Transcript of Record — Griggs v. Allegheny County

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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

Supreme Court of the United States -

OCTOBER TERM, 1961

No. 81

THOMAS N. GRIGGS, PETITIONER,

2

vs.

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

>

>

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED APRIL 18, 1961

CERTIORARI GRANTED JUNE 5, 1961

“

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1961

No. 81

THOMAS N. GRIGGS, PETITIONER,

“ vs.

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY

¥

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ,

\

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

INDEX

Original Print

Record from the Court of Common Pleas of Alle-

gheny County, Commonwealth of espe

Petition for appointment of Viewers —...._____. 4 1

Order of court appointing Board of Vie iewers - 13 7

Order of court instructing Board of Viewers — Be A 15 9

Amendment to = for appointment of ~

Viewett 2560 Mee & eet § dee 18 11

Order of court approving ; amendment te petition

for.appointment of Viewers ___. aaa Sire 19 12

Proceedings before the Board of Viewers . 20 12

Transcript of testimony —.—._____________.. 20 12

Dc Ee 20

Offers in qvidente icatleeiiiariicte Lscieac Nica giamionmiseieries 20 12

Excerpts from testimony of Thomas: N. >

ee Grete a 49 ----16

Report of Viewers 193 .28

Exhibit 1—Plaintiff’s request tor findings of

fact and conelusion of law 208 38

Exhibit 2—Defendant’s proposed findings of

fact and conclusions of law for considera-

tion of the Board of Viewers —_..__ 218 45

Recorp Press, Printers, New York, N. Y., Juty 24, 1961

Record from the Court of Common Pieas of Alle-

gheny County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

—Continued

Proceedings before the Board of Viewers—Con-

tinued

Report of Viewers—Continued.

Exhibit 3—Plaintiff’s exceptions to prelimi-

nary report of Board of Viewers

Exhibit ~4—Defendant’s exceptions to award

of Board of Viewers _____ Sone

Order of court of May 29, 1958

Exceptions of plaintiff to report of Board of

Viewers

Exceptions of defendant to report of Board of

Viewers

Opinion, Soffel, J.

Order referring matter back to Board of Viewers

Supplemental report of Board of Viewers __..__

Order of court dismissing exceptions to report of

Board of Viewers

Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania, Western District i

Docket entries in Case No. 155 _.. pt SEER

Docket entries in Case No. 158

Opinion, Jones, Ch. J.

Dissenting opinion, Bell, J.

Clerk’s certificate (omitted in printing) _._.___

Amendment to Grant Agreement between the

United States and the County of Allegheny,

Pennsylvania (excerpt from the Supplemental

brief and appendix filed by the County of Alle-

gheny, etc.)

Order allowing certiorari

Original Print

226 50

228 52

229 53

231 54

233 55

236 58

257 71

258 72

263 75

265 76

221 76

321 76

323 78

325 80

333 87

347 99

349 =: 100

362 108

a nrc» AD.

[fol. 1]

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS -

OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ,

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

County of Allegheny, ss.:

No. 2384—July Term 1958

Tuomas N. Griaes

v.

#4

i]

County or ALLEGHENY

[fol. 4]

Petition ror APPOINTMENT OF VieEwERS—Filed May 29, 1958

To the Honorable, The Judges of said Court:

The petition of Thomas N. Griggs respectfully repre-

sents:

First: That he was on May 31, 1952, and for some period

of time prior and subsequent to said date, the owner of a

certain tract of real estate in the Township of Moon,

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, described as follows:

ALL that certain tract of land situate in the Township

of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows:

BEGINNING at the intersection of the Macadam

Road, known as the Coraopolis Road, with the West-

erly line of property now or formerly of Witfiam

McClinton Heirs, and running thence by the center of

said Coraopolis Road South 65° 26’ West Five Hun-

dred Twenty-three (523) fé@§ to the center of a Ma-

cadam Road known as the Beaver Grade Road; thence

by the same North 21° 9 West Fifty-five and 53/100

(55.53) feet to’ a point; thence by the same North

15° 41’ West Four Hundred Twenty and one-half

(420-14) tink. a point; thence by the same North

26° 29 West Six Hundred Sixty-one and 14/100

(661.14) feet to a point; thence by the same North

(fol. 5] 38° 31’ West Three Hundred’ Fifty-seven and

84/100 (357.84) feet to the center of road known as

the Thorn Rffm Road; thence by said Road North

54° 51’ East Three Hundred Seventy and 93/100

(370.93) feet to-a point; thence by ‘the.same North

47° 27’. East Three Sixteen and one-half

(316-4) feet to line of land now or formerly of Wil-

liam McClinton Heirs aforesaid; and thence by said

McClinton land South 21° East Sixteen Hundred Forty-

eight (1648) feet to the place of beginning.

CONTAINING 19.161 acres.

HAVING erected thereon a two-story stone dwelling

house, a-frame dwelling house and outbuildings.

Second: The defendant owns certain real estate in said

Moon Township upon which it erected, maintains and oper-

ates the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The said Greater

Pittsburgh Airport was opened for commercial use on, to

wit, June 1, 1952, and has been in continuoug-use since

that time as an air terminal for the transportation for hire

of passengers and cargo by air carriers and will continue

to be so used.

Third: The defendant has entered into a lease with each

of the airlines using said airport whereby, for certain ~

considerations unknown to plaintiff, the airlines are granted

{fol. 6] the right of ingress and egress to and from said

airport; said lessees of the defendant being the Trans

World Airlines, Inc., Eastern Airlines, Inc., Northwest

Airlines, Inc., Capital Airlines, The Allegheny Airlines,

Lake Central Airlines and later the United Airlines and

the American Airlines.

Fourth: The defendant erected and maintains neces-

sary facilities of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport three (3)

runways for airplanes, being the East-West runway, the

Northeast-Southwest runway and the Northwest-South.

Ya

3

east runway. The Northeast-Southwest runway is so erected

and inaintained that it points directly towards plaintiff's

premises described in Paragraph First hereof at a distance

of about one-half mile therefrom.

Fifth: From the opening of the Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port for commercial use, to wit, June 1, 1952, the aircraft

of the several airlines under certain weather conditions

take off at the extreme Northeast end of the said North-

east-Southwest runway towards plaintiff’s property, and,

in landing, glide low over plaintiff's property in order to

land at the extreme Northeast end of said runway.

Sixth: The aircraft of the several airlines landing upon

or taking off from the Northeast runway, descend thereto

or ascend therefrom over plaintiff’s property below the

[fol. 7] safe navigable airspace as fixed and established by

the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to the Acts of

Congress for such case made and provided and as con-

curred in by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Authority. The

said safe navigable airspace begins in rural areas, at five

hundred (500) feet above the ground or above any building

erected thereon, and in copgested areas at one thousand

(1000) feet therefrom.

Seventh: From the opening of the biceiee Pittsburgh

Airport and the beginning of the use of the Northeast-

Southwest runway, to wit, June 1, 1952, there have been

continued flights of aircraft over the aforesaid described

property of plaintiff in landing at and taking off from the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport. That said flights were and

are below the safe navigable airspace as specified by the

-Civil Aeronautics Board, namely five hundred (500) feet,

and were and are at low levels and close to the property

aforesaid.

Eighth: That by reason of said low flights the property

of the plaintiff was and is greatly damaged and depre-

ciated in value; that the use and enjoyment of the property

have been interfered with by reason of the possible danger

of the low flights, the noise and vibrations which they cause,

their lights pointing at the premises at night time and inter-

ference with sleep and rest.

Ninth: The property of the plaintiff as herein described

is within the “approach zone” as specified in the Zoning

{fol. 8] Regulations of the defendant adopted January 4,

1954 by authority of the Airport Zoning Act of the Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania 2 P.S. 1550-1563, which reads

in part as follows:

“In any case in which (1) it is desired to remove,

lower or otherwise terminate a nonconforming struc-

ture, or use, or (2) the approach protection necessary

cannot, because of constitutional limitations, be pro-

vided by airport zoning regulations under this act, or

(3) it appears advisabl¢é that the necessary approach

protection be provided by acquisition of property

rights, rather than by airport zoning regulations, the

political subdivision within which the property or non-

conforming (sic) is located, or the political subdivision

owning the airport, or served by it, may acquire by pur-

chase, grant or condemnation, in the manner provided

by the law, under which political subdivisions are au-

thorized to acquire real property for public purposes,

such air right avigation easement, or other estate or

interest in the property or nonconforming, structure,

or use in question, as may be necessary to effectuate

the purpose of this act.”

Tenth: The property of the plaintiff is within the glide

angle plane for the said Northeast-Southwest runway,

which glide angle plane is in the “appreach zone” and

{fol.9] is a trapezoidal plane; that-is to say, the ghde

angle plane starts ait the Northeast end of the paved por-

tion of the Northeast-Southwest runway at a level of the

paving and thence slopes upward at the rate of one (1)

foot vertically for each forty (40) feet horizontally for

such distance as may be within the limits of the so-called

approach zone. The said glide angle’ plane as located on

plaintiff's premises is below the “floor” of the navigable

airspace as so prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Board

and concurred in by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Au-

thority. The center line of said glide angle plane is near

the house erected thereon and that the bottom of said

°

5

plane is about fifteen (15) to thirty (30) feet. above the

chimney.

‘Eleventh: Immediately after the Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port was opened for commercial use, to wit, June 1, 1952,

and the low flights over plaintiff's property began, the

plaintiff, and other property owners in the area whose

properties were similarly affected, made demand upon

defendant to make just compensation for the damage either

by agreement or by condemnation as provided for in the

statute above quoted in part.

Twelfth: Defendant in response to such demand denied

that it was or is liable for the damage caused by the low

flights and has failed and refused to pass the necessary

resolution for the condemnation of the avigation easements

[{fol. 10] necessary for egress and ingress to said airport

with consequent payment of damages.

Thirteenth: The airlirn@s likewise having denied liability,

your plaintiff entered an action in equity at No. 1288

October Term, 1955 in the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County wherein he named the defendant County

and the several airlines as parties defendant and made

demand that said defendants be required to compensate for

the damage or that tne low flights over his property be

enjoined.

Fourteenth: The aforesaid suit and companion suits of

other property owners similarly affected have been before

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on preliminary and

procedural questions. While no final determination has

been made of said suits and they are still pending, the

Supreme Court has clearly stated that in those proceedings

the Court of Common‘Pleas of Allegheny County sitting

in equity cannot award damages consequential or otherwise

for property taken, injured or destroyed as a necessary

and unavoidable consequence of the construction and oper-

ation of the airport by Allegheny County for public use

under statutory authority.

Fifteenth: The defendant in its Answer filed subsequent

to the opinion of the Supreme Court entered May 23, 1955

at 382 Pa. page 88, asserts that the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport is a public improvement constructed and main-

{fol. 11] tained by defendant to provide airport and air

transport facilities for the use of the general public and

is one of the major facilities of the commercial and civilian

transportation system of the United States, and is a major

instrumentality in the commerce and postal system.

Sixteenth; The airlines serving the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport, in their Answer filed after the opinion of the

Supreme Court aforesaid, assert that to enable the public

to have facilities for air transport of passengers and

cargo, which facilities are necessary for the functioning of

the airport, it is necessary that airplanes enter and leave

the airport by passing through the airspace above the

plaintiff’s property below five hundred (500) feet.

Seventeenth: Defendant County likewise asserts that

such flights over plaintiff’s property below five hundred

(500) feet are necessary for egress and ingress to said

airport.

Eighteenth: That the dwelling house on said property

was occupied by your petitioner and his family from 1944,

and subsequent thereto, and that there are no ofher parties

in interest.

Nineteenth: There are no liens or mortgages affecting

plaintiff’s property.

Twentieth: .Based upon the aforementioned assertion

of the defendant and the airlines serving the Greater

{fol. 12] Pittsburgh Airport in their Answers filed in the

said suit and the location of plaintiff’s property on the

glide angle of the Northeast runway of said Greater

Pittsburgh Airport, plaintiff avers that as a necessary and

unavoidable consequence of the operation of the Greater

Pittsburgh Airport, the defendant, by reason of its right

of eminent domain, has im fact appropriated for public use

avigation rights or easements over and across plaintiff's

property for the purpose of providing access to the airport

by the planes of the airlines.

Bowes de

7

Wherefore your petitioner prays that your Honorable

Court appoint a Board of Viewers in the manner provided

by law and direct that: j

>=

1. The Board of Viewers shall, in limine, determine

whether the erection and operation of.the Greater Pitts-

burgh Airport beginning on June 1, 1952 with consequent

necessary and unavoidable use of the airspace over and

across plaintiff’s property below the safe navigable air-

space for the purpose of egress and ingréss to and from

said Greater. Pittsburgh Airport constituted in fact an

appropriation or “taking” by the defendant of an avigation

easement over said property;

2. After the litigation as to the determination of the

question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1. is finally

“decided by the Beard of Viewers, or by a court of fixal

{fol. 13] jurisdiction in the@ase, such determination shall

be conclusive upon the parties ; :

3. Should the Board of Viewers determine that there

was an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant, then

it shall ascertain and award just compenSation to your

petitioner for the damage’ to his property arising out of

such condemnation by the defendant.

And Your Petitioner Will Ever Pray, Ete. |

Thomas N. Griggs, By William A. Blair, Attorney

in Fact.

Ix tHe Covpr or Common P:=as

Orper or Court Apporxtixc Boarp or ViEwERsS—

May 29, 1958

And Now, to wit, this 29th day of May, 1958, on motion

of William A. Blair and David B. Faweett, Attorneys for

petitioner, the Court appoints Thomas P. Trimble, Jr.,

Thomas M. Conrad and Paul G. McAtee, as a Board of

Viewers upon the foregoing Petition and further orders

that the Board of Viewers perform its duties in accord-

ance with the law and Acts of Assembly in such case made

8

and provided ; View - Tuesday, June 24, 1958 - 10 A.M.

o’clock D.S.T., Returnable - First Monday, March, 1959;

And Further:

It appearing to the Court that there are differences of

opinion as to whether Thomas N. Griggs is entitled to

[fol. 14] collect damages described in the Petition for

Appointment of VieWers; and

It further appearing that if all the questions involved

in this case are to be decided at the same time, the Board

of Viewers would be unduly burdened by the evidence so

that it would be required to hear testimony that would

ultimately be ruled irrelevant.

It Is Therefore Ordered and Decreed:

1. The Board of Viewers Shall, in limine, determine

whether the erection and operation of the Greater Pitts-

burgh Airport by the defendant beginning on June 1, 1952

with consequent necessary and unavoidable use of the air-

space over and across the aforesaid described property

“below the safe navigable airspace for the purpose of in-

gres¢ and egress to and from said Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port constituted in fact an appropriation or “taking” by

the defendant of an avigation easement over said property;

_ 2. After the litigation as to the determination of the

question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1. is final

decided by the Board of Viewers, or hy a court of

jurisdiction in the case, such determination shail be con-

clusive upon the parties as to whether there was such

appropriation or “taking” by the defendant;

3. Should the Board of Viewers determine that there

was an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant, then

[fol. 15] it shall ascertain and award just compensation to

the plaintiff for the damage to his property arising out of

such condemnation by thé’ defendant.

By the Court, Weiss.

In tHE Court or Common PLEas

Orper oF Court Instructine Boarp or ViEwERS—

June 19, 1958

And now, to-wit, this 19th day of June, 1958 it appearing

to the Court that on May 2%, 1958, this Court entered the

following order: ,

“Anp now, to wit, this 29th-day of May, 1958, on

motion of William A. Blair and David B. Faweett,

Attorneys for petitioner, the Court appomts Thomas

¥ Trimble, Jr., Thomas M. Conrad and Paul G. Me-

Atee as a Board ot Viewers upon the foregoing Peti-_

tion and further orders that the Board of Viewers per- _

form its duties in accordance With the law and Acts

of Assembly in such case made and provided. View

Tuesday, June 24, 1958—10:00 A.M. Returnable Ist

Monday in March, 1959.

: “Axp FURTHER

“It appearing to the Court that there are differences

of opinion as to whether Thomas N. Griggs is entitled

[fol. 16] to collect damages-described in the Petition

for Appointment of Viewers; and

“It further appearing that if all the questions in-

‘volved in this case are to be decided at the same time,

the Board of+¢ Viewers would be unduly. burdened by

the evidence sc that it would be required to hear testi-

mony that would ultimately be ruled irrelevant.

a

“It Is THEREFORE ORDERED aND DeEcreeED: “

°o

“1. The Board of Viewers shall, in limine, deter-

mine whether the erection and operation of the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport by the defendant begin-

ning June 1, 1952 with consequent necessary and un-

avoidable use of the airspace over and across the

afgresaid described property below the safe navigable

airspace for the purpose of ingress and egress to and

from said Greater Pittsburgh Airport constituted in

10

fact an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant of

an avigation easement over said property;

“2. After the litigation as to the determination of

the question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1., is

finally decided by the Board of Viewers, or by a court

of final jurisdiction in the case, such determination

shall be conclusive upon the parties as to whether there

was such appropriation or “taking” by the defendant;

{fol.17}] “3. Should the Board of Viewers determine

that there was an appropriation or “taking” by the

defendant, then it shall ascertain and award just

compensation to the plaintiff for the damage to his

property arising out of such condemnation by the de-

fendant.

