Brief for the Respondents — Morales v. City of Galveston

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| FILED

APR 13 1962

| JOUN F. DAVIS, CLERK |

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1961

NO. 480

ROBERT MORALES, ET AL., Petitioners

we Vv.

“CITY OF GALVESTON, ET AL., Respondents

»

Brief on the Merits for Respondent Cardigan

Shipping Company, Ltd.

;

. EASTHAM, WATSON, DALE & FORNEY

CLARENCE S. EASTHAM

EDWARD W. WATSON

‘ $14 U.S. Nat'l Bk. Bldg.

Alpha Low Brief Co., 402 M & M Bidg., Houston 2

A GARI 6 he

Ae ee ee ee

SUBJECT INDEX

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THE ARGUMENT

A The Facts of the Case

bh. The Law of the Case

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICH

INDEX TO CASES

CASES

Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160) F.2d 173

lier vo United States Lines Co., 286 BFi2d 920, 1961 AMC

1134, cert.den. SoS U.S. S36, 7 Lkd.2d 37

Grzybuwski v. Arrow Barge Co.J 283) F.2d dS), 1960) AMC

2281

Hoilev, admx. v. The S/S MANFRED STANSFIELD. Ise

B.S, 212, 1960 AMC 1956

Hooper v. Terminal Steamship Co., 246 Flzd 2S]

Knox v. United States Lines, 204 Fk o2d 354

Mitchell v. Trawler Raver, Inc., 062 U.S, 339. 4 Liked. 2d

i] 2S,

Morrell vo United States, 297 F.2d 662

United N.Y. & N. J. Sandy Hook Pilots Assn. vo Haleeki.

vies &.5. 615, & b.ba.28 34!

Valerio vo American President Lines, 112 B.S) 262

IN THE

Supreme Cowt of the Anited States

OcToBER TERM, 1961

NO. 480

ROBERT MORALES, ET AL., Petitioners

Vv.

CITY OF GALVESTON, ET AL., Respondents

Brief on the Merits for Respondent Cardigan

Shipping Company, Ltd.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This libel in Admiralty was brought by Robert Morales

and seven other longshoreman as a third-party action

against the City of Galveston, owner and operator of a

grain elevator, and Cardigan Shipping Company, Ltd.,

owner and operator of the British Steamship 7GREL-

MARION. Libellants alleged that while employed by a

‘contract stevedore (not a party to this action) and en-

gaged in trimming bulk grain being loaded from the

elevator onto the GRELMARION they were overcome

by noxious gases from a fumigant which had been used on

the grain. Charges of negligence were made against the

2

City as owner-operator of the elevator and of negligence

and unseaworthiness against Cardigan as owner-operator of

the GRELMARION.

Trial before the District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of Texas, Galveston Division, resulted in a decree

for the respondents (181 F.S. 202, 1961 AMC 2199).

That decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit on February 22, 1960 (275 F. 2d 191).

On the initial petition for Writ of Certiorari the Court

entered a Per Curiam Order on December 17, 1960 which

read “The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated

and the case is remanded to that Court for consideration

in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.

539”. (364 U.S. 295, 5 L. Ed. 2d 84). Upon that re-

consideration the Court of Appeals reaffirmed, in a new

opinion, its earlier conclusion that the District Judge

had not erred in finding no unseaworthiness (291 F. 2d

97, 1961 AMC 2194). On a second petition to this Court

Certiorari has again been granted (368 U.S. 816, 7 L. Ed.

2d 23).

This respondent assumes, and it trusts correctly, that the

principal if not the sole concern of this Court on the

present hearing is with the issue of “seaworthiness’”, and

particularly with the contexture of that question which

may be regarded as following from Mitchell v. Trawler

Racer, supra. The instant petition for Writ of Certiorari,

and the petitioners’ brief on the merits, are not so limited

and present as well extended arguments against both re-

spondents rested solely in negligence and against the re-

spondent Cardigan for unseaworthiness founded in negli-

gence.

As the brief for the City of Galveston will have dealt

at length with the fact question of sole concern to it, and

3

described the handling of the grain up to the point of de-

livery into the vessel from the elevator’s spout, those de-

tails and the related arguments will not be repeated in

this brief at any length.

