, filed.

Oct. 22—Recognizance as to Defendant Frank W. Boy-

kin, filed.

Oct. 26—Appearance of Harry Adelberg, Esquire as

attorney for Defendant Thomas F. Johnson, Order filed.

Oct. 26—Appearance of Edward Bennett Williams,

Esquire as attorney for Defendant Frank W. Boykin,

Order filed.

Oct. 26—Appearance of Edward A. Palamara, Esquire

as attorney for Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin (for the pur-

pose of arraignment only), Order filed.

Oct. 26—Defendants arraigned and each plead ‘‘Not

Guilty’’.

Nov. 26—Order of Removal as to Defendant J. Kenneth

Edlin from the U. 8. District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of Florida, Miami Division together with Waiver

of Removal Hearing, Appearance Bond and Certified

copy of Indictment, filed.

Nov. 26—Order of Removal as to Defendant William L.

Robinson from the U. S. District Court for the Southern

District of Florida, Miami Division together with Waiver

of Removal Hearing Appearance Bond and Certified copy

of Indictment, filed.

Nov. 26—Motion of Defendant, William L. Robinson,

for a Bill of Particulars, filed.

Nov. 26—Motion of Defendant, Thomas F, Johnson, for

Bill of Particulars and Citations of authorities in sup-

port thereof, filed.

ri vo "

hee ERED TIMDRMEENARLO 1 Oe RATNER RSYNC MEST etn NRE ReRen eRg

App. 82

Nov. 26—Motion of Defendant, Frank W. Boykin, for

Bill of Particulars and Memorandum in support thereof,

filed.

Dec. 3—Appearance of Edward L. Genn, Esquire as

attorney for Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin, Order filed.

Dec. 3—Motion of Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin for

Bill of Particulars, filed.

Dec. 3—Supplemental Motion of Defendant J. Kenneth

Edlin for a Bill of Particulars, filed.

Dec. 5—Answers United States of America to Motion

of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson for Bill of Particulars,

filed.

Dec. 5—Answer of United States of America to Motion

of Defendant Frank W. Boykin for Bill of Particulars,

filed.

Dec. 5—Answer of United States of America to Motion

of Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin for Bill of Particulars,

filed.

Dec. 5—Answer of United States of America to Motion

of Defendant, William L. Robinson for Bill of Particulars,

filed.

Dec. 6—Answer of United States of America to Supple-

mental Motion of Defendant, J. Kenneth Edlin for Bill

of Particulars, filed.

Dec. 7—Hearing on Motions of Defendants William L.

Robinson, Thomas F. Johnson and Frank W. Boykin for

Bills of Particulars; and Motion and Supplemental Motion

of J. Kenneth Edlin for Bill of Particulars, before Thom-

sen, C. J.

Dec. 19—Bill of Particulars of Plaintiff, filed.

Dec. 26—Motion of Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin to Dis-

miss indictment and points and authorities in support

thereof, filed.

—

App. 33

Dec. 27—Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin for pro-

duction of transcript of Grand Jury testimony and memo-

randum in support thereof and Affidavit, filed.

Dec. 27—Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin for

production of documents &c., filed.

Dec. 27—Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin to Dis-

miss count one for duplicity, memorandum in support

thereof and exhibits, filed.

Dec. 27—Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin to Dis-

miss counts two through eight for failure to state an

offense against the United States and memorandum in

support thereof, filed.

Dec. 27—Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin to Dis-

miss counts two through eight for failure to allege the

commission of an offense within the District of Maryland

and memorandum in support thereof, filed.

Dec. 27—Certificate of Service of Defendant Frank W.

Boykin of Motions, filed.

Dee. 27—Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

Dismiss first count of indictment, filed.

Dee. 27—Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

Dismiss first count of indictment for lack of jurisdiction,

filed.

Dec. 27—Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson for

production of documents, filed.

Dee. 27—Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

Dismiss all counts of the indictment for failure to show

venue of the offenses charged within the District of Mary-

land, filed.

1963

Jan. 16—Transcript of proceedings before Thomsen,

C. J. on December 7, 1962 Re: Motions of Defendants for

Bills of Particulars, filed. (Filed Separately).

NE s¢.0-7

App. 34

Jan. 18—Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

Dismiss the Substantive Counts of the Indictment, filed.

Jan. 19—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin, to

dismiss Count 1 for duplicity, filed.

Jan. 19—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to Motion of Defendant, Frank W. Boykin, to

dismiss Counts 2 through 8, for failure to state an offense

against the United States, filed.

Dec. 19—Answer of United States of America to Motion

of Defendant, Frank W. Boykin, for Production of Tran-

script of Grand Jury testimony, filed.

Jan. 19—Answer of United States of America to Motion

of Defendant, Thomas F. Johnson, for Production, filed.

Jan. 19—Answer of United States of America to Motion |

of Defendant, Frank W. Boykin, for Production under

Rules 16 and 17 (c), filed.

Jan. 22—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to Motion of Thomas F.. Johnson to dismiss the

first count of the Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction,

filed.

Jan. 22—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to Motion of Thomas F. Johnson to dismiss

the first count of the Indictment, filed.

Jan. 22—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

dismiss each and all counts of the Indictment by reason of

their failure to show venue of the offenses charged within

the District of Maryland, filed.

Jan. 22—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to motions of Defendants Thomas F. Johnson

and Frank W. Boykin for discovery, filed.

Jan. 22—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin to

fn]

Oo cen PN lame Te telah dada dil aA

~~

App. 35

dismiss counts 2 through 8 for failure to allege the Com-

mission of an offense within the District of Maryland,

filed.

Jan. 22—Memorandum of United States of America in

opposition to Motion of Defendant, J. Kenneth Edlin to

dismiss Indictment, filed.

Jan. 25—Hearing on (1) Motion of Defendant J. Ken-

neth Edlin to Dismiss indictment and points and authori-

ties in support thereof, (2) Motion of Defendant Frank W.

Boykin for production of transcript of Grand Jury testi-

mony and memorandum in sv»yport thereof and affidavit,

(3) Motion of Defendant Frank W. Boykin for produc-

tion documents &c, (4) Motion of Defendant Frank W.

Boykin to Dismiss count one for duplicity, memorandum

in support thereof and exhibits, (5) Motion of Defendant

Frank W. Boykin to Dismiss counts two throvgh eight

for failure to state an offense against the Uxited States

and memorandum in support thereof, (6) Motion of De-

fendant Frank W. Boykin to Dismiss counts two through

eight for failure to allege the commission of an offense

within the District of Maryland and memorandum in sup-

port thereof, (7) Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson

to Dismiss first count of indictment, (8) Motion of Defend-

ant Thomas F. Johnson to Dismiss first count of indict-

ment for lack of jurisdiction, (9) Motion of Defendant

Thomas F. Johnson for production of documents, (10)

Motion of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to Dismiss all

counts of the indictment for failure to show venue of the

offenses charged within the District of Maryland, before

Thomsen, C. J.

Jan. 25—Argument of counsel not concluded, to be re-

sumed at a later date.

Feb. 1—Affidavit in Support of Motion of the Defend-

ant Thomas F. Johnson, for the Production of Documents,

filed.

Feb. 1—Hearing on Motions of the Defendants (before

App. 36

Thomsen, C. J.) continued from January 25, 1963, Argu-

ment not concluded, to be resumed at a later date.

Feb. 8—Supplemental Memorandum of United States

of America in opposition to Motion of Defendant Frank

W. Boykin to dismiss counts 2 through 8 for lack of juris-

diction, filed.

Jan. 12—Supplemental Memorandum of United States

of America in opposition to Motion of Defendant Thomas

F. Johnson to Dismiss the First Count of the Indictment

for Lack of Jurisdiction and Appendix A and B, filed.

Feb. 8—Supplemental Memorandum of Defendant

Frank W. Boykin in Support of Motion to Dismiss Counts

2 through 8 for Lack of Jurisdiction, filed.

Feb. 13—Argument of counsel on Motions of Defend-

ants continued from Friday, February 1, 1963.

Feb. 13—Argued and held sub-curia.

Feb. 25—Supplemental Memorandum of Defendant

Frank W. Boykin on Legislative Background, filed.

Feb. 27—Subpoenaes (45) on behalf of United States

issued.

Feb. 28—Subpoena on behalf of United States issued.

Feb. 28—Opinion of the Court (Thomsen, C. J.) filed.

Mar. 8—Motion of Thomas F. Johnson for Reconsidera-

tion by the Court of its Decision denying the Production

of his Grand Jury Testimony, filed.

Mar. 14—Subpoenaes (2) on behalf of the United States

issued.

Mar. 19—Subpoenaes (2) on behalf of United States

issued.

Mar. 20—Subpoena on behalf of United States issued.

Mar. 21—Subpoenaes (3) on behalf of United States

issued.

—_

App. 37

Mar. 25—Voir Dire on behalf of the Government, filed.

Mar. 25—Voir Dire on behalf of Defendant Frank W.

Boykin, filed.

Mar. 25—Voir Dire on behalf of Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson, filed.

Mar. 25—Jurors examined on Voir Dire, not concluded.

Mar. 26—Examination of Jurors on Voir Dire resumed.

Mar. 26—Jury empannelled and sworn as to each De-

fendant before Thomsen, C. J.

Mar. 26—Subpoenaes (2) on behalf of United States,

issued.

Mar. 28—Subpoenaes on behalf of the United States

issued.

Mar. 28—Memorandum in Support of Government’s Re-

quest for use of Montgomery County, Maryland Grand

Jury Transcripts of Testimony of Thomas F. Johnson,

and Frank W. Boykin, filed.

Mar. 28— Hearing on Oral Motion of the United States

Attorney | .t the Sealed Transcript of the Testimony of

the Defendant Thomas F. Johnson before the Grand Jury

for Montgomery County, Maryland, be released to the

Government, before Thomsen, C. J.

Mar. 28—Answer of Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

the verbal Motion of the United States Attorney that the

sealed transcript of the testimony of the Defendant

Thomas F. Johnson before the Grand Jury for Mont-

gomery County, Md., be released to the Government, filed.

Mar. 28—Oral Opinion rendered by the Court directing

that the Montgomery County Grand Jury Testimony be

made available upon conditions more fully set forth orally

from the Bench.

Mar. 29—Further hearing on various Motions before the

Court (Thomsen, C. J.) Re Montgomery County Grand

Jury Testimony, on which the Court ruled at the Bench.

4 VEL TNE PRL GY PINS STN INTE

App. 38

Mar. 29—Memorandum in Support of Government’s

Request for Use of Montgomery County, Maryland Grand

Jury Transcripts of Testimony of Thomas F. Johnson

and Frank W. Boykin, filed.

Mar. 29—Opinion of the Court (‘Thomsen, C. J.) filed.

Mar. 29—Subpoena on behalf of United States issued.

Apr. 1—Hearing on various Motions before the Court

(Thomsen, C. J.) on which the Court ruled at the Bench.

