Brief for the Appellee — Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States

Supreme Court brief1963

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ME Con, Y a Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

ee UR) FILED

ae é OCT 16 1962

IN THE JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

Supreme Court of the Gnited

Octower TeERM, 1962.

No. 47."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant,

v. > Mihi.

MERICAN WORLD NIRWAES. INC. WLRLGRACE

O.. and PAN AMERICAN-GRACE AIRWAYS. INC,

( Li Appellees,

Mate Magn

"ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEi YORK

BRIEF FOR W. R. GRACE & CO.

Lawrev cr J. MehWay.

Wintiam E. Hrcasry.

Raywonp L. fans. Jk

“0 Pine Street.

New York 5. New York.

Attorneys for Appellee, WR. Groce de Cu, .

Of Counsel: see

©, CamLi, Gordon, Reinpen & Onn

80 Pine Street

New York 5, New York

Oetober 15. 1962?

INDEX.

«

GOMOTIONS PRBRGRMTBD ...0.....-.0.s..,.cssecssebscaiacnrccasenseneceseees

SN gosh ictsace acta ena teoisastodbeapeeceauadammeincasaainls

SumMary oF ARGUMENT |... 000.0... petlltin hades

° . —_—

ARGUMENT:

I. The Court has jurisdiction to hear this nagem...

Il. The participation of Grace in the formation of

Panagra never was, and is not now, a combina-

tion ‘in restraint of trade in violation ‘of the

MN IG fincccaschncssscegensstestichcestess seesacdtacianes Migyhonr

A. Competition between U.'S. flag airlines in

« South America prior to 1938 was economi-

cally impossible | .........20...02......2...00-+: iiacunmaeantis

B. The organization of Panagra did not un-

reasonably restrain trade; it was an eco-

nomically sound arrangement which ad-

vanced the policies and interests of the

WN eee detreecscns casi ateeuanens

L,

Grace had no unlawful intent or pur-

pose in participating in ‘the formation

Oe aca liane esespeectncctins-toerntonennine

The formation of Panagra did not elim-

inate competition between Pan Ameri-

eR ao rk hasan ates

No alleeation of territories was implicit

_in the formation of Panagra.................... |

‘The formation of Panagra was econom-

I NE sisi cieatandon

18

14

Hit.

We

hart

IL

.

The temporary and ad hoc zoning arrange-

ment which existed prior : ‘to 1938 was not

unlawful ......: é tiocinnsien,

A. The east-west zoning arrangement................

B. The east-west zoning arrangement was not

“SN OI NII oo ccicessescrennstess Sasstesmisctensionis ,

C. The Government has not shown-an unrea-

sonable_restraint of the domestic or foreign

commeree of the United NN eae

D.. No relief against Grace ig warranted. PAE RAE

. The scope, terms and duration of the zoning

‘arrangement were as found by. the District

. The District Court correctly held that the

restraints imposed upon Panagra were unilat-

erally ‘imposed by Pan American pursuant to

‘its unlawful attempt to -monopelze aid its

monopolization; those restwainfs will be rem- . -,

edied’ by div eatery of Pan An rican. ci

Grace's 50% isitioteindbens in the organization

‘and development of Panagra,; while .owning

all of the stock of Grace Line, did not, and does

not, unreasonably restrain trade. 00002020002...

we A. The services rendered by Panagra and by

Grace Liné are not reasonably interchange-

able; they. do not constitute parts of the

same competitive market.............. RBI

| Al |b Aaliat: SMe Mirae nO TORS ;

2. Passenger transportation .............. ...... mi

a. Cargo DOOD Siscceceictncsened RENE ere

The Government’s authorities...... ee ?

PAGE

in

‘«

B. Grace’s participation in the organization

and development of Panagra whil owning:

all of the stock of Grace Line did not, and

. does not, unreasonably restrain trade....... ,

ly

9

me

v.

ConcLUSION

APPENDIX A:

A new venture cannot be equated with

a merger .......... seascabein cided pe A Oo TRII An

No substantial eompetition is eliminated

Or Ga TIN sintigenresncnesintesinctionssdcnnstennsec

There is important competition from

a Bc OTE irr SO ETT x

No Congressional or administrative pol-

icy supports the Government’s argu-

ment Pan eSee aE eo Rae I Ny eR ee PEE Hoa EROOS

There j is no evidence of actual restraint

a onal a eae oemepacses

,

Memorandum disapproving conse’.t deeree..............

Proposed consent deecree................ a LIOR iaaer oho

«

PAGB

90

TaBLe or Cases.

PAGE

Additional ore to Latin America, 6 (. A. B. 857

(1946) . " een aa

Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C. A. ‘B. 473 (1948)... 95

Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda.Fine A rts Co. 191

F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) . | RS 46°

American President Lines. 8, “Ltd., 7 ro re B. 799

(1947) . a = TONSA EOS 4

Americas ‘Precking ‘Heesdiathen. Inc. v. United

States, 355 U. &. 141 (1957)..............02....cc.ccccccsssessascsee %

Besser Mfa. Co. x. United States, 343 U. S. 444 (1952) 3

Boston and Maine and Maine Central Railroads,

Control—North East Air Lines, Inc., 4 C. A. B.

379 (1943) . ena pciabdetanesaiicion 93

Brown Shoe Co. United States, 370 . S. 204 :

Chicago Board of Trade y. United States, 46 U.S.

RR Tee tec asaietals” ie

_Gameo, Ine. vy Providence Fruit & Produce Building,

Inc., 194 F. 2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert, denied, 344

gt _, RD Om ARON alle MCTEDEE Ar eiiiaeehanasigas 65

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Tele-

phone & Tele — Co., 18 F. Supp. 650 (D. Del.

1937) . tata | 42

Great Lahe es Aves Case, 8 c, A. B. 360 (1947) ' 95

Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co. v. Un ‘ted States.

87 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Hawaii 195)) . * &5

Interlocking Relationships, 6 ©. A.B. 399 (1945), 83

International Boring Club vy. United States, 258 -

U.S. 242 (1959) | 72

Klor’s Inc, v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc, 350 U.S. *

207 (1959) ae 65

Lehman v. Ciril Aeronautics Board, 200 F. 2d 289

(D.C. Cir, 1953), cert. denied; 347 U.S. 916 (1954) 82

y

‘VAGE

National Air Fryight Forwarding Corp. v. Civil '

Acronautis Board, 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 93, 96

North rn Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 256

eee Sa ee Ce |

Pan American 4irace Airwaas, lnw.. Mad Rates, Dt. =

GODS, findings and conclusions of April 25, 1958

confirmed Maw 15. 14s as iis

Parker © Brown, OAT US. SAL (19428) eae 43

Radiaal Rurn rs, due. ¥. People « fias Leaht & Coke

Coste US. 656 1061) Beas 65

Kock Island Moter Transport Company, 4 ommon

Carrier Appliation, 62 Met COOL ti abe 6

Southern Pecific Compana’s Ownership of Atlantic

. Steamship Line 807 1. V4 O12) 96

Steamer Lines on Lona Island Sound, 501. C. C. 634°

(1998); 183 1. CC. CC. 283. (2058)... )

St. Joe Paper Ca. v. Atlantic Coast Line Neilvead,

47 &. S. 208 (1954) ween ane tied 7

TACA, S. A. Foreiqn Air Carrier Permit, 10

C. A. B. 130 (1949) . “5

Times Picayune Pub. Co. ¥. United States, 345 U. S.

994 (1953) .... ........ Reareaee 71

Timken Roller BRearma we “United State. S 241

U.S. 598 (1951) | occ aay BH, 35, Be, 6S

Union Circulation Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,

241 F. 24 652 (2d Cir. 1957)... 20

United States v. AlaminumCo. of America, 146°F.

2d 416 (2d Cir. 145) c 465,65

United States v. C lumbia Steel Co., BA U.S. 495

(148) . . S87

oi nitel States ¥. _E. 1. DuPont de Memeare é Co. 118

F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd. 1 U.S.

I ise see eesdanoen 42,71, 85

United States \ ¥. . Insurance Board ofc Cler eland, 188

P. Supp. 949 (N. D. Ohio 1966) nce, 42

vi

PAGE

United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.

Supp. 545 (E. D. Pa. 1960) aff’d, 365 U. S. 567

III: Os sdcacelesnietanneianlininiieviigdalcacaniancnegionabaticciniaantscalaies 42

United States v. Minnesota Mining d&: Mfg. Co., 92 F. :

bai, EE LT. Bee: TI acs snsceeesicisennninnencs 44

United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S. D..

iain atipnicachen mend 42

United States v. National Football Te 116 F.

Supp. 319. (E. D. Pa. 1953) 2... eeepc 42

United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 .

(S. D. N\Y. 1945), aff’d, 332 U.S. 319 (1947)... 46

United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S.

ESE Sentra ear AS Re tO SOT me

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S: 338 ania 2.3

STATUTES.

Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. $§12, et $eq.,

ERASE. NEP OM errr ne nee” mee ARO sisdeeeaie 86

Expediting Act, 15 USS. C., ve .

ose suesnnatincnsesaniinas 13

Foreign Air Mail Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 248 (70th

ik BID Re ita ccsscnssntacarscasnniatncinicasaabiniiatiangainncs 16

Foreign Air Mail Act of 1929, 45 Stat. 1449 (70th

aaa -_ eee iia aiid dacecliekateistianaakentadelinaaanticl 16

Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. §$1 et seq.:

sa AES Ce RRO: De a nneD ‘aa 2

Section 2............ aes are aaa 8, ST 10,13 -

TRI inn ditsessmcd niin cadesinns Ree MR ETD Ne NOES 2,13

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS.

Hearings Before a Special’Committee of the Senate

on Investigation c° Air Mail ard Ocean Contracts,

73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1934, page 2459: (‘Black

ig RETR IE a RTE OR HONE Meee 17

Vil

: PAGE

House Report 481, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. (1928) .000000... 16

Sen. Doe. No. 15, 74th Cong., Ist Sess, (1935)... 15, 19, 20

» 83 Cong., Ree. 6768, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., May 12, 1988 94

83 Cong., Rec. 6848, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., May 13, 1928 94

MISCELLA} cOUS.

Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Anti-trust Laws

‘Handler. Industridl Mergers and the Antitrust Laws,

32 Colum. L. Rev. 179 (1932)........-. sees Sele ceaueaiabian 85

Matthews *‘ Why America Is Vital To U 3” New York

Times Mayazine, p.17 (April 26, 1959)... a

Note, Restrictions on Entry of Surface Canviens Seek-

ing to Fly, 71: Yare L.°J. 1529 (1962)...............sccecseoee 95

Oppenheim, Federal Anti-trust Legislation: Guide-

posts to a Revised National Anti-trust Fancy, 50

Mico. L. Rev. 1139, 1176-77 (1952) 2........c.ss:sesceesseteeene 4.

Puffer, Air Transportation (Blakiston, 1941, p. 53-54) 20

Report of the Attorney General’s National Commit-

tee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955) p. 83..... ...... 42; 44

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Tero, 1962.

No. 47.

Unitep STaTes OF AMERICA,

Appellant,

‘ ; ; . v.

.

Pan American Worip Airways, Inxc., W. R. Grace & Co., »

and Pan AmeEnicaN-Grack Airways, Inc.,

| ae Appellees.

% o .

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOULHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

- BRIEF FOR W.R. GRACE & CO.

. Questions Presented. |

The questions presented by this appeal ace the fol-

lowing: .

. a

‘1(a) Did W. R. Grace & Co. (hereina*ter ‘‘Grace’’) and

Pan Americztn World Airways (hereivafter ‘‘Pan Ameri-

can’’) agree to ‘allocate territories fur the providing of

air transportation services between the United States and

Latin America and within Latin America and thereby

unlawfully restrain the forei;n commerce of the United

States? . iter

mm,

2

(b) If there was, prior to 1938, an unlawful allocation

of territories, does it warrant present relief against Grace?

2(a) Does the steamship: service operated -by Grace

Line, a wholly owned subsidiary of Grace, between the’

eastern coast of the United States and the western coast of

South America, form a part of the competitive market

which includes the air service operated by Pan American-

Grace Airways, Inc. (hereinafter ‘‘ Panagra’’) in that area?

(b) If these services are in the same competitive mar-

ket; did Grace’s 50% particip#ttion in the organization and

development of Panagra, while it owned all of the stock of

Grace Line, constitute a combination.in restraint of trade

violative of Section 1 or Section 3 of the Sherman Act, such

that relief is warranted against Grace?

Statement.

“This suit was commenced in January, 1954 in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New

York. In 1958 the Government ag@ Pan American sub-

mitted a proposed consent: decree which District Judge

Murphy declined to approve. Trial was had in May 1959.

The opinion of Judge Murphy was handed down in March

1961, and judgment was entered in May, 1961. o

Grace is the only one of the three parties actively

involved in‘the appeals from the judgment in this case

which supports that judgment in its entirety. . Grace be-.

, lieves that the opinion of the District Court accurately states

the relevant facts. J udge Murphy’s findings are, of course,

entitled to great weight since this Court has made it plain

that im a case like this it will not ‘‘try the case de noro

on the record,’’ United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S.

”

»

338, 340-41 (1949), and that there is a ‘harrow scope of

review’ in this Court with respect to issues of fact in ya

trust casesg Besser Mfg. Conv. U nited States, 343 u.

444, 446 (1952). Judge Murphy’ s opinion; like the opinion

in the Yellow Cab case, Wiis “prepared with obvious‘care”’

(338 U. S. at 341). x

The statement set out in the brief submitted by the

Government is deficient, both in its omission of important

material and in the emphasis, or lagk of it, put upon.various

factors. The statement in the brief of Pan American

filed in the appeal in No. 25 suffers even more severely in

these respects. These defects of omission and emphasis

will be corrected in the course of our argument. We believe

it appropriate at the outset, however, to-bring to the Court *s

attention certain unique features of this litigation. These

unique features can best be delineated by reference to cer-

tain anomalies which inhere in the Government's position.

The first anomaly is that tle Government secks, not

only to div est Pan AmcMean, the perpetrafér of a restraint

of trade, of the stock interest which it fas used as the

instrument of restraint, but also to invoke the remedy of

divestiture against Grace, the principal opponent and vie-

tim of the restraint.

On a reading of Judge Murphy’ s opinion and of the

Government’s brief, it soon becomes evident that the prin-

cipal problem which gave rise to this litigation, and the

significant restraint at which the Government's case is

- aimed, is Pan American’s persistent blocking of anv appli-

cation by Panagra to extend its routes to the continental ”

‘United States. One result of this restraint is that Panagra

has been, and now remains, the only American inter-

national air carrier without its own terminal in the

United States. The record is clear that the party who

resisted Pan American and atte mpted to secure ai. exten-

sion of Panagra’s routes was Grace...

4

or o

Indeed, since Pan American and Grace has each at all

times owned one-half of the stock of Panagra and since each -

has at all times elected Gne-half of the Board of Directors of

Panagra, without Grace’s persistent advocacy of Panagra

route extensions, no issue would have arisen and Panagra’s

development would have been even more effectivels sup-

pressed. As owner of 50% of the stock of Vanagra, Grace

was the only party, apart from the general public, injured

by Pan American’s restraint... Yet, the Government charges

Pan American and Grace equally with antitrust violation

and seeks the same remedy against both.

The second anomaly is that, while the Government has

charged a combiration and conspiracy between Pan Amer- .

ican and Grace to alloca‘e territories in violation of the

antitrust laws, it has characterized the relationship between

Grace and Pan American as one of ‘‘bitter quarrel’’ and

‘‘impasse.’’* This would, perhaps, not be surprising if the

_ “impasse’’ and ‘‘bitter quarrel’’ related to matters other

than, and extraneous to, the ar-.as in which the Government

alleges combination and conspiracy. But this is not the

_ ease. The impasse and bitter quarrel have existed for more

than a generation with respect to the very restraint upon

which the Government bases its case. The record shows,

the District Court found, and the Governient admits, that

since 1938, when the coming of age-of international avia-

tion and the ehactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act made

it feasible, Grace has pe-sistently sought to extend Pan-

agra’s routes to the United States and Pan American has

persistently opposed and blocked that extension.. For ¢xam-

| ple, when in 1938 Grace sought the approval of Pan Amer-

ican for the making of an application by Panagra for the

® Trial Brief for the United States, Part I, p. 2; Brief for the

United. States in Nos. 23 and 47 (hereinafter referred to as

ee p. 11._

7,

cee as

extension of its reute to the United States, the minutes of

the Board of Directors of Pan Aineriean recorded:

‘‘Mr. Trippe reported to the meeting on the status

of negotiations with W.-R. Grace & Co. It was the

sense.of the meeting that it would not be in tie inter-

est of our stockholders [Pan Ameriecatr’s] for our

. directors to authorize an application by Pan Amer-

ican-Grace Airways, Inc. to extend north of Cristobal

in competition with Pan American Airways, Ine.’’