THE ARGUMENT

A. The Facts of the Case

The S/S GRELMARION was a dry-cargo vessel of con-

ventional design and one of a large number of vessels en-

gaged in carrying export grain from the ports of the

United States. On this particular voyage she lifted 161,000 °

bushels of No. 2 yellow corn and 186,000 bushels of No. 1

hard winter wheat for delivery to India, and loaded this

cargo at the large ship-side elevator operated by the re-

spondent City. Prior to loading the GRELMARION was

“fitted-out” for bulk grain in the usual way, with shifting

boards, bins, and feeder boxes, and the ship and these fit-

tings were inspected and approved by a surveyor for the

National Cargo Bureau who certified that they conformed

to the applicable Coast Guard Regulations. (R. pp. 983,

985, and 990; Cardigan Exhibit 3), All bins were found

to be of standard type construction, including the ‘tween

deck bin in which petitioners were working at the time

of the incident in suit (R. p. 985). This bin was formed

by a center-line partition or bulkhead and received its

grain from a feeder-box in the square of the hatch at

one end of the bin. The approximate dimensions of the

bin were 28 feet by 22 feet, and the height 9 feet. (cf.

R. 249-259 and 374-375).

As described by petitioners they would “beam-out”’ this

grain by pulling it away from the feeder-box and into the

further corners of the bins. When they stopped work at

4

noon the bin was approximately three-fourths full and

nothing unusual had happened (R. pp.’ 41-42). After

eating, the petitioners and others re-entered the bin and

signalled for a “shot” of grain from the elevator spout

in order to resume work. As this first shot of new grain

entered their bin the petitioners almost immediately noticed

something was wrong, the first symptom being a burning

or smarting of their eyes which made tears come (cf.

R. pp. 44-46, 279-281). In the words of the gang’s

“pusher” Sheridan:

“Well, in other words, when that grain come in there,

there was something unusual about it. I had never

had the experience of that kind of stuff before, and

I didn’t know what was happening to us.” (R,. 280).

Several points were undisputed, even by the petitioners’

evidence: Until the event last recited this loading had been

without incident related in any way. All prior grain re-

ceived on the ship (and this included almost the entire

cargo) was completely free from noxious odors or | gases

of any kind. No fumigation procedures had been carried

out on the ship either to prepare the ship for her cargo

or during the loading. Whatever the source of any noxious

fumes affecting the petitioners those fumes came directly

off this “shot” of grain as it entered the ship’s bin from

the elevator’s spout.

It was equally undisputed that the GRELMARION and

her fittings were not only usual and standard but were

entirely suitable for the purpose of receiving this cargo

of grain and for the engagement of the petitioners in trim-

ining that cargo. The petitioners own testimony made it

abundantly clear, as the Trial Court found (Finding of

Fact 9, 10, 11, 17 and 18), that absent those gases which

came directly off the grain as it entered the bin this load-

ing operation would have proceeded to a normal and un-

eventtul conclusion.

As both petitions tor Writ of Certiorar: tiled in this

case, and even now the petitioners’ brief on the merits,

make repeated references to the absence of a_blower-

system for ventilation of the cargo bin (ct. Petitioners’

Brief pp. 12, 30) it becomes necessary to point out that

no one, including petitioners and their own witnesses, gave

any testimony to indicate. that “blowers” should have been

used to ventilate such cargo bins during loading, or even

to suggest that it would have been practical to do so.

(R. pp. 63, 107-108, 293-294). Petitioner is in error in

stating (Petitioners’ Brief p. 12) that the Trial Court

did not make any Finding of Fact on the failure of

Cardigan to use blowers to force air into the hatch since

the Court’s Finding of Fact 17 expressly stated ‘While

the GRELMARION cargo spaces were not equipped with

forced ventilation system, I find that only very rarely ‘s

this the case on grain vessels, and that it is not necessary

or customary” (181 F.S. at 206).

To conform this argument to the record it is also neces-

sary to point out that Petitioners’ Brief (at p. 30) again

1 Note as to the Numbering of the Trial Court's Findings of

Fact: In the published report of this case before the District Court

the Findings of Fact relating to liability are numbered consecu-

tively “1” through “18”. However, in some transcription of these

Findings of Fact the number “13” was not used and all para-

graphs subsequent to “12” were given a number one higher than

appropriate. In this brief the Findings of Fact will be referred

to as they appear in the printed report. It is noted that in Peti-

tioners’ Brief the higher number is used, and the references

therein to Finding of Fact “19” are to the Finding of Fact num

bered as “18” in the printed report.