BY tHe Court

s/ Weiss, J.”

and it further appearing to the Court that in order that

there be a prompt adjudication of the matters in dispute

that the proceedings follow the ordinary and usual course:

Now, therefore it is ordered and decreed that the Order

entered May 29, 1958 be and the same is hereby vacated

and it is further ordered and decreed that the following

order be and the same is hereby entered:

.. There is hereby appointed by this Court from the mem-

bers of the permanent Board of Viewers appointed by law

Thomas P. Trimble, Thomas M. Conrad and Paul G.

McAtee as viewers in the matter within mentioned, and the

said viewers are hereby ordered and directed to meet upon

the line of the improvement and view the same and the

‘premises affected thereby on Tuesday, the 24th day of

June, 1958, at 10:00 o’clock A.M., E.D.S.T.; to hold such

meetings as are necessary and hear all parties and wit-

nesses in relation thereto and decide and true report make

[{fol. 18] ‘concerning all matters and things submitted in

relation to which they are authorized to inquire as directed

by Acts of Assembly in such cases made and provided;

the said viewers to give all parties notice as required by

a

11

Acts of Assembly and rules of this Court, and file a

report in this Court on or before the Ist Monday of

March, 1959, unless the time is hereaftercextended.

By the Court

W.

In tHe Court or Common PLEas

AMENDMENT 80 PETITION FOR Arromrrusut oF VIEWERS-—

Filed Janyary 15, 1959

To the Honorable, the Judges of Said Court:

And now, comes the petitioner, Thomas N. Griggs, and

moves the Court that he may be permitted to amend Para-

graph Twentieth of the Petition for Appointment of View-

ers filed in the above proceeding to read as #eHows:

Twentieth: Based upon the aforementioned asser-

tion of the defendant and the airlines serving the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport in their Answers filed in

the said suit and the location of plaintiff's property

- on the glide angle of the Northeast runway of said

Greater Pittsburgh Airport, plaintiff avers that as a

[fol.19] necessary and unavoidable consequence of

‘the operation of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, the

defendant, by reason of its right of eminent domain,

for the purpose of providing access to the airport by

aircraft of the airlines, has in fact appropriated for

public use an easement or fee simple interest in the

airspace over plaintiff’s property necessary for such

purpose.

Thomas N. Griggs, Petitioner.

12

~ Is tHe Court or Common PLEas

Orper oF Court ApprRoviInc AMENDMENT TO PETITION FOR

APPOINTMENT oF ViEwers—January 16, 1959

And now, to wit, this 16th day of January, 1959, the

foregoing Petition to amend the original Petition for

Appointment of Viewers having been presented in open

Court, and hearing had thereon, and upon consideration

thereof, the amendment is approved and ordered to be filed.

By the Court

ae

[fol. 20]

Proceepincs Berore THE Boarp oF VIEWERS

Transcript of Testimony—Filed July 15,-1959

VIeweERs: ~

Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Esquire |

Thomas M. Conrad ae

Paul G. McAtee

APPEARANCES

William A. Blair, Esquire, David B. Fawcett, Esquire,

Counsel for plaintiff.

Maurice A. Louik, Esquire, John W. Mamula, Esquire

Counsel for County of Allegheny.

Heagrxo Date—January 26, 1959

Orrers 1n EvipENce__

Mr. Blair: May I offer in evidence Deed for the purpose

of showing title only, of Mabelle R. McMahon, widow, to

Thomas N. Griggs, dated the 22nd day of January, 1945,

covering certain property, as will later be described, in

the Township of Moon, and recorded in Deed Book Volume

2827, page 386. If your Honors please, when we visited the

Airport with the County and I believe Mr. Conrad was

° 13

also present, they made available to use there certain

maps which I think are necessary in the determination of

the various facts relating to the problem before this Court.

We will offer this general map in evidence as Exhibit “B”

which shows locations—

[fol.21}] Mr. Louik: If you tell us what date you are con-

cerned with we will be able to furnish master plans as

of prior dates.

Mr. Blair: I don’t know that that is very material.

Mr. Louik: This is a master plan as of 1957.

Mr. Blair: Shows no change with respect to ‘the north-

east-southwest runway from the time the Airport opened?

Mr. Louik: That is right. ,

4 Blair: We offer in evidence Exhibit “C” which is a

prmt showing the approach zone from the northeast run-

way and which includes the Griggs property as well as that

of K. C. Gardner, each of which is located within the

approach zone as shown on that map. This map also shows

the elevations of the houses and the center line of the

approaeh zone.

“ Mr. Faweett: ‘T. is m~p is marked as the approach zone

and glide angle of *’ - northeast runway and it is dated

October 9, 1953.

Mr. Biair: I will offer this plan in evidence and it is

agreed by Counsel for the County and the plaintiff that

there has been no change in the glide angle or approach

zone since the opening of the Airport for commercial pur-

poses in June of 1952. We offer/in evidence Exhibit “D”

which is a sketch of the northeast glide angle from the end

[fol. 22] of the northeast runway showing the glide angle

over the Griggs property @nd ground elevation as well as

the elevation of the house on the property. I asked for the

Airport Zoning Ordinance. Do you have it?

Mr. Louik: If the Court please, we have all these papers

available and we will bring them over upon request.

Mr. Trimble: The zone map as it is called as well as the

zoning regulations.

Mr. Blair: I offer plaintiff’s Exhibit “E” being an Air-

port Zoning Regulation of the County of Allegheny, Penn-

sylvania.

\ ye

J

VY

14 .

Mr. Mamula: We object to the offer of the Airport

Zoning Ordifance as being immaterial in connection with

the present socegsae-

Mr. Trimble: ere will have to be a further reason

than immateriality. I am not going to sustain an objection

on immateriality. You will have to be specific.

Mr. Mamula: Objected to for the reason that the Air-

port Zoning is not to be construed as a basis for the taking

of any private property in and about the Airport insofar

as the restrictions on use. It has no bearing in the pro-

ceeding before this Board.

Mr. Trimble: Might the zoning map which is part of the

zoning regulations itself be construed as in any way, shape

{fol. 23] or form fixing a metes and bounds over this

property to such an extent that it might be considered an

easement? .

Mr. Mamula: The question of the type, the frequency

and the number of flights that go over the property of the

plaintiff is the issue at hand and whether such flights, the

type, nature and their frequency constitutes a taking is, I

think, the mandate to this Board to determine that only

and not as to whether or not‘there is some restriction on

use insofar as height or type of stri ‘ture that can be

erected on plaintiff's property, which is a separate and

distinct principle. Isn’t that what we are doing here—

that the issue has been remanded to your Board to make

certain findings that will determine the quantum of the

take, the nature of the take, if any, over what property,

and the date of the taking—all of which is to be the result

of the compilation of data and testimony here so that you

ean teil the type, nature and the frequency of flight. Enact-

ing an Ordinance doesn’t constitute any of the elements—

the factual elementz that I understood this proceeding to

embrace.

Mr. Trimble: Up to this moment. I am going to admit

it and I will rule on it later. I want to see what has been

done by the County.

Mr. Blair: I think the Board has a mandate from the

Supreme Court to determine everything that has been done

in connection with the Airport situation and the Zoning

15

[fol. 24] Ordinance is very pertinent to that as it assumes

dominance over airspace within those zones as shown on

the zoning map.

Mr. Trimble: I just jet it in. We will rule later as to

whether or not it is material.

Mr. Louik: I'd like to add one thing. The zoning regu-

lations do only one thing. They limit certain uses and

they limit the certain heights of structures. Now, if the

plaintiff is intending that we took the property by reason

of the adoption of the zoning regulations I think he is im-

properly before this Court. That weuld invalidate the zon-

ing regulations and the proper procedure would have been

an attack upon the zoning reguiations. If that is not the

basis then the uses—the } tion of the uses of this

property has nothing to do witthis case.

Mr. Blair: It does have directly because the zoning ordi-

nance was issued for ihe purpose of providing safe access

in and out of the Airport by the airplanes which use the

Airpert, and the County has undertaken to prescribe those

regulations, what may or may net be done within those

particular zones leading to the runways.

Mr. Louik: is nO’ more pertinent than the City

zoning regulations limiting the residences that may be

so constructed. It is not an issue before this Board.

{fol.25] Mr. Trimble: We may so find when we come to

that point. We are net ¢ ing to rule on it now.

Mr. Blair: I offer als» as Exhibit “F” the zoning map

of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport.

Mr. Mamula: We enter the same objection to the zoning

map as we did to the zoning ordinance and for thesame

reason.

Mr. Trimble: 1 will rule Jateg-on it. We are guing to

get everything into this thing so we can have on: hearing

and one hearing only. The Board will make the rulings

later.

Mr. Blair: If your Honors please, we asked the County

to furnish lease agreements with the air lines relating to

the use of the Airport. .

Mr. Trimble: The County has informed the Board they

would do it when they were requested and I am sure they

will.

a

Mr. Blair: I ask that they be produced.

Mr. Louik: So as not to clutter up this record we have

identical agreements with all of the air ines. Do you want

us to bring all of the agreements or will one agreement be

sufficient?

Mr. Blair: Was it a uniform agreement with all of

them? .

Mr. Louik: It is a uniform agreement with all of the

air lines which were entered into either in June of 1952

or subsequently when the new air lines came and we have

{fol.26} a renewal of that agreement in °57. We can

bring one agreement that was entered into in 1952 and fol-

low it up with an agreement when it ran out in June of —

1957.

Mr. Fawcett: Were the agreements for five year pe-

riods? 4

Mr. Louik: The air lines that were there.

(Off the record discussion. )

Mr. Biair: If your Honors please, we also ask to be

produced at the present time the lease and agreement

between the County and the Federal Government relating

to the Airport the agreement as to the erection of the Air-

port, the contribution of the Government and wiatever

ebligation the County assumed with regard to the opera-

tion of that Airport.

Mr. Louik: As I told Mr. Trimble. we have several

hundred agreements with different agencies of the Federal

Government and we have a number of grants and agree-

I still don’t know exactly what you want.

Mr. Trimble: We are only talking about the flight of

aircraft.

Mr. Leuik: We have an agreement with the Air Force

for the use of certain area of the Airport and we have

what is known as a grant agreement. We have a number

[fol. 27] of those whereby they have contributed certain

funds to the County. They are all identical and we can

bring over one.

Mr. Blair: Do you have a master agreement at the be-

ginning or do they all show the obligation of the County?

4

17

Mr. Louik: Every time we request aid from th® Federal

Government there is a grant agreement and there are any

number of those. They are all identical—a statutory form

Athat the Federal Government has and we can bring those

over. s.

Mr. Trimble: To what extent would they be material?

Mr. Blair: Under the Federal Airport Act which pro-

vides for aid by the Federal Government to municipalities

in connection with the operation of the Airport it says the

condition precedent to the approval of the Commissioner,

or whatever the head of that department was in Washing-

ton, of a project ander this chapter, the Administrator

shail receive assurances in writing, satisfactory to him

that all facilities of the Airport developed with Federal

Aid and all those usable for the landing and take-off of

aircraft will be available to the United States for military

and naval aircraft in common with other aircraft—and

there are obligations under that Act that are assumed when

a municipality receives contributions or aid from the Fed-

eral. Government. Se

[fol. 28] Mr. Louik: I would like to say this—we will

bring them ovyr, but I weuld like to call the Board's atten-

tion to the recent case handed down in California in con-

nection with the Western Air Lines where it was specifi-

cally held by the Court of Appeals out there that any

provision of the grant agreement of the Federal Govern-

ment were not or could not be used by a private party in a

ease against the Airport or the Air Lines, but we will have

a copy of these grant agreements here. We don’t believe

there is anything in that agreement that has a bearing on

this case, but we will bring it in. We do have an agree-

ment with the Air Foree about the military planes: They

have exclusive use of a certain portion of that field. We

have basically two types of arrangements with the Federal!

Government. One is the grant agreement which is signed

by any Airport that receives Federal aid. In addition, we

have at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport something which

they have only at a few Airports and that is we have a

lease agreement with the Federal Government whereby

they have exclusive use of a certain portion of the field at

the Greater Pittsburgh Airport and they also have use in

18

common with all other users of the Airport the remaining

portion of the field. That agreement was entered into back

in 1945 or 1946, and it runs for some twenty-five years. I

did not understand that Mr. Blair asked for that.

{fol. 29] “Mr. Trimble: I would think he is talking of the

way he would like to tie in that the.County gets a grant

from the United States ahd in partial consideration the

County must not refuse admission te Miny military planes.

Mr. Blair: If you keep in mind that’ Airport legislation

in Washington is to prombte air travel, not for military

alone, but for the publie—they woul have no inclination

gto contribute to the Gteater Pittsburgh Airport to serve

unless it was going to be used for the receiving of the

public as well as the military and that Act so says. They’d

never grant funds to g“Municipality only for the purpose

of. the military. They"W operate it themselves if that were

the case. a :

Mr. Trimble: That is in addition to the other conditions? -

Private and public air lines and also the military?

Mr. Blair: That is right. To promote air commerce.

I'd like to ask the County if they have taken any records of

altitudes of flights over these properties and measurements

- by decibels of sounds over the said properties?

Mr. Louik: If the Court please, I don’t think we have

to produce our evidence to the plaintiff. I don’t think we

. have to reveal what we Have done to prepare oti¥ case.

Mr. Trimble: We will get to that later on. :

e “Se eee, ° ° .

[fol. 49] Tuomas N. Gricss, sworn:

Direct examination:

By Mr. Blair:

Q. Mr. Griggs, will you describe just what took place

with regard to plane operation over your property begin-

ning in June of 1952? Was there a pattern of flight?

A. Mr. Blair, beginning in June of 1952, with the open-

ing of the commercial airport there began a stream of

planes landing dnd taking off over my residence and land-

\

19

ing and taking off and causing the results to which I testi-

fied this morning and in addition other results. I have to

explain in connection with my prior answers that runway

use is partially a matter of wind direction. The altitude of

planes coming in over a runway or going out over a runway

varies to some degree with the weight of the equipment,

[fol. 50] the size of the plane, and also with weather con-

ditions, but from June 2, 1952, when that runway was in

use with commercial airplanes the living conditions in that

house. were unbearable. '

Q. Did you notice the type of airplanes?

A. Yes sir—and I kept—not continuous records, but I

kept some records of the use of that runway. I turn first

here in 1952 and I think the first record I have in this book

is Sunday, June 15—late Sunday afternoon—planes—Alle-

gheny Air Lines, Capital and T.W.A.

Q. How did you know those airplanes?

A. I could see the designations on the ships.

Q. You mean you could read the letters on the planes?

A. Yes sir. And other times I knew the designations on

the tails and on the fuselage. I could identify the planes

and very often could pick them that way—also the colors.

Q. What did you notice about them on that date for

instance?

A. I noticed they were coming close to my tree tops.

I also noticed the noise. The next note I have is Monday,

June 16, planes at dinner time and in the evening; wakened

three times during the night and in the early morning,

and I marked that I had seen both T.W.A. and Capital

that day. Now, I note here because I said I couldn’t keep

these records always and J don’t think it was my burden to,

{fol.51] but Monday, the 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th I was

away. My next note—nlanes landing Sunday June 29 in

the late afternoon. My next notation—planes landing late

afternoon Sunday—June 29. Wednesday, July 2—planes

\ landing. Thursday, July 3—planes landing.

Q. Why did you notice them particularly, Mr. Griggs?

A. Because they interfered with my life and my use and

my happiness in my home.

Q. Because of the height, noise—or what was it?

20

A. Because of the noise when planes were landing, Mr.

Blair, and also you will find places where they are taking

off and that also interfered with my life. L_aiso had some

fears in connection with it because the planes were so close

to my house, and those fears were confirmed at a later date

as to which I shall testify after I get through with this

part of it. ‘

Q. Any vibration caused by these planes? ~-

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did you notice that and what effect did it have?

A. Window frames would rattle, and I noticed I could

feel vibration on the second floor, and sometimes—I am

not going to say these particular days, as I testified before

the planes would go by and I could hear plaster drop be-

hind the walls, little noises of plaster.

{fol. 52) Q. Did you have any idea how high those planes

were or have any knowledge of their height?

A. Mr. Blair, what I think I would prefer to do is put in

my records and come back to the place because I want to

identify something here. ©

Q. Okay—proceed.

A. I was out of town early in June, getting home on

July 10. On Saturday, July 12, planes were landing all

day and night over my house, and that is a night when

I had about two or three hours sleep. On Sunday, July 13,

there were planes early. Monday, July 14, I was at

home in the evening and I have this notation that planes

were landing—6:00 P.M.—on trees. What I meant by that

was on or near the tree tops. I was on the ‘phone-—heard

the planes. I noted here I had seven telephone calls that

evening and I had to interrupt them because of these

planes and put them in later. My notes at 8:00 P.M. on

that day—T.W.A. plane over the house and I could read

the number of it. At least the number is here. 4 show

at 8:00 o’clock an Air Force plane was down towards the

road. I show then—over the trees—a private plane. I

show at 8:10 Capital Airlines; 8:12 an Air Force plane;

8:12—was an Air Force plane; 8:15 T.W.A. These times

—whether it be 8:15 or 8:1514—they are as close as I

could take them because I wasn’t working with a stop

21

[{fol. 53] watch. 8:45 Capital; 8:46 National; 9:00 o’clock

—private red plane; 9:10 T.W.A.; 9:23—I have noted

lights were on—T.W.A. The next plane after that—Alle-

gheny Airlines—as nearly as I could tell. Next plane—

9:25 Army; 9:40 T.W.A. or Capital—I couldn’t be sure.

