Transcript of Record — Griggs v. Allegheny County
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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD
Supreme Court of the United States -
OCTOBER TERM, 1961
No. 81
THOMAS N. GRIGGS, PETITIONER,
2
vs.
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
>
>
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED APRIL 18, 1961
CERTIORARI GRANTED JUNE 5, 1961
“
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1961
No. 81
THOMAS N. GRIGGS, PETITIONER,
“ vs.
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY
¥
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ,
\
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
INDEX
Original Print
Record from the Court of Common Pleas of Alle-
gheny County, Commonwealth of espe
Petition for appointment of Viewers —...._____. 4 1
Order of court appointing Board of Vie iewers - 13 7
Order of court instructing Board of Viewers — Be A 15 9
Amendment to = for appointment of ~
Viewett 2560 Mee & eet § dee 18 11
Order of court approving ; amendment te petition
for.appointment of Viewers ___. aaa Sire 19 12
Proceedings before the Board of Viewers . 20 12
Transcript of testimony —.—._____________.. 20 12
Dc Ee 20
Offers in qvidente icatleeiiiariicte Lscieac Nica giamionmiseieries 20 12
Excerpts from testimony of Thomas: N. >
ee Grete a 49 ----16
Report of Viewers 193 .28
Exhibit 1—Plaintiff’s request tor findings of
fact and conelusion of law 208 38
Exhibit 2—Defendant’s proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law for considera-
tion of the Board of Viewers —_..__ 218 45
Recorp Press, Printers, New York, N. Y., Juty 24, 1961
Record from the Court of Common Pieas of Alle-
gheny County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
—Continued
Proceedings before the Board of Viewers—Con-
tinued
Report of Viewers—Continued.
Exhibit 3—Plaintiff’s exceptions to prelimi-
nary report of Board of Viewers
Exhibit ~4—Defendant’s exceptions to award
of Board of Viewers _____ Sone
Order of court of May 29, 1958
Exceptions of plaintiff to report of Board of
Viewers
Exceptions of defendant to report of Board of
Viewers
Opinion, Soffel, J.
Order referring matter back to Board of Viewers
Supplemental report of Board of Viewers __..__
Order of court dismissing exceptions to report of
Board of Viewers
Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Western District i
Docket entries in Case No. 155 _.. pt SEER
Docket entries in Case No. 158
Opinion, Jones, Ch. J.
Dissenting opinion, Bell, J.
Clerk’s certificate (omitted in printing) _._.___
Amendment to Grant Agreement between the
United States and the County of Allegheny,
Pennsylvania (excerpt from the Supplemental
brief and appendix filed by the County of Alle-
gheny, etc.)
Order allowing certiorari
Original Print
226 50
228 52
229 53
231 54
233 55
236 58
257 71
258 72
263 75
265 76
221 76
321 76
323 78
325 80
333 87
347 99
349 =: 100
362 108
a nrc» AD.
[fol. 1]
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS -
OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Allegheny, ss.:
No. 2384—July Term 1958
Tuomas N. Griaes
v.
#4
i]
County or ALLEGHENY
[fol. 4]
Petition ror APPOINTMENT OF VieEwERS—Filed May 29, 1958
To the Honorable, The Judges of said Court:
The petition of Thomas N. Griggs respectfully repre-
sents:
First: That he was on May 31, 1952, and for some period
of time prior and subsequent to said date, the owner of a
certain tract of real estate in the Township of Moon,
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, described as follows:
ALL that certain tract of land situate in the Township
of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows:
BEGINNING at the intersection of the Macadam
Road, known as the Coraopolis Road, with the West-
erly line of property now or formerly of Witfiam
McClinton Heirs, and running thence by the center of
said Coraopolis Road South 65° 26’ West Five Hun-
dred Twenty-three (523) fé@§ to the center of a Ma-
cadam Road known as the Beaver Grade Road; thence
by the same North 21° 9 West Fifty-five and 53/100
(55.53) feet to’ a point; thence by the same North
15° 41’ West Four Hundred Twenty and one-half
(420-14) tink. a point; thence by the same North
26° 29 West Six Hundred Sixty-one and 14/100
(661.14) feet to a point; thence by the same North
(fol. 5] 38° 31’ West Three Hundred’ Fifty-seven and
84/100 (357.84) feet to the center of road known as
the Thorn Rffm Road; thence by said Road North
54° 51’ East Three Hundred Seventy and 93/100
(370.93) feet to-a point; thence by ‘the.same North
47° 27’. East Three Sixteen and one-half
(316-4) feet to line of land now or formerly of Wil-
liam McClinton Heirs aforesaid; and thence by said
McClinton land South 21° East Sixteen Hundred Forty-
eight (1648) feet to the place of beginning.
CONTAINING 19.161 acres.
HAVING erected thereon a two-story stone dwelling
house, a-frame dwelling house and outbuildings.
Second: The defendant owns certain real estate in said
Moon Township upon which it erected, maintains and oper-
ates the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The said Greater
Pittsburgh Airport was opened for commercial use on, to
wit, June 1, 1952, and has been in continuoug-use since
that time as an air terminal for the transportation for hire
of passengers and cargo by air carriers and will continue
to be so used.
Third: The defendant has entered into a lease with each
of the airlines using said airport whereby, for certain ~
considerations unknown to plaintiff, the airlines are granted
{fol. 6] the right of ingress and egress to and from said
airport; said lessees of the defendant being the Trans
World Airlines, Inc., Eastern Airlines, Inc., Northwest
Airlines, Inc., Capital Airlines, The Allegheny Airlines,
Lake Central Airlines and later the United Airlines and
the American Airlines.
Fourth: The defendant erected and maintains neces-
sary facilities of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport three (3)
runways for airplanes, being the East-West runway, the
Northeast-Southwest runway and the Northwest-South.
Ya
3
east runway. The Northeast-Southwest runway is so erected
and inaintained that it points directly towards plaintiff's
premises described in Paragraph First hereof at a distance
of about one-half mile therefrom.
Fifth: From the opening of the Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port for commercial use, to wit, June 1, 1952, the aircraft
of the several airlines under certain weather conditions
take off at the extreme Northeast end of the said North-
east-Southwest runway towards plaintiff’s property, and,
in landing, glide low over plaintiff's property in order to
land at the extreme Northeast end of said runway.
Sixth: The aircraft of the several airlines landing upon
or taking off from the Northeast runway, descend thereto
or ascend therefrom over plaintiff’s property below the
[fol. 7] safe navigable airspace as fixed and established by
the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to the Acts of
Congress for such case made and provided and as con-
curred in by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Authority. The
said safe navigable airspace begins in rural areas, at five
hundred (500) feet above the ground or above any building
erected thereon, and in copgested areas at one thousand
(1000) feet therefrom.
Seventh: From the opening of the biceiee Pittsburgh
Airport and the beginning of the use of the Northeast-
Southwest runway, to wit, June 1, 1952, there have been
continued flights of aircraft over the aforesaid described
property of plaintiff in landing at and taking off from the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport. That said flights were and
are below the safe navigable airspace as specified by the
-Civil Aeronautics Board, namely five hundred (500) feet,
and were and are at low levels and close to the property
aforesaid.
Eighth: That by reason of said low flights the property
of the plaintiff was and is greatly damaged and depre-
ciated in value; that the use and enjoyment of the property
have been interfered with by reason of the possible danger
of the low flights, the noise and vibrations which they cause,
their lights pointing at the premises at night time and inter-
ference with sleep and rest.
Ninth: The property of the plaintiff as herein described
is within the “approach zone” as specified in the Zoning
{fol. 8] Regulations of the defendant adopted January 4,
1954 by authority of the Airport Zoning Act of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania 2 P.S. 1550-1563, which reads
in part as follows:
“In any case in which (1) it is desired to remove,
lower or otherwise terminate a nonconforming struc-
ture, or use, or (2) the approach protection necessary
cannot, because of constitutional limitations, be pro-
vided by airport zoning regulations under this act, or
(3) it appears advisabl¢é that the necessary approach
protection be provided by acquisition of property
rights, rather than by airport zoning regulations, the
political subdivision within which the property or non-
conforming (sic) is located, or the political subdivision
owning the airport, or served by it, may acquire by pur-
chase, grant or condemnation, in the manner provided
by the law, under which political subdivisions are au-
thorized to acquire real property for public purposes,
such air right avigation easement, or other estate or
interest in the property or nonconforming, structure,
or use in question, as may be necessary to effectuate
the purpose of this act.”
Tenth: The property of the plaintiff is within the glide
angle plane for the said Northeast-Southwest runway,
which glide angle plane is in the “appreach zone” and
{fol.9] is a trapezoidal plane; that-is to say, the ghde
angle plane starts ait the Northeast end of the paved por-
tion of the Northeast-Southwest runway at a level of the
paving and thence slopes upward at the rate of one (1)
foot vertically for each forty (40) feet horizontally for
such distance as may be within the limits of the so-called
approach zone. The said glide angle’ plane as located on
plaintiff's premises is below the “floor” of the navigable
airspace as so prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Board
and concurred in by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Au-
thority. The center line of said glide angle plane is near
the house erected thereon and that the bottom of said
°
5
plane is about fifteen (15) to thirty (30) feet. above the
chimney.
‘Eleventh: Immediately after the Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port was opened for commercial use, to wit, June 1, 1952,
and the low flights over plaintiff's property began, the
plaintiff, and other property owners in the area whose
properties were similarly affected, made demand upon
defendant to make just compensation for the damage either
by agreement or by condemnation as provided for in the
statute above quoted in part.
Twelfth: Defendant in response to such demand denied
that it was or is liable for the damage caused by the low
flights and has failed and refused to pass the necessary
resolution for the condemnation of the avigation easements
[{fol. 10] necessary for egress and ingress to said airport
with consequent payment of damages.
Thirteenth: The airlirn@s likewise having denied liability,
your plaintiff entered an action in equity at No. 1288
October Term, 1955 in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County wherein he named the defendant County
and the several airlines as parties defendant and made
demand that said defendants be required to compensate for
the damage or that tne low flights over his property be
enjoined.
Fourteenth: The aforesaid suit and companion suits of
other property owners similarly affected have been before
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on preliminary and
procedural questions. While no final determination has
been made of said suits and they are still pending, the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that in those proceedings
the Court of Common‘Pleas of Allegheny County sitting
in equity cannot award damages consequential or otherwise
for property taken, injured or destroyed as a necessary
and unavoidable consequence of the construction and oper-
ation of the airport by Allegheny County for public use
under statutory authority.
Fifteenth: The defendant in its Answer filed subsequent
to the opinion of the Supreme Court entered May 23, 1955
at 382 Pa. page 88, asserts that the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport is a public improvement constructed and main-
{fol. 11] tained by defendant to provide airport and air
transport facilities for the use of the general public and
is one of the major facilities of the commercial and civilian
transportation system of the United States, and is a major
instrumentality in the commerce and postal system.
Sixteenth; The airlines serving the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport, in their Answer filed after the opinion of the
Supreme Court aforesaid, assert that to enable the public
to have facilities for air transport of passengers and
cargo, which facilities are necessary for the functioning of
the airport, it is necessary that airplanes enter and leave
the airport by passing through the airspace above the
plaintiff’s property below five hundred (500) feet.
Seventeenth: Defendant County likewise asserts that
such flights over plaintiff’s property below five hundred
(500) feet are necessary for egress and ingress to said
airport.
Eighteenth: That the dwelling house on said property
was occupied by your petitioner and his family from 1944,
and subsequent thereto, and that there are no ofher parties
in interest.
Nineteenth: There are no liens or mortgages affecting
plaintiff’s property.
Twentieth: .Based upon the aforementioned assertion
of the defendant and the airlines serving the Greater
{fol. 12] Pittsburgh Airport in their Answers filed in the
said suit and the location of plaintiff’s property on the
glide angle of the Northeast runway of said Greater
Pittsburgh Airport, plaintiff avers that as a necessary and
unavoidable consequence of the operation of the Greater
Pittsburgh Airport, the defendant, by reason of its right
of eminent domain, has im fact appropriated for public use
avigation rights or easements over and across plaintiff's
property for the purpose of providing access to the airport
by the planes of the airlines.
Bowes de
7
Wherefore your petitioner prays that your Honorable
Court appoint a Board of Viewers in the manner provided
by law and direct that: j
>=
1. The Board of Viewers shall, in limine, determine
whether the erection and operation of.the Greater Pitts-
burgh Airport beginning on June 1, 1952 with consequent
necessary and unavoidable use of the airspace over and
across plaintiff’s property below the safe navigable air-
space for the purpose of egress and ingréss to and from
said Greater. Pittsburgh Airport constituted in fact an
appropriation or “taking” by the defendant of an avigation
easement over said property;
2. After the litigation as to the determination of the
question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1. is finally
“decided by the Beard of Viewers, or by a court of fixal
{fol. 13] jurisdiction in the@ase, such determination shall
be conclusive upon the parties ; :
3. Should the Board of Viewers determine that there
was an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant, then
it shall ascertain and award just compenSation to your
petitioner for the damage’ to his property arising out of
such condemnation by the defendant.
And Your Petitioner Will Ever Pray, Ete. |
Thomas N. Griggs, By William A. Blair, Attorney
in Fact.
Ix tHe Covpr or Common P:=as
Orper or Court Apporxtixc Boarp or ViEwERsS—
May 29, 1958
And Now, to wit, this 29th day of May, 1958, on motion
of William A. Blair and David B. Faweett, Attorneys for
petitioner, the Court appoints Thomas P. Trimble, Jr.,
Thomas M. Conrad and Paul G. McAtee, as a Board of
Viewers upon the foregoing Petition and further orders
that the Board of Viewers perform its duties in accord-
ance with the law and Acts of Assembly in such case made
8
and provided ; View - Tuesday, June 24, 1958 - 10 A.M.
o’clock D.S.T., Returnable - First Monday, March, 1959;
And Further:
It appearing to the Court that there are differences of
opinion as to whether Thomas N. Griggs is entitled to
[fol. 14] collect damages described in the Petition for
Appointment of VieWers; and
It further appearing that if all the questions involved
in this case are to be decided at the same time, the Board
of Viewers would be unduly burdened by the evidence so
that it would be required to hear testimony that would
ultimately be ruled irrelevant.
It Is Therefore Ordered and Decreed:
1. The Board of Viewers Shall, in limine, determine
whether the erection and operation of the Greater Pitts-
burgh Airport by the defendant beginning on June 1, 1952
with consequent necessary and unavoidable use of the air-
space over and across the aforesaid described property
“below the safe navigable airspace for the purpose of in-
gres¢ and egress to and from said Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port constituted in fact an appropriation or “taking” by
the defendant of an avigation easement over said property;
_ 2. After the litigation as to the determination of the
question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1. is final
decided by the Board of Viewers, or hy a court of
jurisdiction in the case, such determination shail be con-
clusive upon the parties as to whether there was such
appropriation or “taking” by the defendant;
3. Should the Board of Viewers determine that there
was an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant, then
[fol. 15] it shall ascertain and award just compensation to
the plaintiff for the damage to his property arising out of
such condemnation by thé’ defendant.
By the Court, Weiss.
In tHE Court or Common PLEas
Orper oF Court Instructine Boarp or ViEwERS—
June 19, 1958
And now, to-wit, this 19th day of June, 1958 it appearing
to the Court that on May 2%, 1958, this Court entered the
following order: ,
“Anp now, to wit, this 29th-day of May, 1958, on
motion of William A. Blair and David B. Faweett,
Attorneys for petitioner, the Court appomts Thomas
¥ Trimble, Jr., Thomas M. Conrad and Paul G. Me-
Atee as a Board ot Viewers upon the foregoing Peti-_
tion and further orders that the Board of Viewers per- _
form its duties in accordance With the law and Acts
of Assembly in such case made and provided. View
Tuesday, June 24, 1958—10:00 A.M. Returnable Ist
Monday in March, 1959.
: “Axp FURTHER
“It appearing to the Court that there are differences
of opinion as to whether Thomas N. Griggs is entitled
[fol. 16] to collect damages-described in the Petition
for Appointment of Viewers; and
“It further appearing that if all the questions in-
‘volved in this case are to be decided at the same time,
the Board of+¢ Viewers would be unduly. burdened by
the evidence sc that it would be required to hear testi-
mony that would ultimately be ruled irrelevant.
a
“It Is THEREFORE ORDERED aND DeEcreeED: “
°o
“1. The Board of Viewers shall, in limine, deter-
mine whether the erection and operation of the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport by the defendant begin-
ning June 1, 1952 with consequent necessary and un-
avoidable use of the airspace over and across the
afgresaid described property below the safe navigable
airspace for the purpose of ingress and egress to and
from said Greater Pittsburgh Airport constituted in
10
fact an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant of
an avigation easement over said property;
“2. After the litigation as to the determination of
the question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1., is
finally decided by the Board of Viewers, or by a court
of final jurisdiction in the case, such determination
shall be conclusive upon the parties as to whether there
was such appropriation or “taking” by the defendant;
{fol.17}] “3. Should the Board of Viewers determine
that there was an appropriation or “taking” by the
defendant, then it shall ascertain and award just
compensation to the plaintiff for the damage to his
property arising out of such condemnation by the de-
fendant.