6

has repeated the statements that “Coast Guard books and

literature available to the shipping industry show what

measures should and could be taken in the event of an

occurrence such‘ as occurred here” and tor that reason

Cardigan was under a duty “to provide either torced vent-

lation or blowers tor the very purpose of preventing

asphyxiation and the danger to Petitioners”. These state-

ments are completely without toundation in any testimony

or exhibits offered at the trial and apparently and solely

relate to a manual which libellants’ counsel had in posses-

sion showing ventilation procedures recommended to be

followed when fumigation bad been carried out aboard a

ship. The use of this manual was dropped at the trial since

it was apparent that it related only to that special situation

which was not true on the GRELMARION. A picture ot

a ‘“‘blower-system” taken from the manual was resurrected

as “Appendix G” in the first petition tor Writ of Cer-

tiorari to this Court. While this Respondent contends that

these questioned statements are not only misleading but

are also not properly a part of the Record in this case,

unless these premises are conceded by the Petitioners it 1s

respectfully submitted that this “new evidence” should

be placed before the Court in its entirety so that its lack

of application to the circumstances here can be correctly

evaluated.

A final consideration as to the facts of the case con-

cerns the reference in Petitioners Brief (by emphasis added

at p. 7, and at pp. 12, 20, 21 and 30) which would sug-

gest that the petitioners were asphyxiated because the flow

of grain cut off their supply of oxygen. All of the evi-

dence showed, and the Court found (Finding of Fact 11,

181 F.S. at 205) that this was not the case and that any

damage suffered by the petitioners was an intoxication

caused by the fumes of chloropicrin coming off the grain.

7

B. The Law of the Case

In stating the position of this respondent it 1s assumed

~and understood that a ship may be rendered unseaworthy

by a condition which is only temporary or transitory, and

that the ship-owner’s notice of this condition, either actual

or constructive, is not essential to his liability. However,

the questions remain whether, under the facts of this case,

it should be found that an unseaworthy condition was

present and that this was the cause of, injury.

Whether the GRELMARION and her appurtenances

were “reasonably suited for their intended use” was a ques-

tion resolved by the Trial Judge in these terms:

“(17) I find that the GRELMARION’S cargo spaces

were of customary design and construction; that they

were clean, and in all respects ready to receive the

wheat; and had been surveyed and approved prior to

loading. No fumigation for weevils was made aboard

the vessel, and none was necessary. While the GREL-

MARION’S cargo spaces were not equipped with

forced ventilation systems, I find that only very rarely

is this the case on grain vessels, and that it is not

necessary or customary, I find that the vessel was not

unseaworthy in any respect or particular, and that

her Captain, crew, agent or other representatives were

not negligent in any particular.

(18) The finding heretofore has been made that

the noxious gases and fumes were introduced into the

bin with the last “shot” of grain, and resulted from

a fumigant that had been improperly applied, and

that had adhered to the grain an unusually long period

of time. Under these circumstances, | find that the

admission thereof into the bin of the vessel did not

cause the GRELMARION to become unseaworthy,

the vessel and all its appurtenances being entirely ade-

8

quate and suitable in every respect”. (181 F.S. at 206-

207)

Unlike Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, supra; Grzybowsk:

v. Arrow Barge Co., 283 F. 2d 481 (4th Cir., October

1960); Knox v. United States Lines, 294-F. 2d 354 (3rd

Cir., June 1961), and other cases where a jury’s verdict

has been set aside because the guiding principles were er-

roneously stated, in the instant case there is no indication

that the conclusion of the Trial Judge as to seaworthiness

was rested on faulfy premises. Betitioners’ Proposition 1s

that under the facts here related and as found by the

Trial Court the opposite conclusion was required as a

matter of law. To a considerable extent the einphasis of

that argument is taken from the choice of language used

by the Court of Appesis (in the first hearing of this case,

275 F. 2d 191), particularly:

“This is a case of a happening ‘when the last batch

of wheat came out of the funnels’ instantaneously

rendering unfit quarters which until then bad been,

and, when the funnels cleared away. continued to be

entirely seaworthy.”

