Transcript of Record — Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers
Supreme Court brief1961
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VOLUME Tk :
TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD
Supreme Court of the United States
_ -. OCTOBER TERM, 1960
No. 315
POWER REACTOR as OAY EVOPMENT COSIPANY,.
; k PETITIONER,
US. , |
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEC TRICAL, RADIO
AND MACHINE ‘WORKERS, AFPL-ClO, ET AL.
-
UNLTED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
“0S. |
& - . : ¢ ,- “
NPERNATION AL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, BADIO
sf
AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, ET AE.
>
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO "THE UNATFED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Cilé oe |
§
i 315 PETITION FOR CERTIGRARE FILED ALG sT 12, 1960
NO. 454 PE TITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 1460
€ ERT IOR. ARE GR ANTED NOVE MBER } 1, 1960
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INDEX TO VOLUME HI
Additional proceedings before the Atomic Energy
Commission be a
Excerpts from testimony of Ernest R. Acker
Testimony of Hans A. Bethe .
‘Norman Hilberry °
W. Kenneth Davis
‘¢ Abel Wolman
Excerpts from cross examination- of ‘erent R.
Acket - aa = baked tcconcatecd
Comssinnied: Exhibit No. 3—“Theoretical Possi-
bilities,and Consequences of Major Accidents
” he Large Nuclear Power Plants, March, 1957”
Opinion and initial decision of Atomic Energy
Commission : ra.
Intervenors’ exceptions to - Opinion and Ini-.,
e
lial Decision - _.-.__..& eat. <
Proceedings i in the United States Court of Appeé als
for the District of Columbia Circuit
Amended petition. for review of aim order of the
Atomic Energy Commission
Order allowing intervention of Power Reactor De-
velopment Company
Order a]lwing intervention of ‘State of Michigan’
Statement of issues of intervenor Power Reactor
Development .Company *
Statement of issves for the respondents
Petitioners’ supplementary statement of the issues ©
Opinion, Edgerton, J.
Dissenting opinion, Burger, J.
Judgment
Order denying petition of Power Reactor Develop-
ment Company for a rehearing in bane
Order denying petition of Respondents for a re-
hearing in bane
Order staying transmission of certified copies of
opinion and judgment
Clerk’s certificate (Omitted-in. printing)
Orders allowing certiorari
’
Original
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3950
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4326
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- 6846
6909
. 6918
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6922
6925
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6931
6944
6948
. 6949
6950
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6953
Print *
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965
. .969
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ih G
e
-{ fol. 3920] - In evidence January 8, 1997, Tr. 42
. Sstom THe Aromic LNERGY COMMISSION
Dockot No. F. 16
In the Matter of |
-Power Reacpor DEVELQPMENT COMPANY
, “2 “As : :
Fol
e
é
Testim§yy oF Ernest R. Ackrr, Vice-Presipen
: > Power Reacror DeveLopMENT ComMPANy
Background and ( ualifications
.
My name iS Ernest R. Acker. fam a member of the Board —
of it dae of Power Reactor Development Company
(VRDC). iam also a Vieo-President of PRDC, a member,
of the Executive Committee and Chairman of the Financial
Committee. Iam President of Central Hudson Gas & Elee?
tric Corporation, which is a member of PRDC.
I graduated from Cornell University with a degree in
mechanical engineering in 1917) During’ World War 1, |
served in the Chemical Warfare Service with the rank of
First Lieutenant. In 1919 L commenced my employment
with Central Hudson Gas & Electric (Company, predecessor
of the present corporation, and J have been with this or-
ganization continually since that date. I began my employ-
ment in the Engineering De ‘partient and subsequently be-.
caine General Superintendent of the Kingston District’ uf
the Company and later General Commercial Manager of
the Company. 1 have been’a Director of Central Hudson.
Gas & Eleetrie Corporation since 1927 and have held the
itol. 8921]. position of 1} esident and General Manager of
that cofporation since 1932. Lam a member of. Tau Beta Pi,
an honorary engineering society. I have been President of
Edison Electric Institute and the American. Gas Associa.
tion. L am’ also a member of the Board of Directors of
Atomie Power De ‘velopment Associ: ites, Ene. (APDA), and
. have been since its organization,
ofp
722
Organiz ation and Backaround of
Power Reactor Development Company
PRDC is a Michigan non-profit membership corporation
org nized to study and demonstrate the economic and techs
“nical feasibility’ of produc ug electricity from nuclear fuels
through the design, construction and operation of a develop-
mental nuelpar power reactor. PRDC is now engaged in the
design, development and construction of a full-scale. fast
neutron breeder reactor at a site on Lake Erie in Monroe
County, Michigan. This reactor wills provide steam which
will be used fer the productian of electricity in. facilities
owned by Fhe Detroit’Edison Company: “Phe entire plant
will be known as the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant.
Copies of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of
PRDC are included as Exhibit II] and Amended Exhibit
IV to the Application, as amended, fora license -under
Section. 104.b of the Atomic Energy ‘Act of 1954, filed by’
PRDC. PRDC is a membership corporation and as such
cannot issue shares ot stock or any other evidence of owner-
ship. The members of PRDC are twenty-one in pumber and
_are all corporations. ee
[fol. 3922 There are thirt en operating utility company
members as follows
Central Hudson Gas & Electric OC or poration
wl incinnati Gas & Electric Company
The Columbus and Seuthern Ohio Electr i¢ Company
Consumers Power Company
Delaware Power & Light Company |, -
The Detroit Edison Company .
lowa-Llinois Gas & Electrie C omipany
Long Island Lighting Company
Philade ‘Iphia Electrie Company
- Potomae Eleetrie Power Company
Rochester Gas & Electrie Corporation
The Toledo Edison Company
Wisconsin Electric Power-Company
¢ : : ; : te
There are seven industrial company members as follows:
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company — .
The Babeock & Wilcox Company ae
“pe
-by PRDC, and the By-Laws :
‘ Burroughs Corporation
Combustion Engineering. Incorpori ited
Fruchauf Trailer Company
Holley Carburetor Company
Westinghouse Electrie Corporation
‘ & Pre
Anothers member is“auservrree company, Southern. Ser-.
views, Ine. representing Alabama Power Company, Georgia
Power Company, Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power
Company, cach of which is an operating utility and a con-
tributor te PRDC, and the parent of those five Companies,
The Southern Company. Southern Services, Ine., ulso pro-
vides the Trustee representative.
The purpose of PRDC is to do rese areh and deve Jopment_
in?the field of the peacetime application of atomic energy
for the production of electrie power through the construe-
tion and operation of a developmental power reactor, and
toaake niformation acquired from these research and de-
| fol. 5923] velopment activities available, not only: to its
members buf also to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
for the use of the public, and to all others who may desire
such information, subject solely to AEC security regula:
tions. *PRDC is not organized ‘for profit. The Articles of
Incorporatidn provide that no part of the net carnings of
PRDC may inure to the benefit of any member, any private
individual, or any corporation. They provide further tuat
members may receive nothing on dissolution, since in the
ease of dissolution any remaining assets must be turned
over to an organization or organizations operated exclu-
sively for educational or scientific purposes. Under the.
By- Laws of. PRDC members are prohibited from obtaining
any Special privilege to use patents which may be developed
equire that all such
patents beemade freely available toO®anyone who may prop-
erly request their use.
Memberships in PRDC are non-transferable, and changes
cangoceur only when new members are elected or old-mem-
Ders resign, and members may he elected to me mbership
and resign membership. There Js, no written instrument
evidencing membership. Each me amber has one vote regard-
i
<
724 :
less of the amount of its finaneial contr ibution to the activi-
ties of PRDC. :
The affairs of PRDC are pe by a Board*of Trus-
tees, twenty-seven in number, who are elected by the mem-
bers. No member may be represented on the Board ¢
Trustees by more tian one person. The Trustees are as -
follows:
lfol. 8924} Ernest R. Acker, President
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation .
Dy. Robert F. Bacher, Director
Norman Bridge Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Walter C. Beeckjord, President
The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company
George Bisset, Vice-President
Potomac Eleetrie Power Company
Walker L. Cisleéer, President
The Detroit Edison Company
John S. Colethan, President a
Burroughs Corporation
Stuart Cooper, Chairman
Delaware Power & Light Company
Errol W. Doebler, President
-Long Island Lighting Company | :
Géorge D. Ellis, Vice-President Pee
Combustion Engineering, Incorporated ; oe
Robert E. Ginna, President.
‘Rochester Gas & Electrie Corporation
Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad, Vice-Preside ‘nt in
Charge of Research ee &
General Motors Cor poration
Daniel C. Hickson, Vice-Presidént
Bankers Trust Company .
George M. Holley, Jr., President
Hlolley ( ‘arburetur Company
Alfred Iddles, President
The Babcock & Wileox C ompany
Charles EF. Ide, President \
‘The Toledo Edison Company |
ty’
: | "929
[fol 6925) Dan BE. Karn, President
Consumers Power Company
Edward L. Love
Chase Manhattan Bank
= Jaekson Martindell, President
American-Institute of Management
Harry M. Millér, President
Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company
Alexander C. Monteith, Viee-President
Westinghouse Electric Cor poration |
"R. George Rinclitfe, President
Plriladelphig-Electrie Company
J. Frank Roberts, Vice-President
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company ,
Herbert J. Scholz. President
Southern Services, Ine.. % ey
Dean KE. Blythe Stason
Law School, University of Michigan
Gould W. VanDerzee, President
Wisconsin Eleetrie Power Company
Charles H. Whitmore, President
dowa-Llinois Gas & Electric Company
Dr. Theodore P. Wright, Vice-President
for Research
Corne!l University '
It will be observed that each member company, except
Frachaut Trailer Company, is represented by a trustee,
Each trustee is an officer of the: company he represents,
and in addition there are trustees who. are unconnected
with any member and who represent the fields of cducation,
finance-and seientifié research.
-[fol. 3926] The Hoard of Trustees elects the principal
officers of the company. They are as follows:
Walker L. Cisler, President
(The Detroit Edison Company) °
R. George Rineliffe, Executive Vice President
{Vhilad-lphia Electrie Company)
Dan EB. Karn, Vice President
(Consumers Power Company )
o* .m®
Herbert J. Scholz, Vice President
(Southern Services, Ine.) .-
Ernest R. Acker, Vice President ; Bry
(Central Hudson-Gas & Electrie Corporation)
John ‘A. Lagrou, Treasurer and Assistant Secretary
John Fk. Anderson, Ags ‘istant Treas surer and
Assistant Secretary “
George FE. Olmsted, Secre ee and Assistant
Treasurer
“Errol Doebler . |
(Long Island Power & L ighting) . ;
The Board of Trustees also functions through the foilow-
ing committees whose respective: responsibilities are ap-.
parent from, theirenaries: The Executive Committee (of
which | am a member), The Technical: a4 Engineering
Committee,eThe Administrative Advisory Committee, Phe
Legal Committee, The Financial Committee (of whith |
am Chairman), and The By-Laws Committee. While one
or more trustees serye on each committee, the gommittecs
also include others who are not trustees. |
a he utility company members. and contributofs provide
approximately 17¢¢ of the eleetriec generating capac ity of
(fol. 8927] the investor-owned utility §eompanies in the
United States, have a combined earned syugplus of approxi-
mate y $400,000,000, and have combined @@&sets in) excess
of $2,000,000,000, In addition, the industr#@J members have
_very substantial financial resourees and are important rep-
resentatives of various segments ef American industry.
It is the purpose of the members of PRDC to construct and
operate the reactor portion of the Enrico Fermi Atomic
Power Flant in order to provide themselves and the country
with the knowledge that will be gained in this important .
area of the utilization of nuclear materials.
The origin of the PRDC fast breeder reactor goes bak
to April, 1951, when The Detroit Edison Company and Dow
Chemical Company entered into a study agreement with
the AEC to conduct ‘research, looking to the feasibility of
generating electricity by th+ use of fissionable materials.
~
°
} 727
. .
In the period between 1952 and 1955 certain other coinpanies
joined the study group initiated by The Detroit) Edison,
Company and Dow Choanieal Company. In o4 Dow Chea
ical Company withdrew from the group to concentrate on |
the application of atomic energy To chemical processes.
APD AS was organized as a New York membership corpora-
tion in March of 1955 to carry onthe work whieh had -pre-
viously been conducted by this stady group. As a result
sof its studies, APDA determined that the fast’ neutron
reeder reactor heldgreat promise because of conservation
of nuclear fuels possible through the use of this type cof
ryactor. As Dr. Bethe has stated in his testimony, the
folesurs | development of breeder reactors igsof the utmost
jmportance to an ecoromic use of nuclear fuels for peace-
time purposes because of the fuel conservation possible,
The adoption by Congress oY the Atomic Bnergy Act of
1954 to encourage participation of private industry in ad.
Vaneing the peacetime application of the atom niade possible
amextetided mdustrial itortint+isarea, Ln January, 155,
the AEC announerd its) Powfr Demonstration Reactor
Program and invited indusiry tg submit proposals for the
construction of reactots of warious, types. On Mareh 50,
1955, The Detroit Edison Company; om behalf of a group
of companics, ath of which are now members of PRDC, sub
mitted to the A he a proposal under this program to design,
construct, own and operate a developmental fast neutron
breeder reactor,” On dwigust 8. 1955, the AKC announeed
that the Mareh 30 proposal was acceptable as a basis for
further negotiation. Copies of the proposal made by The
Detroit Mdison Company to the AEC and of the acceptance
of the proposal as a basis for negotiation are contaimed in
the PRC Application for License as Exhibits T and Tf,
respectively.» URDC and the AEC are now negotiating an,
operating agreement under the Power Demonstration Re-
detor Program. : ; mee
| think | should make clear‘the fact that Atemic Power
Development Associates, Inc. (APDA) and Power Reactor
Developm nt Company (PRDC) are completely separate
and distinct companies. [ have already desertbed PRDC
‘fol. 3928) in some detail. APDA is primarily a technical
wnd design research organization in'the field of fast brecder
‘ . : o e
reactors, ind i is re espons sible for the coneeptual design of the
PRDC reactor. Many of the twenty-one member companies
of P RDC are also members of APDA, although not ail of
them are, and APDA has many members whieh are not
members. of PRDC.
APDA, working with PRDC on thet fast breeder dexelop-
mental reactor, is performing design, technical and researeh
functions. APDA will also conduct non-nuclear tests of
certain reactor components, and upon the conelus sion of
such tests will deanster certain of the tested equipment and |
devices.to PRDC fer incorporation in its reactor. Arrange-
ments between PRDC and APDA have beén forma’. -d
in a contract dated December 14, 1... included as Exhibit
XX1 to the PRDC Application for Lic nse and incorporated
in this testimony by referenee.- ~
The management of PRDC has been guided and will con-
tinue to be guided by the design, technical and safety ree-
ommendations received from APDA from time to time.
PRDC will also conduet the pre-operational and other tests
~ recommended by APDA, in consultation with PRDC con-
sultants, and will adopt start-up, operational ang other
procedures in accordance with such recommendations. Much
of the testimony to be given in this proces eding with respect
to the research and test program for the Enrico Fermi. re-
accor is accordingly presented by ‘two APDA employees
whe are particnlarly gorge he this arga of APDA work,
Mr. A. Amorosi and Mr. . MeCarthy. .