BY tHe Court
s/ Weiss, J.”
and it further appearing to the Court that in order that
there be a prompt adjudication of the matters in dispute
that the proceedings follow the ordinary and usual course:
Now, therefore it is ordered and decreed that the Order
entered May 29, 1958 be and the same is hereby vacated
and it is further ordered and decreed that the following
order be and the same is hereby entered:
.. There is hereby appointed by this Court from the mem-
bers of the permanent Board of Viewers appointed by law
Thomas P. Trimble, Thomas M. Conrad and Paul G.
McAtee as viewers in the matter within mentioned, and the
said viewers are hereby ordered and directed to meet upon
the line of the improvement and view the same and the
‘premises affected thereby on Tuesday, the 24th day of
June, 1958, at 10:00 o’clock A.M., E.D.S.T.; to hold such
meetings as are necessary and hear all parties and wit-
nesses in relation thereto and decide and true report make
[{fol. 18] ‘concerning all matters and things submitted in
relation to which they are authorized to inquire as directed
by Acts of Assembly in such cases made and provided;
the said viewers to give all parties notice as required by
a
11
Acts of Assembly and rules of this Court, and file a
report in this Court on or before the Ist Monday of
March, 1959, unless the time is hereaftercextended.
By the Court
W.
In tHe Court or Common PLEas
AMENDMENT 80 PETITION FOR Arromrrusut oF VIEWERS-—
Filed Janyary 15, 1959
To the Honorable, the Judges of Said Court:
And now, comes the petitioner, Thomas N. Griggs, and
moves the Court that he may be permitted to amend Para-
graph Twentieth of the Petition for Appointment of View-
ers filed in the above proceeding to read as #eHows:
Twentieth: Based upon the aforementioned asser-
tion of the defendant and the airlines serving the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport in their Answers filed in
the said suit and the location of plaintiff's property
- on the glide angle of the Northeast runway of said
Greater Pittsburgh Airport, plaintiff avers that as a
[fol.19] necessary and unavoidable consequence of
‘the operation of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, the
defendant, by reason of its right of eminent domain,
for the purpose of providing access to the airport by
aircraft of the airlines, has in fact appropriated for
public use an easement or fee simple interest in the
airspace over plaintiff’s property necessary for such
purpose.
Thomas N. Griggs, Petitioner.
12
~ Is tHe Court or Common PLEas
Orper oF Court ApprRoviInc AMENDMENT TO PETITION FOR
APPOINTMENT oF ViEwers—January 16, 1959
And now, to wit, this 16th day of January, 1959, the
foregoing Petition to amend the original Petition for
Appointment of Viewers having been presented in open
Court, and hearing had thereon, and upon consideration
thereof, the amendment is approved and ordered to be filed.
By the Court
ae
[fol. 20]
Proceepincs Berore THE Boarp oF VIEWERS
Transcript of Testimony—Filed July 15,-1959
VIeweERs: ~
Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Esquire |
Thomas M. Conrad ae
Paul G. McAtee
APPEARANCES
William A. Blair, Esquire, David B. Fawcett, Esquire,
Counsel for plaintiff.
Maurice A. Louik, Esquire, John W. Mamula, Esquire
Counsel for County of Allegheny.
Heagrxo Date—January 26, 1959
Orrers 1n EvipENce__
Mr. Blair: May I offer in evidence Deed for the purpose
of showing title only, of Mabelle R. McMahon, widow, to
Thomas N. Griggs, dated the 22nd day of January, 1945,
covering certain property, as will later be described, in
the Township of Moon, and recorded in Deed Book Volume
2827, page 386. If your Honors please, when we visited the
Airport with the County and I believe Mr. Conrad was
° 13
also present, they made available to use there certain
maps which I think are necessary in the determination of
the various facts relating to the problem before this Court.
We will offer this general map in evidence as Exhibit “B”
which shows locations—
[fol.21}] Mr. Louik: If you tell us what date you are con-
cerned with we will be able to furnish master plans as
of prior dates.
Mr. Blair: I don’t know that that is very material.
Mr. Louik: This is a master plan as of 1957.
Mr. Blair: Shows no change with respect to ‘the north-
east-southwest runway from the time the Airport opened?
Mr. Louik: That is right. ,
4 Blair: We offer in evidence Exhibit “C” which is a
prmt showing the approach zone from the northeast run-
way and which includes the Griggs property as well as that
of K. C. Gardner, each of which is located within the
approach zone as shown on that map. This map also shows
the elevations of the houses and the center line of the
approaeh zone.
“ Mr. Faweett: ‘T. is m~p is marked as the approach zone
and glide angle of *’ - northeast runway and it is dated
October 9, 1953.
Mr. Biair: I will offer this plan in evidence and it is
agreed by Counsel for the County and the plaintiff that
there has been no change in the glide angle or approach
zone since the opening of the Airport for commercial pur-
poses in June of 1952. We offer/in evidence Exhibit “D”
which is a sketch of the northeast glide angle from the end
[fol. 22] of the northeast runway showing the glide angle
over the Griggs property @nd ground elevation as well as
the elevation of the house on the property. I asked for the
Airport Zoning Ordinance. Do you have it?
Mr. Louik: If the Court please, we have all these papers
available and we will bring them over upon request.
Mr. Trimble: The zone map as it is called as well as the
zoning regulations.
Mr. Blair: I offer plaintiff’s Exhibit “E” being an Air-
port Zoning Regulation of the County of Allegheny, Penn-
sylvania.
\ ye
J
VY
14 .
Mr. Mamula: We object to the offer of the Airport
Zoning Ordifance as being immaterial in connection with
the present socegsae-
Mr. Trimble: ere will have to be a further reason
than immateriality. I am not going to sustain an objection
on immateriality. You will have to be specific.
Mr. Mamula: Objected to for the reason that the Air-
port Zoning is not to be construed as a basis for the taking
of any private property in and about the Airport insofar
as the restrictions on use. It has no bearing in the pro-
ceeding before this Board.
Mr. Trimble: Might the zoning map which is part of the
zoning regulations itself be construed as in any way, shape
{fol. 23] or form fixing a metes and bounds over this
property to such an extent that it might be considered an
easement? .
Mr. Mamula: The question of the type, the frequency
and the number of flights that go over the property of the
plaintiff is the issue at hand and whether such flights, the
type, nature and their frequency constitutes a taking is, I
think, the mandate to this Board to determine that only
and not as to whether or not‘there is some restriction on
use insofar as height or type of stri ‘ture that can be
erected on plaintiff's property, which is a separate and
distinct principle. Isn’t that what we are doing here—
that the issue has been remanded to your Board to make
certain findings that will determine the quantum of the
take, the nature of the take, if any, over what property,
and the date of the taking—all of which is to be the result
of the compilation of data and testimony here so that you
ean teil the type, nature and the frequency of flight. Enact-
ing an Ordinance doesn’t constitute any of the elements—
the factual elementz that I understood this proceeding to
embrace.
Mr. Trimble: Up to this moment. I am going to admit
it and I will rule on it later. I want to see what has been
done by the County.
Mr. Blair: I think the Board has a mandate from the
Supreme Court to determine everything that has been done
in connection with the Airport situation and the Zoning
15
[fol. 24] Ordinance is very pertinent to that as it assumes
dominance over airspace within those zones as shown on
the zoning map.
Mr. Trimble: I just jet it in. We will rule later as to
whether or not it is material.
Mr. Louik: I'd like to add one thing. The zoning regu-
lations do only one thing. They limit certain uses and
they limit the certain heights of structures. Now, if the
plaintiff is intending that we took the property by reason
of the adoption of the zoning regulations I think he is im-
properly before this Court. That weuld invalidate the zon-
ing regulations and the proper procedure would have been
an attack upon the zoning reguiations. If that is not the
basis then the uses—the } tion of the uses of this
property has nothing to do witthis case.
Mr. Blair: It does have directly because the zoning ordi-
nance was issued for ihe purpose of providing safe access
in and out of the Airport by the airplanes which use the
Airpert, and the County has undertaken to prescribe those
regulations, what may or may net be done within those
particular zones leading to the runways.
Mr. Louik: is nO’ more pertinent than the City
zoning regulations limiting the residences that may be
so constructed. It is not an issue before this Board.
{fol.25] Mr. Trimble: We may so find when we come to
that point. We are net ¢ ing to rule on it now.
Mr. Blair: I offer als» as Exhibit “F” the zoning map
of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport.
Mr. Mamula: We enter the same objection to the zoning
map as we did to the zoning ordinance and for thesame
reason.
Mr. Trimble: 1 will rule Jateg-on it. We are guing to
get everything into this thing so we can have on: hearing
and one hearing only. The Board will make the rulings
later.
Mr. Blair: If your Honors please, we asked the County
to furnish lease agreements with the air lines relating to
the use of the Airport. .
Mr. Trimble: The County has informed the Board they
would do it when they were requested and I am sure they
will.
a
Mr. Blair: I ask that they be produced.
Mr. Louik: So as not to clutter up this record we have
identical agreements with all of the air ines. Do you want
us to bring all of the agreements or will one agreement be
sufficient?
Mr. Blair: Was it a uniform agreement with all of
them? .
Mr. Louik: It is a uniform agreement with all of the
air lines which were entered into either in June of 1952
or subsequently when the new air lines came and we have
{fol.26} a renewal of that agreement in °57. We can
bring one agreement that was entered into in 1952 and fol-
low it up with an agreement when it ran out in June of —
1957.
Mr. Fawcett: Were the agreements for five year pe-
riods? 4
Mr. Louik: The air lines that were there.
(Off the record discussion. )
Mr. Biair: If your Honors please, we also ask to be
produced at the present time the lease and agreement
between the County and the Federal Government relating
to the Airport the agreement as to the erection of the Air-
port, the contribution of the Government and wiatever
ebligation the County assumed with regard to the opera-
tion of that Airport.
Mr. Louik: As I told Mr. Trimble. we have several
hundred agreements with different agencies of the Federal
Government and we have a number of grants and agree-
I still don’t know exactly what you want.
Mr. Trimble: We are only talking about the flight of
aircraft.
Mr. Leuik: We have an agreement with the Air Force
for the use of certain area of the Airport and we have
what is known as a grant agreement. We have a number
[fol. 27] of those whereby they have contributed certain
funds to the County. They are all identical and we can
bring over one.
Mr. Blair: Do you have a master agreement at the be-
ginning or do they all show the obligation of the County?
4
17
Mr. Louik: Every time we request aid from th® Federal
Government there is a grant agreement and there are any
number of those. They are all identical—a statutory form
Athat the Federal Government has and we can bring those
over. s.
Mr. Trimble: To what extent would they be material?
Mr. Blair: Under the Federal Airport Act which pro-
vides for aid by the Federal Government to municipalities
in connection with the operation of the Airport it says the
condition precedent to the approval of the Commissioner,
or whatever the head of that department was in Washing-
ton, of a project ander this chapter, the Administrator
shail receive assurances in writing, satisfactory to him
that all facilities of the Airport developed with Federal
Aid and all those usable for the landing and take-off of
aircraft will be available to the United States for military
and naval aircraft in common with other aircraft—and
there are obligations under that Act that are assumed when
a municipality receives contributions or aid from the Fed-
eral. Government. Se
[fol. 28] Mr. Louik: I would like to say this—we will
bring them ovyr, but I weuld like to call the Board's atten-
tion to the recent case handed down in California in con-
nection with the Western Air Lines where it was specifi-
cally held by the Court of Appeals out there that any
provision of the grant agreement of the Federal Govern-
ment were not or could not be used by a private party in a
ease against the Airport or the Air Lines, but we will have
a copy of these grant agreements here. We don’t believe
there is anything in that agreement that has a bearing on
this case, but we will bring it in. We do have an agree-
ment with the Air Foree about the military planes: They
have exclusive use of a certain portion of that field. We
have basically two types of arrangements with the Federal!
Government. One is the grant agreement which is signed
by any Airport that receives Federal aid. In addition, we
have at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport something which
they have only at a few Airports and that is we have a
lease agreement with the Federal Government whereby
they have exclusive use of a certain portion of the field at
the Greater Pittsburgh Airport and they also have use in
18
common with all other users of the Airport the remaining
portion of the field. That agreement was entered into back
in 1945 or 1946, and it runs for some twenty-five years. I
did not understand that Mr. Blair asked for that.
{fol. 29] “Mr. Trimble: I would think he is talking of the
way he would like to tie in that the.County gets a grant
from the United States ahd in partial consideration the
County must not refuse admission te Miny military planes.
Mr. Blair: If you keep in mind that’ Airport legislation
in Washington is to prombte air travel, not for military
alone, but for the publie—they woul have no inclination
gto contribute to the Gteater Pittsburgh Airport to serve
unless it was going to be used for the receiving of the
public as well as the military and that Act so says. They’d
never grant funds to g“Municipality only for the purpose
of. the military. They"W operate it themselves if that were
the case. a :
Mr. Trimble: That is in addition to the other conditions? -
Private and public air lines and also the military?
Mr. Blair: That is right. To promote air commerce.
I'd like to ask the County if they have taken any records of
altitudes of flights over these properties and measurements
- by decibels of sounds over the said properties?
Mr. Louik: If the Court please, I don’t think we have
to produce our evidence to the plaintiff. I don’t think we
. have to reveal what we Have done to prepare oti¥ case.
Mr. Trimble: We will get to that later on. :
e “Se eee, ° ° .
[fol. 49] Tuomas N. Gricss, sworn:
Direct examination:
By Mr. Blair:
Q. Mr. Griggs, will you describe just what took place
with regard to plane operation over your property begin-
ning in June of 1952? Was there a pattern of flight?
A. Mr. Blair, beginning in June of 1952, with the open-
ing of the commercial airport there began a stream of
planes landing dnd taking off over my residence and land-
\
19
ing and taking off and causing the results to which I testi-
fied this morning and in addition other results. I have to
explain in connection with my prior answers that runway
use is partially a matter of wind direction. The altitude of
planes coming in over a runway or going out over a runway
varies to some degree with the weight of the equipment,
[fol. 50] the size of the plane, and also with weather con-
ditions, but from June 2, 1952, when that runway was in
use with commercial airplanes the living conditions in that
house. were unbearable. '
Q. Did you notice the type of airplanes?
A. Yes sir—and I kept—not continuous records, but I
kept some records of the use of that runway. I turn first
here in 1952 and I think the first record I have in this book
is Sunday, June 15—late Sunday afternoon—planes—Alle-
gheny Air Lines, Capital and T.W.A.
Q. How did you know those airplanes?
A. I could see the designations on the ships.
Q. You mean you could read the letters on the planes?
A. Yes sir. And other times I knew the designations on
the tails and on the fuselage. I could identify the planes
and very often could pick them that way—also the colors.
Q. What did you notice about them on that date for
instance?
A. I noticed they were coming close to my tree tops.
I also noticed the noise. The next note I have is Monday,
June 16, planes at dinner time and in the evening; wakened
three times during the night and in the early morning,
and I marked that I had seen both T.W.A. and Capital
that day. Now, I note here because I said I couldn’t keep
these records always and J don’t think it was my burden to,
{fol.51] but Monday, the 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th I was
away. My next note—nlanes landing Sunday June 29 in
the late afternoon. My next notation—planes landing late
afternoon Sunday—June 29. Wednesday, July 2—planes
\ landing. Thursday, July 3—planes landing.
Q. Why did you notice them particularly, Mr. Griggs?
A. Because they interfered with my life and my use and
my happiness in my home.
Q. Because of the height, noise—or what was it?
20
A. Because of the noise when planes were landing, Mr.
Blair, and also you will find places where they are taking
off and that also interfered with my life. L_aiso had some
fears in connection with it because the planes were so close
to my house, and those fears were confirmed at a later date
as to which I shall testify after I get through with this
part of it. ‘
Q. Any vibration caused by these planes? ~-
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did you notice that and what effect did it have?
A. Window frames would rattle, and I noticed I could
feel vibration on the second floor, and sometimes—I am
not going to say these particular days, as I testified before
the planes would go by and I could hear plaster drop be-
hind the walls, little noises of plaster.
{fol. 52) Q. Did you have any idea how high those planes
were or have any knowledge of their height?
A. Mr. Blair, what I think I would prefer to do is put in
my records and come back to the place because I want to
identify something here. ©
Q. Okay—proceed.
A. I was out of town early in June, getting home on
July 10. On Saturday, July 12, planes were landing all
day and night over my house, and that is a night when
I had about two or three hours sleep. On Sunday, July 13,
there were planes early. Monday, July 14, I was at
home in the evening and I have this notation that planes
were landing—6:00 P.M.—on trees. What I meant by that
was on or near the tree tops. I was on the ‘phone-—heard
the planes. I noted here I had seven telephone calls that
evening and I had to interrupt them because of these
planes and put them in later. My notes at 8:00 P.M. on
that day—T.W.A. plane over the house and I could read
the number of it. At least the number is here. 4 show
at 8:00 o’clock an Air Force plane was down towards the
road. I show then—over the trees—a private plane. I
show at 8:10 Capital Airlines; 8:12 an Air Force plane;
8:12—was an Air Force plane; 8:15 T.W.A. These times
—whether it be 8:15 or 8:1514—they are as close as I
could take them because I wasn’t working with a stop
21
[{fol. 53] watch. 8:45 Capital; 8:46 National; 9:00 o’clock
—private red plane; 9:10 T.W.A.; 9:23—I have noted
lights were on—T.W.A. The next plane after that—Alle-
gheny Airlines—as nearly as I could tell. Next plane—
9:25 Army; 9:40 T.W.A. or Capital—I couldn’t be sure.
