Brief for the Respondents — Morales v. City of Galveston
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| FILED
APR 13 1962
| JOUN F. DAVIS, CLERK |
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1961
NO. 480
ROBERT MORALES, ET AL., Petitioners
we Vv.
“CITY OF GALVESTON, ET AL., Respondents
»
Brief on the Merits for Respondent Cardigan
Shipping Company, Ltd.
;
. EASTHAM, WATSON, DALE & FORNEY
CLARENCE S. EASTHAM
EDWARD W. WATSON
‘ $14 U.S. Nat'l Bk. Bldg.
Alpha Low Brief Co., 402 M & M Bidg., Houston 2
A GARI 6 he
Ae ee ee ee
SUBJECT INDEX
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THE ARGUMENT
A The Facts of the Case
bh. The Law of the Case
CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICH
INDEX TO CASES
CASES
Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160) F.2d 173
lier vo United States Lines Co., 286 BFi2d 920, 1961 AMC
1134, cert.den. SoS U.S. S36, 7 Lkd.2d 37
Grzybuwski v. Arrow Barge Co.J 283) F.2d dS), 1960) AMC
2281
Hoilev, admx. v. The S/S MANFRED STANSFIELD. Ise
B.S, 212, 1960 AMC 1956
Hooper v. Terminal Steamship Co., 246 Flzd 2S]
Knox v. United States Lines, 204 Fk o2d 354
Mitchell v. Trawler Raver, Inc., 062 U.S, 339. 4 Liked. 2d
i] 2S,
Morrell vo United States, 297 F.2d 662
United N.Y. & N. J. Sandy Hook Pilots Assn. vo Haleeki.
vies &.5. 615, & b.ba.28 34!
Valerio vo American President Lines, 112 B.S) 262
IN THE
Supreme Cowt of the Anited States
OcToBER TERM, 1961
NO. 480
ROBERT MORALES, ET AL., Petitioners
Vv.
CITY OF GALVESTON, ET AL., Respondents
Brief on the Merits for Respondent Cardigan
Shipping Company, Ltd.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This libel in Admiralty was brought by Robert Morales
and seven other longshoreman as a third-party action
against the City of Galveston, owner and operator of a
grain elevator, and Cardigan Shipping Company, Ltd.,
owner and operator of the British Steamship 7GREL-
MARION. Libellants alleged that while employed by a
‘contract stevedore (not a party to this action) and en-
gaged in trimming bulk grain being loaded from the
elevator onto the GRELMARION they were overcome
by noxious gases from a fumigant which had been used on
the grain. Charges of negligence were made against the
2
City as owner-operator of the elevator and of negligence
and unseaworthiness against Cardigan as owner-operator of
the GRELMARION.
Trial before the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas, Galveston Division, resulted in a decree
for the respondents (181 F.S. 202, 1961 AMC 2199).
That decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit on February 22, 1960 (275 F. 2d 191).
On the initial petition for Writ of Certiorari the Court
entered a Per Curiam Order on December 17, 1960 which
read “The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated
and the case is remanded to that Court for consideration
in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539”. (364 U.S. 295, 5 L. Ed. 2d 84). Upon that re-
consideration the Court of Appeals reaffirmed, in a new
opinion, its earlier conclusion that the District Judge
had not erred in finding no unseaworthiness (291 F. 2d
97, 1961 AMC 2194). On a second petition to this Court
Certiorari has again been granted (368 U.S. 816, 7 L. Ed.
2d 23).
This respondent assumes, and it trusts correctly, that the
principal if not the sole concern of this Court on the
present hearing is with the issue of “seaworthiness’”, and
particularly with the contexture of that question which
may be regarded as following from Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, supra. The instant petition for Writ of Certiorari,
and the petitioners’ brief on the merits, are not so limited
and present as well extended arguments against both re-
spondents rested solely in negligence and against the re-
spondent Cardigan for unseaworthiness founded in negli-
gence.
As the brief for the City of Galveston will have dealt
at length with the fact question of sole concern to it, and
3
described the handling of the grain up to the point of de-
livery into the vessel from the elevator’s spout, those de-
tails and the related arguments will not be repeated in
this brief at any length.
