Brief Amicus Curiae — Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. (No. 10)

Supreme Court brief1964

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Siainent el he APU REG .. «ic ccsssccscescnee Serr Meter 4

pF PE OE PCLT ore eT) CETTE C eT EEE TS EET Te 3

. I: Testimony By The AFL- GIO ee hed Section. i0l(a) ~

(3) And-Union Endorsement Uf The Statutory Lan- |

. guage Show The Landrum-Griffin Act Was Not In- |

tended To Prohibit “Weighted” Voting By- Delegates . 3

II. Congressional Regulation Of Union Procedures For In-

- ereasing Dues And Levying Assessments Should Be

Interpreted In Light Of Established Union Practices _

Allowing ‘ “Weighted” Voting By Convention Delegates 9

Conclusion REE ME LO EER, Ee Ee eee eee weveeee 1S

Citations -

Cig:

Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U. Ss: _ See

NLEB vy. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264... | €

- Perrine v. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co., 50 U.S. 172 ..... eee 9

Ranes v. Office. Employees Local 28, 317 F. 2d 916 (7th Cir.

, 1963) BE) OER Oy GOO CPOE EOE TT ESE EEE Tee 9, 11

STATUTE: ae

Labor-Management aaiialies and Disclosure Act of 1959 (73

Stat. 522, 29 U S.C. § 411(a) (3) (B) ), see. 101 (a) (3) (B) .

3-6, 8, 10, 14

CONGRESSIONAL:

105 Daily Cong. Ree. 9933 ‘ilies 16, 1959), 9 Leg, Hist, 1294 5

105 Daily Cong., Ree. 14351-52, 14358-59 (Aug. 12, 1959), 2°

Leg. Hist. POPES DOOD 6 oe sete cc bcteweredeacesnevens 6

Hearings on Labor-Management Reform Legislation before a

Joint Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education

and Labor, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959) ..........-..... 4

H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959) -........... eee 4-

H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. ( ee) sauueuure ds ue ees 4

- H.R. 8490, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959) ........ SOT TAGE 4

S. 1555, 86th Cong., ‘Ist. Sess. ii Frneucauensa aes Sas oe

MISCELLANEOUS : ae :

AFL-CIO C onstitution 6) Ey er ea aaeeni-s < say 7

AFL-CIO News, Aug. Serer heer Terr ere ata

N.Y. Times, Aus. ed irae hn ate ean nw a Riad ee AG 6

2 Proceedings of the AFL-CIO Fifth Constitutional Conven-

tion [|Report of the Executive Council] (1963) .......... 14

i.

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

NO. 27

«

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS OF THE

“UNITED STATES AND CANADA, ET AL,

Petitioners,

\

v. *

EDDIE WITTSTEIN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

- 0 THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

AND. CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

AS AMICUS CURIAE

—

INTEREST OF THE AFL-CIO

This brief amicus curiae is filed by the American Federa-

tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

(AFL-CIO) with the consent of the parties, as provided for

in Rule 42 of the Rules of this Court.

2

The AFL-CIO is a federation which includes 131 national

and international labor organizations, having a total of

about thirteen million members. The Federation is vitally

concerned with maintaining demecratic procedures among

all its affiliates. It is also vitally concerned with ensuring

_that each individual affiliate is allowed the widest latitude,

consonant with guarantees of fairness for its membership,

in deciding upon that particular mode of procedure best

suited to its own needs and desires. Genuine democracy is

served far better through a healthy diversity than through

a rigid conformity in the private institutions -of our free

society,

The-instant ease presents one specific question about the

latitude to be allowed. labor organizations in determining

the procedure for-inereasing member ship dues. ~The ques-

tion is important in itself, because under the decision of

the court below doubt is cast on the methods now used by

over. half of the AFL-CI(’s affiliates in securing essential

revenue. The question is atso important because it: will

enable this Court to provide guidance on how the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73:

Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. $401 ef seq., should be interpreted in

other contexts, when there is a choice between a narrow and

artificial reading that will wreak havoe upon established

union procedures withqut promoting any known congres-

sional purpose, and, on the other hand, a sensible and

renlistic reading that will assure every individual union

man dis proper membership rights without interfering with

the practices and usages freely adopted by his organization.