Apr. 1—Case trial begun before the Court (Thomsen,

C. J.) and Jury.

Apr. 1—Not concluded.

Apr. 2—Subpoena on behalf of United States of America

issued.

Apr. 2—Trial of case resumed, not concluded.

Apr. 3—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 4—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 8—Subpoenaes (3) on behalf of the United States

of America issued.

Apr. 8—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 9—Subpoena duces tecum on behalf of the United

States of America issued.

Apr. 9—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 10—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 11—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 15—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 15—Subpoena on behalf of the United States of

America issued.

Apr. 16—Subpoena on behalf of the United States of

America issued.

Apr. 17—Case continued—not concluded.

PRD PPS —

— ——————————o a

App. 39

Apr. 18—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 18—Subpoena on behalf of the United States

issued.

Apr. 18—Stipulation between the parties re: Authen-

ticity requisition orders for speech delivered by Defend-

ant Thomas F.. Johnson, and attachments thereto, filed.

Apr. 22—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 23—Case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 23—Subpoena on behalf of United States of

America issued.

Apr. 24—Motion of the Defendant Thors F. Johnson

for ‘‘Judgment of Acquittal’’ as to the 1st Count (the

conspiracy charge) and with respect to the substantive

counts, filed.

Apr. 24—Oral Motions of each of the Defendants Frank

W. Boykin, J. Kenneth Edlin and William L. Robinson,

for a ‘‘Judgment of Acquittal’’ as to the 1st Count of

the Indictment, and with respect to the substantive counts,

made at the close of the Government’s evidence-in-chief.

Apr. 24—Hearing on Motions of each of the Defendants

Thomas F. Johnson, Frank W. Boykin, J. Kenneth Edlin

and William L. Robinson for Judgment of Acquittal as to

the 1st count (the conspiracy charge) and with respect

to the substantive counts.

Apr. 24—Argument of counsel concluded as to Motions

of Defendants for Judgment of Acquittal as to each of

substantive counts. Argument to be resumed as to Motions

of Defendants for Judgment of Acquittal as to the 1st

Count (The conspiracy charge).

Apr. 25—Argument of counsel on Motions of Defend-

ants for Judgment of Acquittal as to the 1st Count (the

conspiracy charge) continued.

Apr. 25—Motions of Defendants for Judgment of

Acquittal as to each of the substantive counts and as to

~

App. 40

the 1st Count (The conspiracy Charge) ‘‘denied’’ without

prejudice in Open Court.

Apr. 29—Trial of case continued—not concluded.

Apr. 30—Case continued—not concluded.

May 1—Case continued—not concluded.

May 2—UCase continued—not concluded.

May 6—Case continued—not concluded.

May 13—Case continued—not concluded.

May 14—Case continued—not concluded.

May 14—Hearing on Oral Motion of the Defendant

Thomas F. Johnson to Supress testimony taken before

the Grand Jury, before Thomsen, C. J.

May 14—Testimony not concluded to be resumed.

May 15—Hearing on Oral Motion of the Defendant

Thomas F. Johnson to Suppress testimony taken before

the Grand Jury continued from May 15, 1963.

May 15—Oral Opinion of the Court ‘‘Overruling’’ Mo-

tion of the Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to Suppress

Grand Jury Testimony for reasons more fully set forth

orally from the Bench.

May 15—Trial of case resumed from Tuesday, May 14,

1963. Case continued—not concluded.

May 20—Case continued—not concluded.

May 21—Case continued—not concluded.

May 22—Renewed Oral Motion of Defendant J. Kenneth

Edlin for Mis-Trial, ‘‘overruled’’ by the Court.

May 22—Case continued—not concluded.

May 23—Case continued—not concluded.

May 27—Case continued—not concluded.

May 28—Case continued—not concluded.

App. 41

May 29—Case continued—not concluded.

June 3—Case continued—not concluded.

June 3—Subpoenaes (3) on behalf of the United States,

issued.

June 4—Case continued—not concluded.

June 5—Subpoena on behalf of the United States issued.

June 5—Case continued—not concluded.

June 6—Case continued—not concluded.

June 10—Case continued—not concluded.

June 11—Renewed Oral Motion of Defendant Frank W.

Boykin for Judgment of Acquittal as to the 1st Count of

the Indictment (the Conspiracy Charge) and with respect

to each of the substantive counts, made at the close of all

the evidence. Motion ‘‘Denied’’ by the Court.

June 11—Renewed Oral Motion of Defendant J. Ken-

neth Edlin for Judgment of Acquittal as to the Ist Count

(The Conspiracy Charge) of the Indictment and with re-

spect to each of the Substantive Counts, made at the close

of all the evidence. Motion ‘‘denied’’ by the Court.

June 11—Renewed Oral Motion of Defendant William

L. Robinson for Dismissal and for Judgment of Acquittal

as to the Ist Count (the Conspiracy Charge) of the In-

dictment and with respect to each of the Substantive

Counts, made at the close of all the evidence. Motion

‘*denied’’ by the Court.

June 11—(82) Motion of the Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson, for a Judgment of Acquittal Under the First

Count (The Conspiracy Charge) of the Indictment, and

with respect to each of the Substantive Counts filed at the

close of all the evidence, filed.

June 11—(83) Order of Court (Thomsen, C. J .) ‘*deny-

ing’’ Motion of the Defdt. Thomas F. Johnson for a

Judgment of Acquittal under the First Count (the Con-

IP Oa ROR CaF ee. PP Ct. AE 3 5! » SVE PRMD ANS SEO ENR My FRE ~ mee

App. 42

spiracy Charge) of the Indictment, and with respect to

each of the substantive counts, filed. (See Pleading No.

82.)

June 11—(84) Motions of the Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson to strike Government Exhibit No. 6, and to strike

testimony of FBI Special Agents Robert Milne and Strick-

land, as to verbal statements made to them & etc., filed.

June 11—(85) Order of Court (Thomsen, C. J.) ‘‘grant-

ing’’ Motion of the Defendant Thomas F. Johnson to

Strike Government Exhibit No. 6, and ‘‘denying’’ Motion

of the Defendant Thomas F.. Johnson to strike testimony

of Special Agents Robert Milne and Strickland, fd. (See

Pleading No. 84.)

June 11—Argument of counsel—not concluded.

June 12—Argument of counsel resumed—not concluded.

June 13—Argument of counsel concluded.

June 13—(86) Government’s (8) Prayers, filed.

June 13—(87) Defendant Thomas F.. Johnson’s Prayers,

filed.

June 13—(88) Defendant Frank W. Boykin’s (21)

Prayers, filed.

June 13—(89) Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin’s (33)

Prayers, filed.

June 13—Court’s Charge-to-the Jury.

June 13—Bailiffs (Joseph Schildt and Timothy Gavin)

sworn.

June 13—Verdict as to Defendant Thomas F. Johnson:

‘*Guilty’’ as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inclusive.

June 13—Verdict as to Defendant Frank W. Boykin:

‘‘Guilty’’ as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inclusive.

June 13—Verdict as to Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin:

‘*Guilty’’ as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inclusive.

ntl

—

June 13—Verdict as to Defendant William L. Robinson:

‘*Guilty’’ as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inclusive.

June 13—Imposition of sentence as to each of Defend-

ants Thomas F. Johnson, Frank W. Boykin, J. Kenneth

Eclin and William L. Robinson postponed pending filing

of Motions for New Trial.—Time for filing Motion for

New Trial and Judgment N.O.V. extended to July 10,

1963.

July 10—(90) Motion of Defendant, Frank W. Boykin

for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the verdict

or, in the alternative, for a New Trial, and Memorandum

in support thereof, filed.

July 10—(91) Motion of Defendant, J. Kenneth Edlin,

for New Trial and/or Motion in Arrest of Judgment,

and/or Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding

the Verdict; Points and Authorities in support thereof,

filed.

July 10—(92) Motion of Defendant, Thomas F. John-

son, for a Judgment of Acquittal, Notwithstanding the

Verdicts and, in the alternative, Motion for New Trial,

and Affidavit, filed.

July 15—(93) Motion of Defendant, William L. Robin-

son for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Ver-

dict or, in the alternative, for a New Trial, and Memo-

randum in support thereof, filed.

July 26—(94) Memorandum of the United States of

America in Opposition to Motions of all Defendants for

Judgment of Acquittal, N.O.V., or in the alternative, for

a New Trial, filed.

Aug. 5—Hearing on Motions of the Defendants Thomas

F. Johnson, Frank W. Boykin, J. Kenneth Edlin and Wil-

liam L. Robinson for Judgment N.O.V. or in the alterna-

tive for a new trial, before Thomsen, C. J.

Aug. 5—Oral Opinion rendered by the Court ( Thomsen,

C. J.) ‘‘overruling’’ Motions of Defendants for Judgment

N.O.V. or in the alternative for a New Trial.

App. 43

a ee Clad es

App. 44

Aug. 5—(95) Order of Court (Thomsen, C. J.) ‘‘over-

ruling’’ Motion of the Defendant Frank W. Boykin for

Judgment of Acquittal N.O.V. or in the alternative for a

new trial, filed. (See Paper No. 90.)

Aug. 5—(96) Order of Court (‘thomsen, C. J.) ‘‘over-

ruling’’ Motion of the Defendant J. Kenneth Edlin for

Judgment of Acquittal N.O.V. and or to arrest Judgment

and to grant a new trial, filed. (See Paper No. 9.)

Aug. 5—(97) Order of Court (Thomsen, C. J.) ‘‘over-

ruling’’ Motion of the Defendant 'Thomas F. Johnson for

a Judgment of Acquittal N.O.V. and in the Alternative for

a new trial, filed. (See Paper No. 92) p. 13.

Aug. 5—(98) Order of Court (Thomsen, C. J.) ‘‘over-

ruling’’ Motion of the Defendant William L. Robinson for

Judgment of Acquittal N.O.V. or in the Alternative for

a New Trial, filed. (See paper No. 93.)

Aug. 16—(99) Opinion of the Court (Thomsen, C. J.)

Re: ‘‘Denial of all Motions,’’ fd.

Oct. 7—(100) Waiver of Defdt. Frank W. Boykin, to be

present at the imposition of sentence, and to make any

statement in his own behalf and present any information

in mitigation of punishment, Consent of United States

Attorney thereon and Affidavit, filed.

Oct. 7—(101) Opinion of Court Thomsen, C. J. Re:

Waiver of Defendant of his right to be present at imposi-

tion of sentence under Rules 43 and 32(a), fd.

Oct. 7—(102) Judgment as to Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson: That the defendant is hereby committed to the

custody of the Attorney General or his authorized repre-

sentative for imprisonment for a period of Six (6) Months

and that the defendant pay a fine of Five Thousand Dol-

lars ($5,000.00), without commitment in default of pay-

ment of said fine, as to Count No. 1; that the defendant

is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney Gen-

eral or his authorized representative for imprisonmenj{

for a period of Six (6) Months as to each of Counts Nos.