THE ARGUMENT
A. The Facts of the Case
The S/S GRELMARION was a dry-cargo vessel of con-
ventional design and one of a large number of vessels en-
gaged in carrying export grain from the ports of the
United States. On this particular voyage she lifted 161,000 °
bushels of No. 2 yellow corn and 186,000 bushels of No. 1
hard winter wheat for delivery to India, and loaded this
cargo at the large ship-side elevator operated by the re-
spondent City. Prior to loading the GRELMARION was
“fitted-out” for bulk grain in the usual way, with shifting
boards, bins, and feeder boxes, and the ship and these fit-
tings were inspected and approved by a surveyor for the
National Cargo Bureau who certified that they conformed
to the applicable Coast Guard Regulations. (R. pp. 983,
985, and 990; Cardigan Exhibit 3), All bins were found
to be of standard type construction, including the ‘tween
deck bin in which petitioners were working at the time
of the incident in suit (R. p. 985). This bin was formed
by a center-line partition or bulkhead and received its
grain from a feeder-box in the square of the hatch at
one end of the bin. The approximate dimensions of the
bin were 28 feet by 22 feet, and the height 9 feet. (cf.
R. 249-259 and 374-375).
As described by petitioners they would “beam-out”’ this
grain by pulling it away from the feeder-box and into the
further corners of the bins. When they stopped work at
4
noon the bin was approximately three-fourths full and
nothing unusual had happened (R. pp.’ 41-42). After
eating, the petitioners and others re-entered the bin and
signalled for a “shot” of grain from the elevator spout
in order to resume work. As this first shot of new grain
entered their bin the petitioners almost immediately noticed
something was wrong, the first symptom being a burning
or smarting of their eyes which made tears come (cf.
R. pp. 44-46, 279-281). In the words of the gang’s
“pusher” Sheridan:
“Well, in other words, when that grain come in there,
there was something unusual about it. I had never
had the experience of that kind of stuff before, and
I didn’t know what was happening to us.” (R,. 280).
Several points were undisputed, even by the petitioners’
evidence: Until the event last recited this loading had been
without incident related in any way. All prior grain re-
ceived on the ship (and this included almost the entire
cargo) was completely free from noxious odors or | gases
of any kind. No fumigation procedures had been carried
out on the ship either to prepare the ship for her cargo
or during the loading. Whatever the source of any noxious
fumes affecting the petitioners those fumes came directly
off this “shot” of grain as it entered the ship’s bin from
the elevator’s spout.
It was equally undisputed that the GRELMARION and
her fittings were not only usual and standard but were
entirely suitable for the purpose of receiving this cargo
of grain and for the engagement of the petitioners in trim-
ining that cargo. The petitioners own testimony made it
abundantly clear, as the Trial Court found (Finding of
Fact 9, 10, 11, 17 and 18), that absent those gases which
came directly off the grain as it entered the bin this load-
ing operation would have proceeded to a normal and un-
eventtul conclusion.
As both petitions tor Writ of Certiorar: tiled in this
case, and even now the petitioners’ brief on the merits,
make repeated references to the absence of a_blower-
system for ventilation of the cargo bin (ct. Petitioners’
Brief pp. 12, 30) it becomes necessary to point out that
no one, including petitioners and their own witnesses, gave
any testimony to indicate. that “blowers” should have been
used to ventilate such cargo bins during loading, or even
to suggest that it would have been practical to do so.
(R. pp. 63, 107-108, 293-294). Petitioner is in error in
stating (Petitioners’ Brief p. 12) that the Trial Court
did not make any Finding of Fact on the failure of
Cardigan to use blowers to force air into the hatch since
the Court’s Finding of Fact 17 expressly stated ‘While
the GRELMARION cargo spaces were not equipped with
forced ventilation system, I find that only very rarely ‘s
this the case on grain vessels, and that it is not necessary
or customary” (181 F.S. at 206).
To conform this argument to the record it is also neces-
sary to point out that Petitioners’ Brief (at p. 30) again
1 Note as to the Numbering of the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact: In the published report of this case before the District Court
the Findings of Fact relating to liability are numbered consecu-
tively “1” through “18”. However, in some transcription of these
Findings of Fact the number “13” was not used and all para-
graphs subsequent to “12” were given a number one higher than
appropriate. In this brief the Findings of Fact will be referred
to as they appear in the printed report. It is noted that in Peti-
tioners’ Brief the higher number is used, and the references
therein to Finding of Fact “19” are to the Finding of Fact num
bered as “18” in the printed report.