I have something here I can’t read with ditto marks for

9:43; 9:48 and 9:52. I have at 11:00 and 12:00 during

the night—wakened; and 5:00 A.M., and 7:00 A.M. the

next morning. The pext night my note is—worked until

11:30; 12:00 midni§ft plane overhead. Wednesday, July

16, 5:00 A.M.—wakened. I was around the house in the

morning and a transport went over when I was on the

telephone. Several Army planes low over trees in front

of house. 1:05 Allegheny Airlines—over trees. Then

marked here some jets and transports, from 2:00 until 4:30.

Capital—4:40; followed by Air Force; T.W.A. at 4:40;

Capital—4 :43; Capital—4:45; T.W.A.—4:46. Then a jet

over the house—then another jet—another jet—Capital—

4:55; Capital 5:04; 6:55—Capital; T.W.A.—7:40; Capitai

—8:00 o’clock. Then Thursday—July 17, fog in the morn-

ing. Then I go with another list of planes. On Friday,

July 18—wakened by planes at 6:00 o’clock in the morning

Planes during the evening and night. Saturday, July 19—

[fol. 54] five planes—6:00 to 7:30. Several during the in-

. terim between 7:30 and 9:40. Capital at 9:40; 10:00 o'clock

Allegheny; 10:05—T.W.A. Then ‘sometime after 10:90

o'clock unidentified commercial; 10:09 Allegheny Airlines;

10:15 Air Foree. Sunday, July 20, at night—11:00 to

12:00 six to seven planes. There is a note I was awakened

twice after that. Monday, July 21—planes again at night.

That is where I stopped keeping a record there.

By Mr. Mamula: 4

Q. May I see that book?

A. Sure.

By Mr. Blair:

F)

Q. Did you keep any additicnal records from time to

time?

A. Yes sir—I have a lot of records here. In this book I

-

4.

22

started April 4, 1953—airplanes last night. April 5—air- .

planes last night. April 6—ditto.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. Airplanes were flying over my house on that runway

landing that night, or taking off.

Q. How high were they flying?

A. They were low enough to waken me, Mr. Blair, that

is how I knew it. 4 |

By Mr. Faweett:

Q. How frequent?

[fol.55] A. Mr. Faweett, I can’t answer that for every

night. I have ideas about th overall frequency of it based

on my observation. For the present all I can do—I can’t

stand up there all night and try to identify every plane

that flies over, nor can I spend all my time watching the

clock during the night. April 5—planes last night; April

6—planes last night; April 7—planes last night; April 8

airplanes took «ff last night; April 9—last night airplanes

wakened me at 1:00 and 3:00. April 10—airplanes last

night; April 11—planes last night; six betwoen 11:15 and

12:15—I think it is. April 12—planes last night; April 13—

planes last night until wind changed. April 23—planes last

night; April 24—planes last night—bad take-off I have

marked. May 2—planes last night; May 4 planes bad last

night; May 8—planes last night; May 12—planes last

night; May 13—planes last night; May 17—planes last

night; May .22—planes last night. Monday—May—25—

some planes last night; May 26—planes last night; May 29

—planes last night; and I might add most of the inter-

ruptions where there is no record—these books show I was

out of town. July 14, 1953—planes last night. I have a

note here that they used all runways, and one took off high

over the house this morning about 8100 o’clock. Capital

came in low. Wednesday, July 15—planes last night. July

{fol. 56] 17, planes last night—take-offs today. July 22,

planes. July 23—planes. July 25—planes last night. There

are a couple of these that say “see file memos” andéI will

get the file memos in a minute. July 28—planes today.

September 9—planes last night.. September 11—planes last

a

23

night. September 12—planes last night and this morning

—wakened.

By Mr. Blair:

Q. When you have in your memoranda “planes: last

night” do you mean one plane or more planes than one or

a pattern of planes?

A. I am talking about enough planes, Mr. Blair, to inter-

fere with my night’s rest. Now, you will have to under-

stand that wind conditions change. They changed and

varied. I have watched that Airport many times under

certain wind conditions and have seen planes take off _in

one direction and immediately after a plane take off in the

opposite direction because the wind is not a controlling

factor. Essentially what I am trying to say is sometimes

the traffic can be substantial and I am talking about

commercial traffic on one runway or the other runway or on _

the center runway. At other times depending on the wind ~

it ean be distributed between them. I am talking about the

planes during the night. that interfered with sleep and rest

in our household. . .

[fol.57] Q. Mr. Griggs, I show you plaintiff’s Exhibit

“Pp”, “Q” and “R”. What are they?

A. Mr. Blair, this is a part of a calendar which calendar

was on the wall of our kitchen. I gave instructions in the

daytime because I was not there to write on this calendar

when planes were over our property on take-off or landing.

This first calendar covers the month of May, 1953, down

through December, 1953. The second calendar runs from

January, 1954, through December, 1954. The third calendar

is for the year of 1955. I should say, Mr. Blair, in connec-

tion with these records as well as the ones I. kKept—they

are not complete. There were more planes than were

recorded here, but the ones that are on there do show the

use of that runway when the records were kept.

Q. By whom were they taken?

A. My wife and our cook. «

- Q. Under your direction?

A. They were.

Q. Did you consult with them from time to time?

24

A. I did—and asked them and that is where I say they

are not complete. Sometimes I asked if they had kept the

record and they said no and then | asked ‘them again to

do it.

Q. These were made under your direction?

A. They were.

{fd1. 85] By Mr. Blair:

Q. What did you record in the memoranda?

A. Mr. Blair, I took this memoranda by ‘sitting in my

property observing planes going over my property and

landing on the northéast-southwest runway of the Airport.

Q. What, as to the number-of planes could you tell or

could you recall the number of planes that you saw flying

over your property at that particular time?

A. Where I can count them on this memoranda-—marked

on the memoranda is the approximate time of each plane

that went over for the most part. I will be happy to read

it into the record.

Q. All right—read it.

A. 6:15—one Capital Airlines—this particular one was

not over my property. 6:25 to 6:45 one Capital, one East-

ern, three T.W.A., one Allegheny Airlines, two Capital.

6:55 to 7:10—two T.W.A. and then here is a word I can’t

read. 7:15—T.W.A. cut to southwest corner of my prop-

erty. 7:16—U.S. Air Force. 7:25 Capital. 7:25—US.

{fol. 86] Air Force. 7:26—one silver plane with a black

rudder—small. 7:36.T.W.A. curved from the south. 7:38

—Capital cenrved from the north. 7:50—U.S. Air Force

over road. 7:52—Allegheny Airlines. 7:58—one white

plane with blue trim—small. 8:10—a plane came over while

I was at the telephone, and I recall that I couldn’t hear and

had to stop until the plane went past. 8:15—T.W.A. 8:30

—FEastern. Then one U.S. Air Force and then from 9:30

to about 9:45—six commercial planes. Then I have the

notation—“ ll evening.” Then during the night “awakened

twice”. I i.ave Thursday morning—9:30 A.M. to 9:45 about

six. 9:58—Capital. 10:10—jet over the property turned

north and three jets very high. 10:45—T.W.A. 11:02—

4

25

T.W.A. 11:14—commercial over Jenks across the road,

cut low over the corner of my property. 11:15—Capital

cut up from the southwest corner. 11:16 a plane I couldn’t

identify, and about the same time A.A.A.—Allegheny Air-

lines. About 11:18—Allegheny Airlines. 11:20—Capital

up from the southeast corner. 11:25—T.W.A. 11:33—

T.W.A. 11:37—Capital. 11:41— Eastern—with a question

mark. 11:50—Here is one with a number—I think it is

NS 8867—right over the house. I think that is it—it is not

too plain. 11:51—Allegheny Airlines. 11:52—jet far down.

11:55 Lake Central. 11:56—Capital—question mark. 11:56

[fol. 87] —T.W.A. 11:58—Air Force. 12:05—T.W.A.—

something about coming low. 12:07—T.W.A.—higher than

usual. _12:10—Capital and then 12—I can’t read it

—T.W.A.—two. Then I have them marked there with jets

on the field—12:14. I have the record 12:29—I was in the

house and one plane came over the house. J have a note

12:31 Air Force not landing but below 500 feet. I have

12:40—a blue and white plane private. I have 12:55—

looked like Air Foree—red and white. Then I had at 1:05

—four motor—big white Air Force plane diagonally across

property. 1:30—National.- 1:34—Capital. Then 1:35 to

2:45 I have no notations as far as I can recall it. 2:40—

Eastern. Then I noted a couple of planes here going over

other houses in the area. 4:20 Allegheny Airlines. 4:22—

two jets. I have a notation—jets playing. I have 4:30 Air

Foree. 4:35—T.W.A.—curving in from the north. 4:37—

T.W.A. 4:40—T.W.A. Then I have@nother note here that

is not too clear to me—away from my property an Eastern.

Then I have 5:00 o’clock—Northwest Airlines. I should

say that in recording those times—the planes come into

vision from the front of my house a considerable distance

away to the east of me, and come over my property and

then I watch that plane go over and my timing on picking

up the-next one and recording it all depends on when I

{fol. 88] turn around and look at the next one—so the

times are approximately accurate, but there is no accurate

’ way to start to measure the time at a particular place or

the beginning of a plane coming into sight.

26

Q. Mr. Griggs, I notice from your memoranda you de-

seribe the planes. Wee they flying so low that you could

read the lettering on them?

A. Most of them. Private planes of course would fly in

high and the private planes were no real bother to us. It

was primarily the commercial ships and I could read the

designations on the side, see the colors, see the markings,

and many times see at least part of the numbers of the

planes.

Q. When the planes came in at night did they have lights

—that is the planes that were landing?

A. Mr. Blair, when the planes were landing they did

put their lights on before they came to the easterly bound-

ary of my property.

Q. On the take-offs were their lights on?

A. At the beginning and for some time after the opera-

tion of the commercial~Airport commenced they would

have their lights on on the end of the runway and they

would remain on past my house. At a subsequent stage of

it they often turned their lights off. I am talking about

the bright lights now—not the lights that are on when a

{fol. 89] plane is in flight during the night. Sometimes

before they got to my property.

Q. Mr. Griggs, were the flights of the aircraft over your

property as you reiated them yesterday and this morning—

fights landing and taking off the northeast runway of the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport?

A. Mr. Blair, my testimony except for particular desig-

nations where I have said other property on those memos

related only to planes that were coming over my property

going into Greater Pittsburgh Airport on the northeast

runway or taking off from the northeast runwey.

. « ew e@ + a 7

{fol. 104] Q. Did you make any effort to learn the num-

ber or percentage of flights over the northeast runway in

and out of the Airport? .

A. I did.

Q. In what manner did you make that effort?

A. I inquired of Mr. Austin White who was the C.A.A.

representative in the Control Tower, I think in 1953. He

was present at the meeting I testified to in June of 1953.

xt 27

Q. Did you ask him for the percentage of operations

over the northeast runway—the record of flights?

A. Yes I did. I asked about the records of the runways.

The information given to me was that there was no record.

Mr. Mamula: If the Board please—I object to a conver-

sation with Mr. White with respect to the frequency of

flight.

Mr> Trimble: Is Mr. White available for this Board?

Do You know?

Mr. Blair: He is no longer there.

{fol. 105] Mr. Trimble: Is he available for this Board?

Mr. Mamula: We can find that out, Mr. Trimble. He is

not the present C.A.A. representative.

Mr. Trimble: Any records available for this Board of

the flights made in and out of this Airport for 1953 on this

runway?

Mr. Mamula: No sir.

Mr. Trimble: The objection is overruled. Let’s hear

what Mr. White had to say.

(Witness continuing) Mr. White told me there was no

record of which runways were used for the landing or

take-offs in that period of time.

_ By Mr. Blair:

Q. All right now Mr. Griggs, you mentioned yesterday

the sales of two parts of your property?

Mr. Mamula: Before we proceed may I amend my an-

swer. I don’t know whether the question was directed to

me as to whether or not there are any records; that would

have to Wa qualified “no” on my part. There are records

which are destroyed periodically.

Mr. Conrad: Are those the ones they destroy every

thirty days?

[fol. 106] Mr. Mamuta: I think Mr. Conrad knows of

what I speak, and Mr. Blair and Mr. Fawcett, who were

present when the C.A.A. representative told us that a

recording of ell flight conversations in and out of the

Airport is recorded on tape for a period of thirty days,

for purposes of reference in case of accident for investiga-

28

tion or infraction ef any rule. Subsequent to the 30th day

that tape is cleaned and re-used on a machine which we all

looked at. There are five or six tape recorders that record

for a period of four hours, then automatically shift onto

another tape for an additional four, so that when I an-

swered “Were there any records?” I think I said “no”.

With that explanation I still say no—other than the num-

ber of flights in and out—take-offs and landingr at the

‘Airport, theve are records but not broken down as to any

of the three runways.

Mr. Blair: That is what we are trying to develup. That

is what we tried to find out at that time whether there was

any record maintained of the operation of the various

planes over the various runways in and out of the Greater

Pittsburgh Airport.

_ Mr. Mathula: The answer to that would have to be yes,

but they are not maintained beyond a period of thirty days.

[fol. 107] Mr. Faweett: Mr. Mamula, do you know when

they started to keep these records.

Mr. Mamula: Nothing other thar what you heard the

man tell us jointly last Friday.

Mr. Blair: No record available anywhere. to show the

number of planes which used the northeast runway from

June 1, 1952, up to within thirty days from the preceding

date—isn’t that about what you are saying.

Mr. Mamula: Anything that happened in the period of

time in excess of thirty days preceding vesterday or today

has been wiped out insofar as it being an aid in determin-

ing the number of flights.

[fol. 193]

De * .

Berore THe Boarp or VIEwERs

Report or Viewers—Filed July 15, 1959,

To the Honorable, the Judges of Said Court:

The undersigned, members of the permanent Board of

Viewers of Allegheny County, who were duly appointed

by your Honorable Court as Viewers in the above and

foregoing matter, respectfully report:

29

They met upon said property at the time and place

named in the Order of your Honorable Court and examined

the premises affected, and then and there adjourned to

meet at the Court House of said County at Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania, on the 26th day of Jannary, 1959, when and

where and at subsequent adjournments of said meeting,

they heard the parties in interest desiring to be heard

and witnesses, touching all matters upon which they had

authority to inquire and act; and they estimated and deter-

mined the damages for property taken, injured or de-

stroved thereby, and to whom the same are payable.

They prepared a Preliminary Report awarding to the

plaintiff $12,690 00 inclusive of detention money and gave

notice to the parties of the time and place when and where

said Viewers would meet and hear exceptions thereto.

Requests for Findings and Conclusions were presented

and are made part hereof and marked Exhibits Nos. 1 and

2.

[fol. 194] That at the time and place so fixed, they met

_ and heard exceptions which are attached hereto and marked

Exhibits Nos. 3 and 4, together with the notes of testimony

which are filed ander separate cover and hereto referred to

as Exhibits Nos. 5 and o-A.

“They file herewith and make part hereof a, photostatic

copy of Exhibit “C” showing the improvement and the

premises affected. ?

They also file herewith and make part hereof their Find-

ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

T. B. Trimble, Jr, T. M. Conrad, Paul G. McAtee,

Viewers.

July 15, 1959.

Prevtiminary Report

The undersigned Viewers have prepared the attached

Statement of Facts, Question of Law and Conciusion with-

out Exhibits; found damages inciuding detention money

in the sum of Twelve Thousand, Six Hundred Ninety and

30 >

no/100ths ($12,690.00) Dollars, and submit the same to

Counse! in lieu of regular form and notice.

Exceptions to said award may be filed in writing at the

Office of the Board of Viewers within five (5) days from

{fol. 195} the date of this notice and any exceptions so

filed will be heard on April 22, 1959, at 9:30 o'clock, A. M.

T. B. Trimble, Jr., Thos. M. Conrad, Paul G. McAtee,

Viewers. “

Acceptance of Service: David B. Fawcett, Attorney for

Plaintiff; John W. Mamula, Attorney for Defendant.

Fisprxes

Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, is a resident of Allegheny

County, Pennsylvania; and was the owner in fee of the

following tract ef land and improvements thereon in Moon

Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania:

ALL that certain tract of land situate in the Township

of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows:

BEGINNING at the intersection of the macadam road,

known as the Coraopolis Road, with the Westerly line

of property now or formerly of William MeClinton

Heirs, and running thence by the center of said Cora-

opolis Road South 65° 26’ West five Hundred Twenty.