App. 45

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; said terms of imprisonment to run

concurrently, making a total term of imprisonment of Six

(6) Months as to Counts Nos. 2, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Term

of imprisonment imposed as to Count No. 1 to run con-

currently with term of imprisonment imposed as to Counts

Nos. 2 through 8 inclusive, making a total term of im-

prisonment of Six (6) Months and defendant to pay 4

costs of case. Service of sentence to begin on November 4,

1968 at ten o’clock A.M., Order (Thomsen, C. J.), filed.

Oct. 7—(103) Judgment as to Defendant Frank W. Boy-

kin: That the defendant pay a fine of Five Thousand

Dollars ($5,000.00) on each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inelu-

sive; said fines to be cumulative, making a total fine of

Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) and Defendant to

pay 1% costs of case. Imposition of sentence as to im-

prisonment suspended and defendant released on proba-

tion for the period of Six (6) Months, upon condition that

the fines be paid within three (3) Months, Order (Thom-

sen, C. J.), filed.

Oct. 7—(104) Judgment as to Defendant J. Kenneth

Edlin: That the defendant is hereby committed to the

custody of the Attorney General or his authorized repre-

sentative for imprisonment for a period of One (1) Year

as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inclusive, said terms of

imprisonment to run concurrently making a total term

of imprisonment of One ( 1) Year; defendant to become

eligible for parole at such time as the Board of Parole

may determine, pursuant to U. S. C., Title 18, Section

4208(a) (2); and Defendant to pay a fine of Two Thousand

Dollars ($2,000.00) as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 in-

clusive, said fines to be cumulative making a total fine of

Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00), without commit-

ment in default of payment of said fine and defendant to

pay % costs of case. Service of sentence to begin on

November 4, 1963 at 10:00 o’clock A.M., Order (Thomsen,

C. J.), filed.

Oct. 7—(105) Judgment as to Defendant William L.

Robinson: That the Defendant is hereby committed to the

i ric ks tla 5 PETE ES RES

ee ee

RES pe Dae ER

App. 46

custody of the Attorney General or his authorized repre-

sentative for imprisonment for a period of Six (6) Months

as to each of Counts Nos. 1 to 8 inclusive; said terms of

imprisonment to run concurrently, making a total term of

imprisonment of Six (6) Months and Defendant to pay 4

costs of case. Service of sentence to begin on November

4, 1963 at 10:00 o’clock A.M., Order (Thomsen, C. J.),

filed.

Oct. 14—(106) Petition of Defendant, William L. Robin-

son, Affidavit and Order (Thomsen, (. J.) authorizing

Petitioner to file Notice of Appeal and to proceed on

appeal in forma pauperis, filed.

Oct. 14—(107) Notice of Appeal of Defendant, William

L. Robinson, filed. (Service admitted by U. S. Attorney.)

Oct. 15—(108) Notice of Appeal of Defendant, Thomas

F. Johnson, filed. (Service admitted by U. 8S. Attorney.)

Oct. 16—(109) Notice of Appeal of Defendant J. Ken-

neth Edlin, filed. (Service admitted by U. S. Attorney.)

Oct. 17—Statement of Docket Entries and an attested

William L. Robinson and Attested copies of Petition of

Defendant, Affidavit, Order of Court authorizing Peti-

tioner to file Notice of Appeal, ete., and Notice of Appeal,

transmitted to Clerk, United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Cireuit, Richmond 19, Virginia.

Oct. 17—Statement of Docket Entries as to Defendant

copy of the Notice of Appeal, as to Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson, transmitted to Clerk, United States Court of

Appeals, Fourth Circuit, Richmond 19, Virginia.

Oct. 17—Statement of Docket Entries and an attested

copy of the Notice of Appeal, as to Defendant J. Kenneth

Edlin, transmitted to Clerk, United States Court of Ap-

peals, Fourth Cireuit, Richmond 19, Virginia.

Oct. 17—(1i10) Election of Defendant, Thomas F. John-

son, not to commence service of sentence, filed.

App. 47

Oct. 25—(111) Designation of Defendant William L.

Robinson as to contents of Record on Appeal, filed.

Oct. 25—(112) Designation of Defendant Thomas F.

Johnson as to contents of Record on Appeal, filed.

Oct. 28—(113) Designation of Defendant J. Kenneth

Edlin as to contents of Record on Appeal, filed.

Oct. 31—(114) Recognizance pending appeal as to De-

fendant J. Kenneth Edlin, filed.

Oct. 31—(115) Recognizance pending appeal as to De-

fendant Thomas F. Johnson, filed.

Nov. 6—(116) Recognizance of Defendant William L.

Robinson on appeal, filed.

Nov. 19—(117) Motion of Defendants, Thomas F. John-

son, J. Kenneth Edlin and William L. Robinson and Order

(Watkins, J.) that the time for transmitting the record on

appeal be extended until December 13, 1963, filed.

Dec. 6—(118) Transcript of Proceedings before the

Court (Thomsen, C. J.) on January 25, 1963; February 1,

1963; April 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24,

25, 29, 30, 1963; May 1, 2, 6, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27,

28, 29, 1963; June 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 1963 and Decem-

ber 7, 1963, filed. (Filed separately.)

Dec. 10—(119) Motion of Defendant, Edlin and Order

(Watkins, J.) that the time for filing the record on appeal

in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is hereby

extended to and including December 24, 1963, filed.

Dec. 20—(120) Petition of Harry B. Wolf, Jr., Director

of the State Department of Building, Savings and Loan

Associations, by Doris P. Scott, Esq., Affidavit and Order

(Thomsen, C. J.) consented to, authorizing and directing

the Clerk to deliver unto Petitioner certain Government’s

Exhibits as therein more particularly set forth, &c, filed.

PEEL MEN IAN LESS PON a

App. 48

PRE-TRIAL OPINION

TxuomseEn, Chief Judge

Defendants in this eight-covnt indictment found by the

Grand Jury for the District of Maryland are: Thomas F.

Johnson and Frank W. Boykin, who at all times mentioned

in the indictment were Members of the House of Repre-

sentatives of the United States from Maryland and Alabama

respectively; J. Kenneth Edlin, who is alleged to have

dominated and controlled certain savings and loan associa-

tions and land companies, which are named as co-con-

spirators but not indicted; and William L. Robinson, a

lawyer, who is alleged to have been a director and officer of

those associations and companies.'

The First Count charges a conspiracy, in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. 371,? among defendants and others ‘‘to defraud

the United States of and concerning its governmental

functions and rights’’, in specified particulars summarized

below under the heading ‘‘The Indictment’’. Each of the

seven other counts charges that, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.

281 and 2,’ Johnson, acting in concert with and aided and

1 Boykin is alleged to have dominated and controlled a co-conspirator,

Tensaw Land and Timber Company.

2Ҥ 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States

“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense

against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any

agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more

of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,

each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than

five years, or both.

* * *”

3Ҥ 281. Compensation to Members of Congress, officers, and others

in matters affecting the Government

“Whoever, being a Member of or Delegate to Congress, or a

Resident Commissioner, either before or after he has qualified, or the

head of a department, or other officer or employee of the United

States or any department cr agency thereof, directiy or indirectly

receives or agrees to receive, any compensation for any services

rendered or to be rendered, either by himself or another, in relation

to any proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation,

arrest, or other matte: in which the United States is a party or

directly or indirectly interested, before any department, agency,

court martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commission,

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than

two years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office

of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.

See also 1962 Pocket Part, 18 U.S.C.A. 281.

—

App. 49

abetted by the other defendants, directly or indirectly re-

ceived compensation from Edlin and Robinson for services

rendered and to be rendered by Johnson before the De-

partment of Justice in relation to a charge, accusation and

indictment against Edlin et al.

Each defendant has filed a number of motions, or

adopted those filed by other defendants; they will be dis-

cussed under the following headings:

I. Motions to Dismiss the First Count

A. Jurisdiction—Art. 1, sec. 6, cl. 1 of the Constit-

tion

B. Duplicity

C. Vagueness—Improper Use of Charge of Con-

spiracy to Defraud the United States.

II. Motions to Dismiss the Substantive Counts (Sec-

ond to Eighth)

A. Venue

B. Claimed Failure to Charge an Offense Against

the United States

C. Payor as Aider and Abettor

III. Motions for Discovery

A. Grand Jury Testimony

B. Other

The Indictment

1. The First Count, the conspiracy count, after identi-

fying defendants and their alleged co-conspirators and re-

ferring to an indictment against Edlin et al. in the District

of Maryland, charges in paragraph 14 that from on or about

April 1, 1960, and continuously thereafter until on or about

December 31, 1961, defendants and their co-conspirators

PEE ELE TLE ERO LOLS RIOR

|

conspired in Maryland and elsewhere to defraud the United

States ‘‘of and concerning its governmental functions and

rights’’, described in four sub-paragraphs as: (a) its right

to have the business of the Department of Justice conducted

free from improper and undue influence; (b) its right to

have the personnel of that Department free to transact its

official business unhindered by the exercise upon them of

corrupt, unlawful, improper and undue pressure and in-

fluence; (c) its right to have the duties of Johnson and

Boykin in their official capacities as Members of the House

performed free from corruption resulting from their per-

sonal and pecuniary interest in the success of Edlin et al.

in attempting to persuade the Department of Justice to

cause the postponement of the trial and the eventual dis-

missal of the indictment against Edlin et al; and (d) its

right not to be deprived of the faithful services of Johnson

and Boykin in their official capacities as Members of the

House uninfluenced by corruption and by payments of

money and other valuable considerations to them by the

other defendants and co-conspirators as compensation for

services rendered and to be rendered by Johnson in behalf

of the other defendants and co-conspirators in relation to

matters pending in the House, and for services rendered

and to be rendered by Johnson and Boykin before the De-

partment of Justice in relation to proceedings, charges and

accusations in which the United States is a party and di-

rectly interested.

App. 50

The First Count then sets out in paragraphs 15 to 25

that it was a part of the conspiracy: (para. 15) that John-

son should, at the request of Edlin and Robinson, render

services for compensation to them and their co-conspirators,

namely, the making of a speech on the floor of the House

defending ‘‘the operations of Maryland’s ‘independent’

savings and loan associations, the financial stability and

solvency thereof, and the reliability and integrity of the

‘commercial insurance’ on investments made by said ‘in-

dependent’ savings and loan associations, on the floor of

the House of Representatives’’; (para. 16) that Johnson,

———

App. 51

Edlin and Robinson would cause to be reprinted 50,000

copies of said speech for distribution to prospective de-

positors in the aforesaid savings and loan associations, to

members of the General Assembly of Maryland, and to

others; and (paras. 17-25) that Johnson and Boykin

should at the request of the other defendants and their

co-conspirators render specified services for compensation

in relation to the aforesaid indictment, bringing the pres-

tige, weight and influence of their official position to bear

upon the officials of the Department of Justice to obtain

decisions and actions beneficial to defendants and their

co-conspirators, particularly the postponement of the trial

and the eventual dismissal of the indictment.