6
has repeated the statements that “Coast Guard books and
literature available to the shipping industry show what
measures should and could be taken in the event of an
occurrence such‘ as occurred here” and tor that reason
Cardigan was under a duty “to provide either torced vent-
lation or blowers tor the very purpose of preventing
asphyxiation and the danger to Petitioners”. These state-
ments are completely without toundation in any testimony
or exhibits offered at the trial and apparently and solely
relate to a manual which libellants’ counsel had in posses-
sion showing ventilation procedures recommended to be
followed when fumigation bad been carried out aboard a
ship. The use of this manual was dropped at the trial since
it was apparent that it related only to that special situation
which was not true on the GRELMARION. A picture ot
a ‘“‘blower-system” taken from the manual was resurrected
as “Appendix G” in the first petition tor Writ of Cer-
tiorari to this Court. While this Respondent contends that
these questioned statements are not only misleading but
are also not properly a part of the Record in this case,
unless these premises are conceded by the Petitioners it 1s
respectfully submitted that this “new evidence” should
be placed before the Court in its entirety so that its lack
of application to the circumstances here can be correctly
evaluated.
A final consideration as to the facts of the case con-
cerns the reference in Petitioners Brief (by emphasis added
at p. 7, and at pp. 12, 20, 21 and 30) which would sug-
gest that the petitioners were asphyxiated because the flow
of grain cut off their supply of oxygen. All of the evi-
dence showed, and the Court found (Finding of Fact 11,
181 F.S. at 205) that this was not the case and that any
damage suffered by the petitioners was an intoxication
caused by the fumes of chloropicrin coming off the grain.
7
B. The Law of the Case
In stating the position of this respondent it 1s assumed
~and understood that a ship may be rendered unseaworthy
by a condition which is only temporary or transitory, and
that the ship-owner’s notice of this condition, either actual
or constructive, is not essential to his liability. However,
the questions remain whether, under the facts of this case,
it should be found that an unseaworthy condition was
present and that this was the cause of, injury.
Whether the GRELMARION and her appurtenances
were “reasonably suited for their intended use” was a ques-
tion resolved by the Trial Judge in these terms:
“(17) I find that the GRELMARION’S cargo spaces
were of customary design and construction; that they
were clean, and in all respects ready to receive the
wheat; and had been surveyed and approved prior to
loading. No fumigation for weevils was made aboard
the vessel, and none was necessary. While the GREL-
MARION’S cargo spaces were not equipped with
forced ventilation systems, I find that only very rarely
is this the case on grain vessels, and that it is not
necessary or customary, I find that the vessel was not
unseaworthy in any respect or particular, and that
her Captain, crew, agent or other representatives were
not negligent in any particular.
(18) The finding heretofore has been made that
the noxious gases and fumes were introduced into the
bin with the last “shot” of grain, and resulted from
a fumigant that had been improperly applied, and
that had adhered to the grain an unusually long period
of time. Under these circumstances, | find that the
admission thereof into the bin of the vessel did not
cause the GRELMARION to become unseaworthy,
the vessel and all its appurtenances being entirely ade-
8
quate and suitable in every respect”. (181 F.S. at 206-
207)
Unlike Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, supra; Grzybowsk:
v. Arrow Barge Co., 283 F. 2d 481 (4th Cir., October
1960); Knox v. United States Lines, 294-F. 2d 354 (3rd
Cir., June 1961), and other cases where a jury’s verdict
has been set aside because the guiding principles were er-
roneously stated, in the instant case there is no indication
that the conclusion of the Trial Judge as to seaworthiness
was rested on faulfy premises. Betitioners’ Proposition 1s
that under the facts here related and as found by the
Trial Court the opposite conclusion was required as a
matter of law. To a considerable extent the einphasis of
that argument is taken from the choice of language used
by the Court of Appesis (in the first hearing of this case,
275 F. 2d 191), particularly:
“This is a case of a happening ‘when the last batch
of wheat came out of the funnels’ instantaneously
rendering unfit quarters which until then bad been,
and, when the funnels cleared away. continued to be
entirely seaworthy.”