{fol: 196] three (523) feet to the center of a macadam

road knowr as the Beaver Grade Road; thence by the

same North 21° ¥ West Fifty-five and 53/100 (55.53)

feet to a point; thence by the same North 15° 41’ Wea

Four Hundred Twenty and one-half (4201,) feet to

a point; thence by the same North 26° 2% West Six

Hundred Sixty-one and 14/100 (661.14) feet to a

point; thence by the same North 38° 31’ West Three

Hundred Fifty-seven and 84/100 (357.84) feet to the

center of known as the Thorn Run Road; thence

by. said Road No ° 51’ East Three Hundred

Seventy /100. (370.93) feet to a point; thence

by the same North 47° 2% East Three Hundred Six-

teen and one-half (3161,) feet to a line of land now

31

or formerly of William McClinton Heirs aforesaid;

and thence by said McClinton land South 21° East

Sixteen Hundred Forty-eight (1648) feet to the place

of beginning. :

CONTAINING 19.161 acres.

HAVING erected thereon one large stone and stucco

residence two cottages, a four-car garage with apart-

ment above, a frame be . and pump house.

The County of Allegheny, Defendant, a “public agency”

sponsored, owns and maintains the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport on land purchased by it in Moon and Findlay

{fol. 197} Townships as a public improvement to pratvide

airport and air transport facilities for the use of the gen-

eral public in conformity with the Rules and Regulations

of the Civil Aeronautics Administration within the scope

of the “National Airport Plan.”

Among said facilities . the Northeast-Southwest run-

way with “clear zone” and “approach area”; said “ap-

proach area” extending beyond and over the land of said

Griggs.

Plaintiff's Exhibit “O” is composed of three executed

documents, with amendments, between the County of Alle-

gheny and The United States of America (Acting through

the Administrator of Civil Acronautics) designated “Pro}-

ect Application”, “Sponsor's Assurance Agreement” and

“Grant Agreement”, the relevant parts of which are:

a. Agreement by County to abide by and adhere to

the Rules and Regulations of Civil Aeronautics

Administration (Project Agreement).

b. . . . “the sponsor (County of Allegheny) “will

maintain a master plan of the airport, including”

... “approach areas”... (See. 1 b. Sponsor's As-

surance Agreement).

ce. ... “The airport approach standards to be fol-

lowed in this connection shall be those established

[fol. 198] by th » Administrator in Office of Airports

Drawing No. 672 dated September 1, 1946, unless

32 ~*

otherwise authorized by the Administrator”; and

the County of Allegheny further agreed that it

“will acquire such easements or other interests

in lands and air space as may be necessary to

perform the covenants of this paragraph” (Sec.

. * 1 j. Sponsor’s Assurance Agreement).

d. “The airport approach standards to be followed in

performing the covenants contained in this para-

graph shal! be those established by the Adminis-

. trator in Office of Airports Drawing No. 672 dated

September 1, 1946, unless otherwise authorized by

the Administrator.” (Paragraph 8 (i) of Amended

“Grant Agreement.”

That in compliance with said Rules and Regulations of

Civil Aeronautics Administration the County of Allegheny

laid out and submitted for approval said “Master Plan”

including required “approach areas” which was, approved

by said Civil Aeronautics Administration and adopted as

the plan for the Class V airport sponsored by the County

of Allegheny and designated as the “Greater Pittsburgh

Airport”. A copy of part of said plan designating the

[fol. 199] location of approach area and property of plain-

tiff is adopted as Viewers’ Plan and attached hereto and

marked Exhibit “C”.

The approved and established standards for approach

‘grea for Northeast runway were center line extension

10,000 feet beyond “clear zone”, a 200’ strip of same width

and elevation of runway as projected, with gradient of

1 on 40 having splayed slope surface with lateral width

extended uniformly from 500 feet to 2500 feet with varying

depths or heights from zero to 250 feet at end of center

line projected 10,000 feet.

The residence of said plaintiff is bisected by a theoretical

line vertical to the ter line of runway as projected

3250 beyond end of “ zone” within said approach area;

and said center line being 420 feet more or less eastwardly

from center of said residence.

The portion of plaintiff’s property within said approach

area contains the residence, garage, stucco cottage, tennis

33

courts and elaborate landscaping; and 6.1 acres of land,

more or less.

Said Viewers’ Plan shows elevation at end of northeast

runway to be 1150.50 feet above sea level; the door sill of

plaintiff's home to be 1183.64 feet above sea level; the top

of chimney of said home to be 1219.64 feet above sea level;

the slope gradient of approach area to be as 40 is to 3250’

or 81 feet above 1150.50’ or 1213’ thus leaving a clearance

[fol. 200] of 11.36 feet at plaintiff's residence, or the dif-

ference between height of aireraft on climb out or let down

to runway elevation of 1150.50 flying on a 1 on 40 gradient

3250’ distanct (sic) from end of “clear zone”.

The date of opening Greater Pittsburgh Airport was

June 1, 1952, said date of opening being so designated by

Resolution of the Commissioners of Allegheny County

adopted May 27, 1952.

Affective (sic) as of said date of opening Defendant

executed leasehold agreements in conformity with Rules

and Regulations of Civil Aeronautics Administration with

the several commercial airlines licensed by Civil Aero-

nautics Board to use Greater Pittsburgh Airport granting

inter alia the right ‘to land, take off” * * °

Since the opening of said Greater Pittsburgh Airport

the Northeast runway with its approach area has been in

regular operational use for landing and taking off of com-

mercial and other aircraft in regular flight patterns at

heights near and over plaintiff's residence and over plain-

tiff’s land on take-off varying from thirty (30) feet to three

hundred (300) feet, and on let-down fifty-three (53) feet

to one hundred fifty-three (153) feet.

The interference by the low flight of airplanes with plain-

tiff’s existing use and enjoyment of his property resulted

[fol. 201] from the noise, disturbances and vibration cre-

ated by such airplanes as well as the fear for personal

safety caused by the low flights in close proximity to the

plaintiff's residence; said noise of planes over plaintiff's

property on let-down to the Northeast runway being com-

parable to that of a noisy factory, and in take-off to the

noise of a riveting machine.or steam hammer.

“The low altitude flights Per plaintiff’s property caused

the plaintiff and occupants of his property to become ner-

34

vous and distraught, eventually causing their removal

therefrom as undesirable and unbearable for their resi-

dential use.

The opening of Greater Pittsburgh Airport and its con-

sequences caused a diminution in value of plaintiff's prep.

erty in ita adapted use.

Plaintiff's Requests for Findings of Fact accepted and

substantially incorporated herein are as follows: 1, 2, 3, 4,

5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28,

30, 31, 32, 33. Those denied are: 9, 12,13, 14, 17, 26, 27, 34,

35, and 36.

- Plaintiff's Requests for Conclusions of Law are accepted

as follows: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to the extent that the latter

conforms to the conclusions herein. Those denied are: 6.

Defendant’s Requests for Findings of Fact accepted

as follows: 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,

21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, and 32. Those denied

[fol. 202} ave: 2, 4, 5, 8. 9, 10, 25 and 28.

Defendant's Requests for Conclusions of Law are denied

in toto.

Question

Is the County of Allegheny liable to T. N. Griggs as the

result of the exercise of its power of eminent domain in the

location, lay out and opening of Greater Pittsburgh

Airport? /

Discussion

The property of Griggs lies beneath the area projected .

from the end of the “clear zone”, being a 200-foot long

strip corresponding with the width and elevation of the

concrete Northeast runway. This area is designated as

the “approach area” and has the same center line projected

as said runway. It was located with engineering precision

in compliance with Civil Aeronautics Administration

“standards” as to width, length and depth to meet the

Federal qualifications and requirements for the laying out

and public use of a “Continental Airport” such as the

y peer of Allegheny proposed for the Greater Pittsburgh

irpert.

te

tY

35

The “standards” adopted and used in the laying out by

the County of Allegheny of this Northeast runway ap-

proach area were an extension of the center line 10,000

{fol. 203] feet beyond clear zone with a gradient of 1 to 40

and having a splayed slope surface with lateral width ex-

tending uniformly from 500 to 2500 feet. The approach

area thus has varying depths or heights from zero at clear

zone elevation to 250 feet at the end of the center line

projected 10,000 feet. At the Griggs’ property the surface

of the approach area is only 11.36 feet above.the residence

due to the increase in elevation of the land, which is shown >

on Plaintiff's Exhibit “C” and adopted as the Viewers’

Plan bearing the same letter identification.

In the law, as distinguished from airmen’s: and engi-

- neers’ parlance in which “glide angle” is in common usage,

the word “approach” has a definite and positive meaning.

It is an integral part of a publie structure, like a bridge,

but for its existence, the structure would be incomplete

and without public utility.\Jn a controversy between Penn

Township and Perry County, reported in 75 Pa. 457, where

the County built only the bridge structure and left the—

approach for the Township to construct, the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania, by Mr. Justice Gordon, said (p.

3 459) : -

“The design of bridging is to provide a safe and con-

venient passage for the public over some stream or

ravine, but no such passage is afforded when the

structure cannot be approached. Can a house be said

to be finished until there are steps up to its doors or

{fol. 204] stairs to its chambers? And how can a

bridge be said to be completed without the proper

means of access? Certainly this is so necessary to its

use, that without it, the structure is a vain thing;

utterly useless and of no account, The bridge is in-

complete until everything necessary for its proper use

has been supplied, and every such necessary appliance

is part of the bridge. When, therefore, the Act of

Assembly directed the counties of Dauphin and Perry

to build this bridge over the Juniata, it meant that

these two counties without the aid of the townships

36

~

should provide a safe and convenient passage or high-

way over that river, and not merely that they should

set up a structure which the public ‘could not reach.”

Citing the Penn Township case, supra, the eminent past

~—Dean of-the Dickinson Law School, Trickett, in his authori-

tative “Pennsylvania Road Law”, has this to say (p. 330):

“The bridge i is not composed merely of its piers, abut-

ments, arches and superstructure. Whatever is neces-

sary to make feasible ingress and egress, is a part of

it, and if the County has become liable to erect. the

bridge it has ipso facto become liable to construct

these approaches.”

In addition to bridges, the same view of the law has been

applied to subways. Knoll v. Harborcreek Township, 86.

Pa. Super. Ct. 423.426.

{fol. 205] Laying out this approach imposed a burden on

the land of Griggs for the flight of aircraft to and from

the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. To this extent the County

of Allegheny has exercised the power of eminent domain

conferred upon it by implication by the Act of May 21,

1923, P. L. Sec. 1, which reads as follows:

“That any county of the second class in this Common-

wealth is hereby authorized and empowered to acquire

by lease, purchase or condemnation proceedings any

land within the limits of the County for the purpose

of establishing and maintaining thereon airdromes or

aviation landing fields, whenever the county commis-

sioners of the county, by resolution duly adopted deem

it advisable so to do.”

Alt..ough the County of Allegheny purchased all the

“land” required for the location of the physical structures

at the Airport, it had been invested with the right to ap-

propriate such lund and the grant of that right carried

with it by necessary implication the power to take all in-

terests in land necessary to operate the Airport facilities

for public use. Such an implied grant of power of eminent

domain is analogous to that of railroads for the construc-

37

tion of switches and sidings, as to which it was held in

Beaver Borough.v. Beaver Valley Railroad Company, 217

Pa. 280, 286:

fol. 206] “The right to build the switeh and siding

is included as_a necessary incident in the right to

build a railroad** * * . . . even where there is no

expressed powér in the charter to construct switches,

it is clearly to be inferred from the general power con-

ferred, and the essential purposes of the grant.”

The power to appropriate “land”, therefore, carried with

it the power to appropriate an easement over the land and

the laying out of that easement by a plan constituted an

act of dominion or condemnation by the County of Alle-

gheny. The resulting burden upon the land is similar to

that which follows the laying out of a street or road.

The “taking” of the superterranean casement over the

property of Griggs became effective on June 1, 1952, at

1201 A. M., by virtue of the Resolution of the Commis-

sioners of Allegheny County dated May 27, 1952, designat-

ing that date and hour as the time for fhe opening of the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport fur public user. Consequently,

the right to damages accrued at that time.

The damages allowed by the Viewers have been mea-

sured by the usual procedure of deducting the after value

from the value of the property as a whole immediately

before and unaffected by the public improvement, to which

has been added 6% per annum interest as detention money

- from the date of opening the Airport. We have found

that the highest and best use of the property was as a

[fol. 207] country estate. We determine the “after” dimin-

ished value of the property as being directly and immedi-

ately caused by frequent low flying to and from the Air-

port, inevitably preducing noise, vibration, fear of disaster,

anxiety and general interference with the peaceful and

quiet enjoyment of the property by the owner, resulting

in damages to the extent of $12,690.00.

T. P. Trimble, Jr., T. M. Conrad, Paul G. McAtee,

Viewers.

July 15, 1959.

~~

38 —

(fol. 208] /

Exuzsir No. 1 to Report

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Or AtLecHENY County, PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2384

July Term, 1958

Tuomas N. Grices,

Plaintiff

aq

Vv.

County or ALLEGHENY,

Defendant

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR FINDINGS OF

FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW

To the Honorable, Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Thomas M.

Conrad and Paul G. McAtee, Viewers.:

‘ Now comes the Plaintiff, Thomas N. Griggs, by his

attorneys, William A. Blair and David B. Faweett, and

respectfully requests your Honorable Board to make the

following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the

above captioned case:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, is a resident of Alle-

gheny County, Pennsylvania.

2. The County of Allegheny, Defendant, is a political

subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

3. Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, on the dates material

to this action was the owner in fee of the following tract

{fol. 209] of land and improvements thereon in Moon Town-

ship, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania:

_

39

ALL that certain tract of land situate in the Township

of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows:

_ BEGINNING at the intersection of the macadam road,

known as the Coggopolis Road, with the Westerly line

of property now or formerly of William McClinton

Heirs, and running thence by the center of said Cora-

opolis Road South 65° 26’ West Five Hundred Twenty-

three (523) feet to the center of a macadam road

known as the Beaver Grade Road; thence by the same

North 21° 9’ West Fifty-five: and 53/100 (55.53) feet

to a point; thence by the same North 15° 41’ West

Four Hundred Twenty and one-half (42014) feet to

a point; thence by the same North 26° 29’ West Six

Hundred Sixty-one and 14/100 (661.14) feet to a point;

thence by the same North 38° 31’ West Three Hun-

dred Fifty-seven and 84/100 (357.84) feet to the center

of road known as the Thorn Run Road; thence by

said Road North 54° 51’ East Three Hundred Seventy

and 93/100 (370.93) feet to a point; thence by the

same North 47° 27’ East Three Hundred Sixteen and

one-half (31614) feet to line of land now or formerly

{fol. 210] of William McClinton Heéfrs aforesaid; and

thence by said McClinton land South 21° East Sixteen

Hundred Forty-eight (1648) feet to the place of be-

ginning.

CONTAINING 19.161 acres.

HAVING erected thereon one large stone and stucco

residence, two cottages, a four car garage with apart-

ment above, a frame barn and pump house.

4. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport is owned and main-

tained by the County of Allegheny, on land owned by it,

in Moon and Findlay Townships.

5. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport is a public improve-

ment constructed and maintained to provide airport and

air transport facilities for the use of’the general public.

40

6. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport comprises, among

other facilities, a large Administration Building and land-

ing areas assigned to each of several commercial aertenes.

7. The County owns and maintains at said Airport, and

as an integral part thereof, a system of runways for the

landing and taking off of airplanes at said Airport, being

known and designated as the Northeast-Southwest runway,

the East-West runway, and the Northwest-Southeast run-

way. (Exhibit B.)

[fol.211} 8. The Plaintiff's property is located in the

“Approach Zone” or the glide angle or glide path of said

Northeast runway. (Exhibits C., D., E. and F.)

9. The Plaintiff’s property is situate approximately

Thirty-one Hundred (3100) feet from the end of the North-

~ east runway.

10. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport, including the facili-

ties connected therewith, was opened for public use on

June 1, 1952. (Exhibit G., p. 32.)

11. At or about the time the said Airport was opened for

public use, the Co. nty of Allegheny entered into leases with

certain commercial airlines whereby, for the considerations

therein named, it granted to them, in connection with the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport, the right, inter alia, “to

operate a transportation system by airplane for the carriage

of persons, property, cargo, and mail . . . to land, take-off,

fly, taxi, tow, park, load and unload airlines’ aircraft and

other equipment used in the operation of scheduled, shuttle,

courtesy, test, training, inspection, ec Seeioe special

charter, sightseeing and other flights .

12. That prior to the opening of the Airport for public

use, the said Airport was used solely for the landing and

taking off of military planes.

13. That said military planes were mostly of the lighter

type or two motor planes ; that said military planes did not

follow a flight pattefn in and out of said Airport, and made

(fol. 212] only oecasional low flights over Plaintiff’s prop

erty.

—\~

41

14. That said flights of military airplanes in and out of

the Airport did not interfere with the use and enjoyment

of Plaintiff's property. (Testimony, pp. 32 and 57.)

15. Since the opening of said Greater Pittsburgh Airport

on June 1, 1952, for publie use, the Northeast runway has

been used for the landing and taking off of commercial and

other aircraft.

16. Commencing on June 1, 1952, regular patterns of

flight of aircraft landing at and taking off from the North-

east runway and other runways available at the Greater

Pittsburgh Airport were established.