These are words which originated with the Court of Ap-

peals and were not words “quoted with approval” from

the District Court as stated by Petitioners’ Brief, at page

16. While under the circumstances they would not appear

to have any significance in the present posture of the case

Judge Hutcheson did clarify his meaning in his second

opinion (291 F. 2d 97) when he elaborated:

“Bere the vessel was af all times staunch and fit for

the service intended, the reception. of grain which

did not contain dangerous chemicals, and since it was

not intended or expected that grain so contaminated

9

would be loaded into the bins, the ship was af all

times seaworthy and fit tor its service of receiving

uncontaminated grain.” (kmphasis added) (291 F.

2d at 98).

In Mitchell the slime and fish gurry which made the

ship’s rail unseaworthy was a normal by-product of the

intended service of the vessel. In the Grzybowsks case the

soap was applied to skids as an aid in handling the cargo

of steel. In the Kuox case the collapse of tiers of burlap

Pl pp eek

in Holley, Admx. v. 8.8. Manfred Stansfield, 186 F.S, 212,

1960 AMC 1956 (E.D. Va. 1960), a case cited in Peti-

tioners’ Brief at pp. 16, 20.

A similar if not identical distinction is readily seen in

the cashew-nut oil cases, Valerio v. American President

Lines, 112 F.S. 202 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) and Anderson v.

Lorentzen, 160 F. 2d 173 (2nd Cir, 1947), cited by Peti-

tioners, since a cashew-nut oil cargo was inherently danger-

ous to those handling it without appropriate precautions.

Of a like characteristic was the carbon tetrachloride used

in the Halecki case (United N.Y & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots

Assn. v. Halecki, 1959, 358 U.S. 613, 3 L. Ed. 2d 541).

In the instant case the Trial Court found, on sufficient

evidence, not only that the direct cause of any injury to

the Petitioners was a vice in the cargo itself, but also that

the presence of this alien gas in the wheat was neither

a normal nor to be forseen characteristic of that cargo.

Petitioners’ Counsel obviously anticipated the dilemma

in which this element of the case would place not only

the theory of negligence but also the theory of unsea-

worthiness since the arguments are here repeated concern-

1 per ars te ;

ing four “similar” incidents of which the parties had

\

10

notice. However, as the Trial Court determined (Findings

of Fact 12 and 16), the last of these incidents was in

1953, some years previous to the incident in suit, and,

unlike the present case of a residue of chioropicrin trom

negligent fumigation at an inland point (Findings of Fact

12, 13 and 14), those previous cases charged negligent

fymigation in the City’s own elevator.

In summary, the Petitioners have not brought themselves

within the specifications for liability which were announced

in the Mitchell case, or which may be found in any other

case in this area of the maritime law. A contrary conclu-

sion could only be reached if the shipowner’s absolute

warranty does extend to the freedom of all cargo from

conditions which might cause injury. This rule has not

been stated in this Court or any other.

Under a separate proposition Petitioners’ Brief urges th

negligence of both respondents for failing to test the grain

between the elevator bins and the ship’s hold so as tw

detect the presence of the injury-causing chloropicrin gas.

The errors in that argument, and in the facts given in

support, have already been noted in some part. No sut-

ficient reason is offered by Petitioners for disturbing the

clear and detailed judgment of the Trial Court on this

issue. On this the Court of Appeals said:

“Careful consideration of, and reflection on, the claims

and arguments of the opposing parties, in the light of

the record and the controlling authorities, leaves us in

no doubt that, as to the charges of negligence, there

is no basis whatever for the attack here upon the

findings as clearly erroneous. . Indeed, we are convinced

that, under an impartial and disinterested view of the

evidence as a whole, the findings are well supported

and wholly reasonable.

—275 F. 2d at 193.

ll

Overall, and with the facts of this case fairly viewed,

the decree for the shipowner fully conformed to the

settled principles of the maritime law, including those

stated in Mitchell. Neither the fact that an accident did

occur, ror that it occurred from a transitory, even in-

stantaneous cause, was sufficient without more, to establish

unseaworthiness as the cause of injury. The vessel and

her appliances remained reasonably fit for the use to which

they were put. No more was required.

Blier v. United States Lines Co., 2d Cir. 1961, 286

F. 2d 920, 1961 AMC 1134, cert. den. 368 U.S.

836, 7 L. Ed. 2d 37;

Hooper v. Terminal S.S. Co., 2d Cir. 1961, 296 F.