{fol. 3930} On January 7, iF : PRDC filed an Applica-
tion for License under Section: 104 b of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 to construct and operate a fast neutron breeder
reactor. This Application has been amended from’ time to
time and is now pending. On August 4, 1956, the AEC
granted PRC a provisional construction permit.
a -&
PRDC Safety Policy
* e * -‘* . os
Public safety, therefore, has been and is of prime con-
cern to the PRDC management. We are completely satis-
fied that there is no public risk, Whatever involved in goint
forward with the plaat construction werk-at this time. In
addition, we will certainiy not place the plant in operation
(fol. 3931] unless the safety expe riments to be condueted
(29
‘ satisfy both the AEC and the staff and consultants: of
PRDC-and APDA that the reactor can be operate d without
endangering the public health and safety,
Furthermore, the management of PRDC believes that any
financial risk in proceeding with the immediate construction
of the reactor—-and no other risk is) invelved—ise fully,
justified’ by the time. savings involved. By preceeding with
both the éonstruction and the researeh and experimental
program at the same time, we should be able to save sev-
erak vears in the time required to place in-operation a dem-
onstration power reactor of signifieant size which we believe
Will point the way to the economically feasible production
of electric power through the use of nuclear materials,
We believe that this time saving is important to the ad-
vancement of the technology of* nuelear power pr oduction,
us well as to the preservation of American leadership in
‘the peaceful tiene of atomic energy.
S . * - : *
[fol. 3947] *° oi)
Henagement Responsibilities. As has been noted here-
tofore, the mapagement of PRDC did not authorize the filing
of the Appleation for Lieense with the AEC until it was
assured by its staff and consulting technicians, engineers
and physicists that the health and-safety of the public
could not possibly be endangered by the construction of
the fast breeder reacter at its ptoposed, site in| Monroe
County, Michigan, and that guy problems requiring. solution
with respect to the operation of the reactor could be satis-
factorily vesolved. The management of PRDE is, of course,
aware that further important research and experiments
are.to be conducted during the construction period, and in
fact has arranged for the conduct of a substantial amount,
of such research and experimental work, in order to provide
further experimental evidence that its redctor ean, when
constructed, be operated safely. We consider that the most
[f6l. 3948] important contribution we can make in expedit-
ing the development of the use of .atomie energy for the
production of Gretreify is to proceed with the construction
of the proposed fast brecder reactor in reliance upon the
advice of our staff and consultants, Before ‘be plant is
placed in operation all essential safety experiments will
have been conducted. We will not place the plant ini opera-
3 * * *
>
230) , :
—_ . ; e
tion unless these wey org nts satisfy both the AEC ‘and the
staffs and consultantNot PRDC and APDA that the reactor
ean be operated without endangering the‘health and safety
of the public. We are confident that this will be the case and
that it is in the best interest of the publie for the construe
tion of this project to go farward without unnecessary
Wemy.
[tol 39: 50] In evidence January 8, 1957, Tr. 43
e
"
Brerore THE AtoMic ENERGY CoMMISSION
In The Matter Of
Power Reactor Devel OPMEN NT COMPANY
.
rr 4 ‘
° Testimony or Hans A. Betrurt, Proressor or Piysics,
' CorNELL UNIVERSITY
(1) Biography and Qualifications
My name is Hans A. Bethe. [ am John Wendell Ander-
son Professor-of Phtsics at Cornell University. I was born
in Strassburg, Alsace-Lorraine, 6n July 2, 1906: 1 studied’
at the Universities of Frankfort and Munich and obtained
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in. Physiesefrom the
University of Munich in 1928. From 1928 through 1933 I
taught theoretiéal physics at the Universities of Frankfort,
Stuttgart; Munich and Tubingen. From 1933 through 1935 —
i was lecturer at the Universities of Manchester and Bristol
in England. [ came to Cornell University as an assistant.
professor in 1935 and have been a full professor since 1937...
My general field is ‘theoretical physics. My work from
1934 to 1940, and again Since 1946,-has been chiefly in
nuclear physics. In 1934 intensive study of this subject
was jist beginning. Many experimental data were con-
stantly obtained, and one of my main activities was to cor-
relate these data, to interpret them and to obtain from them
a theoretical understanding of the structure ofatomic nuclet
e ¥
v
<
«
and of the reac trons between them. In 1936 and 1937 T wrote
three Compre hensive review articles, together of the length
of an average book, on nuclear physics. These. articles were
frequently reprinted and ee for about 15, vears as the
standard textbook from which students as well as active
research workers, in the field obtained their information, P
\in this country as‘well as abroad.
\[ fol. 3951 | A4large fraction of my research work before
the War was spent on investigating the properties of neu-
trons. While not doing any experiments myself, J kept in.
close contact with the experimental work on neutrons at
Cornell University. Our University was a pieneer in this
field; in particular we deve ‘loped the first accurate neutron
velocity selector to study the resgnances in the interaction
of slow. neutrons with nuclei.
J alsy worked on the energy generation in. stars by means
of nuclear reactions. My the ‘ory of this process, first de-
veloped in LOBS, is cenerally regarded as the explanation of
the large energy production in the-sun and other stars.
For this work | reeeived two A, Cressy Morrison prizes
from the New York Academy of Sciences and the Henry
Draper Medal from the National Academy of Sciences.
l am a member, among others, of the 2 National Academy
of; Sciences, the American Philosophical Society and. the
American Physical Society. I) was President of the latter
society in 1954. 1 hold fgur honorary degrees. of Doctor
of Science, frof Brooklyn P olyfechnie Institute and from
the Universities = Denver, Chicago, and Birmingham, Eng-
land. | .
Karlyjin the W ar ¢ became.engaged in war research. My
first’ war work, in 1940, was concerned with the penetra-
tion of armor by projectiles. This work has been extended
by other se jentists ‘and the results have been widely used
by Ordnance experts, and as far as I know still ‘form the
basis of understanding of armor penetratjon.
Next I was’ asked to work for Division 8S of the National
waves produced by explosives, expecially in air and water.
During 194i and 1942, I wrote three papers on the subject
of shock waves. :
“
‘Defense Research Council which was concerned with shock -
732° .
[fol. 3952 | Early in 1942 1 started work for the Radiation
Laboratory at MIT which was eoncerned with the develop-
ment of Radar.
In the summer of 1942 | was asked to join n snail group
of theoretical physicists int Berkeley, California, under the
direction of Jo K. Op pe nheimer which was set up by the
“Metallurgical Project” at Chicago. The purpose of the
Met tallurgical Project: was to obtain a chain reaétion in
uranium and then to, use this chain reaction for the manu-
facture of plutonium, The task of our theoretical group
was to study methods by which nuclear explosions epuld be
obtained from fissionable material. This group. was the
core of the later Los Alamos Scientific ‘Laboratory which
was started in April 1943.
I was a member of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
from its beginning. When a definite organization of the
Laboratory was adopted, I was appointed Chief of the
Theoretical Division of the Laboratory and remained in
that position until December 1945, after. the end of the
~War. Our Division was responsible for all calculations con-
cerning the atomic bomb, and for most of its conceptual
design. In particular we had to devise inethods to calculate
the diffusion of neutrons in fissionable materiai and in re-
flectors, methods which have later proved useful for the
study of reactors. _We had to calculate the course of a |
nuclear explosion before any one was ever observed. | am,-
therefore, thoroughly familiar with calculations of nuclear
explosions and with the conditions that are required for
such explosions. We also studied ordinary, nonnuclear ex-
plosions and the behavior of materials when hit by the
shock from ordinary explosions. While all this work was
carried out by a large group of people in my division, at
one time more than SO individuals, I kept in close contact
with all phases of the work and contributed my self to the
solution of many of ‘these problems.
For my work at Los Alamos, I received the Medal. of
Merit, the highest decoration that can.be awarded to. a
civilian by the United States Government.
[fol. 8953] After the War, L-returned to Cornell Univer-
sity. However, | kept in close contact with tie development ¢
of atomic energy both for war and for peaceful purposes.
La
Oy Se 7 "- 933
In the first place, } became a consultant to the Los Alamos
Sejentifie Laboratory, This involved further work on nu-
clear Weapons, but in addition it served to keep ne informed.
on new .methods to estimate nyciear explosions, and on
new caleulational methods for netitron diffusion. 1 also
kept informed on the néwest measurements of nuclear cross
sections and participated -in the interpretation of ‘some of —
‘these which are particularly, important for fast breeder
reactors. -*
- In addition, I Jecame a consultant to several Laboratories
eimenail with the design of atomic reactors. | worked
particularly intensively with the Knolls Atomic Power Lab-
oratory (KAP L) at Schenee ‘tady, from its founding in 1946
until approximately 1950. After this time, KAPL became
involved in very special problems relating to Naval Re-
actors, and although I continued as a consultant I spent
much less time on this work. From 1946 to 1950, when I
did participate actively, the major project of KAPL was
the desigit of a breeder. reactor, which was first intended
to’ work with neutrons ef. intermediate energy and later
with fast neutrons: In this conhection, I stimulated ‘and
closely followed a program to determine experimentally a
certain quantity, the ratio ‘of capture to fission in U**?
and Pu, which is decisive for the breeding qualities of the
breeder reactor. Many novel experimental techniques were
invented by the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in con-
nection with their fast breeder work. About 1949, L wrote
a report for KAPL on the safety of their proposed reactor,
in. partienlar on the mild nuelear explosion which could
occur as a result of a ‘possible nuclear accident. This re-
port is, to my kriowledge, the first report on the theory of
nuclear accidents vf power reactors. :
[fol 3954) 1 also consulted for NEPA, a svebeat for nu-
“aa propulsion of aireraft, from 1946 to 1951, and since
1951 for Oak Ridge. National Laboratory. ‘In these two con-
tracts, I was chiefly concerned with the theory of the shield-
‘ing of reactors.
Since the end of the War I have been a member of several
committees of the United States Government. They. in-
chided the Committee on Atomie Energy of the Research
and Development Board of the Department of Defense,
"TOF ee a
from 1952 to 19540 the: Nuclear Panel of, the Scientifie Ad-
visory Board to the U.S. Air Feree from 19535 to 1954, and
the Scientitie Advisory Committee to the Office of Defense
Mobilization at present, in ade dition to minor committees.
TL have continued iny teaching and my research ino plire
plivsie s at Cornell University. From September 195. to
July 1956, while on leave from ‘Cornell U niversity, | was
Visiting Professor of Physies at thre vU uiversity of Cain-
bridge, England. During this time, [had an opportunity
to study the British Atomie Energy effort, in particular on
tle fast breeder reactor. T wassa member of the United
States* team to exchange information on the fast reactor
with the United, Kingdom, I was also, a me mber of the
U.S. delegation to.the.Geneva Conferenee on Peaceful Ap-
-plieation of Atomic Energy in August 1955. :
Since 1953 1 have been’ a consnitant to Atomie Power
‘Development Associates, Inc. (APDA), and the Study
Ctroup which preceded it. This group was first known as the
Dow.Detroit Edison Study Group, and then was reorganized
as APDA. Pursuant to a contract between APDA and
Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC), APDA
prov ides nuclear and other technical services to. PRDC.
| ufiderstand that this eontract between APDA and PRDC
is included in the PROC Application for License as Exhibit
XXAI. In connection with inv work for APDA, I have be-
come generally familiar with. the proposed design for the’
- Enrico Fermi Reactor, as set forth in APDA-115, included
ffol. 3955] as Exhibit XA to the PRD€: License Application, * -
as amended. | have worked on some phases.of this design —
as'an-APDA consultant,-and in particul ar on problems. re-
lated to its safety and the testing of its safety. In connee-
tion with this work, I have beeome farhiliar with the work
of Argonne National Laboratory-on fast reactors, and with
the theoretical work of Nuclear Development. Associates,
Ine. (NDA) in White Plains, New York on the same sub-
ject. | have read the testimony to be given in this proceed-
ing by Dr. Norman Hilberry of Argonne National Labora-
tory, ‘as Well as that to-be given by Mr. A. Amorosi, Mr.
Walter J. McCarthy and Mr: Kenneth Davis.
}
(2) Principles of Fast Reactors
‘A reactor is a deve in whieh the ehergy of the fission
of uranium‘is converted intosheat. Ina power reactor this
heat is removed in ach a way as to pe rmut further con-
version into cleefricity by a conventional generator,
The most inportant ingredient of a reactor is the atomic
fuel which is*U>* in practically all the re actors so far con-
strneted. In the future, plutonium-and Ue" may also. be
used as reactor fuelsy The reactor works by means of
neutrons which cause fission in the U°’ nuechki. The power
produced is directly proportional to the rate 6f this fission.
When no neutrons are present in the reactor, no power will
be produced, nee .
In each fission of U** about 2.5 neutrons are set free
from the nucleus. Some of these neutrons leak out of the
reactor, others are captured in the structural material or
in the coolant, some willbe c iptured by another nucleus of
U: ss A certain fraction: of the ne utrons captured in U2
nuclei will cause another fission. If, on the average, one
“of the neutrons emittéd’in each fission causes another fis-
sign, a self-sustaining chain reaction will result: the num-
ber of neutrons will ‘then remain ¢onstant, and the power
Ww rill be steady. ‘
(Tol. : 3956 | In geneyal, this will, not be exactly the case,
We define the multiplieation fretor k which is the number
of fissions produced on. the average by the neutrons origi- ~
nating from ane fission. If k = 1, the power is steady. If k
is greater than’ one, the nurther of fissions in the next gen-
eration will be-greater than th at in the laste neration and
the power will increase with tune. If the multiplication
factor k is less than one, the power will decrease with time.
_The difference k — 1 is often éalled the reactivity or some-
times the excess reactivity of the re acne and is often
de ‘noted by , “k,
The reactivity is controlled by cantrat eis: Three dif-
ferent ways have heen proposed and ised for controlling. a
reactor, The first is to vary the amount of fuel in the
reactor, i.e. to have somé fol pods which can be moved in
and out of the reactor, The second method is to-have rods
tnade of a substance which absorbs neutrons strongly, these
are catled poison rods. Finally, part of the reflector may
706
be made movable, this the n controls thé leakage of neutrons
from the reactor.
The most common type: -of control as by poison rods.
When such a control rod is inserted into the reactor, more
neutrons will be absorbed by it, fewer neutrons will. be
available to make fission in U*° and hence the multipliea-
tion faetor will’drop, The control rod works like a com-
bination of brake and accelerator in an automobile, and
‘just as a cay can be accelerated or decelerated at will, so
the power of.a reactorcan lie regulated by the control rod,
The ease with which the reactors I have seen respond to
controls is most impressive. . S
By ‘the fission of Uy energy is developed. This energy
heats the.fuel U2." This heatgis taken away by the eookant,
which is normaliy ca fluid cireulating through the reactor,
Most of the reactors so far built are cooled with water.
Some are cooled with liquid sodium, including the proposed
[fol. 8957] PRDC reactor. The sodium will in turn give its
heat te water whicli is thereby transformed into steam, and
the sfeam drives the electrie generator. In several designs,
including the PRDC design and that of EBR-I1, which is to
be constructed by Argonne National Laboratory, the trans-.
fer of heat from sodium to water is not done directly but
through ai intermediate heat exchange fluid as an added
precaution to prevent release of radioactivity as a result.
of a chemical reaction between sodium and water.
The proposed PRDC reactor is a fast reactor. This name
refeys to the speed of the neutrons in the reactor. The neu-
trons come out of a fission with speeds of about ten thou- .
sand miles per second. In some types of reactors they are
pe ‘rmitted to collide many times with atomic nuclei, and
in each such coltision they lose some of their speed, until
> their speed is eoduced to about one milg per second. ‘They
‘are then called thermal neutrons, and reactors in which
_ this process goes on are called thermal reactors., In a
therinal reactor.most of the fissions are caused by thermal
neutrons, and only -very few neutrons are able to cause fis-
sions while they are fast.. The substance which slows the
-neutrons down from ten thousand to one mile per second is
ealied the mode rator. The West moderators are materials
which contain many nuclei of low Atomic weight such as
hydrogen or carbon, i.e. materials like water or graphite.
y
: , 737
‘Ina fast reactor the use of a moderator is avoided as
far as pdssible.. Then the neutrons remain fast and will
inake fissioms While their speed-is still Several tldusand
tutes per second rather thatyone mile per second. In order
to accomplish this all materials te ie livdrogen are
kept away*from the reactor core, This is one“of the main
_ reasons why sodium is used ay a coolant. Even the ambunts
of soditn and: of structural materials like ‘stainless steel
in the reactor core are kept to a minimum, in order not ta.
slow down the neutrons.
fol. ¢ 3908 | The purpdsweof keeping the neutrons fast is:
to. accomplish breeding. This means that the reactor re-
generates its own fuel, and if possible produces additional
fuel. In order to accomplish this, the materials in the re-
actor niust be-so arranged that most of the nentrons which
do not cause fission are captured in the common isotope of
uranium, U*. Tf this happens, U* is converted into plu-
tonium which is a very good atomic fuel. This conversion
is the process by which plutonium is produced in the big
* Hanford. and Savannah River reactors of the <Atomie
nergy Commission, However, in these reactors, which are
not fast reactors, less plutonium is produced than U** is
consume ‘d. It has been shown, both by calculation and by
‘experinient, that in a fast reactor the production of. plu-
tonium will be greater tian the consumption of U. Ulti- _
mately when plutonium can be used as a’ fuel for a fast
reactor, one hopes to produce in a breeder .at least’ 1.5
plutonium atoms for each plutonium atom used up as fuel.