(G-182, R. 711; see R. 5405).°

*

This is what the. ‘‘bitter quarrel’ : and ‘impasse’? have

been, ail about. P |

The third and final anomaly helps, perhaps, to explain

the first two. This anomaly-resides in the fact that the

Government has made it clear that the ultimate purpose

and objective of this’ litigation, in so far as it felates to

‘Grace, is not the vindication of the antitrust laws or the

effectuation of their policy, but rather the accomplishment

of certain objectives Which the Department of Justice has

believed would be helpful té the Civil Aeronauties Board

in a Iministering ‘the Federal Aviation Act. As Judge

Murphy pointed out in-his opinion:

“The ultimate objective of the government is to,

facilitate the merger of defendant Panagra with

* The Government’s Exhibits, which were introduced in evi-

dence at pages 868-979 of the original transcript, are beremafter

referred to as whe | QU0"’; the Government's Statistical Exhibits,

introduced at page 12 of the transcript, are hereinafter referred

to as ‘“SGS-000"’; Grace's Exhibits 1 throuvh 173. which were

‘introduced at pages 500-17 of the eriginal trans: ‘ript. are herein-

after referred. to as ‘‘ WRG-000"?+ Pan “Ate rican’ s Exhibits, which

were introduced at page $59) 1e original trauseript, are herein

after referred to as “*P-000." 0 The places in the: record af which .

these exhibits were introduced in.evidence will not be Tefe ‘rred to

hereafier.

re 6°

Braniff International Airways: (Braniff), the only

other American flag*carvier operating between the

United States and South America. aside from Pan

American. hens men aneth (R. 5366-67).

That J udge Murphy accurately stated the Gov ernment” s

objective is @Vident from the consent decree which the

Antitrust. Division and Pan Americau submitted to Judge

Murphy in 1958 and which Judge Murphy refused to sign.*®

‘The decree provided for the divestiture by Pan American

of its interest in Panagra by sale: of its stock to Braniff,

but made that: divestiture contingent on the sale by Grace

to Braniff, either voluntarily or as a result of court order,

of enough of its interest to give Braniff control.

Consideration of the Government’s objective demon-

strates that it does not believe that Panagra is in an unduly

‘dominant position on the western coast of South America

or that there’ i is an. insufficiency of airline competition Ones.

that route; its apparent purpose is to elitiinate Panagra

and thereby secure more concentration, rather than less.

Moreover, us Grace pointed out in opposing the consent

decree, the Government apparently sought not only to divest

alleged antitrust violators of their Stock iffterests but also

to conipel them to sell their stock toa particular competitor

of the joint enterprise. It did not appear to Grace when

the consent decree was presented, and it does not ‘appear

to it now, that it is a proper function of antitrust enforce- —

ment to supplement the Federal Aviation Act by seeking —

to compel a merger which the Civil Aeronautics Board has

‘no authority to brin® about and by seeking to deprive Grace

' of an interest in Panagra which is reserved and guaranteed

| ° The proposed consenf decree and Fbiige Mur phy’ s order dis-

approving i it are printed as Appendix. A to this Brief.

‘ - :

to it by the ‘‘grandfather clause’’ of that Act.* Cf, St.

Joe Paper Co..v, ‘ftlantic Coast Line Railroad; 3. 7 U. s.

- 298, 305 (1954). ; _ *

: Of course if Grace’ has violated the antitrust laws it

éannot | object to being: held to account for its violation

merely’ because the’ Government is sceking to serve some

other policy. On the other haud, if an antitrust violation —

has not been committed, Grace is entitled to object to the -

use of an antitrust prosecution as a means of achieving

| objectives which some department,of government may have

thought desirable but whicu it is not authorized to secure.

Grace submits that Judge Murphy fairly analyzed the

. record in this case and correctly concluded that no unlaw-

ful restraint of trade by Grace was | shown.

+

Summary of nates

I.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, Brown

Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 a

A. The issues of. this case can only be understood

- against the background of economic conditions and govern-

mental policies which existed when Panagra was formed.

In the light of the economic situation in air transporta-

tion in the pioneering years before 1938, and in theNight -

of the policies ‘‘enforced,’’ as the Government’s brief puts it

(p. 13), by the United States Government through the Post

Office and State Departments during that period, competi-

tion between United States flag carriers within South Amer-

ica was, in the words of. th District Court, ‘economically

“® See ~~s 94, infra. /.

Mm

’ |

-impossible.’’ Indeed, the Government concedes that this

Was 80. . *

B. Grace’s participation in.the organization of Panagra

did not unreasonably restrain trade. °

Grace had no unlawful intent or purpose in particl-

. pating in the formation of Panagra. The Government’s

‘contention that the District Court found such an intent is

based upon an obvious misreading of the opinion below.

The District Court found that Grace participated in the

formation of Panagra without unlawful intent, and with

the sole purpose of creating a successful pioneering venture

in air transportation. These findings are not clearly errone-

ous but find ample support in the record.

Since competition between U. S. flag carriers was

economically impossible, the formation of Panagra did

not prevent competition between Pan American and Grace

and did not restrain trade. Rather, since the complemen-

tary resources of Pan American and race made possible

the development of a venture which it was in the interests

of the United States to promote, the formation of Panagra

was economically justified and strongly advanced the

public interest.

Nor was any allocation of territories Setweds Panagra

and Pan American implicit in Panagra’s formation. - - Ab

this Court held in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United

States, 341 U. S. 593 (1951), competition between affiliated

companies is not only possible and consistent with the affilia-

tion, but, indeed, such competition my be. required by the

Sherman Act. :

a

A. Shortly after the formation. of Panagra an ‘under-

standing developed between Grace and Pan American

whereby Panagra was, to operate down the west coast of

a

)

South America and Pan American was to operate along the

east coast of South America. This arrangement was based °

upon the economic situation existing prior to 1938 and the

policies of the Post Office and State Departments during

that period, under which competition between United States

flag air lines in South America was not possible. It reflected

and was defined by the contract routes granted to Panagra

and Pan American by the Post Office Department during

that period. There was never any understanding between

Pan American and Grace limiting possible future opera- -

tions of Panagra north from the Canal Zone.” The east-

west zoning arrangement ceased to exist in 1938 when the

expiration of Panagra’s ten-year mail contract and the

enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act fundamentally

altered the situation and made competition possible. Grace

never relied: upon or recognized any zoning arrangement

after that time. On the contrary, as the Government con-

cedes, Grace made persistent efforts subsequent to 1938 to

extend Panagra’s routes both north from the Canal Zone

and within South America. The extensions sought by Grace

‘were blocked by Pan American 'g negative control.

B. Judge Murphy correctly concluded that the east-

west zoning arrangement was lawful during the period

; when it existed. The arrangement did not restrain or

‘prevent compefition since competition was at that time

‘‘economically impossible.’’ Even if a restraint had been

shown, the Government has not proved itS case because it

has failed to demonstrate that the east-west zoning arrange-

ment unreasonably restrained the foreign or domestic com-

meree of the United States. In-any event, since the agree-

ment went out of existence in 1938, and since Grace, from

1938, has persistently taken action completely inconsistent

with any such agreement, no relief against Grace is war-

ranted.

10

Iv.

Grace agrees with the Government that competition in

air transportation between South America and the con-

tinental United States has been restrained. The District

Court correctly conc!ided, -however, that this restraint of

competition was the result of the unilateral and unlawful

actions of Pan American.

Pan American, over the strenuous opposition of Grace —

since 2938, has. limited Panagra to routes south of the

-Canal Zone for the sole purpose of preventing Panagra

from competing with Pan American. Pan American’s one-

- half interest in Panagra did not give it the right to prevent

Panagra’s lo ied development, in competition with Pan

‘American... In view of Pan American’s dominant position;,

its intent to prevent’ competition, and the limited number

of potential competitors in this particular market, Pan

American’s restraint of —ooo

‘Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Pan American’s action is not justified by the economic

arguments whigh it now advances against Panagra’s

extension. Those arguments, which were advanced for

the first time at the trial of this case, never formed .the

basis of its action. The Civil Aeronautics Board was -the

proper agency to determine whether extension of Panagra’s

routes was economically sound and in the public interest;

Pan American prevented the Board f rom making this deter- &

mination by blocking Panagra from submitting any “appli-

cation to it. The Board has never authorized, approved, or

required this anticompetitive behavior by Pan American

' go as to exempt it from the Sherman Act. |

The District Court’s order divesting Pan American of

its stock interest in Panagra does not interfere with or

e .

.

ee erences FOr ee IN ns neon

hl

encroach upon the exercise by the Civil Aeronautics Board

of its proper authority. The District Court took no action

with respect to the awarding or cancelling of routes;

it merely directed-a change in the ownership of Atty per

cent of Panagra’s stock. ; :

’

Vv.

The affiliation between Grace and Pan: agra is not.

rendered inherently unlawful by Grace’s ownership of the

stock of Grace Line.

' ¢ ’

A. The services offered, respectively, by Grace Line

and Panagra are not reasonably interchangeable so as to

be competitive within the meaning of the Sherman Act.

Grace Line is principally a eargo carrier whereas Panagra

is predominantly a earrier of passengers. The passenger

service offered by Panagra is both vastly quicker and

substantially less expensive tham that offered by Grace

_ Line. On these routes, particularly in view of their length,

the potential traveller does not regard the services. as rea-

sonable alternatives. The operative reason for a passen-

ger’s selecting Grace Line’s service is the desire for a sea

voyage. With respect to cargo, the services are not inter-

changeable because of, on the one hand, the radical differ-

ence in cost, and on the other hand, the great difference in

speed of delivery. The Government’s evidence demon-

strates that there is no substantial likelihood of significant

competition for cargo between air and sea carriers on this

particular route. M .

The administrative rulings upon which the Government

relies do not demonstrate the existence of competition on

this route; they relate to other routes with different char-

acteristics. The Civil Aeronautics Board has recognized

a

that, under certain circumstances and on particular routes,

air and surface transportation may not be competitive.

. : : ; 3

B. Even if Grace Line and Panagra were competitive,

' Grace’s ownership of an interest in Panagra would not

unreasonably restrain trade. In participating in the

formation of Panagra, Grace did not acquire an existing

competitive facility; rather, it participated in the creation .

- of a new facility—an extension of its interest in transporta-

. tion into a new means of transportation. The creation

of such a facility, unlike a merger, does not eliminate or

lessen competition. In any event, even assuming that

Grace Line and’Panagra compete to some degree, the record

demonstrates that they are not sufficiently competitive

so that an affiliation between them could constitute an

unreasonable restraint of trade. Moreover, there is

vigorous competition from other sources, both with respect

to air line service and steamship service, which would

_ deprive the affiliation of any possible restraining effect.

Rather than supporting ‘the Govermment’s argument,

the congressional and administrative policies upon which it

Felies support the view that air carrier-surface carrier ©

affiliation ought not to be generally eondemned. Such

affiliations: have repeatedly been held to be lawful, in the

public interest, and to have no restraining effect. Even if

there were a policy of the kind the Government describes,

the existence of such a policy would not demonstrate the

existence of a Sherman. Aci violation in this case.

Although the affiliation between Grace and Panagra has

existed.for ‘more than thirty yeags, the Government has

presented no evidence of any restraint imposed by Grace

a.

13

upon Panagra. Rather, Grace’s persistent efferts to.°.

develop Panagra’s operations, demonstrated by the record,

found by the Distriet Court, and recognized by the Govern-

‘ment, demonstrate that no restraint has occurred and that

nane will occur in the future.

ARGUMENT.

I.

The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

We agree with the Government—that the decision in

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294 (1962) is

controlling and that the judgment of the District Court

was a final judgment within the meaning of the Expediting

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29. We, therefore, agree that the Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. °

a

7)

The participation of Grace in the formation of

Panagra never was, and is not now, a combination in

restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.

Analysis oe Government’s charges must begin with

an understanding of the state of development of air trans-

portation in the late 1920s, the problems faced in offering

- an air transportation service abroad, and the other envi-

ronmental factors and governmental policies which condi-

tioned the organization and development of such a venture

up until 1938. Only when these factors are understood can

the Government's attack on the organization of ,Panagra

be evaluated.

14

A. Competition between U. 8. flag airlines in South oe

. America prior to 1938 was — impos-

sible.

In these “ays of mammoth jet liners wait modern air- Ag

“ports, it is difficult te recall and appreciate the circum-

>~stances in which air transportation was conducted by an

American company in a foreign country in 1929—one year

after Lindbergh’s historic flight. Some idea of what it was

like to fly the United States mail from Buenos Aires over

. the-Andes to the Canal Zone in the equipment used in those

_ days is conveyed by a published journal of the first recorded

air mail flight in October, 1929 (R. 4661-73).—Such_a flight —

was a-challenge.and an adventure. The same fetling of

adventure was given classie literary expression in ‘‘Night

Flight’” (The Century Co. 1931), where, in Chapter TIT °

Saint-Exupery described the French air mail service from

Santiago to. Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. &

Some of the practical problems of international aviation

were desgribed by the Federal Aviation Commission in

2935 as follows: ae : |

“The fact that the foreign lines are necessarily

‘self-contained has also to be reckoned, with. No

government can engage in great engineering under-

takings outside its own borders. It is impossille

for the Department of Cornmerce to set-up lights

and radio stations in Central America or the Orient,

7 and in many cases the. countries concerned have

found no adequate reason to provide facilities them-

selves. It has been necessary for the air lines to

build their own landing fields, provide their own .

meteorological service, maintain their own com-

munications systems, and install their own lights if

night flying were to be attempted. All that has been

supplementary. to the development of operating and

traffic organizations and the maintenance of offices

15

e

. r

in many lands and working in inany languages, and ©

the establishment of good standing with the govern-.-

"ments and peoples through whose territory the lines

° must pass. .It-is impossible that all that should be .

~ done, involving as it .does.a very heavy capital out-

© lay, without some definitessurance of a continuance

of governmental aid over a considerable period’’

(Sen. Doe. No. 15, 74th Cong. - Sess. 7. 88-89

(1935) ).°

\-

.

During these early days an American-airline operating

in this area was also faced with vigorous competition from

foreign airlines which were. seeking to develop their own

routes. Cne such effort was a pr oposed combination in -1929

of Scadta, Faucetf and LAB in cooperation with the Chilean

authorities to establish a route between Colombia, Ecuador,

* Bolivia and Chile (WRG-32, R. 4684), Panagra was kejst

informed of this effort, which also involved Nyrba, the

F rench affiliated company Latecoere, and the Curtiss inter- -

egts, by the State Department (WRG-34, R. 4686). Another

company on the scene was the Tri-Motor Company which,

as Grace understood, was not an American company

despite its place of incorporation, but, was rather backed

by the British steamship company, the Royal Mail Steam *

- Packet Co. (WRG-35, R. 4687-88). In addition to the com-

bination. of these companies an effort was made by LAB

to obtain a monopoly in Bolivia which would have effec-

tively barred to Panagra this alternative route across the

Andes (WRG-36, R. 4688-89). “At the suggestion of Grace

(WRG37,' R. 4690), the State Department instructed the

AmericanMinister in Bolivia ‘‘to niake representations

against any monopoly [tending to] restrict [the] oppor-

_ tunity [of an} American company’’ (WRG-38, R. 4691).

* An excellent description of the problems .aced. by Panagra

in these first few years will be found in a letter dated May 6, 1935

which appears in the record (WRG-41, R. 4698-4703).»

e

16°

In the light of the difficulty of undertaking air trans-

portation in South America.during this period, the extent

of the potential foreign competition, and the. vital interest

of the United States i in the development of United States

flag air services,” various departments of the United States

~ Government soon developed a policy designed to stimu-

- late, enconrage and support United States flag lines. The

‘basic elements of this policy during the 1930’s were to pro- |

vide financial support to United States flag lines, to assist

..., them in securing the: necessary concessions from foreign

countries, and to assist them in meeting foreign competi- ©

- tion. In order to achieve these purposes, these agencies

adopted a poliey of encouraging United States flag air

lines not to parallel one another’s routes. That policy, as

: Judge Murphy found, made the operation of more than |

one United States _ carrier on any — route °

impossible.

The first United States legislation designed to subsidize

international commercial aviation was the Foreign Air Mail

Act of 1928, 45 Stat: 248 (70th Cong. 1st Sess.) which was

approved by the President on March 8, 1928. This. Act pro-

vided for the letting of contracts by the Postmaster General

for the transportation of.air mail to foreign countries for

periods of not more than ten years at fixed rates per pound

carried per mile flown. The Foreign Air Mail Act of 1929,

45 Stat. 1449 (70th Cong., 2nd Sess.), similarly provided ©.

for the letting of contracts ‘‘On routes between the United.

* The legislative history of the foreign air mail legislation evi-

-- ences this vital interest. House Report 481, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.

- (1928), particularly pages 1 and 2. It was then ‘‘an established

principle of our international policy that among the Foreign. Rela-

tions of the United States. as they fall into categories, the Pan

American: policy takes first place in our diplomacy.’’ ‘ Secretary of

State Kellogg in January 1928 as quoted in Matthews ‘‘ Why)}Amer-

ica Is Vital To Us”’, New York Times Magazine, p.-17 (AY il 26,

1959).