Seventy-five overt acts to effect the objects of the alleged

conspiracy are specified. Reference is made to 18 U.S.C.A.

371.

2. The Second Count charges that on or about April 3,

1961, in the District of Maryland, Johnson, being then a

Member of Congress, acting jointly and in concert with

and aided and abetted by the other defendants, unlawfully,

wilfully and corruptly received, directly or indirectly,

from Hdlin and Robinson, compensation in the amount of

$800.00, to wit, the proceeds of a bank check drawn by

Robinson on a certain bank in Miami, Florida, which was

‘deposited in, credited to and final payment in the sum

of $800.00 made thereon to the account of’’ Johnson at the

Exchange and Savings Bank, Berlin, Maryland, the date

and place of the receipt of said check by Johnson being

to the Grand Jurors unknown, for services rendered and

to be rendered by Johnson before the Department of

Justice in relation to the proceeding, charge and accusa-

tion referred to in the First Count. Reference is made

to 18 U.S.C.A. 281 and 2.

3, 4, 5, 6. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Counts

are similar to the Second Count except for dates and

amounts and the allegation that the checks referred to

in those four counts were drawn by one of the alleged

—

App. 52

co-conspirators on the National Bank of Bethesda-Chevy

Chase, Bethesda, Maryland.

7, 8. The Seventh and Eighth Counts are similar to the

Second Count except for dates and amounts of the checks.

A

Motions to Dismiss the First Count

A.

J urispicTtion—Arrt. 1, Sec. 6, Cu. 1 or THE CoNSTITUTION

Johnson, Edlin and Robinson have moved‘ to dismiss

the First Count for lack of jurisdiction on the ground

that the prosecution of the offense charged therein is

barred by Art. 1, Sec. 6, Cl. 1 of the Constitution, which

provides :

‘“‘The Senators and Representatives shall receive

a compensation for their services, to be ascertained

by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United

States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony

and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest

during their attendance at the session of their respec-

tive Houses and going to and returning from the

same; and for any speech or debate in either House

they shall not be questioned in any other place.’’

Defendants do not cite any authority which holds that

the quoted clause bars the prosecution of a Member of

Congress for accepting money for making a speech on the

floor of the House of which he is a member, nor for par-

ticipating in a conspiracy of which that is an incident.

They rely on the doctrine of the separation of powers,

on the importance thereto of the privilege granted by the

clause, and on the statements contained in opinions deal-

ing with civil actions rather than criminal prosecutions.

The importance of the doctrine and of the privilege is uni-

versally recognized. The question here, however, is the

scope of the prohibition contained in the clause.

* Boykin has not filed a similar motion.

we

App. 53

The historical background of the clause is reviewed at

length in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201 et seq.,

and in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; that discussion

need not be repeated here.

Both of those cases were civil actions, one for false

arrest and the other for deprivation of civil rights. They

hold that the clause should be liberally construed to cover

voting and other official action by legislators, as well as

speeches and debates. Other cases hold that the question

whether a matter is before the House should also be

liberally construed. See, e.g., Cochran v. Couzens, D.C.

Cir., 42 F.2d 783; Barsky v. United States, D.C. Cir., 167

F.2d 241. Defendants rely heavily on the following

passage in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (a civil action for

slander), construing the Massachusetts Constitution:

‘‘These privileges are thus secured not with the intention

of protecting the members against prosecutions for their

own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by

enabling their representatives to execute the functions of

their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.

I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed

strictly but liberally, that the full design of it may be

answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion,

uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend

it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report

and to every other act resulting from the nature and in

the execution of the office. And I will define the article

as securing to every member exemption from prosecution

for everything said or done by him as a representative in

the exercise of the functions of that office. * * *”’

That passage from Coffin was quoted with approval in

Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204. It should be noted, however,

that the opinion in Kilbourn went on to say: ‘‘It is not

necessary to decide here that there may not be things

done, in the one House or the other, of aa extraordinary

character, for which the members who take part in the

act may be held legally responsible.’’ 103 U.S. at 204. The

PONS nS ae Cte a TPR REA PS SF

App. 54

caveat was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Tenney,

341 U.S. at 378-89.

Without question, the clause should be liberally con-

strued to accomplish its purpose—the freedom of legisla-

tors from fear of prosecutions, whether civil or criminal,

for words spoken, or votes cast, or actions taken in the

pursuit of their lawful functions. But neither the statutes,

the decisions, nor the text writers suggest that the purpose

of the clause would be aided by a construction which would

shield a legislator from prosecution for bribery or from

prosecution for a conspiracy of the nature charged herein.

Congress has repeatedly enacted statutes providing for

criminal prosecution in the courts of a Member of Con-

gress for bribery and graft, including the taking of money

for his action, vote or decision. See 18 U.S.C.A., 1950 ed.,

sec. 201 et seq., especially sec. 205 and sec. 281. See also

1962 supp., sec. 201 et seq., especially sec. 203. The debates

in Congress when the first of such acts was adopted—

unanimously—do not show that anyone questioned its

eonstitutionality.©5 Nor does it appear that any ques-

tion of constitutionality was raised when Congress adopted

the statute which was in effect in 1961 or the present

statutes which were adopted in 1962.

The Supreme Court pointed out in Tenney, 341 US. at

375, n. 5, that provisions generally similar to Art. 1, sec. 6,

cl. 1 of the United States Constitution appear in the con-

stitutions of most of the states. Practically all of those

states also have statutes making the acceptance by legisla-

tors of compensation from private individuals a criminal

offense. It does not appear that any prosecution under

5 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3260, 3261, 3262 (1862). See

also 8 Cong. Deb. 2511 et seg. (1832) dealing with the assault by

General Sam Houston on a fellow Member of Congress.

® See Ala. Code ch. 21, sec. 72 (1958), Ala. Code ch. 21, sec. 64 (1958);

Ariz. Rev. State Ann., ch. 2, secs. 13-286 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. ch. 9,

sees. 41-901 (1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 7, sec. 40-7-5 (1953),

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 7, sec. 40-7-7 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.

ch. 942, sees. 53-149 (1960); Ga. Code Ann. ch. 26-41, secs. 26-4102

(1953), Ga. Code Ann. ch. 26-50, secs. 26-5023 (Cum. Supp. 1961),

Ga. Code Ann. ch. 26-42, secs. 26-4203 (1953), Ga. Code Ann. ch. 26-4?

App. 55

any of those statutes has ever been held to violate the con-

stitutional privilege. Indeed, it does not appear that the

question has ever been raised. See People v. Logie, 321

Mich. 303, 32 N.W.2d 458; People v. Hammond, 132 Mich.

422, 93 N.W. 1084; State v. Burns, 238 Mo. App. 220, 177

S.W.2d 909; State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75, 84 S.W.

105. See also Hemans v. United States, 6 Cir., 163 F.2d

228. |

Leading text writers also indicate that the purpose of

the provisions is to prevent the prosecution of any action,

civil or criminal, for words spoken, for libel or slander,

and historically for treason or sedition.’ No authority

has been cited or found which suggests that the clause

was intended to bar criminal prosecutions based on the

acceptance of money for speeches, votes or other legisla-

tive acts.

secs. 26-4201 (1953); Idaho Code ch. 47, secs. 18-4704 (1947); Ill. Stat.

Ann. ch. 38, secs. 38-78 (1935), Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, secs. 38-79 (1935) ;

Ind. Stat. Ann. ch. 6, sec. 10-601 (1956); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. ch. 21,

sec. 21-825 (1949); Ky. Stat. Rev. ch. 432, sec. 432.350 (1955); La.

Stat. Rev. ch. 1, sec, 14.118 (1951); Me. Stat. Rev. ch. 135, sec. 5 (1954) ;

Md. Code Ann. art. 27, sec. 28 (1957); Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 268, sec. 8

(1956); Mich. Stat. Ann. ch. 286a, sec. 28.313 (1938); Minn. Stat. Ann.

ch. 613, sec. 613.05 (1947), Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 613, sec. 613.06 (1947) ;

Mo. Stat. Ann. ch. 558, sec. 558.020 (1953); Mont. Rev. Code ch. 29,

sec. 94-2906 (1947); Neb. Stat. Rev. ch. 28, sec. 28-706 (1943); N.H.

Stat. Rev. Ann. ch. 587, sec. 587.26 (1955), N.H. Stat. Rev. Ann. ch.

587, sec. 587.27 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. ch. 93, sec. 2A: 93-2 (1939) ;

N.M. Stat. Ann. art. 8, sec 40-8-1 (1953), N.M. Stat. Ann. art. 8,

sec. 40-8-3 (1953); N.Y. Penal Code, sec. 1328; N.D. Code Ann. ch.

12-09, sec. 12-09-09; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 2917, sec. 2917.01 (1953);

Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 7, sec. 309 (1951); Ore. Stat. Rev. ch. 162, sec.

162.230 (1959); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, art. 3, sec. 4303 (1939); RL.

Gen. Laws ch. 7, sec. 11-7-8 (1956); S.D. Code ch. 1310, sec. 13.1009

(1939); Tenn. Code Ann. ch. 8, sec. 39-802 (1955); Tex. Penal Code

arc. 159 (1925); Utah Code Ann. art. 2, sec. 76-28-18 (1953); Vt. Stat.

Ann. tit. 18, ch. 21, sec. 1102 (1958); Va. Code ch. 6, art. 2, sec. 18.1-279

(1950) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. ch. 9.18, sec. 9.18.020; W. Va. Code art.

5, sec. 6003 (1961); Wis. Stat Ann. ch. 946, sec. 946.10 (1957); Wyo.

Stat. ch. 8, sec. 6-156 (1957). Arkansas, Maryland, Pennsylvania and

Texas have provisions in their Constitutions making acceptance by a

public official of compensation to influence him in his official eu % a

criminal offense. See Ark. Const. Art. V, sec. 35; Md. Const. Art. it

sec. 50; Pa. Const. Art. 3, sec. 29; and Tex. Const. Art. 16, sec. 41.