Suth a breeder would then be like a coal furnace which
-makes more coal than it uses up.
[tis clear that a breeder will be of the utmost importance
for a large scale atomic power economy. It-is like ly that in‘
30 to 50 vears, aiarge fraction of our power. will be de rived
from atomic energy. This ning only be possible if the supply -
of atomic fuel is very great. Breeders seem to me indis-
peasable for. this purpose. Since power demands increase
constantly and at a rapid rate,a very Targe supply of atomic
fuel will be required,
Indeed, one of the most compelling reasons for develop-
ings atomic power ix to extend our fuel reserves. We hear
that our natural oil supply will become insufficient in two-
or three deeades, and that coal reserves, although much.
~
O
738
Jarger, are also limited. Atomic power wae discowered just
in time to prevent Serious worry about our fuel reserves,
However, if. we use only the Isotope U Which is directly
fissionable, ‘then all the uranium reserves now kyown to
| fol, 3959] exist in the world will give Jess ene rev than the
known reserves of coal. This is because toe is only 4 per:
cent of the uraniuin we find in nature. TP we learn to use
breeders we can use all the uraniun instead “of just. the
U*’, because a breeder will convert the non-fssionable but
fertile material k=, which constitutes 99.5 per cent of nat-
ural uranium, into thé fissionable material plutonium., This
will extend the supply of atomic fuel more than a hundred-
fold. Only if we kuice coed in doing this will ‘atomic energy -
give us.a real improvement in our fuel reserve; in this case
- the uranium reserves will outlast the’ reserves of our fossil
fuels more than 50 times, The development of breeders is,
therefore, a most important 1 measure of conservation of our
precious atomic fuel. .
Other catintries have fully recognize’ + the importance of-
breeders. This is partic larly true of Great Britain, which
has the greafest need for atomie power because of tue high
eost.of mining coal from partly exhausted coak fields and
because of an actual shortage of coal which goes hand in
hand with this. Britain has therefore taken the. lead in the
actualiconstruction’of atomic power reactors, and in its pro-
‘gram is including fast breeders in an important way. . They
started their breeder development in 1941, and are now ex-
pecting to put a full scale breeder reactor into operation in
1958. This means that they are now several years ahead
of our development“in this field. Even little Belgium is
thinking seriously of the development of kreeder, reactors.
In the United States, we had an initial lead in this field.
The Argonne Natione] Laboratory built -an experimental
breeder reactor of about 1000 kilowatts power as far back
as 1950. ‘his reactor, EBR-I, has given imuch scientific in-
fprmation, and in particular, has definitely established that
breeding is possible. But high power breeders will not be
completed for several vears. As I hav? already mentioned,
Argonne is planning another breeder, EBR-H, this ‘one to
be of intermediate power, Phe only. full seale power breeder
on which design has progressed substantially, however, is
fol. 2960} the proposed PRD reactor,
The construction of this plant,-and the simultaneous re-
‘search and development program of APDA, and of the
. ee
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, will help to restore to
the United States the leadership in this important section
of the gtoinic power program, and will substantially ex-
tend the frontiers of teclinical knowledge in this area. The
siuultaneous pursuit of programs of fesearch, development
and construction has become standard in the fast-moving
field of atomie energy and: is: necessary in order to keep
abreast or ahead of our competitors.’ The expeditious con-
struction of a full-scale breeder is in my opinion an essen-
tial step in any large-scale program of developing economi-
‘ cally feasible nuclear power. “
(3) Hazards — a : r
The mere constenection ef d.reactor without the introdue-
tion of nuclear fuel involves no hazard te the public, since
“Such construction is performed in the same manner as the
4
construction of any building, industrial plant or power
plant. No possibility of the creation of any nuclear hazard
exists until nuclear material if present. 1 can envisage no
danger-to the United States or its security arising from the
construction of a reactor plant. ; iioiee
After nuclear fuel has beén introduced into the nuclear
reactor and the reactor is put into operation, it is still im-
possible that the reactor ever explode like an-atomie bomb.
There is no ‘way in whieh this ould ever happen. The
diazards we aré speaking of in nuclear reactors do not lie in
any violent explosion, but in the possibility that the radio-
active fission products which have been formed by the opéra-.
tion of the reactor get released into the atmosphere and
thereby cause a radiation hazard for the surrounding area. |
‘fol. 3961] When we talk about these hazards, .we must
have clearly in mind that we are talkingpabout extremely te-
mote possibilities, The probabilit® of nuclear accidents
- leading to dangerous release of radioactive substances from
? : . *:
a reactor ts inéomparably smaller than that of the most
freakish accidents we oceasio tally read of in the newspapers
sand very mueh smaller than that of the rarest diseases. The
y |
reason Why accidents to reactors are so unprobable ts that.
they areadesigned in such a way that one failure, such as
earelessness of the operator or failure of one techantedl
component ofthe reactor, by itself can never lead to an.
aceident. Of: course, every inechanical Component is de-
signed and built with the greatest of caresand the operators
are highly.trained and competent. But still, an evemight
by the “Gperator will.not by itself lendeto an accident: be-
cause mechanical devices will take over und mesure safety,
and the tailureof the mechanical component Will not cause
trouble, since other inechanieal devices will still opertte
cand shut the repetor down if necessary, Only if twe or
three, or im important @ases even more, major failures
occur simultaneously is there even a chance of an aceident.
Since each component has only avery stunall chance to fail,
heeause of TR careful cons ruction, the simultaneous fail-
ure of several independent compbnents is almost unbeliev-
ably small, We have, as it were, in each, situation several
strong and independent fines of defense,
As T have said, the hazard of miclear reactors. is due to-
the radioactive substances in it. Their, Presence Arises as
follows. In the fissiom progess the jarani nucleus splits
into two sinaller nuclei. Most of the resulting fission fray:
ments are reidipgactive, that is, they change into still other
nucle in the course of, time and is doing so eb emit radio-
active rays. The hazard potential ina reactor is, therefore,
[fol.: 3962 | detertiined by the smount of Sadan products
which are contained in the reactor, This amount ‘he
primarily upen the power of the reactor, The reactor which
PRDC proposes to brild las omy mode rately nigh power,
100,000 kilowatts of electrics t power or SOO .000 kilowatts
of- heate At least ene other reactor whose construetion has
been approved will have more than twiee this power,
The wmount of fission products in a reactor doex not
depend on the mass of U'" in the reactor. This mass is
indeed high in a fast reactor. In the PRDC reaetor, for in-
stance, it will he about 485 kilograms er a little over 1,000
Ibs., which is about twice as much as ina thermal reactor of
similar power working with enriched and solid fuel. Flow-
ever, this is comipe nsated (for the. present consideration)
hy the fact that at any given time there are fewer radio-
741
aetive fission product mue clei per pound of -U°" in the fast
reactor, Tn facet, if a reactor is operated: fer: avery long
time—many veats—-alwayvs ‘at. the same power, and if
none of the fission: produets are removed, ther the total
wmnount of radioactivity in the reactor will depend only on
tle power at whieh if has ra proseneta and will be pro-
portional to that power. «Even the distribution of fission
products among various chemical species -is, nearly. the
same for a fast as fer a thermal reactor, and the small
existing differences hate no inthierce on the hazard,
Actually, the fuel elements from a reactor are unloaded
periodically, and are reprocessed cheniic ‘aliy to remove
the fission produe ts. The used-up fined elements are replaced
by fresh ones ina reloading process. Ina fast reactor, the
reloading period ts usually relatively short: in the PROC
reactor, for example, it is eee to reload dnd replace
some of the fuel elenents every week, and any given. fuel
element will stay in the reae tas aa about T2 weeks. This
tucans that same of the lang-lived fission products will be
Pol, SOG. | present InomUcH smaller atmounts than in a.re-
aetor which is reloaded less freqhently, as is often the prac-
tice In thermal reactors, These long-lived fission produets,
and espe¢ ially stroptitan-SO whieh is among them, are gen
erally considered particnlarly harmful biologics ally, and. .
keeping their @neentration down will re “duce possible haz-
-pisciep Thus, the PRDC reactor will actually contain slightly
lesser aiieunts of danse rous fission products than a t€pied!
thermal reactor of the same pewer. But the main point is
‘that’ a fast reactor does not contgin any more fission prod:
‘ucts, or any more hazardous fissih, products, than a thermal
ene,
in norinal operation of any reac tor the fission produets
are enclosed within the rfhetor and cannot ese ape Their
radiation cannot wet out even inte the buil ling surrounding
the reac tor, let flotie to the surrounding country, This pre-
fertion from radiation is generaliy aceoimplished by oa
shield made of concrete and iron or lead or-other material
Which is expecially designed to prevent radiation from es-
capimg, A large amount of knowledge exists on shield de-
“igh, and substantiah protection can be afforded by a prop-
-*tily designed shield.. In my opinion, the shield prepared
-
“T4e
for the PRDC reactor is constrvative!y designed and no
fundamentak question exists as to its fuyctional safety.
The only hazard, then, could come from a re ‘lease of the
fission products from their normat confined location in the
uranium inside the reactor, Protection against this can be
provided by adequate containment; fission products can be
released only if the several containing vessels which usually
surround the reactor were fo break in succession. For ex-
amplt, in the proposed PRDC design, as disclosed in: the
License Application as amended, the reactgy itself is en--
closed‘in the reacter vessel, a strong steel vessel whicli
will stand up under considerable pressure, Outside: this is
the graphite primary neutron shield which is surrounded hy
(fol. 8464] the primary shield tank, azain of steel. A sheavy
conerete and steel hiolowient shield surrounds the primary
shield tank and the entire svsterr ts-located in the reactor
commzrtinent, a sealed region filled with an inert gas. The
reactor tompartinent is belaw the operating floor -of the
reactor building, and the outside wall of this building con-
sists entirely of a strong steel shell.
The primary contaimnuent is by the reactor vessel, and
every precaution ix taken te design this vessel with the
createst-care. Precautions are taken against a large num-
ber of conceivablé cattses for its mechanical faikure. One
of these inight be heat shock, ave. stidden change of tem
perature of the sedium coolant; elaborate precautions are >
taken against this-affecting the vessel. Another cause of |
‘trouble might bechemiéal action between sodium and water;
strong safeguards are taken against this. Mechanical shock
might be still another and this also ix guarded against.
Of course, none of tiese various conceivable causes of
failure of the reaetor vessels pecenhar to a fast reacter.
Heat shocks may aecur just as easily in water-cooled ther-
mal reactors as in fast reactors. Alse, sodium cooling is
not peculiar to fast reactors but has been used in inter-
mediate-energy ones and is being “Sncorporated. ino some
thermal reactors, due to its great advantages for sheat
transfer. There is still anothser possible cause for failure
of a reactor vessel, namely, men Seeere insid@ it, com-
bined with inechanieal fatigue of the material of the ves-
sel: many thermal reactors, especiaily the pressurized
143
water reactor, use high pressure, while fast reactors, in-
eluding the PRDC reactor, do not. In short, the possible
non-nuclear causes of failure are present in-thermal as much
“as in fast reactors, and in some cases morg so. Failure due
tonuclear accident is immy opinion far less likely than any:
of. the improbable. non-nuclear events which [| mentioned.
Of course, nuclear accidents also’ canbe conceived for ther-
| fol. 3965.) mal as Well as for fast reactors ; their discussidn
will form the main part of iy testimony. |
Even if the reactor, yessel in a fast reactor of the type.
‘proposed by PRDC should be breache ‘d, the fission prodacts
Will not be released to the outside? In the firstt plaice, the
fission products are still enclosed in-the fuel elements them-
selves, “These fuel elements auust lose their integrits. by
melting, harming, or crumbling into small fragments, before.
the fission products can escape,
_ Some fuel elements gnore or fewer, according to the type
of accident; .vay, of course, disintegrate and release their
fission produets.° But we must remember that most of the
fission products are solid or liqaid at normal tempera-
tures, Tie ‘se liquids or solids will then merely be sprayed
over the primary shield. Some fission products are gases,
These, in case of a breach in the reactor vessel, will still be
contamed in the primary slield tank, and if this alse fails,
in the: gas-tizht, reactor compartine nt. Tt would be very
difficuly for them to find their Way up to the operating floor
of the reactor building. If thes did, or if the reactor com-
partinent were to break also, the fission gases” would:still
bein a confined space, namely the reactor yilding.
To prevent them from esc aping from this building, we
have the last and strongpst line of defense, the steel shell
of the reactor building itself. This stee] shiell is madi gas
tight and thas can contain the gaseous fission products.
“Therefore, even if the reactor vessel, the primary shield
tank and the reactor compart cent should be biear hed this
Wilt net cause a hazard to the surrounding country but
Well mie rely nake the reactor biilding inaccessible fer a
number of cules or months, : aula
“Phe gas-tight shell of the PRDC reactor building is made
af steel so that it can withstand some pressure. This is to
Tol. 3966} > provide for the remote possibility that. the
oe ee se a
ee J
sodium in the reactor might burn if the reactor vessel
breaks which would heat the air ip the puilding and thus
increase the pressure, Even if all the sodium weregeo burn,
the steel shell is designed to contain the residual air and the
fission gases.
[fol. 3967] (4) Nuclear Accident.
One of the improbable events whic : tight release fission
produats from a reactor is a nuclear accident. This cquld
come about if the power of.the reac “i were suddenly to ex-
coed the normal power by a large ‘amount. Due to the ex-
cess of power, the fuel elements would heat up; they might
then melt and the coolant night vaporize. ,
Such nuclear accidents can come about by 4 malfunction-
ing of the reactor contrel. As T mentioned hefore, a reactor
has control rods which are moved mechanically and which
determine the multiplication factor k. If the control rods -
are set’inesuch a way thaf k is greater than one, then the
number of neutrons and the re&etor power will increase and
if this increase is not stopped, an aceident could’ oceur.
There are many safeguards built into all- reactors so
that this cannot happen. Perhaps the anost important is
the power seram meehanism. When the power exceeds a,
certain level which is previously determined, then an auto~
matic device will shut down the reactor. Phat is, the device .
will cause certain control rods to move rapidly into the re-
actor. This, ax we have said, will decrease tne re gn
tion factor k below. one and thus le ad to a quick drop in
the reactor power
These special comtyol rods which can he rapidly. pushed :
into the reaétor are called safety reds. In, the: PRDC re-
actor, for example, they will be normally suspended abeve
the reactor core by means of an electromagnetic clutch.
When the scram signal comes, the maynetie ch ch is. re-
- leased and the safety rods drop into the reactor. If for
some reason the apparatus does not ftnetion properly,
for ae ifthere is a power failure, the magnetic clutch
automatically. ceases to operate, the safety rods drop into -
the reactor and the reactor is shut down. In other words,.
[fol. 8968]: any failure in the system will lead to increased
safety, the safety rods fail safe.