17

‘States ... and foreign countries.’’ The Postmaster General

in his advertisement of bidding for such contracts described

. the particular route and thereby established the territory,

of the successful bidder.*

The Postmaster General! described ifs policy in adminis-

tering the foreign air mail acts in the late1920’s and the

* early 1930’s as follows:

ao

“I have stated frankly to the air mail operatore

that in the present state of the industry it did not

seem the part of wisdom to invade each other’s terri-

tory with competitive services and that I.did not. .

believe that money paid for postal service should be

used to set up services, ta injure competitors. In

pursuance of this policy I suggested the abandon-

ment by the Pan American Co. of the domestic field

in the United States ... Their field is the interna-

~ tional service . . . Consistently 8 the policy out-

lined, it would seem improper for any of our domestic

‘air mail operators to use mail pay to invade the

peculiar ficld of Pan American Co. ”- (Hearings

Before a Special Committee of the Senate on Inves-

tigation of Air Mail and Ocean Contracts, 73rd Cong.,

‘2nd Sess. 1934, page- 2459 (‘‘Black Hearings’’),

( emphasis supplied) ).

t

The Postmaster General’s justification for this policy

was, first, that it was enough for the United States to sup-

port with mail subsidies ‘one company operating at a loss on

a particular route and, second, if more than one U. S. flag

air line sought concessions from South American govern-

ments there might‘be diplomatic complications which could

result in the South American governments granting exclu-

sive concessions to ‘non-United States flag carriers (Id.

2460, 2461, 2463, 2469, 2639 and 2640).

~~ © Panagra was’ ‘granted a ten-year ate for Foreign Air

Mail Route No. 9 between the Panama Canal Zone and Buenos Aires

via the west coast of South America.

- 18

The State Department .also pursued this same policy.

It aided the carrier which had been awarded an air mail

contract over all other companies in the territory covered

by its route (Id. at 2461). The State Department expressed .

itself as being concerned that if competition were permitted

between American companies it was ‘‘possible that no

American company would obtain the desired privileges’? -

from the South and Central American governments (Id.

at 2462). 7 | a

One incident strikingly illustrates the spalbery sssieandl by

the State Department during this period. In a letter to the

Postmaster’ Géneral dated June, 1929, Secretary of State

Henry L. Stimson described the difficult diplomatic situa-

. tion created by: the rivalry between Pan American and a. _

company called Latin American Airways, both of -which

were seeking concessions in Guatemalu. Secretary Stimson

went on to say that the American Minister in Guatemala

had arrsnged what the Government would now stigmatize |

as a ‘‘division of. territories” between me companies as .

follows: . =

“The American Minister at Guatemala City oes

reported that he had succeeded in persuading the

two companies to abandon ‘their activities against

one another’ upon the. understanding that - Pan |

- American Airways would seek permission to extend

its Miami-Cristobal service-to Guatemala*and El .

‘Salvador, while the Latin American Airways would ©

seek ‘permission to establish a service from the

| Mexican frontier to Guatemala City’’ (Id. at 2462-

~= 68). 4

The 1935 report of the Federal ‘Aviation Commission

- cited above similarly recognized the important interest of. 7

the-United States in stimulating the development of United

States flag air lines on international routes. The report.

19

noted that “The policy of the United, States should ie to

_ support and assist American “Airlines in their relations

with foreign governments and with foreign competitors’’

(Sen. Doe. 15, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 91). ‘The report also

made the following significant recommendation :

“The status of American air transport in foreign

fields competing with foreign-owned airlines should

in general not be ‘one of competition between. Amer- ©

ican. lines, but of carefully controlled Tegi mal

monopoly ”?. (Id. at p. 88). , \ ,

In commenting. on this viiiaeiaiiliitins the Commission

q

. ‘

-“*. ,,. an air line operating internationally has‘to be

a self-contained enterprise and’ provide its own

facilities to a much greater eXtent than any domestic

line 1 is required to do, and that it-has to meet foreign -

competition. If American air lines are to compete

with lines’ under foreign direction it would be an

obvious absurdity to divide the American strength

_ by competition among a multiplicity of American-

. flag enterprises. ‘The aid that is appropriated for

foreign air transport in any particular part of;the |

globe. ought not to be sc uandered, hy dividing it

among two.or more competttors who will use govern-

ment-prov ided funds to duplicate each ofher’s facil-

ities’? (Id. at D. 88).

‘Adherence to ‘these policies by the United States Gov-

"ernment made it economically impossible during the late

1920’s and 1930’s for more than one United States flag air

_ line to engage in air transportation "on any single inter-

national route. Judge Murphy so found: |

-**Competition among’: American carriers under the

policy ofthe Post Office Department under the

4

7

4

20

foreign mail contracts, was economically impossible

..’’ (R. 5394; emphasis supplied): —

oe

*

7

As the material cited above indicatés, Judge Murphy’s

finding was firmly grounded in the recotd. In 1935, for

example, the Federal Aviation Commission reported that:

‘‘To maintain a safe and efficient air transportation

syste under existing gonditions demands diredt

- governmental aid:’’ (Sen. Doe. 15, 74th Cong., Ist

Sess. 1935, p. 47; emphasis supplied.)

Ponagra’s own history demonstrates that vovernmental

aid was essential to survival. During every year .between

1930 gm@.1938 its operating loss hefore taking mail pay

into” adcbunt was in excess of $1 boohoo, and in 1928 it —

was $1,305, 000 (Exh. PS6, R. 173, 4528). It is significant

‘that out of 145 air lines which tried to operate without

ain mail contracts from 1925 to 1940 only one was still

operating in 1941. Puffer, Air Transportation (Blakiston,

1941) pp. 53- o4:

‘ Since it was not possible during this period to operate.

without. government subsidy, and since the policy of the

United “States Government was to provide ‘such subsidy

only.to a single carrier in a particular zone, it was obviously

not possible for more than one United States flag carrier

to operate in any stch zone.

Moreover, if a United States flag: hae sought to. operate

_in competition with the subsidized carrier on a particular

‘route, it would face, not only all of the difficulties of

establishing an air line under the adversities which existed

during this period, but, in addition, it would be faced with

competition from another United States flag line which ©

had enormous advantages not ‘available to it, i.e., govern-

mental subsidy and diplomatic assistance from the State

the ‘‘ultimate question on the merits”’ as:

21

Department. It is apparent that, once the Postmaster

General had awarded an air mail contract on a particular

route, no other United States flag line could hope to survive :

in competition with that carrier.

B. The organization of Panagra did not unreasbn-

ably restrain trade; it was an economically

sound arrangement which advanced the pol- .

icies and interests of the United States. ;

‘The Government’s contentions. on this appeal have

undergone a considerable metamorphosis since the filing of

‘the Notice of Appeal and; indeed, even since the filing. of

the Jurisdictional Statement.

Ii. ‘ts Notice of Appeal the ‘Government specified as the

questions which it was raising, first, the question whether

Grace and Panagra illegally combined ‘and’ conspired with

Pan American to allocate territories in air transportation,

second, whether Grace monopolized or attempted to monopo-

lize air transportation in Latin America, and, third, whether

the affiliation between Grace Line’s steamship service and

Panagra’s air service unreasonably restrained trade (R.

5448). ,

Tn its: Jurisdict snal Statement -¢p. 2) the Government

indicated that it was ‘‘pot pressing the issue’ stated as the

second question above and. stated the other iwo questions

in substantially the same way ‘in which they were set out

in the Notice of Appeal.

' In its brief, however, the Government characterizes a

restated version of these remaining issues as **subordi-

nate questians’’ (pp. 2-3). The Government now regards

.

. Whether the simine® Pan American and

Grace to form an airline (Panagra) operating on,

and confined to, the west coast of South America,

%

in which each would have 50 per cent stock ownership,

together with their division of markets and other

incidental arrangements, was, im ite inception and

operation, a violation of the Sherman Act requiring

a decree'ordering both Pan American and Grace to

divest themselves of the stock’’ (p. 2). -

The Court may regard the Govérnment’s tardy effort to

challenge the original combination of Pan American and

Grace in Panagra on the variety of grounds set out in its

brief, in addition to ehallenging (he allegedly unlawful

allocation of t@rritories and the affiliation of Grace Line’s

‘steamship interests with Panagra’s air service, a@a chang-

ing of ‘‘the substance of the questions already presented”’

in the Notice of Appeal in violation of Rules J0 and 15 of

the Rules of this Court.* ®

If, however, the Government’s attack upon the original

combination of Pan American and Grace in Panagra is

entertained, it must be rejected.

In this portion of our brief we will demonstiate that in

participating in the formation of Panagra Grace had no

intention or purpose of suppressing or restraining competi-

tion, but rather intended to participate actively and vigor-

ously in ihe development of a pioneer venture in aviation.

- We will also demonstrate that no allocation of territories .

or other restraint of trade Was implicit in the formation —

of Panagra and ‘that the formation of Panagra did not

unreasonably restrain trade by preventing Pan American.

“ Rule 10-2 of the Rules of this Court restricts the Government

o ‘‘the questions set forth in the notice of appeal or fairly com-

prised therein .. .’’ Rule 15-1(c)(1) provides that ‘‘Only the

questions set forth in the Jurisdictional Statement or fairly com-

prised therein will be considered by the court.’’ Rule 15-1(c¢) (2)

further provides that the Jurisdictional Statement “. . . may not

raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions *

already presented.”’ :

”

~-st

and Grace from competing iy air transportation along the

western coast of South America.

1. Grace had no unlawful intent or purpose in

participating in the formation of Panagra.

The Government’s argument that the purpose under-

lying the formation of Panagra was to protect Pan Ameri-

can and Grace from competition is based entirely on an

obvioussmisreading af Pudge Murphy's opinion in the Dis-

triet Court. At pages 3) and 32 of its brief the Government

"quotes extensively from statements by Judge Murphy to

the effect that Grace and Pan American appreciated the

daugers of competition between theiselves, that Grace was

aware of the competitive potential of air transportation,

and that the parties appredated the protection a combina-

tion of their interests on the west coast would afford against

_ the competition of an independent carrier. The Govern-

ment seeks to construe these statements by the Distriet

Court as findings of fact. Indeed, while the Government

‘states that the ‘*undisputed evidence’? shows’ that “the

purpose underlying the formation of Panagra was to pro-

tect Pan American and Grace from competition’’ (p. 31),

it refers to no such evidence, but onl¢ to the supposed find-

- ings of the Distriet Court. : P

A reading of Judge Murphy's opinion unmistakably

reveals that tlie remarks relied upon and quoted by the

Government do not constitute findings or conclusions and

do not even represent the views of the Judge, Judge

Murphy prefaces the part of hix opinion from which the

Government quotes with tlie statement that the principal

dispute between the parties ‘relates to the inferences which

we are asked to draw from the evidence’’ (R. 5388). Judge ‘

‘Murphy then says.‘‘The argument for the inference of con-

24

spiracy is appealing to a mind bent on finding conspiracy.’’

¢(Ibid.) In the next four paragraphs of his opinion, the

paragraphs upon which the Government relies, Judge

Murphy proceeds to set out the conclusions which the

‘‘mind bent on. finding conspiracy’’ might accept. After

doing so, however, Judge Murphy states his own contrary

conclusion as follows:

.**We have carefully considered all of the evidence

relating to the conspiracy charge and, in our opinion,

no such conspiracy existed between Grace and Pan

Americah’’ (R. 5390).°

After discussing the sound economic reasons which justi-

fied the joinder of Pan’ American and Grace in forming

Panagra, Judge Murphy says:

‘*. . . we feel constrained to accept those consistent

with innocence from among ihe equivocal inferences

‘permissible from the evidence presented”’ (R.5391).°

Against the remarks erroneously cited and relied upon

by the Government should be set the following statement

by Judge Murphy, which does indeed represent his findings

‘and conclusions with respect to-Grace’ S participation in the

formation of Panagra:

* The Government argues (Brief, p. 30, note 13) that the state-

ment quoted above is not a finding of fact but is merely a legal

conclusion based upon the ‘‘logically prior legal determination’’

that the ‘‘combination’’ between Pan American and Grace did not

violate: the Act. A reading of the relevant portions of Judge

Murphy’s opinion demonstrates the error in the Government's

contention. It is plain from: the portions of the opinion quoted

above that Judge Murphy’s determination that there was no con-

spiracy and no unlawful intent on Grace’s part was not a ‘‘legal

conclusion’? based on some “‘logically prior’’ determination, but

was rather a finding arrived at after Judge Murphy had “carefully

considered all of the evidence’’ and based on ‘‘inferences’’ from

that evidence and the fact that the ‘‘evidence’’ did not ‘‘make out’’

an unlawful intent.

) 5

a

”

“We cannot, from the evidence adduced, make out

an unlawful intent to restrain aviation competition

in the Grace participation in the formation of Pan-

agra, and the history of Grace’s activity in the affairs.

of Panagra preponderatingly demonstrates that it

fostered and fought for Panagra development and

expansion. To be sure, Grace sought continuously

to control the management of Panagra, and its

efforts were crowned with success in 1939. Its desire

to control the management can as readily be °

explained as an aggressive business instinct, inten- .

sified in the light of the conflicting, containing atti-

tude of Pan American, as Well as from the standpoint

of its asserted attempt to monopolize all transporta-

tion on the west coast. We are buttressed in our

choice of the former in that the record before us

fails to disclose any antitrust violations on the part

of Grace vis-a-vis Panagra, unless it be per se viola-

tive of the Sherman Act for Grace to own the stock

that it does in that company’”’ (R. 5392-93 ; emphasis

supplied). ‘ | ‘> -

The Government's argument, rather than being based

upon findings made by the District Court, flies directly in the

face of those findings. Judge Murphy, after a careful

review of a massive record, concluded that Grace did not

participate in the formation of Panagra to protect itself.

from competition, but rather that it entered upon this

enterprise because it ‘‘recognized the potential of air .

‘transportation in the commercial development of the South .

American countries’? (R. 5392), because ‘it ‘had a great

deal to offer to enhance that development”’ (R. 5392), and

because its joinder with Pan American represented ‘an

economically sound arrangement for the establishment and

successful development of American commercial aviation

on the western coast of South America’? (R. 5391).

26

Judge Murphy’s findings were amply supported by the

evidence ; indeed, there is no evidence to support the Govern-

ment’s contrary contentions.

The Government, in ‘its brief, points out that Grace

_“ ‘regarded aviation as simply a new development in trans-

portation’’’ (Brief, p. 34), apparently attaching some

stigma to this attitude In point of fact, Grace’s interest

_in this ‘‘new development”’ was & proper business instinct -

- which it proceeded to pursue with vigor and imagination.

As Mr. Patchin, a.Grace manager at that time, stated in

1928 in the document from which the Government quotes :

. we regarded aviation as simply a new develop- |

ment in transportation and as we had always been

; interested in transportation to the West Coast of

South Ameriga we were following the matter closely

..”’ (G-5, R. 340). ‘

In his testimony before the Civil Aeronautics Board in

Docket 779° Mr. Patchin described Grace’s attitude as

apnea:

. I felt that the flight of Colonel Lindbergh across

the ‘Atlantic established aviation as transportation.

W. R. Grace & Company had always: been

interested in transportation. I felt it would be an

excellent line of activity for the Company, a splendid

thing for the development of the South American

countries with which we were doing business and in

which we were doing business’’ (G-170, R. 5304).

The documentary record is replete with evidence dating

back to the early years of Panagra which reflects Grace’s

active interest in the vigorous development of Panagra ’s

* The Panagra Terminal Investigation, instituted on _—

ber 10, 1942. .

operations. As Mr, Roig wyote to Mr. Patchin on October

4, 1930:

s6 — am more than ever convinced that this busi-

ness, if our partners will let us run it in a business-

like way; will be a very important success .. .’’

(WRG-32, R. 4682).

In a similar vein the Grace agency in Lima wrote on Novem-.

ber 7, 1928 to the various sub-agencies in Peru:

“This sérvice, we hope will be the nucleus of a.

through service between the United States and Chile

and there is consequently the possibility that the

service will be augmented in the -future. The success

of the primary operation will naturally depend on

. keeping expenses to a ‘minimnin and obtaining as

_.» much business as possible’’ (Ww KG- as, R. 4642).

Grace. instructed its personnel in South America to make

every effort to promote the development of the new enter-

prise. For example, Mr. Cogswell of Grace, in a letter dated |

September 4, 1928, said:

“We trust that our houses in Peru will use every

effort to stimulate interest in this business and be

of all assistance coed (G- 16, R. 358).

Pan American’ s_motive in participating in the joint

venture in these early days was. apparently the same, i.e.,

. because [Pan-American] could contribute to

it a knowledge of the air bu<iness, whereas [Grace]

could contribute a Knowledge of South American

business, and. that working together we should be

able to develop a successful enterprise’’ (G-54, R.

486; see also G-30, R. 412: G-13, R. 349-50).

46°

.

At least, as the document quoted indicates, this was Grace’s

understanding of Pan American’s motive.

. : 28

The record demonstrates that Grace was-interested in

aviation along the west coast of South America as a new

development in transportation in an area in which it had

long been interested, both as owner of Grace Line and: by

virtue: of its extensive trading and agency ‘operations in

that area. The record also demonstrates that Grace

embarked upon this new enterprise with the idea of actively |

and aggressively promoting it rather than with any idea

of strangling or suppressing it to enhance Grace Line’s

steamship operations. —

It will be demonstrated in later sections of this “brief

that Grace’s active efforts for the promotion and develop-

ment of Panagra have continued through the years and

up until the present.time., For the moment, however, it is

sufficient to note that, in participating in the organization

of Panagra, Grace’s sole interest was to initiate an enter-

prise which would actively and effectively develop this

new means of transportation.

-_

2. The formation of Panagra did not eliminate

competition between Pan American and ,Grace.