17. That the extent and periodic duration of the use of

said Northeast runway varies with wind and weather con-

ditions, as well as the availability of the other runways.

18. Thet beginning June 1, 1952, the property of the

Plaintiff became subject to regular flights of airplanes in

landing at and taking off from the Northeast runway at

said Airport.

19. That such flights were, and are, at such low altitudes

and at such frequent intervals as to constitute a direct and

immediate interference with Plaintift’s use and enjoyment

of the land.

[fol. 213] 20. The interference by the low flight of air-

planes with Plaintiff's existing use and enjoyment of his

property resulted from the noise, disturbances and vibra-

tion created by such airplanes as well as the fear for per-

sonal safety caused by the tow flights in close proximity to

the Plaintiff's residence. cress pp. 26, 27, 28, 36

and 85.)

21. That the noise of planes over Plaintiff’s property in

landing at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport on the North-

ss east runway is comparable to a noisy factory. (Testimony,

p. 54.)

22. That the noise of planes over Plaintiff’s property in

taking off the Northeast runway is comparable to the noise

of a riveting machine or steam hammer. (Testimony, p.

84.) ‘

“

42

23. Asa result of the low and frequent flights over Plain-

tiff’s property, the Plaintiff and the occupants of his prop-

-—y became nervous and distraught, the property became

t as a residence, and Plaintiff and his family were com-

pelled to remove therefrom. (Testimony, pp. 54, 55 and

57.)

24. Asa further result of the low and frequent flights of

aircraft over ‘Plaintiff's property, it was rendered un-

desirable and unbearable for normal residential use and

has suffered seriousdoss in value. (Testimony, pp. 34 and

35.) -

25. That the said “Approach Zone” or glide angle or

glide path of flight over Plaintiff’s property begins about

{ fol. 214] two hundred (200) feet from the Northeast end

of the Northeast runway, at a width of five hundred (HW)

feet and gradually increases fo a width of twenty five

hundred (2500) feet at a distance of ten thousand tw»

hundred (10,200) feet from the end of saffl,runway. (Ex-

hibits C. and D.) et

26. That the said “Approach Zone” or glide angle or

glide path is approximately one thousand (1,000) feet in

width at the distance of thirty-one hundred (3100) feet

from the Northeast end of the Northeast runway. (Exhibits

C. and D.)

27. The approach zone to the Nertheast runway includes

all the property of Plaintiff extending from the Southerly

side or front thereof Northwardly a distance of six hundred

(600) ‘feet and passes over the principal buildings thereon.

28. That the said Northeast runway is a non-instrument

runway, and the “slope” or angle thereof is forty to one

(40:1) or forty (40) feet of horizontal distance to one (1)

foot of vertical distance. (Exhibits C., D. and E.)

29. That the bottom of said glide angle or glide path is

approximately forty-three (43) feet above the ground level

of Plaintiff's’ residence and approximately thirteen (13)

“9 above the chimney on said residence. (Exhibits C. and

-)

-

43

30. That the heights of airplanes over Plaintiff's resi-

dence on teking off from the Greater Pittsburgh Airport

{fol. 215] vary from thirty (30) feet to three hundred (300)

feet, and on landings fifty-three (53) feet to one hundred

fifty-three (153) feet. (Testimony, pp. 55 and 56.)

31. The flights of aircraft over Plaintiff's property are

below the safe altitude of flight as prescribed by the Federal

Aviation Ageney (formerly Civil Aeronautics Authority)

and as adopted by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commis-

sion.

32. Landing of aircraft at the Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port cannot be accomplished from the safe altitude of flight

of five hundred (500) feet above Plaintiff's property. (dx-

hibit D.) |

33. The “approach zone” over [Plaintiff's property to

the Northeast runway is necessary to provide airport and

air transport facilities for the use ,of the general public

and is a part of said Airport.

34. That the fair markef vatue of Plaintiff's property

befpre the Greater Pittsburgh Airport was opened for

public use on June 1, 1952, was Seventy-five Thousand

($7 5,000. 00) Dollars.

35. Thatthe fair market value of Plaintiff's property on

and after June 1, 1952, when the Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port was opened for public use and as affected by such

public use is Forty Thousand ($40,000.00) Dollars.

(fol. 216} 36. That Plaintiff has been damaged by reason

of such public use in the amount of Thirty-five Thousand

($35,000.00) Doilars.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The County of Allegheny, owner of the Greater Pitts-

burgh Airport, is empowered to aequire by grant, purchase

or condemnation land and property rights necessary to

accomplish the public purpose of the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport.

2. The approach zones at the Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port, including the Northeast approach zone, are necessary

44

to provide airport and air transport facilities for the use

of the general public and are a part of the Greater Pitts-

burgh Airport.

-3. The flights of airplanes over the Northeast approach

zone of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport are at such low

altitudes over Plaintiff's property as to interfere with and

prevent his existing use and enjoyment thereof.

4. The ownership of such airspace over Plaintiff's prop- |

erty as is necessary to the enjoyment of the use of the”

surface is vested in the Plaintiff.

5. The County of Allegheny has taken and appropriated

for public use a permanent avigation easement or a fee

simple interest in the airspace over Plaintiff's property

{fol. 217] extending from the Southerly side or front thereof

Northwardly a distance of six hundred (600) feet beginning

at thirteen (13) feet above the fiyincipal residence thereon

and extending vertically to the safe altitude of flight a

distance of five hundred (500) feet above said property.

6. As a result of such taking or appropriation the prop-

erty of the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of

Thirty-five Thousand ($35,000.00) Dolla=s.

Respectfully submitted,

Wriuas A. Bean

Daviy B. Fawcer7t

Attorneys for Plaintiff

4

[fol. 218]

Exist No. 2 to Report

IN THE COURT OF-COMMON PLEAS

Or ALLecHENY CouNTy. PennsyLvania

No. 2384

July Term, 1958

Tuomas N. Grices,

Plaintiff

v.

County oF ALLEGHENY,

Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE

3 BOARD OF VIEWERS :

The County of Allegheny by Maurice Louik, its Solicitor,

John W. Mamula, its Second Assistant Solicitor, and

Thomas J. Dempsey, its Assistant Solicitor, respectfully

submits the follgwing proposed findings of,fact and con-

clusions of Jaw for consideration of the Board of ‘Viewers

appointed in this action.

* FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Thomas N. Griggs, hereafter called plaintiff, pur-—

chased a tract ‘of land in Moon Township, Allegheny

County, @n January 22, 1945 from Mabelle R. McMahon, for

the sum of $20,000 the said property consisting of some-

what over 19 acres, and having erected upon it a main resi-

[fol. 219} dence, a 4 car garage with apartment above, a

frame cottage, a pump house and a frame stable or barn.

2. At the time the plaintiff purchased the said property

he was familiar with the existence and location of the

Greater Pittsburgh Airport owned by the County of Al-

legheny in Moon Township.

.

46

3. The plaintiff occupied the said preperty with his

family as a residence until shortly after December 1, 1955

at which time he and his family moved to another home.

4. The plaintiff sold the main house and somewhat over

4 acres by deed of general warranty dated March 26, 1956

for $25,000 to the Board of Trustees for the Episcopal

Diocese of Pittsburgh.

5. By deed of general warranty dated July 27, 1956

.plaintiff sold the 4 car garage with the d4partment above and

1.2 acres of ground to Franklin E. Bashline and Alice IL.

Bashline, his wife, for $9000.00.

6. Plaintiff is still the owner of approximately 15 acres

of the original tract purchased by him having a frame barn

or stahiv. a frame cottage and a pump house erected there-

on.

7. The frame cottage located on the property of the

plu.ntiff has been occupied b¢ tenants paying a rental of

[fol. 220] $25.00 per month from sometime prior to June 1,

1952 until the present with a vacancy at only one time of a

couple of weeks.

8. In 1940 the County of Allegheny acquired the Bell

farm in Moon Township for airport purposes, and there-

after continued to acquire other property and to construct

the Greater Pittsburgh Airport.

9. In 1941 the Greater Pitsburgh Airport began operat-

ing as a base for military planes.

10, The zoning ordinance of Moon Township dated May

10, 1943 which was effective when the plaintiff bought his

property shows the location of the County airport on the

zoning map made a part of the ordinance, and also shows

the property of Mabelle R. McMahon, the predecessor in

title of the plaintiff, in an area zoned residential A, which

classification allows single family residences and certain

non-residential uses.

11. By Resolution dated May 27, 1952, the Board of

County Commissioners of Allegheny County fixed the open-

ing date of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport for commercial

airlines services as June 1, 1952 at 12:01 A.M.

47

12. By leases dated June 3, 1952 and by subsequent

leases, the County of Allegheny granted to TWA, Capital

Airlines and other airlines the use of the airport premises

{fol. 221] in commen with others including the right to

operate a transportation system by airplanes, the right to

land, take-off and fly aircraft, and the rights of ingress to

and egress froin the premises and facilities of the Greater

Pittsburgh Airport. The payments due from the airlines

for these rights were to become effective as of the day

which the Board of Commissioners of Allegheny County by

Resolution designated as the opening date of the airport

for commercial airline services.

13. On June 1, 1952, the Greater Pittsburgh Airport

opened for commercial airline services in accordance with

the Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, and com-

mercial flights into and from the airport commenced on that

day and have continued since that time. At the time that

the airport was opened for commercial purposes, the County

owned approximately 1500 acres in fee simple.

14. In landing and taking-off at the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport, the aircraft of the commercial airlines utilize one

of the several runways constructed and existing at the air-

port depending upon wind and other conditions and cireum-

stances existing a#t the time of the landing or take-off.

15. The property of the plaintiff lies to the North and

East of an extension of the center line of the Northeast-

Southwest runway of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport and

[fol. 222} distant 3450 feet from the northeasterly end of

the Northeast-Southwest runway though separated from

the airport boundary and the runway terminus by inter-

vening properties, by the Allegheny County Airport Park-

way, a divided 4 lane express highway, and by the

Coraopolis Carnot Road. The property of the plaintiff lies

within the designated approach zone for aircraft utilizing

the Northeasterly end of the Northeast-Southwest runway -

as it existed in June of 1952 and as it exists to date.

16. On June 15, 16 and 29 of 1952 aircraft flew over

plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.

48

17. On July 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of

1952 aircraft flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate

altitudes.

18. On April 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23 and 24 of 1953

aircraft flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate

altitudes.

19. On May 2, 4, 8, 12, 13, 17, 22, 25, 26 and 29 of 1953

aircraft flew over plaintiff’s property at indeterminate

altitudes.

20. On July 14, 15, 17, 21, 23, 25 and 28 of 1953 aircraft

flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.

21. On August 12 and 13 of 1953 aircraft flew over plain-

tiff’s property at indeterminate altitudes.

{fol. 223] 22. On September 9, 11 and 12 of 1953 aircraft

.flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.

23. On October 13 and 20, 1953 aircraft flew over plain-

tiff’s property at indeterminate altitudes.

24. On November 16 and 17 of 1953 aircraft flew over

plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.

25. The plaintiff made no proper measurement of the -

altitude of the above mentioned flights above or in the

vicinity of his property and his recollections of many of

them are limited to the existence of “planes overh

though a number of flights disturbed his sleep and made

conversation difficult.

26. The plaintiff's own valuation testimony was based

upon the value to him of his property as a country estate

type home.

27. The plaintiff’s expert real estate witness fixed the ,

after-value of the plaintiff’s property as affected by the

alleged taking on May 15, 1952, which was prior to the time

the airport was opened for commercial airline use and prior

to the time the plaintiff complained of aircraft flights over

or in the vicinity of his property. ~

28. The Board of Commissioners of Allegheny County

has never adopted a Resolution or other otficial enactment

(fol. 224] appropriating plaintiff’s property or any part of

49

his property or any interest in his property by virtue of the

eminent domain powers vested in the County of Allegheny.

29. There is no evidence of any control exercised over.

any aircraft by the County of Allegheny.

30. All flights into and out of the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport are regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Administra-

tion of the United States of America.

31. No flights of aircraft have been shown to be in viola-

tion of any regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administra-

tion.

32. No flights were shown to be lower than necessary for

a safe landing or a safe taking-off.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The plaintiff has not proved that the nature, character

and frequency of the flights of aircraft over or in the

vicinity of his property were such as to constitute a taking

of his property or any part of it or any interest in it by any

person, organization or body, public or otherwise.

2. There were no flights of aircraft over plaintiff’s prop-

erty below the navigable air space of the United States of

America.

{fol. 225] 3. The County of Allegheny has hot by Resolu-

tion, official enactment, or otherwise taken plaintiff’s prop-

erty or any part of it or any interest in it for any purpose

or use.

4. The plaintiff has not proved by any competent evi-

dence that the fair market value of his property was de-

preciated by reason of any flights of aircraft over or in the

vicinity of his property.

Respectfully submitted

Mavrice Lovik

County Solicitor

Joun W. Mamuta

Second Assistant County

Solicitor

Tuos. J. Dempsey

Assistant County Solicitor

7

50

{fol. 226]

Exuisit No. 3 to Report

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Or AttecHueny County, PENNSYLVANI

No. 2384

July Term, 1958

Tuomas N. Griaes,

Plaintiff

Vv.

County oF ALLEGHENY,

Defendant

EXCEPTIONS TO PRELIMINARY REPORT

OF BOARD OF VIEWERS

Anp Now, comes Thomas N. Griggs, Piaiglit, by his

attorneys, William A. Blair and David B. Faweett,. and

respectfully files Exceptions to the Preliminary Report of

the Board of Viewers in the above captioned case, as fol-

lows: ’

1. Plaintiff excepts to the action of the Board in denying

Plaintiff's Request “or Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 12, 13, 14,

17, 26, 27, 34, 35 and 36.

2. Plaintiff excepts to the action of the Board in denying

Plaintiff’s Request for Conclusion of Law No. 6.

3. Plaintiff excepts to the award of the Board in that

the Board erred in substituting for,the uncontroverted

expert testimony of Plaintiff’s case as to damages, said

testimony being predicated upon views made before and

immediately after the taking, to wit, June 1, 1952, the

Board’s own ideas of value predicated upon ité view made

more than six years after the taking and after the residence

(fol. 227] property portion had changed hands; such action

51

is contrary to the intent of the statutes establishing the

Board and its powers.

4. Plaintiff excepts to the award. as being arbitrary,

capricious and against the weight of and contrary to the

uncontradicted evidence.

5. Plrintiff excepts to the award on the grounds that the

Board disregarded the only sound evidence of damage

under the cireumstances of this case.

_ 6. The Plaintiff excepts to the award as being contrary

to law, for the award is contrary to the evidence binding

upon the Board under the circumstances of this case.

7. Plaintiff excepts to the award for damages including

detention money iz. the sum of Twelve Thousaszd Six Hun-

dred Ninety and 00/100 ($12,699.00) Dollars as inadequate.

&. Wuererore, the exceptant, reserving the right to file

additional exceptions, respectfully requests the Board to

correct and make the said award conform to law sad to

the evidence. eae

" Wriuam A. Bram

¢ Dav B. Fawcetr

- Attorneys for

. Thomas N. Griggs

And now 13 July, 1959 exceptions overruled.

T. P. Trimsie, JR.

T. M. Conrap

Pau.t G. McATEE

Viewers

52 ©

{fol. 228]

Exnarsit No. 4 To Report #

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Or ALLecHEeNy County, PENNSYLVANIA

: No. 2384

July Term, 1958

Tuomas N. Grices,

Plaintiff

Vv.

County oF ALLEGHE® ‘:

Defendant

EXCEPTIONS

The County of Allegheny excepts to the award made by -

the Board of Viewers to THoMas N. Grices in the above >

entitled proceeding for the following ns:

1. The award of-the Board of Viewers in the sum of

$12,690.00 is contrary to law and the wéight of the evidence.

2. The award is excessive.

6 Mavrice Lovix

w srg Solicitor*

ieee Txos, J. Dempsey

Assistant County Solicitor

And now 13 July, 1959 exceptions overruled.

(fol. 229]

In tHe Court or Common PLEas

Orper or May 29, 1958

Allegheny County, ss:

At a Court of Common Pleas, held.and kept at Pitts-

- burgh, on the 29th day of May in the year of our Lord one

thousand nine hundred and Fifty-eight, before the honorable

W. H. MeNaugher, President Judge of said Court: -

The Petition of Thomas N. Griggs, was presented, setting

forth that

Order of Court

And now, to-wit, this 29th day of May, 1958, on motion of

William A. Blair and David B. Faweett, Attorneys for peti-

-tioner, the Court appoints Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Thomas

M. Conrad and Paul G. McAtee, as a Board of Viewers upon ~

the foregoing Petition and further orders that the Board of

Viewers perform its duties in accordance with the law and

acts of Assembly in such case made and provided. View,

Tuesday, June 24, 1958, 10 A. M. o’clock D.S.T., Returnable

First Monday, March, 1959.