2d 281;

Morrell v. United States, 9th Cir.. 1961, 297 F.

2d 662.

CONCLUSION _

For the foregoing reasons jiatamadiles Cardigan Ship-

ping Company, Lxtd., pray that the judgments of the

District Court and the Court of Appeals be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

EASTHAM, WATSON, DALE & FORNEY

CLARENCE S. EASTHAM

EDWARD W. WATSON

—_ De ate aa TN keen

Attorneys for Cardigan

Shipping Company, Ltd.

U.S. Nat’l Bk. Bldg.

Galveston, Texas

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing brief has been mailed this

day of April, 1962 to Arthur J. Mandell, Esq., South Coast

Building, Houston 2, Texas, Attorney for Petitioners, and

to Preston Shirley, Esq., Santa Fe Building, Galveston,

Texas, Attorney for Respondent City of Galveston.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 480.--Ocroper Teka, 1961,

Robert Morales, et al..| Pe Rae? .

5 Mnited States Court of Ap-

,. ae = | peals for the Fifth Cireuit

(ity of Galveston et al!

[June 11, 1962. |

Mr. Jusvice Srewart delivered the opinion of the

Court.

On the afternoon of March 14, 1957, the S. 8. Grel-

marion was berthed at Galveston, Texas, taking on a

cargo of wheat from a pierside grain elevator owned and

operated by the city. The wheat was being loaded

directly from the elevator into the ship by means of a

spout. The petitioners were longshoremen engaged in

“trimming” the wheat as it was received in the off-shore

bin of the vessel's No. 2 hold, which was then about three-

quarters full. A last “shot” of grain was called for and

was released into the bin. The grain in this last shot

had been treated with a chemical insecticide, and the

petitioners were injured by fumes from the chemical,

tnade noxious by concentration in the closely contined

area where they were working.

The petitioners brought the present suit against the

City of Galveston and the owner of the vessel to recover

for their injuries.’ Their claim was predicated upon the

negligence of the city and the shipowner, and upon the

unseaworthiness of the ship. After an extended trial.

the Distriet Court entered judgment for the respondents.

' Petitioners of course received compensation and medical treatment

under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act

33 U.S.C. $901 et seq. 181 F. Supp., at 207.

2 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.

based upon detailed findings of fact, 181 F. Supp. 202, and

the Court,of Appeals affirmed, 275 F. 2d 191. On certio-

rari (364 U. S. 295) we vacated the judgment and

remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for considera-

tion in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362

U.S. 539, which had been decided in the interim. That

court, one judge dissenting, was of the view that Mitchell

was inapplicable to the facts of the present case, and

again affirmed the District Court's judgment, 291 F. 2d

97. We granted certiorari to consider a seemingly sig-

nificant question of admiralty law. 368 U. S. 816.

The factual issues bearing upon the alleged negligence

of the city and shipowner were determined in their favor

by the District Court. Specifically, the court found that

the city had not itself applied the fumigant to the grain

in question, and that neither of the respondents knew, or

in the exercise of reasonable care could have known, that

the grain had been improperly fumigated at an inland

point by someone else.?- Even a cursory examination of

“14. 1 find that neither of the respondents knew, or in the exer-

cise of reasonable care should have known, that this quantity of

grain, which had been improperly treated with an excessive amount

of fumigant, was in the elevator or loaded aboard the Grelmarion.

and that (for all the evidence shows here) the respondent city, 1p

the operation of its elevator, had never received knowledge of a prior

instance where chloropicrin or other fumigants applied at inland ele-

vators had adhered to the grain sufficiently long as to present danger

after receipt by the elevator.

“15. I find that the respondent city was not negligent in failing to

know or learn of the presence of this quantity of grain within it-

elevator, in failing to make some additional inspection therefor, or in

any other particular. The record shows without dispute that careful

and painstaking inspections and examinations were made under gov-

ernmental authority when the grain was received, and again as it was

disbursed by the elevator, which in the present instance failed ts

detect the presence of the remaining traces of fumigant in this quan

tity of grain. I find that had additional inspections been made by

MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON. 3

the lengthy record shows that these findings were based

upon substantial evidence. They were re-examined and

affirmed on appeal... We cannot say that they were

clearly erroneous. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S.