As the principal spokesman for organized working people -

in this country, the AFL-CIO wishes to submit to the Court

certain data which, in our opinion, establish two critical

points. First, the court below misconstrued the relevant

siatutory terminology by failing to appreciate its meaning

as commonly understood in intraunion affairs. Secondly,

the court’s interpretation would foree a great many inter-

national labor organizations, including’a majority- of the

Federation’s affiliates, to abandon their established proce-

dures for increasing dues or fees or for levying assess-

ments, despite the absence of any indication in the legisla-

tive history that Congress evef intended so unsettling a

a Sanne EE nT eae

ARGUMENT

Section 101(a)(3)(B) of the Labor-Management Re-

porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C.

-§411(a)(3)(B), provides -in effect that an international

union may. inerease individual members’ dues or fees oy,

inter‘alid, a “majority vote of the delegates voting” at a

convention of the organization. Judge Thurgood Marshal,

dissenting below, and petitioners, in their brief here, have

said all. that seeda to be said to show that as a matter of ©

law the quoted language should properly be construed as

including ‘authorization fora procedure whereby a dele-_

gate’s vote is “weighted” to reflect the number of members

he represents. In view of this, we will confine ourselves to

setting forth in summary fashion two items which we think

confirm the soundness of petitioners’ position, and which

we feel are most appropriately presented by the AFL-CIO.

These cover (1) congressional testimony by Federation

President George Meany regarding his understanding of

section 101(a)(3) of the Act, in the light of established

union practices; and (2) the potential effect of the instant

decision upon the voting procedures presently followed by

the 131 national and international unions affiliated with the

AFL-CIO.

I. Testimony By The AFL-CIO Regarding Section 101(a) (3)

And Union Endorsement Of The Statutory Language Show

The Landrum-Griffin Act Was Not Intended To Prohibit

‘*Weighted” Voting By Delegates.

- On June-3, 1959 AFL-CTO President George Melty ap-

peared before a joint subcommittee of the House of Rep-

4

resentatives to set forth in detail the Federation’s views

- on proposed labor legislation, including S. 1555, 86th Cong., _

’ Ist Sess. (1959), as passed by the Senate. He voieed three

specifie objections to section 101(a)(3) of the Senate bill,

- dealing with union. membership dues, fees, and assess-

ments.’ First, certain prescribed. voting methods would

apply whenever dues and fees were “changed”; this was

unduly broad, since safeguards for individual members —_

would obviously. not be needed when rates were decreased.

Secondly, the language of the provision might be suscep-

tible of the interpretation that international unions could

change their rates only by convention action, and not by a

membership referendum. President Meany added, however,

that he did not think the Senate really meant to bar inter- ©

national unions ‘rom following the referendum procedure.

Having made this latter observation, President Meany

then submitted his third criticism of the section with these

comments: “If-we are correct in this assumption as to what

the Senate intended, section 101(a)(3) actually permits

_ changes im dues and assessments by every method which

unions generally employ except action by a general execu-

_tive board or similar body.” (Empbasis supplied. )

This analysis of section 101(a)(3) received exceptionally

_ close attention. Each of the three principal bills to come

* before the House, H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959)-

(the House Labor Committee or Elliott bill), H.R.-8400

(the employer-backed Landrum-Griffin bill, which was

eventually passed), and H. R. 8490 (the union-backed Shel-

ley bill), contained identical language in section 101(a) (3),

and this language varied from the Senate’s version so as

to take account of each of the three objections leveled by

President Meany.

1 Hearings on Labor- Management Reform. Legtslation dei a

- Joint Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and ~

Labor, 86th. Cong., 1st Sess. 1482, ser 18 cea

* Id. at 1518.

5

_ Under tke ‘provisions of each bill’s section 101(a)(3),

the limitations on voting procedures would apply only when

the rates of dues and initiation fees were “increased,” and

not when they were otherwise “changed.” Under subsection

(B) (it) it was expressly provided that a vote on an inter-

national union’s dues, fees, or assessments could be taken

in a “membership referendum.” And under subsection (B)

(iii) the “executive board or Similar governing body” of an

international was-allowed to increase dues and fees and -

levy assessments between conventions. Plainly, there was

no desire on the part. of any legislative faction to wrangle

over this relatively noncontroversial . provision of. the bill.