The Government next argues that Pan American and

Grace were potential competito.s s and that their jecnt for-

mation of Panagra prevented competition between them.

When the Government asserts that Pan American and

Grace were potential competitors it’ bases this assertion

only on a suggestion that there was ‘‘a substantial likeli-

hood’’ that both Pan American and. Grace would enter

into the air transportation business in western South

America.

In point of fact, there is no basis for such a con-.

elusion. The evidence upon which the Government relies

>

OQ

3

29

.

shows only that Grace kept itself informed of the activities

.of certain companies which were becoming active in west

coast air transportation and that Grace had-given some

study to possible west coast routes (Brief, p.. 34). This

does not, however, demonstrate that there was a ‘‘likeli- —

hood’’ that Grace would have, in fact, organized a company -

to engage in air transportation on this route if it had not

been able to work out a cooperative enterprise’ with Pan

American. Grace had no‘previous experience in air trans-

portation and it might well have concluded that the obsta- .

cles and difficulties of such a venture made the risks too

great. In any event, it is Sheer speculation to resolve the

question one way or the other. i,

On the Pan American side, it is clear that it had no

intention of embarking on this venture by itself and felt

that, without Grace’s participation, it would not be able to

do so. In a memorandum dated May 23, 1928, Patchin, of

Grace; quoted Hoyt, speaking for Pan American, as saying

that ‘‘if we [Grace] were disposed to go ahead on our own, |

he would be inclined to stand aside and not compete as he

- felt we would be in better position than anyone else

to undertake it’? (G-5, R. 340). Moreover, in submitting

Panagra’s bid for the air mail contract on the -west cvast of

South America Juan Trippe of Pan Amerivan stated that

‘‘without the cooperation of the Grace organization . .’. no

American Air Transport Company. could economically sur-

vive in this terr’.. y’’-(G-30, R. 415). — |

Apart from these evidences of the specific intent ofthe

parties, however, the above description of the conditions

and governmental Policies affecting air, transportation on

this route prior is 1938 (pp. 14-21, supra) demonstrates

the impossibility of competition between Pan American

and Grace.

’

30

It is quite clear that the Postmaster General might have

. awarded an air mail contract for the west coast route to

Pan American or to Grace, but never to both. As has been.

demonstrated above, the party who failed to secure the con-

tract would not have been able to’survive., The possibility

of competition between Pan American and Grace, which the «

Government postulates,. did not exist. Indeed, the Govern-

ment concedes that this is true when it says in its brief:

‘<... it may be that only one of the two parent com-

-panies would have been able to obtain a government

‘Subsidy, and hence that only one would have actually

bL2gun to operate a west coast air line in 1928... ”’

(Hrief, pp. 37-38). .

The Government seeks»to prevent the collapse of its

argument by suggesting that, even if there was no.possi-

bility of competition between Pan American and Grace,

the formation of Panaj,ra deprived the Government of

competitive bidding on the air mail contract. If the only

anti-competitive effect of the formation of Panggra to

which the Government can point’is a reduction of the num-

ber of bidders for an air mail contract which was awarded

in 1929 and expired in 1938 with the enactment of the Civil

Aeronautics Act, its position is weak indeed. ,

Teis is not a case where prospective bidders have got-

ten together secretly to submit a joint bid. One of the

principal reasons why the air mail contract was awarded

to Panagra was because the Postmaster General took

account of the respective contributions which Pan Ameri-

_ ean and Grace could make to the new enterprise. Thus, i in

\ awarding the contract the Postmaster General said:

‘‘This is the most important ‘air mail contract

that has yet been awarded. Its importance goes not .

alone to the financial ability of the bidders but more

dl

directly and to a far greater degree to their proven .

and recognized capacity for performing the service

contemplated.

“‘The Pan American Company has filed evidence

of extensive preparation for the operation of an air

mail route through the countries with which arrange-

ments are necessary. .... In addition to this it will

have the benefit of all the facilities of the Grace Line .

of steamers now operating a ‘firmly established ser-

vice by sea along the whole line of the proposed air

mail route” (WRG-1, R. 4619).

Indeed, as the Postmaster ‘General observed, the con-

‘tract was not awarded to the lowest bidder, but rather to -

Panagra, because of ‘the resources which Grace ‘and Pan

. American would be able to devote to the new enterprise

(WRG-1, R. 4618-20). The award to Pariagra was sub-

sequently upheld by the Attorney General's offi¢e over the

protest of an unsuccessful bidder, and after the Attorney

Generai had examined ‘‘the facts disclosed in the very large

record’’ submitted by the Postmaster Geneew, ‘36 Op. Atty.

Gen. 33 (1929).. te

The Government’s final effort to resuscitate its argu-

ment is contained in the suggestion that :

‘*. ,. the joint venture foreclosed the possibility of

‘competition from the losing bidder at some future

time’when a subsidy would be less important’’ (Brief,

p. 38). ,

At this point the Government’s argument becomes

speculative to the point of absurdity. What the Govern-

ment is apparently suggesting is that two parties may not

join their complementary resources to enter a business in

‘which the United States Government will allow only one

company to engage because to do so would prevent pos-

>

32

. gible competition at some future time, if. governmental

policy changes, and if, at that time, the other party is able

to compete with the party wha has already become estab-_

lished with the Government’s assistance. To state the

argument is to reveal its deficiencies. ~

A word should also be said about the Government’s dene

acterization’ of Grace-and Pan American as ‘*nowerful

firms’’ and ‘‘potentially strong competitors’’ (Brief, pp. 35,

37). It is easy to make these characterizations now, but it

was not so easy in 1928, At that time Grace was completely

without experience of any kind in aviation; Panagra was’

its first and only venture in this field. To identify it as a.

‘potentially strong competitor’’ is to say what it might be

"now, not what it was in 1928. Pan American, on the other

hand, was a far cry from today’s colossus. In -October

1927 it began operations ‘under its first mail contract (R.

_ 5372-73), and in 1928 it owned three airplanes (R, 5374,

note 5). :

Apart from the particular facts aan the ‘for-

mation of Panagra which justify the organization of the

enterprise and demonstrate that it did- not restrain -

trade, the basic proposition upon which the Govern-

ment’s contention is based will not stand’ analysis. ‘Appar-

ently the Government argues that, whenever there is a

‘substantial likelihood’’ that two companies might enter

upon a particular venture individually, those companies

are barred by the antitrust laws from undertaking the

venture together. Nostrums about ‘preventing the birth:

of ‘a commerce which does not exist’? (Brief, p. 21) are

~ not helpful in assessing the practical consequences of such

Or

Lan 33

a.rule. it is difficult to imagine a.principle which would

_ be more stultifying of American enterprise abroad.

Virtually every joint venture which is undertaken is

- begun by parties who were, prior to the formation of the

joint venture, interested to some.degree in the enterprise

which the venture was formed to undertake. Moreover, most

joint'ventures are formed if situations where each of two

or more partics has something to contribute to the ven-

ture, as was the case with Panagra. On the Government’s

| - theory, the very fact that cach of the parties had some-.

thing to contribute would be evidence of the likelihood of

. , that party’s undertaking :the venture ‘alone. If the Gov-

ernment’s principle were adopted, it is difficult to imagine

any economically sound joint venture which would escape

condemnation. And, indeed, the sounder and more logical |

the venture, the greater the risk of condemnation would be.

3. No allocation of territories was implicit in the

formation of Panagra.

In seeking to establish some " restraining effect of the

formation of Panagra the Government next states that an

‘‘inescapable implication of the joint venture was a mutual

agreement between Pan American and Grace ‘dividing

-territory so that neither parent. company would offer com-

peting air transportation in the territory served by

Panagra, and Panagra would not compete in the territory

_to be served by Pan American” (Brief, p. 34).

This i is another of the Government’s arguments which

flies directly in the face of the explicit findings of the

District Court. — Murphy = out in his opinion

below:

‘“‘Grace... contends that their territorial agree-

ment was entered into after Panagra’s formation...’’

(R. 5396) (emphasis by the Court)..

34 : §

| Judge Murphy went on to say:

‘‘We find that the agreement between the defend-

‘ants as to spheres of operations and its evolution —

was substantially in the manner described by Grace”’

- & 5398). | ec

” The terms and legal consequences of the understanding

between Pan American: and Grace which was given effect

during the first decade of Panagra’s existence will be con-

sidered hereafter. It is clear, however, that Judge Murphy

found no agreement as to spheres of operation and’ no

territorial arrangement implicit in the formation of Pan-

agra. The discussion, of the evidence with respect to the

arrangement which was arrived at; infra at pages 38-58,

will make it plain that Judge mast s finding was well

grounded.

The-Gover nment’s Ss effort to find an allocation of terri-

tories ‘‘implicit’? in Panagra’s., formation is belied

by the subsequent history of Panagra. Grace certainly

never recognized that it was implicit in Panagra’s forma-

tion that Panagra would not compete with Pan American.

In the Government’s own words, the period since the late

1930’s has been characterized by ‘‘Grace’s efforts to extend -

Panagra’s operations north of the Canal Zone to the United

States, a route which would have. brought Panagra into

competition with Pan American”? (Brief, p. 11).

Apparently what the Government is saying is that,

whenever one company has an interest, or-at least an inter-

_est which gives it negative control, in another company, it

is implicit inthat arrangement that the parent will not com-

pete with the subsidiary and that the subsidiary will not

compete with the parent. Such a principle would make

nonsense of this Court’s rulings in Timken Roller Bearing

Co. ¥. United States, 341 U. S. 593 (1951). .

35

c

In that case Timken owned 30.25% of British Timken;

. Dewar owned 25% of British Timken and tiie remainder

of British Timxen was publicly owned. Timken also owned

50% of French -Timken and Dewar owned 50% © of that.

company (341 U. S. at’ 595, 601, note 10). This Court

did. not, however, find that. there was any division of ter-°

itories or agreement not to compete inherent in these

affiliations. Rather, the Court found that there wére for‘

- mal agreements among the parties allocating trade terri-

tories and that, under the circumstances of that case, these

formal agreements. were unlawful. Thus, the Court said to

'. the defendants that, hot only were the cross- filiations con-

‘ sistent with competition among the companies, but, indeed,

that the companies were required by the anti-trust laws to

compete, despitesthe affiliations.

Even those rhembers of the Court who fay ored divesti-

ture in the Timken case did not do so on the greund that °

there was any unlawful territorial allocation imnplicit:in .

. the corporate affiliations, but sitherpon’ the ground that

- the interests were obtained as part ‘of a plan to promote

illegal trade restraints and, if continued, would: provide

‘the temptation and means to engage in the prohibited

conduct’’ (341 U. S. at 600). . This is quite the opposite -

of suggesting that a prohibited restraint,was implicit in

the affiliation itself. As Mr. Justice Reed pointed out in

his concurring opinion:

‘*As there were no findings of fact tending to show

violation of the Sherman Act otherwise than through

formal agreements of partition of territory, we

assume that appellant’s conduct was otherwise law-

ful’? (341 U. S. at one).

Acceptance of the Government’s argument that an

| unlawful division of territory was implicit in the formation

36

of Panagra would be contrary to the findings of the District

Court and the evidence in the case, and would 1 ignore this

Court’s rulings in the Timken case.

4. The formation of Panagra was economically

justified.

In holding that there was no illegality in the joinder of

Grace and Pan’ American to form Panagra Judge Murphy

found as follows:

.**The-joinder of Grace and Pan American of their

complementary facilities was a natural and mutually

advantageous combination, and an economically

sound arrangement for the establishment and suc-

cessful-development of American commercial aviation

‘on the west coast of South America. Grace had the .

established branches and agencies on the west coast

_and all the facilities used in connection with the oper- *

ations of the steamship ‘ine that could be used to

such advantage in corinection with the new airline

operation. Grace also had widespread commercial

contacts, a respected trade name and considerable

influence in the countries along the proposed route.

Pan American was further advanced than any other

American company in the carriage of foreign air

mail, and had the technical aviation skill which Grace

lacked at that time. The union of their physical and

technical resources assured the maximum possibili-

ties of success in instituting and carrying 6n a pie-

“neering yenture, useful to the community, which did

not theretofore exist’’ (R. 5391-92).

It is submitted that these findings by Judge Murphy

accurately ‘sum up the considerations which led to the for-

mation of Panagra. Judge. Murphy’s findings, and the

evidence which supports them, make it plain that the for-

mation of Panagra was not a device to restrain competition

but was rather an economically justified business relation-

37

B

ship, dictated by the complementary experience and facili-

ties of the two participants in the enterprise, and essential

to the development of United States flag air transpartation

on the west coast of South America in those early days.

It ill behooves the Government at this late date to argue

that-when Grace embarked upon its venture with Pan Amer-

ican it violated the Sherman Act. The Government con-

~ eedes that Grace had an important contribution to make to

*the enterprise (Brief, pp. 36-37). The Government con-

_cedes that the union of Grace and Pan American in Paldacra

resulted ‘in a company which was best abie to mect the

challenge of foreign competition and develop a venture

_ important to the interests of the United States (Briet, p.

38). The Government concedes that the United States

‘‘enforeed”’ a policy which permitted only a single United

States flag air line to operate on the western coast of South

America (Brief, pp. 13, 37-38, 67). The Government ean-

not help but concede that Pan American and Grace joined in

this venture with the aid, assistance and encouragement of

various branches of the United States Government. The

Government cannot help but recognize that the formation

of Panagra and its operations promoted the national inter

est by enabling an American carrier to participate effee-

tively in the development of this route.

Now, after the venture has been operating for more

than 30 years and after it has succeeded in building a strong

United States flag air lige, Grace is told that its participa-

’ tion in the enterprise was unlawful from the very beginning.

The illegality which the Government charges does not flow

from any activities by which Grace, over the course of the

intervening 30 years, has restrained: competition or other-

wise injured the interests of the United States. Rather, the

claimed illegality lies in Grace’s decision in 1928 to join

in the venture in the first place. The Government says that,

38

&

despite governmental encouragement and assistance which

-enabled Grace to join in that venture, and despite the

‘important service which Grace rendered to the interests of

the United States by so participating, Grace ought to have

_ recognized that its participation would violate the Sherman

‘Act and should have stood aside. If the Government had

. told Grace in 1928 what it tells it now, a United States flag

air line might never have become established on the western

coast of South America at all.

. -

IIl. ) aa

‘The temporary and ad hoc zoning arrangement

which existed prior to 1938 was not ualawful.

Having considered the. Government’s arguments |

directed to the inherent illegality of the \formation of Pan-

agra and the division of territories alleged to be implicit in

its organization, we now turn to the explicit zoning arrange-

ment which formed the basis of the Government's position

in the District Court and which raises the first issue stated

_ by the Government in its Notice of Appeal.

The zoning arrangement of which the Government com-

plains ean hardly justify the bringing of this suit. As

the following discussion will make clear, the only zoning

agreement which ever existed expired in 1938, and Grace’s

actions since that time have been completely inconsistent

with the course of conduct which such an agreement would

‘cali for. Grace has since 1938 pressed for an expansion

of Panagra’s activities in competition with Pan American,

rather than agreeing to avoid competition. : Even during

the now distant period when the agreement was operative

it affected only activities within South America, unrelated

a to the foreign commerce of the»United States, and, even

in that geographical area and at that time, it- restrained

(

39

“no competition because competition was economically:

impossible. .

We will consider first the terms of the oaneteuan and its

evolution, as found by the District Court. We will then con-

sider whether the agreement which existed was. illegal

either per se or as an unreasonable restraint of trade and

whether any relief against Grace is warranted. Finally, '

we shall consider certain arguments advanced by Pan

American to the effect that the findings of the District Court

as to the terms, scope, and duration of the agreement were

erroneous. | ‘

A. The east-west zoning arrangement.

As Judge Murphy: observed in his opinion, there has

been a sharp difference between Grace and Pan American

with respect to the proper scope of Panagra’s operations.

‘At the trial both Pan Americar and the Government con-

tended that Pan American and Grace had agreed, prior to

the formation of Panagra, that Panagra was to be restricted

- in perpetuity to the west coast.of South America. °

Grace, on the other hand, contended that the only zoning

arrangement ever agreed upon was an ad hoc arrangement

which developed after Panagra’s formation. Grace con-

tended that the agreement was only to the effect that

Panagra was to operate in the countries of the west coast

- ‘through which its mail line ran and that Pan American

would operate only on the east coast. Grace contended

further that there was never any agreement one way or

the other with respect to possible extension of Panagra’s

_ line to the United States. Judge Murphy summed up this

portion of Grace’s contention: as follows:

... there was no intention one way or the other

eeasiroti mutually. by. them [Grace and Pan

American] with respect to possible extension of Pan-

agra’s line to the United States’? (R. 5396; empha-

sis by the Court).

40°.

_ Grace also contended that this zoning arrangement arose

out of the ‘‘no-parallel’’ policy of the Postmaster General

and the air mail contracts awarded pursuant to that policy.

Thus, the agreement was related-to the 10-year mail con-

tract which was awarded to Panagra and which expired in °

1938, and the agreement terminated in 1938 on expiration

of that air mail contract, together with the change in policy

represented by the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act.