And Further:

It appearing to the Court, Siig there are differences of

opinion as to whether Thomas N. Griggs is entitled to

collect damages described in the Petition for Appointment

-of Viewers ; and

It further appearing that if all the questions involved in

this case are to be decided at the same time, the Board of

[fol. 230] Viewers would be unduly burdened by the evi- —

dence so that it would be required to hear testimony that

would ultimately be ruled irrelevant. :

It Is Therefore Ordered and Decreed.

1. The Board of Viewers shall, in time, determin

whether the erection and operation of the Greater Pitts-

burgh Airport by the defendant beginning on June 1, 1952

»

54

with consequent necessary and unavoidable use of the air-

space over and across the aforesaid described property be- -

low the safe navi,zable airspace for the purpose of ingress

and egress to and from said Greater Pittsburgh Airport

constituted in fact an appropriation or “taking” by the de-

fendant of a navigation easerffent over said property;

2. After the litigation as to the determination ‘of the

question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1. is finally

* decided by the Board of Viewers, or by a Court of final

jurisdiction in the case, such determination shall be con-

clusive upon the parties as to whether there was such ap-

propriation or “taking” by the defendant;

3. Should the Board of Viewers determine that there

was an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant, then it

shall ascertain and award just compensation to the Plaintiff

- [fol. 231] for the damage to his property arising out of such

condemnation by the defendant. “

- + By the Court, Weiss.

a From the Record, David B. Roberts, Prothonotary,

by Louis W. Sauers, pornny.

(Sear)

Filed May 29, 11:42 AM, 1958.

Lx tHe Court or Common Peas

Exceptions or Piarntirr To Report oF Boarp or

Viewers—Filed August 13, 1959

And Now, comés Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, by his at-

torneys, William A. Blair and David B. Fawcett, and re-

spectfully files Exceptions To Report of Board of Viewers

in the above captioned case, as follows:

1. The Board of Viewers erred as a matter of law in

substituting for the uncontroverted expert testimony of

the Plaintiff as to damages, its own idea of value predicated

upon its.view made more than six (6) years after the taking.

2. Action of the Board of Viewers in disregardiag the

_ uncontradicted evidence as to Plaintiff's damage and sub-

5

stituting its own judgment with respect to damage is con-

trary to law.

{fol. 232] 3. The Board of Viewers erred as a matter of

law in disregarding the evidence as to property values and

substituting its own ideas.

4. Plaintiff excepts to the award as being arbitrary and

against the weight of and contrary to the uncontradicted

evidence.

5. Plaintiff excepts to the award on the ground the Board

disregarded the only sound evidence of damage under the

circumstances in this ease.

6. Plaintiff excepts to the award as being contrary to

law, for the award is contrary to the evidence binding upon

the Board under the circumstances of this case.

7. Plaintiff excepts to the award for damages, including

detention money from the date of the opening of the airport

namely, J une 1, 1952, in the sum of $12,690.00 as inadequate.

Wherefore, the Pla atiff, reserving the right to file addi-

tional Exceptions, respectfully requests your Hvusorable

Court to correét and make the said award conform to the

law and to the evidence in this case.

William A. Blair, David B. Fawcett, Attorneys for

Thomas N. Griggs, Piaintiff.

[ fol. 233]

Ix tHe Court or Common PLE«s

Exceptions oF DEFENDANT TO REPORT OF

Viewers—Filed August 14, 1959

The County of Allegheny excepts to the Report of

Viewers filed and confirmed nisi on July 15, 1959 and to the

award to Thomas N. Griggs in the amount of a 00 for

the following reasons:

1. As a matter of law the plaintiff failed to sustain the

burden of proof on him to show that the nature, character

and frequency of flights of aircraft over or in the vicinity of

his property were such as to constitute a taking of his prop-

cet LIE ERE REE ARR EES ORE LE RINE ih OMELETTE PSO cr

56

erty, or any part of it, or any interest in it, by any person,

organization or body, public or otherwise.

2. The plaintiff did not show that there were any flights

of aireraft over his property below the navigable air space

of the United Stetes of America.

3. The plaintiff did not show that any flights of aircraft

were in violation of any regulations of the Civil Aeronautics

Administration, which organization controls and regulates

the flight of aircraft.

4. The plaintiff did not show that any flights of aircraft

were lower than necessary for safe landings or safe take-

offs.

5. The plaintiff failed to show that the County of Alle-

gheny exercised any control over the flights of any aircraft.

ifol. 234) 6. There was no basis for a finding by the

Viewers that the defendant had appropriated any portion

or interest in the plaintiff's property since the Board of

Commissioners of Allegheny County never adopted a Reso-

lution or other official enactment appropriating plaintiff's

property, or any part of it, or any interest in it, by virtue

of the eminent domain powers vested in the defendant and

since the evidence failed to establish such interference with

the property of the plaintiff as ash mes would constitute

an appropriation.

7. As a matter of law the plaintiff failed to sustain the

burden of proof cn him ‘o prove by competent evidence

that the fair market value of his property was depreciated

by reason of any flights of aircraft over or in the vicinity

of his property.

- 8. The teetimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses was

too vagne, uncertain and inaccurate to sustain a finding by

the Viewers that the number of afrcrai't flying over or in the

vicinity of the plaintiff’s property interfered sufficiently

with the property to constitute an appropriation.

9. The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses was

too vague, uncertain and inaccurate to sustain a finding by

the Viewers that the noise of aircraft flying ovei ~ in the

a

vicinity of plaintiff’s property or the vibrations caused by

such aircraft interfered sufficiently with the property to

constitute an appropriation.

[fol. 235} 10. Lf, as the plaintiff contends and the Viewers

have ruled, there was an appropriation by the County on

June 1, 1952, then all evidence of subsequent flights of air-

craft would be inadmissible and should have been —

by the Viewers. % ip

1. The report and award of the Viewers were contrary

to pa inasmuch as under the facts alleged in plaintiff's

Petition for Appointment of Viewers, the County of Alle-

gheny cannet legally be held liable for the appropriation for

public use of avigation rights, or easements over and across

plaintiff's property,

12. The report or award of the Viewers were contrary

to law inasmuch as,.as a matter of law, the flights of aircraft

over plaintiff's property were within the free navigable

air space as declared by the United States of America.

13. The report and award of the Viewers were contrary

to law inasmuch as, as a matter of law, if plaintiff has any

claim for the appropriation of property, it is not against the

County of Allegheny.

Wherefore, the County of Allegheny requests your

Honorable Court to sustain its exceptions and to send the

Reports of Viewers back with instructions to find according

{ fol. 236] to defendant’s proposed Findings of Facts and

Conclusions of Law.

* Maurice Louik, County Solicitor, Thomas J. Demp-

m sey, Assistant County Solieito>, Attorneys for

County of Allegheny.

th!

mais

<<

4

Ix tHe Court or Common PLEas

Option

Soffel, J.

This case comes before this Court on Exceptions filed

both by plaintiff and defendant to certain Findings made by

the Board of Viewers.

_ Briefly summarized, these are the facts :

The plaintiff filed a petition for the appointment of

viewers alleging that aircraft of several airlines landing

upon or taking off from the northeast runway of the Greater

Pittsburgh Airport descended and ascended over plaintiff's

property below the safe navigable air space as fixed pur-

’ guant to acts of Congress and that by reason of said low

flights, the property of the plaintiff was greatly damaged

and depreciated in value. The plaintiff further averred that

the defendant by reason of its right of eminent domain has,

in fact, appropriated for public use an easement or fee

simple interest of the air space over the plaintiff's prop-

erty. Following proceedings before the Board of Viewers,

[fol. 237] a report was filed by the Board of Viewers in

5 it made certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

ie

The Board of Viewers found inter alia that on June 1,

1952, the County of Allegheny, defendant, condemned or

appropriated a superterranean easement over plaintiff's

property in Moon .ownship with consequent damage to

said property. Damages in the a:nount of $12,690 were

awarded the plaintiff.

This case is now before this Court on Exceptions to

Findings of Fact and Conclusions made by the Board of

Viewers.

Plaintiff’s Exceptions are directed solely to the amount

of damages awarded.

Defendant’s Exceptions are directed to certain conclu-

sions made by the Board of Viewers as not being legally

warranted, and contrary to decisions of the Supreme Court,

to-wit:

+ There was ‘a taking of a superterranean easement

over plaintiff’s property by the County of Allegheny.

a

59

2. This taking occurred as of June 1, 1952.

The background of this case is fully set forth in the case

of Gardner v. Allegheny County, reported at 382 Pa. 88 and

393 Pa. 120. The plaintiff in the instant case was one of the

plaintiffs in the group of cases which went on appeal to the

Supreme Court and were decided in the Gardner cases. In

[fol. 238] these cases, the plaintiff, together with other

property owners, brought action in equity against Alle- —

gheny Couny and certain airlines, alleging: 1) continuing

trespasses over their properties, and 2) a taking of their

respective properties. In the Gardner case at 382 Pa. 88,

the Supreme Court sustained the County’s preliminary ob-

jections as to the “taking of property” and continued the

case with respect to an injunction for trespass. Sub-

sequently, in the same cases reported in Gardner v. Alle-

gheny County, 393 Pa. 120, the Supreme Court stayed the

pending equity proceedings until thc plaintiffs either pro-

ceeded under eminent domain or in actions of trespass. The

decision in the Gardner case at 393 Pa. 120, was entered on

June, 1958. -

A few days prior to June 3, 1958, the plaintiff filed a

petition forthe appointment of viewers, out of which this

action arises. The Board of Viewers filed a report in which

it made certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

_ The Findings of Fact made by the Board of Viewers in-

cluded the following, submitted b, defendant:

“29. There is no evidence of any control exercised over

any aircraft by the County of Allegheny.

30. All flights into and out of the Greater Pittsburgh Air-

port are regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-

[fol. 239] tration of the United States of America. -

31. No flight. of aircraft have been shown to be in viola-

tion of any regulations of the Civil Acronauties Ad-

ministration. é

_ 32. No flights were shown to be lower than necessary for

a safe landing or a safe taking-o gy

The Board of Viewers also accepted the Finding of Fact

submitted by defendant tbat “aircraft flew over plaintiff's

property at indeterminate or wang

Pree,

60

With respect to the question of damages, the Board of

Viewers also made this Finding of Fact:

“27. The plaintiff’s expert real estate witness fixed the

after-value of the plaintiff’s property as affected by

the alleged taking on May 15, 1952, which was prior

to the time the airport was opened for commercial

airline use and prior to the time the plaintiff com-

plained of aircraft flights over or in the vicinity of

his property.”

The Board of Viewers in its discussion concluded that

there was an act of dominion or condemnation by the County

of Allegheny and found that:

“The ‘taking’ of the superterranean easement over

the property of Griggs became effective on June 1, -

_- [fol. 240] 1952, at 12:01 A. M., by virtue of the Resolu-

* tion of the Commissioners of “Allegheny County dated

May 27, 1952, designating that date and hour as the

time for the opening of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport

for public user. Consequently, the right to damages

accrued at that time.”

We shall consider the legal questions raised before this

Court.

_ First: Did the Board of Viewers err in the amount

- awarded the plaintiff?

The Board of Viewers awarded the plaintiff damages in

the sum of .$12690 for the taking of a superterranean ease-

ment. The plaintiff contends that the Board of Viewers was

required to award damages upon the uncontradicted testi-

mony of its real estate expert in the amount of $35000.

Plaintiff contends further that the Board failed to explain

“usual procedure” or what method it used in arrivipg at

damages in the aforesaid arbitrary amount.

. The only testimony as to value was-that produced by the

plaintiff and his real estate expert. Plaintiff testified that

the value of his property before taking was $80000. The

real estate expert, Mr. McDowell, a highly respected and

exceptionally well qualified man in his field, testified that

61

the value immediately before the taking and as unaffected

by the taking was $75000 and that the value of the property

[fol. 241] immediately after the taking as affectéd thereby

was $40000, or a diminution in value of $35000.

Mr. McDowell was familiar with plaintiff’s and other

properties in the neighborhood for a long period of time

prior to June 1, 1952, and possessed a detailed knowledge

of sales and values in the vicinity. He had examined plain-

tiff’s property immediately prior to that time and reason-

ably soon thereafter.

The defendant, County of Allegheny, offered no testi-

mony on this or any other aspect of the proceedings. |

Plaintiff contends that the Board of Viewers disregarded

the testimony of its expert. in making an award of $12690,

which includes detention money at six per cent.

Where, as in the case at bar, only one uncontradicted set

of values was before the viewers and the damages awarded

in no way appear related to that set of values, and where

the only explanation for the variance between the two 1s

vague and uninformative, it must be concluded that the

viewers rejected in whole or in part the expert’s testimony

and considered ‘other information in arriving at their con-

clusion. Since no other informatien is of record, it must be

assumed that the viewers substituted_their own judgment.

[fol. 242] While the viewers were entitled, as are any

triers of fact, to use the background of their knowledge and

experience in evaluating the testimony of expert witnesses,

Leaf v. Pennsylvania Co., 268 Pa. 579, 112 A. 243 (1920),

they were not entitled to throw away the only criteria given

them in this case and substitute their own judgment based

on matters not of record.

The question has been raised whether the plaintiff's ac-

tion in filing an Exception to the Report of the Board of

Viewers rather than taking an appeal from its decision is

the correct course to be followed. We are of the opinion

that it is. Questions of law are properly raised by excep-

tions to a. viewer’s report and questions of fact can only

be raised by an appeal from such a report. Lower

Chichester Twp. v. Roberts, 308 Pa. 195, 162 A. 460 (1932).

Appeal of Lakewood Memorial Gardens, 381 Pa. 46, 112

‘And 135 (1955). The plaintiff has raised the issue of

62 oe

whether the viewers could disregard the uncontradicted tes-

timony of an expert witness in arriving at the amount of

damages to be awarded, and this is clearly a ai of

law.

None of the cases cited by the plaintiff is in point

. factually, for they alf involve sittations in which the viewers

or other fact-finding bodies when confronted with conflicting

testimony, ignored that testimony and substituted their own

judgment. In the case at bar, there is no conflicting testi-

(fol. 243] mony relative to damages. The only testimony

is that of the plaintiff and his expert. witness. In the case

at bar, the viewers did not admittedly ignore the testimony

of the expert and substitute their own judgment but rather

gave no explanation for the award they made other than

the cursory explanation that the damages had been

measured by the “usual procedure”.

Despite these factual differences, the principles governing

', the cited eases and the instant case are the same. Triers

of fact, whether judges, jurors, viewers, boards or com-

missions, must render their verdict, finding or award based

on the testimony or other evidence’ presented. The fact-

finding body cannct substitute for that testimony or evi-

dence its own knowledge or belief, no matter what” ex-

‘traneous matter that knowledge or belief is based upon.

Cowan v. Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa. Super. 573, 49 A2d

270 (1946); Flower v. Baltimore and Phila. Railroad Co.,

132 Pa. 524, 19 A. 274 (1890); Avins v. Commonwealth, 379

Pa. 202, 108 A2d 788'(1954).

We are of the opinion that plaintiff’s Exceptions to the

award of damages should be sustained. We believe the

question of the amount ‘awarded should be referred back to

the Board of Viewers for reconsideration and discussion of

the factors upon which the award was predicated.

We come now toa consi eration of the issues raised by

the defendant.

[fol. 244] - The defendant Liat first, that the legal con-

clusion of the Board of Viewers that there was a “taking”

of plaintiff’s property by the defendant is not legally war-

ranted under the Findings. of Fact which it made. The de-

soncant cites specifically a Findings of Fact:

-

.

i]

Oi OK ANT eld Reese PS Nee rene ote a ke 008 nA en teint Nea

’

“

'

‘

C

63

: 29. There is no evidence of any control exercised over

any aircraft by the County of Allegheny.

30. All flights into and out of the Greater Pittsburgh

Airport are. regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Ad-

ministration of the United States of America.

31. No flights of aircraft have been shown to be in viola-

- tion of any regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Ad-

ministration.

32. No flights were shown to be lower than necessary for

a safe landing or a safe take-off. h

In addition, the defendant cites the Finding as submitted

by the plaintiff and accepted by the Viewers tHat, “aircraft

flew over. plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.”

These Findings, says the defendant, support the conelu-

sions that all fiights of aircraft over plaintiff's property

were lawful and within the navigable airjspace appropriated

by the Federal government. As a result, if there was a

[{fol. 245] “taking” of-+the plaintiff’s property it was by the

United States and not bv the defendant-in this action. The

defendant refers us to the Air Commerce Act of. May 20,

1926; c. 344 §6, 44 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C.A. §176(a), which

states:

“The United States of America is declared to possess

and exercise complete and exclusive national sover-

eignty in the air space above the United States, includ-

ing the air space above all inland waters and the air

space above those portions of the adjacent marginal

high seas, bays and lakes, over which by international

law or treaty or convention the United States exercises

national jurisdiction.”