These are words which originated with the Court of Ap-
peals and were not words “quoted with approval” from
the District Court as stated by Petitioners’ Brief, at page
16. While under the circumstances they would not appear
to have any significance in the present posture of the case
Judge Hutcheson did clarify his meaning in his second
opinion (291 F. 2d 97) when he elaborated:
“Bere the vessel was af all times staunch and fit for
the service intended, the reception. of grain which
did not contain dangerous chemicals, and since it was
not intended or expected that grain so contaminated
9
would be loaded into the bins, the ship was af all
times seaworthy and fit tor its service of receiving
uncontaminated grain.” (kmphasis added) (291 F.
2d at 98).
In Mitchell the slime and fish gurry which made the
ship’s rail unseaworthy was a normal by-product of the
intended service of the vessel. In the Grzybowsks case the
soap was applied to skids as an aid in handling the cargo
of steel. In the Kuox case the collapse of tiers of burlap
Pl pp eek
in Holley, Admx. v. 8.8. Manfred Stansfield, 186 F.S, 212,
1960 AMC 1956 (E.D. Va. 1960), a case cited in Peti-
tioners’ Brief at pp. 16, 20.
A similar if not identical distinction is readily seen in
the cashew-nut oil cases, Valerio v. American President
Lines, 112 F.S. 202 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) and Anderson v.
Lorentzen, 160 F. 2d 173 (2nd Cir, 1947), cited by Peti-
tioners, since a cashew-nut oil cargo was inherently danger-
ous to those handling it without appropriate precautions.
Of a like characteristic was the carbon tetrachloride used
in the Halecki case (United N.Y & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots
Assn. v. Halecki, 1959, 358 U.S. 613, 3 L. Ed. 2d 541).
In the instant case the Trial Court found, on sufficient
evidence, not only that the direct cause of any injury to
the Petitioners was a vice in the cargo itself, but also that
the presence of this alien gas in the wheat was neither
a normal nor to be forseen characteristic of that cargo.
Petitioners’ Counsel obviously anticipated the dilemma
in which this element of the case would place not only
the theory of negligence but also the theory of unsea-
worthiness since the arguments are here repeated concern-
1 per ars te ;
ing four “similar” incidents of which the parties had
\
10
notice. However, as the Trial Court determined (Findings
of Fact 12 and 16), the last of these incidents was in
1953, some years previous to the incident in suit, and,
unlike the present case of a residue of chioropicrin trom
negligent fumigation at an inland point (Findings of Fact
12, 13 and 14), those previous cases charged negligent
fymigation in the City’s own elevator.
In summary, the Petitioners have not brought themselves
within the specifications for liability which were announced
in the Mitchell case, or which may be found in any other
case in this area of the maritime law. A contrary conclu-
sion could only be reached if the shipowner’s absolute
warranty does extend to the freedom of all cargo from
conditions which might cause injury. This rule has not
been stated in this Court or any other.
Under a separate proposition Petitioners’ Brief urges th
negligence of both respondents for failing to test the grain
between the elevator bins and the ship’s hold so as tw
detect the presence of the injury-causing chloropicrin gas.
The errors in that argument, and in the facts given in
support, have already been noted in some part. No sut-
ficient reason is offered by Petitioners for disturbing the
clear and detailed judgment of the Trial Court on this
issue. On this the Court of Appeals said:
“Careful consideration of, and reflection on, the claims
and arguments of the opposing parties, in the light of
the record and the controlling authorities, leaves us in
no doubt that, as to the charges of negligence, there
is no basis whatever for the attack here upon the
findings as clearly erroneous. . Indeed, we are convinced
that, under an impartial and disinterested view of the
evidence as a whole, the findings are well supported
and wholly reasonable.
—275 F. 2d at 193.
ll
Overall, and with the facts of this case fairly viewed,
the decree for the shipowner fully conformed to the
settled principles of the maritime law, including those
stated in Mitchell. Neither the fact that an accident did
occur, ror that it occurred from a transitory, even in-
stantaneous cause, was sufficient without more, to establish
unseaworthiness as the cause of injury. The vessel and
her appliances remained reasonably fit for the use to which
they were put. No more was required.