As Grace said in its trial memorandum (p. 50):

“Tt [the east-west zoning arrangement] was

described in terms of the routes awarded Panagra

and Pan American by the United States. It was

further, at least in Grace’s eves, an understanding

ancillary both in term and purpose to ‘the develop-

ment of Panagra, the ‘mutual interest’, under its

ter-year mail contract.’’

After analyzing the contentions. of both parties Judge

Murphy found as follows:

‘‘We find that the agreement between the defendants

as to spheres of operations and its evolution was sub-

stantially in the manner described by Grace. We

accepé the version of Pan American, not as respects .

agreement between it and Grace, but as representing

its own intentions for the destiny of Panagra’’. (R.

5398).

That Judge Murphy regarded the east-west zoning

arrangement as not having endured past: 1938 is evident

from his finding that the arrangement was ‘‘consistent with

‘the best interests of this country in establishing and develop-

‘ing American international aviation in the years from 1929

to 1938” (R. 5398), and from his statement that the agree-

ment was ‘‘perfectly consistent’? with this country’s air

transportation policy in ‘‘those formative years’’ (R. 5395).

? : “41

Although the Government argued at'trial in support of

- Pan American’s view of the sleged azreement with Grace,

the Government is apparently now abandoning that position.

We do not understand that the Government now challenges

Judge Murphy ’s findings with respect to the terms of

’ the zoning arrangement which arose by agreement of the’

parties. The Government's present reliance on an alleged

“implicit”? agreement makes this clear (Brief, pp. 34-35).

‘ For present purposes, the signifieant features ef the

understanding which'the District Court found are, first. that

it-related only to routes within South America and that there

was no mutual understanding with respect, to “Fautes

between the Canal Zone and the “United States and, seeond,

that the agreement was related to operations under

Panagra’s 10-year air mail contract and ceased to have

application subsequent to 1938.

B. The east-west zoning serangoment was not per .

se unlawful. .

The Government's argument directed to the east-west

zoning arrangement is, éssentially one of per se illegality.

It seeks. to make that argument by epithetieal deserip-

tion rather than by analysis of the terms, eircumstances,

and consequences of the zoning arrangement. ,Thus the

Government cites and relies principally upori the dictum in *

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. a

5 (1958), that a division of territories is per se unlawful,

and other cases condemning price fixing, group boycotts

and similar practices. - : .

Neither the Northern Pacific case, however, ner any of

~_ the other authorities upon which the Government relies,

demonstrates that a rule of per se illegality can be applied

automatically and without any reference to the context in

which an allegedly unlawful practice ovcurs,

42

‘It has specifically been held, for example, that a prac-

tice which might otherwise be condemned is not unlawful

where, as here, it is incident to the creation of a new indus-

try.. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. .

Supp. 545, 556-57 (E. D. Pa. 1960), aff’d, 365 U. S. 567

(1961) ; United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours € Co.,

118 F. Supp. 41, 219-20 (D. Del. 1953), afftd, 351 U. S. 377°

(1956) ; General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Tele-

‘phone dé Teiegraph Co., 18 F. Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937).

Practices which superficially appeared to fall within @

category of per se illegality have, on a variety of other

grounds, been held.to be lawful in the particular context

in which they occurred. E.g.; United, States v. Morgan, .

118 F. Supp. 621 (S. D. N. Y. 1953) ; United States v. Na-

tional Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E. D. Pa. 1953) ;

Union Circulation Co. v. Federal. Trade Commission, 241

F. 2d 652, 656-57 (2d Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Insurance

Board of Cleveland, 188 F. Supp. 949, 954-55 (N. D. Ohio

1960). Indeed, this Court has itself held that price fixing, .

ordinarily condemned out of hand, may be lawful in a par-

ticular context. Chicago Board of Trade v. U nited States,

246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).

Special caution in applying a per se rule is warranted in

a- situation where foreign commerce, or operations outside

of the United States are involved. Report of the Attorney

General’s National .C ommittee to Study the Anti-trust

* Laws (1955) p. 83; Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antt-

trust Laws (1957) pp. 344-46; Oppenheim, Federal Anti-

trust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Anti-

trust Policy, 50 Micu. L. Rev. 1139, 1176-77 (1952).

It ic submitted that the arrangement which Judge

Murphy fonnd here had no anti-competitive effect and was .

not unlawful.

43

The agreements which this Court has struck down as

unlawful divisions of territory have been agreements which ©

prevented competition which, but for the agreements, would

have existed. Here the lack of competition did not result ;

from the agreement of the parties; rather, it resulted from

the economic conditions and governmental policies within

the framework of which the parties operated. .

_ As Judge Murphy found, it was during the period prior

to 1938 ‘‘economically impossible’’ for two U.S. flag airlines

to parallel each-other’s routes (pp. 14-21, supra). Indeed,

- the Government concedes that the Post Office Department

‘*enforced a ‘no-parallel’ policy’’ (Brief, p. 13; emphasis

supplied) during this period and concedes further that it

was a consequence of this policy that ‘‘only one [U. S.

flag airline] would have actually begun to operate a west

~ coast airline’ during the period when the policy was

enforced (Brief, pp. 37-38). Against these facts it is plain.

that it was not any zoning agreement which prev ented com-

petition. ’ Competition was not possible, in any event, and

the arrangement merely drew in the details of the demarca-

tion line between the operations of Panagra” and Pan

American. _

It has been universally recognized both by the courts

and the commentators that no unlawful restraint of com- |

petition can exist where, by virtue of governmental policy

or economic factors, the competition allegedly restrained

is impossible and-cannot exist. This C ourt recognized the

validity of such a principle in Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S.

341 (1943) where it. held that a program controlling the

production of raisins did not violate the Sherman Act

because the resfraint_was ‘‘imposed’’ by the State of Cali-

fornia as ‘‘an act of Government’’ which the Sherman “Act

was not ‘intended to. prohibit. Similarly, if the Post Office

and State Departments adopt and enforce policies which,

a ge

as ‘“‘acts of Government,’’ make competition impossible,

the restraint does not violate the Sherman Act. 3

Yn United States v..Minnesota Mining & Mfg: Co., 92 F.

Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950), Judge Wyzanski gbserved that:

‘“‘It is axiomatic that if over a sufficiently long

period American enterprises, as a result of political

or economic barriers, cannot export: directly or -

indirectly from the United States to a particular

foreign country at a, profit, then any private action

taken to securgor interfere solely with business in

that area, whatever else it may do, does not restrain

foreign commerce in that area in violation of the

Sherman Act. For, the very. hypothesis is that there

is not and could not be any American foreign com-

merce in that area which could be restrained | or

monopolized” ¢ (92 F. Supp. at 958).

See ins Reniet of the Attorney General’s National Com-

mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955), p. 83.

_ It is submitted that Judge Murphy was well justified

in ccucluding that: | |

‘¢Consideration of the defendants’ agreement or

- understanding with respect to the respective spheres

of operations for the two airlines, when viewed in

the light of ‘thie conditions under which they under-

took, as foreigners, to establish an American system

of international aviation in South America, the

_ policy of this government and its stake in fostering

their efforts, and the dedication of public monies

involved, as well’as the relation of the parties one

. to the other and the nature of the industry itself,

compels the conclusion on our part that it involved

no violation of the antitrust laws’’ (R. 5393-94). .

The Government finds it difficult to disagree. In its

Jurisdictional Statement it said that ‘‘. . . it would seem

that such an agreement ceased to be valid no later

a ee oe

than 1938, when the Civil Aeronautics Act subjected both

Pan American and Panagra to a detailed’ regulatory

scheme under which their éntry into new markets. required

prior government authorization’’ (p. 18). As has been

demonstrated above, Grace participated in no zoning agree-

ment subsequent to 1938. The Government apparently

‘agrees with Judge Murphy that the agreement was valid

during the period when it existed.

C. The Government has not shown an unreason-

able restraint of the domestic or foreign com-

_ merce of the United States.

If the’ Government’s argument of per se illegality is

rejected, then no other argument remains. For-the same

reasons which make per se condemnation improper, the

zoning arrangement cannot be found fo be an unreasonable

refivaiat..

Moreover, the Government has failed to demonstrate

that the zoning. arrangement had any restraining effect

on the foreign or domestic commerce of the United States.

The only jinstances in which either Pan American: or

Panagra_ suecessfully relied on the east-west © zoning’

arrangement were in the late*1920’s and early 1930's when

an arrangement was worked out for Panagra to handle the

through and loeal traffic in Argentina between Mendoza and

Buenos Aires while Pan American’s subsidiary Alas

(Wings) handled other local traffic (G-63, G-64; R. 507-09;

G-83, R. 535-38; R. 5396), and in 1930 when Grace objected to”

Pan American’s subsidiary operating between Mendoza and

Santiago (G-67, R. 512-13; G-68, R. 514; R. 5396).°

*In other instances thecazreement was invoked, but without

effect. Pan’ American objeeted to Panagra’s instituting a route

' through Bolivia to Buenos Aires, but the route was nevertheless

instituted (R. 5397). Pan American also objected to Panagra’s

fiying through the interior of Colombia by way of Medellin or Cali,

but the Cali stop was ultimately approved ( R. 5397).

_

-

*

/

/

[46

|

These arrangements had no obvious impact on the for-.

eign commerce of the United States and the Government has

demonstrated none. :

In Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts Co., 191'

_ ‘BF. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) the court ruled that an antitrust

‘violation was not made out where the restriction ‘‘was

_ meant to have; and did have, at most, only an incidental, |

peripheral, reference to sales in the United States of

America’’ (191 F. 2d at 105-06). In the same vein, the

Report of the Attérney General’s National Committee to

‘Study the Antitrust Laws took the. view that:

‘‘We feel that-the Sherman Act applies only to those

arrangements between Americans alone, or in con-

_ cert with foreign firms, which have such substantial»

anti-competitive effects on this country’s ‘trade or .

commerce ... with foreign nations’ as to constitute

unreasonable restraints’’ (p..76).

See also United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. .

513, 524-25 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff’d, 332 U. S. 319 (1947);

United States v. Aluminum Company of America, and F. 2d

416 (2d Cir. 1945).

The Government has failed to show that Grace _par-

- ticipated in an arrangement which unreasonably restrained

competition anywhere. More particularly, the Government

“has failed to show any possible impingement on the foreign

or domestic commerce of the United States. Judge Murphy

correctly held that no unlawful agreement. was shown.

D. No relief einen Grace is weenie

Even if the Government had demonstrated that the zon- ,

_ ing arrangement which existed prior to.1938 was an illegal

‘agreement to divide territories, it would by no means fol-_

low that present relief, either —_— or otherwise, is

warranted against Grace.

47

'. As this Court observed in United States v. Oregon Med-

ical Society, 343 U. S. 326 (1952):

‘‘It will simplify consideration of such cases as

‘this to. keep in sight the target at which relief is

- aimed. The sole function of an action for injunction

is to forestall future violaiions. .-. .

‘|... We agree with the trial court that conduct

discontinued in 1941 does not warrant the issuance

of an injunction in 1949’ (343 U.S. at 333-34).

If this is so, then certainly the existence of an agree-

- ment which expired in 1938 and has not been relied upon

or enforeed by Grace & since that time do»s not warrant

present relief. ;

Moreover, the complete superfluity of relint against

Grace is evidenced by Grace’s conduct over the last 30

-years. Both the District Court and the Government have

recognized Grace’s vigorous action to develop Panayrra’s

routes and resist Pan American’s suppression during. that

entire period. As Judge Murphy found:

“If anything has been established it is that Grace

has been the only one of Panagra’s two partners

that has persistently and continuously attempted to

improve its service and extend its routes to the

United States’’ (R. 5429).

There is no reason whatever to anticipate that, once

Panagra is released from Pan American’s restraining hand,

Grace will in any way impede Panagra’s logical develop-

ment or prevent it from competing with Pan American for

its rightful position in the Latin American transportation

market. Indeed, it is evident that no proponent of Pana-

gra’s development more active or vigorous than Grace

can be found.

48

‘ _E. The scope, terms and duration of. the zoning

_ arrangement were as found by the District Court.

While the Government apparently does ‘not challenge ~

the District Court’s findings as to thé terms and duration

of the zoning arrangement which developed between Grace

‘and Pan American,* Pan-American does.** It is there-

fore appropriate to consider the evidence upon which

‘Judge Murphy relied and the contentions advanced by

Pan: American, F

Both the ad hoc and temporary nature of the arrange-

ment and its east-west orientation emerge clearly from

a contemporaneous ‘memorandum dated March 26, 1937

‘and signed by Hardld Roig of Grace. That un *morandum

provided in part as follows:

“Tn the early days of Panagra and before Pan

-American had purchased Nyrba, it was felt that in

view of the general relationship between Panagra.

. and Panair.and the interest of Panair in Panagra,

there should be some general understanding as to

the respective sphere of activity of the two com-

panies. A gentlemen’s agreement was accordingly

reached that Panagra’s activities would cover the -

West Coast of South Amerjca and Pan American

the East Coast and that in respect of the Argentine,

_Panagéa’s only interest would be in the line between

Mendoza and B. A. and thence to Montevideo. This —

was definitely a gentlemen’s agreement covering. the

respective ideas of policy as they existed at that time.

It was.not contemplated that this understanding was

not subject to change wheii it suited the mutual inter-

est or that in the event of such: change money pay-

ment should be required by one company to the other

~ as a condition to such change’’, AG- 123, R. 589).

® The Government does, of course, as is noted above ( ‘pp. 33- 36) P

contend that there was 4 broader agreement implicit in the forma-

- ° tion of Panagra.

. © Brief for ‘Aenstiogs Pan American World Airways, Ine: in

“No. 23 (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘PAA Brief’’) -pp. 9-23.

‘

e

~

Pe 49

Pan American also recognized the temporary nature of the

arrangement and its relatiou to Panagra’s 10-year mail

contract. Ina letter dated April 8, 1931 from Juan Trippe,

President of Pan American, to Panagra Mr. Trippe said:

‘* it was understood by all parties that our Com-

pany was to retain full rights to operate ai: trans-

port lines in the eastern or central part of South

“America; that Pan American, during the term of

your United States mail contract, would use. your

services on the western coast of South Ameriea and

your present Trans-Andean route to Buenos Aires,

and, except between Buenos Aires and Montevideo,’

you would use Pan American’s services elsewhere in

the Argentine and South America, the two compa-

" nies. cooperating in their respeetive spheres’” (G-

iA, R. 521; emphasis supplied),

It is significant that when the Government enumerates

the instances when the zoning arrangement was applied, it :

adverts to no instance in which Grace recognized or relied

upon any such arrangement subsequent to 1938. Thus, at

pages 12-13 of its brief the Governnient refers to instances

in 1929, 1930, -1931, 1935. and 1937. The Government also

refers to an instance in 1946, but, with respect to that

instance, says only that:

i" ‘“‘Pan American, in 1946, relied upon the agreement

to object to any service by Panagra to Bogota

+ (R. 633-34)? (Brief p. 12 3 "

Inspection of the document which the Government cites,

-which is a memorandum dated January 22, 1946 from Mr.

Dean of Pan American to Mr. Frienglly of Pan American, ©

reveals that this was an instance in which Pan American

was resisting pressure for an extension of Panagra’s

routes, pressure applied by Gace. In another instance |

referred to at page 40 of its brief, the Government says:

Pee.

“eS

. . 60

“When Grace had wished Panagra to extend its 4

service from Lima, Peru, to Rio de Janiero, Pan

American would not agree.’’

References cited by the Government (R. 639-40, 651-52,

1285-86, 5397-98) show that in 1950 and 1951 Grace was

strongly pressing Pan American for an extension of Pan-

agra’s service from Lima to Rio. The extension was

blocked, not by any Pan American-Grace agreement, but

_ by Pan American’s riegative control and its determination

to resist Panagra’s extension. %

Indeed, while Pan American cited the su} posed agree-

ment when it served its own interests, Pan American did

" not consistently reeognize it since, for example, it took the

position that its affiliate Panair do Brasil could provide

services from Lima to Rio (G-162, R. 651-52).

Grace’s own actions, as recognized by the Government,

belie any notion that it recognized or adhered to any agree-

ment limiting Panagra’s operation to routes.south of the

Canal Zone. As the Government says, beginning in the late

1930’s, the dispute which arose between Grace and Pan

American:

‘*, . . foensed largely on Grace’s efforts extend

Panagra’ 8 apg north of the Canal Zone to

the United States... .’’ (Brief, p. 11).

Judge Murphy’s findings and the evidence relied upon,

both by him and by the Government, show that the ad hoc

understanding never barred extension of Panagra’s

routes to the United States and that even the east-west

arrangement was vitiated by the termination of Panagra’s

mail contract and the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics

Act in 1938.

Nor do’ the contentions advanced by Pan American

require any different conclusion.” Pan American, in an

- .