19, 20-21.

Of greater significance in this litigation is the issue

which prompted our remand to the Court of Appeals for

reconsideration. Briefly stated, the question is whether,

upon the facts as found by the District Court, it was error

to hold that the Grelmarion was seaworthy at the time

the petitioners were injured.‘

In the Mitchell case, supra, we reversed a judgment

for the defendant, because the District Court and the

Court of Appeals had mistakenly imported concepts of

the respondent city, there is no reason to believe that such inspections

would have been more successful.

“17. I find that the Grelmarion’s cargo spaces were of customary

design and construction; that they were clean, and in all respects

ready to receive the wheat; and had been surveved and approved

prior to loading. No fumigation for weevils was made aboard the

vessel, and none was necessary... . I find... that her Captain,

crew, agent, or other representatives were not negligent in any partic-

ular.” 181 F. Supp. 202, at 206-207.

*“Careful consideration of, and reflection on, the claims and argu-

ments of the opposing parties, in the light of the reeord and the con-

trolling authorities, leaves us in no doubt that, as to the eharges of

negligence , there is no basis whatever for the attack here upon

the findings as cleary erroneous. Indeed, we are convinced tuat,

under an impartial and disinterested view of the evidence as a whole,

the findings are well supported and wholly reasonable.” 275 F. 2d,

at 193.

‘The District Court and the Court of Appeals, without discussion,

proceeded upon the assumption that the petitioners belonged to the

class to whom the respondent shipowner owed the duty of providing

4 seaworthy vessel. This was correct. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierach.

328 U.S. 85; Pope & Talbot, Inc.>v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406.

4 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.

common-law negligence inte an action for unseaworthi-

ness. There the jury had erroneously been instructed

that liability for unseaworthiness could attach only if the

alleged unseaworthy condition was “there for a reason-

ably long period of time so that a shipowner ought to

have seen that it was removed.” ° The Court of Apveals

had affirmed on the theory that, at least as to an unsea-

worthy condition that arises during the progress of the

voyage, the shipowner’s obligation “is merely to see that

reasonable care is used under the circumstances .

incident to the currection of the newly arisen defect.”

It was alleged in that case that a ship’s rail which was

habitually used as a means of egress to the dock was ret-

dered unseaworthy by the presence of slime and gurr®.

We did not decide the issue, but reversed for a new trial

under proper criteria, holding that the shipowner’s actual

or constructive knowledge of the unseavorthy condition is

not essential to his liability, and that he has an absolute

duty “to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably

fit for their intended use.” 362 U.S., at 550.

In the present ease the Court of Appeals was of the

view that the trial judge’s determination of the Grel-

marion’s seaworthiness at the time the petitioners were

injured was in no way inconsistent with our decision in

the Mitchell case. We agrée. The District Judge did

not, as in Mitchell, hold that unseaworthiness liability

depends atpon-the~shipowner’s actual or constructive

knowledge. He did not, as in Mitchell, indicate that

liability may be excused if an unseaworthy condition is

merely temporary. Rather, as the Court of Appeals

pointed cut, the trier of the faets found, upon substantial

evidence, that “the cause of the injury was not any defect

in the ship but the fact that the last shot of grain which

° 362 U.S., at 540-541, n. 2.

"265 F.2d 426, 432.

MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON. 5

was being loaded was eontaminated 2.0. 0° PUL F.2d

at OS.

The trial court found, upon substantial evidence, that

What happened was an unexpected, isolated oecurrence.

Several years before there had been three. or perhaps

four, ‘neidents involving Injury te longshoreinen from

grain stich had been fumigated by the city itself. But

at the time the present case arose the city had adopted a

series of safety and inspection measures which miade

completely innocuous the grain which it fumigated, and

“vast quantities of wheat and other grains had been

loaded through the elevator, some eight to ten percent

of which had been fumigated by the city, without similar

incident in recent years.” * ‘Rhe court found that the

fumes in the present case came from “chloropierin, an

insecticide which had never been used by the respondent

city.” * |

here. Under these circumstances we cannot sav that

it was error for the court to rule that the absence of a

forced ventilation system in the hold did hot Constitute

unseaworthiness.”