- P 745
\
The power scram mechanism ana reactor is set at a power
level which may. be-some 20 higher than the normal
operating level, and some 20 ty 50° lower than the power.
level at which fuel elements would melt. Safety ret are,
“of course, frequently tested to insure their continued sate |
operation, a ane
Why is it nee ss#ry to ever let the multiplication factor k
become greater tllan unity? We must permit such‘excess re-
activit, (k greater than one) in order to get the reactor
started. When the reactor has heen shut down for any
reason, its power has to increase again from a low value
to the operating level. This requires reactivity greater than
one, : =
The higher the excess reactivity k — 1, the faster will the
power of a reactor increase, The rate of increase of power
is measured by the time which. would be necessary to have
the ‘reactor power increased by a factor of about 2.7; this
we call the period of the .reactor.: When the reactor. is
started up, this period is in ge ‘neral kept at a minute or
mere by suitable se tting of the ‘controls, but it may also
he hours or it may be as short as seconds. It is a possible
hazard to let the reactor power’ increase too fast bee ause
we might thereby lose control. For this reason another
‘safety device is ordinarily provided on reactors which pre-
vents’ the period from becoming’ too short. For instance,
we may ieeiée that we shall never operate at a reactor
_ period shorter than.ten seconds. In this case, a second —
scram device is provided which shuts-the reactor down if
its period becomes shorter than ten seconds. {his is called
the period scram in contrast to the power scram discusse d
be i. oe
Properly designed scram devices have always worked in
the. history of réactors. Jven in the few instances when
small accidents have oceurred in reactors, such as in the
accident of the experimental breeder reactor EBR-I of
[fol. 3969] the Argonne National Laboratory, the power
scram apparently worked. However, in this EBR-I ae-
cident, the period scram had purposely been ‘dise onnected
in order to perform a ee rtain experiment which will be dis-
cussed in more detail later on. For this reason, the period
Was permitted to become as short as one’second, ¢orrespond-
?
746
ing toa value of k considerably in excess of one.’ Now there
is necessarily a delay between the: power scram signal and
the aétual movement of control rods which substantially
reduces the reactivity of the reactor. This delay is usually
a second or so, and if the period itself is as short as a sec-
ond, then the power will have increased considerably beyond
. the seram power by the time the reactor is actually shut
down. For this reason, the EBR-I overheated and its ‘core
was partly melted, as deseribed in more de tail by Dr. Hil-.
berry in lis testimony.
However, if there is a period scrain set e.g. at ten seconds,
such an overshoot of the power cannot happen . Power will
then never rise very fast, and during the delay from the
scram signal to the actual shutting down of the reactor, the
power will not rise appreciably.. This hazard\ can be fur-
.ther minimized by making the delay from signal to shut-
down as short as possible. For — in any power re-
actor the period scram will be set at such a period that it
will be entirely safe from overshoot of the power. Power
react yr operators will never do any experiment) in Which
they eliminate the period sera, The PRDC reactor, for
example, will have a safe power scram set at a safe power
level, and a period scram set at a safe period, and this
combination seems to me to — very real assurance
of safe operation. — .
A further shfeguard i in the conivel of reactors which is
-incorporated in the PRDC reactor is that the control roas
| fol. 8970). which are used by the operator to control the re-
actor power, as well as the safety rods, can be removed
from the reactor only very slowly. Thus reactivity canein-
crease only very slewly. This is in contrast to rapid inser-
tion of the safety and control rods which can decrease -
the reactivity very rapidly. Mechanical means thus insure
_. that all motions which jead to higher power and thus to
hazard will be carried out slowly, while all motions leading
to greater safety take place very fast once they arg started.
Slow increase in, peactivity has the advantage “that. the
measuring instruments can follow the power and the reactor —
period very easily and that there can be no overshoot.
There is no difference between the control of a fast
reactor and the control of a slow reactor. Perhaps dif-
x
747
ferent materials and a higher velumetrie concentration of
poison may be used in a fast reactor than in a thermal
“one, However, the reactor periods which are involved are-
the same in both eases; they are of the order of seconds *
or minutes, and do not depend on the speed of the neutrons,
The reason for this is that some of the neutrons that are
emitted in fissien do not come ont of the nucleus immedi-
ately but are delayed by times varying from about a second
to about aminute. The control of a reactor, either thermal
or fast, depends essentially on these delayed neutrons. In
the case of U-” oe woe of all the neutrons emitted in
fission are delayed, et
if the multiplication Yactor k is éxactly one, the chain re-
action wi!l bé self-sustaining, but this will be true only if
we use all the neutrons, including all the delayed ones. If
‘Wwe raise the multiplication factor k above one, we need less
and less of the delayed neutrons. Finaliy, if k. becomes
about 10075 the delayed neutrons are no. longer needed.
For in this case it suffices to use 9014. of the neutrons,
those which are emitted promptly, ian we shall still get as
any neutrons in the next generation-as in the last, and
~ [fol 3971] thus be able to sustain the chain reaction. Thus, -
for k=1.0075, a reactor is critical with prompt neutrons”
alone, and: this condition is called prompt critical.
_-It is imperative to keep a reacior always below prompt
critical, and reactor controls must operate chiefly in the
jonny hetween the ordinary critical eérdition, called de-
laved critical, and prompt critical. For convenience, re-
actor scientists bave called the interval from del aved critical
to prompt eritical one dollar.’ This dollar is used as the
unit of reactiv. vy and corresponds for U* fuel to’ an in-
terval of 0.075 ink. This interval is subdivided into a hun-
dred “cents”. Thus a reactivity of 10-cents means a multi-
plication facter of k ef 1.00075. Ordinarily reactor controls
are set at no more than a few conts of reactivity.
There is a definite relation between reactivity in cents
und the reactor period. For instance, one cent of reac-
Hivity corresponds to a reactor period of about 20 minutes,
In general, this relation is expressed by a rather ‘com-
plicated mathematical formula known as the in- hour egua-
tion, This equation depends almost entirely on the prop.
&
748 0 Diag ;
érties of the delayed neutron: and is very nearly indepen-
dent of the speed of the neutrons which cause the fissions.
This statement is accarate to a sinall fraction.of one per-
cent at the low exeess reactivities ‘at which reactors are
nerimalivy operated, But even if the reactor verfod. were to:
get as short as one second, thie corresponding excess re-
‘activity is 75.5 cents fora tas st reactor, and 76.0 cenfs for
a rather slow the rinal react or. For thi§ reason reacter con-- -
trol is the same for fast and for thermal reactors.
Only if a reactor were permitted to operdte very near to
or above prompt eritical would there be any influence of the
speed‘of the neutrons. In this case indeed the power in a
fast reactor would increase more rapidly with time than
(fol. 3972] that‘of a thermal factor. However, no. reactor
is ever operated above prompt critical. In the operation of
the PRDC reactor, excess reactivity will be limited at the
most to about 70 cents, and wilicneversbe allowed to even
-approach the dollar which would make the reactor prompt
critical and thereby hazardous. |
As a matter of fact, it is perfectly feasible to "design
a reactor in.such & way, and to load it: with fuel in such
manner we it will be impossible ‘for the operator to in-
crease the reretivity to a full dollar or close to it ‘even if os
were to rans all rules of operation. This safeguard ca
‘be applied.in addition te period seram and’ power revel
scram, and, im fact it will be incorporated in the PRDC
desigh. We simply shall not have a dollar excgss reac-
tivity available. - -
j
We are able ‘to: incorporate this safety feature because
of the special properties of a fast reactor. The main prop-
erty is that the fuel in tae reaetor burns up very sloyly,
Heeause the critical mass is so large and the power per unit
mass not particularly -high. Now in the PRDC’ reactor,
fuel will be reloaded every week, and betaveen two such
reloadings only about .5% of the fuel will burn. It is eon-
servatively estimated that this burn-up, together with all
accompany ing changes like the accumulation of fission prod-
uct poisons, will consume less than 42 cents of reactivity.
It is planned to provide an additional 50 cents as a control
margin for the operator. This means. that even directly -
after reloading no more than 72 cents of excess reactivity
tore eties ee ilad IS
2
x .
2
are available anyehere’ in the reactor onee it is at the
operating teraperature even Pall tle eomirol rods and satety
rodsare withdrawn, Ns b bare sliown, up te 72 cents and
somewhat higher, theres noappreciabl ditference bet Ween
the belravior of a Yast and oot a tuerual reactor No eon-
Piok pt Head | es ceivpbie dais crtier the iméchanical devices
or the Opens perater ean “brie the renetor ta protiipe Bae oc)
* OGnCe itis opefativiv aiter 3 VEL p vit trol at a re ote: ny
Thermal reactors require far greater provisions of ox.
GURS reactivity, This is because the fuel in. these regetons
burns relatively faster since the total aivount of fuel
initially provided as lowey than taat in a typical fast re-
actor. lence atthe same power level a therimal reactor
~ has a greater-crate of reactivity change due to fuel burn-up
than a fast reactor, ‘ ire
Moye serious than this fact f6r the cont: ‘ol of thermal re-
actors is the nuclide Xe-135. This nuclide is a fission product
Which hasan enormous capture cross section for therniat
neutréns, but almost mone for fast neutrons. Pnta reactor
operating at high power, Jarge amounts of this muclide
will be present whieh will greails decrease the reactivity?
On the other Shand, before the reactor has operated,
XNe-135 will not Le present. Therefore, in this “clean” state
a large amount of excess reactivity lias to be provided so
that it can then gradually be given fo pee: Feactor as the
Xenon-135 builds up. Por theruial react eer high power,
ten dollars or mere of excess rea cuvity nitist be avatlable -
for this xenon ov: or-ritle, No nuciide of similar properties
Is expected te exist in the case of yet reactors: for these:
reactors, all nuclei will have OTs or tess the same cross
section and unnsually teh eroks bahia are unpossihle
the laws of nuclear plyssics. “Therefore, it will now ie
necessary in a’ fast retictor to provide darge excess rene:
tivity when the reactor is clean for the purpose.of over-
riding the absorption of some nuclide when the reacter is
filled with fission produc ts. From this very impertant stand-
point then, a fast reaetor cau te made sater than a- slowhone,
(fol. 89741 (5) Special Hazards in Fast Reactors
| heheve; therefore, that a gt redetor of the genera!
type proposed by PRDC ean be desimed and operated
790
2
safely. However, fhere have been some adverse statements
dnede about the savety of this reactor type, and fb believe
such statements are based on certain naclear characteristics
of a fast reactor whieh are not found ooa thermal reac tor.
There are three main characteristics of this type.
1.” Probably the ioest important of these fies in the faet
that if ever the reaetivity becomes greater than prompt
critical, the powet in a fast reac tor will rise with a faster
period than ina thermal one. b have explamed before
that this is net the case asdong as the reactor stays below
prompt critical, and that many independent precautions are
taken to assure that a reactor never ets hevond porompit
* critical oreven near it.
2
Although TP see no way in whi prompt eritieal ean ever
he exceeded ina reactor such as that propesed by PRDC,
we are nevertheless, prepared te consider what could hap
pen if through a completely unforeseen combination of
circiistanets, we sheuld execed preiapt eritieal,
In this case indeed a fast reactor would. heat up tore
tapidw than aahermal one, and a nuclear adecident would
occur, However, even if prompt eritieal were exceeded this
does not result in an ¢ sxplosion Which jm any way would be
comparabi® to an atomle homh, In order te obtain an atomie
explosion, one has te raise the reactivity of the fissionable .
thaterials in the atomic bomb vy¥ry suddeniv tea high value;
infact a reactivity of perhaps-one hundred dollars hes to he
reached in ga few mijliqnths of a second. Moreover, even
then a bomb explosion will not result if a large mumfer of
netitrons is present to becun with, as will be the ease in an
(fol. SOTO) operating reactor. Tn short. itd Jextremely if.
fieult ahd jcenires special designs toaake an storie onab,
and one ezamet obtain an atémie bomb by accident. The high
level of neutrons ina reactor is in itself anabsoluce yuaran-
tee that nocatomie bomb explosion esin-ever result, 7
Is reactor ever has and aecident, thy ain be at the worst,
comparable to av boiler explosion in Qeconventional power.
plant. Its severity depénds prjifarily on the rafetat whieh
the reactivity increases beyond prompt critical. New, all
the imdtions of cartrol rods in reactors? are designed in
such a wav that reaetivity can Inerease ONES ‘ata very slow
rate. For example, in the PRDC design, an increase of 1¢
~~.
get iol
per second is the most thatthe mechanism will parmit.
APDA has carried out caleuMitiins with whiehld ai
familiar, ta determine the course of th? accide nt Which
would resuit if all serani @fechuanisnis were to fail and
re tle LAVILY, Were to lie ili ent ted at the rate of le 8 second,
even bevond prowpteritieal Phese eale ations have shown
that im this case the matural therzsal expansion of the ura-
nium in the reactor would, autoimaticnliv shut down. the
reactor even tikouy pprotipt eritieanl was exceeded. In other
words, even Tf all-ghut down ime Ms anisius were to’ fail, the
natural ie ‘havior of the uranium when heated wotld prevent
an aecident, We would mere Hwecet solue rise in temperature
which Would subsequentiy die down, |
\nother caleulation with which tan: familiar wes made
in oh tel the reactivity was allowed to increase 1000 Tites |
faster. at sho per second: alibeorih beaanet eoneerve ef any
movement OF the contrals which weyido make the reactivits
Herease at anything near that-rafe. This caleulation avas.
carried out oy Nuclear Development “Corporation ONDA)
a? White Plains. N.Y. a fuelear consultant to APDAL The
result ef thos caleulation was that even this rapid Ine rease
oF renetivity would net lead to serious trouble, and would
fol. S976) -presumats not burst the reactor Vessel,
2. The second Special nuclear characteristic found in fast
reactors is that their reactivity would incréase if moderna:
tors were introduced inte the rehetor. Por instatee, if
Sedum In a& fast reactor coolant ~\stem Were partially re-
parted Ly sonie material comtaimine lvdroge wh Abr instance |
Wimoor Wate br - the reactivity would increases Tf this, were -
(lone te an ap pree iatblevextent, the pemetiv ity meh increase
les onal jieinpt eritieat kxclusion of niederaters from
i. fant reme for ~\ story) cloves Theol, however, sresent any vipat
thle proliems. In the PROG reactor, tor example, there is
no conceivable wax in which oil or water aight getcinto the
sedi svstem: which is campletely sealed. To make doubly
sere, Water-is tebe completely excluded from the reactor
be idiug—-there are ne dr: nking fountains, ne wash- stands,
hething eise containing water in the building. Oil and grease
Bs Kept to an absolute minitnum; there are no. ceservoirs
Polubricants as gre eouminern wit! large. motors, but each
ahs of equipment whieh requires it is hubricated only by a
stall cartridge of lubricant.
- @rs a .