51

attempt to justify its unilateral oppositior to the extension

of Panagra’s routes, argues that it entered into an agree-

ment with Grace which truncated Panagra’s routes in per-

petuity at the Canal Zone. This argumenit.rests principally

on a misreading and misinterpretation of Judge Murphy's

opinion and on evidence which says only that, when Panagra

. was organized, the end immediately in view was the devel-

opment. of the route from the Canal Zone south along the

west coast of South America. |

Pan American relies heavily (P. A. A. Brief, pp. 12-13,

19, 25), as does the Government, on paragraphs in Judge

Murphy's opinion, referred to above (p). 23-25), which do

not purport to be findings but which are Judge Murphy's

views as to what the ‘‘mind bent on finding conspiracy”’

might conclude. While Pan ‘American makes an extended’

effort to suggest confusion and confradiction in Judge

Murphy’s opinion, a reading of the opinion, rather than

Pan American’s paraphrases and randgm quotations,

reveals clarity and consistency rather than contradiction. }

-Turning to ths evidence, Pan American grounds its

argument that Grace and Pan American agreed to a per-

petual confinement of Panagra’s routes to the west coust

of South America principally on the exchangé of letters

‘which resulted in the formation of Panagra (R. 5377-78,

note 7; P. A. A. Brief, p. 11). Those letters did, of course,

refer to the inauguration of a through mail service from the

Panama Canal to Valparaiso, Chile. This was the route

for which the Postmaster General was expected to accept

bids. This reference, however, to the immediate objective

of the venture by no means embodied an agreement between

the parent companies that, whatever the future require-

ments for a logical development of the compuny, it would

always be limited to the route described. Indeed, despite

52

this reference to Valparaiso, Panagra’s route ¥ was subse-

quently extended to Buenos Aires. |

Pan American seeks to buttress its argument by stating

that: Poa

. Panagra was created for the specific and only

purpose of being a connecting carrier with Pan

‘American at the Canal Zone, and to serve with Pan

American as a complementary 4 carrier to supply

together air transportation from the United States

to South America, ...’’ (P. A. A. Brief, p. 17).

The references cited by Pan American, however, with one

- exception, indicate only that the establishment of the west

coast route was the immediate concern when Panagra was

organized. The exception is a statement by R. G. Fer-

. guson, Treasurer of Pan American, in his testimony in the

District Court that:

‘«. .. the objective of Panagra . , . was to operate

_ a connecting line between the Canal.Zone and Buenos

_ Aires’? (R. 216-17).

%

Apart from the fact that this was obviously a self-serving

statement made in the course of the trial, Mr. Ferguson

admitted that he knew the earlier history of Panagra, not

first hand, but only through the testimony in C. A. B.

Docket 779 (R. 216).

The next bit. of evidence from which Pas American

seeks to infer the agreement for which it contends is an.

exchange of memoranda between Messrs. Iglehart and

Roig of Grace in March of 1937 (P. A. A. Brief, pp. 21-22;

G-118, R. 582-84). The documents do not support Pan

American’s argument. In that correspondence Iglehart

was suggesting that Grace itself institute a direct service

from New York through to Buenos Aires (G-118, R. 582-83).

TIglehart contemplated this action as a means, of meeting

Pan American’s threat to hack its affiliate Scadta in going

to Guayaquil or Quito in Ecuador. The breaches of agree-

ment to which, Roig was referring in speaking of meeting

‘Cone breach’ with another’? were Pan American's breach

in going to Keuador in, competition with Panagra on the.

‘west coast of South America and the breach which Would

exist if Grace instituted a service in Panagra’s area down

the west coast of South America. In Roig’s view at that

time, which was prior to the enactment of the Civil Acro-~

rauties Act-and prior to the expiration of the ten-year mail

contract, both Pan ‘American and Grace were obliged to

refrain from instituting service parallelling Panagra’s

routes on the west coast of South America, That this is

what Roig had in mind is apparent from his statement that

the question whether it suited to meet one breach of agree-

ment by threatening another might depend on:

‘whether we preferred to scrap Panagra’ at the

expiration of the present mail contract and form-a

company of our own to compete with Panair on.the

new contract’? (G-119, R. 584).

If Panagra was to be serapped in any event, tlrere would be

less objection to instituting the proposed Grace service.

Tt is apparent,that this exchange of memoranda in no

way suggests that Pan American and Grace had agreed to

limit Panagra in perpetuity to routes south of the Canal

Zone. . a

Pan American next seeks to derive an agreement barring

Panagra from extension to the United States from the

so-called ‘‘management agreement’? whereby a designee of

Grace was placed in charge of the management of Panagra

in 1939 (P. A. A. Brief, p. 17). Pan American says of this

agreement that it providedjhat an application for extension.

of Panagra’s routes to the United States:

o4

2

‘« - . should be made only if Pan American’s

connections with Panagra at the Canal should become

. inadequate’’ (P. A. A. Brief, p. 17).

The agreement contained no such limiting provision.

The management agreement did specifically provide that

if Pan American: Salle. to provide adequate eoupeeting

service it:

r

‘*will cause its directurs on the Board of Panagra

to take such action as will permit Panagra’s apply-

ing to the C. A. A. for a certificate to operate this

connecting service ...’’ (G-190, R. 729).

The agreement by no means indicated that these were the

only circumstances in which Panagra could apply for a

route to the United States nor was there anything in the

agreement which barred, either directly or by implication,

Panagra from making such application. Pan American’s

brief seeks to distort an affirmative obligation to act in a

given circumstance into a negative understanding that Pan

Americar. was free to veto :ompetition by Panagra in all

other circumstances. |

Later on in its brief Pan American makes a similar

‘ argument with respect to the Through-Flight Agreement

entered into in 1946 (P. A. A. Brief, pp. 61-72). Pan

American argues that embodied in the Through-Flight

Agreement and the concomitant Parent Company Agree-~

ment was an understanding that Panagra was ‘‘under

obligation to continue for the term of the agreement with

through flight arrangements instead of a route of its own”’

(P. A. A. Brief, p. 62).°

*From this Pan American goes on to argue that the CAB

» approved of,an agreement barring Panagra from extending its

routes and that Pan American's blocking of such extension was,

therefore, immunized from the antitrust laws.

\

SS

55

Pan American’s contention is plainly inconsistent both

with the agreements submitted to the CAB and with the

- testimony before the Board with respect to the terms of

those agreements.

The only agreements submitted to the Borrd were the

Parent Company Agreement (G-267, R. S92 ef seq.) and the

Through-Flight Agreement (PAA-2, R. 1859 et seq.). Roig

of Grace testified that the only agreement was ‘tin these

papers’? (PAA-420, R. 4048) and that there was no agree-

ment ‘‘other than what is in print here (indicating) *’ (PAA-

420, R. 4110).

A reading of the agreements reveals that there is no

provision in cither one to the effeet that Pan American; in

order to protect itself from competition, may prevent

Panagra from submitting an application to the Moard for

its own route. The only provision which touches upon

application b§ Panagra for its own route is paragraph 5 of

the Parent Company Agreement (G-267, R. 806). It ix there

provided that in. the event of transfer,eabandonment or

‘cancellation of Pan American's route certifieates **Pan

American will consent’? to Panagra’s making appliéation.

The testimony before the Board was that this provision

settled the question of a deadlock in the Panagra board

“only in respect of this one sitnation referred to in that

paragraph. It has no relation to any other situation that

might arise’ 4 PAA-420, R. 4047).

' ‘This provision imposed an affirmative obligation on Pan

American effective in one circumstance. It did not relieve

Pan American of duties otherwise owed by it as a Panagra

stockholder nor of any prohibition imposed ‘upon it by the .

‘Sherman Act as a Panagra competitor. If Pan American

had desired to include in the agreement a provision barring

Panagra from extending its routes to the United States or

authorizing Pan American to vote against such extension,

F

56

its experienced counsel could easily we done so. No such

provision was included. ©

The agreement submitted to and approved by the Board

accomplishea only certain limited purposes: (a) Pan Ameri-

- can agreed to charter ‘‘at the request of Panagra’’ Panagra

planes over certain Pan American routes (which in effect

’ has meant only the Canal Zone-Miami route) (PAA-2,:

1860); (b) Pan American agreed -to maintain Panagra

planes, to train Panagra pilots, and to act as sales agent,

with certain safeguards designed to protect Panagra (R.

'. 1864-68) ; (c) Pan American and (irace agreed not to inter-

fere with the performance of the through- flight agreement

‘sin accordance with its terms”’ and to dismiss the litigation

' pending between them (G-267, R. 893, 896).

None of these provisions supports an inference that

Pan American could, for its own anti-competitive purposes,

prevent Panagra from applying for its own routes. It is

clear that an agreement by Pan Ameriéan to charter planes

over the Canal Zone-Miami route ‘‘at the request of

Panagra”’ leaves the option in Panagra to apply’for its own

route if it desires to do so. It is alse clear that a throuch-

flight arrangement over this route has nothing to do with

possible appiications by Panagra for routes co other points,

such as New York or the west coast of the United States,

applications which Panagra’s management later proposed -

that Panagra make, but which Pan American blocked

(G-1f31, @-1134, G-1135; R. 1662, 1669, 1673). Finally, it’

is clear that the dismissal of litigation pending at one point

in time, did not, in the absence of further agreement, war-

rant a ¢onciusion that either Grace or Panagra renounced

for all time the right to press for an extension of Panagra’s

own routes. . F

The testimony an the agreements supports the infer-

ence which the agreements themselves require.

87

The Pan American testimony was:

‘“*Q. Now, Mr. Friendly, do you understand, as a

result of contracts A and B, that Panagra is pre-

vented from applying for a route to the United States

in its own name? A. No.’? (R. 4175).

“‘Q. Mr..Friendly, in response to a question by

Mr. Schneider on cross-examination, I understood

you to saf¥ that there was nothing in the agreement

involved in this proceeding to prevent Panagra from

applying for an independent franchise to enter into

the United States; is that correct? A. That is rht.

“*Q. I would like to know whether. there is ‘any

understanding outside of the agreement now involved

in this proceeding which would so prevent Panagra

from applying? A. There is no understanding what--

ever in regard to Panagra's applying or not apply-

ing. Panagra can apply at any time if its board of

direc ‘tors so authorized’? (PA A- 420, R. i

Mr. Friendly suggested that, there was an implication

that Grace would not agitate for a Panagra extension

(PA A-420, R. 4175), but for the content of this implication

Mr. Friendly adopted the Roig testimony as ‘‘undoubtedly

better’? (PAA-420, R. 4176), and this adoption was repeated

(PAA-420, R. 4196). |

In the testimony adopted by Mr. Friendly, Mr. Roig.

expressed his hope that the matter would not come up again °

and he expressly denied-that there was an understanding

that Panagra would not seek to come from the Canal Zone

to the United States: ;

“(. Does that imply that the original extension

is no Jonger contemplated, and is not to be sought?

A. Yes, ad ;

| “Q. By Grace management? A. It implies that,

ves. It dotsn"t so expressly prov ide, but obviously

this is a substitute.

: ° . 38

r

{

‘*Q. That from here ‘on out those who run the

affairs of Panagra have an understanding that Pan-

agra will not seek to come from the Camal Zone to

. the United States. A. f did not so testify, and that

is not the fact. The only agreement between us on

that point is in these papers.

‘*Q. You said it settled it. A. No. I said it was .

a fair implication. After all, you don’t keep on run-

ning after the trolley aftér you got aboard, and we

have accepted this, at least for the moment, and as"

far as I can see, for a good long time. I hope so. —

‘‘Q. For 99 years. A. I hope.so, as a settlement

_of this controversy’’ (PAA-420, R. 4047-48).

Thus, there was no understanding, express or implied.

There was merely the ‘“‘hope’’ that the 1946 agreements

would obviate, ‘‘at least for the moment’’ and as Mr. Roig”

hoped ‘‘for a good long time,’’ the necessity of again pre-

senting the question of Panagra route applications.

_ The plain fact is that the agreements were completely

silent as to Panagra’s right to apply for its own routes.

There was no agreement which barred Panagra from apply-

ing for its own 10utes or which barred Grace from pressing

for such applications if it later appeared advisable, or

which gave Pan American the right to veto the making-of

such applicatiors in order to protect its own competitive

position.

Neither in connection with the formation of Panagra;

nor in the management agreement of 1939, nor in the

Through-Flight agreement of 1946, nor at any other time,

did Grace ever enter into an agreement barring Panagra’s

extension north of the Canal Zone’ Judge Murphy’s find-

ings as to the limited temporal and geographical scope of

the east-west zoning arrangement are not clearly erroneous.

On the contrary, they are 80 dly grounded in the record.

“

59

IV.

- The District Court correctly held that the restraints

imposed upon Panagra were unilaterally imposed by

Pan American pursuant to its unlawful attempt to

monopolize and its monopolization; those restraints

will be remedied by divestiture of Pan American.

While Grace disagrees with some of the Government’s.

_ charges of restraint. of trade, it does not contend that no

_ restraint of trade has been shown in ‘this case. With respect

to the Government's contentions that competition in United

States foreign commerce in .air trahsportation between

South America and the continental United States has been

restrained (Brief, pp. 43-47), Grace disagrees only with

the Government’s position with respect to the source of the

restraint. Grace agrees with the District Court that, compe-

tition has been unlawfyplly restrained by the confinement of -

Panagra to South America and the blocking of arry exteis-

sion of its routes to the United States. It is Grace’s view,

however, that this restraint is not attributable to’ any action

_of Grace or to any agreement in which Grace participated.

Rather, the restraint is attributable to Pan American’s

unlawful action in blocking Grace’s repeated efforts to’ °

secure for Panagra the routé extensions which would have

completed its development. Ot

The source of the restraint is apparent from the Gov- °

ernment’s own description of it:

‘‘Pan American used its negative control over

the Panagra Board of Directors to block Panagra’s

applications to the Civil Aeronautics Board for an’

extension to the continental United States! ’ (Brief,

p. 44).

60

In this respect, the Government agrees with the findings of

the District Court that: ‘ ;

‘‘Pan American blocked Panagra’s independent

entry into the United States-South American market

in order that it may continue to share in substantially

all traffic ‘carried by Panagra and bound for \the

United States, or originating in the United States,

and bound for points on Panagra’s west sa

routes”? (Brief, Pp. 43; R. wee .

- Pan American secks to shift the responsibility for the

problem by suggesting in its brief that: .

‘6... it was Grace, not.Pan American, whose agita- |

tion and aggrandizement caused the friction which

prompted the Government to institute this action

to free Panagra from its divided ownership”’ (P. A.

A. Brief, p: 6).

Apparently what Pan Aesielian means is that Grace caused

friction by persistently pressing for the route extensions

which were logical to Panagra’s developnrent, which the

Civil Aeronautics Board had solicited, and which would

have produced competition ;between Panagra and Pan

American. | ae “

In view of the unanimotis recognition that Grace has

been the party responsible for the effort to extend Pan-

agra’s routes, little attention need be devoted to a recount-

ing of the history of Grace's efforts. A word should hew-.

ever, be said about several distortions of the record which

appear in Pan American's brief.

Pan American first says that “ no question was raiséd*? |

about extending Panagra’ s routes to the United States

prior to 1938 (P. A. A. Brief, p. xvi). The reason why

the issue was not raised before that time is obvious. First

of all, during the first decade of its existence Panagra

was engaged. in establishing itself on its routes within

< . 61

South America. Moreover, by virtue of the ‘‘no-parallel”’

policy of the Post Office Department described above, it

would have been impossible for Panagra tu seek extension

of its route north of the Canal Zone in competition with

’an American prior to 1938, in any event. :

Pan American next points to Grace’ s acceptance of the

Through-F light Agreement in 1946 and suggests that, if

Grace was dissatisfied with Pan American’s action in con-

nection with Panagra route extensions, it could have ‘‘made

a showing of the impropriety in Pan American’s conduct

and have prosecuted the application in the name of Pan-

agra’? (P. A. A. Brief, p. 483). Pan American impliedly

criticizes Grace for accepting the Through-Flight’ Agree-

ment rather than pressing in this Court the litigation which

had arisen wut of its application, im behalf of Panagra, for

a route exte nsion. The Government cehoes this attitude

when it states that the litigation was ‘quickly su Atled by the

adoption of the through-flight agreement’ ( Brief, p. 44).

| Judge Murphy ts findings est explain Grace’ s

action:

|

‘After the Board certificated Branut, Panagra was

faced with two “allernétives : (1) to enter into the

Through Flight Agreement and Hmmediately amprove

its Competitive position with Brant, or (2) continue

to press for its own certificates. Under the latter

‘ ‘ . &

course Graee, on behadt of Parnes

neowenld continne

the litigation which it had initiated before the

C. A. B. in 1941 which was then pending review by the

Supreine Court oeertiorart to the Second Curenit.

‘The outeome of the appeal of course was uncer-

tain, and axsuming it Were favorable to Panera,

the matter would still then have to return to. the

@. AL B. for a eonsideration of the merits of the

action. Panagra simply could not afford the delay

which this course of litigation would entail. Its eo-

&

62° |

nomic life hung in the balance. If Panagra did not

_' get to the United States, ut least by way of a through

flight interchange ‘agreement with Pan American,

and if Braniff commenced such operations under the

authority granted by the Board, Panagra’s economic

position would rapidly deteriorate. Cf. New Yark-

Balboa Through Service, Reopened, 18 C. A. B. 501,

i \505. «: :

' -**Grace-and Panagra sesctinibad to the restraint

of Pan American ‘and acquiescetl in the Through

tem. Agreement” (R. 5414).

As. has hoch pointed out above, there was. no term of

the Through- Flight cement, or any related agreement,

which nel ane in for its own routes to

the United States. Nor race’s action in accepting

the Through-Flight Agreement represent an agreement or

" understanding voluntarily entered into ‘to limit- Panagra’s - :

development. Rather, in the.face ot Pan American’s oppo-

‘sition, and in the light of the risks and uncertainties ahead,

Grace accepted the best alternative available to it at that

‘tiine.