Blier v. United States Lines Co., 2d Cir. 1961, 286
F. 2d 920, 1961 AMC 1134, cert. den. 368 U.S.
836, 7 L. Ed. 2d 37;
Hooper v. Terminal S.S. Co., 2d Cir. 1961, 296 F.
2d 281;
Morrell v. United States, 9th Cir.. 1961, 297 F.
2d 662.
CONCLUSION _
For the foregoing reasons jiatamadiles Cardigan Ship-
ping Company, Lxtd., pray that the judgments of the
District Court and the Court of Appeals be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
EASTHAM, WATSON, DALE & FORNEY
CLARENCE S. EASTHAM
EDWARD W. WATSON
—_ De ate aa TN keen
Attorneys for Cardigan
Shipping Company, Ltd.
U.S. Nat’l Bk. Bldg.
Galveston, Texas
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing brief has been mailed this
day of April, 1962 to Arthur J. Mandell, Esq., South Coast
Building, Houston 2, Texas, Attorney for Petitioners, and
to Preston Shirley, Esq., Santa Fe Building, Galveston,
Texas, Attorney for Respondent City of Galveston.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 480.--Ocroper Teka, 1961,
Robert Morales, et al..| Pe Rae? .
5 Mnited States Court of Ap-
,. ae = | peals for the Fifth Cireuit
(ity of Galveston et al!
[June 11, 1962. |
Mr. Jusvice Srewart delivered the opinion of the
Court.
On the afternoon of March 14, 1957, the S. 8. Grel-
marion was berthed at Galveston, Texas, taking on a
cargo of wheat from a pierside grain elevator owned and
operated by the city. The wheat was being loaded
directly from the elevator into the ship by means of a
spout. The petitioners were longshoremen engaged in
“trimming” the wheat as it was received in the off-shore
bin of the vessel's No. 2 hold, which was then about three-
quarters full. A last “shot” of grain was called for and
was released into the bin. The grain in this last shot
had been treated with a chemical insecticide, and the
petitioners were injured by fumes from the chemical,
tnade noxious by concentration in the closely contined
area where they were working.
The petitioners brought the present suit against the
City of Galveston and the owner of the vessel to recover
for their injuries.’ Their claim was predicated upon the
negligence of the city and the shipowner, and upon the
unseaworthiness of the ship. After an extended trial.
the Distriet Court entered judgment for the respondents.
' Petitioners of course received compensation and medical treatment
under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
33 U.S.C. $901 et seq. 181 F. Supp., at 207.
2 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.
based upon detailed findings of fact, 181 F. Supp. 202, and
the Court,of Appeals affirmed, 275 F. 2d 191. On certio-
rari (364 U. S. 295) we vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for considera-
tion in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362
U.S. 539, which had been decided in the interim. That
court, one judge dissenting, was of the view that Mitchell
was inapplicable to the facts of the present case, and
again affirmed the District Court's judgment, 291 F. 2d
97. We granted certiorari to consider a seemingly sig-
nificant question of admiralty law. 368 U. S. 816.
The factual issues bearing upon the alleged negligence
of the city and shipowner were determined in their favor
by the District Court. Specifically, the court found that
the city had not itself applied the fumigant to the grain
in question, and that neither of the respondents knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care could have known, that
the grain had been improperly fumigated at an inland
point by someone else.?- Even a cursory examination of
“14. 1 find that neither of the respondents knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have known, that this quantity of
grain, which had been improperly treated with an excessive amount
of fumigant, was in the elevator or loaded aboard the Grelmarion.
and that (for all the evidence shows here) the respondent city, 1p
the operation of its elevator, had never received knowledge of a prior
instance where chloropicrin or other fumigants applied at inland ele-
vators had adhered to the grain sufficiently long as to present danger
after receipt by the elevator.
“15. I find that the respondent city was not negligent in failing to
know or learn of the presence of this quantity of grain within it-
elevator, in failing to make some additional inspection therefor, or in
any other particular. The record shows without dispute that careful
and painstaking inspections and examinations were made under gov-
ernmental authority when the grain was received, and again as it was
disbursed by the elevator, which in the present instance failed ts
detect the presence of the remaining traces of fumigant in this quan
tity of grain. I find that had additional inspections been made by
MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON. 3
the lengthy record shows that these findings were based
upon substantial evidence. They were re-examined and
affirmed on appeal... We cannot say that they were
clearly erroneous. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S.