I have something here I can’t read with ditto marks for
9:43; 9:48 and 9:52. I have at 11:00 and 12:00 during
the night—wakened; and 5:00 A.M., and 7:00 A.M. the
next morning. The pext night my note is—worked until
11:30; 12:00 midni§ft plane overhead. Wednesday, July
16, 5:00 A.M.—wakened. I was around the house in the
morning and a transport went over when I was on the
telephone. Several Army planes low over trees in front
of house. 1:05 Allegheny Airlines—over trees. Then
marked here some jets and transports, from 2:00 until 4:30.
Capital—4:40; followed by Air Force; T.W.A. at 4:40;
Capital—4 :43; Capital—4:45; T.W.A.—4:46. Then a jet
over the house—then another jet—another jet—Capital—
4:55; Capital 5:04; 6:55—Capital; T.W.A.—7:40; Capitai
—8:00 o’clock. Then Thursday—July 17, fog in the morn-
ing. Then I go with another list of planes. On Friday,
July 18—wakened by planes at 6:00 o’clock in the morning
Planes during the evening and night. Saturday, July 19—
[fol. 54] five planes—6:00 to 7:30. Several during the in-
. terim between 7:30 and 9:40. Capital at 9:40; 10:00 o'clock
Allegheny; 10:05—T.W.A. Then ‘sometime after 10:90
o'clock unidentified commercial; 10:09 Allegheny Airlines;
10:15 Air Foree. Sunday, July 20, at night—11:00 to
12:00 six to seven planes. There is a note I was awakened
twice after that. Monday, July 21—planes again at night.
That is where I stopped keeping a record there.
By Mr. Mamula: 4
Q. May I see that book?
A. Sure.
By Mr. Blair:
F)
Q. Did you keep any additicnal records from time to
time?
A. Yes sir—I have a lot of records here. In this book I
-
4.
22
started April 4, 1953—airplanes last night. April 5—air- .
planes last night. April 6—ditto.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Airplanes were flying over my house on that runway
landing that night, or taking off.
Q. How high were they flying?
A. They were low enough to waken me, Mr. Blair, that
is how I knew it. 4 |
By Mr. Faweett:
Q. How frequent?
[fol.55] A. Mr. Faweett, I can’t answer that for every
night. I have ideas about th overall frequency of it based
on my observation. For the present all I can do—I can’t
stand up there all night and try to identify every plane
that flies over, nor can I spend all my time watching the
clock during the night. April 5—planes last night; April
6—planes last night; April 7—planes last night; April 8
airplanes took «ff last night; April 9—last night airplanes
wakened me at 1:00 and 3:00. April 10—airplanes last
night; April 11—planes last night; six betwoen 11:15 and
12:15—I think it is. April 12—planes last night; April 13—
planes last night until wind changed. April 23—planes last
night; April 24—planes last night—bad take-off I have
marked. May 2—planes last night; May 4 planes bad last
night; May 8—planes last night; May 12—planes last
night; May 13—planes last night; May 17—planes last
night; May .22—planes last night. Monday—May—25—
some planes last night; May 26—planes last night; May 29
—planes last night; and I might add most of the inter-
ruptions where there is no record—these books show I was
out of town. July 14, 1953—planes last night. I have a
note here that they used all runways, and one took off high
over the house this morning about 8100 o’clock. Capital
came in low. Wednesday, July 15—planes last night. July
{fol. 56] 17, planes last night—take-offs today. July 22,
planes. July 23—planes. July 25—planes last night. There
are a couple of these that say “see file memos” andéI will
get the file memos in a minute. July 28—planes today.
September 9—planes last night.. September 11—planes last
a
23
night. September 12—planes last night and this morning
—wakened.
By Mr. Blair:
Q. When you have in your memoranda “planes: last
night” do you mean one plane or more planes than one or
a pattern of planes?
A. I am talking about enough planes, Mr. Blair, to inter-
fere with my night’s rest. Now, you will have to under-
stand that wind conditions change. They changed and
varied. I have watched that Airport many times under
certain wind conditions and have seen planes take off _in
one direction and immediately after a plane take off in the
opposite direction because the wind is not a controlling
factor. Essentially what I am trying to say is sometimes
the traffic can be substantial and I am talking about
commercial traffic on one runway or the other runway or on _
the center runway. At other times depending on the wind ~
it ean be distributed between them. I am talking about the
planes during the night. that interfered with sleep and rest
in our household. . .
[fol.57] Q. Mr. Griggs, I show you plaintiff’s Exhibit
“Pp”, “Q” and “R”. What are they?
A. Mr. Blair, this is a part of a calendar which calendar
was on the wall of our kitchen. I gave instructions in the
daytime because I was not there to write on this calendar
when planes were over our property on take-off or landing.
This first calendar covers the month of May, 1953, down
through December, 1953. The second calendar runs from
January, 1954, through December, 1954. The third calendar
is for the year of 1955. I should say, Mr. Blair, in connec-
tion with these records as well as the ones I. kKept—they
are not complete. There were more planes than were
recorded here, but the ones that are on there do show the
use of that runway when the records were kept.
Q. By whom were they taken?
A. My wife and our cook. «
- Q. Under your direction?
A. They were.
Q. Did you consult with them from time to time?
24
A. I did—and asked them and that is where I say they
are not complete. Sometimes I asked if they had kept the
record and they said no and then | asked ‘them again to
do it.
Q. These were made under your direction?
A. They were.
{fd1. 85] By Mr. Blair:
Q. What did you record in the memoranda?
A. Mr. Blair, I took this memoranda by ‘sitting in my
property observing planes going over my property and
landing on the northéast-southwest runway of the Airport.
Q. What, as to the number-of planes could you tell or
could you recall the number of planes that you saw flying
over your property at that particular time?
A. Where I can count them on this memoranda-—marked
on the memoranda is the approximate time of each plane
that went over for the most part. I will be happy to read
it into the record.
Q. All right—read it.
A. 6:15—one Capital Airlines—this particular one was
not over my property. 6:25 to 6:45 one Capital, one East-
ern, three T.W.A., one Allegheny Airlines, two Capital.
6:55 to 7:10—two T.W.A. and then here is a word I can’t
read. 7:15—T.W.A. cut to southwest corner of my prop-
erty. 7:16—U.S. Air Force. 7:25 Capital. 7:25—US.
{fol. 86] Air Force. 7:26—one silver plane with a black
rudder—small. 7:36.T.W.A. curved from the south. 7:38
—Capital cenrved from the north. 7:50—U.S. Air Force
over road. 7:52—Allegheny Airlines. 7:58—one white
plane with blue trim—small. 8:10—a plane came over while
I was at the telephone, and I recall that I couldn’t hear and
had to stop until the plane went past. 8:15—T.W.A. 8:30
—FEastern. Then one U.S. Air Force and then from 9:30
to about 9:45—six commercial planes. Then I have the
notation—“ ll evening.” Then during the night “awakened
twice”. I i.ave Thursday morning—9:30 A.M. to 9:45 about
six. 9:58—Capital. 10:10—jet over the property turned
north and three jets very high. 10:45—T.W.A. 11:02—
4
25
T.W.A. 11:14—commercial over Jenks across the road,
cut low over the corner of my property. 11:15—Capital
cut up from the southwest corner. 11:16 a plane I couldn’t
identify, and about the same time A.A.A.—Allegheny Air-
lines. About 11:18—Allegheny Airlines. 11:20—Capital
up from the southeast corner. 11:25—T.W.A. 11:33—
T.W.A. 11:37—Capital. 11:41— Eastern—with a question
mark. 11:50—Here is one with a number—I think it is
NS 8867—right over the house. I think that is it—it is not
too plain. 11:51—Allegheny Airlines. 11:52—jet far down.
11:55 Lake Central. 11:56—Capital—question mark. 11:56
[fol. 87] —T.W.A. 11:58—Air Force. 12:05—T.W.A.—
something about coming low. 12:07—T.W.A.—higher than
usual. _12:10—Capital and then 12—I can’t read it
—T.W.A.—two. Then I have them marked there with jets
on the field—12:14. I have the record 12:29—I was in the
house and one plane came over the house. J have a note
12:31 Air Force not landing but below 500 feet. I have
12:40—a blue and white plane private. I have 12:55—
looked like Air Foree—red and white. Then I had at 1:05
—four motor—big white Air Force plane diagonally across
property. 1:30—National.- 1:34—Capital. Then 1:35 to
2:45 I have no notations as far as I can recall it. 2:40—
Eastern. Then I noted a couple of planes here going over
other houses in the area. 4:20 Allegheny Airlines. 4:22—
two jets. I have a notation—jets playing. I have 4:30 Air
Foree. 4:35—T.W.A.—curving in from the north. 4:37—
T.W.A. 4:40—T.W.A. Then I have@nother note here that
is not too clear to me—away from my property an Eastern.
Then I have 5:00 o’clock—Northwest Airlines. I should
say that in recording those times—the planes come into
vision from the front of my house a considerable distance
away to the east of me, and come over my property and
then I watch that plane go over and my timing on picking
up the-next one and recording it all depends on when I
{fol. 88] turn around and look at the next one—so the
times are approximately accurate, but there is no accurate
’ way to start to measure the time at a particular place or
the beginning of a plane coming into sight.
26
Q. Mr. Griggs, I notice from your memoranda you de-
seribe the planes. Wee they flying so low that you could
read the lettering on them?
A. Most of them. Private planes of course would fly in
high and the private planes were no real bother to us. It
was primarily the commercial ships and I could read the
designations on the side, see the colors, see the markings,
and many times see at least part of the numbers of the
planes.
Q. When the planes came in at night did they have lights
—that is the planes that were landing?
A. Mr. Blair, when the planes were landing they did
put their lights on before they came to the easterly bound-
ary of my property.
Q. On the take-offs were their lights on?
A. At the beginning and for some time after the opera-
tion of the commercial~Airport commenced they would
have their lights on on the end of the runway and they
would remain on past my house. At a subsequent stage of
it they often turned their lights off. I am talking about
the bright lights now—not the lights that are on when a
{fol. 89] plane is in flight during the night. Sometimes
before they got to my property.
Q. Mr. Griggs, were the flights of the aircraft over your
property as you reiated them yesterday and this morning—
fights landing and taking off the northeast runway of the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport?
A. Mr. Blair, my testimony except for particular desig-
nations where I have said other property on those memos
related only to planes that were coming over my property
going into Greater Pittsburgh Airport on the northeast
runway or taking off from the northeast runwey.
. « ew e@ + a 7
{fol. 104] Q. Did you make any effort to learn the num-
ber or percentage of flights over the northeast runway in
and out of the Airport? .
A. I did.
Q. In what manner did you make that effort?
A. I inquired of Mr. Austin White who was the C.A.A.
representative in the Control Tower, I think in 1953. He
was present at the meeting I testified to in June of 1953.
xt 27
Q. Did you ask him for the percentage of operations
over the northeast runway—the record of flights?
A. Yes I did. I asked about the records of the runways.
The information given to me was that there was no record.
Mr. Mamula: If the Board please—I object to a conver-
sation with Mr. White with respect to the frequency of
flight.
Mr> Trimble: Is Mr. White available for this Board?
Do You know?
Mr. Blair: He is no longer there.
{fol. 105] Mr. Trimble: Is he available for this Board?
Mr. Mamula: We can find that out, Mr. Trimble. He is
not the present C.A.A. representative.
Mr. Trimble: Any records available for this Board of
the flights made in and out of this Airport for 1953 on this
runway?
Mr. Mamula: No sir.
Mr. Trimble: The objection is overruled. Let’s hear
what Mr. White had to say.
(Witness continuing) Mr. White told me there was no
record of which runways were used for the landing or
take-offs in that period of time.
_ By Mr. Blair:
Q. All right now Mr. Griggs, you mentioned yesterday
the sales of two parts of your property?
Mr. Mamula: Before we proceed may I amend my an-
swer. I don’t know whether the question was directed to
me as to whether or not there are any records; that would
have to Wa qualified “no” on my part. There are records
which are destroyed periodically.
Mr. Conrad: Are those the ones they destroy every
thirty days?
[fol. 106] Mr. Mamuta: I think Mr. Conrad knows of
what I speak, and Mr. Blair and Mr. Fawcett, who were
present when the C.A.A. representative told us that a
recording of ell flight conversations in and out of the
Airport is recorded on tape for a period of thirty days,
for purposes of reference in case of accident for investiga-
28
tion or infraction ef any rule. Subsequent to the 30th day
that tape is cleaned and re-used on a machine which we all
looked at. There are five or six tape recorders that record
for a period of four hours, then automatically shift onto
another tape for an additional four, so that when I an-
swered “Were there any records?” I think I said “no”.
With that explanation I still say no—other than the num-
ber of flights in and out—take-offs and landingr at the
‘Airport, theve are records but not broken down as to any
of the three runways.
Mr. Blair: That is what we are trying to develup. That
is what we tried to find out at that time whether there was
any record maintained of the operation of the various
planes over the various runways in and out of the Greater
Pittsburgh Airport.
_ Mr. Mathula: The answer to that would have to be yes,
but they are not maintained beyond a period of thirty days.
[fol. 107] Mr. Faweett: Mr. Mamula, do you know when
they started to keep these records.
Mr. Mamula: Nothing other thar what you heard the
man tell us jointly last Friday.
Mr. Blair: No record available anywhere. to show the
number of planes which used the northeast runway from
June 1, 1952, up to within thirty days from the preceding
date—isn’t that about what you are saying.
Mr. Mamula: Anything that happened in the period of
time in excess of thirty days preceding vesterday or today
has been wiped out insofar as it being an aid in determin-
ing the number of flights.
[fol. 193]
De * .
Berore THe Boarp or VIEwERs
Report or Viewers—Filed July 15, 1959,
To the Honorable, the Judges of Said Court:
The undersigned, members of the permanent Board of
Viewers of Allegheny County, who were duly appointed
by your Honorable Court as Viewers in the above and
foregoing matter, respectfully report:
29
They met upon said property at the time and place
named in the Order of your Honorable Court and examined
the premises affected, and then and there adjourned to
meet at the Court House of said County at Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, on the 26th day of Jannary, 1959, when and
where and at subsequent adjournments of said meeting,
they heard the parties in interest desiring to be heard
and witnesses, touching all matters upon which they had
authority to inquire and act; and they estimated and deter-
mined the damages for property taken, injured or de-
stroved thereby, and to whom the same are payable.
They prepared a Preliminary Report awarding to the
plaintiff $12,690 00 inclusive of detention money and gave
notice to the parties of the time and place when and where
said Viewers would meet and hear exceptions thereto.
Requests for Findings and Conclusions were presented
and are made part hereof and marked Exhibits Nos. 1 and
2.
[fol. 194] That at the time and place so fixed, they met
_ and heard exceptions which are attached hereto and marked
Exhibits Nos. 3 and 4, together with the notes of testimony
which are filed ander separate cover and hereto referred to
as Exhibits Nos. 5 and o-A.
“They file herewith and make part hereof a, photostatic
copy of Exhibit “C” showing the improvement and the
premises affected. ?
They also file herewith and make part hereof their Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
T. B. Trimble, Jr, T. M. Conrad, Paul G. McAtee,
Viewers.
July 15, 1959.
Prevtiminary Report
The undersigned Viewers have prepared the attached
Statement of Facts, Question of Law and Conciusion with-
out Exhibits; found damages inciuding detention money
in the sum of Twelve Thousand, Six Hundred Ninety and
30 >
no/100ths ($12,690.00) Dollars, and submit the same to
Counse! in lieu of regular form and notice.
Exceptions to said award may be filed in writing at the
Office of the Board of Viewers within five (5) days from
{fol. 195} the date of this notice and any exceptions so
filed will be heard on April 22, 1959, at 9:30 o'clock, A. M.
T. B. Trimble, Jr., Thos. M. Conrad, Paul G. McAtee,
Viewers. “
Acceptance of Service: David B. Fawcett, Attorney for
Plaintiff; John W. Mamula, Attorney for Defendant.
Fisprxes
Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, is a resident of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania; and was the owner in fee of the
following tract ef land and improvements thereon in Moon
Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania:
ALL that certain tract of land situate in the Township
of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows:
BEGINNING at the intersection of the macadam road,
known as the Coraopolis Road, with the Westerly line
of property now or formerly of William MeClinton
Heirs, and running thence by the center of said Cora-
opolis Road South 65° 26’ West five Hundred Twenty.