Adversaries on many other issues readily united in acced-

ing to President Meany’s views on this paneer section.

Against this tieiligvound, it seems entirely fair to regard

as definitive President Meany’s characterization, of section

101(a)(3) as permitting (with the House modifications )

dues increases and assessments “by every method which

‘unions generally employ.” No member of Congress ever

challenged the accuracy of that appraisal.’ .

As the leading spokesman for American labor, President

Meany was of course aware that it was an accepted practice

_ among many unions to “weight” the votes of thei r delegates

at conventions in accordance with the number. of meters

they represented.‘ It is inconceivable that President Meany,

either in criticizing the language of S. 1555 or later in en-

5 See, e.g., Senator McClellan's point-by- polit | response to many

of President. Meany’s other comments on title I of S. 1555. 105

Daily Cong. Ree. 9933 (June 16, 19 59), 2 Leg. _ Hist. of the LMRDA

1294. No question was raised about President Meany’s quoted esti-

mate of the seope of section 101(a) (3).

“See affidavit of ‘George Meany submitted in the Distriet Court

below (R. 110), and the figures se forth in part I], infra. :

6

‘ dorsing the Shelley bill,* which had language identical to

section 101(a)(3) as enacted, would have acquiesced in* the

invalidation of the voting procedures followed at conven-

tions by a majority of the AFL-C10O’s affiliated interna-

tionals. es .

Furthermore, as this Court has declaredy if a “word he

deemed to have a peculiar connotation for those intamate

with trade-union affairs, it is incumbent upon us to give the

word its technical menting,’ * especially where, as here, the

- term “is un integra] part of a statute whose sponsors were

fainiliar with labor organization and labor problems and

Which was doubtless draw n by specialists in labor relations.”

NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling C o, of Louisville 7 300 US. 264,

269. Such terminology ax a “majority vote of the dele-

- gates,” as customarily used in international constitutions,

merely describes the percentage needed to adopt a

measure; it does not say whether that perceniage shall be

a percentage of the individual delegates or a. percentage of

the weighted voting strength they represent. Indeed, the

phrase “majority vete” in many unions refers to a per-

*Sec 105 Daily Cong. Ree. 1435 1-52, 14358-59 ‘ Aug. 12, 1959),

2 Leg. Hist. 1627-28, 1634-35; V. Y. Tin s. Aug. 7, 1959, p. 1, col.

® p. 8, col. 3; AFL-CIO News, Aug. 8, 1959, p. 1, bin 5. °

Section’ 101 (a) (3) (A) (iii) of S. 1555, as passed by the Senate,

spoke in terms of a “majority vote at-a regular convention or a

special convention®**” ; Section 101 (a) (3) (B}(i) of the three House

bills spoke in terms of a “majority vote of the delegates voting at

aa reeular convention, frata special convention®*®®.” The plirase “of

the del egates voting”. was evidently inserted to make certain that

the “majorite” needed ‘to adopt a measure would be determined

othe basis of the delegates actually voting, and not on the basis

of the .entire body of delegates attending the eonvention, which

would be a stiffer standard to mect. Plainly, this slight language

* change was not intended: to effect sucha major legal change as

requiring the “majority” to be determined on the basis of the num-

her of individual delegates rather than on che basis of: the voting.

streneth of the delegates. So drastic an alteration would have

oceasioned commen’, and -would not have been approved by the

AFL-CIO when incorporated into the Shelley bill. In any event, as

discussed more Tully in the text, a “majority vote of the delegates”

in union parlanee ealls for no. such narrow and restrictive reading.

centage determined on either basis, depending on what vot-

ing procedure is being followed at a particular time. Under-

standing how union conventions ‘are generally conducted

will show why this is so.

As in many deliberative bodies, routine, noncontroversial

inatters at a convention are ordinarily handled by a voice

vote. More controversial questions, resulting in a closer

‘division of the assembly, are decided by. a standing vote

or a show of hands. In neither of these cases is any effort

made te take account of. a delegate’s “weighted” voting

strength. On the most important oF most controversial

issues, however, the usual procedure is to vote by roll-call.