A vessel's unseaworthiness might arisefrom anv num

ber of individualized circumstances. Her gear might be

" IS] F. Supp., at 205.

* Lhid.

2... While the Grelmanon’s eargo spaces were not equip

with forced ventilation systems, I find that only v: ry rarely is thi

Cise on grain vesseis, and that it is not necessary OF CUSTOMIAL

“The finding heretofore has been made that the noxious gases and

fumes were introduced into the bin with the last ‘shot’ of gram. ond

resulted from a fumigant that had been improperly appled, and that

hud adhered to the grain an unusually long pemod of time. Under

these circumstances, I find that the admission thereof into the hin

vi the vessel did net cause thi Grelmarion to become unseaworths

‘he vessel and all its appurtenances bemg entirely equate and suit

‘ble in every respect.” 1S] F. Supp., at 206-207

wee

The petitioners question none of these findings |

6 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.

defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her crew unfit

The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its

stowage, might be improper. Mahnich v. Southern S. s

Co., 321 U.S. 96; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. =

85; Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, gl U. S. 406; Alaska

Steamship Co. v. Petterson, 347 U. S. 396; Rogers v

United States Lines, 347 U. 8. 984; peu v. Lykes

Bros. S. S. Co., 348 U.S. 336; Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser

358 U.S. 423: Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., v. Eller-

man Lines, Ltd., 369 U. S. 355. For any or all of thes:

reasons, or others, a vessel might not be reasonably fi!

for her intended service. What caused injury in the pres-

ent case, however, was not the ship, its appurtenances, 0!

its crew, but the isolated and completely unforeseeah|«

introduction of a noxious agent from without. The trier

of the facts ruled, under proper criteria, that the Gre’-

marion was not in any manner unfit for the service to

which she was to be put, and we cannot say that hi

determination was wrong.

Affirmed

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER took no pert 9 in the consi:

eration or decision of this case.

eS

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 480. fee Tere, 1061.

Robert Morales, et al.

Petitioners.

,

‘Tila Wed cf Cestineats in the

United States Court of Ap-

i ; | peals for the Fifth Cireuit

Citv of Galveston et al.

{June 11, 1962. |

Mr. Justice Dovcias, with whom THe Cuter Jverics

and Mr. Justice Black coneur, dissenting.

The Distriet Court found that the libellants were

injured in 1957 as a result of a release into the held of a

“shot” of grain that completely closed the hatch opening,

which was the only source of ventilation for the hold «.

which they were working. This grain had been treated

bv ehemicals for weevil infestation: and the noxious

fumes from those chemicals injured libellants.

The vessel's cargo spaces were not equipped with a

foreed ventilation system. Cirain vessels, the District

Court found, rarely are so equipped; and it eoneluded

that foreed ventilation is “not necessary or customary.”

If this were an isolated instance of fumigated grain

releasing nexious gases, no claim of unseaworthiness eould

be maintained. But this was not an isolated instance.

Of the wheat loaded through this elevator. some & to 10%

was fumigated by the city. Wheat is commonly furi-

gated either in the elevators or in railroad ears. Whe,

the fumigant is properly applied. the gases and fumes are

dissipated so as not to be dangerous or harmful after 24

to 48 hours. The Distriet Court found, however. that te

the knowledge of the owners of the vessel several recent

incidents like that in the present case had oeeurred. in

Galveston, causing injury to longshoremen—one in 1940.

one in 1950, two in 1953

2 MORALES v. CITY OF GALVESTON.

A vessel without a forced ventilation system would tx

seaworthy if this mjury were an unexpected, isolated

occurrence. But Lagree with Judge Rives of the Court of

Appeals that the vessel and her appurtenances were jot

“reasonably fit for their intended use” (291 F. 24 97, 09

where up to 10% of the grain loaded from this elevate:

was fumigated and where the owners had knowledge ot

like accidents. One “intended service” of this vessel wa-

therefore, the loading of fumigated grain whieh in the pas!

had given off noxious fumes. Unseaworthiness by rease:

of the absence of a forced ventilation system is cleare:

here than it was in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Ine. 302

U.S. 539, where temporary slime and gurry on the ship -

rail rendered it unseaworthy. The unseawortha cord:

tion in the present case had no such teniporary spat

What happened here shows that the vessel was unses

worthy whenever fumigated grain was being loaded

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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