{fol: 196] three (523) feet to the center of a macadam
road knowr as the Beaver Grade Road; thence by the
same North 21° ¥ West Fifty-five and 53/100 (55.53)
feet to a point; thence by the same North 15° 41’ Wea
Four Hundred Twenty and one-half (4201,) feet to
a point; thence by the same North 26° 2% West Six
Hundred Sixty-one and 14/100 (661.14) feet to a
point; thence by the same North 38° 31’ West Three
Hundred Fifty-seven and 84/100 (357.84) feet to the
center of known as the Thorn Run Road; thence
by. said Road No ° 51’ East Three Hundred
Seventy /100. (370.93) feet to a point; thence
by the same North 47° 2% East Three Hundred Six-
teen and one-half (3161,) feet to a line of land now
31
or formerly of William McClinton Heirs aforesaid;
and thence by said McClinton land South 21° East
Sixteen Hundred Forty-eight (1648) feet to the place
of beginning. :
CONTAINING 19.161 acres.
HAVING erected thereon one large stone and stucco
residence two cottages, a four-car garage with apart-
ment above, a frame be . and pump house.
The County of Allegheny, Defendant, a “public agency”
sponsored, owns and maintains the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport on land purchased by it in Moon and Findlay
{fol. 197} Townships as a public improvement to pratvide
airport and air transport facilities for the use of the gen-
eral public in conformity with the Rules and Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Administration within the scope
of the “National Airport Plan.”
Among said facilities . the Northeast-Southwest run-
way with “clear zone” and “approach area”; said “ap-
proach area” extending beyond and over the land of said
Griggs.
Plaintiff's Exhibit “O” is composed of three executed
documents, with amendments, between the County of Alle-
gheny and The United States of America (Acting through
the Administrator of Civil Acronautics) designated “Pro}-
ect Application”, “Sponsor's Assurance Agreement” and
“Grant Agreement”, the relevant parts of which are:
a. Agreement by County to abide by and adhere to
the Rules and Regulations of Civil Aeronautics
Administration (Project Agreement).
b. . . . “the sponsor (County of Allegheny) “will
maintain a master plan of the airport, including”
... “approach areas”... (See. 1 b. Sponsor's As-
surance Agreement).
ce. ... “The airport approach standards to be fol-
lowed in this connection shall be those established
[fol. 198] by th » Administrator in Office of Airports
Drawing No. 672 dated September 1, 1946, unless
32 ~*
otherwise authorized by the Administrator”; and
the County of Allegheny further agreed that it
“will acquire such easements or other interests
in lands and air space as may be necessary to
perform the covenants of this paragraph” (Sec.
. * 1 j. Sponsor’s Assurance Agreement).
d. “The airport approach standards to be followed in
performing the covenants contained in this para-
graph shal! be those established by the Adminis-
. trator in Office of Airports Drawing No. 672 dated
September 1, 1946, unless otherwise authorized by
the Administrator.” (Paragraph 8 (i) of Amended
“Grant Agreement.”
That in compliance with said Rules and Regulations of
Civil Aeronautics Administration the County of Allegheny
laid out and submitted for approval said “Master Plan”
including required “approach areas” which was, approved
by said Civil Aeronautics Administration and adopted as
the plan for the Class V airport sponsored by the County
of Allegheny and designated as the “Greater Pittsburgh
Airport”. A copy of part of said plan designating the
[fol. 199] location of approach area and property of plain-
tiff is adopted as Viewers’ Plan and attached hereto and
marked Exhibit “C”.
The approved and established standards for approach
‘grea for Northeast runway were center line extension
10,000 feet beyond “clear zone”, a 200’ strip of same width
and elevation of runway as projected, with gradient of
1 on 40 having splayed slope surface with lateral width
extended uniformly from 500 feet to 2500 feet with varying
depths or heights from zero to 250 feet at end of center
line projected 10,000 feet.
The residence of said plaintiff is bisected by a theoretical
line vertical to the ter line of runway as projected
3250 beyond end of “ zone” within said approach area;
and said center line being 420 feet more or less eastwardly
from center of said residence.
The portion of plaintiff’s property within said approach
area contains the residence, garage, stucco cottage, tennis
33
courts and elaborate landscaping; and 6.1 acres of land,
more or less.
Said Viewers’ Plan shows elevation at end of northeast
runway to be 1150.50 feet above sea level; the door sill of
plaintiff's home to be 1183.64 feet above sea level; the top
of chimney of said home to be 1219.64 feet above sea level;
the slope gradient of approach area to be as 40 is to 3250’
or 81 feet above 1150.50’ or 1213’ thus leaving a clearance
[fol. 200] of 11.36 feet at plaintiff's residence, or the dif-
ference between height of aireraft on climb out or let down
to runway elevation of 1150.50 flying on a 1 on 40 gradient
3250’ distanct (sic) from end of “clear zone”.
The date of opening Greater Pittsburgh Airport was
June 1, 1952, said date of opening being so designated by
Resolution of the Commissioners of Allegheny County
adopted May 27, 1952.
Affective (sic) as of said date of opening Defendant
executed leasehold agreements in conformity with Rules
and Regulations of Civil Aeronautics Administration with
the several commercial airlines licensed by Civil Aero-
nautics Board to use Greater Pittsburgh Airport granting
inter alia the right ‘to land, take off” * * °
Since the opening of said Greater Pittsburgh Airport
the Northeast runway with its approach area has been in
regular operational use for landing and taking off of com-
mercial and other aircraft in regular flight patterns at
heights near and over plaintiff's residence and over plain-
tiff’s land on take-off varying from thirty (30) feet to three
hundred (300) feet, and on let-down fifty-three (53) feet
to one hundred fifty-three (153) feet.
The interference by the low flight of airplanes with plain-
tiff’s existing use and enjoyment of his property resulted
[fol. 201] from the noise, disturbances and vibration cre-
ated by such airplanes as well as the fear for personal
safety caused by the low flights in close proximity to the
plaintiff's residence; said noise of planes over plaintiff's
property on let-down to the Northeast runway being com-
parable to that of a noisy factory, and in take-off to the
noise of a riveting machine.or steam hammer.
“The low altitude flights Per plaintiff’s property caused
the plaintiff and occupants of his property to become ner-
34
vous and distraught, eventually causing their removal
therefrom as undesirable and unbearable for their resi-
dential use.
The opening of Greater Pittsburgh Airport and its con-
sequences caused a diminution in value of plaintiff's prep.
erty in ita adapted use.
Plaintiff's Requests for Findings of Fact accepted and
substantially incorporated herein are as follows: 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28,
30, 31, 32, 33. Those denied are: 9, 12,13, 14, 17, 26, 27, 34,
35, and 36.
- Plaintiff's Requests for Conclusions of Law are accepted
as follows: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to the extent that the latter
conforms to the conclusions herein. Those denied are: 6.
Defendant’s Requests for Findings of Fact accepted
as follows: 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, and 32. Those denied
[fol. 202} ave: 2, 4, 5, 8. 9, 10, 25 and 28.
Defendant's Requests for Conclusions of Law are denied
in toto.
Question
Is the County of Allegheny liable to T. N. Griggs as the
result of the exercise of its power of eminent domain in the
location, lay out and opening of Greater Pittsburgh
Airport? /
Discussion
The property of Griggs lies beneath the area projected .
from the end of the “clear zone”, being a 200-foot long
strip corresponding with the width and elevation of the
concrete Northeast runway. This area is designated as
the “approach area” and has the same center line projected
as said runway. It was located with engineering precision
in compliance with Civil Aeronautics Administration
“standards” as to width, length and depth to meet the
Federal qualifications and requirements for the laying out
and public use of a “Continental Airport” such as the
y peer of Allegheny proposed for the Greater Pittsburgh
irpert.
te
tY
35
The “standards” adopted and used in the laying out by
the County of Allegheny of this Northeast runway ap-
proach area were an extension of the center line 10,000
{fol. 203] feet beyond clear zone with a gradient of 1 to 40
and having a splayed slope surface with lateral width ex-
tending uniformly from 500 to 2500 feet. The approach
area thus has varying depths or heights from zero at clear
zone elevation to 250 feet at the end of the center line
projected 10,000 feet. At the Griggs’ property the surface
of the approach area is only 11.36 feet above.the residence
due to the increase in elevation of the land, which is shown >
on Plaintiff's Exhibit “C” and adopted as the Viewers’
Plan bearing the same letter identification.
In the law, as distinguished from airmen’s: and engi-
- neers’ parlance in which “glide angle” is in common usage,
the word “approach” has a definite and positive meaning.
It is an integral part of a publie structure, like a bridge,
but for its existence, the structure would be incomplete
and without public utility.\Jn a controversy between Penn
Township and Perry County, reported in 75 Pa. 457, where
the County built only the bridge structure and left the—
approach for the Township to construct, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, by Mr. Justice Gordon, said (p.
3 459) : -
“The design of bridging is to provide a safe and con-
venient passage for the public over some stream or
ravine, but no such passage is afforded when the
structure cannot be approached. Can a house be said
to be finished until there are steps up to its doors or
{fol. 204] stairs to its chambers? And how can a
bridge be said to be completed without the proper
means of access? Certainly this is so necessary to its
use, that without it, the structure is a vain thing;
utterly useless and of no account, The bridge is in-
complete until everything necessary for its proper use
has been supplied, and every such necessary appliance
is part of the bridge. When, therefore, the Act of
Assembly directed the counties of Dauphin and Perry
to build this bridge over the Juniata, it meant that
these two counties without the aid of the townships
36
~
should provide a safe and convenient passage or high-
way over that river, and not merely that they should
set up a structure which the public ‘could not reach.”
Citing the Penn Township case, supra, the eminent past
~—Dean of-the Dickinson Law School, Trickett, in his authori-
tative “Pennsylvania Road Law”, has this to say (p. 330):
“The bridge i is not composed merely of its piers, abut-
ments, arches and superstructure. Whatever is neces-
sary to make feasible ingress and egress, is a part of
it, and if the County has become liable to erect. the
bridge it has ipso facto become liable to construct
these approaches.”
In addition to bridges, the same view of the law has been
applied to subways. Knoll v. Harborcreek Township, 86.
Pa. Super. Ct. 423.426.
{fol. 205] Laying out this approach imposed a burden on
the land of Griggs for the flight of aircraft to and from
the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. To this extent the County
of Allegheny has exercised the power of eminent domain
conferred upon it by implication by the Act of May 21,
1923, P. L. Sec. 1, which reads as follows:
“That any county of the second class in this Common-
wealth is hereby authorized and empowered to acquire
by lease, purchase or condemnation proceedings any
land within the limits of the County for the purpose
of establishing and maintaining thereon airdromes or
aviation landing fields, whenever the county commis-
sioners of the county, by resolution duly adopted deem
it advisable so to do.”
Alt..ough the County of Allegheny purchased all the
“land” required for the location of the physical structures
at the Airport, it had been invested with the right to ap-
propriate such lund and the grant of that right carried
with it by necessary implication the power to take all in-
terests in land necessary to operate the Airport facilities
for public use. Such an implied grant of power of eminent
domain is analogous to that of railroads for the construc-
37
tion of switches and sidings, as to which it was held in
Beaver Borough.v. Beaver Valley Railroad Company, 217
Pa. 280, 286:
fol. 206] “The right to build the switeh and siding
is included as_a necessary incident in the right to
build a railroad** * * . . . even where there is no
expressed powér in the charter to construct switches,
it is clearly to be inferred from the general power con-
ferred, and the essential purposes of the grant.”
The power to appropriate “land”, therefore, carried with
it the power to appropriate an easement over the land and
the laying out of that easement by a plan constituted an
act of dominion or condemnation by the County of Alle-
gheny. The resulting burden upon the land is similar to
that which follows the laying out of a street or road.
The “taking” of the superterranean casement over the
property of Griggs became effective on June 1, 1952, at
1201 A. M., by virtue of the Resolution of the Commis-
sioners of Allegheny County dated May 27, 1952, designat-
ing that date and hour as the time for fhe opening of the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport fur public user. Consequently,
the right to damages accrued at that time.
The damages allowed by the Viewers have been mea-
sured by the usual procedure of deducting the after value
from the value of the property as a whole immediately
before and unaffected by the public improvement, to which
has been added 6% per annum interest as detention money
- from the date of opening the Airport. We have found
that the highest and best use of the property was as a
[fol. 207] country estate. We determine the “after” dimin-
ished value of the property as being directly and immedi-
ately caused by frequent low flying to and from the Air-
port, inevitably preducing noise, vibration, fear of disaster,
anxiety and general interference with the peaceful and
quiet enjoyment of the property by the owner, resulting
in damages to the extent of $12,690.00.
T. P. Trimble, Jr., T. M. Conrad, Paul G. McAtee,
Viewers.
July 15, 1959.
~~
38 —
(fol. 208] /
Exuzsir No. 1 to Report
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Or AtLecHENY County, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 2384
July Term, 1958
Tuomas N. Grices,
Plaintiff
aq
Vv.
County or ALLEGHENY,
Defendant
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
To the Honorable, Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Thomas M.
Conrad and Paul G. McAtee, Viewers.:
‘ Now comes the Plaintiff, Thomas N. Griggs, by his
attorneys, William A. Blair and David B. Faweett, and
respectfully requests your Honorable Board to make the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the
above captioned case:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, is a resident of Alle-
gheny County, Pennsylvania.
2. The County of Allegheny, Defendant, is a political
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
3. Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, on the dates material
to this action was the owner in fee of the following tract
{fol. 209] of land and improvements thereon in Moon Town-
ship, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania:
_
39
ALL that certain tract of land situate in the Township
of Moon, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows:
_ BEGINNING at the intersection of the macadam road,
known as the Coggopolis Road, with the Westerly line
of property now or formerly of William McClinton
Heirs, and running thence by the center of said Cora-
opolis Road South 65° 26’ West Five Hundred Twenty-
three (523) feet to the center of a macadam road
known as the Beaver Grade Road; thence by the same
North 21° 9’ West Fifty-five: and 53/100 (55.53) feet
to a point; thence by the same North 15° 41’ West
Four Hundred Twenty and one-half (42014) feet to
a point; thence by the same North 26° 29’ West Six
Hundred Sixty-one and 14/100 (661.14) feet to a point;
thence by the same North 38° 31’ West Three Hun-
dred Fifty-seven and 84/100 (357.84) feet to the center
of road known as the Thorn Run Road; thence by
said Road North 54° 51’ East Three Hundred Seventy
and 93/100 (370.93) feet to a point; thence by the
same North 47° 27’ East Three Hundred Sixteen and
one-half (31614) feet to line of land now or formerly
{fol. 210] of William McClinton Heéfrs aforesaid; and
thence by said McClinton land South 21° East Sixteen
Hundred Forty-eight (1648) feet to the place of be-
ginning.
CONTAINING 19.161 acres.
HAVING erected thereon one large stone and stucco
residence, two cottages, a four car garage with apart-
ment above, a frame barn and pump house.
4. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport is owned and main-
tained by the County of Allegheny, on land owned by it,
in Moon and Findlay Townships.
5. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport is a public improve-
ment constructed and maintained to provide airport and
air transport facilities for the use of’the general public.
40
6. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport comprises, among
other facilities, a large Administration Building and land-
ing areas assigned to each of several commercial aertenes.
7. The County owns and maintains at said Airport, and
as an integral part thereof, a system of runways for the
landing and taking off of airplanes at said Airport, being
known and designated as the Northeast-Southwest runway,
the East-West runway, and the Northwest-Southeast run-
way. (Exhibit B.)
[fol.211} 8. The Plaintiff's property is located in the
“Approach Zone” or the glide angle or glide path of said
Northeast runway. (Exhibits C., D., E. and F.)
9. The Plaintiff’s property is situate approximately
Thirty-one Hundred (3100) feet from the end of the North-
~ east runway.
10. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport, including the facili-
ties connected therewith, was opened for public use on
June 1, 1952. (Exhibit G., p. 32.)
11. At or about the time the said Airport was opened for
public use, the Co. nty of Allegheny entered into leases with
certain commercial airlines whereby, for the considerations
therein named, it granted to them, in connection with the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport, the right, inter alia, “to
operate a transportation system by airplane for the carriage
of persons, property, cargo, and mail . . . to land, take-off,
fly, taxi, tow, park, load and unload airlines’ aircraft and
other equipment used in the operation of scheduled, shuttle,
courtesy, test, training, inspection, ec Seeioe special
charter, sightseeing and other flights .
12. That prior to the opening of the Airport for public
use, the said Airport was used solely for the landing and
taking off of military planes.
13. That said military planes were mostly of the lighter
type or two motor planes ; that said military planes did not
follow a flight pattefn in and out of said Airport, and made
(fol. 212] only oecasional low flights over Plaintiff’s prop
erty.
—\~
41
14. That said flights of military airplanes in and out of
the Airport did not interfere with the use and enjoyment
of Plaintiff's property. (Testimony, pp. 32 and 57.)
15. Since the opening of said Greater Pittsburgh Airport
on June 1, 1952, for publie use, the Northeast runway has
been used for the landing and taking off of commercial and
other aircraft.