This declaration was implemented by the passage of the

Civil Aeronautics Act of. June 23, 1938, ¢. 601 Title 1 43,

52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C.A. $401 et seq., which states in §403:

“There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of

any citizen of the United’States a publie right of free-

dom of transit in air commerce through the navigable

* air space of the United States.” ,

r

=

oF

This same Act, which empowered the Civil Aeronautics

Authority to carryout its provisions defined “navigable air

space” as “air space above the minimum altitudes of flight

prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter.” ($401-

24)

[fol. 246] The Civil Aeronautics Board has specifically

defined the minimum altitudes of flight over both rural and

urban areas. It has not defined the minimum safe altitudes

for use in landing and taking-off. The defendant seeks ‘to

bridge this gap in the Civil Aeronautics Regulations by

quoting the following excerpts from the first Gardner case,

382 Pa. 88, at page 108: :

“Regulation 60.17 defines and prescribes the air space

appropriated for take-offs and landings, if at all, only

‘ negatively and by implication.

... However, since take-offs and landings are obviously

absolutely necessary if there are to be interstate flights,

‘ or indeed if there is to be any flying at all, reason and

common sense impel the conclusion that Congress must

have intended the Federal Agencies to have the right

and power to prescribe and appropriate for public use

such air space as is reasonably necessary for take-offs

and landings. This naturally will vary with terrain,

wind conditions and other factors and consequently it

is difficult and may be impractical and unwise to

attempt, to more particularly define such air space.”

i P

As a buttress for the logic expressed in the above quota-

tion the‘defendant also refers this Court to Civil Air Regu-

(fol. 247] lation No. 60, interpretation No. 1, adopted by the

Civil Aeronautics Board on July 22,-1954, which read, in

part, as follows:

“.. . Directly involved is the question whether the air-

space which lies at and above the flight path of aircraft

making normal take-offs and landings comes within

the term “navigable airspace” as. defined in the Civil

Aeronautics Act. If it does, a public right of freedom

of transit is recognized and proclaimed to exist for

citizens of the United States by Section 3 of that Act.

Re teed

65

... In consideration of the foregoing, the Board con-

strues the words, ‘Except wher necessary for take-off

or landing, no person shall operate an aircraft below

the following altitudes’ where such words appear’ in

$60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations, as establishing a

minimum altitude rule of specific applicability to air-

eraft taking off and landing. It is a rule based on the

standard of necessity, and applies during every instant

that the airplane climbs after take-off and throughout

its approach to land. Since this provision does pro-

scribe a series of minimum altitudes within the mean-

ing of the Act, it follows, through the application of

§3, that an aircraft pursuing a normal and necessary

flight path in climb and after take-off or in approach-

ing to land is operating in the navigable airspace.”

.[fol. 248] The plaintiff contends that the paths of Hight

over his property taken by the planes in landing and taking-

off were not within the minimum safe altitudes of flight and

thus net within the navigable air space pre-empted by the

Federal government. The plaintiff’ relies principally on

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1945),

which involved the same legal issue which is now before this

Court. The plaintiff emphasizes the basic question to be

that stated by the Viewers in its Report, page 6, to-wit:

“Is the Cobnty of Allegheny liable to T. N. Griggs as the

result of the exercise of its power of eminent domain

in the location, laying out and opening of Greater Pitts-

burgh Airport?” ,

An analysis of the cases cited by both parties leads us to

believe that the arguments of the plaintiff must prevail.

Reference to the pre-emption of air space within the glide

path of planes landing and taking-off is contained only in

the dicta of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the first

Gardner case and is not determinative of the law. Similarly,

the Civil Aeronautics Regulation, Interpretation No. 1, was

issued after the alleged “taking” in this case. The law as

stated in the Causbi; case, suprayas clear—328 U.S. at page

263 :

\

“The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes

was that approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority

.{fol. 249] does not ¢ the result. The navigable

airspace which Congress has placed in the public

domain is ‘airspace above the minimum safe altitudes

of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.’

49 USCA §180, 10A FCA Title 49, §80. If that agency

prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then _

we would have presented the question of the validity

of the regulation. But nothing of the sort has been done.

The path of glide governs the method of operating—of

landing or taking off. The altitude required for that

operation is not the minimum safe altitude of flight

which is the downard reach of the navigable airspace.

The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet

during the day and 1000 feet at night for air carriers

(Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61 §61.7400, 61.7401, Code

Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp. title 14, ¢ 1) and from#00 feet

to 1000 feet for other aircraft depending on the type

of plane and the character of the terrain. Ibid, Pt. 60

§60.350-60.3505. Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., supra. Hence,

the flights in question were not within the navigable air-

space which Congress placed within the public domain.

If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were

ineladed, flights which were so close to the land as to

render it uninhabitable would be #nmune. But the

[fol. 250] United States concedes, as we have said, that

in that event there would be a taking. Thus, it is

apparent that the path of glide is not the minimum

safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the stattte.

The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the

power to prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has

defined navigable airspace only in terms of one of

them—the minimum safe altitudes of flight.

... As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which

skim the surface but do not touch it is as much an ap-

propriation of the use of the land as a more conven-

tional entry upon it.

. The superadjacent airspace as this low altitude

is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it

+ ¥

16 tebeethod Tt bn ede> .

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67

affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We

think that the landowner, as an incident to ‘his owner-

ship, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in

the same category as invasions of the surface.”

In the Ca».sby case the government gaised the very same

questions that the defendant is now seeking to raise here;

namely, (1) the government did not take property in using

the air space over the land; (2) since the Federal govern-

ment has asserted control over the use of air space by

aircraft, there was no “taking;” (3) that the flight of the

aircraft was within the navigable air spece as defined hy

{fol. 251] the statutes and regulations and such flights were

an exercise of the declared right of travel through that

air space. The law as thus stated in the Causby case, supra,

effectively disposed of those questions and likewise the

questions which the defendant raises here.

See also Highland Park, Inc. y. United States, 161 F.

Supp. 597; Freeman v, United States, 167/F. Supp. 541;

Cravens v. United States, 163 &. Supp. 309; Adaman Mu-

tual Water Company v. United States Court of Claims,

decided October 8, 1958; Ralph Dick et al. v. United States,

169 F. Supp. 491; Hopkins v. United States, 173 F. Supp.

245 (Advanced report-July 13, 1959); and United States

v. Ashcraft, et al., 176 F. Supp. 447 (Advanced report—

October 26, 1959). These cases uniformly recognize that

the government has not appropriated the space necessary

to land and take off.

In the Ashcraft case cited supra, Judge Yankw ich makes

this pertinent observation—p. 448:

“.. Regardless of any congressional limitations, the

land owner as an incident to his ownership, has a claim

to the superadjacent airspace at such altitude as

interferes with his enjoyment of the property and ‘that

invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of

the surface.’ United States v. Causby, 1946, 328 U.S.

256, 265, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206.”

[fol. 252] The defendant concludes that, by reason of the

fact that low flights are not in vioiation of the Civil Aero-

nautics Authority regulation and that they are not lower

A

68

than necessary for safe landing or taking off, they are law-

ful and within the navigable air space appropriate by the

United States of-America. The answer to this assumption

is:

1. The flights are lawful only if there has been a “taking”

of the plaintiff's property and just compensation paid

for it; and

2. The Causby case decides such flights are not within

the minimum safe altitude of flights within the mean-

ing of the statute.

Reduced to its simplest terms the contention of the de-

fendant is that the regulations of a Federal agency can

extinguish private property rights and that such is also

the view of the Civil Aeronautics’ Authority which promul-

gates the regulation. It is submitted that the regulation of

a Federal agency and that agency's interpretation of its

regulation cannot be the law of the land. Private property

rights are determined by the law of the state in which it is

located and cannot be acquired for public use except in the

manner provided by law.

[fol. 253] We therefore conclude, as did the viewers by

implication, that the flights of aircraft over the land of the

plaintiff were not within the navigable air space as defined

by Federal regulations and were not operated over or in

an easement which the Federal government had previously

“taken.”

This conclusion is not in conflict with Findings of Fact

Nos. 29, 30, 31 and 32 as made by the Viewers. Lack of

control over the aircraft by the defendant (Finding of

Fact No. 29) in no way affects or is related to our conclu-

sion. The same must be said of Finding of Fact No. 30.

Finding of Fact No. 31, that no flights were shown to be in

violation of the regulations of the Civil Aeronauties\Ad-

ministration, is not inconsistent with the conclusion that

the flights were not within the navigable air space; the regu-

lations in effect at the time the flights were made did not

define a minimum safe altitude or navigable air space, so

that it was entirely possible for those flights to be in accord-

ance with the existing regulations and still not within the

aheeuists

ene eee i ti ae Si

Way Sag PP a eka vee

nA pte Rice tA ht PBA Rh Ty CAEN: IS oReae ere NY TN RLS earns re

69

navigable air space as discussed in the Causby case. Find- |

ing of Fact No. 32, that no flights were shown to be lower

than necessary for safe landing_oy a safe take-off, can be

reconciled with the conclusion in the same manner.

There remains but one quéstion to be resolved: Do the

Findings of Fact support the conclusion that there was a

fol. 254] “taking” by the defendant! The general principle

of law that there is liability for interference by aircraft

with the air space above property is found in this excerpt

from Crew vy. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A. 2d 179 (1948),

at page 547:

“Although the Kextieaition Code of May-25, 1933, P. L.

1001, andthe Air Commerce Act of 1926 . . diminish

the absolute rights that landowners had to the space

above the surface of their land under the common law,

they \do not authorize the flight of aircraft at such low

altitudes as to interfere with the reasonable use and

enjoyment of the land. See United’ States v. Causby,

328 U.S. 256... After the establishment of a regular

flight traffic pattern, if airplanes fly very close to plain-

tiffs’ building, or in any other way cause real damage

to plaintiffs’ property adequate relief in equity will be

available...”

In Dlugas et ux. vy. United Air Lines, 43 D & C 402, the law

is thus stated:

y

“It may be observed in concluding . . . that the A.L.I.

Restatement of the Law of Torts, $194, considers flights

of aircraft over the lands of another to be privileged

cnly if at a height so as not t&terfere unreasonably

[fol. 255] with the possessor’s enjoyment of the surface

and the air space above it.”

Under these statements of the law, and under the facts

found by the Viewers, there was an unreasonable inter-

ference with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of the surface of his

land and the airspacé above it, and that interference coi-

stituted a “taking” by the defendant.

The defendant asserts, however, that the liability of the

defendant can be established only if it is shown that the

a

70

flights were unlawful, relying on the language in the

Gardner cases. l@furiher asserts the Findings of Fact cited

above lead inevitably to the conclusion that all flights were

lawful and were in conformity with the regulations of the

Federal agency. Again we must point out that the discus-

sion in the Gardner cases of what flights give rise to a cause

of action is dicta and not determinative of the issues here.

Therefore, we believe that the Findings of Fact made by

the Viewers and their conclusion that there was a “taking”

are entirely consistent under the law as stated in the cases

cited.

The defendant has also excepted to the Viewers’ Finding

that the “taking” of plaintiff's property occurred on June 1,

1952, the date the airport was opened to public user. They

assert that such a finding is in conflict with the decisions

of the Supreme Court in both Gardner cases, supra, and

fol. 256] that to determine that a “taking” took plare by

reason of the mere opening of the airport is to completely

disregard the Supreme Court’s holding that the nature,

character, frequency and permanency of the flights must

be considered.

It appears to be correct that on June 1, 1952, no flights in

or out of the airport had taken place and certainly no

definite flight pattern had developed. The dimensions of

the flight pattern, about which the plaintiff complains, were

developed only after the facilities were in use and many

landings and take-offs had been made. To this extent the

“taking” by the County could have occurred only after the

nature, character, frequency and permanency of the flights

were definitely ascertained.

The Viewers were faced, however, with the problem of

fixing a date when the “taking” took place, and in their

search for a solution to this problem they chose the only

certain date available to them, fhe date of the opening of

the airport. The only other alternative was to choose a

later date at random, after first finding that a sufficient

number of flights had been made to provide a detailed pic-

ture of the air traffic. This choice, however, would only

have served to push the problem facing the Viewers one

tep further away,for they would then be called upon to

etermine at what hour on what day the flight pattern

which constituted the “taking” crystallized.

71

[fol. 257] The Viewers made the only definitive choice.

They did not arbitrarily choase—June 1, 1952, at the outset

of the hearings and before testimony as to the nature and

frequency of the flights was introduced and then go on to

provide their calendar skeleton with the flesh of testimonial

detail. Rather, the Viewers heard all testimony concerning

the landings and take-offs, determined from that testimony

that there had been a “taking,” and then ascribed a date to

that “taking” which was definite and logical. Under these

circumstances, we do not believe that the testimony as to

the nature, character, frequency and permanency of the

flights, even though it related to flights after June 1, 1952,

is either irrelevant or immaterial as defendant contends.

We believe plaintiff's exception to the award of the

Viewers should be sustained and defendant’s exceptions dis-

missed. :

Is tHe Court or Common Peas’

Orper or Court Rererrtnc Matter Back To Boarp or

: Viewers—February 10, 1960

And Now, to-wit, February 10, 1960, it is ordered, ad-

judged and decreed that plaintiff's exception to an award

by the Viewers in the amount of $12,690 be sustained. It is

further directed that this matter be referred back to the

Viewers for reconsideration and action as defined in this

opinion.

[fol. 258] It is also ordered, adjudge | and decreed that

defendant’s exceptions to Findings of Fact made by the

Viewers be dismissed.

By the Court, Soffel, J.

Eo die exception noted and bill sealed.

Soffel, J. [Seal]

In tHE Court oF Common Peas

SuprpLeMEentAL Report or Viewers—Filed March 2, 1960

Conforming to your Honorable Court’s direction to re-

consider and discuss the factors upon which the Board of

Viewers predicated its opinion of the amount of damages

awarded to plaintiff, the members respectfully state:

That they viewed the property on June 24, 1958, but due

to time of day and wind conditions no flights of. aircraft

were observed using the runway glide angle affecting said

property. However, on subsequent visits to the property

for observation and after “views” of other “takings” for

airport navigational, runway and general purposes they

observed and heard flights of single and multi-engine air-

craft over plaintiff's property in the glide angle for \both

take-off ard let-down at times of heavy and light to mod-

erate air traffic.

{fol. 259] That during the numerous observations and sub-

sequent thereto they concerned themselves with the effect of

flights on plaintiff's property considering, inter alia, the

frequency of low-flying and the attendant proximity dam-

ages such as fear of disaster, noise, vibration, anxiety and

general interference with the peaceful and quiet enjoyment

of the property by the owner Griggs as previously assigned ~

in recorded Report of Viewers, which unfortunately was

unavailable to the Court at argument and decision time due

to misfiling and misplacing.

That since 1955 they have viewed, heard valuation tes-

timony of expert witnesses and made damage awards and

benefit assessments on upwards of 200 properties con-

demned for Airport purposes as well as those for highway,

petroleum pipelines and water line construction in the gen-

eral and immediate vicinity of plaintiff’s property.

That they have familiarized themselves with sales and

holding prices of property in the general area of the Air-

port; the topography, airport and township zoning, road

locations, commercial and residential areas; locations of

market places, churches and their denominations, schools,

police and fire facilities, transportation; all available

printed material by the U. S. government, the airplane in-

73

dustry and real estate appraisers relating to effect of air-

port approach on neighboring properties; and authoritative

[fol. 260] books treating on flight procedure for aircraft

take-off and let-down, the frequency of motor failure and

the percentage of resulting disastrous effects, navigational

problems, and other pertinent informatian. .

All of the foregoing factors, including the “Findings of

Facts” are basic to and part of the Viewers Report (Supra)

DISCUSSION

Viewers are freeholders who are sworn to report dam-

ages or benefits, as the case may &, to the appointing Court.

In the performance of this duty they

“may resort to any source of information which the mem-

bers of it may think proper—even the evidence of their

senses”;

Spring Garden Streets Case 4 Rawle 192

They examine the property and ubserve the nature and

quantity of land affected and are directed by the statutes

to hear witnesses, if any appear after due notice. Their _

powers and duties are as an “inquest” (Patten v. The Sus-

quehanna R. R., 1 Pearson 48, 49, 51 & 53) at common law

and no statutory. or judicial limitation has ever curtailed

or threatened to curtail those investigatory and fact finding

duties until the unprecedented restraint first appeating in

Cowan v. Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa. Super. 573, later

{fol. 261] adopted by the Supreme Court in Avins v. Com-

monwealth, 379 Pa. 202 at 205:

“The limitation upon the triers of fact in condemnation.

cases with respect to the-permissible source of their

information is the same whether they be ‘judges, jurors,

viewers, boards or commissions’.””

At the hearings whether on In Limine Petition (Powell

Appeal, 385 Pa. 467, 474; Petition of Wynn, Common Pleas

of Allegheny County, 739 Jan. 1957 affirmed 188 i’a. Super.

499) or on regular petition the Viewers follow trial proce-

dure of the Courts for

74 —_

b I

“it is implicit that a jury of view must decide all rele-

vant questions of law or fact before it can competently

make an award of damages or assessment of benefits:

see case of the Germantown and Perkiomen Turnpike

Road Company, 4 Rawle 191...’ (The Viewers) were

bound to dispose, in the first instance, of all the matters

committed to them, whether constituted of law or of

fact, subject however to review by the Sessions.’ ”

Gardner v. Allegheny County, 393 Pa. 120, 130

(1958)

Witnesses are heard and their competency and the

weight and relevancy of their testimony is determined. In

the instant case the Viewers heard Mr. McDowell, plain-

({fol. 262] tiff’s real estate expert, both on direct and cross-

examination, individually cognizant of his excellent reputa-

tion as a citizen and exceptional qualifications. His opinion

was neither impeached nor contradicted. The County of

Allegheny offered not a scintilla of evidence except to sup-

ply documents on request of plaintiff or the Viewers. It

“rested” after conclusion of plaintiff's case.