It is on the roll-call that those organizations providing for

weighted voting proeeed to tabulate the’ delegates’ votes

according to the number of members they represent. In

this latter instance the phrase “majority vote of the dele-

gates,” or its equivalent, is read to mean a majority of the

“weighted” voting strength of the delegates. ‘To verify the

existence of this interpretation might, in the case of some

unions, require knowledge of the organizations’ practices

rather. thai merely of their constitutional provisions. But ~

the Constitution of the AFL-CIO. confirms by its very

lang ridley » the validity of our analysis.

Article XVIT of the AFL re lO C onstitution: reads as fol-

lows: . °

“This constitution can be amiended or altered only

by the convention, by a lwo-thirds vote of those prese nt:

and voting, citnher by a show of hands, or, if a rolleall

is properly demanded as. provided in thie constitution,

by such roll-call.”") (Emphais supplied. )

Article IV, section 17 of the AFL-CLO Constitution pro-

vides : .

“Questions may be decided by division or a show

of hands, but a calk of the roll may be demanded by 30

© AFLCIO Constitution, art. XVII (1961).

«8

percent of ‘the delegates present. Upon — roll-call

each delegate représenting affiliated national or inter-

: ationa]. unions, organizing committees and directly

-- affiliated local unions shall a entitled to cast one vote

for every member whom he represents. Each state and

local central body and national] trade and. industrial

department shall he entitled to one vote.” (Emphasis.

. supplied.) >

As can casily be seen, the phrase “two-thirds vote of those

present and voting,” which is found in the AFI.-ClO Con-

* ostitation, precisely parallels the plirase, “majority vote.

of the delegates. voting,” which is found in ‘section

101(a)(3)(B)(ij) of the Landrum-Griffin Act. The AFL- -

C10 Constitution goes on to make plain beyond any doubt.

that the “*twosthirds vote” may refer “ectther” to a two-thirds

count determuned on the basis of the number of individual

delegates present and voting, “or,7 on a roll-call, to a. two-

thirds count determined on the basis of the number of me

hers represented by those delegates.

Section 101 (a)(3)(B) of the Landrum-CGriffin Act, in-

’ ‘eorporating as it does a phrase having a “peculiar connota-

tion for those intimate with trade-union affairs,” must be

interpreted accordingly. -A “majority vote of the delegates

voting™ means either a majority calealated in terms of indi-

vidual delegates, or a majority calculated in terms of the

voting strength reflected by those delegates, depending on

how a particular organization provides that its delegates’

votes ‘shall be measured. Such an interpretation of the

*Jd., art. IV, §17. - |

* Like the AFL-CIO, a number of international unions on a roll-

cali give representatives of certain constituent bodies-one vote each, -

2 ‘though deiegates from affiliated unions vote the full membership .

they represent. This former group, which in the ease of the AFL-

(10 aceounts for only about. 260 votes out of approximately 12.5

million votes on a rolt-ceall, has been disregarded ‘in our discussion

(and in the classification in part Hl, infra), on the ground it is

d+ minimis and has no. bearing on whether an organization’s pro-

. ecdures would meet the standard required by the court below.

r .” ‘ g

statutory language is consistent with the meaning which

_ “specialists in labor relations” would be expected to convey.

It does no violence to any expression of legislative intent.:

It ecomports with the unchallenged understanding of AFL-

C1O President George Meany, as set forth in carefully

_ studied and highly influential congressional testimony. And,

as we. shall next show, it makes it unnecessary to rewrite

the freely chosen voting procedures which are spelled out

_. in the constitutions of over half of the AFL-C10's affiliated

-international unions. .

‘II. ‘Congressional Regulation Of Union Procedures For In.

creasing Dues And Levying Assessments Should Be Inter-

preted In Light Of Established Union Practices Allowing

‘*Weighted”. Voting By Convention Delegates. |

In Ranes v. Office Employees Local 28, 317 F.2d 915,

917-18 (7th Cir. 1963), the court in discussing another prob-

lem arising under Landrum-Griffin’s section 101(a)(3) took’

a sensible and realistic approach which we think is cqnally

appropriate here:

“We cannot assume that Congress was unawafe of the.

traditional structure and dues practices of labor unions

when it enacted 101(a)(3), or that Congress, “being

aware of the traditional structure and practices, in-

‘ tended by enacting that Section to strip international

unions of their traditional power to control the minima

and maxima of rates of dues without one word in the

Committee Reports expressing that intention. On the

contrary,.we must assume that Congress was aware of

the established structure and practices and interpret.

the statute in the light thereof.’””