19, 20-21.
Of greater significance in this litigation is the issue
which prompted our remand to the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration. Briefly stated, the question is whether,
upon the facts as found by the District Court, it was error
to hold that the Grelmarion was seaworthy at the time
the petitioners were injured.‘
In the Mitchell case, supra, we reversed a judgment
for the defendant, because the District Court and the
Court of Appeals had mistakenly imported concepts of
the respondent city, there is no reason to believe that such inspections
would have been more successful.
“17. I find that the Grelmarion’s cargo spaces were of customary
design and construction; that they were clean, and in all respects
ready to receive the wheat; and had been surveved and approved
prior to loading. No fumigation for weevils was made aboard the
vessel, and none was necessary... . I find... that her Captain,
crew, agent, or other representatives were not negligent in any partic-
ular.” 181 F. Supp. 202, at 206-207.
*“Careful consideration of, and reflection on, the claims and argu-
ments of the opposing parties, in the light of the reeord and the con-
trolling authorities, leaves us in no doubt that, as to the eharges of
negligence , there is no basis whatever for the attack here upon
the findings as cleary erroneous. Indeed, we are convinced tuat,
under an impartial and disinterested view of the evidence as a whole,
the findings are well supported and wholly reasonable.” 275 F. 2d,
at 193.
‘The District Court and the Court of Appeals, without discussion,
proceeded upon the assumption that the petitioners belonged to the
class to whom the respondent shipowner owed the duty of providing
4 seaworthy vessel. This was correct. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierach.
328 U.S. 85; Pope & Talbot, Inc.>v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406.
4 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.
common-law negligence inte an action for unseaworthi-
ness. There the jury had erroneously been instructed
that liability for unseaworthiness could attach only if the
alleged unseaworthy condition was “there for a reason-
ably long period of time so that a shipowner ought to
have seen that it was removed.” ° The Court of Apveals
had affirmed on the theory that, at least as to an unsea-
worthy condition that arises during the progress of the
voyage, the shipowner’s obligation “is merely to see that
reasonable care is used under the circumstances .
incident to the currection of the newly arisen defect.”
It was alleged in that case that a ship’s rail which was
habitually used as a means of egress to the dock was ret-
dered unseaworthy by the presence of slime and gurr®.
We did not decide the issue, but reversed for a new trial
under proper criteria, holding that the shipowner’s actual
or constructive knowledge of the unseavorthy condition is
not essential to his liability, and that he has an absolute
duty “to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably
fit for their intended use.” 362 U.S., at 550.
In the present ease the Court of Appeals was of the
view that the trial judge’s determination of the Grel-
marion’s seaworthiness at the time the petitioners were
injured was in no way inconsistent with our decision in
the Mitchell case. We agrée. The District Judge did
not, as in Mitchell, hold that unseaworthiness liability
depends atpon-the~shipowner’s actual or constructive
knowledge. He did not, as in Mitchell, indicate that
liability may be excused if an unseaworthy condition is
merely temporary. Rather, as the Court of Appeals
pointed cut, the trier of the faets found, upon substantial
evidence, that “the cause of the injury was not any defect
in the ship but the fact that the last shot of grain which
° 362 U.S., at 540-541, n. 2.
"265 F.2d 426, 432.
MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON. 5
was being loaded was eontaminated 2.0. 0° PUL F.2d
at OS.
The trial court found, upon substantial evidence, that
What happened was an unexpected, isolated oecurrence.
Several years before there had been three. or perhaps
four, ‘neidents involving Injury te longshoreinen from
grain stich had been fumigated by the city itself. But
at the time the present case arose the city had adopted a
series of safety and inspection measures which miade
completely innocuous the grain which it fumigated, and
“vast quantities of wheat and other grains had been
loaded through the elevator, some eight to ten percent
of which had been fumigated by the city, without similar
incident in recent years.” * ‘Rhe court found that the
fumes in the present case came from “chloropierin, an
insecticide which had never been used by the respondent
city.” * |
here. Under these circumstances we cannot sav that
it was error for the court to rule that the absence of a
forced ventilation system in the hold did hot Constitute
unseaworthiness.”