72 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 929 (8th ed. 1927); 1 Tucker,

Constitution, sec. 207 (1899); 1 Willoughby, Constitution of the United

States, sec. 342 (2d ed. 1929).

ey olen SCR tsi

—

App. 56

It appears from the foregoing discussion that the prose-

cution of a Member of Congress for receiving money from

a private person for making a speech on the floor of the

House would not be barred by Art. 1, sec. 6, cl. 1 of the

Constitution. A fortiori, the prosecution of the offense

charged in Count One of the present indictment is not

barred. The making of the speech was but an incident of

the conspiracy charged, which is alleged to have included

the reprinting by Johnson, Edlin and Robinson of 50,000

copies of the speech for distribution to prospective de-

positors in the two savings and loan associations named

as co-conspirators, among others, as well as various

actions by the alleged conspirators in connection with the

indictment pending against Edlin, et al. To hold Count

One of the present indictment barred by the privilege

would subvert rather than advance the purpose for which

the privilege exists—the independence of the legislator in

the fulfillment of his public trust. II James Wilson’s

Works 156 (1804); Hemans, 163 F.2d at 234; United

States v. Glasser, 7 Cir., 116 F.2d 690, 696, 315 U.S. 60,

66; United States v. Manton, 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 834, 839.

The motions to dismiss Count 1 for lack of jurisdiction

are hereby denied.

B.

DuPpLicity

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the First Count for

duplicity are without merit. They admit that one con-

spiracy may have two or more objects, but they contend

that the First Count charges two conspiracies, one involv-

ing the preparation, making and distribution of a speech

before the House of Representatives and one involving

the services of Johnson before the Department of Justice

in connection with the indictment against Edlin et al. The

Court does not so construe the First Count. It charges a

single conspiracy to defraud the United States of and

concerning its governmental functions and rights which

are set out in subparagraphs (a), (b), (ec) and (d) of

~ oe

+ Beem

ee

App. 57

paragraph 14, and charges that the conspiracy had various

objects or parts, which, together with the means used

to accomplish them, are set out in paragraphs 15 to 25

of Count One. The parts or objects of the conspiracy so

charged all deal with the general subject of Edlin’s con-

nection with two savings and loan associations operating

in Maryland named as co-conspirators herein, with the

commercial insurance of the investments of such associa-

tions, and with the indictment against Edlin and others

on charges arising out of the operation of the two associa-

tions. All of the services alleged to have been rendered

by Johnson, both in his speech and. in his dealings with

the Department of Justice, were in connection with these

matters.

What was said in May v. United States, D.C. Cir., 175

F.2d 944, 1002, applies here.* See also Pinkerton v. United

States, 328 U.S. 640; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.

204, 210; Travis v. United States, 10 Cir., 247 F.2u 130;

United States v. Lennon, 2 Cir., 246 F.2d 24, cert. den. 355

U.S. 836; United States v. Manton, 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 835.

If the evidence fails to sustain the charge of a single

conspiracy, the point can be raised by an appropriate mo-

tion. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750; Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78.

C.

VacuENEss—Improper Use or Cxuarce or CoNnsPIRACY

To Derraup THE UniTep States

Johnson has moved to dismiss the First Count on the

ground that it violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

to the Constitution by depriving him of his right to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, by

‘ The basis for the dissent by Judge Stephens on this point in May

does not exist in the instant case. Count I of the indictment in May

charged a conspiracy both to violate old sec. 203 and to defraud the

United States. The conspiracy charged in the instant case is a con-

spiracy to defraud the United States; a purpose to violate sec. 281 is

not charged as part of the conspiracy.

BR PPR ERS Rade SSN DN: TRS EES ee oe te

App. 58

charging him with participation in a conspiracy, the pur-

pose of which are so vague, general and indefinite that he

is not apprised of the offense charged, is unable to pre-

pare his defense, and may not be able to plead former

jeopardy in the event of a second prosecution. He further

contends that a count charging the second alternative of

sec. 371°—a conspiracy to defraud the United States—

may not be used when the acts charged amount to sub-

stantive offenses in violation of other statutes.

Counsel for Johnson first refers to the criticism which

the Supreme Court and other federal courts have leveled

at the indiscriminate use of conspiracy indictments. See,

e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 772; Krulewitch

v. United States, 336 U.S. 440; Grunewald v. United

States, 353 U.S. 391; United States v. Falcone, 2 Cir., 109

F.2d 579. This Court is aware of that criticism, and is

also aware that the Supreme Court has not forbidden

the use of such an indictment in a preper case. Under

the authorities cited to support this Court’s conclusion

on the various points discussed herein, the inclusion of the

conspiracy count in the present indictment was not im-

proper.

Counsel then argues that the original of sec. 371, which

proscribes conspiracies ‘‘either to commit any offense

against the United States or to defraud the United States,

or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose’’,

was passed shortly after the Civil War primarily to deal

with tax violations. He criticizes the federal judiciary for

broadening the classes of cases to which the statute has

been held applicable; see Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462,

476-481, Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,

and numerous cases in the inferior federa! courts, such as

United States v. Manton, 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 834, May v.

United States, D.C. Cir., 175 F.2d 994, and United States

v. Bowles, D.Me., 183 F. Supp. 237. He says: ‘‘ Although

the effort of the Supreme Court in the Hammerschmidt

ease to restrict the language inadvertently used in Haas

* See note 2, above.

>

3 s

—

was commendable, the new definition of ‘defrauding’ was

still too broad.’’ The definition in Hammerschmidt of

which counsel complains read as follows: ‘‘To conspire

to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the

Government out of property or money, but it also means

to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful govern-

mental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least

by means that are dishonest. It is not necessary that the

Government shall be subjected to property or pecuniary

loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate official

action and purpose shall be defeated by misrepresentation,

chicane or the overreaching of those charged with carry-

ing out the governmental intention.’’ 265 U.S. at 188.

This language has been construed in Manton, May, Bowles,

and other cases to permit the prosecution of counts gen-

erally similar to the First Count in the indictment under

consideration. Counsel cites an article, 68 Yale L. J. 405,

criticizing the use of counts charging a conspiracy to de-

fraud the United States by dishonest means, and suggest-

ing that Congress should repeal or amend the statute.

Nevertheless, this Court should follow the law as laid

down by the Supreme Court and other federal courts.

App. 59

The argument that the alleged objects of the conspiracy

are so vague, broad and indefinite that they give defend-

ants no adequate notice of the offense charged, miscon-

strues the nature and objects of the conspiracy. The First

Count charges, in paragraph 14, a conspiracy to defraud

the United States of and concerning its governmental func-

tions and rights hereinafter described. Subparagraphs

(a), (b), (ec) and (d), which immediately follow, state the

rights referred to.1° They are not, as Johnson’s brief

assumes, purposes of the conspiracy. The purposes, parts

or objects of the conspiracy are set out in paragraphs 15

to 25 of the First Count, together with the means to be

used to accomplish the purposes. Thereafter 75 overt acts

are alleged, as having been done and performed in pur-

suance of and in order to effect the objects of the con-

10 See summary of. those paragraphs under “The Indictment” supra.

spiracy. The government has conceded what appears to

me required by the allegations of the First Count, that

it will not attempt to prove any purposes and objects of

the conspiracy except those set out in paragraphs 15 to 25.

So construed, as I think it must be, the First Count gives

defendants adequate notice of the offense charged, more

than sufficient to meet the requirements of the Fifth and

Sixth Amendment and of Rule 7(c), F. R. Crim. P., 18

U.S.C.A.

It is true that the First Count does not allege a con-

spiracy ‘‘to cheat the Government out of property or

money’’, and that it does not in haec verba allege inter-

ference with or obstruction of lawful governmental func-

tions ‘‘by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means

that are dishonest’’. But it does not follow that the

charge fails to meet the test laid down in Hammerschmidt.

Paragraphs 15 to 25 contain allegations of the means used

to defraud the United States of its rights enumerated in

subparagraphs (a), (b), (ec) and (d) of paragraph 14.

This Court believes that the means charged are dishonest

means. See discussion of the Hammerschmidt rule in

Bowles, 183 F. Supp. at 245-247, and the discussion under

II. B., below.

Finally, counsel contends that a charge of a conspiracy

to defraud may not be made when the indictment as a

whole shows that violations of specific statutes are in-

volved. He contends that such a prosecution must be

brought for the violation of the specific statutes or for a

conspiracy to violate those statutes under the first alterna-

tive of sec. 371. No authority is cited to support this

proposition, which is at odds with the prevailing practice,

and would unreasonably restrict the preparation of an

indictment for conspiracy where repeated violation of

several statutes by several persons are incidents of a

single broad conspiracy to defraud the United States of

its governmental functions and rights. If the government

fails to prove the conspiracy charged, defendants will not

be without remedy.

e

App. 60

All motions to dismiss the First Count are hereby denied,

without prejudice to the rights of defendants to raise

similar points by motions at the conclusion of the govern-

ment’s case or at the close of all the evidence.

II.

Motions to Dismiss the Second to Eighth Covzis

App. 61

A.

VENUE

Johnson and Boykin have moved to dismiss Counts 2

through 8 of the indictment for lack of venue, on the

ground that those Counts fail to allege that any violation

of 18 U.S.C.A. 281 occurred within the District of Mary-

land. Robinson has adopted these motions.

A prosecution under sec 2811! may be brought only in

the District where the Congressman or other officer

rendered the services or agreed to render the services, or

where he received the compensation or agreed to receive

the compensation. In none of the substantive cout.ts is it

charged that Johnson rendered any services or agreed to

render any services in the District of Maryland, nor is it

alleged that Johnson agreed in Maryland to receive any

compensation. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court

with respect to those counts must rest on a sufficient

allegation that Johnson received compensation within the

District of Maryland.

Each substantive count (Second through Eighth)

charges that in the District of Maryland, Johnson, a duly

elected Member of Congress, acting jointly and in concert

with, and aided and abetted by the other defendants, un-

lawfully, wilfully, knowingly and corruptly did receive,

directly and indirectly, compensation in a specified

amount, to wit, the proceeds of a bank check payable

to the order of Johnson and Johnson, which was deposited

41 Set out in note 3 supra.

7

in, credited to and final payment made thereon to the

account of the said Thomas F. Johnson at the Exchange

and Savings Bank, Berlin, Maryland, the date and place

of the receipt of the check by the defendant Thomas F.

Johnson being to the Grand Jurors unknown. In the

Third, Fcuzih, Fifth and Sixth Counts, the checks are

alleged to have been drawn on the National Bank of

Bethesda-Chevy Chase, Bethesda, Maryland; in the Sec-

ond, Seventh and Highth Counts, the checks are alleged

to have been drawn on the Industrial National Bank of

Miami, Florida.

App. 62

Defendants have taken th» position that compensation

is received in the District in which a check is delivered

and only in that District; that the place where a check

is cashed or deposited for collection and the place where

it is ultimately paid are immaterial; and that since it is

alleged that the place where Johnson received the check

is unknown to the Grand Jurors, the indictment fails to

‘ allege venue in this District.

The government contends that compensation was re-

ceived in each instance at the place where the proceeds of

the checks were made available to Johnson; that each

substantive count aileges that Johnson received compensa-

tion in the State of Maryland in a specified amount, to wit,

the proceeds of a specified check which was deposited in,

credited to and final payment made thereon to Johnson’s

account at a specified bank in Berlin, Maryland; and,

: therefore, that the receipt of compensation in the State

2 of Maryland has been sufficiently alleged. As an alterna-

tive contention, the government argues that when payment

is made by check, the receipt of compensation in violation

of sec. 281 is a continuing offense which does not end

until the proceeds of the check have been made fully avail-

able to the offender; thus, there may be venue in more

than one District if the check is deposited in one District

and paid in another.