As can readily be demonstrated, the “traditional strue-

' ture and dies. pragtices of labor unions” encompass; for a

‘majority of the 131 international unions affiliated with the

AFL-CIO, procedures whereby the dyes or fees, ur the

minima thereof, or the, assessments, jpavahle by individual

members may be set by a vote of th¢ delegates at an inter-

* Citing Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93, 98-101;

Perrine v. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co., 50.U. S. 172, 187-88.°

10.

national convention in which the voting strength of each

delegate is measured or “weighed,” in one way or another,

according to the number of members he represents.’ Peti-

tioners have fully briefed the proposition that such

“weighted” voting is one of the mest feasible methods of

ensuring & democratic reflection of the wishes of the entire

membership of the union, without having a convention so

‘large that it is both overly cumbersome and. overly: ex- .

pensive.” We will limit ourselves to setting forth the sta-

tistics on the voting procedures followed by the Federation's

affiliates. . F

AFL-C1LO cou:.sel have examined the conatitetiogs of the |

131 affiliated int-rnational organizations to determine the

way each raises «'ues and levies assessments.” The results

of this study ar: tabulated in the Appendix of this brief.’

Five, distinet voting methods are employed: (1) non-con-

vention action—all dues, fees, and assessments, or minima

thervof, payable by individual members are governed by

WAS Judge Marshall pointed out in his dissent below, the peti-

tinner international has a total membership of about 280,000, spread

threughout local unions ranging in size from around 28,000 down

‘to 20, and this is by no means atypical. Directly proportional

representation of cach loeal in such a union, if achieved through

the number of delecates at the international convention rather than ©

through the voting strength of the delegates, would require a con-

vention consisting ef some 14,000 delegates.

'' Labor organiz.:tions are required by the Landrum-Griffin Act

ty file their constitr‘ions with the Department of Labor. These con-

stitutions are available for publie inspection, so the accuracy: of

the AFL-CIO’s elassifieations can easily be verified. As an added

precaution, the classifications made by Federation counsel were .

submitted to all 131 affiliates for thcir comments or corrections.

{in light of their own interpretations and practices. -

2%n classifying the internationals’ voting procedures, . certain

ground rules were adopted. The only voting procedures considered

were those covering ‘finaneiai obligations placed dirceetly. on in-

dividual members, sinee section 101(a) (3) of the Aet deals solely

with dues, fees, or assessments “payable by members.” (Emphasis .

supplied.) Financial obligations imposed by internationals on their

constituent locals as organizational entities were ignored. Inter-

national unions which fix minimum dues or ‘fees but Teave to the

s'

a : Seat

niethods other than a vote of convention delegates, e.g., by

membership referenda or by the various loeal unions; (2)

equal voting at a convention—each delegate has one vote;

(3) membership weight at a convention—delegates vote

the membership they represent, e.g., a delegate represent-

ing 603 members has 603 yotes; (4) directly proportional

voting at a convention—delegates have a voting strength

in direct proportion (sometimes. ignoring fractions) to the

number of members they, represent, ¢.g., a delegate repre-

sentivg 100: members has one vote and a delegate represent-

ing 603 inembers has 6 (or 6.03) votes; and (5) sliding seale

voting at a conventton—delegates’ voting strengths vary de-

pending on the number of niembers they represent, but

there is a graduated rather than directly proportional re-

lationship, ¢.g., a delegate has one vote for the first 100

members he represents, one additional vote for the next 200,

and one additional vote for each additional 300 members. _

. The first two of these procedures for setting dues and

locals the setting of the exact amount were treated, however, like

organizations which fix the rate at the international level, beeause

the power to raise the minima is the legal, and often the practical,

* equivalent of the power to inerease the rate itself. Cf. Ranes v.