_ There can be no real issue as to the source of the restraint

which ented Panagra from extending its routes to the

United States. The only issue which deserves discussion

is the question whether the restraint imposed by Pan Amer-

ican was unlawful.. We submit that sudge Murphy properly

_ held that it was.

While we do not propose to meet Pan Kamina! s brief

in detail, ‘since that task will pr ‘esumably be performed by

the Government, we believe it necessary and appropriate,

as the party principally injured by Pan American’s ”

restraint, to sketch, at least in general terms, Grace’s

position. :

as alia ttacks ae prea below on three

principal grounds: .(1) that its voting against allowing

63

Panagra to apply for route extensions was a lawful exercise

of its rights as a holder of one-half of Panagra’s stock ;

(2) that its opposition to these route extensions was based

upon sound economic reasons rather. than any attempt to

monopolize; and (3), that the-order requiring it to divest

will embarrass the*Civil Aeronauties Board in its develop-

ment of a sound Latin American route structure.®

- Pan American’s argument that its half-ownership of

Panagra gives it an inherent right to block Par .gra’s exten-

sion to the United States ‘i is expressed principally in terns

of a ‘simple: illustrative: example” (P. A. A. Brief, p. 26).

The example postulates a situation where Jones and Smith

join in opening a department store in Providence and where

Jones subsequently objects to the Providence venture’s

; opening a store competitive with Jones’ individually owned

store in Boston. The illustration is ‘‘simple’’ and alsc mis-

‘leading for the very reason that it-excludes the facts which

distinguish that example-from the situation here, facts

which mark Pan American’s conduct as unlawful.

In the first place, Pati American’s example does not

involve a situation in whic the proposed extension of the

joint venture represents a logical extension of its activities,

What Grace has been secking for Panagra is the natural

extension of Panagra’ s routes to the sources of the bulk

of its traffic. There-is no similar logic about the extension

® We will not consider Pan American’s further argument that -

‘its opposition to route extension for: Panagra was specifically

“approved by the CAB and, therefore exempted from the Sherman

Act, since we ‘have already deménstrated (pp. 54-58, supra) that no

agreement x thorizing such action was ever presented to the Board.

Nor will we consider Pan American’s argumert that it did not

“texclude’’ Panagra from the Canal Zone-United States market,

since we regard it as quite obvious that there is a sufficient ‘‘exeln-

sion”’ in action which allows Panagra access to the market only in a

a eal flight arrangement with Pan Ameren.

64

7

‘of Pan American‘s hypothefical venture from Boston to

Providence. . |

Passing this, however, if we add a few additional facts

to Pan American’s illustration, analogouseto facts which

the District Court found in this case, the illustration is radi-

cally altered. Suppose, for example, that Jones’ store in |

Boston is one-of a very few stores in that city and occupies

a dominant position in the market. Suppose further that the

Providence venture is one of. a véry few enterprises which

could reasonably enter into the Boston market in competi-

tion with Jones. Suppose, finally, that'the very purpose of

Jones’ voting against the extension of the Providence ven-

ture is to preserve his dominant position. It is submitted

that, with this additional background filled in, the violation

inherent in Jones’ conduct becomes evident.

* Judge Murphy did not condemn Pan American's con-

duct on the basis of the broad kind of ruling which Pan .

American assumed in constructing its illustration. Rather,

he carefully limited his ruling to the situation before ‘him:

‘*We would like it clearly understood that it is not

our opinion that every defendant who exercises

similar negative control over a single potential g¢om-

petitor and thereby excludes such competitor from a

relevant market necessarily monopolizes thereby. It

is a relative concept which can only be applied in a -

given context. Here, the excluded competitor is the

most potential of a very limited numbpr of competi-

tors and one that enjoys a substantial share of the

_ relevant market, and in which share the exclusiona y

action Of Pan American guarantees it participation,

One result ia Yhed competi n between the-twe for

their significant shares of the market is to a sub-

stantial degree restrained. Other factors we con-

65 ¢

sidered are, the nature of the industry, the size and

strength of the two companies involved, and the

limited market potential.

‘*We feel that the affirmative blocking of a Pan-

agra application to the CAB is sufficient under the

facts presented to make out the violation by Pan

American of monopolization. . .”’ (R. 5408-09).

Pan American's contention is effectively answered, not

only by Judge Murphy's reasoning, but by rulings of this’ _

Court. It is of course’ clear that a party dominant in a

market who seeks to monopolize may violate the Sherman

Act by the-commission of acts or practices which would

otherwise be lawful.- E.¢.. United States v. Aluminum Com-

pany of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Moreover,

this Court has recently emphasized that the exclusion of a

single competitor ffom a market may have antitrust con-

sequences, Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Lie.»

359 TLS. 207 (1959); NE Burners, Ine. ¥. Peoples Gas

Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). In Gameo, Ine.

v. Providence Fruit & a Building Ine.. 194 F. ad

484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 817 (1952) the

court ruled that: °

¢

. the latent monopolist must justify the «<elusien

- of a competitor from the market Which he con-

trols. .*. . The conjunction of power and motive to

exclude with an exclusion not immediately and pat-

ently justified by reasonable busine ‘ss requirements

establishes a prima facie ease of the purpose to

monopolize’? (194 F, 2d at 485). . ;

Pan America’s argument that its conduct ix justified by

its stock interest in Panagra is effectively answered by this

-Court’s ruling in. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United

States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). This Court there held that the

fact that Timken owned one-half of French Timken and

approximately one third of British Timken «id not give it

a

- 66

the right to agree with thobe cuneniinn to allocate territo-

ries and not to compete. If a parent’s stock interest in a one-

half owned subsidiary does not insulate from condemnation -

an agreement with the subsidiary not to compete, it logically

follows that the same stock interest will not insulate from

condemnation the parent’s overriding of the wishes of the

co-owner of the subsidiary and his coercion of the subsidiary

not to compete pursuant | o an attempt to monopolize.

Pan American’s next argument, that a sound economic

basis existed for its restraint, stumbles’ first on the fact

= . . ! .

that Pan American never advanced any such ‘‘economic

argument’’ until the trial of this case. Prior to that time

Pan American had made the reason for its restraint quite .

clear. When Grace, proposed the extension of Panagra’s. ~

route to the United States in 1938 the matter was considered

at a meeting of the Pan American Board of Directors.

The minutes of that meeting, held on December 28, 1938,

record the following : a :

‘*It was the sense of the meeting that it would not be

in the interest of our [Pan American’s] stockholders

for our directors to authorize an application by Pan

American-Grace Airways, Inc. to extend north of

Cristobal in competition with Pan American Airways,

Inc.’’ (G- 182, R. 711; see R. 54). |

Judge Murphy found, on 1 the basis of ieiticiiliiaedas that

this same purpose motivated Pan American’s action during

Panagra’s entire history (R. 5405). Andeed, even .in ‘

when the Panagra management recommended to its soe

.tors, on the basis of a detailed managemept study a- 1139,

R. 1677-1850), that an application be made to extend its

routes to Miami, New York, and the West Coast of the

United States, Pan American, and its nominees on the

Panagra board, refused to consider the proposals on the

merits and argued only that Panagra was restricted in

67

perpetuity tc its existing route (G-1134, R. 1669-70; G-1135,

R. 1673-76). As Judge Murphy said, Pan American's

‘‘intentions in excluding Panagra from [the ‘Canal Zone-

United States] sector are beyond doubt’> (R, 5407).

Judge Murphy also pointed out there has at, all times

been a proper forum available to hear and ennees Pan

American’s economic arguments (R. 5407). If Pan Ameri--

can believes that an extension of. Panagra ’s route would be

economically unsound it can present to the Civil Aero-

nautics Board any evidence arid arguments it may have in

opposition to such extension.* Pan American has, however,

arrogated to itself the power to make this détermination-

and, by blocking any application by Panagra, has deprived

the Board: of an opportunity to rule on the matter.**

Finally, Pan American has failed to show that the

imposition of relief appropriate to its violation will hamper -

* Pan American states in its answering brief in No. 47 (p. 4) ..

that competition between Pans American and Panagra Was at all

times been ‘‘economically impossible’’ and that it ‘‘would not have

been sanctioned by the CAB....’’ If that is so,‘one wonders why

Pan American has been so adamant in opposing an application by -

Panagra which, in Pan American's view, the Board would never

have granted. It is also significant that, while Pan American now -

argues that competition between it and Panagra is economically

impossible it filed itself, in 1957, a petition with the Civil Aero-

\ nauties Board for extension of its routes to points on the West

Coast of South America now serv ed by Panoera c A. “B. Docket

No. 8597.

- In view of the teettow ance of Pan American’s economic argu-

- thents no extended effort will be made here to analyze and meet

them. We note, however, that even in economic terms they. do not

._ prove what they purport to show. The economic arguments adduced

were constructed for Pan American by a retained expert. Cross-

examination, we submit, showed. basie deficiencies and bias in the

exyert’s analysis. (See. for example, R. 279-81, 288-90, 294-97, 297- —-

301, 302-12.) The lack of significance attached by Pan Americ n to. *

its argument that the Balboa-Miami route was a low density sector

is indicated by the fact that, at the time of the trial, Pan American

was seeking before the Civil Aeronautics Board to parallel the prin-

cipal international route of Northwest Airlines which had a similarly

an low density (R. 281-82). Pan American was doing so because, so it

* gaid, its route from the West Coast of the United States via Hawaii

to Japan was ‘‘antiquated’’ and ‘‘will become. more ~> when the

the CAB in the performance of its functions or disrupt the

Latin American route structure.

' Pan American seeks to create the impression that’ the

District Court’s judgment involves an allocating of routes

and other functions which fall within the authority of the

Civil Aeronautics Board. Thus, Pan American talks about

the Court's deciding ‘‘the affliatiun of [a] route’’ (P. A. A.

Brief, p. 54), and speaks of the consequences of Panagra.

being ‘‘given a route between the United States and the

Canal...” (P. A. A. Brief, p. 55). Pan American also

sennatinials that the District Court's judgment would have

‘*the consequence of Panagra’s becoming a third American

flax carrier into Latin America..." ( P. A. A. Brief, p. 52).

A reading of Judge Parshy’ s ioleiins reveals that it

does none of these things. The judgment pr ovides merely

that Pan American must dispose of its stock in Panagra.

Judge Murphy’s judgment does not award to Panagra any

new route, deprive Pan American of any route, or ether-

wise alter the Latin American route structure. Nor does

that judgement have the consequence of making Panagra a

‘third American flag carrier into Latin America. ... Far

from being a ‘‘third’’ carrier, Panagra was the iailacitias

American flag carrier on the west coast of South America.®

— ‘ »

it s come into the pteture’ in comparison with Northwest's great

circle route to Japan (R. 230-31), a description equally applicable

to Panatra’s truncated route as coripared with Pan American’ s

route from New York to Buenos Aires. Pan American’s economic

evidence should also be compared with the study made by Panagra’s

management showing the feasability. and desirabiltiv of extcnding

its routes to the United States (G.-1139, R. 1677- 1850).

e As the Civil Aeronautics Board said in 1958:

**Panagra is to be commended for developing a self-suffi- .

cient air transport system in the important Latin American

market; and the Board is confident that Panagra will cou-

tinue io make every effort to strengthen its position 9s a

service carrier’? (Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., Mail

Rates, Dkt. 6958, finlings and. conclusions al April 25,

1958 confirmed May 13, 1958).

‘ .

e .

° 6O

It is evident that the-judgment of which Pan American

complains does not create a new airline, increase subsidy

requirements, or otherwise impair the capacity of the Civil -

Aeronautics Board to deal with the question of routes.

Judge Murphy's judgment further insured that the divesti-

ture of Pan American would not be disruptive of our Latin

American air transportation poliey by giving the Civil

Aeronautics Board an opportunity to participate in the

formulation of wd divestiture plan. Far from encroach-

ing on the Board's authority, the judgment, by’ freeing

- Panagra so that it can make such applieations to the Board

as appear to he in ifs and the public's interest, will enable

the Board to determine freely what the publie convenience

- and necessity requires. .

Judge Murphy's judgment does net create any problem

of route structure which did not exist prior to the entry:

of that judgement. The judgment merely corrects a orob-

lem whigh hi: isJong frustrated the ¢ ‘wil Aeronanties Board,

t. ¢., the problem of freeing Panagra from Pan American’s,

unlawful domination. * :

It is submitted that the only unlawful restraint which

the record shows is the restraint unilaterally imposed. by

Pan American and that Pan American’s restraint ean only

he adequately remedied by the divestiture which .ve District

Court ordered.**

*In the Unitéd States-South America Route Case, Dkt. 12895,

the isoard is presently reviewing the South American route strue-

ture. After determining what route structure is likely to be sound-

est the Board proposes to seerre that strueture by apuropriate

“‘alteratiggf amendment, modification, suspension, or cancelation -

in whole o in part’’ of the eertiiente, of Pan American, ‘Panagra

and Braniff. Pudge Murphy's judement does not, of course, affect

the Board ‘’s authority to make such revisions.

_: - w e do not undertake to discuss the issue of Pan Americgn’s

position in the relevant market or its ennmeration of considerations

which, in its view, render’ divestiture in¥ppropriate. Nor do we

consider, bevond what is set ont avove, Pan American's otimary

jurisdiction argument. We assume that all of these matters will

be dealt with in the Government’s brief in No. 23. We are of the

view, however, that in al! of these areas the findings and conclu-

Grace’s 50% participation in the organization and .

development of Panagra, while owning all of the stock

of Grace Line, did not, and ute not, unreasonably

restrain trade.

The final issue-to be jcuaaial in this brief, and the _

second issue raised by the Government in its Notice of

Appeal, is the question whether there is an inherent illegal-

ity in Grace’s participating, as a 50% partner, in the

creation and develapment.of Panagra while ow ing, as a

wholly-owned subsidiary, Grace Line Ine. The .Govern-

ment argued below that an affiliation - between an air carrier

and a steamship line is per se unlawful. The Government ,

now characterizes the affiliation as an unlawful horizontal

‘‘merger’’ (Brief, pp. 61 et seq.), but makes no attempt to

instance any restraint upon either Panagra or Grace Line

which in fact resulted from the affiliation.. The argument

remains one of per se illegality.* .

This issue divides itself into two subsidiary a

(1) Are air transportation and sea transpertation between

the eastern coast of the United States and the western

coast of South America reasonably interchangeable ser-

vices which form parts of the same competitive market, so

that an affiliation between the two-could have anti-com-

petitive consequences? (2) If these two services form

parts of the same competitive market, does the affiliation

‘through Grace’s stock interests in fact unreasonably

restrain trade? .

* It should be borne.in mind that the Government indicated .in

its Jurisdictional Statement (p. 2) that it was ‘‘not pressing the“

issue’’ stated in its Notice of Appeal as to whether ‘‘Grace

attempted to monopolize, conspired to monopolize, and monopolized

all or part of Latin American Air Transportation Service.’’

rs

‘

7 The services rendered by Panagra and by Grace

Line are not reasonably interchangeable; . they

' do not constitute parts of the same competitive

market. 0 = :

-—

ee

The findings of the District Court, and the evidence upon

which those findings are grounded, demonstrate that the

air services rendered by Punagra and the sea transpor-

tation offered by Grace Line -are not reasonably inter-

changeable. Judge Murphy’s. findings are not contra-

dicted by any evidence to which the Government can point

nor by any analogy or inference which the Government

can properly draw from Congressional and administrative

policies in other areas.

1. The legal test.

The Government recognizes in its brief that the test.

whether two products or services are sufficiently competi-

tive to constitute parts of the same market ‘answered |

by determining whether there is; a ‘reasonable inter-

changeability’’ between those products or services and a

“‘cross elasticity of demand’’ between them (Brief, p. 48)..

This Court spelled out the applicable rule in Times Pica-

yune Pub.Co. v. United States, 345 U. S..594- (1953), where

it said that: |

(‘For every product substitutes exist. But a rele-

vant market cannot meaningfully encompass that

infinite range: The circle must be drawn narrowly

to exclude any other product to which, within reason-

. able variations in price, only a limited number of

buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose

‘cross-elasticities of demand’ are small” (345 U. S.

* at 612, Note ‘1).

ee

As this Court pointed out in United States v. E: I. DuPont

de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377 (1956:

#

“ 72 _—

‘* | . one can think of building materials as in com-

modity competition but one could hardly say that

brick. competed with steel or wood or cement or stone

in the meaning of Sherman Act litigation: the prod-

ucts are too different’’ (351 U.S. at 393).

Even where. products superficially appear to be quite

similar, the characteristics of the demand for them may

* require the.conclusion that they are not ‘‘reasonably inter-

changeable.’’ Thus, in: International Boxing Club v. United

States, 358 U. S. 242 (1959), this Court held that cham- _

pionship and non-championship boxing matches were suffi-

ciently distinct to constitute separate markets — their

obvious similarities.

It is clear that in determining whether air - fransporth-

tion and sea transportation compete in the sense which the ©

Sherman Act contemplates it~is not enough to determine -

how many people or how many pounds of goods are con- *

veyéd by each of the two modes of transportation. The

relevant question is: What are the differences between the _

services and do these differences indicate that a purchaser

' or potential purchaser of one service would not regard that

service as reasonably interchangeable with the other?