(du
Thus only very small amounts of livdrogenetus material
are available anywhere ino the buildine,, and these small
amounts cannot get into the sodiuni xv'ste in. Nevertheless,
NDA has also carried out calentations with which Pam
familiar about the effeet? of substituting Moderator for
sodium mm the PRDC reactor. Even making unduly -pessi-
nh tie asstinptions, no serious aceidgnt, resulted unless an
immense amount of moderator was introduced, and | con-
sider this incredible. :
Tam acyuaintéd also with what | consider to be a some-
What more realistic calculation, made by APDA, which en-
visaged the possibility. that suddenty the sodium entering
the reactor was 100 degrees cooler than the sodium normalpy
entering.” Howeverl this should come about, PE eannot con-
(fol. 3977 | ceive, but this possibility again uid uot load a
— nuclear accident,
«
3. A-third relevant characteristic of fast reactors iS the
large amount of rather lightly enriched fissionable material
contained in them. if ali this. material ig the PRDC re-
tetor, for example, were assembled in one solid: bail, and
then surrounded tightly by a good neutron reflector such as
solid natural uraninin, we would have about six times a
eritieal mass. Gf brought tagether suddeniy, sacha lio rge
winennt of material would explode but as b have pointed
out alréady, with nothing remotely resembling the force
associated with an atomic bombs Therma! reactors of equal .
|
power working on enriched Uo o contain less t- and there-
fore de not inyeive this hazard, especiaily if the US? as
not highly enriched. In fast veactors, only. the geometric
dispersion of the tuel for eooling purposes prevents the re-
actor from, bemg supereritical for this neason,-it is “essen-
tial to make sure that the fuelin a fast reactor can never
assemble im one large mass. fi is feared that sueh an as-
sembly qnight result if a fast reactor melted down, At
present, APDA, Argonne, and others are conducting very
thorough mvestigations to make sure th: at ary conceivable
melt-down willnot lead to the asse nibs ly oo a large volume of
enriched wrannun. :
(7 course, overs pres auutipn ix takenwin any well-designed
I
fast yenétor’ (such as the PRDC rracBr) so that even the
es
“~
703
re ; ;
first part of this hypothetical accident; namely, the melt
mye down of the uranium, will never-oceur, | have discussed
some of these precautions hefore and will discuss others
later on. Hiowever, it is argued, the experimental ‘breeder
reactor EBRD did partially melt down, in an incident in
November, 1955, and this ¢meident has caused most of the
‘fears concerning fast reactors. ft is miv sincere helief that
these fears are groundless and that the causes which made
the EBR-Loamelt down will sot exist in the PRDC reactor.
{fol 3978] This is because the structute of the PRDC reae-
ter will be different from EBR-I, anid the reactor will be
opie ‘rated inva different manner, I shall dise uss the ‘se dit:
ferences further in. this testimony. i
4. Finally, a fourth characteristic relevantte safety is
sometimes attributed to fast reactors and not te slow ones
as a class, “Phis is the observation that EBR-P had a posi-,
tive temperature coefficient of reactivity which Was the im-
inediate case of its accident and it is sometimes argued
that a positive tempe —e coeflicient might be a general
feature of fast reactors. [do not believe that this is the’
ease, and T shall give my reasons for this opinion in the
next section in whiel EP shall also explain the meaning of the
‘term positive temperature cooficient,
The positive tempera’ ire cocilicient ard the consequences
of a vossible melt down of a fast reactor are provlems
which do require further experimental and theoretical.
study. In the next three sectiéns of this testimony, I shal!
deal with the studies which have already been made on these
prohlens,and with those which are now leing eendueted and
are? plained for the coming months. In any opinion, this
work will establish that geeflicients of reactivity and meit—
down problems m fast redetors do not repder this type of |
reactor hace rdéus for operation in populated areas.
To summarize, there are many safety features of reac-
tors. They inelude well-trained operators, good imstryunien-
tation, many independent automatic shut-down mechanisms,
control svsteus designed to fail safe, a sealed-up. coolant
“)stem, and many independent, strong containing vessels.
There are some features peculiar to fast reaetors. which
fend to make them even safer than thermal ones, e.g. that
tie system is at low presstire, that the reloading cycle of the
.
jot
fuel is short, and gspecially that only a very small amount
of exe ess re ac tiv its Tee “ds to bye provided heecmuse there ix he
ffol, OOF Of need for Xenon override, Taken: ell together,
it is any opinion that on ihe | wsix of present knowledge
there is as minel assurance of designing and operating a
fast reactor safel?‘1in a populated area as there is of de.
- signing and operating a thermal peactor, with the sale pos.
(6) Temperature Coefficient
sible exception of the two areas ‘of tempexature coe fherent
amd meit dewn whieh are still being exatined Hoth theo-
Yetreally and experanentaily. Et is my further opiroon, that
4 fast reactor can be so designed and constructed a» to pre-
vide ‘Adequate siifeguards in thse two areas. gmd that the
theoreticaPand exnerinental work-now underway im these
fields will confirm this.
oe : aie
=
.
It is generally tene that an ingrease in the temperature
bf a reactor willlead to an expansion of the Tuel and of the
restof the reaefor, and™ hat this e Spansion will decrease the
reactivity. Pf this is the “ease, we say that the reaetivits
has a negative te Isperature coefficient. In caleulating ilies
efteet of anild accidents; e.g. in the ealeulations of APD ap
ane span ekaatin linentioned before, a negative temperate
coefficient is wenernlls assumed and its value ix caleutated
from thie elk n thermake \panston of dwraniun and the other
constituents of the reactor, Af the normal mechanical -
safety devices of a reactor should fail, the negative tem-
perature coefficient is the chief mechanism woich prevents
severe aceidents.. ery:
‘Unfortunately, the EBRD accident ins Nevember, 15,
which Pomentioned befire has shown thatthe EBRD reae-
ter had a positive ten oerature coefficient. The power and
the reactivity. were carefully recorded. during the coarse of
the accident and there is ne doubt that the reactivity of
EBRD inereased.as the reactor heated up. In faet, it had
been known for @nore than twe veass before the aecident
that EBRD bad a positive temperature coeficient. Clearly.
the positive coeflicien was the direct cause of the accident
1, 3980) of November, 1955: as the power increased the ”
.
reabtivite. of he veaeroer iner sed. whieh caen led to an,
even faster rise of power, and so on. : .
-,
Obviously a pesitive temperature coefficient cannot be.
tolerated. [ts existence had given grave concern to the
scientists at ANL. APDA and NDA ever sinee it was dis-
covered, and the experiment of November, 1955, whieh led
to the accident was part of an ext ded program to find out
nore details about the positive temperature coe ‘ficient and,
if possible, to detertmine its eatise. A further progran for
investigating its cause and possible cure is well under Way.
It is necessary to qualify the statement tat the FE RRA
hatha positive temperature coefficient. Actually, if the whole
-reactor was heated slowly, the reactivity of EBR-E de-
creased as it does for all reactors T know, The positive
cool he ‘lent was observed only if the fue! Was heated very
rapidly se that there was no time tér the sodium coolant
tocarry the leat away. We therefore sav that the prompt
temiperature coefficient is positive; on the other hand, if one
waits long encech, the total temperature coefficient is nega-
tive. Therefore E BRET behaved alk right im normal opera-
tion Indeed, E BRL oawas aperated for four vears without
any troub lie, ups tnany exspernbentol results were obtained
Yromdt. Only when a special e xperiment was made in which
the operatinieona ions were entirely different from those
Uoporinal epevation and ine which the reactor Was pur-
cosély puconoa fast vising period by inserting consider:
able extess reget tivity, then the berernnipat eoethiciont came
into play whieh finally led tothe accident,
The facet that in this ease we have to do with a prompt
temperatuit coefficient: shows pumediately that this co-
efficient. must be assoeigted with the temperature ‘of the
uel itself. “Phe-question advises now whether the positive
Fol 3UST 1" temperature coefficient is in any way pecahiar
to fast renetors, and whether perhaps if as unavoidabie in
fast reactors. Lan contident that this is Pe the ease,
It is trne that an effect exists whieh could givera posittye
contribution to the temperature coeflicient in EBR-L and —
Which ¢ characteristic of fast reactors: This is the so-eatled
Doppler effect. Investigations on this effeet lave pro-
Pace} 1 alinost te noVears, nies thy at the Nnolis Atom
Power ¥diboretory at Seherieet adv. However, that Lahora-
tory Was primarily meres a Intemaediate reactors in
“hich the neutrons are neither thermal nor fast. For fast.
ys
Fb
reactors, the firs€ therough -theoretical treatment of the
Doppler effect’ was given two vears age by Dro Goertzel |
and his associates at NDA. Loara famitiar with therm cal-
culations and in fact followed this work very. closely due to
its extreme importance, Their main results were, first,
that the. temperature coefheient due té Doppler effect is
very small and second, that it depends critically on the dilu-
tion of Ue with US. In EBR-T in which nearly pure U*
is used,’ the Doppler, effect may indeed cause a: snuall posi-
_tive temperature coefficient. But if Ue is diluted: nh at
east one atom: ef .U- per atom of 235, then the Doppler
effeet will give-a negative temperature coeficient.” In the
PRDC reactor, for example, there’ will be about 3 atoms of
23S per atom of 255 and this will make the. Doppler ¢o-
efficient certainly negative and its value somewhat larger
than for “EBR-L Therefore, according -to the -best theo-
retical information now available, the Doppler effect can be
cmmade to contribute to safety ino fas< power reactors “and
will do so in the PRDC reactor.
Even in the EBR-I, the Doppier effect cannot have been
. the cause of the observed positive temperature coeficient.
fol. S982] Aceordins omy own latest calculations, it could -
have contributed no more than 56 of the observed) posi-
‘tive temperature coethcfent, ; :
Mx periments.re under way at Arco, Idake, to measure
the Doppler coeficient ia evitieal assembly, ZPR-3, whieh
c@ntains the same caatertals as EBR-E A eritical assembly:
isa reactor which operates at extremely low power, perhaps
a few watts, a condition which is particularly suitable. for
exadet measuements of -the reactivity. The experiments se
far carried ou have given the. fesult. that the Doppler’
effect may be evey smaller. than the caleulated value, cer-
tainly not varger. These difficult experiine nts are continu-
‘ing, and are discussed by Dr. Hilberry in his testimony. At
present they give confidence in the theereticab caleuiations
and confirm the conclusion that the Doppler effect cannot
have been responsible, for the positive temperature © o-.
efficient in EBR-L and will certainly not 4ive a positive
temperature coefficient inthe PRDC reactor.
The experiments prove in’ facet somewhat more. The
experimental fact is that the heating of a piece or i
ii
. ° = a. . é
by itself, without heating-the rest of the reactdr, does not
eaitse ao ineasurable inerease in reactivity, as long as the
draniiin does net move. this excludes not only an unde-
sirable Doppler effect but rieans that there is,also-no other
internal effeet of any kend in-the fuel which gives an ap-
preciable positive teniperature cocfiicient. Thus the eX
periments show that we have not overlooked any pliysical
phenomenon Which might give a positive temperature co-
‘efficient. Thus we. have direct assurance that there is no
intrinsic property of fast reactors which eauses a posi-
tive temperagure coeflicient.: : &
It intherefore generally agneed that the positive tempera. -
ture caefficient observed in EBR-L was due to some features
ffol. 3985] /in the mechanical design ef this reactor rather
than to the high speed of the neutrons. “Now the EBR-F
was désigned to make certain physical measurements, in.
particnlar te establish that breeding is possible. It was not
intended for engineering testsy and ‘was therefore not de-
sygned with the ear, and did not have the mechanical
rigidity, that one should demand of a power reastor.
The fuel elements in EBR-T are rods of U* whieh are
eld at their fop and bottom.” When the reactor operates, .
the side feae! fuel rod which is closer to the center of thes
regetor will become hotter than thé side*away. from the
eent oy This will make the inner side expand relative to
the outer, and the fuel clements will bow. Since its top and
ottom are fixed in vertical position, the middle of the fuel
forment will be pushed closer to the center of the reactor.
‘Thos will lead to an inerease of reactivity.. 2
It is rather generally beheved that this was the cause
the Positive temperature coefficient in ABRIL. One can
estimate the amount of bowing that abould occur at a given
reactor power, and this is just abowe the right aniount to
exnlain the observed positive temperature coefficient. Un-
fortunately, if is not possible to make measureMents of the,
pesition of fuel elements in the reactor white i®is in opera-
tion, and therefore, we hav ono positive proof that bowing
of the estimated Amount actually took place in the reacter
~. ‘To find out whether bowing was responsible a program
is at present under. way to’ relitild the EBR-L with a dif-
ferent mechanical design, as explained 4n more detail in the
x
TOs
testimony of Dr. Hilberry and Mer. Davis. The fuel elements
will be made more msgid and will be held rigidly tn place see
that howing will be wreatly — This program is being
carried out at Arco; Idahe, by personnel of the Argonne
National Laboratory. APDA and PRDC are vitally inter-
ested in the program and are he ping to the best of their
fol. S984] abilities. . o
In the design of the PRDC reactor, for example, the en.
gineers have been aware for some tine that inward bowing
‘of the fuel elements must be avoided, and several alterna-
tive methods are being examined. The testimony of Mg.
McCarthy will describe thesaglexigns more in detail. rT)
intentidfi is to assufe either that no bowing occurs at all or
that bowing should pu) | the fuel elements farther apart in
the core rater, than “loser, together, and if this can be
achieved, the reactivity will “decrease rather than, increase
due to bowing. |
The gutcome of the test of the new EF BRA désign will
greatly influence the further design of fast power. reactors,
including the P RDC reactor. [fit is found that the posi-
tive temperature coefficient has been removed as | anr con-
fident will be the case, we shall feel justified in going ahead
on the basis of present design criter‘a; if it ts not, we shall
make turther changes in designsand further experiments
‘to insure a negative temperaturé coefficient. The EBR-!
test is scheduled to také piace in. the summer of i257.
If vowing can be made to contribute a negative tempera-
ture coefficient, or if it can be eliminated, the total prompt
temperature coefficient of the -PRDC reactor will be nega-
tive, because of the thermal expansion of the fuel elements.
With a negative prompt tentperature coefficientan accident
of the EBR-I type cannot-occur, the reactor will shut itself
Coww when heated even if the.heating occurs rapidiy, and
the reactor will then be safe. :
The EBR-F experiments also revealed another type of
instahilityca resonance. When the reactor was operated at
{fol 8985] its normal power and the How of sodium was
reduced, a point was reached where the reactor power
would begin to oscillate with a period of about fiiteen
seconds, without any: external canse. These oscillations
were investigated in ‘considerable detail by means of a re-
4
° . G09
actor oseilater, a device which Eb shall dtseribe im more
detail later in this testimony, The resonance is somewhat
but not too ciosely related to the vositive temperature CO--
eficient. The resonance does not constitute a direct“hazard —
“butat would linut the power at White ‘+h the reactor could be
operated,
| have every reasonable expectation that the projected
work on EBERT will isolate the causes of instability, both
with resp ect to temperature coefficient and resonance, and
Here is no reasow to expect that any real difficulty wall, he’
‘encountered in designing a fast stable reactor with newa-
tive temperature coeflicrent of: adequate: magnitude and
sign. } further expect that the experimental program will
show the design of the PRDC reactor to be stable; at the
least, | am confident that it will indieate design changes
Which can be made to accomplish stability.
(7) Meltdown in the Presence of Sodium
In normal operation all Known. reactors are extremely
stable. Even the EBR-I which had a: positive prompt
telnperature coefficient operated with gree mn stability and re-.
lialytity for four vears. Normal operation will, therefore,
not lead to meltdown with. its possible consequences,
Meltdown js conceivable when a radical change Has been,
made in the composition of the reactor. One major change
Which oceurs regularly is the reloading of. the re ‘actor with -
new fAel elements. investigations have made whether and
in which way meltdown could occur in the P RDC rea¢tor.
atter reloading.
‘fol. 8986.) Of course, reloading is ¢ -ondue ted in such a way
that malian yill actually not occur.- The new fuel ele-
ments will contain just as much U** as thie old fuel elements
did when they were fresh. “As a precaution, care is taken
that the new fuel clenrents are not inserted in the center
{ the reactor where they would contribute most to the
reatieiey but ouly in the outer parts of the core where the
reactivity contribution is nruch smaller. The used-up cen-
tral fuel elements will-in turn be r®placed by partly-used
-fuel elements which were previously located in the outer
parts of the reactor eore.. This procedure will minunize
any possible excess reactivit’ introduced by reloading.
ya
760 ee ue ee -
The main concern then would be that) perhaps one fue!
elemgnt- might slips in which contaid® € | of a higher en--
richment than is required for the reac ai It is not clear
how this could come about, but to make: ddubly sare, APD.A
is at present considering testing procedutes to which eda ‘hh
fuel element. pin would be subjected before insertion inte
a sub-assembly. This testing would be direc fed toward) in
surance that each fuel pin ~~ exactly thie Us enrichinent
required. § @ | :
_Let us assume that in spite of these.precautions, a fue]
sub-assembly is inserted which 4s too highly enriched and:
therefore gives a larger contribution to reactivity than- re-
quired. If this were to happen, it would be immediately
aliscovered even while the reactor is being reloaded, because
- the instrumy nts would indicate a rise to a higher néutron
level. THe instruments which are used. in the shut-down
condition during a reloading are sensitive enough to detect
a reactivity which excéeds the required one by a fraction
of a dollar. If: such extra reactivity is> discovered, the
reloading will be immediately interrupted, some of the
freshly loaded fuel element: sub-assemblies taken out and
replaced by others until the instruments indicate fhe correct:
[fol. 3987 | reactivity.