Office Employees Local 28, 317 F. 2d 915 (7th Cir. 1963).

The purpose of this survey, of course, was to show how many .

unions'-would have to change their existing practices should the

rule of the court below be upheld. Accordingly, if cither local dues

or other fees (or the minima thereof) payable by individual mem-

bers are set at an international convention, the international is

classified so as to indicate the voting procedure which would or

could be governed by the decision in the present case. Similarly,

" if rates can be raised or assessments levied by a separate membership

referendum as well as by convention action, or by a standing con- |

vention vote with each delegate having one vote as well as by a

roll-eall, upon proper demand, with a weighted ‘vote prevailing,

the referendum. or stahding vote is disregarded and the’ interna-

tional is categorized solely on the basis of the convention action or

roll-eall voting system.. On the other hand, if any dues increase

or assessment requires both a convention vote and » membership

referendum, ihe international is classified as using noi-convention

action, on the ground that at least the referendum would meet the

requirements of subsection (B) (ii), making it immaterial whether

* the convention action met the requirements of subsection (B) (i).

12

Co

laying assessments would not be affected by the holding

below that every delegate must have one vote when action

is by convention. The last three types of procedures would

be invalidated. Under the five categories just described, the

AFL-CIO’s 131 affiliated internationals can be classified ac- _

cording to their voting procedures for raising dues and

levying assessments, as follows: :

Voting Procedures on Finances

Used by 131 AFL-CIO Affiliates

- Procedure : - No. of Unions

Non-Convention Action ............. etasenen'. ae

ME WOE Cidesiedcasccdscedeescrrercess< 42

Total Unions Unaffected by Wittstetn .... 63

I PUTIN kop ice cere orservscucsese fo rae

Eg Stee ereneds - 31

Sliding Seale ........ PESTS Oe ree eee Pee 18

Total Unions Affected by Wittstein ...... 68

Total SE heise ds ee hens eee ss 131 _—

A total of 68 unions, or more than half the AFL-CIO’s

international affiliates, would thus have their voting pro-

cedures on financial issues struck down as unlawful under -

the ruling of the court below. Limiting consideration to the

110 internationals which decide such questions at conven-

tions, this mean: almost two-thirds of the organizations:

would be adversely affected. In‘the absence of the slightest

suggestion in the legislative history that Congress ever

intended so devastating a result, a relatively non-contro-.

Versial section of a statute should not be construed as out-

-lawing such an accepted and concededly democratic trade

union practice.” .

1S Even the majority of the court below pe ae that “weighted

voting is to all appearances the most ‘democratic’ method, in the

sense that each member is duly ‘represented,’ and it is a method

of voting widely. recognized as fair and proper by a number of

unions.” Wittstein v: Musicians, 326 F. 2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1963).

13

As might be expected, an even higher proportion of the

lar,er labor organizations use Ww eighted yoting by delegates

at conventions to pass upon revenue measures. Examina-’

tion of the 34 affiliated internationals having more than

100,000 members each shows the following breakdown:

Voting Procedures on Finances Used by 34 AFL-CIO Affiliates

- Having More Than 100,000 Members Each

Procedure No. of Unions

Non-Convention Action Di alla gi i pe hips oO 2

Equal Voting .,:.... Vane Sete de ered Gena eweet 12

‘Total U nions Unaffected: by- Wittstein eos 14

Membership WEES oc ov avueeud ere arene 6

Fin DE uti nsue ARETE EEE : 9

’ Sliding Seale ...... ERCP aie Sia ae ee ey URE a ae

Total Unions A ffected by Wittstein enieee 20

Ee EE vase vasdhaesakecneus . 34

Labor organizations relying upon various methods of

weighted delegate voting to provide u fair reflection of ©

membership sentiment, without the need for an outsized

-convention, include such quarter-million-member-or-over

internationals as the Auto Workers, the Building Service

Employees, the Communications Workers, the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the International Union . |

of Klectrical Workers, the Hotel and Restaurant Em-

ployees, the Operating Engineers, and the Steelworkers.