16. Commencing on June 1, 1952, regular patterns of
flight of aircraft landing at and taking off from the North-
east runway and other runways available at the Greater
Pittsburgh Airport were established.
17. That the extent and periodic duration of the use of
said Northeast runway varies with wind and weather con-
ditions, as well as the availability of the other runways.
18. Thet beginning June 1, 1952, the property of the
Plaintiff became subject to regular flights of airplanes in
landing at and taking off from the Northeast runway at
said Airport.
19. That such flights were, and are, at such low altitudes
and at such frequent intervals as to constitute a direct and
immediate interference with Plaintift’s use and enjoyment
of the land.
[fol. 213] 20. The interference by the low flight of air-
planes with Plaintiff's existing use and enjoyment of his
property resulted from the noise, disturbances and vibra-
tion created by such airplanes as well as the fear for per-
sonal safety caused by the tow flights in close proximity to
the Plaintiff's residence. cress pp. 26, 27, 28, 36
and 85.)
21. That the noise of planes over Plaintiff’s property in
landing at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport on the North-
ss east runway is comparable to a noisy factory. (Testimony,
p. 54.)
22. That the noise of planes over Plaintiff’s property in
taking off the Northeast runway is comparable to the noise
of a riveting machine or steam hammer. (Testimony, p.
84.) ‘
“
42
23. Asa result of the low and frequent flights over Plain-
tiff’s property, the Plaintiff and the occupants of his prop-
-—y became nervous and distraught, the property became
t as a residence, and Plaintiff and his family were com-
pelled to remove therefrom. (Testimony, pp. 54, 55 and
57.)
24. Asa further result of the low and frequent flights of
aircraft over ‘Plaintiff's property, it was rendered un-
desirable and unbearable for normal residential use and
has suffered seriousdoss in value. (Testimony, pp. 34 and
35.) -
25. That the said “Approach Zone” or glide angle or
glide path of flight over Plaintiff’s property begins about
{ fol. 214] two hundred (200) feet from the Northeast end
of the Northeast runway, at a width of five hundred (HW)
feet and gradually increases fo a width of twenty five
hundred (2500) feet at a distance of ten thousand tw»
hundred (10,200) feet from the end of saffl,runway. (Ex-
hibits C. and D.) et
26. That the said “Approach Zone” or glide angle or
glide path is approximately one thousand (1,000) feet in
width at the distance of thirty-one hundred (3100) feet
from the Northeast end of the Northeast runway. (Exhibits
C. and D.)
27. The approach zone to the Nertheast runway includes
all the property of Plaintiff extending from the Southerly
side or front thereof Northwardly a distance of six hundred
(600) ‘feet and passes over the principal buildings thereon.
28. That the said Northeast runway is a non-instrument
runway, and the “slope” or angle thereof is forty to one
(40:1) or forty (40) feet of horizontal distance to one (1)
foot of vertical distance. (Exhibits C., D. and E.)
29. That the bottom of said glide angle or glide path is
approximately forty-three (43) feet above the ground level
of Plaintiff's’ residence and approximately thirteen (13)
“9 above the chimney on said residence. (Exhibits C. and
-)
-
43
30. That the heights of airplanes over Plaintiff's resi-
dence on teking off from the Greater Pittsburgh Airport
{fol. 215] vary from thirty (30) feet to three hundred (300)
feet, and on landings fifty-three (53) feet to one hundred
fifty-three (153) feet. (Testimony, pp. 55 and 56.)
31. The flights of aircraft over Plaintiff's property are
below the safe altitude of flight as prescribed by the Federal
Aviation Ageney (formerly Civil Aeronautics Authority)
and as adopted by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commis-
sion.
32. Landing of aircraft at the Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port cannot be accomplished from the safe altitude of flight
of five hundred (500) feet above Plaintiff's property. (dx-
hibit D.) |
33. The “approach zone” over [Plaintiff's property to
the Northeast runway is necessary to provide airport and
air transport facilities for the use ,of the general public
and is a part of said Airport.
34. That the fair markef vatue of Plaintiff's property
befpre the Greater Pittsburgh Airport was opened for
public use on June 1, 1952, was Seventy-five Thousand
($7 5,000. 00) Dollars.
35. Thatthe fair market value of Plaintiff's property on
and after June 1, 1952, when the Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port was opened for public use and as affected by such
public use is Forty Thousand ($40,000.00) Dollars.
(fol. 216} 36. That Plaintiff has been damaged by reason
of such public use in the amount of Thirty-five Thousand
($35,000.00) Doilars.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The County of Allegheny, owner of the Greater Pitts-
burgh Airport, is empowered to aequire by grant, purchase
or condemnation land and property rights necessary to
accomplish the public purpose of the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport.
2. The approach zones at the Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port, including the Northeast approach zone, are necessary
44
to provide airport and air transport facilities for the use
of the general public and are a part of the Greater Pitts-
burgh Airport.
-3. The flights of airplanes over the Northeast approach
zone of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport are at such low
altitudes over Plaintiff's property as to interfere with and
prevent his existing use and enjoyment thereof.
4. The ownership of such airspace over Plaintiff's prop- |
erty as is necessary to the enjoyment of the use of the”
surface is vested in the Plaintiff.
5. The County of Allegheny has taken and appropriated
for public use a permanent avigation easement or a fee
simple interest in the airspace over Plaintiff's property
{fol. 217] extending from the Southerly side or front thereof
Northwardly a distance of six hundred (600) feet beginning
at thirteen (13) feet above the fiyincipal residence thereon
and extending vertically to the safe altitude of flight a
distance of five hundred (500) feet above said property.
6. As a result of such taking or appropriation the prop-
erty of the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of
Thirty-five Thousand ($35,000.00) Dolla=s.
Respectfully submitted,
Wriuas A. Bean
Daviy B. Fawcer7t
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4
[fol. 218]
Exist No. 2 to Report
IN THE COURT OF-COMMON PLEAS
Or ALLecHENY CouNTy. PennsyLvania
No. 2384
July Term, 1958
Tuomas N. Grices,
Plaintiff
v.
County oF ALLEGHENY,
Defendant
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE
3 BOARD OF VIEWERS :
The County of Allegheny by Maurice Louik, its Solicitor,
John W. Mamula, its Second Assistant Solicitor, and
Thomas J. Dempsey, its Assistant Solicitor, respectfully
submits the follgwing proposed findings of,fact and con-
clusions of Jaw for consideration of the Board of ‘Viewers
appointed in this action.
* FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Thomas N. Griggs, hereafter called plaintiff, pur-—
chased a tract ‘of land in Moon Township, Allegheny
County, @n January 22, 1945 from Mabelle R. McMahon, for
the sum of $20,000 the said property consisting of some-
what over 19 acres, and having erected upon it a main resi-
[fol. 219} dence, a 4 car garage with apartment above, a
frame cottage, a pump house and a frame stable or barn.
2. At the time the plaintiff purchased the said property
he was familiar with the existence and location of the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport owned by the County of Al-
legheny in Moon Township.
.
46
3. The plaintiff occupied the said preperty with his
family as a residence until shortly after December 1, 1955
at which time he and his family moved to another home.
4. The plaintiff sold the main house and somewhat over
4 acres by deed of general warranty dated March 26, 1956
for $25,000 to the Board of Trustees for the Episcopal
Diocese of Pittsburgh.
5. By deed of general warranty dated July 27, 1956
.plaintiff sold the 4 car garage with the d4partment above and
1.2 acres of ground to Franklin E. Bashline and Alice IL.
Bashline, his wife, for $9000.00.
6. Plaintiff is still the owner of approximately 15 acres
of the original tract purchased by him having a frame barn
or stahiv. a frame cottage and a pump house erected there-
on.
7. The frame cottage located on the property of the
plu.ntiff has been occupied b¢ tenants paying a rental of
[fol. 220] $25.00 per month from sometime prior to June 1,
1952 until the present with a vacancy at only one time of a
couple of weeks.
8. In 1940 the County of Allegheny acquired the Bell
farm in Moon Township for airport purposes, and there-
after continued to acquire other property and to construct
the Greater Pittsburgh Airport.
9. In 1941 the Greater Pitsburgh Airport began operat-
ing as a base for military planes.
10, The zoning ordinance of Moon Township dated May
10, 1943 which was effective when the plaintiff bought his
property shows the location of the County airport on the
zoning map made a part of the ordinance, and also shows
the property of Mabelle R. McMahon, the predecessor in
title of the plaintiff, in an area zoned residential A, which
classification allows single family residences and certain
non-residential uses.
11. By Resolution dated May 27, 1952, the Board of
County Commissioners of Allegheny County fixed the open-
ing date of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport for commercial
airlines services as June 1, 1952 at 12:01 A.M.
47
12. By leases dated June 3, 1952 and by subsequent
leases, the County of Allegheny granted to TWA, Capital
Airlines and other airlines the use of the airport premises
{fol. 221] in commen with others including the right to
operate a transportation system by airplanes, the right to
land, take-off and fly aircraft, and the rights of ingress to
and egress froin the premises and facilities of the Greater
Pittsburgh Airport. The payments due from the airlines
for these rights were to become effective as of the day
which the Board of Commissioners of Allegheny County by
Resolution designated as the opening date of the airport
for commercial airline services.
13. On June 1, 1952, the Greater Pittsburgh Airport
opened for commercial airline services in accordance with
the Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, and com-
mercial flights into and from the airport commenced on that
day and have continued since that time. At the time that
the airport was opened for commercial purposes, the County
owned approximately 1500 acres in fee simple.
14. In landing and taking-off at the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport, the aircraft of the commercial airlines utilize one
of the several runways constructed and existing at the air-
port depending upon wind and other conditions and cireum-
stances existing a#t the time of the landing or take-off.
15. The property of the plaintiff lies to the North and
East of an extension of the center line of the Northeast-
Southwest runway of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport and
[fol. 222} distant 3450 feet from the northeasterly end of
the Northeast-Southwest runway though separated from
the airport boundary and the runway terminus by inter-
vening properties, by the Allegheny County Airport Park-
way, a divided 4 lane express highway, and by the
Coraopolis Carnot Road. The property of the plaintiff lies
within the designated approach zone for aircraft utilizing
the Northeasterly end of the Northeast-Southwest runway -
as it existed in June of 1952 and as it exists to date.
16. On June 15, 16 and 29 of 1952 aircraft flew over
plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.
48
17. On July 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of
1952 aircraft flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate
altitudes.
18. On April 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23 and 24 of 1953
aircraft flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate
altitudes.
19. On May 2, 4, 8, 12, 13, 17, 22, 25, 26 and 29 of 1953
aircraft flew over plaintiff’s property at indeterminate
altitudes.
20. On July 14, 15, 17, 21, 23, 25 and 28 of 1953 aircraft
flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.
21. On August 12 and 13 of 1953 aircraft flew over plain-
tiff’s property at indeterminate altitudes.
{fol. 223] 22. On September 9, 11 and 12 of 1953 aircraft
.flew over plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.
23. On October 13 and 20, 1953 aircraft flew over plain-
tiff’s property at indeterminate altitudes.
24. On November 16 and 17 of 1953 aircraft flew over
plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.
25. The plaintiff made no proper measurement of the -
altitude of the above mentioned flights above or in the
vicinity of his property and his recollections of many of
them are limited to the existence of “planes overh
though a number of flights disturbed his sleep and made
conversation difficult.
26. The plaintiff's own valuation testimony was based
upon the value to him of his property as a country estate
type home.
27. The plaintiff’s expert real estate witness fixed the ,
after-value of the plaintiff’s property as affected by the
alleged taking on May 15, 1952, which was prior to the time
the airport was opened for commercial airline use and prior
to the time the plaintiff complained of aircraft flights over
or in the vicinity of his property. ~
28. The Board of Commissioners of Allegheny County
has never adopted a Resolution or other otficial enactment
(fol. 224] appropriating plaintiff’s property or any part of
49
his property or any interest in his property by virtue of the
eminent domain powers vested in the County of Allegheny.
29. There is no evidence of any control exercised over.
any aircraft by the County of Allegheny.
30. All flights into and out of the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport are regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion of the United States of America.
31. No flights of aircraft have been shown to be in viola-
tion of any regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion.
32. No flights were shown to be lower than necessary for
a safe landing or a safe taking-off.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The plaintiff has not proved that the nature, character
and frequency of the flights of aircraft over or in the
vicinity of his property were such as to constitute a taking
of his property or any part of it or any interest in it by any
person, organization or body, public or otherwise.
2. There were no flights of aircraft over plaintiff’s prop-
erty below the navigable air space of the United States of
America.
{fol. 225] 3. The County of Allegheny has hot by Resolu-
tion, official enactment, or otherwise taken plaintiff’s prop-
erty or any part of it or any interest in it for any purpose
or use.
4. The plaintiff has not proved by any competent evi-
dence that the fair market value of his property was de-
preciated by reason of any flights of aircraft over or in the
vicinity of his property.
Respectfully submitted
Mavrice Lovik
County Solicitor
Joun W. Mamuta
Second Assistant County
Solicitor
Tuos. J. Dempsey
Assistant County Solicitor
7
50
{fol. 226]
Exuisit No. 3 to Report
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Or AttecHueny County, PENNSYLVANI
No. 2384
July Term, 1958
Tuomas N. Griaes,
Plaintiff
Vv.
County oF ALLEGHENY,
Defendant
EXCEPTIONS TO PRELIMINARY REPORT
OF BOARD OF VIEWERS
Anp Now, comes Thomas N. Griggs, Piaiglit, by his
attorneys, William A. Blair and David B. Faweett,. and
respectfully files Exceptions to the Preliminary Report of
the Board of Viewers in the above captioned case, as fol-
lows: ’
1. Plaintiff excepts to the action of the Board in denying
Plaintiff's Request “or Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 12, 13, 14,
17, 26, 27, 34, 35 and 36.
2. Plaintiff excepts to the action of the Board in denying
Plaintiff’s Request for Conclusion of Law No. 6.
3. Plaintiff excepts to the award of the Board in that
the Board erred in substituting for,the uncontroverted
expert testimony of Plaintiff’s case as to damages, said
testimony being predicated upon views made before and
immediately after the taking, to wit, June 1, 1952, the
Board’s own ideas of value predicated upon ité view made
more than six years after the taking and after the residence
(fol. 227] property portion had changed hands; such action
51
is contrary to the intent of the statutes establishing the
Board and its powers.
4. Plaintiff excepts to the award. as being arbitrary,
capricious and against the weight of and contrary to the
uncontradicted evidence.
5. Plrintiff excepts to the award on the grounds that the
Board disregarded the only sound evidence of damage
under the cireumstances of this case.
_ 6. The Plaintiff excepts to the award as being contrary
to law, for the award is contrary to the evidence binding
upon the Board under the circumstances of this case.
7. Plaintiff excepts to the award for damages including
detention money iz. the sum of Twelve Thousaszd Six Hun-
dred Ninety and 00/100 ($12,699.00) Dollars as inadequate.
&. Wuererore, the exceptant, reserving the right to file
additional exceptions, respectfully requests the Board to
correct and make the said award conform to law sad to
the evidence. eae
" Wriuam A. Bram
¢ Dav B. Fawcetr
- Attorneys for
. Thomas N. Griggs
And now 13 July, 1959 exceptions overruled.
T. P. Trimsie, JR.
T. M. Conrap
Pau.t G. McATEE
Viewers
52 ©
{fol. 228]
Exnarsit No. 4 To Report #
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Or ALLecHEeNy County, PENNSYLVANIA
: No. 2384
July Term, 1958
Tuomas N. Grices,
Plaintiff
Vv.
County oF ALLEGHE® ‘:
Defendant
EXCEPTIONS
The County of Allegheny excepts to the award made by -
the Board of Viewers to THoMas N. Grices in the above >
entitled proceeding for the following ns:
1. The award of-the Board of Viewers in the sum of
$12,690.00 is contrary to law and the wéight of the evidence.
2. The award is excessive.
6 Mavrice Lovix
w srg Solicitor*
ieee Txos, J. Dempsey
Assistant County Solicitor
And now 13 July, 1959 exceptions overruled.
(fol. 229]
In tHe Court or Common PLEas
Orper or May 29, 1958
Allegheny County, ss:
At a Court of Common Pleas, held.and kept at Pitts-
- burgh, on the 29th day of May in the year of our Lord one
thousand nine hundred and Fifty-eight, before the honorable
W. H. MeNaugher, President Judge of said Court: -
The Petition of Thomas N. Griggs, was presented, setting
forth that
Order of Court
And now, to-wit, this 29th day of May, 1958, on motion of
William A. Blair and David B. Faweett, Attorneys for peti-
-tioner, the Court appoints Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Thomas
M. Conrad and Paul G. McAtee, as a Board of Viewers upon ~
the foregoing Petition and further orders that the Board of
Viewers perform its duties in accordance with the law and
acts of Assembly in such case made and provided. View,
Tuesday, June 24, 1958, 10 A. M. o’clock D.S.T., Returnable
First Monday, March, 1959.