' Let us assume, however, that ithe operators responsible’
for the reloading (who of course will be particularly com-
-petent) fail to discover the extra reactivity. Then after
‘the reloading process ‘is completed the safety rods will be
withdrawn and thereby: the reactivity allowed to approach
unity. As.I have pointed out beggre, this will be done very
slowly, at a rate not exceeding 1¢ per second, and the.
instruments will be operating all the time. If the neutron
detectors-do not work properly, an interlock will prevent
the withdzawal of the safety rods: Assume now that the
reactor has been loaded: with too much fuel, that the op-
erators have failed to notice this and that the safety rotls
are withdrawn. Then as soon as the reactor period becomes
shorter than the setting of the period trip, the scram wil!
operate and the reactor will be shut down. The same would
happen if the power exceeded the operating power. There.
fore, no meltdown will result even if the wrong type of fue!
>
.
a
ee ey ae ae
element has slipped through the. fuel element testing and
-even if the operators have failed to notice this.
An excess of power-can only result if, in addition to these
two unlikelyeevents, there is a complete failure of the satety
mechanism, if for instance the safety rods which wre
just withdrawn cannot fall back into the reactor. It is quite
inconceivable to me just hoav this could happen. “If it were-
to happen, and if in additjon the moveinent of the safety
rods out of the reactor could not be stopped—another most
unlikely asswnption—then the: reactor —— overheat and
melt down.
These supposed Msiitions « of a reactot evtihion, and
other even more unlikely chains of events, would be quite
similar to the conditions which were purposely created for
experimental purposes when the EBR-I meltdown occurred.
The postulated conditions would be somewhat worse than
[ fol. 3988] those: under which the EB R-F accident occurred,
‘however, @ecause it is postulated that none, of the safety
mechanisms would werk.
Let us, therefore, have a closer look into the meltdown
incident of the EBR-I. The Argonne National Laboratory,
as Dr. Hilberry has explained in bis testimony, has studied
in great de tail the conditions of the core of EBR-I after
its melting, and I am familiar witli these studies; in fact,
Il chave ‘also examined the EBR-I core ,after meltdown.
They have found that uranium was expelled from the center
of the core. .The density of the core before the incident
was about 10.5 grams“per cybie centimeter; after the ig-
cident the density at the center. @f the core was reduced
“to about four grains per cubic centimeter, and this remain-
‘ing material was very porous. Apparently inoreethan halt
of the uranium which was originally at the center of the
core had been pushed out by the melting to a position
near the edge of the core. Indeed, both on the sides of the
reactor core and nea? its lower ‘edge, one finds material
which apparently was pitshed into .these positions from
. somewhere else, in addition to th 1e material which was in
these positions from the beginning and which shows. no
signs of melting. Bglow.the' center of the.core there is a
region in which.the density was increased to 14 or 15 grams
‘per cubic. centimeter by addition,of extra material. Thus
762
there is ample evidence that material from ‘Y center. of
the core was pushed toward the outside. ,
- Now it is well known that the contribution of U*° to the
reactivity is greatest when the U*° is near the center of
the assembly. Material near the edge of the core con-
tributes far less‘to the reactivity, and material pushed into °
the blanket would contribute less still. Therefore, the me!t-
down incident of EBR-L, fr from assembling the materia!
into one big mass of uranium, disassembled it and the reby
reduced the ‘reactivity. i
[ fol. 3989] .While there is no positive evidence ‘on the
mechanism of this disassembly, it is reasonable to specu-
late that it might have happened like this. The molten ura-
nium ‘ame in contact with liquid sodiuin, after eating its
way through the steel claddmg of the fuel. elements... The
boiling. point of sodiuin is below the melting point-of ura-.
nium; therefore the sodiun immediately started to boil. :
Because the processes. were rapid, the ‘boiling sodium did
not find an outlet along the normal coolant channels. In-
stead its, pressure pushéd the uranium away from the cen-
ter ofthe core into the outer parts of the reactor.
Whether. this mechanism is the correct explanation can
only be determined by further examination of the EBR-I
core, and by further theoretical work. However, it seeins
clear “already that there was a rather strong force propelling
the uranium outward. If the accident had been more severe,
this’ force would have been stifl stronger and would have
reduced the reactivity of the reactor even more.
It is not known whether the movement of U** in fact
shut down the EBR-L in its incident. The operator of the
EBR-I hit the scram button when he noticed the fast power
rise, and the automatic power scram Was also functioning?
' property. It is therefore possible that the EBR-I was shut”
down by these seram mechanisms. rather than by the expul-
sion of uranium from the center of the core. However, had
all the scram mechanisms failed, it is clear in my opinion
that the movement of fissionable material awity from the. .'
center, would itself have shut down the reac tor. ’
Therefore, it appears that the melting*of uranium in the
presence of sodium which can vaporize does not lead to an
| a“
e
*
; Jae : ; 763
; ra
assembly of a supercritical mass but is instead a powerful
mechanism for the shutdown of the reactor.. At the same
time, the pressures generated (presumably in the sedium
| fol. 3990 |" Vapor) are not likely to be enormously great.
One eviderce for this is the fact that gravity had time to
operate in the EBR-I incident and assemble more uranium
near the bottom than near the top of the.reactor. Further, ,
the forces were far: too wei ik to burst the reactor vessel.
Ind-ed, in the EBR-I- incident, even. the rather weak blanket
‘was left infact. .
Further eareful’analysis will be needed to establish -all
these points more reliably. However, even now it seems
very likely that a me ‘Itdown in the presence of Sodium will
' not bring the reactor above prompt critical but will provide
ameffective automatic shut-down mechanism.
[ fol. 3991] (S) Meltdown After Loss-of Sodium
Meltdown therefore can lead to: serious trouble only if
it oceurs after the sodium from the reactor has been lost
first. This is an even more unlikely eventuality than the
startup accident which I discussed in the last section. In-
deed, every precaution has been taken in the PRDC reace
tor design against the: possibility of loss of sodium. ‘Even
if the pumyrs fil and if the power fails, the sodium will
still remain.imthe system. As a matter of engineering, it
is certainly possible so to design a reactor vessel and cool-
ing system that the presence of sodium in the reactor will
be ; giaranteed at all times, and | believe that the PRDC de-
-sign as deseribed in the License Application. verbally “does
this.° 1 believe that the sodium’ system of the P RDC reac-
tor has.been designed with greater care than that of any
similar.reactor, and-that we can really be sure that a sud-
den loss of sodium, will never occur.
— Even if there should be a compound leak in the system,
the sodium flows into a sump tank, and afump pump takes
it back into‘the reactor vessel tank. is, it has to be
postulated that anew with, a gompound leak in the
system, there is a failure-of the sump pimp.
Tn this most unlikely contingency, the further course of —
events depends on the size of the leak. With any credible
764
leak, it will take many hours before the large sodium reserve
tank is emptied of its 13,000 gallons of sodimm. During these
hours, the reactor can be unloaded beginning with the cen-
. tral fuel elements which contribute most to the reactivity.
Even if this unloading cannot be completed before the com-
plete loss of sodium, ‘the remainder of the fuel in the per-
iphery of the reactor is likely to be too dispersed to lead to a
critical mass even if it inelteq down under the most unfa-
yorable conditions.
[fol. 3992]. If there were a loss of sodium ‘through a leak
of enormous proportions which persisted in spite of all the
precautions taken such as double containment and the ability
to recirculate, the sodium might run out of the large reserve
tank in a few minutes. This would still give time for
‘some precautionary measures, but [ will consider. the case
when such measures are not taken, except that of céurse
the safety rods are inserted and the reactor shut down
immediately after the loss of sodium begins.
The reactor is then left after a few minutes without
sodium “and without power. However, the fission products
accumulated from the prior operation of the reactor will
continue te develop heat by radioactive decay. At a time
of one second after shutdown, the fission product heat is
about 6.5 per cent of the reactor power before -shutdown.
It then decreases as the 1/5 power of.the time. Five minutes
after shutdown, it amounts to about 2 per cent of the pre-
shutdown power of the reactor.’
In the absence bs sodium, there is no way to dissipate
this power. The réactor core will, therefore, heat up- and
melt, beginging perhaps half’ a minute after, the sodium
has been lost. The fuel at the center of the reactor will melt
first, and then the melting will spread to the outer parts of
the core in a time of another minute or, so.
The details of the melting process-are complicated and
are only partially known at present. At the outset, there-
Fore, it seemed desirable to try to avoid detailed considera-
tian of the melting. To this end, two hypothetical situations
were considered, both of them far worse than any credible
situation. If these hypothetical situations had led to caleu-
lated accidents of moderate size whieh could have been
safely. contained in the reactor building, we would not have
e
%
See
765
needed to itivestigate in detail the probable course of a
meltdown in the absence of sodium. Unfortunately, both
| foi. 3993) calculations ted to substantial release of nuclear
energy ; detailed investigation of the mettdewn conditions
has, therefore, become necessary, and is being undertaken
both: theoretically and e xpe ‘rimentally by APDA and NDA.
The first study of an Aneredible maximum accident was
made by NDA at’ the request of APDA. They assumed
that after the loss of sodium, the soditm suddenly rushed
in again, that it did so with the same ‘speed it has.in normal
operation, and that in addition the sodium was able to
move the (much heavier) molten uranium at the safne
great speed (30 feet per second). !* is clear that these’
assumptions are little short. of fantastic, and could not. be
realized under. any. conditions, not even if we purposely
tried to do so. The energy release found by NDA was
“equivalent to 10,000 Ibs. of TNT.
The second calculation of an incredible accident was
done by Dr. Tait, a member of the British Atomie Research
I’stablishment-at Harwell, and myself. We did not assume
that the sodium returned to the reactor. However, we.
assumed that all the uranitim in the reactor melts without .
changing its pesition and then’ collapses under its own
gravity. Although slightly: more realistic: than those of
NDA, these assumptions clearly are still in the realm of
fantasy. With these assumptions, | have calculated that a
ineltdown accident of the PRDC reactor would release an
energy equivalent. to about 1,000 Ibs. of TNT. A more
accurate calculation is still under way:
‘This figure I consider to be a gross ove1 restimate. For
instance, Dr, Tait and I assumed that the uranium. does
not fill the voids left by the loss of sodium, and this assump-
tion, certainly incorrect, tends to oe the energy
release, pr obably by a factor between 2 and 4. We assumed
that all the uranium melts at the same time’and then
“collapses all together; actually, the center-of the reactor
core will melt first.and’ may flow’ away even before the outer
parts of the core melt. Further, the ‘uranium will trickle
| fol. 3994] down rather than fall freely under gravity. Ail
‘these and other considerations will tend to lower the energy
2
M6 (cee oP a eee
release very much. How much can only be determined by
detailed investigation.
~The original calculation by Tait ‘iad mvself yielded ‘an
energy redease of 350 Ibs. of TNT rather than of the 1,000
ibs: which row obtahrn—Phe difference between these two
figures is mainly due to two causes. In the first place, the
sinaller figure referred to the British fast reactor whieh is °
being constructed at Dounreay, Scotland. The PRDC reactor
has about twice as much ‘uranium as the British reactor,
and this increases the energy release in the postulated
-aceident by a factor somewhat greater than the ratio of
the masses, ; S :
Secondly, Dr. Tait and | inman that no safety rods
would be inserted into. the reactor after the loss of sodium.
Then the reactivity before collapse will be negative only
because the sodium has been lost; this gives a negative
reactivity of about $2. It is.a sounder procedure to insert
the safety rods as soon as the loss of sodium becomes
apparent. If this is done, thé reactivity is $10 negative, and
it is very likgly that no reasonabie flow, of uranium will
bring the res actor back to critical again. will diseuss this
further below, in connection with more realistic calculations
cf the accident which are at present being done at NDA.
liowever, if we make the arbitrary and unrealistic assump-
tions of Tait and myself, namely that the accident never-
theless will happen in any case, and that the core collapses
‘under gravity, we. find the somewhat, surprising result
‘that the accident gets worse if the negative reactivity’ be-
fore collapse is greater. This is because a greater, amount
‘of collapse is required to compensate a. great negative
reactivity, and if a greater amount of collapse is assumed,
a higher part of the core may be assumed to be ineluded in
the.coliapse and so to fall from: a greater height and there-
| fol. 3995] fore to acquire a greater speed due to gravity.
This means that at the time when criticality is reached
again, the reactivity increases at a faster vate if the’ safety
rods have been inserted than without this insertion, and
this m turn éauses the energy release: in the accident to
increase. ™ .
~ An inter ‘esting result of the caleulations.of Tait and=imy-:
self is that the energy release does | not depend, strongly”
‘, | 767
on the speed of the neutrons in the reactor. This speed is
most conveniently measured by: the neutron lifetime, Le.,
the average time whichea neitron takes, from its birth in
one fission to its absorption in the next fission. The energy
_ release is-inversely proportional. ty- abet the fourth root
of the lifetinae. Since the’ lifetime in fast reactors is about
1/100 of that in thermal ones, the energy release in the.
Bethe-Tait type accident is only about three times -what: it
woudl he in.a thermal reactor, Thus, the intluence of the
“fast” character of the reactor, is only moderate, -even
though prompt critical is exceeded inthis type of accident.
It is not known whether an explosion of 1,000 Ibs. of
TNT equivalent gan be contained in the many containers
*
provided in the proposed PRDC reactor. The explosion:
would. certainly burst the reactor vessel. Much of its:
violence would be dissipated in compressing the blanket and
deforming the shield.” Presumably some shock wave will
still .ye transmitted into the air of the reactor building.
Whether or not this shock wave can be contained in the
steel shell of the reactor building ts not Known at present.
If the answer is negative, it is again. not known how much
smaller the energy release has te be before it can be con-
tained. ¢ i
I understand that the Atomic Knergy Commission is.
sponsoring am investigation of (he whole containment prob-
lem. This investigation, which may include model experi-
[| fol. 3996] ments, may give us a much better idea on the
limitations of coniainment. In principle of course, any
explosion: can be contained. in+a building of sufficient
strength.
We should ietiiaiet, however, that.the model of Tait
and myself is only an extreme assumption which has. no -
relation to reality. The relatively large amount of explosive
energy which was obtained in ‘these calculations only in-
dieates the necessity for a more detailed investigation of
the actual sequence of events in the meltdow n in the absence
of sodium. ei .
Such detailed. investigations are now under way. As
Dr. Hilberry has stated in his testimony, the . Argonne
National Laboratory is planning to construct a meltdown
facility for the. investigation of. the actual process in the
? ¢
768
melting of uranium fuel elements, and of the subsequent
flow of the molten material down the reactor, ANE om
collaboration with the Los Alamos Seientifie Laboratory
_plams to take the results of ANL meltdown studies as the.
basis of calculations of the energy which might be released
‘if a eritical mass should be reassembled by the meltdown,
The special knowledge of the Los Alamos Scientific
Laberatory on nuclear explosions and on the behayier of
matter at high temperatures will be very useful for these
- calculations.
APDA has also initiated similar. stulies of itis oi.