The meaning of the words ‘‘receives * * * compensa-

tion’’, as they are used in this section, was discussed by

:

:

a

q

a

—

the Supreme Court in Burton v. United States, 196 U.S.

283. Burton was a Congressman, who was charged in

certain counts of an indictment with illegally receiving

compensation in the form of checks drawn on a bank in St.

Louis, Missouri. The indictment, which was brought in

the Eastern District of Missouri, charged both that Burton

received the checks and that the checks were paid in that

District. The evidence showed that the checks had in fact

been received in the District of Columbia and deposited

there in the Riggs Bank, which had given immediate credit

to Burton and had then sent the checks to Missouri for

collection. The trial judge left to the jury the decision

where compensation had been received. The Supreme

Court held that under the undisputed facts and the appli-

cable banking law the Riggs Bank was not acting as Bur-

ton’s agent in collecting those checks, but that title to the

checks passed in the District ef Columbia to the Riggs

Bank, which in contemplation of law had purchased the

checks; and that venue with respect to those counts could

not be laid in Missouri, where the checks were ultimately

paid. The Court also held that it was not a case where an

offense was commenced in one district and completed in

another, rejecting the contention of the government that

the offense had begun when the checks were mailed from

Missouri to the District of Columbia.

App. 63

Since in Burton the checks were physically delivered to

the Congressman in the District of Columbia and im-

mediate credit thereon given to him by the Riggs Bank in

that District, defendants argue that Burton is no authority

for the proposition that venue lies where the checks were

deposited and credit given rather than where they were

physically delivered. However, the entire discussion of

venue in the opinion of the Supreme Court was devoted to

the law and facts with respect to the deposit of the checks,

the credit given and the payment of the checks. Mr.

Justice Harlan dissented only because he felt that Burton

haa received at St. Louis compensation for his services,

since the checks were paid there to his representative, the

collecting bank. The government rightly argues that if the

Bi

place of physical delivery of the checks were the only

place where venue might be laid, the entire discussion in

Burton would have been beside the point. In this con-

tention the government is supporied by the following dic-

tum of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Lotsch,

2 Cir., 102 F.2d 35, 36: ‘‘Next, it is argued that the crime

was committed when Lotsch took the cheques—that is in

Manhattan—and not when he cashed them in Brooklyn.

That was indeed held in Commonwealth v. Donovan, 170

Mass. 228, 49 N.E. 104; but State v. Walls, 54 Ind. 561,

is to the contrary, and so is United States v. Green. D.C.,

137 F. 618. Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S.

Ct. 243, 49 L. Ed. 482, favors the Indiana rule, at least by

implication, because, if the receipt of the cheque be the

offence, that would have been a short answer to the prose-

eution, for Burton concededly got the cheque in Wash-

ington.’’

App. 64

|

fe

8

The controlling words in sec. 281, ‘‘receives * * * com-

pensation’’, are different from the controlling words in

the various sections of Chapter 11 of Title 18, sec. 201

et seq., as they have read from time to time, which refer

variously to the receipt of ‘‘money’’, ‘‘checks”’ or ‘‘things

of value’’, or use other expressions.

The case of United States v. Green, N.D.N.Y., 136 Fed.

618, cited by Judge Hand, construed a bribery statute

which made it an offense to tender ‘‘any contract, under-

taking, obligation, gratuity, or security for the payment of

money, or the delivery or conveyance of anything of

value.’’ The Court held that a check was not a ‘‘thing of

value’’. Congress then amended the statute there in-

volved by adding the word ‘‘check’’ before the word ‘‘con-

tract’’. See Reviser’s note to 18 U.S.C.A. 201. Defend-

ants argue that since no similar amendment was made to

; what is now sec. 281, it must be assumed that Congress

; felt the term compensation included checks, even though

% they were not ‘‘things of value’’, and, therefore, that no

| amendment to sec. 281 was necessary. This argument

if ignores the probability that if Congress gave any consid-

ay

SIRS RE

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Sa ae RTE aii De tk

.

Batisxce ss

3

App. 65

eration to sec. 281 at that time, it was satisfied with the

construction given to that section by the Supreme Court

in Burton.’

The question presented by the motions presently under

consideration is whether venue lies (a) where the checks

. were physically delivered to Johnson; (b) where the pro-

ceeds of the checks were credited to his account, either at

the time of deposit or after they had been collected;

‘c) where the check was paid by the drawee bank; or

(¢) in two or more of those places.

Questions of venue are more than matters of procedure;

they raise issues of public policy in the light of which

legislation must be construed. Travis v. United States, 364

U.S. 631, 634. When venue is based solely on the receipt

of compensation, there are some arguments in favor of

construing the statute to mean that compensation is re-

ceived at the place where a check is delivered. But this

Court must be guided by the opinion in Burton, which,

as Judge Learned Hand said in Lotsch, implies that the

crime is committed where the check is converted into

money by the Congressman, not where it is physically

delivered to him.

The application of Burton to the ease at bar is made

difficult by the circumstances that the Maryland banking

law is different from the banking law in effect in the Dis-

trict of Columbia at the time of Burton, as found by the

majority opinion therein. Maryland has enacted the Bank

Collection Code, Art. i1, sees. 118-134, Anno. Code of Md.,

1957 ed., See. 119 thereof reads:

‘‘Except as otherwise provided by agreement and

except as to subsequent holders of a negotiable instru-

12 The point is not clarified by the 1962 amendments, which apparently

ignoring the decision in Green, use the single expression “anything of

value” in the new :~ibery statute, sec. 201, although various other ex-

pressions are used in succeeding sections of ch. 11, including new secs.

203-209. The word “compensation” has been carried over from sec. 281 to

| sec. 203 so far as Members of Congress and certain other officials are

concerned. See sec. 2 of Pub. L. 87-849, Oct. 23, 1962, 78 Stat. 1126;

18 U.S.C.A., 1962 Pocket Part, secs. 201, 207 et seq., 281.

tise

”

“

App. 66

ment payable to bearer or endorsed specially or in

blank, where an item is deposited or received for col-

lection, the bank of deposit shall be agent of the de-

positor for its collection and each subsequent

collecting bank shall be subagent of the depositor but

shall be authorized to follow the instructions of its

immediate forwarding bank and any credit given by

any such agent or subagent bank therefor shall be

revocable until such time as the proceeds are received

in actual money or an unconditional credit given on

the books of another bank, which such agent has re-

quested or accepted. Where any such bank allows any

revocable credit for an item to be withdrawn, such

agency relation shall nevertheless continue except the

bank shall have all the rights of an owner thereof

against prior and subsequent parties to the extent of

the amount withdrawn.’’

Since the indictment alleges that Johnson received in

the District of Maryland ‘‘compensation, to wit, the pro-

ceeds of’’ the specified checks, which are alleged to have

been ‘‘deposited in, credited to and final payment made

thereon to the account of ‘‘Thomas F. Johnson’’ at a

specified bank in Berlin, Maryland, it appears that John-

son is charged with having received compensation in

Maryland, with the Burton opinion.

What the evidence may show is another matter.'* If

18 The government states the evidence will show that each check

specified in Counts 2 through 8 was endorsed by Johnson in blank, that

immediately u,on the deposit of each such check Johnson was given credit

on his account upon which he could draw, and that the credit was never

revoked. This statement cannot change the effect of the indictment, but

it is not inconsistent therewith. If the evidence shows that the checks

were endorsed in blank, the following provision of sec. 121 will have to

be considered: “Where a deposited item is * * * endorsed by the de-

positor in blank * * * the fact that such item is so * * * endorsed shall

not change the relation of agent of the bank of deposit to the depositor,

but the subsequent holders shall have the right to rely on the pre-

sumption that the bank of deposit is the owner of the item.” This

provision is criticized as anomalous by the draftsmen of the Uniform

Commercial Code, Comments, Art. 4, secs. 4-201, but it is the statutory

law of Maryland and other States. This Court does not construe that

provision, however, as changing the relationship between the depositor

— 7 eT ahd bank, in the absence of a specific agreement. See

rt. 11, sec. .

——

App. 67

the facts show that the Berlin bank was acting as John-

son’s agent in collecting checks, and that the circumstances

were such that under the applicable law the checks should

be considered as having been converted into money when

and where they were paid by the dravee banks, venue

would lie in the District of Maryland with respect to the

four counts dealing with checks drawn on the Bethesda,

Maryland, bank (Counts, 3, 4, 5 and 6) and not with re-

spect to the three counts dealing with the checks drawn

on the Miami, Florida, bank (Counts, 2, 7 and 8) unless

the offense can be considered as having been begun in one

District and completed in another, within the meaning of

18 U.S.C.A. 3237.4

The government argues that it may be so considered,

citing Benson v. Henkel, 198 U.S. 1. In that case the evi-

dence showed that the defendant mailed cash from San

Francisco, California, to an official of the Department of

the Interior at Washington, D. C., and the defendant, who

was indicted for bribery in the District of Columbia,

challenged venue. The Court treated the case as covered

by see. 731, which provided, like present sec. 3237, that

when an offense is begun in one District and completed

in another it shall be deemed to have been committed in

either, and may be tried in either, as though it had been

wholly committed therein. In the instant case, the govern-

ment argues, the receipt of compensation may be regarded

as having been begun when Johnson deposited the checks

(or even where they were physically delivered to him),

but was not completed until the checks were finally cashed,

so that venue may properly be laid either in the District

14“$ 3237. Offenses begun in one district and completed in another

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Con-

gress, any offense against the United States Hoven in one district

and completed in another, or committed in more than one district,

may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such of-

fense was begun, continued, or comple

“Any offense involving the use of the mails, or transportation in

interstate or foreign commerce, is a continuing offense and, except

as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may

inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into

which such commercé or mail matter moves.”

App. 68

where the checks were deposited or in the District where

they were cashed. It is true that in Burton the Court said:

‘“‘This is not a case of the commencement of a crime in

one district and its completion in another, so that under

the statute the court in either district has jurisdiction.

Rev. Stat. sec. 731; 1 Comp. Stat. p. 5°5. There was no

beginning of the offense in Missouri. The payment of

the money was in Washington, and there was no com-

mencement of that offense when the officer of the Rialto

Company sent the checks from St. Louis to defendant.

The latter did not thereby begin an offense in Missouri.”’