Those cight unions alone account for almost four million

members, about one-third of the total strength of the AFL-

CIO. Can it seriously be maintained that Congress ‘in-

tended, without reason,‘ without explanation, and through

a provision sala ha the endorsement of the President of

'* The major ity below wenevted that « no particular abuses in the

matter of weighted voting for such increases [in dues and fees]

‘had been proved.” Wittstein.v. Musicians, 326 F. 2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.

1963).

|

14 i

the AFL-CIO, to strip these and other unions representing

a vast contingent of American workingmen" of their -tra-

ditional power to obtain essential operating funds through

voting procedures freely’chosen by those organizations, and

carefully designed to secure an accurate expression of the

wishes of their entife memberships?

We think not. We think section’ 101(a)(3) of Landrum-

Griffin should be interpreted in accord with the undisputed

analysis contained in President Meany’s congressional testi-

mony, in acerord with the accepted meaning of its termi-

nology in trade union circies, and in accord with the

unexeeptionable voting practices of. the majority of the

internationals comprising the AFL-CIO. The narrow,

‘niggling reading urged by respondents, and the harsh and

drastic results it would produce, are not required by the

statutory language, and run directly counter to legislative

history and rational. policy.. The phrase ‘ ‘najority vote of

the delegates” can reasonably be interpreted as referring

‘to a majority of the delegates’ voting strength, either equal

or weighted, depending on what method has been chosen

by a particular organization. Common sense and a due

regard for the context in which the statute was written com-

pel the adoption of that interpretation.

The 68 international affiliates of the AFL-CIO which utilize

one form or another of “weighted ’ delegate voting report a total

membership of approximately 7,200,000. See 2 Proceedings of the

AFL-CIO Fifth Constitutional Convention iReport of the Execu-

tive Council] 37-40 seth :

1d

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set. forth

in the brief for petitioners, the judgment of the court below

should be reversed. :

| _.. Respectfully submitted, ~~

oY, J. Aubert WOoLL .

General Counsel, AFL-CIO

‘ Ropert C. Mayer

T'HroporeE J. St. ANTOINE

756 Bowen Building

815 Fifteenth Street, N.W. -

Washington, D. C. 20005

Tuomas E. Harris

2 ; Associate General Counsel,

’ AFL-CIO

815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

| August 1964

—————

16

: _ APPENDIX |

Voting Procedures on Finances Used by 131 AFL-CIO, Affiliates'*

Name of the Union —

Non-Con-

vention

Action

Equal

Voting

Member-

ship

Weight

Direct

Propor-

tion

Sliding

-Bcale

Actors & Artistes —

x

Air Line Dispatchers

Air Line Pilots

Aluminum Workers

_Asbestos Workers

Automobile Workers

Bakery Workers .

Barbers )

Bill Posters

Boiler Makers

Bookbinde rs

Boot and Shoe Workers

Brewery Workers |

Bricklayers

Brick and Clay Workers

- Broadcast Employees - ;

Building Service Em-

ployees

Carpenters |

, Non-Con- Member-

- Name of the .Union ver on | Eaual | snip

, : Weight

|

Cement Workers

Chemical Workers

Cigarmakers . !

Clothing Workers, .

- Amalgamated xX:

~ Commercial

Telegraphers x

i ‘ommunications : .

Workers . -

( ‘oopers ’ Xx

ee i

Distillery W aseene . x

Doll and Toy W orke rs Xx

Ik "Neetwienl wv ROR

(IUE)-

lvetrieal Workers :

(IBEW) es Jo

levator Constructors

Fire Fighters eyed x aoa

Ki iremen and Oilers

F light Engi neers 5

r urniture W orkers te i

. Garment Workers,

United ; x

Non-Con- Member-| Direct :

Name of the Union vention | Eaval Propor- | Sliding

ship

Action | V°UDE | weignt| tion | Scale

(ilass and Ceramie

Workers’ . x

Glass Bottle Blowers x

Glass Cutters. x he

. (tines Workerts, Flint x

Govevamnent Enployees _ =a x

Grain Millers o *, / x foe

Granite Cutters”

ee

ree a

Horse Shoers a ah a a a ; Leas tary

Hosiery Workers _ = eee ve eae

Hotel & Restaurant per ae

Mmplovees ' x

Industrial Workers,

Allied a

fusurance Workers : x

- oo ee ee Ce — ——_— -_—- -——_—_—__ : —

lron Workers = x

Jewelry Workers x

Ladies’ Garment ; ;