During the Viewers deliberations it was evident to the

Chairman that the members could not accept witness Me-

Dowell’s estimate of damage. Notwithstanding the case of

Avins v. Commonwealth (Supra), and relying on the exist-

_ ing law of Spring Garden Streets Case. (Supra) supple-

mented by Crumrine v. Washington County Housing An-

thority, 376 Pa. 234, at (238) _

“Opinion testimony may be of value and it may be of no

value, just as it appeals to the jury. In all such matters

the jury must be left to the free exercise of its own

judgment. It cannot be bound by the opinion of the

witnesses or the mstruction of the Court. It may re-

ject in toto or in part the opinion of any witness it dis-

believes, and this whether that opinion is contradicted

or not”

the Chairman advised the Board Members that under those

circumstances they should arrive at an amount which in

(fol. 263) their opinions would be just compensation.

75

It is most respectfully submitted that the Viewers have

given this case their most careful and thoughtful consid-

eration both as to law and facts; and, after additional re-

consideration, they herewith advise your Honorable Court

that not one has deviated in his opinion as to amount of

just compensation awarded to the plaintiff.

T. P. Trimble, Jr., Thos. M. Conrad, Paul G. MeAtee,

ve Viewers.

vs |

Ix tHe Covet or Common Peas

Oprxtox— Filed March 8, 1960

Per Curiam

This case came before the Court on Exceptions to the

Report of the Board of Viewers awarding damages: in the

sum of $12,600 to the plaintiff for the taking of a super-

terranean easement above plaintiff's property. The plaintiff

filed one exception directed to the amount of damages

awarded. The defendant filed exceptions attacking. inter

alia, the jurisdiction of the Court. After hearing th. argu-

ment of both sides and examination of briefs, the Court

dismissed defendant's exceptions and sustained the plain-

[fol. 264] tiff’s exception. In its Opinion, the Court said.

“We believe the question of the,amount awarded ¢hould be

referred back to the Beard of Viewers for reconsideration

and discussion of the factors upon whith the award was

predicated.” The case was then sent back to the Board of

Viewers which was directed to reconsider and state the

factors which it considered in making the award. This re-

quirement has now been met in its Supplemental Report. -

At the time this case was argued before the Couri en

Banc, the Court was not informed that the Board of Viewers

fad supported its award by a written report setting forth

Findings of Fact and Conclusions qf Law. This report was

not discussed by counsel, nor aes it presented to the

Court. This Report has since been examined. In accord

with the Court's directions, the Board of Viewers has now

filed a Supplemental Report. This sets ferth in detail the

view of the property by the Viewers, their observations

76

on. the ground of the effect of flights on plaintiff's prop-

erty, and the law applicable to a Board of Viewers in

awarding damages or benefits.

Based on the original report of the Board of Viewers

filed in this ease and its supplemental report filed as di-

rected by the Court, we are of the opinion that the piain-

tiff’s exception must now ¥ dismissed.

[fol. 20",] Z

. Ix tHe Court or Common PL eas

. °

Orper or Covrt Dismissinc Exception to Report or

Boarp oF Viewers—March 8, 1960

And Now, to-wit, March 8, 1960 it is Ordered, Adjudged

and Decreed that the Exception of the plaintiff to the

Viewers’ award be and it is hereby dismissed.

Per Curiam, W. McNaugher, Sara M. Soffel, Weiss.

Eo die, exception noted to the plaintiff, and bill sealed.

W. MeNaugher [Seal], Sara M. Soffel [Seal],

Weiss [Seal].

(fol. 321]

Ix THE SupREME,CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Western District

No. 155 March Term, 1960

Tuomas N. Gricos

= Ve :

4County or ALLEGHENY, Appellant

Docket Entries

Appeal from the order entered February 10, 1960, of

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at No.

2384 July Term, 1958.

/

77

March 7, 1960, Appeal and affidavit filed and writ exit,

returnable last Monday of September, 1960.

March 9, 1960, Appearance for appellee, filed.

September 22, 1960, Record filed at No. 158.

September 29, 1960 Argued.

Decision

January 16, 1961 :

The order dismissing the County’s exceptions to the

viewers’ report is reversed with directidns that the

viewers’ report be vacated and set aside.

Jones, C. J. -

Mr. Justice Bell files a _Dissenting Option in which Mr.

Justice Eagen joins. a :

January 25, 1961, Petition for reargument, filed.

February 6, 1961, Answer filed.

{

Order

Before Jones, C. J., and Bell, Musmanno, B. R. Jones,

Bok and Eagen, JJ. (CohenyJ. absent).

February 15, 1961, reargument refused. .

Per Curiam.

February 16, 1961 Remit.d.

{fol. 322] March 23, 1961, Petition io return record pend-

' ing action by the Supreme Court of the United States,

filed.

March 23, 1961, Notice of appeal to Supreme Court filed.

% Order

March 23, 1961, prayer of within petition granted.

» By the Court

Jones, Chief Justice.

\

78

Vy

March 24, 1961, Supplemental Writ exit. /

March 24, 1961, Record returned to this office. A

For Appellant: Maurice Louik, County Solicitor, Francis

A. Barry, First Asst., John W. Mamula, Second Assistant.

For Appellee: William A. Blair, David B. Fawcett.

[fol. 323]

In THE Supreme Court or PENNSYLVANIA

WEsTERN DistRIcT

No. 158 March Termy 1960

Tomas N. Grices, Appellant

v.

County or ALLEGH: NY

Docket Entries

Appeal from the orders of February 10, 1960, and

March 8, 1960, of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny

County at No. 2384 July Term, 1958.

“ March 9, 1960, Appeal and affidavit filed and writ exit,

, Treturnable last Monday of Septeniber, 1960.

March 16, 1960, Appearance for appellee, filed.

oo 22, 1960, Record and 2 volumes of testimony,

ed. “

September 29, 1960 Argued.

Decision

January 16, 1961

Appeal is dismissed.

Jones, ©. J.

|

‘

‘

|

ald eee. a dg lalate:

ah taint pe Rens

-

7x

f

Mr. Justice Bell files a Dissenting Opinion in which Mr.

Justice Eagen joins.

January 25, 1961, Petition for reargument, filed.

February 6, 1961, Answer filed.

Order

Before Jones, C. J. and Bell, Musmanno, B. R. Jones, _

Bok, and Eagen, JJ. (Cohen, g- absent).

February 15, 1961, reargument refused. ,

Ber Curiam.

February 16, 1961 Remitted. ; :

March 23, 1961, Petition to return record pending action

by the Supreme Court of the United States, filed.

: Order

March 23, 1961, Prayer of within petition granted.

By the Court

5 Jones, Chief Justice.

{fol. 324] March 24, 1961, Supplemental Writ exit.

March 24, 1961, Record returned to this office.

For Appellant : William A. Blair, David B. Fawcett.

For Appellee: Maurice Louik, County Solicitor, Francis

A. Barry, First Asst., John W. Mamula, Second Asst.

ao

80

[fol. 325]

Is THE SupRreME Court oF PENNSYLVANIA

Wesvern District

Nos. 155 and 158 March Term, 1960

No. 155—Appeal of County of Allegheny

No. 158—~—Appeal of Thomas N. Griggs

THomas N. Grices, Appellant,

. v.

County or ALLEGHENY, Appellant.

*

Appeals from Orders of the Court of Common Ple4s

of Allegheny County at No. 2384 July Term, 1958. 4

' Oprnion or THE Covrt—Filed January 16, 1961

Jones, C. J.

These appeals grow out of a viewers’ proceeding in-

stituted by the plaintiff as owner of land neighboring

the Greater Pittsburgh Airport to recover damages from

the County of Allegheny, the owner and operator of the

airport, for an slleged appropriation of the plaintiff’s

land beeause of a substantial interference with the use and

enjoyment of_it caused by flights of aircraft at low alti-

tudes, through the air space above the land, when taking”

off or landing at the airport.

The Greater Pittsburgh Airport was opened for com-

mercial air travel on June 1, 1952. At that time, Thomas

N. Griggs, the plaintiff, was the owner of a nearby tract

of land containing 19.161 acres improved with a house,

two cottages, a four-car garage with living apartment

overhead, and certain outbuildings. Part of the Griggs

property lay under an “approach area” for the airport’s

northeast-southwest runway.

4

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81

On May 29, 1958, Griggs petitioned the Court of Common

Pleas of Allegheny County for the appointment of viewers

to assess the damages caused by an alleged taking of his

land by the County of Allegheny on June 1, 1952. The

petitioner averred that, since the opening of the airport

for commercial use, aircraft of several air lines, upon

[fol. 326] taking off and landing at the airport, have fre-

quently and continuonsly flown through the air space

above his land at an elevation of less than 500 feet: that

as the result of such flights, “the use and enjoyment of

[his] property have been interfered with by reason of

the possible danger of .the low flights, the noise and vi-

brations whith they cause, their lights pointing at the

premises at night time and interference with sleep and

rest”; and that the property has been thereby “greatly

damaged and depreciated in value.”

The~court appointed a board of view which sat for

the purpose of its appointment, heard testimony offered

by the claimant, and awarded him damages in the sum

of $12,690. Griggs filed exceptions to the viewers’ report

alleging that the viewers had unlawfully disregarded the

expert testimony adduced: by him as to the damages to

his property which was the only testimony offered before

the viewers on that issue. He also appealed the award

to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County where

the question of damages would he heard de novo, The

County, contending that it was not liable for any damage

allegedly suffered by the claimant, offered no testimony

before the Board of Viewers on the issue of property

value. The County filed exeeptions to the viewers’ award

to Griggs setting forth therein that, based upon the

viewers’ findings of fact, there was no taking of Griggs’

property by the County. The court betow dismissed all

exceptions of both parties from which action each of the

parties took an appeal to this court pursuant to Section

2623 of the Second Class County Code of July 28, 1953,

P.L. 723, 16 P.S. $5623. . 3

It is clear that a property owner may petition the court

for the appointment of vieWers to assess and award dam-

ages against an entity clothed with the power of eminent

domain where such entity effects a “taking” of the pe-

UV

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82 . ov

titioner’s property whether or not the appropriator has

followed the statutorily provided condemnation procedure.

[fol. 327] Rosenblatt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis-

ston, 398 Pa. 111, 126-127, 157 A.2d 182; Philadelphia

Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 264-265, 95 Atl. 429; Barron's Use

v. United Railway Co., 93 Pa. Superior Ct. 555, 557-558.

A “taking” oceurs when the entity clothed with the power

‘of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of -

the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property. Miller

v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 196-197, 82 A.2d 34; Creasy

v. Stevens, 16 Fed. Supp. 404, 410-412.

Paragraph 12 of Griggs’ petition for the appointment

of viewers admits that the county has not condemned his

lana by way of the statutorily authorized procedure.’

What the claimant attempted to show at the hearing

before the viewers was that the county had substantially

deprived him of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his

property. Assuming, for present purposes; that he has

shown a substantial deprivation of the beneficial use and

“€njoyment of his property, we shall proceed at once to

a consideration of the basie question raised by the county's

appeal as to whether such deprivation was, as a matter

of law, caused by the County of Allegheny.

The County, relying on findings of fact by the viewers

that no flights of aircraft were shown to be in violation

of any regulation of the Civil, Aeronautics Administration

and that no flights were shown to be lower than necessary

for a safe landing or take-off, contends that all of the

complained of flights were through air space which the

United States Congress placed within the public domain

and that, therefore, any taking of Griggs’ property was

by the federal government and not by the County of Alle-

gheny.

[fol. 328] Section 10 of the Air Commerce Act of May 20,

1926, 44 Stat. 568, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A., §180, provides

as follows: “As used in this Act, the term ‘navigable air-

_ *Seétion 14 of the Airport Zoning Act of April 17, 1945, P.L.

237, 2 P.S. §1563, confers upon political subdivisions the power to

condemn air avigation easements and other estates in property

for the purpose of providing approach protection for aircraft.

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83

space’ means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes

of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronauties Authority,

and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public

right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation

in conformity with the requirements of said sections.”

Section 3 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of June 23, 1938,

52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C.A., $403, states that “There is

recognized and deelared to exist in behalf of @@v citizen

of the United States a public right of eahans Wicaailt

in air commerce through the navigable air space of the

United States.” [Emphasis supplied.|

Section 1 (24) of the Act, 49 U.S.C.A., $401 (24), de-

fines “navigable air space” as follows: “ ‘Navigable air

space’ means air space above the minimum altitudes of

flight preseribed by regulations issued under this Act.”

Pursuant to authority granted » Civil Aeronautics

Act of 1938, the Civil Aeronauties Board issued Civil Air

Regulations (14 C.F.R.. Parts 1-190). Among these Regu-

lations, Section 60.17, Part 60 (Air Traffic Rules), which

establishes Yninimum safe altitudes of flight at 1000 feet

over congested areas and 500 feet over other than con-

gested areas, is prefaced with the following: “Except

when necessary for take-off or landing, no person shall

operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:”. The

County of Allegheny contends that this exeeption means

that minimum safe altitudes of flight for take-offs and

landings have been established at the heighis necessary

for these purposes.’ The County concludes, therefore,

[fol. 329} that the “navigable air space” which Congress

placed within the public domain includes all air space

needed by an airplane for take-off or landing.

While the conclusion has the rationale of reality to

support it, we are precluded from adopting it by the

Supreme Court's interpretation of similar regulations in

United States x. Caush,, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The de-

cision in that case upheld the claimant's right to damages

from the United States for a taking of certain of his

? This is now the position of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Civil

Air Regulations_Interpretation 1, 19 F.R. 4602, July 27, 1954.

J

84

property located near an airport because of a substantial

interference with his use and enjoyment of it by low

flights of U. S. military planes, when taking off from or

landing at the airpert. in answer to an argument similar

to that which the County of Allegheny makes here, the

Supreme Court said (at pp. 263-264), “The fact that the

path of ghde taken by the planes was approved by the

Civil Aeronauties Authority does not change the result.

The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in

the public domain is ‘airspace above the minimum safe

altitudes of flight prescribed by the (bil Aeronautics Au-

thority. 49 U.S.C., see. 180. If that agency prescribed

83 feet [the height at which the planes passed over

Causby’s land} as the minimum safe altitude, then we

would have presented the question of the validity of the

reguiation. But nothing of the sort has been done. The

path of glide governs the method of operating—of landing

or taking off. The altitude required for that operation

is not the minimum safe altitude of flight which is the

downward reach of the navigable airspace. The minimum

prescribed by the Authority is 500 feet during the day

and 1,000 feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air Regu-

lations, Pt. 61, sections 61.7400, 61.7401, Code Fed. Reg.

Cum. Supp, Tit. 14, ch. 1), and from 300 feet to 1,000

feet for other aircraft, depending on the type of plane and

the character of the terrain. Id. Pt. 60, sections 60.350-

{ fol. 330) 60.3505, Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., supra. Hence,

the flights in question were not within the navigable air-

space which Congress piaced within the public domain.

If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were

included, flights which were so close to the land as to

render it uninhabitable would be immune. But the United

States concedes, as we have said, that in that event there

would be a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of

glide is not the minimum safe altitude of flight within the

meaning of the statute. The Civil Aeronauties Authority

has, of course, the power to prescribe air traffic rules. But

Congress has defined navigable airspace only in terms of

one of them—the minimum safe altitudes of flight.” *

* The Supreme Court of Washington recently rejected the iden-

treal argument, based upon Section 60.17, Part 60, of the Civil Air

ation =o

|

A

85

Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the navigable

air space which Congress placed in the publie domain does

not inciude the path of glide for an airplane's take-off or

landing. As we are, of course. bound by the Supreme

Court's interpretation of the federal statutes involved, we

are, perforce, required to reject the County's contention

that navigable air space, as employed by Congress, in-

cludes the area necessary for an airplane's take-off: or

landing in safety.

(fol. 331] But, even though the complained of flights

were not through air space which was part ef the public

domain, the record does not show that the County of

Allegheny was the efficient legal cause of dny dainage

resulting from the flights. Griggs testified at the hear-

ing before the viewers that the airplanes of several com-

mercial airlines flew over hie land at low altitudes. But,

he offered no proof, however, that any of these planes

were owned by the County of Allegheny er operated by

its agents. Indeed, the viewers Tound as a fact that “There

is ne evidence of any contro? exercised over any aircraft

by the County of Allegheny.” That finding, supported as

it is by the reeord, precludes the claimant from recovering

against the County in this proceeding.

In unwarrantediy awarding damages to Griggs, the

viewers relied upon a finding of fact that the County, in

Regulations, that the County of Allegheny is now pressing upon us,

quoting this paragraph from United States ¥. Causby, supra. Acker-

man V. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). ao gre

*Congress moved te counteract the effect of the decision in

United States v. Caushy, supra, by enacting the Federal Aviation

A

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