Nuclear Metals, Inc., at Cambridge, Massachusetts, under -
the direction of Dr. A. R. Kaufimann, is setting up experi-
ments to study the melting and flow of uranium, using
similar geometric configurations to those which will @xist .
in the reactor, but using natural uraniumvather than U**,
and electric rather than nuclear heat. It is hoped that these
studies will give detailed ‘information on the melting of
the zirconium ¢ladding which ts around the uranium fuel
elements in the PRDC reactor, on the tlow of molten
uranium, and on the possible refreezing of this Granium.
| fol. 3997] ~ At the sang time NDA at the request of APDA
is making theoretical studies of the same problem. One of
their problems is whether the molten uranium will freeze
again as it flows down the reactor, In principle, such re-
freezing is possible because the U** in the lower part of
the core contains ‘less fission products. than that in the
center and, therefore, will not vet be up to the melting point
when the center melts and begins to flow down. In the
lower blanket section, below the reactor core, there is
depleted’ uranium in which the fission product heat is
negligible, so that the temperature is very low. The present
tentative conclusion from the NDA calculations is that the
molten uranium which flows from the center of the core
will not freeze again in the lower section of the core but
may at least partly refreeze when it comes into the lower
blanket. These caleulations are incomplete, and ever after
their completion we shall await confirmation of the theo-
retical results by the experiments at Nuclear. Metals and
Argonne National Laboratory,
oe “769
The question Whether the molten uranium freezes again
While flowing through the bettom uf the reactor is.of prifhe
4
importance for the further course of events. If there is
no refreezing at all, then in the proposed PRDC: reactor
the material will leave the reactor region and drop down
into the special ineltdown compartment which is provided
at the bottom of the reactor. In this meltdown compart-
“ment, the molten uranium is permitted. to distribute itself
over a very wide area, 8 feet in diameter, which will make
the laver of uranium in this compartment:very thin evene
if all the fuel should drop down into it. Such a thin layer
will not be critical even if it is surrounded by godd neutron
reflectors. Detaled calculations will be made to insure that:
the full amount of uranium in the meltdown compartment
will reniain far below. critical, taking into account reflection
of the neutrons from the materials which may. actually -
surround the fuel wher it is in the meltdown | compartment,
For instance, it will he taken into account that the blanket
| fol. 3998] may drep inte tie meltdown ‘compartment .in
the course of events. Special care will also be taken to
design the meltdown compartment in such a way that thé
fuel is certain to distribute itself uniformly over the area
povided. If necessary, knobs or dividing walls containing
a nuclear poison such as boron-10 will be provided. in the
meltdown compartment in order’ further to reduce. the
te activity of the fuel when it isin that compartment.
If*there is no refreezing, the-fow~of fuel through the
reactor will be fast enough so that all of-the fuel flows out
very shortly after it Thelts. For instance, the fuel from
the center-of tha reac tor vcore will have flowed out long
hefore the fuel near the edges begins to melt. In this way
accumulation of fuel in any one section ‘of the reactor,
whether in the core or in the lower blanket, is minimized.
I am confident that under these conditions the reactor will
not get wp to critical again if, by insertion of “the safety
rods, the reactivity starts out at $10 negative. NDA has -
started a more accurate calculation: of the inultiplication
factor of the*reactor as a function of time after melting
begins. Onee the: flow of molten tranium is known, one
‘an. calculate the distribution of fuel at any instant of
7
.
‘moder
of critical mass. It. will, therefore, reduce the ecenomic
770.
time and can then ealeulate the value of the multiplication
factor k for this distribution. ~
On the other hand, if uraninn freezes again, for instance
on its way through the lower blanket, thi channels for its
flow become clogged and further-molten uranium wilk then
accumulate on top of the’ clogged channels. and“ mainly
in the bottom of the reactor core. Lf this were to happen,
.eonditions somewhat sinalar to those postulated in the
Bethe-Tait accident calculations might arise. However, the
rates of assembly of the fuel would undoubtedy be much
slower than assumed in the Bethe-Tait- éale ulation, first
beeaiise not all the uranium would drop down at once and
secondly because it: would ‘merely trickle down rather than
[ fol. 3999] fall freely by gravity. With the much smaller
rate of assembly of the fuel would undoubtedly be much
smaller and would appear to. be containable in the many
containers surrounding the reactor and finally in the reactor-
building.
However important it is to investigate the course of a
possible meltdown accident with the present PRDC. design,
it is far, more important that these same investigations:
may ‘point the way te improvements in the design, It is
very likely that no serious freezing.of the uranium can,
occur in: the-lower part of the core but only in the lower
blanket. If this is confirined, and if the NDA calculations
and the experiments at Nuclear Metals and ANL indicate
a reasonable possibility that the uraniuin will refreeze in
the lower blanket, APDA wil! seriously consider eliminating
the loygr blanket from the reactor. This, will entail some
6 loss. of breeding and sqme moderate increase
‘ralue of the reactor, though not too seriously. However,
under the conditions outlined, the saczifice of the lower
blanket would eliminate entirely the nuclear accident after
meltdown, even after the loss of soditm.
The possible removal of the lower blanket is only one
example of positive action which can be taken in changing
the reactor design depending on the results of the current
research program... Other design changes may be made if
called for. At present, we do not have sufficiently’ realistic
information on the course of meltdown accidents, but only
~‘ ‘
”
of
7
eo SR
T71
.
. : P . sd a
educated guesses. However, a.vigorous research program
is under way to fill the gaps of our knowledge, and the
design of the PRDC reactor is sufficiently tlexible so that
it can profit from the results of this program, + have
reasonable hopes that this combination of research and
design change will lead to a reactor which cannot have any
nuclear accident after meltdown. [ am confident that the’
[fol. 4000] reactor can be designed in such a way that no
ceredible meltdown situation ‘can result in an: accident of
sufficient energy to breach the containment building.
(9) Pre-Operational Testing
To the greatest extent possible, advance: experiments
dnd engineering evaluation. are performed to assure the,
safety of any reactor, and this will, of coupse, be the case
with the PRDC reactor. However, a reactor should be
subjected to’a rigid pre-operational testing which can be
earried out safely at every step. Pre-operational testing
ix. carried out following completion of the construction of
‘a reactor. This procedure’ provides a method for further
check on experimental and theoretical results, and to be
most effective must be carried out on the reactor itvelf.
Consequently, such tests cannot be conducted until a reactor
is completely constructed and ready for the introduction
of nuclear fuel.
sefore the PRDC reactor is asseinbled in Michigan, its
critical mass and ‘many other nuclear properties will be
measured in a critical assémbly in the Arco, Idaho, facility
of the Argonne National Laboratory. Because there are
some nécessary differences between’ the. structure of a
critical assemb'y and of an engineered reactor, it Is ex-
pected that the criticalémass of .the final PRDC reacter
may differ from that measured im the critical assembly by
- ° . vr . . .
up to 5 per cent, either way. The reactivity value of the
control and safety rods, and ‘of fuel elements in various
~positions in the reactor, will also he measured in the Arco
critical assembly. Moreover, it will be passible to measure
the-suberitieal multiplication of a neutron source, with
various percentages of a critical mass loaded in the reactor,
and with various neutron detectors. — ,
&
*
.
ii2 ° a"
When the reactor is re uly for assem) lv in Michigan, the
fissionable material will be put in place piece by piece, in.
the presence of a strong neutron source, The details of the
| fol. ep start-up) procedure are described by Mr.- Me-
Carthy in his. testimony, The central fuel el@nents are
loaded first, and then the logdjng proceeds spirally out-
wards so that, as criticality ‘is approached, ‘the reactivity
value of each of the last fuel elements Is mueéh less than &.
dollar (ubout 40 cents).
The suberitical multiplication of the neutron source bys
the fissionable material will be measured at each stage of
loading with several .neutron detectors of different
characteristics. From these. measurements, the critical mass
can be predicted in various different ways. The most
common method is to plot the reciproeal of @e multiplica-
tion, 1/M, as a function of the mass of fuel. AAs the critical
inass is approached, these plots become straight ines which
-point to the critical mass (at infinite multiplication M).
Since several different neutron detectors afe-tised, several
different. straight lines are obtained whiel should all ex-
trapolate to the critical mass and thus provide a check
on each other. This method, which has been used on many
reactors in the past, permits a very accurate prediction ,
of the critical jnass.
Another method which {s even more aceirate; especially
at earky stages of the assenibly, makes use of the previous
experience with the Arco critical assembly, If the same
neutron source and neutron detector are used, then the
same multiplication will be measured in the P RDC reactor
and in the Arco critical assemdly, when the samme fraction
of the critical mass has been assembled. Thus, it will be
possibhe to deterinine the frac tion of eritical ass assembled
at every step. .
The last steps before criticality is reached will he taken
with especial care. Multiplication will be measured after
the addition of eachenew subassembly with the safety and
control rods in, and after every three subassemblies. also
with the rods out. Close to criticality, the procedure of
[ fol. 4002] plotting the reciprocal of the multipli¢ation
- factor against mass hecomes especially accurate, and it will
rt te
AB
weed tS
be easy to predict exactly which subassembly will make the
reactor critical. _
The approach of a reactor to eriti¢al is no longer a
hazardous procedure, but one which has been carried out
dozens of times ahd has become routine. Moreover, the
start-up of the PRDC reactor will be carried out) by
pecially coumpetent personnel who lave, been, trained
previously in this operation. Especially when ¢riticality
is near, the most competent members of the APDA staff
and of its consultants, as well as experienced AEC repre-
sentatives, will be present. I, therefore, believe that there
ix no hazard involved in the assembiy of a ¢ritical mass in
a populated area
When the er tie ‘al-mass 1 : finally reached, . the control
rods will be pulled out ~ang and the neutrons will be
allowed to- multiply until some low powe# level is attained,
perhaps a few watts. At this low power level, the control
rods will be calibreted, the safety rods tested, and the
neutron responses to changes of reactivity measured.
At. such low power level, the operation of the reactor can
be completély predicted from theory because the fuel will
not be heated, and there can be no effects from the bowing
of fuel elements or from-ather mechanical features’ of the
reactor. The behavior of the reactor then depeads gry on.
the properties of fissfon neutr@ms, in particular of the de-
layed neutrons, and is the same for fast and. thermal
reactors, as I have pointed out before. Thé test at this
low power level is, therefore, completely redictable and
completely safe. Furthermore, the fuel is not radioactive
‘at this time, because the r eactor has not operated at high
power levels.
If the reactor is found to behave satisfactorily at a
power of a'tew watts, the power will then be raised to about
300 kilowatts of heat, which is only 0.1 per cent of the
[fol. 4003] power at which the reactor is supposed to be
normally operated. The coolant wil] be permitted, to flow
at its regular rate so that,the temperature of the fuel will
rise by only about 1/1000 of the amount it would rise at
full poweiy ie., a fraction of a degree. Such slight tempera-
ture changes cannot change Me reactivity measurably, and
in 1 particular cannot lead to noticeable bowing. So the be-
-
oe
e
© ae
Me
o
%
é
havior should. still be the same as at a power of a few
watts, and this will be checked by experiments. ‘The same
will then be done at 1 per cent-of the operational power
level, where the same considerations still hold.
Then the power will be raised in slow steps. The steps
presently proposed are 5, 12.5, 25, 50 and 100 per cent of
the normal operating power, but this schedule is only
teritative. At every stage a full set of experiments will be
made to check ‘the reactor behavior. “The power will not
he raised to the next level before a complgdely satisfactory
result. is obtained at*the lower power level: As the power
is raised, the fuel will expand and may possibly how, and
we shall ther8by have a chance to examine the effect of
fuel temperature on the reactivity and make sure that no
positive temperature coeffic ient exists. ‘7
The chief instrument for studying the reactor behavior
will be the reactor oscillator. This is a special control rod.
which ean begmoved rapidly in and out of ‘thes reactor. This -
control rod is made in the form of a evlinder, one half con-
taining graphite, a good neutron moderator, and the other,
containing boron- 10, a strong neutron absorber, in’ the
form’ of boron carhide. The rod can be rotated at any
frequency from 0.01 to 25 eveles per second, and if it ‘is
so rotated, the reactivity will) change regularly and
periodi¢ally by a certain small amount. This amount can
_ be selected by putting a suitable amount of boron-10 into
the rod; it is planned to restrict. the reactivity change*to
| fol. 4004] 6 tents. Then the rotation of this oscillator rod. .
from the position where the boron is “out” of the reactor,
to the “in” position, will cause sueh a small change of
reactivity that no danger could result even if the rod staved
in the out position. Its 6 cents could easily be compensated
many times dyer by any safety or control rod or hy a rise
_of only about 30°F in the average reactor temperature,
When the ose itor is used to change the reactivity of
the reactor, the reactor pewer will also oscillate with the
same frequency. One can then measure the aniplifieation,
ie., the ratio of the amplitude of the power oscillation to
that ‘of the reactivity oscitlation. One can also measure
whether or no® the power-is in phase with the reactivity,
i.e, Whether the maximum of power is reached at the same
~
- ee im ®
, | .*
tiie as the maximum reactivity, or if this is not the ease,
one can measure the difference in phase between the two
oscillations. These two data, the phase lag and the amplifi-
cation, Will be measured with the oscillator oscillating at
different freque neies, -and all tts ee ee ,
will give a picture of the reactor characteristics.
"1 have’ developed the theory of these measurements in
some detail and have published the results in-a report,
APDA-117, which is ingluded as an exhibit to the PRDC
License Applic ation, as amended, and ts incorporated by
‘reference in this testimony. The theory ‘shows that if the
reactor has an instability (for instance, a resonance)
some high power, lets say at S00 megawatts of heat, one
can predict this instability very well from experiments at
igi lowey power, let us say at 50 to 100 megawatts. gthis
s precisely the purpose of these experiments, namely to
pe advance warning of instabilities long be fore these in-
stabilities actuaily occur, and this feature great® , con-
tributes to the-safety of oscillator experiments,
[fol. 4005] To make them still safer, we shall not simply
increase the.power by steps While keeping: the coolant flow
constant, but we shall first do ering at lower power
with reduced-coolant Hoy. What we really want to study
ix the hehavior of the reactor at diffe ap fuel temperatures
because it f& the temperature of the fuel which determines
its expansion, its bowing, and its Doppler ‘effect. There-.
fore, we should.get essentially the sme result if we operate.
at one-quarter of full power und one-quarter of full coolant
flow as if we operated-at full power and full coolant flow.
Staving at relatively low power and reduced coolant flow
has several advantages. First of all, the total accumulated
radioactivity will be kept.low, so that if against all expecta-
tions there should be an accident, not many fission products
would be released. * Secondly, the slower the coolant flows,
the slower also will be the responses 6f the reactor. We
can then operate ‘the: cscillator at. ‘ow frequency which is
easier mechanically anfagain increases the safety, f
To measure in particular the prompt positive tempera-
ture coefficient, we shall reduce the flow of cookint to a
very small amount, possibly shutting it off completely, and
we shall use very low power, perhaps 1 per cent of normal
operating power. If then the power oscillation is in phase
476
\ %
with the reactivity oscillation, this indicates a positive
prompt temperature coefiicient ; if it has the opposite phase,
then the temperature coefficient, ts negative. If in this
‘experiment, contrary to what I believe will be the fact, the:
teniperature coe flicient should turn out to be positive, we
shall take the reactor be, inch ‘and redesign it.
This method. for sneasuring the prompt temperature
coefficient is quite different from the. transient one used in
the EBR-I. Even if the. proinpt temperature coefficient is
positive, our method will be conipletely safe.. This is bé-
®@[ fol. 4006] cause on the .avgrage the reactor fuel is not.