And Further:
It appearing to the Court, Siig there are differences of
opinion as to whether Thomas N. Griggs is entitled to
collect damages described in the Petition for Appointment
-of Viewers ; and
It further appearing that if all the questions involved in
this case are to be decided at the same time, the Board of
[fol. 230] Viewers would be unduly burdened by the evi- —
dence so that it would be required to hear testimony that
would ultimately be ruled irrelevant. :
It Is Therefore Ordered and Decreed.
1. The Board of Viewers shall, in time, determin
whether the erection and operation of the Greater Pitts-
burgh Airport by the defendant beginning on June 1, 1952
»
54
with consequent necessary and unavoidable use of the air-
space over and across the aforesaid described property be- -
low the safe navi,zable airspace for the purpose of ingress
and egress to and from said Greater Pittsburgh Airport
constituted in fact an appropriation or “taking” by the de-
fendant of a navigation easerffent over said property;
2. After the litigation as to the determination ‘of the
question set forth in preceding Paragraph 1. is finally
* decided by the Board of Viewers, or by a Court of final
jurisdiction in the case, such determination shall be con-
clusive upon the parties as to whether there was such ap-
propriation or “taking” by the defendant;
3. Should the Board of Viewers determine that there
was an appropriation or “taking” by the defendant, then it
shall ascertain and award just compensation to the Plaintiff
- [fol. 231] for the damage to his property arising out of such
condemnation by the defendant. “
- + By the Court, Weiss.
a From the Record, David B. Roberts, Prothonotary,
by Louis W. Sauers, pornny.
(Sear)
Filed May 29, 11:42 AM, 1958.
Lx tHe Court or Common Peas
Exceptions or Piarntirr To Report oF Boarp or
Viewers—Filed August 13, 1959
And Now, comés Thomas N. Griggs, Plaintiff, by his at-
torneys, William A. Blair and David B. Fawcett, and re-
spectfully files Exceptions To Report of Board of Viewers
in the above captioned case, as follows:
1. The Board of Viewers erred as a matter of law in
substituting for the uncontroverted expert testimony of
the Plaintiff as to damages, its own idea of value predicated
upon its.view made more than six (6) years after the taking.
2. Action of the Board of Viewers in disregardiag the
_ uncontradicted evidence as to Plaintiff's damage and sub-
5
stituting its own judgment with respect to damage is con-
trary to law.
{fol. 232] 3. The Board of Viewers erred as a matter of
law in disregarding the evidence as to property values and
substituting its own ideas.
4. Plaintiff excepts to the award as being arbitrary and
against the weight of and contrary to the uncontradicted
evidence.
5. Plaintiff excepts to the award on the ground the Board
disregarded the only sound evidence of damage under the
circumstances in this ease.
6. Plaintiff excepts to the award as being contrary to
law, for the award is contrary to the evidence binding upon
the Board under the circumstances of this case.
7. Plaintiff excepts to the award for damages, including
detention money from the date of the opening of the airport
namely, J une 1, 1952, in the sum of $12,690.00 as inadequate.
Wherefore, the Pla atiff, reserving the right to file addi-
tional Exceptions, respectfully requests your Hvusorable
Court to correét and make the said award conform to the
law and to the evidence in this case.
William A. Blair, David B. Fawcett, Attorneys for
Thomas N. Griggs, Piaintiff.
[ fol. 233]
Ix tHe Court or Common PLE«s
Exceptions oF DEFENDANT TO REPORT OF
Viewers—Filed August 14, 1959
The County of Allegheny excepts to the Report of
Viewers filed and confirmed nisi on July 15, 1959 and to the
award to Thomas N. Griggs in the amount of a 00 for
the following reasons:
1. As a matter of law the plaintiff failed to sustain the
burden of proof on him to show that the nature, character
and frequency of flights of aircraft over or in the vicinity of
his property were such as to constitute a taking of his prop-
cet LIE ERE REE ARR EES ORE LE RINE ih OMELETTE PSO cr
56
erty, or any part of it, or any interest in it, by any person,
organization or body, public or otherwise.
2. The plaintiff did not show that there were any flights
of aireraft over his property below the navigable air space
of the United Stetes of America.
3. The plaintiff did not show that any flights of aircraft
were in violation of any regulations of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, which organization controls and regulates
the flight of aircraft.
4. The plaintiff did not show that any flights of aircraft
were lower than necessary for safe landings or safe take-
offs.
5. The plaintiff failed to show that the County of Alle-
gheny exercised any control over the flights of any aircraft.
ifol. 234) 6. There was no basis for a finding by the
Viewers that the defendant had appropriated any portion
or interest in the plaintiff's property since the Board of
Commissioners of Allegheny County never adopted a Reso-
lution or other official enactment appropriating plaintiff's
property, or any part of it, or any interest in it, by virtue
of the eminent domain powers vested in the defendant and
since the evidence failed to establish such interference with
the property of the plaintiff as ash mes would constitute
an appropriation.
7. As a matter of law the plaintiff failed to sustain the
burden of proof cn him ‘o prove by competent evidence
that the fair market value of his property was depreciated
by reason of any flights of aircraft over or in the vicinity
of his property.
- 8. The teetimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses was
too vagne, uncertain and inaccurate to sustain a finding by
the Viewers that the number of afrcrai't flying over or in the
vicinity of the plaintiff’s property interfered sufficiently
with the property to constitute an appropriation.
9. The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses was
too vague, uncertain and inaccurate to sustain a finding by
the Viewers that the noise of aircraft flying ovei ~ in the
a
vicinity of plaintiff’s property or the vibrations caused by
such aircraft interfered sufficiently with the property to
constitute an appropriation.
[fol. 235} 10. Lf, as the plaintiff contends and the Viewers
have ruled, there was an appropriation by the County on
June 1, 1952, then all evidence of subsequent flights of air-
craft would be inadmissible and should have been —
by the Viewers. % ip
1. The report and award of the Viewers were contrary
to pa inasmuch as under the facts alleged in plaintiff's
Petition for Appointment of Viewers, the County of Alle-
gheny cannet legally be held liable for the appropriation for
public use of avigation rights, or easements over and across
plaintiff's property,
12. The report or award of the Viewers were contrary
to law inasmuch as,.as a matter of law, the flights of aircraft
over plaintiff's property were within the free navigable
air space as declared by the United States of America.
13. The report and award of the Viewers were contrary
to law inasmuch as, as a matter of law, if plaintiff has any
claim for the appropriation of property, it is not against the
County of Allegheny.
Wherefore, the County of Allegheny requests your
Honorable Court to sustain its exceptions and to send the
Reports of Viewers back with instructions to find according
{ fol. 236] to defendant’s proposed Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law.
* Maurice Louik, County Solicitor, Thomas J. Demp-
m sey, Assistant County Solieito>, Attorneys for
County of Allegheny.
th!
mais
<<
4
Ix tHe Court or Common PLEas
Option
Soffel, J.
This case comes before this Court on Exceptions filed
both by plaintiff and defendant to certain Findings made by
the Board of Viewers.
_ Briefly summarized, these are the facts :
The plaintiff filed a petition for the appointment of
viewers alleging that aircraft of several airlines landing
upon or taking off from the northeast runway of the Greater
Pittsburgh Airport descended and ascended over plaintiff's
property below the safe navigable air space as fixed pur-
’ guant to acts of Congress and that by reason of said low
flights, the property of the plaintiff was greatly damaged
and depreciated in value. The plaintiff further averred that
the defendant by reason of its right of eminent domain has,
in fact, appropriated for public use an easement or fee
simple interest of the air space over the plaintiff's prop-
erty. Following proceedings before the Board of Viewers,
[fol. 237] a report was filed by the Board of Viewers in
5 it made certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
ie
The Board of Viewers found inter alia that on June 1,
1952, the County of Allegheny, defendant, condemned or
appropriated a superterranean easement over plaintiff's
property in Moon .ownship with consequent damage to
said property. Damages in the a:nount of $12,690 were
awarded the plaintiff.
This case is now before this Court on Exceptions to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions made by the Board of
Viewers.
Plaintiff’s Exceptions are directed solely to the amount
of damages awarded.
Defendant’s Exceptions are directed to certain conclu-
sions made by the Board of Viewers as not being legally
warranted, and contrary to decisions of the Supreme Court,
to-wit:
+ There was ‘a taking of a superterranean easement
over plaintiff’s property by the County of Allegheny.
a
59
2. This taking occurred as of June 1, 1952.
The background of this case is fully set forth in the case
of Gardner v. Allegheny County, reported at 382 Pa. 88 and
393 Pa. 120. The plaintiff in the instant case was one of the
plaintiffs in the group of cases which went on appeal to the
Supreme Court and were decided in the Gardner cases. In
[fol. 238] these cases, the plaintiff, together with other
property owners, brought action in equity against Alle- —
gheny Couny and certain airlines, alleging: 1) continuing
trespasses over their properties, and 2) a taking of their
respective properties. In the Gardner case at 382 Pa. 88,
the Supreme Court sustained the County’s preliminary ob-
jections as to the “taking of property” and continued the
case with respect to an injunction for trespass. Sub-
sequently, in the same cases reported in Gardner v. Alle-
gheny County, 393 Pa. 120, the Supreme Court stayed the
pending equity proceedings until thc plaintiffs either pro-
ceeded under eminent domain or in actions of trespass. The
decision in the Gardner case at 393 Pa. 120, was entered on
June, 1958. -
A few days prior to June 3, 1958, the plaintiff filed a
petition forthe appointment of viewers, out of which this
action arises. The Board of Viewers filed a report in which
it made certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
_ The Findings of Fact made by the Board of Viewers in-
cluded the following, submitted b, defendant:
“29. There is no evidence of any control exercised over
any aircraft by the County of Allegheny.
30. All flights into and out of the Greater Pittsburgh Air-
port are regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
[fol. 239] tration of the United States of America. -
31. No flight. of aircraft have been shown to be in viola-
tion of any regulations of the Civil Acronauties Ad-
ministration. é
_ 32. No flights were shown to be lower than necessary for
a safe landing or a safe taking-o gy
The Board of Viewers also accepted the Finding of Fact
submitted by defendant tbat “aircraft flew over plaintiff's
property at indeterminate or wang
Pree,
60
With respect to the question of damages, the Board of
Viewers also made this Finding of Fact:
“27. The plaintiff’s expert real estate witness fixed the
after-value of the plaintiff’s property as affected by
the alleged taking on May 15, 1952, which was prior
to the time the airport was opened for commercial
airline use and prior to the time the plaintiff com-
plained of aircraft flights over or in the vicinity of
his property.”
The Board of Viewers in its discussion concluded that
there was an act of dominion or condemnation by the County
of Allegheny and found that:
“The ‘taking’ of the superterranean easement over
the property of Griggs became effective on June 1, -
_- [fol. 240] 1952, at 12:01 A. M., by virtue of the Resolu-
* tion of the Commissioners of “Allegheny County dated
May 27, 1952, designating that date and hour as the
time for the opening of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport
for public user. Consequently, the right to damages
accrued at that time.”
We shall consider the legal questions raised before this
Court.
_ First: Did the Board of Viewers err in the amount
- awarded the plaintiff?
The Board of Viewers awarded the plaintiff damages in
the sum of .$12690 for the taking of a superterranean ease-
ment. The plaintiff contends that the Board of Viewers was
required to award damages upon the uncontradicted testi-
mony of its real estate expert in the amount of $35000.
Plaintiff contends further that the Board failed to explain
“usual procedure” or what method it used in arrivipg at
damages in the aforesaid arbitrary amount.
. The only testimony as to value was-that produced by the
plaintiff and his real estate expert. Plaintiff testified that
the value of his property before taking was $80000. The
real estate expert, Mr. McDowell, a highly respected and
exceptionally well qualified man in his field, testified that
61
the value immediately before the taking and as unaffected
by the taking was $75000 and that the value of the property
[fol. 241] immediately after the taking as affectéd thereby
was $40000, or a diminution in value of $35000.
Mr. McDowell was familiar with plaintiff’s and other
properties in the neighborhood for a long period of time
prior to June 1, 1952, and possessed a detailed knowledge
of sales and values in the vicinity. He had examined plain-
tiff’s property immediately prior to that time and reason-
ably soon thereafter.
The defendant, County of Allegheny, offered no testi-
mony on this or any other aspect of the proceedings. |
Plaintiff contends that the Board of Viewers disregarded
the testimony of its expert. in making an award of $12690,
which includes detention money at six per cent.
Where, as in the case at bar, only one uncontradicted set
of values was before the viewers and the damages awarded
in no way appear related to that set of values, and where
the only explanation for the variance between the two 1s
vague and uninformative, it must be concluded that the
viewers rejected in whole or in part the expert’s testimony
and considered ‘other information in arriving at their con-
clusion. Since no other informatien is of record, it must be
assumed that the viewers substituted_their own judgment.
[fol. 242] While the viewers were entitled, as are any
triers of fact, to use the background of their knowledge and
experience in evaluating the testimony of expert witnesses,
Leaf v. Pennsylvania Co., 268 Pa. 579, 112 A. 243 (1920),
they were not entitled to throw away the only criteria given
them in this case and substitute their own judgment based
on matters not of record.
The question has been raised whether the plaintiff's ac-
tion in filing an Exception to the Report of the Board of
Viewers rather than taking an appeal from its decision is
the correct course to be followed. We are of the opinion
that it is. Questions of law are properly raised by excep-
tions to a. viewer’s report and questions of fact can only
be raised by an appeal from such a report. Lower
Chichester Twp. v. Roberts, 308 Pa. 195, 162 A. 460 (1932).
Appeal of Lakewood Memorial Gardens, 381 Pa. 46, 112
‘And 135 (1955). The plaintiff has raised the issue of
62 oe
whether the viewers could disregard the uncontradicted tes-
timony of an expert witness in arriving at the amount of
damages to be awarded, and this is clearly a ai of
law.
None of the cases cited by the plaintiff is in point
. factually, for they alf involve sittations in which the viewers
or other fact-finding bodies when confronted with conflicting
testimony, ignored that testimony and substituted their own
judgment. In the case at bar, there is no conflicting testi-
(fol. 243] mony relative to damages. The only testimony
is that of the plaintiff and his expert. witness. In the case
at bar, the viewers did not admittedly ignore the testimony
of the expert and substitute their own judgment but rather
gave no explanation for the award they made other than
the cursory explanation that the damages had been
measured by the “usual procedure”.
Despite these factual differences, the principles governing
', the cited eases and the instant case are the same. Triers
of fact, whether judges, jurors, viewers, boards or com-
missions, must render their verdict, finding or award based
on the testimony or other evidence’ presented. The fact-
finding body cannct substitute for that testimony or evi-
dence its own knowledge or belief, no matter what” ex-
‘traneous matter that knowledge or belief is based upon.
Cowan v. Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa. Super. 573, 49 A2d
270 (1946); Flower v. Baltimore and Phila. Railroad Co.,
132 Pa. 524, 19 A. 274 (1890); Avins v. Commonwealth, 379
Pa. 202, 108 A2d 788'(1954).
We are of the opinion that plaintiff’s Exceptions to the
award of damages should be sustained. We believe the
question of the amount ‘awarded should be referred back to
the Board of Viewers for reconsideration and discussion of
the factors upon which the award was predicated.
We come now toa consi eration of the issues raised by
the defendant.
[fol. 244] - The defendant Liat first, that the legal con-
clusion of the Board of Viewers that there was a “taking”
of plaintiff’s property by the defendant is not legally war-
ranted under the Findings. of Fact which it made. The de-
soncant cites specifically a Findings of Fact:
-
.
i]
Oi OK ANT eld Reese PS Nee rene ote a ke 008 nA en teint Nea
’
“
'
‘
C
63
: 29. There is no evidence of any control exercised over
any aircraft by the County of Allegheny.
30. All flights into and out of the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport are. regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration of the United States of America.
31. No flights of aircraft have been shown to be in viola-
- tion of any regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration.
32. No flights were shown to be lower than necessary for
a safe landing or a safe take-off. h
In addition, the defendant cites the Finding as submitted
by the plaintiff and accepted by the Viewers tHat, “aircraft
flew over. plaintiff's property at indeterminate altitudes.”
These Findings, says the defendant, support the conelu-
sions that all fiights of aircraft over plaintiff's property
were lawful and within the navigable airjspace appropriated
by the Federal government. As a result, if there was a
[{fol. 245] “taking” of-+the plaintiff’s property it was by the
United States and not bv the defendant-in this action. The
defendant refers us to the Air Commerce Act of. May 20,
1926; c. 344 §6, 44 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C.A. §176(a), which
states:
“The United States of America is declared to possess
and exercise complete and exclusive national sover-
eignty in the air space above the United States, includ-
ing the air space above all inland waters and the air
space above those portions of the adjacent marginal
high seas, bays and lakes, over which by international
law or treaty or convention the United States exercises
national jurisdiction.”