A vessel's unseaworthiness might arisefrom anv num
ber of individualized circumstances. Her gear might be
" IS] F. Supp., at 205.
* Lhid.
2... While the Grelmanon’s eargo spaces were not equip
with forced ventilation systems, I find that only v: ry rarely is thi
Cise on grain vesseis, and that it is not necessary OF CUSTOMIAL
“The finding heretofore has been made that the noxious gases and
fumes were introduced into the bin with the last ‘shot’ of gram. ond
resulted from a fumigant that had been improperly appled, and that
hud adhered to the grain an unusually long pemod of time. Under
these circumstances, I find that the admission thereof into the hin
vi the vessel did net cause thi Grelmarion to become unseaworths
‘he vessel and all its appurtenances bemg entirely equate and suit
‘ble in every respect.” 1S] F. Supp., at 206-207
wee
The petitioners question none of these findings |
6 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.
defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her crew unfit
The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its
stowage, might be improper. Mahnich v. Southern S. s
Co., 321 U.S. 96; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. =
85; Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, gl U. S. 406; Alaska
Steamship Co. v. Petterson, 347 U. S. 396; Rogers v
United States Lines, 347 U. 8. 984; peu v. Lykes
Bros. S. S. Co., 348 U.S. 336; Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser
358 U.S. 423: Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., v. Eller-
man Lines, Ltd., 369 U. S. 355. For any or all of thes:
reasons, or others, a vessel might not be reasonably fi!
for her intended service. What caused injury in the pres-
ent case, however, was not the ship, its appurtenances, 0!
its crew, but the isolated and completely unforeseeah|«
introduction of a noxious agent from without. The trier
of the facts ruled, under proper criteria, that the Gre’-
marion was not in any manner unfit for the service to
which she was to be put, and we cannot say that hi
determination was wrong.
Affirmed
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER took no pert 9 in the consi:
eration or decision of this case.
eS
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 480. fee Tere, 1061.
Robert Morales, et al.
Petitioners.
,
‘Tila Wed cf Cestineats in the
United States Court of Ap-
i ; | peals for the Fifth Cireuit
Citv of Galveston et al.
{June 11, 1962. |
Mr. Justice Dovcias, with whom THe Cuter Jverics
and Mr. Justice Black coneur, dissenting.
The Distriet Court found that the libellants were
injured in 1957 as a result of a release into the held of a
“shot” of grain that completely closed the hatch opening,
which was the only source of ventilation for the hold «.
which they were working. This grain had been treated
bv ehemicals for weevil infestation: and the noxious
fumes from those chemicals injured libellants.
The vessel's cargo spaces were not equipped with a
foreed ventilation system. Cirain vessels, the District
Court found, rarely are so equipped; and it eoneluded
that foreed ventilation is “not necessary or customary.”
If this were an isolated instance of fumigated grain
releasing nexious gases, no claim of unseaworthiness eould
be maintained. But this was not an isolated instance.
Of the wheat loaded through this elevator. some & to 10%
was fumigated by the city. Wheat is commonly furi-
gated either in the elevators or in railroad ears. Whe,
the fumigant is properly applied. the gases and fumes are
dissipated so as not to be dangerous or harmful after 24
to 48 hours. The Distriet Court found, however. that te
the knowledge of the owners of the vessel several recent
incidents like that in the present case had oeeurred. in
Galveston, causing injury to longshoremen—one in 1940.
one in 1950, two in 1953
2 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.
A vessel without a forced ventilation system would tx
seaworthy if this mjury were an unexpected, isolated
occurrence. But Lagree with Judge Rives of the Court of
Appeals that the vessel and her appurtenances were jot
“reasonably fit for their intended use” (291 F. 24 97, 09
where up to 10% of the grain loaded from this elevate:
was fumigated and where the owners had knowledge ot
like accidents. One “intended service” of this vessel wa-
therefore, the loading of fumigated grain whieh in the pas!
had given off noxious fumes. Unseaworthiness by rease:
of the absence of a forced ventilation system is cleare:
here than it was in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Ine. 302
U.S. 539, where temporary slime and gurry on the ship -
rail rendered it unseaworthy. The unseawortha cord:
tion in the present case had no such teniporary spat
What happened here shows that the vessel was unses
worthy whenever fumigated grain was being loaded
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.