Workers - x ,

Lathers x

19

}

ay Non-Con-|

Name of the Union vention /

; ; Action ‘

Equal

Laundry & Dry

Cleaning Uniog ; ae

Voting _watp ——"

Leather Goods Workers x.

ee Ce

Leather Workers, |

United — | X

Letter Carriers < ) _ Xx

Locomotive Firemen &

enginee ro Xx

|ongshores men ji x

Mac ‘hinists . “XxX

Maintenance “a We ay

Miuplovees ‘

Marble | ‘olishers

* Marine & Shipbuilding

Workers : x

anne ine Fanginerre

M: aritime Union — A

Masters, Mates & e ilots e oa Se

--— —

Maste r Mechanics , x

Meat Cutters x

Mechanies ‘Educational .

Society , x

Metal Polishers. - 1 x

— ee eee = ae a OG en a - aeelene oon ao Ce een ccenEENEEE eo aes neGenee -<oe

Name of the Union

Member- Direc.

Bn owed ship Scale

Weight; tion

Molders

Musicians |

Newspaper Guild

Office Employees

Oil Workers

Operating Engineers

Packinghouse Workers

Painters °.

Papermakers \.

we

lattern Makers —

Photo Engravers

Plasterers

Plumbers

Porters, Sleeping Car

Post Office Motor

Vehicle Employees

Post Office Mail-

‘Handlers

Postal Clerks

Potters.

Printers & Engravers

x

Printing Pressinen

Name of the Union

Non-Con- Equal

Voting

ship

Weight

Pulp & Sulphite

Workers

Radio Association |

Railroad Telegraphers ses

Railroad Trainmen

Railway Carmen

Railway Clerks

Tiai'way Patrolmen .

Railway Supervisors:

Retail Clerks

) Retail, Wholesale

Union

Roofers on

Rubber Workers

Seafarers

Shect Metal Workers

Shoe Workers, United

Siderographers

Signalimen

Special Delivery

Messengers

Stage Employees

e

' Name of the ‘Union ;

“

Equal

Voting

State, County &

’ Municipal Employees

~ Steelworkers

Stereotypers

Stone Workers

Stonecutters

stove Workers

Street & Electric

’ Railway Employees

Switchmen

Teachers

Technical Engineers

- Textile Workers,

United

Textile Workers

(TWUA)

~ Tobacco Workers

Train Dispatchers

Transport Service

- Employees.

Transport Workers

Typographical Union

- Upholsterers

23

|

Name of the Union ‘ = bn wed weight | =" Beale

Utility Weekes = t(D

Yaoi feo PE

Woodworkers Meee oe gs : Seen oie

an a

© Por an explanation of ‘the method followed in’ preparing this

chart, see notes LL and 12, supra, and accompanying text. .

Tie classification headings represent the following voting systems :

‘‘Non-Convention Action”~-.\l! dues, foes and assessments, or

minima thereof, payable by indjvigual members are governed

by methods other than a vote of convention delegates, ¢.4.,

by membership referenda cr by the various local unions,

‘‘Equal Voting’—-Each delegate at a convention has one

vote. — - mee

‘‘Membership Weight’’—Delegates at.a convention vote the

membership they represent, ¢.g.. a delegate representing 605

members has 603° votes. : .

‘‘Direct Proportion’’—-Delegates at a convention have a vot-

ing strength in direct proportion (sometimes ignoring frae-

. tions) tofthe number of members they represent, ¢.g., a dele-

; gate representing 100 members has.one vote and a delegate

representing 603 members has 6 (or 6.03) votes.

‘Sliding: Scale”-—-Delevates’ voting strengths at a. conven:

tion vary depending on the number of members they repre-

sent, but there is a graduated rather than directly: propor-

tional relationship, ¢.g., a delegate has one vote for the first

100’ members he represents, one additional vote for the nest

200, and one additional vote for each additional 800 members,

The 63 international affiliates in the first- two categories would

aot be affeeted by the rule of the eourt below. The 68 intermrtionals

in the remaining three categories: would have their votine pre

cedures invalidated. -

J

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.