This declaration was implemented by the passage of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of. June 23, 1938, ¢. 601 Title 1 43,
52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C.A. $401 et seq., which states in §403:
“There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of
any citizen of the United’States a publie right of free-
dom of transit in air commerce through the navigable
* air space of the United States.” ,
r
=
oF
This same Act, which empowered the Civil Aeronautics
Authority to carryout its provisions defined “navigable air
space” as “air space above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter.” ($401-
24)
[fol. 246] The Civil Aeronautics Board has specifically
defined the minimum altitudes of flight over both rural and
urban areas. It has not defined the minimum safe altitudes
for use in landing and taking-off. The defendant seeks ‘to
bridge this gap in the Civil Aeronautics Regulations by
quoting the following excerpts from the first Gardner case,
382 Pa. 88, at page 108: :
“Regulation 60.17 defines and prescribes the air space
appropriated for take-offs and landings, if at all, only
‘ negatively and by implication.
... However, since take-offs and landings are obviously
absolutely necessary if there are to be interstate flights,
‘ or indeed if there is to be any flying at all, reason and
common sense impel the conclusion that Congress must
have intended the Federal Agencies to have the right
and power to prescribe and appropriate for public use
such air space as is reasonably necessary for take-offs
and landings. This naturally will vary with terrain,
wind conditions and other factors and consequently it
is difficult and may be impractical and unwise to
attempt, to more particularly define such air space.”
i P
As a buttress for the logic expressed in the above quota-
tion the‘defendant also refers this Court to Civil Air Regu-
(fol. 247] lation No. 60, interpretation No. 1, adopted by the
Civil Aeronautics Board on July 22,-1954, which read, in
part, as follows:
“.. . Directly involved is the question whether the air-
space which lies at and above the flight path of aircraft
making normal take-offs and landings comes within
the term “navigable airspace” as. defined in the Civil
Aeronautics Act. If it does, a public right of freedom
of transit is recognized and proclaimed to exist for
citizens of the United States by Section 3 of that Act.
Re teed
65
... In consideration of the foregoing, the Board con-
strues the words, ‘Except wher necessary for take-off
or landing, no person shall operate an aircraft below
the following altitudes’ where such words appear’ in
$60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations, as establishing a
minimum altitude rule of specific applicability to air-
eraft taking off and landing. It is a rule based on the
standard of necessity, and applies during every instant
that the airplane climbs after take-off and throughout
its approach to land. Since this provision does pro-
scribe a series of minimum altitudes within the mean-
ing of the Act, it follows, through the application of
§3, that an aircraft pursuing a normal and necessary
flight path in climb and after take-off or in approach-
ing to land is operating in the navigable airspace.”
.[fol. 248] The plaintiff contends that the paths of Hight
over his property taken by the planes in landing and taking-
off were not within the minimum safe altitudes of flight and
thus net within the navigable air space pre-empted by the
Federal government. The plaintiff’ relies principally on
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1945),
which involved the same legal issue which is now before this
Court. The plaintiff emphasizes the basic question to be
that stated by the Viewers in its Report, page 6, to-wit:
“Is the Cobnty of Allegheny liable to T. N. Griggs as the
result of the exercise of its power of eminent domain
in the location, laying out and opening of Greater Pitts-
burgh Airport?” ,
An analysis of the cases cited by both parties leads us to
believe that the arguments of the plaintiff must prevail.
Reference to the pre-emption of air space within the glide
path of planes landing and taking-off is contained only in
the dicta of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the first
Gardner case and is not determinative of the law. Similarly,
the Civil Aeronautics Regulation, Interpretation No. 1, was
issued after the alleged “taking” in this case. The law as
stated in the Causbi; case, suprayas clear—328 U.S. at page
263 :
\
“The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes
was that approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority
.{fol. 249] does not ¢ the result. The navigable
airspace which Congress has placed in the public
domain is ‘airspace above the minimum safe altitudes
of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.’
49 USCA §180, 10A FCA Title 49, §80. If that agency
prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then _
we would have presented the question of the validity
of the regulation. But nothing of the sort has been done.
The path of glide governs the method of operating—of
landing or taking off. The altitude required for that
operation is not the minimum safe altitude of flight
which is the downard reach of the navigable airspace.
The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet
during the day and 1000 feet at night for air carriers
(Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61 §61.7400, 61.7401, Code
Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp. title 14, ¢ 1) and from#00 feet
to 1000 feet for other aircraft depending on the type
of plane and the character of the terrain. Ibid, Pt. 60
§60.350-60.3505. Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., supra. Hence,
the flights in question were not within the navigable air-
space which Congress placed within the public domain.
If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were
ineladed, flights which were so close to the land as to
render it uninhabitable would be #nmune. But the
[fol. 250] United States concedes, as we have said, that
in that event there would be a taking. Thus, it is
apparent that the path of glide is not the minimum
safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the stattte.
The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the
power to prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has
defined navigable airspace only in terms of one of
them—the minimum safe altitudes of flight.
... As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which
skim the surface but do not touch it is as much an ap-
propriation of the use of the land as a more conven-
tional entry upon it.
. The superadjacent airspace as this low altitude
is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it
+ ¥
16 tebeethod Tt bn ede> .
\
‘
et IPD Ie LULA SP RD IATA SP hoe drial VIF,
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eriey fe we
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they
67
affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We
think that the landowner, as an incident to ‘his owner-
ship, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in
the same category as invasions of the surface.”
In the Ca».sby case the government gaised the very same
questions that the defendant is now seeking to raise here;
namely, (1) the government did not take property in using
the air space over the land; (2) since the Federal govern-
ment has asserted control over the use of air space by
aircraft, there was no “taking;” (3) that the flight of the
aircraft was within the navigable air spece as defined hy
{fol. 251] the statutes and regulations and such flights were
an exercise of the declared right of travel through that
air space. The law as thus stated in the Causby case, supra,
effectively disposed of those questions and likewise the
questions which the defendant raises here.
See also Highland Park, Inc. y. United States, 161 F.
Supp. 597; Freeman v, United States, 167/F. Supp. 541;
Cravens v. United States, 163 &. Supp. 309; Adaman Mu-
tual Water Company v. United States Court of Claims,
decided October 8, 1958; Ralph Dick et al. v. United States,
169 F. Supp. 491; Hopkins v. United States, 173 F. Supp.
245 (Advanced report-July 13, 1959); and United States
v. Ashcraft, et al., 176 F. Supp. 447 (Advanced report—
October 26, 1959). These cases uniformly recognize that
the government has not appropriated the space necessary
to land and take off.
In the Ashcraft case cited supra, Judge Yankw ich makes
this pertinent observation—p. 448:
“.. Regardless of any congressional limitations, the
land owner as an incident to his ownership, has a claim
to the superadjacent airspace at such altitude as
interferes with his enjoyment of the property and ‘that
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of
the surface.’ United States v. Causby, 1946, 328 U.S.
256, 265, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206.”
[fol. 252] The defendant concludes that, by reason of the
fact that low flights are not in vioiation of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority regulation and that they are not lower
A
68
than necessary for safe landing or taking off, they are law-
ful and within the navigable air space appropriate by the
United States of-America. The answer to this assumption
is:
1. The flights are lawful only if there has been a “taking”
of the plaintiff's property and just compensation paid
for it; and
2. The Causby case decides such flights are not within
the minimum safe altitude of flights within the mean-
ing of the statute.
Reduced to its simplest terms the contention of the de-
fendant is that the regulations of a Federal agency can
extinguish private property rights and that such is also
the view of the Civil Aeronautics’ Authority which promul-
gates the regulation. It is submitted that the regulation of
a Federal agency and that agency's interpretation of its
regulation cannot be the law of the land. Private property
rights are determined by the law of the state in which it is
located and cannot be acquired for public use except in the
manner provided by law.
[fol. 253] We therefore conclude, as did the viewers by
implication, that the flights of aircraft over the land of the
plaintiff were not within the navigable air space as defined
by Federal regulations and were not operated over or in
an easement which the Federal government had previously
“taken.”
This conclusion is not in conflict with Findings of Fact
Nos. 29, 30, 31 and 32 as made by the Viewers. Lack of
control over the aircraft by the defendant (Finding of
Fact No. 29) in no way affects or is related to our conclu-
sion. The same must be said of Finding of Fact No. 30.
Finding of Fact No. 31, that no flights were shown to be in
violation of the regulations of the Civil Aeronauties\Ad-
ministration, is not inconsistent with the conclusion that
the flights were not within the navigable air space; the regu-
lations in effect at the time the flights were made did not
define a minimum safe altitude or navigable air space, so
that it was entirely possible for those flights to be in accord-
ance with the existing regulations and still not within the
aheeuists
ene eee i ti ae Si
Way Sag PP a eka vee
nA pte Rice tA ht PBA Rh Ty CAEN: IS oReae ere NY TN RLS earns re
69
navigable air space as discussed in the Causby case. Find- |
ing of Fact No. 32, that no flights were shown to be lower
than necessary for safe landing_oy a safe take-off, can be
reconciled with the conclusion in the same manner.
There remains but one quéstion to be resolved: Do the
Findings of Fact support the conclusion that there was a
fol. 254] “taking” by the defendant! The general principle
of law that there is liability for interference by aircraft
with the air space above property is found in this excerpt
from Crew vy. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A. 2d 179 (1948),
at page 547:
“Although the Kextieaition Code of May-25, 1933, P. L.
1001, andthe Air Commerce Act of 1926 . . diminish
the absolute rights that landowners had to the space
above the surface of their land under the common law,
they \do not authorize the flight of aircraft at such low
altitudes as to interfere with the reasonable use and
enjoyment of the land. See United’ States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256... After the establishment of a regular
flight traffic pattern, if airplanes fly very close to plain-
tiffs’ building, or in any other way cause real damage
to plaintiffs’ property adequate relief in equity will be
available...”
In Dlugas et ux. vy. United Air Lines, 43 D & C 402, the law
is thus stated:
y
“It may be observed in concluding . . . that the A.L.I.
Restatement of the Law of Torts, $194, considers flights
of aircraft over the lands of another to be privileged
cnly if at a height so as not t&terfere unreasonably
[fol. 255] with the possessor’s enjoyment of the surface
and the air space above it.”
Under these statements of the law, and under the facts
found by the Viewers, there was an unreasonable inter-
ference with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of the surface of his
land and the airspacé above it, and that interference coi-
stituted a “taking” by the defendant.
The defendant asserts, however, that the liability of the
defendant can be established only if it is shown that the
a
70
flights were unlawful, relying on the language in the
Gardner cases. l@furiher asserts the Findings of Fact cited
above lead inevitably to the conclusion that all flights were
lawful and were in conformity with the regulations of the
Federal agency. Again we must point out that the discus-
sion in the Gardner cases of what flights give rise to a cause
of action is dicta and not determinative of the issues here.
Therefore, we believe that the Findings of Fact made by
the Viewers and their conclusion that there was a “taking”
are entirely consistent under the law as stated in the cases
cited.
The defendant has also excepted to the Viewers’ Finding
that the “taking” of plaintiff's property occurred on June 1,
1952, the date the airport was opened to public user. They
assert that such a finding is in conflict with the decisions
of the Supreme Court in both Gardner cases, supra, and
fol. 256] that to determine that a “taking” took plare by
reason of the mere opening of the airport is to completely
disregard the Supreme Court’s holding that the nature,
character, frequency and permanency of the flights must
be considered.
It appears to be correct that on June 1, 1952, no flights in
or out of the airport had taken place and certainly no
definite flight pattern had developed. The dimensions of
the flight pattern, about which the plaintiff complains, were
developed only after the facilities were in use and many
landings and take-offs had been made. To this extent the
“taking” by the County could have occurred only after the
nature, character, frequency and permanency of the flights
were definitely ascertained.
The Viewers were faced, however, with the problem of
fixing a date when the “taking” took place, and in their
search for a solution to this problem they chose the only
certain date available to them, fhe date of the opening of
the airport. The only other alternative was to choose a
later date at random, after first finding that a sufficient
number of flights had been made to provide a detailed pic-
ture of the air traffic. This choice, however, would only
have served to push the problem facing the Viewers one
tep further away,for they would then be called upon to
etermine at what hour on what day the flight pattern
which constituted the “taking” crystallized.
71
[fol. 257] The Viewers made the only definitive choice.
They did not arbitrarily choase—June 1, 1952, at the outset
of the hearings and before testimony as to the nature and
frequency of the flights was introduced and then go on to
provide their calendar skeleton with the flesh of testimonial
detail. Rather, the Viewers heard all testimony concerning
the landings and take-offs, determined from that testimony
that there had been a “taking,” and then ascribed a date to
that “taking” which was definite and logical. Under these
circumstances, we do not believe that the testimony as to
the nature, character, frequency and permanency of the
flights, even though it related to flights after June 1, 1952,
is either irrelevant or immaterial as defendant contends.
We believe plaintiff's exception to the award of the
Viewers should be sustained and defendant’s exceptions dis-
missed. :
Is tHe Court or Common Peas’
Orper or Court Rererrtnc Matter Back To Boarp or
: Viewers—February 10, 1960
And Now, to-wit, February 10, 1960, it is ordered, ad-
judged and decreed that plaintiff's exception to an award
by the Viewers in the amount of $12,690 be sustained. It is
further directed that this matter be referred back to the
Viewers for reconsideration and action as defined in this
opinion.
[fol. 258] It is also ordered, adjudge | and decreed that
defendant’s exceptions to Findings of Fact made by the
Viewers be dismissed.
By the Court, Soffel, J.
Eo die exception noted and bill sealed.
Soffel, J. [Seal]
In tHE Court oF Common Peas
SuprpLeMEentAL Report or Viewers—Filed March 2, 1960
Conforming to your Honorable Court’s direction to re-
consider and discuss the factors upon which the Board of
Viewers predicated its opinion of the amount of damages
awarded to plaintiff, the members respectfully state:
That they viewed the property on June 24, 1958, but due
to time of day and wind conditions no flights of. aircraft
were observed using the runway glide angle affecting said
property. However, on subsequent visits to the property
for observation and after “views” of other “takings” for
airport navigational, runway and general purposes they
observed and heard flights of single and multi-engine air-
craft over plaintiff's property in the glide angle for \both
take-off ard let-down at times of heavy and light to mod-
erate air traffic.
{fol. 259] That during the numerous observations and sub-
sequent thereto they concerned themselves with the effect of
flights on plaintiff's property considering, inter alia, the
frequency of low-flying and the attendant proximity dam-
ages such as fear of disaster, noise, vibration, anxiety and
general interference with the peaceful and quiet enjoyment
of the property by the owner Griggs as previously assigned ~
in recorded Report of Viewers, which unfortunately was
unavailable to the Court at argument and decision time due
to misfiling and misplacing.
That since 1955 they have viewed, heard valuation tes-
timony of expert witnesses and made damage awards and
benefit assessments on upwards of 200 properties con-
demned for Airport purposes as well as those for highway,
petroleum pipelines and water line construction in the gen-
eral and immediate vicinity of plaintiff’s property.
That they have familiarized themselves with sales and
holding prices of property in the general area of the Air-
port; the topography, airport and township zoning, road
locations, commercial and residential areas; locations of
market places, churches and their denominations, schools,
police and fire facilities, transportation; all available
printed material by the U. S. government, the airplane in-
73
dustry and real estate appraisers relating to effect of air-
port approach on neighboring properties; and authoritative
[fol. 260] books treating on flight procedure for aircraft
take-off and let-down, the frequency of motor failure and
the percentage of resulting disastrous effects, navigational
problems, and other pertinent informatian. .
All of the foregoing factors, including the “Findings of
Facts” are basic to and part of the Viewers Report (Supra)
DISCUSSION
Viewers are freeholders who are sworn to report dam-
ages or benefits, as the case may &, to the appointing Court.
In the performance of this duty they
“may resort to any source of information which the mem-
bers of it may think proper—even the evidence of their
senses”;
Spring Garden Streets Case 4 Rawle 192
They examine the property and ubserve the nature and
quantity of land affected and are directed by the statutes
to hear witnesses, if any appear after due notice. Their _
powers and duties are as an “inquest” (Patten v. The Sus-
quehanna R. R., 1 Pearson 48, 49, 51 & 53) at common law
and no statutory. or judicial limitation has ever curtailed
or threatened to curtail those investigatory and fact finding
duties until the unprecedented restraint first appeating in
Cowan v. Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa. Super. 573, later
{fol. 261] adopted by the Supreme Court in Avins v. Com-
monwealth, 379 Pa. 202 at 205:
“The limitation upon the triers of fact in condemnation.
cases with respect to the-permissible source of their
information is the same whether they be ‘judges, jurors,
viewers, boards or commissions’.””
At the hearings whether on In Limine Petition (Powell
Appeal, 385 Pa. 467, 474; Petition of Wynn, Common Pleas
of Allegheny County, 739 Jan. 1957 affirmed 188 i’a. Super.
499) or on regular petition the Viewers follow trial proce-
dure of the Courts for
74 —_
b I
“it is implicit that a jury of view must decide all rele-
vant questions of law or fact before it can competently
make an award of damages or assessment of benefits:
see case of the Germantown and Perkiomen Turnpike
Road Company, 4 Rawle 191...’ (The Viewers) were
bound to dispose, in the first instance, of all the matters
committed to them, whether constituted of law or of
fact, subject however to review by the Sessions.’ ”
Gardner v. Allegheny County, 393 Pa. 120, 130
(1958)
Witnesses are heard and their competency and the
weight and relevancy of their testimony is determined. In
the instant case the Viewers heard Mr. McDowell, plain-
({fol. 262] tiff’s real estate expert, both on direct and cross-
examination, individually cognizant of his excellent reputa-
tion as a citizen and exceptional qualifications. His opinion
was neither impeached nor contradicted. The County of
Allegheny offered not a scintilla of evidence except to sup-
ply documents on request of plaintiff or the Viewers. It
“rested” after conclusion of plaintiff's case.