196 U.S. 283, at 304. The first sentence of that passage

must be read in connection with the point argued, shown

by the balance of the quotation. Even if the first sentence

should be construed more broadly, as intended to cover

also the conversion of the checks into money, the con-

clusion stated therein would not apply here, because the

facts and the applicable law are different. In Burton the

Supreme Court held that title to the checks, which had

been delivered to the Congressman in the District of

Columbia, had passed to the Riggs Bank in that District,

since the bank had in legal effect purchased the checks

from the Congressman. Under the present Maryland law,

applicable in the instant case, if the Berlin bank were

acting as agent of Johnson in converting the checks to

cash, the offense of receiving may well be considered as

having been begun when the checks were deposited in the

Berlin bank and not completed until they were paid by

the drawee banks or until the credit to Johnson’s account

was made unconditional.

It is unfortunate that questions of venue should turn

upon the banking law of the place where the checks were

deposited, but that appears to be the teaching of Burton.

The government might have avoided the problem in this

case by prosecuting the charges made in the Second

to Eighth Counts in the District of Columbia, where the

services are alleged to have been rendered. But the gov-

ernment had the right to seek an indictment either in the

=~

App. 69

District where the services were rendered or in the Dis-

trict where compensation was received.

At the present time it is only necessary to rule that

under the applicable law the seven substantive counts

(Second through Eighth) sufficiently allege that Johnson

received compensation in the District of Maryland, and

that the motion to dismiss those counts for lack of venue

must be denied.

CLAIMED F'arLurRE TO CHARGE AN OFrFrENSE AGAINST

Tue Unirep States

Defendants have moved to dismiss the substantive

counts (Second to Eighth) on the ground that those counts

fail to state an offense against the United States com-

mitted by defendant Johnson, and therefore fail to state

an offense committed by the other defendants as aiders

and abettors.’®> They contend: (1) that the services were

rendered by Johnson as an attorney in connection with a

prosecution against Edlin and others, then pending before

this District Court; (2) that sec. 281 does not prohibit

a Member of Congress from receiving compensation for

representing a client in court, even though the United

States is a party or is interested in the case, and there-

fore should not be construed to prohibit him from con-

ferring with officials of the Department of Justice in

connection with the court proceeding; and (3) that no

offense under sec. 281 was committed unless the compensa-

tion was received for services rendered for the purpose

of obtaining favorable decisions and actions in relation to

a proceeding, charge, accusation or other matter pending

before a department; that the Department of Justice had

no power to decide or act upon a request to postpone or

dismiss the Edlin indictment, since this power rested with

the Court, and therefore that there was no proceeding,

185A charge against an alleged aider and abettor must fall if no

sufficient charge is made against the principal. Meredith v. United States,

4 Cir., 238 F.2d 535, 542." See also United States v. Tornabene, 3 Cir.,

222 F.2d 875; Edwards v. United States, 5 Cir., 286 F.2d 681; Karrell

v. United States, 9 Cir., 181 F.2d 981.

a.

App. 70

charge, accusation or other matter pending before the

Department.

These points will be considered in order:

(1) The indictment nowhere alleges that Johnson is a

lawyer, but charges him fer his actions as a Member of

Congress and not as an attorney acting for a client. The

Court may take judicial notice of the fact that Johnson is

a member of the bar, but may also take notice of the fact

that he did not enter his appearance for any of the defend-

ants in the indictment against Edlin et al, which was

pending in this Court. It does not appear from the indict-

ment in the instant case or from any of the motions filed

herein that Johnson told the officials of the Department of

Justice that he was appearing before them or acting as an

attorney representing any of the defendants named in the

indictment against Edlin et al.

(2) See. 281 does not prohibit a Member of Congress

from receiving compensation for appearing in a court

proceeding even though the United States is a party or

otherwise interested. Congressional Globe, pt. 1, 38th

Cong., Ist sess. (1863-64), pp. 63, 555-56, 561. See also

42 Cong. Ree. (1908), pp. 1895-1898; Burton v. United

States, 202 U.S. 344, 365; United States v. Waldin, E.D.

Pa., 122 F. Supp. 903; United States v. Adams, D.N.D.,

115 F. Supp. 731; United States v. Quinn, E.D.N.Y., 111

F. Supp. 870.

It is not necessary te decide on the pending motions

to what extent a Member of Congress who has entered his

appearance publicly for a defendant in a criminal case

pending in a federal court may act outside the court room

to persuade officials or employees of the Department of

Justice to take or refrain from taking any specific action

in that case. Cf. Chudoff v. McGranery, 3 Cir., 179 F.2d

869. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to draw a line if

the Congressman is openly appearing as an attorney for

the accused. But that is not the sitration presented by

this indictment and by these motions.

—

App. 71

The main purpose c¢ sec. 281 is ‘‘to secure the integrity

of executive action against undue influence upon the part

of members of that branch of the Government whose favor

may have much to do with the appointment to, or reten-

tion in, publie position of those whose official action it is

sought to control or direct. The evils attending such a

situation are apparent and are increased when those seek-

ing to influence executive officers are spurred to action

by hopes of pecuniary reward.’’ Burton v. United States,

202 U.S. at 368. See also United States v. Quinn, 8.D.N.Y.,

141 F. Supp. 622, 624. The evils are further increased if

the Member of Congress fails to disclose the fact that he

is appearing as an attorney for compensation and not as

a disinterested public official.

None of the cases cited by either the government or

defendants is directly in point, but they have been helpful

in clarifying the issue.

Although the statute must be strictly construed, it

should be construed to accomplish its purpose, as defined

by the Supreme Court, and to prevent the mischief at

which it was aimed. All ‘‘court related activities’ are not

excluded from its operation. Under the facts charged in

the indictment and appearing from the motions, see dis-

cussion under (1) above, the pendency in court of the in-

dictment against Edlin et al. at the time Johnson is alleged

to have rendered services for compensation before the

Department of Justice does not of itself preclude a prose-

eution under see. 281.

(3) Defendants’ third point assumes that there was no

violation of sec. 281 unless the proceeding, charge, accusa-

tion or other matter was pending before the Department.

They argue that since the indictment against Edlin et al.

was pending before this Court, there was nothing pending

before the Department of Justice on which it could act.

However, the word ‘‘pending’’ does not appear in sec. 281.

The words ‘‘before any department, agency’’, etc. refer

to where the services have been rendered or are to be

rendered, not where the proceeding or other matter is

Se. OO RO Rare Ree

PPro ctr er te

App. 72

pending. This conclusion is supported by the way the

offense was stated in the second Burton opinion, where the

Supreme Court, construing a predecessor statute which

used similar language, said: ‘‘But we cannot doubt the

authority of Congress by legislation to make it an offense

against the United States for a Senator, after his election

and during his continuance in office, to agree to receive or

to receive compensation for services to be rendered or

rendered to any person, before a Department of the Gov-

ernment, in relation to a proceeding, matter or thing in

which the United States is a party or directly or in-

directly interested.’’ 202 U.S. at 365. See also Waldin,

122 F. Supp. at 905, and the Report of the Judiciary Com-

mittee of the House in connection with the 1962 statute

above referred to, which makes it clear that the new

statute, like the old, is intended to embrace all matters

that come betore a Federal department or agency.'®

Defendants argue that the Department was without

power to postpone or dismiss the court proceeding. Never-

the less, the Department had power to request a postpone-

ment and to move to dismiss the indictment. Rule 48(a),

F. R. Crim. P., 18 U.S.C.A. That was the determination

and action by the Department sought by Johnson, accord-

ing to the indictment. The fact that Court approval would

be necessary to accomplish a final dismissal of the indict-

ment is not fatal to the charge made in the Second to

Eighth Counts. Felder v. United States, 2 Cir., 9 F.2d

872, 874.

C.

Payer as Amer AND ABETTOR

Edlin and Robinson have moved to dismiss the substan-

tive couuts as against them on the ground that one who

pays money to a Member of Congress is not an aider

and abettor of the crime of receiving compensation pro-

16 H.R. Rep. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., July 20, 1961, p. 20.

—

scribed by sec. 281.'7 So stated, the proposition presents

a serious legal question, which has been answered differ-

ently by different judges. See May v. United States, D.C.

Cir., 175 F.2d 994, 1002 et seq., with dissenting opinion

by Judge Stephens, 175 F.2d at 1011, 1018, et seq., and

United States v. Bowles, D.Me., 183 F. Supp. 237. See also

Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112; Nigro v. United

States, 8 Cir. 117 F.2d 624; and Lott v. United States,

9 Cir., 205 Fed. 28. It is not necessary, however, to an-

swer that question at this time. Each of the seven sub-

stantive counts charges Edlin and Robinson, as well as

Boykin, with ‘‘aiding, abetting, counselling, commanding,

inducing and procuring’’ the commission of the offense. A

bill of particulars, furnished at defendants’ request, states

that Boykin, Edlin and Robinson ‘‘aided, abetted, coun-

selled, commanded, induced and procured’”’ Johnson in the

rendering of the services alleged as well as in the receipt

of the compensation alleged. The manner in which the sev-

eral defendants are claimed to have aided and abetted

the planning and performance of the services is specified

in detail in the bill of particulars. If the evidence shows

that Edlin and Robinson did nothing to aid and abet the

alleged offenses except to make the payments charged in

the several counts, they may raise the point on motion for

judgment of acquittal. But the allegations contained in

the substantive counts of the indictment are sufficient.

United States v. Quinn, E.D.N.Y., 111 F. Supp. 870.

App. 73

All motions to dismiss the Second to Eighth Counts are

hereby denied, without prejudice to the rights of defend-

ants to raise similar points by motions at the conclusion

of the government’s case or at the close of all the evidence.

‘t They argue that where a statute defines as criminal an act which

necessarily requires the participation of two persons, and the statute

specifically makes only one of those persons criminally liable, this is

evidence of a legislative intention to leave the conduct of the other

unpunished. ‘

ml

App. 74

III.

Motions for Discovery

A.

z Granp Jury TESTIMONY

Boykin and Johnson have each moved, pursuant to

Rule 6(e), F. R. Crim. P., for an order directing produc-

4 tion of a transcript of their respective testimony given

; before the grand jury which returned the indictment in

4 this case. Both of them voluntarily accepted an oppor-

: tunity to testify before the grand jury; neither was

4 summoned.

Boykin has supported his motion by his own affidavit

: and by a letter from George W. Calver, M.D., the attend-

: ing physician to the Congress of the United States, which

: has been admitted in evidence in support of his motion

without objection from the government. From the affi-

davit and certificate, it appears: that Boykin testified

before the grand jury on October 12, 1962; that he had

been a patient at the U. S. Naval Hospital at Bethesda,

Maryland, from September 29 until October 10; that his

appearance before the grand jury was against the advice

both of the medical officers at the Hospital and of Dr.