2. Passenger. transportation.

It is precisely from this point of view that Judge

Murphy approached the problem. With respect to passen-

ger transportation Judge Murphy noted the difference’ in

time element: ‘‘from New York to Santiago by air takes

today about 12 hours—by steamer 20 to 21 days’’ (R. 5426). -

While the comparison is slightly less striking on the shorter

trips, it is still impressive. Thus, from New York to the

- Canal Zone by air is a 10-hour trip whereas by steamship

it is a voyage of 614 to 714 days (WRG-168, R: 5204).*

*Since jets have been introduced the discrepancy is even

greater. as

\i

3

~

~y

tions:

.

to

a

Judge Murphy also noted the significant difference in

fare, with Panagra in every case offering a less expensive

service than Grace Line. The Panagra fare to Lima

ranges from $308.80 to $399.80; the steamship fare ranges m=

from $515:00 to $1,510.00 in the winter season and from.

$435.00 to $1,220.00 in the sttmmer season (R. 5426; WRG-

168, R. 5205). ae

Judge Murphy asked the followi ing very ——- ques-

* :

‘*Ts the passenger who is willing to spend 6 weeks

on a steamer the samé as the person who wants to

fly somewhere and*back in a hurry? Is the person

who desires to transact business in afar a way South

American city and’ return a potential steamship

‘passenger to and from the same city ?”” (R. 5426)

Judge Murphy concluded that he was ‘‘not persuaded aie

_the proof i in this case shows: that the market is the same’

(ibid. ). ; é

‘The. Government says nothing whie h challenges this

conclusion. It does not do so by pointing to the testi-

mony of a Pan Ameriéan witness (whose bias was appar-

ent) that more than one-half of all air passengers to South

America travelled for non-business reasons (Brief, p. 50).

_It is apparent from the differences between air and sea

transportation on this route that the tourist, like the busi-

nessman, would not regard these services. as. reasonably

interchangeable. Ifa person has six weeks to devote to a

vacation, he certainly cannot plage i in the s same category an

-air-trip to Santiago Which w ould consume 24 hours round |

trip and a steamer trip to thie same place which would con-

suine the entire six weeks. Such services are interchange-

able only in the sense that a: ski lodge at Sun Valley com-

‘petes with The Waldorf-Astoria.in New York or a hotel in

the Caribbean competes with a fishing lodge in Canada. Of

course, all of these present alternatives to the vacafioner;

a

i4

'. but they surely are not competitive for Sherman Act pur-

poses. If they are, the relevant market must be expanded

to include far more than the air transportation offered by

Panagra and the sea trahsportation offered by Grace Line.

Although the Government states that cross-elasticity of

- demand may be measured by a correlation between changes

in\pricé differentials and corresponding shifts in demand,

_the Government fails to demonstrate the existence of any

‘snch correlation. The Government points to the fact that

‘‘the air carriers’-share of passenger traffic to South

America has risen from only 44 of 1% in 1931 to more

than 84% in 1957” (Brief, p49), but it fails to show that -

the increasing air traffic was drewn from the séa lanes b.

a reduction in the differential between the fares or by other

means of competition. Indeed, there is nothing in the

record to show what the differential in fares was over this

period of time. The Government merely makes a com-

pletely unsupported statement that if sea carriers are

Uesirous of retaining a share of the passenger traffic they;

-junst do so by lowering fares and de. Moping gther attrac-

tions to compensate for the lack-of speed (Brief, p. 49). It

is quite clear that the passengers who travel by Grace Line

_ do so, not by virtue of some competitive inducement, but

because they want a sea voyage. So far as lowering fires

to compensate for the lack of speed is concerned, the record

shows that Grace Line’s fares are substantiaily in excess

‘of Panagra’s (WRG- 168, R. 5205).

The Government is apparently relying upon’ the: kind °

of reasoning embodied in the statement which it later makes

when it discusses cargo traffic that:

‘¢...1f there were no air transportation available it

epuld unque anny move. by water... .’’ (Brief,

p. 35). ; . 3

.

There are two deficiencies in this kind of argnment.

—_—

~

—_

: ae

First, there is every retson to believe that the greater

part of the presently exisfing air traffie is traffic which did

not exist prior to the development. of air lines and which

would not havé existed if it had not been for that develop-

ment. A great proportion of the present air traffic, both —

passenger and cargo, is undoubtedly new traflie whieh could

‘not possibly have been carried by sea. Among the examples

whieh jump to mind is the tourist who has only- two weeks

\ to spend and who now uses it in an air flight to Santiago.

The second difficulty in the Government’s approach, is

that even traffic whith once went by sea may be traffic for

which. steamships could not compete once air lines had come

into existence. -At the ‘moment when the ‘first air line

became established as a safe and reliable means of grans-

portation there was undoubtedly a substantial amougPof

traffic, which previously went by sea, but for which sea

transportation was no longer a reasonable alternative. An

example is the man who wishes to go to Santiago solely for -

. the transaction of important business which will require

only a few days’ time. o-

A consideration of the important differences between

air transportation and sea transportation on these partic-

ular routes makes it evident that the great bulk of pas-

sengers carried by Panagra are passengers for whom

Grace Line’s steamships do not offer a reasonable alterna:

tive and that the passengers carried by Grace Line are

passengers who for some reason desire a Jengthy voyage’

by sea and for whow air transportation does not offer an

acceptable alternative. This conclusion is reinforeed by

the very statistics upon which the Government relies.

As the Government recognizes, a large portion of Pan-

agra’s passenger traflie is to points which Grace Line does

not e¥en serve (Brief, p.-00, note 17). -And even on the

routes served by both Panagra ‘and Grace the number of

’

Sw

‘ . *

passengers who travel by sea are only a very small per-

centage of those who travel by air. Thus, between the

United States: and Colombia in 4958 only 4.2% of the

passengers travelled by sea (WRG-168, R. 5198); between

the United States and Ecuador the figure was 10.1% (WRG-

168, R. 5199); between the. United States and Peru the

figure was 7% (WRG-168, R. 5200) ; and between the United

‘States and Chile the figure was 14% (WRG-168, R. 5201).

Moveover,. the statistics also demonstrate what is suggested

above, i.e., that the bulk of the presently existing air

traffic is newly developed traffic, rather than traffic which was

secured by competition with the parallel steamship car-

rier. For example, the number of passengers between the

United States and Colombia by sea ‘decreased only from

3,120 in 1931 to 1,676 in 1958 (WRG-168, R. 5198). During

this same period the number of air passengers increased

from 23 to 38,178 (WRG-168, R. 5198). Similarly, between

1948 and 1958 the number of passengers hy sea between

the United Stat»s and Chile deereased only from 3,251 to

2,279 whereas the number of passengers by air increased

from 2,714 to 14,434 (WRG-168, R. 5201). .

Although the Governmerit seeks to attribute the inerease

in air travel to ‘shifts in customer preferences . . . in

response to changes in passenger fares”’, and sneaks of an

‘‘interplay’’ between these services (Brief, p. 49), it cites

no evidence in support of the alleged changes in passenger

fares or the shifts allegedly resulting from them. The

important differences between these modes of transporta-

tion strongly support Judge Murphw’s conclusion that no

significant ‘‘shifts”’ or ‘‘interplay”’ occurs.

3. Cargo traffic. ;

Turning to cargo transportation, it is first of all relevant

te compare, as the’ District Court did, the total amount of

cargo which is moved by air and sea respectively on the

relevant routes. Judge*Murphy found that ‘tas between

the two the volume of cargo carried by Panagra as compared

to Grace was miniscule’? (R. 5428). The Government

criticizes this characterization and uses ‘the device of

describing air freight in terms of ‘trevenue’ ton miles.”’

The large-sounding figures given for revenue ton miles .

must be evaluated with recognition of the fact that

such.a figure represents a multiplication of the number of

- tons carried by tl number of miles over which they are

carried. Thus, if one ton is carried 1,000 miles it repre-

sents 1,000 ton-miles.*

A comparison with the. amount of-cargo cnnvied” by sea

-can best be made ‘i ‘in térms of tlie number of tons of cargo

earried over the particular routes in question. The record

shows that in 1958, the last year for which there. was

- evidence before the Court, Panagra carried 3,32 1 tons of

freight whereas Grace’s route from the east coast of. the

United States to the west coast of South America (Line

**A’’) carried 936,585 tons. In 1957 Panagra emplaned

349 tons of cargo in Chile whereas Grace Line carried

294,550 tons of cargo from that country (WRG-168, R.

5224). The word “miniscule”, which J — Murphy used,

was well chosen.* ,

The vital difference between the cargo service performed

by Grace Line and that performed by Panagra is illustrated

° The Government is to be congratulated for its restraint; it

might “have spoken in terms of pound-inches.

**® Since the Government goes outside the record to refer to the .

fact that Panagra carried 8,000,000 revenue ton-miles of cargo in

1961 (Brief, p. 53), we will take the same liberty. In 1961 Pan-

agra carried 4,405 revenue tons of cargo and Grace Line carried

999,036 tons on its run between the east coast of the United States

and the west coast of South America. (Figures derived from Pan-

agra’s Form 41 Reports to the Civil Aeronautics Board and Grace

Line’s Schedule 3002 of Form MA-172 filed with the _Maritime

Administration ). ;

78

by a comparison of the rates charged by the two companies.

There was evidence before the District Court which pro-

vided a detailed comparison of these rates. This evidence

showed, for example, that the rate charged for shipping a

" ton of goods via Panagra from New York to Santiago was

$1,660 whereas the rate.charged for the same weight over

the Grace Line route was $90 (WRG-168, R. 5224). The evi-

dence in the record also compared the rates charged for cer-

tain specific commodities. This’ comparison showed, for

example,’ that to ship 2,000 pounds of auto parts from New

York to Santiago would cost $1,260 on Panagra and $32 on

Grace Line. Indeed, on certain bulky items Grace Line

offered rates even lower than’ those specified above (WRG-

168, R. 5224-25). With dirferences in rates of this order of

magnitude. it is apparent that the two services are not ‘*rea-

sonably interchangeable’’ and are not used for the same

- purposes. If they were, Panagra could not long stay in this

business. — °

_These differences in the rates decent for transporta-

tion by air and sea are grounded in the basic economics of

air and sea cargo transportation. They directly reflect a

difference of the same order of magnitude between the costs

of garrying goods by each of these two means. A detailed

break-down of the cost of carriage by Panagra and: by

. Grace Line demonstrates that the cost of transporting

goods by air was $0.356 per revenue ton mile whereas the .

.eost of carrying goods by Grace’Line freighter service was

$0.00653 per revenue ton mile (WRG-168, R. 5227). A pub-

lication of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

. deséribes the cost of air transportation of cargo as being

about 40 times as much as the cost of sea transportation

(WRG-168, R.5212).

These comparisons demonstrate thai air transportation

of cargo is designed to serve a market quite different from

cF

iets 79

the sea cargo market. Although there may be minimal

competition between the two in very limited areas, the air —

lines will never carry the bulky cargos or great volume of

cargo presently carried by sea, nor can the sin) ping lines

meet the need for speed or emergency cargo shipment which

is met by the air lines. That this is true was recognized by

the Government’gown expert witness. |

Professor Stanley H. Brewer, who was tendered by the

Government as au expert in air cargo operations and the

competition between air and sea cargo” carriage, testified

among other things as follows : |

“When we talk about a future in air cargo we are

talking about something less than 1% of the total.

amount’’ (R. 112).

‘|. . the vast majority of export freight, tons

and ‘in miles, were of commodities that couldn’t

possibly lave been carried by. air-plane’’ (R. 112).

‘«.,. only a relatively few of the many thousands

of commodities which are now moved in world com-

merce can be considered to be [air] candidates in the

foreseeable future’’ (R. 113).

‘*.,. steamship rates on quantity movements are

far below attainable cost for moving freight by air

m the foreseeable future’’ (R. 115).

His farthest forecast was to 1975 and he predicted that

by that tin:e air carriers might achieve 7/10 of.1% of the

total cargo movement (R. 123).° Even on the most specu-

* Even these figures were based upon highly questionable cal-

culations and predictions. Professor Brewer himself recognized

that there have long been ‘‘ predictions of mountains of cargo mov-

ing by air’’ and that the air cargo movement. hasn’t come up to

these expectations (R. 111). He recognized that the data. were

‘‘very difficult to interpret’? (R. 115). His entire testimony

rested on the ‘‘basic assumption’. that cargo valued in-excess of

_ $.70 per pound was potential air cargo (R. 124). Yet nowhere in ‘

his reports or his testimony was there any basis for this assump- -

tion & 125-26).-

80

lative assumptions which the Governmert’s witness

advanced, it is clear that there will be no significant

infringement by air cargo service upon the. business

_ presently done by. the water carriers.

While the Government presented several witnesses (R.

77-89, 89-104, 127-49), whose testimony apparently did not

impress the trial judge, for thé purpose of citing a few

instances of situations in which air cargo carriers had

transported goods which might have been carried by steam-

ship, these involved rather special situations which fell far

_short of demonstrating a ‘‘reasonable interchangeability”’

‘of the two services. Moreover, the only instarice the Govern-

ment was able to show which involved transportation

between the United States and the west coast of South

America was a movement of 500 tons of onjons from Chile

to New York (R. 104). It is on this kind of evidence that

the Government attempts to base its demonstration of ©

‘‘reasonable interchangeability’’ and substantial competi-

tion.

The Government seeks to reinfor¢te its statistical argu-

ments by referring to several bits of evidence which it

suggests constitute a ‘‘recognition by the parties of com-

petition between air and sea transportation”’ (Brief, p. 60).

The first bit of evidence is testimony by Pan American’s

treasurer, Mr. Cornwall, to the effect that air and sea

carriers to South America are ‘‘very definitely’? in com-

petition for passengers and ‘‘are both trying to get the

. same market’’ (R. 229). In the context of this litigation —

Pan American’e treasurer can hardly be regarded as an

unbiased witness. Mvreover, Mr. Cornwall admitted that

he had ‘‘no particular knowledge”? about the movement of

~ cargo between the United States and the west coast of South

America (RB. 66). ay

a

- $1

The Government next states that: ©

**. . . Grace has always candidly admitted that

‘Panagra is a direct competitor of the Grace Line,’

and that Panagra’s development had resulted ‘in

prejudice to the Grace Line.’ ’’ (Brief, pp. 60-61)

_ The-only thing cited in support’ of this sweeping statement,

$3

however, is a single paragraph which the Government has

excerpted from a 1941 draft of a letter which was never sent *

(G-378, R. 1027). The letter which was actually sent on this

particular occasion is G-207 (R. 759-61); the cited para- —

graph does not appear in that ]-tter. It may be that the

paragraph upon which the Government relies was excised

from the letter as finally sent precisely because it was not an

accurate statement. In any event, this bit of evidence does

not constitute an admission. by Grace that Panagra is, or

was, a ‘‘direct competitor’ of Grace Line and certainly

does not demonstrate that the two companies’ services are

‘*reasonably interchangeable”? for Sherman Act purposes.

Another bit of evidence relied upon by the Government

in this connection demonstrates that instances of competi-

tion between Grace Line and Panagra were the exception

and that the services were not generally competitive. In

a letter from which the Government quotes in part at page

61 of its brief, Mr. Roig of Grace cited certain shipments

of gold as ‘‘..-. one of the few instances which have arisen

involving a conflict of interest between Panagra and Grace

Line’’’(R. 1003; emphasis supplied). If the few shipments

referred to are the only instances the Government has been

able to find in the long history:of Panagra where Grace

Line and Panagra competed for a shipment, then this, in |

itself, strongly demonstrates the absence of ‘‘reasonable

interchangeability.’’ ;

«

Ww

| 82

4. The Government’s authorities.

_ The Government finally seeks to rely upon judicial and

’ administrative decisions, and the policies allegedly embod-

ied in certain statutes, to show that there is competition

betwen air and sea transportation. All of these instances

are quite beside the point since none of them says anything

~ about cémpetition between - ‘air and sea transportation on

the routes here in question. Grace has never contended,

and does not now contend, that air and sea transportation

can never compete. In determining whether competition

exists on particular routes, the characteristics of those

routes, and particularly their Jength, are significant. Grace

contends, and believes that it has demonstrated, that air.

_ and-sea transportation are not eammadiiPaiatitenycetin

on the particular routes involved in this case.

The Government’s reliance on the decision in Eéhman

v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 209 F. 2d 289 (D. C. Cir. 1953),

cert, denied, 347 U.S. 916 (1954), is misplaced for this

very reason. In that case the court held merely that it

would not upset the findings of the Civil Aeronautics Board

that the services offered by the two carriers involved in

that case were competitive. Moreover, the steamships and

_ the air lines involved there were operating over the rela- .

tively short distances of the Caribbean and a great disparity

between the duration of the sea and air voyages did not

exist. Even i in that case Judge Prettyman, in a vigorous

dissent, expressed the view that the carriers were not in

: competition: and that the Board’s oe should be set

* aside:

“To say that the competition between these tivo

could create a conflict of interest which might produce

results not in the public interest is without support

in the facts, in my judgment. Of course there is

‘ 83

° * % - .

a sort

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Brief for the Appellee — Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States · 371 U.S. 296 | Frix