During the Viewers deliberations it was evident to the
Chairman that the members could not accept witness Me-
Dowell’s estimate of damage. Notwithstanding the case of
Avins v. Commonwealth (Supra), and relying on the exist-
_ ing law of Spring Garden Streets Case. (Supra) supple-
mented by Crumrine v. Washington County Housing An-
thority, 376 Pa. 234, at (238) _
“Opinion testimony may be of value and it may be of no
value, just as it appeals to the jury. In all such matters
the jury must be left to the free exercise of its own
judgment. It cannot be bound by the opinion of the
witnesses or the mstruction of the Court. It may re-
ject in toto or in part the opinion of any witness it dis-
believes, and this whether that opinion is contradicted
or not”
the Chairman advised the Board Members that under those
circumstances they should arrive at an amount which in
(fol. 263) their opinions would be just compensation.
75
It is most respectfully submitted that the Viewers have
given this case their most careful and thoughtful consid-
eration both as to law and facts; and, after additional re-
consideration, they herewith advise your Honorable Court
that not one has deviated in his opinion as to amount of
just compensation awarded to the plaintiff.
T. P. Trimble, Jr., Thos. M. Conrad, Paul G. MeAtee,
ve Viewers.
vs |
Ix tHe Covet or Common Peas
Oprxtox— Filed March 8, 1960
Per Curiam
This case came before the Court on Exceptions to the
Report of the Board of Viewers awarding damages: in the
sum of $12,600 to the plaintiff for the taking of a super-
terranean easement above plaintiff's property. The plaintiff
filed one exception directed to the amount of damages
awarded. The defendant filed exceptions attacking. inter
alia, the jurisdiction of the Court. After hearing th. argu-
ment of both sides and examination of briefs, the Court
dismissed defendant's exceptions and sustained the plain-
[fol. 264] tiff’s exception. In its Opinion, the Court said.
“We believe the question of the,amount awarded ¢hould be
referred back to the Beard of Viewers for reconsideration
and discussion of the factors upon whith the award was
predicated.” The case was then sent back to the Board of
Viewers which was directed to reconsider and state the
factors which it considered in making the award. This re-
quirement has now been met in its Supplemental Report. -
At the time this case was argued before the Couri en
Banc, the Court was not informed that the Board of Viewers
fad supported its award by a written report setting forth
Findings of Fact and Conclusions qf Law. This report was
not discussed by counsel, nor aes it presented to the
Court. This Report has since been examined. In accord
with the Court's directions, the Board of Viewers has now
filed a Supplemental Report. This sets ferth in detail the
view of the property by the Viewers, their observations
76
on. the ground of the effect of flights on plaintiff's prop-
erty, and the law applicable to a Board of Viewers in
awarding damages or benefits.
Based on the original report of the Board of Viewers
filed in this ease and its supplemental report filed as di-
rected by the Court, we are of the opinion that the piain-
tiff’s exception must now ¥ dismissed.
[fol. 20",] Z
. Ix tHe Court or Common PL eas
. °
Orper or Covrt Dismissinc Exception to Report or
Boarp oF Viewers—March 8, 1960
And Now, to-wit, March 8, 1960 it is Ordered, Adjudged
and Decreed that the Exception of the plaintiff to the
Viewers’ award be and it is hereby dismissed.
Per Curiam, W. McNaugher, Sara M. Soffel, Weiss.
Eo die, exception noted to the plaintiff, and bill sealed.
W. MeNaugher [Seal], Sara M. Soffel [Seal],
Weiss [Seal].
(fol. 321]
Ix THE SupREME,CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Western District
No. 155 March Term, 1960
Tuomas N. Gricos
= Ve :
4County or ALLEGHENY, Appellant
Docket Entries
Appeal from the order entered February 10, 1960, of
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at No.
2384 July Term, 1958.
/
77
March 7, 1960, Appeal and affidavit filed and writ exit,
returnable last Monday of September, 1960.
March 9, 1960, Appearance for appellee, filed.
September 22, 1960, Record filed at No. 158.
September 29, 1960 Argued.
Decision
January 16, 1961 :
The order dismissing the County’s exceptions to the
viewers’ report is reversed with directidns that the
viewers’ report be vacated and set aside.
Jones, C. J. -
Mr. Justice Bell files a _Dissenting Option in which Mr.
Justice Eagen joins. a :
January 25, 1961, Petition for reargument, filed.
February 6, 1961, Answer filed.
{
Order
Before Jones, C. J., and Bell, Musmanno, B. R. Jones,
Bok and Eagen, JJ. (CohenyJ. absent).
February 15, 1961, reargument refused. .
Per Curiam.
February 16, 1961 Remit.d.
{fol. 322] March 23, 1961, Petition io return record pend-
' ing action by the Supreme Court of the United States,
filed.
March 23, 1961, Notice of appeal to Supreme Court filed.
% Order
March 23, 1961, prayer of within petition granted.
» By the Court
Jones, Chief Justice.
\
78
Vy
March 24, 1961, Supplemental Writ exit. /
March 24, 1961, Record returned to this office. A
For Appellant: Maurice Louik, County Solicitor, Francis
A. Barry, First Asst., John W. Mamula, Second Assistant.
For Appellee: William A. Blair, David B. Fawcett.
[fol. 323]
In THE Supreme Court or PENNSYLVANIA
WEsTERN DistRIcT
No. 158 March Termy 1960
Tomas N. Grices, Appellant
v.
County or ALLEGH: NY
Docket Entries
Appeal from the orders of February 10, 1960, and
March 8, 1960, of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County at No. 2384 July Term, 1958.
“ March 9, 1960, Appeal and affidavit filed and writ exit,
, Treturnable last Monday of Septeniber, 1960.
March 16, 1960, Appearance for appellee, filed.
oo 22, 1960, Record and 2 volumes of testimony,
ed. “
September 29, 1960 Argued.
Decision
January 16, 1961
Appeal is dismissed.
Jones, ©. J.
|
‘
‘
|
ald eee. a dg lalate:
ah taint pe Rens
-
7x
f
Mr. Justice Bell files a Dissenting Opinion in which Mr.
Justice Eagen joins.
January 25, 1961, Petition for reargument, filed.
February 6, 1961, Answer filed.
Order
Before Jones, C. J. and Bell, Musmanno, B. R. Jones, _
Bok, and Eagen, JJ. (Cohen, g- absent).
February 15, 1961, reargument refused. ,
Ber Curiam.
February 16, 1961 Remitted. ; :
March 23, 1961, Petition to return record pending action
by the Supreme Court of the United States, filed.
: Order
March 23, 1961, Prayer of within petition granted.
By the Court
5 Jones, Chief Justice.
{fol. 324] March 24, 1961, Supplemental Writ exit.
March 24, 1961, Record returned to this office.
For Appellant : William A. Blair, David B. Fawcett.
For Appellee: Maurice Louik, County Solicitor, Francis
A. Barry, First Asst., John W. Mamula, Second Asst.
ao
80
[fol. 325]
Is THE SupRreME Court oF PENNSYLVANIA
Wesvern District
Nos. 155 and 158 March Term, 1960
No. 155—Appeal of County of Allegheny
No. 158—~—Appeal of Thomas N. Griggs
THomas N. Grices, Appellant,
. v.
County or ALLEGHENY, Appellant.
*
Appeals from Orders of the Court of Common Ple4s
of Allegheny County at No. 2384 July Term, 1958. 4
' Oprnion or THE Covrt—Filed January 16, 1961
Jones, C. J.
These appeals grow out of a viewers’ proceeding in-
stituted by the plaintiff as owner of land neighboring
the Greater Pittsburgh Airport to recover damages from
the County of Allegheny, the owner and operator of the
airport, for an slleged appropriation of the plaintiff’s
land beeause of a substantial interference with the use and
enjoyment of_it caused by flights of aircraft at low alti-
tudes, through the air space above the land, when taking”
off or landing at the airport.
The Greater Pittsburgh Airport was opened for com-
mercial air travel on June 1, 1952. At that time, Thomas
N. Griggs, the plaintiff, was the owner of a nearby tract
of land containing 19.161 acres improved with a house,
two cottages, a four-car garage with living apartment
overhead, and certain outbuildings. Part of the Griggs
property lay under an “approach area” for the airport’s
northeast-southwest runway.
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81
On May 29, 1958, Griggs petitioned the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County for the appointment of viewers
to assess the damages caused by an alleged taking of his
land by the County of Allegheny on June 1, 1952. The
petitioner averred that, since the opening of the airport
for commercial use, aircraft of several air lines, upon
[fol. 326] taking off and landing at the airport, have fre-
quently and continuonsly flown through the air space
above his land at an elevation of less than 500 feet: that
as the result of such flights, “the use and enjoyment of
[his] property have been interfered with by reason of
the possible danger of .the low flights, the noise and vi-
brations whith they cause, their lights pointing at the
premises at night time and interference with sleep and
rest”; and that the property has been thereby “greatly
damaged and depreciated in value.”
The~court appointed a board of view which sat for
the purpose of its appointment, heard testimony offered
by the claimant, and awarded him damages in the sum
of $12,690. Griggs filed exceptions to the viewers’ report
alleging that the viewers had unlawfully disregarded the
expert testimony adduced: by him as to the damages to
his property which was the only testimony offered before
the viewers on that issue. He also appealed the award
to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County where
the question of damages would he heard de novo, The
County, contending that it was not liable for any damage
allegedly suffered by the claimant, offered no testimony
before the Board of Viewers on the issue of property
value. The County filed exeeptions to the viewers’ award
to Griggs setting forth therein that, based upon the
viewers’ findings of fact, there was no taking of Griggs’
property by the County. The court betow dismissed all
exceptions of both parties from which action each of the
parties took an appeal to this court pursuant to Section
2623 of the Second Class County Code of July 28, 1953,
P.L. 723, 16 P.S. $5623. . 3
It is clear that a property owner may petition the court
for the appointment of vieWers to assess and award dam-
ages against an entity clothed with the power of eminent
domain where such entity effects a “taking” of the pe-
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82 . ov
titioner’s property whether or not the appropriator has
followed the statutorily provided condemnation procedure.
[fol. 327] Rosenblatt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis-
ston, 398 Pa. 111, 126-127, 157 A.2d 182; Philadelphia
Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 264-265, 95 Atl. 429; Barron's Use
v. United Railway Co., 93 Pa. Superior Ct. 555, 557-558.
A “taking” oceurs when the entity clothed with the power
‘of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of -
the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property. Miller
v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 196-197, 82 A.2d 34; Creasy
v. Stevens, 16 Fed. Supp. 404, 410-412.
Paragraph 12 of Griggs’ petition for the appointment
of viewers admits that the county has not condemned his
lana by way of the statutorily authorized procedure.’
What the claimant attempted to show at the hearing
before the viewers was that the county had substantially
deprived him of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his
property. Assuming, for present purposes; that he has
shown a substantial deprivation of the beneficial use and
“€njoyment of his property, we shall proceed at once to
a consideration of the basie question raised by the county's
appeal as to whether such deprivation was, as a matter
of law, caused by the County of Allegheny.
The County, relying on findings of fact by the viewers
that no flights of aircraft were shown to be in violation
of any regulation of the Civil, Aeronautics Administration
and that no flights were shown to be lower than necessary
for a safe landing or take-off, contends that all of the
complained of flights were through air space which the
United States Congress placed within the public domain
and that, therefore, any taking of Griggs’ property was
by the federal government and not by the County of Alle-
gheny.
[fol. 328] Section 10 of the Air Commerce Act of May 20,
1926, 44 Stat. 568, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A., §180, provides
as follows: “As used in this Act, the term ‘navigable air-
_ *Seétion 14 of the Airport Zoning Act of April 17, 1945, P.L.
237, 2 P.S. §1563, confers upon political subdivisions the power to
condemn air avigation easements and other estates in property
for the purpose of providing approach protection for aircraft.
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83
space’ means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes
of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronauties Authority,
and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public
right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation
in conformity with the requirements of said sections.”
Section 3 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of June 23, 1938,
52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C.A., $403, states that “There is
recognized and deelared to exist in behalf of @@v citizen
of the United States a public right of eahans Wicaailt
in air commerce through the navigable air space of the
United States.” [Emphasis supplied.|
Section 1 (24) of the Act, 49 U.S.C.A., $401 (24), de-
fines “navigable air space” as follows: “ ‘Navigable air
space’ means air space above the minimum altitudes of
flight preseribed by regulations issued under this Act.”
Pursuant to authority granted » Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, the Civil Aeronauties Board issued Civil Air
Regulations (14 C.F.R.. Parts 1-190). Among these Regu-
lations, Section 60.17, Part 60 (Air Traffic Rules), which
establishes Yninimum safe altitudes of flight at 1000 feet
over congested areas and 500 feet over other than con-
gested areas, is prefaced with the following: “Except
when necessary for take-off or landing, no person shall
operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:”. The
County of Allegheny contends that this exeeption means
that minimum safe altitudes of flight for take-offs and
landings have been established at the heighis necessary
for these purposes.’ The County concludes, therefore,
[fol. 329} that the “navigable air space” which Congress
placed within the public domain includes all air space
needed by an airplane for take-off or landing.
While the conclusion has the rationale of reality to
support it, we are precluded from adopting it by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of similar regulations in
United States x. Caush,, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The de-
cision in that case upheld the claimant's right to damages
from the United States for a taking of certain of his
? This is now the position of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Civil
Air Regulations_Interpretation 1, 19 F.R. 4602, July 27, 1954.
J
84
property located near an airport because of a substantial
interference with his use and enjoyment of it by low
flights of U. S. military planes, when taking off from or
landing at the airpert. in answer to an argument similar
to that which the County of Allegheny makes here, the
Supreme Court said (at pp. 263-264), “The fact that the
path of ghde taken by the planes was approved by the
Civil Aeronauties Authority does not change the result.
The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in
the public domain is ‘airspace above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight prescribed by the (bil Aeronautics Au-
thority. 49 U.S.C., see. 180. If that agency prescribed
83 feet [the height at which the planes passed over
Causby’s land} as the minimum safe altitude, then we
would have presented the question of the validity of the
reguiation. But nothing of the sort has been done. The
path of glide governs the method of operating—of landing
or taking off. The altitude required for that operation
is not the minimum safe altitude of flight which is the
downward reach of the navigable airspace. The minimum
prescribed by the Authority is 500 feet during the day
and 1,000 feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air Regu-
lations, Pt. 61, sections 61.7400, 61.7401, Code Fed. Reg.
Cum. Supp, Tit. 14, ch. 1), and from 300 feet to 1,000
feet for other aircraft, depending on the type of plane and
the character of the terrain. Id. Pt. 60, sections 60.350-
{ fol. 330) 60.3505, Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., supra. Hence,
the flights in question were not within the navigable air-
space which Congress piaced within the public domain.
If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were
included, flights which were so close to the land as to
render it uninhabitable would be immune. But the United
States concedes, as we have said, that in that event there
would be a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of
glide is not the minimum safe altitude of flight within the
meaning of the statute. The Civil Aeronauties Authority
has, of course, the power to prescribe air traffic rules. But
Congress has defined navigable airspace only in terms of
one of them—the minimum safe altitudes of flight.” *
* The Supreme Court of Washington recently rejected the iden-
treal argument, based upon Section 60.17, Part 60, of the Civil Air
ation =o
|
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85
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the navigable
air space which Congress placed in the publie domain does
not inciude the path of glide for an airplane's take-off or
landing. As we are, of course. bound by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal statutes involved, we
are, perforce, required to reject the County's contention
that navigable air space, as employed by Congress, in-
cludes the area necessary for an airplane's take-off: or
landing in safety.
(fol. 331] But, even though the complained of flights
were not through air space which was part ef the public
domain, the record does not show that the County of
Allegheny was the efficient legal cause of dny dainage
resulting from the flights. Griggs testified at the hear-
ing before the viewers that the airplanes of several com-
mercial airlines flew over hie land at low altitudes. But,
he offered no proof, however, that any of these planes
were owned by the County of Allegheny er operated by
its agents. Indeed, the viewers Tound as a fact that “There
is ne evidence of any contro? exercised over any aircraft
by the County of Allegheny.” That finding, supported as
it is by the reeord, precludes the claimant from recovering
against the County in this proceeding.
In unwarrantediy awarding damages to Griggs, the
viewers relied upon a finding of fact that the County, in
Regulations, that the County of Allegheny is now pressing upon us,
quoting this paragraph from United States ¥. Causby, supra. Acker-
man V. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). ao gre
*Congress moved te counteract the effect of the decision in
United States v. Caushy, supra, by enacting the Federal Aviation
A
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