Calver, who hau told Boykin that he should take at least

a week to recover from his cardiac difficulties and to get

his strength back; that Boykin had a difficult time making

the trip to Baltimore; that he was weak, particularly while

testifying before the grand jury, and that he was under

physical and emotional strain. Boykin also states that he

: has not been able to remember with clarity or to inform

his attorne.’s about the testimony which he gave at the

grand jury hearing; that his home in Mobile, Alabama,

and his office in Washington, D. C., were burglarized on

or about March 4, 1962, and, foliowing the burglaries, a

number of Jocuments referred to in the First Count were

missing.

a

Johnson has supported his motion by an affidavit that

he was interrogated by the United States Attorney for

several hours on September 25, 1962, and produced certain

records which had been requested; that he recalls clearly

some of his testimony, but by reason of the length of the

testimony, the intensity at times with which it was con-

ducted, and the fact that he was tired, physically and

mentally, from his work in the House of Representatives

and his vigorous campaign for reelection, he does not

recall a considerable part of his testimony; that he seeks

an opportunity to inspect and copy the transcript of his

testimony before the grand jury in order that he may

prepare adequately in advance of the trial his defense to

the accusations contained in the indictment.

App. 75

In response to a request from the Court, the govern-

ment has stated that it has not yet decided whether it will

use the testimony of Bovkin as part of its case in chief

against him, and will not decide until a week or so before

the trial. The government made the same statement with

respect to the possible use of Johnson’s testimony.

The long established policy of the federal courts, firmly

entrenched in this Circuit and this District, is to preserve

the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Disclosure of

grand jury testimony should rarely be granted and then

only under ‘‘compelling cireumstances’’, upon a showing

of ‘‘particularized need’’. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.

United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399; United States v. Proctor

¢ Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681; United States v. Socony

Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234; United States v. Ka-

haner, S.D.N.Y., 203 F. Supp. 78, 86; United States v.

Wortman, E.D. M1., 26 F.R.D. 183, 206.

The facts alleged in support of Johnson’s motion are

similar to those in Kahaner, where Judge Weinfiela said:

‘‘Undoubtedly most persons who appear before grand

juries as prospective defendants are under some emo-

tional tension. However, it would indeed be unusual for

any person, whether calm or under stress, to recall the

precise details of his questioning. If this were an ade-

,

quate basis upon which to require disclosure of testimony,

the grand jury minutes should be made available as a

matter of course to any witness who is later indicted.

Perhaps this should be the rule. While there are those,

including this Court, who believe that in an enlightened

system of criminal justice defendants who have made

voluntary statements to prosecution and investigation

officials should, as a matter of simple fairness, receive

copies of their statements, such view has not yet found

general favor and admittedly there does not appear any

doctrinal trend in that direction. To grant this motion

on the sole ground advanced would not only breach the

historic policy against disclosure of grand jury matters,

but would initiate a precedent which appears foreclosed

by the rationale of the recently decided Murray case.’’'*

203 F. Supp. at 87. There is no showing that Johnson

was not in full possession of his faculties when he gave

his testimony; nor is any reason suggested why his pres-

ent version of the facts should differ from the original.

Johnson has shown no ‘‘compelling cireumstances’’ or

‘*narticularized need’’ for the disclosure of his testimony

at this time.’® His motion is hereby denied, without

prejudice to his right to renew the motion if and when

the government decides to offer his grand jury testimony

as part of the case in chief. This Court intimates no

option as to what its ruling would then be.

Boykin’s motion presents a different situation. His

poor physical condition at the time he testified is sup-

ported not only by his own affidavit but by the certificate

of the attending physician to the Congress. Under all the

circumstances, the Court feels that Boykin has shown a

‘‘narticularized need’’ to examine his testimony at this

time, so that he may know the incidents which he may be

called upon to admit, deny or explain, and to prepare his

defense. His motion is hereby granted.

App. 76

‘4

3

§

b

Ee

<4

4

ati

18 United States v. Murray, 2 Cir., 297 F.2d, 820-22.

19 If the general rule is to be charged it should be done by the Supreme

Court, perhaps by an amendment to the Criminal Rules. This Court

adheres to the general rule. ’

Beiiieccccie ARCA n es AS RR MT SR RC RO aha

App. 77

B.

OTHER

Defendants requested the disclosure of various items

believed to have been in the possession of the government.

The Court understands that all such questions have now

become moot, either because the government has made

the material available to defendants or because the govern-

ment has stated that it does not have the particular doeu-

ment requested.

Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

[Tr. 6256-6306] :

CHARGE OF THE COURT TO THE JURY

(The Court) Members of the jury, the time has now come

for me to charge the jury, that is, to instruct you as to the

law of the case.

As I think you already know, the functions of the judge

and the jury are quite different. It is my duty, as judge,

to instruct you as to the law applicable to this case. It is

your duty to accept without question for the purposes of the

case the statements which I make te you about the law. But

is the province of the jury, your province, to determine the

facts from the evidence.

In my instructions to you on the law of the case, I may

refer to some of the evidence for purposes of illustration

or for advisory help in the application of the law to the

facts as the jury may find the facts. But I emphasize again

that it is the sole power, duty and function of the jury to

appraise the evidence and to determine from the evidence

what are the facts in the case, and that any reference I may

make to the evidence is advisory only and it is in no way

binding on you.

What I may say to you about the facts—I may say that

I expect to say very little, because the facts have been

a

App. 78 ;

fully argued to you by counsel on both sides within the last

two or three days.

What I may say to you about the facts is net intended to

convey to you any opinion that I may have about the guilt

or innocence of any of the defendants, nor to imply that I

have any such opinion, nor is it intended to ecnvey any

opinion I may have as to how any of the questions of fact

in the case should be answered.

I have not intended to express or to intimate any opinion

as to what witnesses are worthy of belief or disbelief. |

have not intended to express or intimate any opinion as to

what disputed facts are established, or what facts have not

been established. I have also not intended to express or

intimate any opiion ~s to what inferences should be drawn

from the evidence.

You and only you are the judges of the facts. If any

expression of mine or anything I may or may not have

done or said has seemed to indicate any opinion relating to

any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.

In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants

and any subsidiary questions of fact involved in the case,

you may consider not only the evidence to which T may

refer, and the evidence to which you may have been re-

ferred by counsel! in their arguments, but you may also

consider any testimony or exhibits in the ease, whether or

not referred to by me or by counsel, which you inay believe

to be material in determining the question of the defendants’

guilt or innocence on any of the counts of the indictment.

My reference to certain facts does not of course give them

any greater or different significance than you would other-

wise ascribe to them. In the course of the trial I have asked

questions of some of the witnesses. This was done solely

to develop informatio: Neither the questions nor the an-

swers thereto have any other or cifferent or greater signifi-

eance than they would have if the questions had been asked

by any of the counsel.

—

You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But

in your consideration of the evidence you are not limited

to the bald statements of the witnesses. On the contrary,

you are permitted to draw, from facts which you find have

been proved, such reasonable inferences as seem justified

in the light of your own experience.

App. 79

The statements of counsel are not evidence and should

not be considered as evidence unless such statement or

statements were made as admissions or stipulations con-

ciding the existence of a fact or facts.

You must not consider for any purpose any evidence

offered and rejected or which has been stricken out by the

Court; such testimony is not evidence in this cause and is

to be completely disregarded. Most of the evidence has been

admitted generally and may be considered for or against

all of the defendants. However, I have instructed you from

time to time that som< sf the evidence is not admissible

against one cr more of the defendants.

In deciding the case against a particular defendant, you

are to decide this case solely upon the evidence that has

been admitted by the Court as to that defendant, and the

inferences that you may reasonably draw as to that de-

fendant and such presumptions as the law affords as to that

defendant.

At times throughout the trial the Court has been called

upon to pass upon the admissibility of certain offered evi-

dence. You should not be concerned with such rulings or

the reasons for them. Whether evidence which has been

offered is admissible or is not admissible is purely a ques-

tion of law, and from a ruling on such question you are not

to draw any inference. In admitting evidence, to which an

objection has been made, the Court does not determine what

weight should be given to such evidence. You raust not

guess what the answer might have been to any question to

which an objection was sustained and you must not specu-

late as to the reason the question was asked or the reason

for the objection. Every defendant has the right to object to

SES ASR EAE AE NI AE Le RENEE I

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SARA iis a NR et

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: -

App. 80

any evidence offered against him, to obtain from the Court

the legal opinion of the Court as to whether such evidence

is admissible and, if admissible, for what purposes and to

what extent. You are not to infer that any objection to

evidence had any other purpose. The same is true with

respect to any objections which may have been made by the

Government.

This is a criminal case. There are certain rules which

apply to criminal cases generally, to which I will now refer.

An indictment is but a formal method of accusing a de-

fendant of 9 crime. It is not evidence of any kind against

the accused, and does not create any presumption or permit

any inference of guilt. A defendant cannot be convicted

except upon the determination of the truth of one or more

of the charges by the unanimous verdict of the jury.

Another rule applicable to criminal cases is that a de-

fendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence. This

presumption attends him throughout the trial, and the

burden of overcoming this presumption rests upon the

government, which must establish a defendant’s guilt by

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every

essential element of the particular count under considera-

tion.

From the beginning of the trial to the end, the govern-

ment has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable

doubt, every fact essential to the conviction of the defend-

ants; the defendants have no burden to sustain, and have

no duty to prove that they did not commit the alleged crime;

it is enough if their evidence taken with the goverr™ert’s

raises » reasonable doubt of guilt, in which event they must

be acquitted.

A reasonable doubt means a doubt founded upon reason.

It does not mean a fanciful doubt, or a whimsical or capri-

cious doubt, for anything relating to human affairs and

dependii:g upon human testimony is open to some possible

or imaginary doubt.

App. 81

A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause rea-

sonable men to hesitate to act in matters of importance to

themselves.

When all the evidence in the case, carefully analyzed,

compared and weighed by you, produces in your minds a

settled conviction or belief of a defendant’s guilt, such a

conviction as you would be willing to act upon in matters

of the highest importance relating to your own affairs, when

it leaves your minds in such a condition that you feel an

abiding conviction amounting to a moral certainty of the

truts of the charge, then, and in that event, you would be

free from a reasonable doubt. Absolute or mathematical

certainty is not required, but there must be such certainty

as satisfies ycur reason and judgment, and upon whick

you feel conscientiously entitled to act.

A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence

produced, but also from a lack of evidence. Since the burden

is upon the prosecution to prove the accused guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime

charged, a defendant has the right to rely upon failure of

the prosecution to establish such proof. A defendant may

also rely upon evidence brought out on cross examination

of witnesses for the prosecution. The law does not impose

upon a defendant the duty of producing any evidence.

The jury should not reach a verdict based on conjecture

or speculation, nor on sympathy or emotion of any kind in

favor of a defendant or agz‘nst a defendant, either gen-

erally, or in this particular case. You should find your

verdicts on the evidence, that is, the testimony of the

witnesses testifying under oa h and the documents admitted

in «**dence as exhibits.

The defendants are on trial only for the offenses charged

in the indictment and not for any act or conduct not charged

in the indictment.

You should not consider in any way :f your deliberations

any fact, opi

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