~ heated up. The power is alternately higher and lower than
it was without tlre oscillator working, so that on the average -
it is. uot changed*° and the avérage fuel temperature and
the average reactivity likewise remain unchanged. If there
were any small change of average reactivity, this could
he « compensated by re-setting the main control rod. If
there were any increase of average temperature, this could
eniv be very siow and would then be communicated to the |
whole reac tor, and, as | have Snentioned before, the over-all
temperature coefficient, corresponding to heating of the
Whole reactor, was negative even in EBR-I, and, therefore,
this procedure is safe. |
4o measure the prompt temperature coefficient, we nrust
change the temperature of the fuel alone, and we imast
do this very rapidly. This rapid change is proVided in
our method byrotating the reactor oscillator with high
-frequency. it ix quite unnecessary to oscHlate the reactivity
with a large amplitude; a few cents is sufficient if we have
sensitive instruments to observe the power ose ation. Even
at the moment when the oseillator is completely “out,” the
excess reactivity will only be a few. cents (which causes no
hazard), and a moment-later it is minus the samé number
of cents.
Jn the EBR-I transient experime mr on the other hand,
- the way by which the fuel temperature could be changed
rapidly Was to provide a large excess reactivity, in the end
about 75 cents. Tivis is relatively dangerous; the fuel heated
rapidly without heating the rest of the reactor structure,
and the reactor went out of contrel, We have no intention -
of using this hazardous procedure. /By- providing rapid
a Po as posal
hm
-~
TT
change without appreciable excess reactivity, our procedure
will be safe and will still give the same information.
If, contrary to my expectations, our measurements do
show a positive prompt temperature coefficient, we shall,
“of course,-try to find its cause, which is likely to be some
{fol..4007| feature in the mechanical design. of the fuel
element. We shall then redesign the relevant part of the
reactor core, put it together again, and repeat the tests.
Tlie reactor structure is sufficiently flexible to >ermit. re-
design without rebuilding the reactor vessel, the shield
and other major parts.
A positive prompt temperature coefficient, is not the only
possible reactor instability; there is also the possibility of.
a resonancé, As I have mentioned before, the EBR-I had
such a_resoaance, at a frequency of about 0.4 eyeles per
second at full power and reduced coolant flow, Such a res-
onance is not in jtself dangerous, but it makes if impossible
to operate the reactor above the critical power at which it
oceurs. There is good hope that the resonance of EBR-T,
tovether with the positive température coerfficgent, can be
eliminated by a fetter: mechanical design and that the
mechanical. design of the PRDC reactor has in fact ae-
complished this. The reactor oscillator is particularly
suitable. for finding a-resonance, and if one exists, how-
ever, just as in the case of the positive temperature Co-
effic ent, it will be possible to predict the existence of a
resonanee at a much lower power than that at which the
resonance occurs.
Summarizing, it is my opinion thet safety tests with the
help of a reactor oscillator can be carried out without:
danger to public safety and that the tests will give all the
information zequired to insure safe operation of the reac tor
subsequently.
(10) Safety Consciousness of PRDC
As a .eonsultant, b am not directly a-smember of the
APDA staff, and thus T have an Popportunity to observe their
operation from. the outside, though very closely. Tam
also in a position. to make comparisons with other reactor
laboratories ‘with which T have been. or ain presently
associated.
778 | ao
(fol. 4008} To am happy to be able to state that, in my
experience, PRDC,and APD.A, as well as the Dow-Detroit —
Edison group, have always been filly conscious of the
requirements of ‘safety. Because of their concern about
safety, APDA arranged a meeting on the safety of fast
reactors-in Detroit in the Fallvof 1954. This was the first
mecting on this subject of such broad scope. Only one —
similar meeting had been held previously, under the
auspices of the AEC, in New York City about 1949, but
“that meeting was much smaller and less comprehensive.
The safety. meeting at Detroit was attended by many
scientists from- AEC and industrial laboratories and was
considered very muchgworthwhile by all participants. The
full record of the me@ting has been published. It was the
consensus of the participants in the meeting that the safety
of fast reactors was not an extremely difficult: problem and -
that most of the outstanding rs lis Were on-the way to
being solved:
Further evidence of the concern of APDA for safety
is shown by the fact that in my consultant's contract with
this company, reactor safety and reactor design were spe¢-
ified as the two major problems with which T should be.
concerned.
Karly in 1955, APDA ov ced that oscillator experiments
be done on- EBR-I, and these led to the discovery ofa
resonance in. that reactor, Scientists from APDA and
NDA, at the request of APDA, made major contributions
to the early analysis of the -resonaneé experiments, The
fact that the resonance re ‘anained tine ‘xplained Was the main
reason ANL undertook the further experiments whieh
finally led to the often mentioned accident to EBR-T. Full:
understanding is the primary. requirement for safety, and
even the lessons from the EBR-I accident itself are Likely to
help us to insure that no accident will occur In the PRDG
reactor. , ° ; .
_ [fol. 4009] APDA initiated calculations at NDA of
possible reactor accidents, considering, the worst possible
circumstances. At the sequest and expense, of APDA,
NDA made the first reliable caleulations of the Doppler
effect in fast rea¢tors, which were then followed by caleu-
lations of the British Project and by some of my own.
Psi in 1956, APDA initiated designs of the PRDC
actor, which would either avoid bowing or make the-
— -
-
>
yy
. 49
temperature coefficient due to bowing negative. APDA had
long been aware of the problem ofthe positive temperature
coefticient of EBR-I and of the meltdown préblem, and
Was engaged in prograqus for their solution. Since last
sununer, these programs have been intensified. There lis
close coordination between APDA and Argonne National °
Laboratory, both in fast reactor design and in safety
programs. | ‘
(11) Sum mary
By the application of theoretical physics to what we now
know, it is my opinion that a fast breeder reactor of the
general tyyie proposed by PRDC can be constructed ands
operated inva popylated community without undue risk
to the publie, and that it can be demonstrated, when such
reactor has been built, that its operation is safe.
The information to be developed by the projeeted pro-
gram of APDA, including pre-operational testing, and by
the related programs of ANL and other agencies of, the
AEC, will in my opinion eliminate any uncertainties that
may now exist with respect to operation of: the proposed
PRDC reactor. 1 believe that this information will be’
sufficient to enable “PRDC to furnish such additional
technical information as is required to complete its Applica-
tion for License under Section 104 } of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954. |
On the basis of what we already know as a result of
experimentation and research, operating experie nee with
reactors, and theoretical calculations, it is ay further
[fol 4010]: opinion that such additional information will
in fact show, with very high probability, that, a reactor
constructed in accordance with the present PRC design
can be safely operated. E-verr if the planned investigations
should not demonstrate safety on the basis of the present
design, they will at least substantially eliminate areas of
uncertainty and point the-way-to-charges’ in’ particular
features of the design so as to assure safety. The design of
the PRDC reactor is: sufficiently flexible “to ‘accommodate
such changes.
780
-[fol. 4012}. In evidence January S. 1957, Tr. 43
———
_Brrort- tue: Atomic ENEngy C CoMMIsston
Doc sai 0, F- 16
% . ————
~ In The ‘Matter of
Power Reactor DEVELOPMENT. COMPANY
itcaaaciaon
Testimony oF NorMAN HiLperry,
Deputy Director, ARGONNE. NATIONAL LaporaTory
Background and Q wal tfica ti ons
My name is-Norman Hilberry. | am the Deputy Director ,
of Argonne National Laboratory. Since July 1, 1956 1.
have been acting in this capacity as the Laboratory's chief
executive officer. |
~-. was born in ussewood, Ohio, now a suburb of Cleve-
land, on.March 13, 1899. 1 received my Bachéfor’s degree
with majors in eal physices and mathematics from Oberlin
College in 1921, started graduate work in physies at the
UniveTsity of Chicago in the fall of-1921, and accepted a
position.as instructor in the Physies Department at New
York University in the fall of 1925. [taught both under-
vraduace and graduate physics courses at New York
University, first at Washington Square College from 1925
to 1928 and then at the U niversity Heights campus as an
instructor from 1928 to 1930 and as an Assistant Professor
from 1930 until the summer of 1940, at which time |
returned to the University of Chicago ‘on sabbatical leave
and completed’ my vraduate work, I received the Ph. D.
in physics from the U niver rsity of Chicago in the spring
of 1941. The summer of 1941 was spent as a member of
a State Department-sponsored cosmic ray expedition to
South America. After a month utilized in making high
altitude cosmic ray measurements in the Andes of southern
Peru, I was a member of a symposium on cosmic rays
sponsored by the -Brazilian Acadeniy of Sciences in Rio
ot
wor,
: 751
- Janiero, returning to wee See Univer sity in the fall
of 199T
ffol. 4018! In December of 1541 1 was asked by Dr Arthur
H. Compton to serve ap his assistant on a war project
which was just then heing organized. This project was
known during the war as the Metallurgical Project and
since has been renamed the’ Plutonium Project. 1 reported
for fullftime duty on January 1, 1942 and have served in
the national atomic energy “activities icrmaentaars since
that time: ea .
During the early part of 1943 I had an active roie in
organizing the Metallurgieal Project, not only by assisting
in establishing it as an administrative unit dut also by
establishing and stafling new scientific divisions to meet the
swiftly broadening demands for the incorpsration of
‘additional scientifie and technigal disciplines. - During this
sume. period inv responsibilities inciuded erranging for the
necessary developmental work on methods for the produc-
tion of the extremely pure graphite necessary for auclear
reactor construction’ and for obtaining this -graphite in
quantities adequate to meet the project needs. My dnties
Jalso involved: an active part in the procurement of the
necessary high purity uranium nfetal. Twas one of a group
of three who served as the first site selection board for
an atonne energy facility, recommending the selection of the
present Oak Ridge. site in the spring of 194. Shortly after
“our selection of a site had been sade, the Manhattan
Djstriet of the tnited States Army Engineer Corps was
organized, and Gur recommendation was forwarded to them
for action, resulting in the acqipsition of the present Oak
Ridve site. As a member of the group present in the West
- Stands laboratory at the University of Chicago when the
| fol: 4014] first nuclear reactor went critical on December 2,
1842) it was my assignment to man one of the several
manual safety copprol devices provided for “emergency
shut-down.” © 9 - ;
During the calendar vear. 1942, the activities of the
Metallurgical Project ema rapidly. In addition to the
Metallurgical Laboratéry itself, additional project groups
became necessary and these were éstablished under separate
contracts at numerous other loce itions, such as Towa State
9 -
782 Ses
>
College at Ames, Iowa, the University of California at
Berkeley, California, Battelle Memorial Institute at Colum-
“bus, Ohio, and Washington University at. St. Louis,
Missouri. It was necessary to providd some organizational
mechanism to handle all matters of i al administration
for .these associated contracts and ‘to assure that the
scientific program of the project as a awhole was effectively
coordinated. For this purpose, a- Metallurgical Project
Office, independent. of, the Metallurgical Laboratory, was
_ established, with Dr. Arthur Hl. Compton, as Director, to
serve as the central execitive unit for the Project as a
whole. From January 1, 1942 until May, 1943, this Projeet
Office reported on matters of both program and admin-
istration to the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment, which Was the governme ntal ageney. responsible dur-
ing’ this peried for the over-all atomic energy program.
‘From. May, 1943 until. July, [946 it. reported to the
Manhattan District, U. S. Army Engineer Corps, and it
“was discontinued July 1, 1946. First as assistant to Dr.
Compton and later as ‘Associate Project Director, L served
as the executive officer for this Project Office. a
In the spring of 1942, active steps were taken to design
{fol. 4015] a reactor of large enough power te produce
experimental quantities of plutonium and a chemical process
plant adequate to,separate this plutonium from the uranium
fuel elements in which if was forméd. These facilities
were designed with’ the assistance of KE. 1. duPont de
Nemours & Co,, Ine., and constructed at the Oak Ridge
site. They formed the key facilities of the Clinton Labora-
tories which were established, staffed, and operated during
the war by the University of Chicago. Construction of
these facilitics proceeded during 1943, nie the X-10 reactor
went critical in November of that vea As the re present-
ative of the Metallurgical Project Office, I was present af
Clinton Laboratories during the final stages of ‘the con- |
struction and throughout the start-up of this reactor.
During this period also, construction was completed in
the Argonne Forest section of the Palos Park Division of
the Cook © ounty Forest Preserve of facilities to house the
Q
first nuclear reactor. The reactor Itself’ was disassembled .
.
5
oa
’
—
sm
~~.
from its location in the. West Stands and reassembled in -
the new laboratory facilities. It was here also -that the
world’s first heayy water moderated reactor was buflt and
put into operation in May of F944. Although the Argonne
Forest’ laboratory was administered as a separate unit,
it was operated under’ the same prime contract as the
Metallurgical Laboratory itself..
In January, 1945, active design was started on a full-
_seale plutonium production plant. The MetaHurgical
“Project: was ‘responsible for all matters of basie scientific
-and technic il design, while E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
_Ine., was responsible for all detailed engineering design
‘for construction and eventual. operation of the plant. As
_a matter of contractual obligation, the Metallurgical Project
was required to approval all final drawings, specifications,
(fol. 4016) and initial operating, procedures for the Hanford
plant. from the point of view of operability as far as basic
science and technology were concerned...
In July, 1944, 1] was ‘appointed Associate Project Director
of the Metallurgié al Project and assigned to Hanford as
the liaison between the duPont company and all of the
Metallurgical Project laboratories, in particular the
Metallurgical Laboratory itse!® and the Clinton Labora-
tories. This role called for an active part in the start-up
of the: Hanford reactors in the fall of 1944.
During 1945 and the first half of 1946, the responsibilities
of the Associate Project Director included the planning for
re-establishipent of the wartime atomic energy projects on
a permanent peacetime basis and for the establishment of
‘certain new atomic energy installations, including Brook-
haven National Laboratory and the reorganization of the
Metallurgical Laboratory and--the Argonne Forest Lab-
oratory into the present Argonne National, Laboratory.
With. the fimal establishment of Argonne National
Laboratory on July 1, 1946, I-beeame Associate Director,
and on December 1, 1950, [avas appointed Deputy Director.
As a result, throughout the past ten years I have been in
active contact with all of the Laboratory’s reactor aé-
tivities. These have included the first Experimental Breeder
Reactor, EBR-I; certa'n phases*of the design of the
Materials Testing Reactor; the design, construction, and
+
im
784
a use :
operation of the Laboratory’s heavy water research reactor,
CP-5; the conceptuat design and basic engineering of the
- Mark I Submarine Thermal Reaétor; the conceptual design
of the Savannah River, Production Reactors: the design,
construction, . operation, ang 2 expe rine ‘ntal: progvams
associated with the ‘BORAX reactors; the design and
[ fol. 4017] construction of. the FE xperimentai Boiling Water
Reacfor; the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor,
EBR-IT: the design of the Argonne Low Power ienctor,
to serve as a package reactor for use as a power supply
in remote locations; the design arid construction of the
‘Argonaut, a training and limited rese: irch type of reactor ;
and the conceptyal design of the ARBOR reactor, to meét
full-scale engineering deve lopme nt requirements. :
Incidental to these major reactox projects, my duties ©
have required continual contact with the Laboratory’ s Zero
Power Reactor program, which has included the zero power
version of the Submarine Thermal Reactor, ZPR-1; the zero
power mock-up of-the Savannah River reactor, ZPR-I1;
the zero pawer mock-up of the Experimental Breeder Re-
actor, ZPR-III: the fast ¢xponential experiments on fast
reactors, ZPR-IV; and the coupled fast-thermal zero power:
reactot, ZPR-V. These projects have spanned the ten-year
period sinca Argonne National Laboratory was established
and have provided esgentially continuous contact with highly
important and productive reactor development actiy ities.
The Laboratory is now preparing for the start-up and
operation of the Experimental Boiling Water Reactor and
of the Borax-IV reactor. Criticality experiments are under »
way with botii reactors, and full-scale operation is scheduled
~ in the immediate future. Argonne is also currently engaged
in. preparing detailed plans for rebuilding and operating
EBR-1, and for tae design, construction, start-up, and
operation of a new Experimental Breeder Reactor, EBR-II.
The Laboratory has completed the initial design of this
{fol 4018] new reactor, and is preséntly directing the
activities of the architect-engineer on producing the detailed. *
engineering design. The Argonaut reactor for university
training and reactor research is’ nearing conipletion, and - |
start-up is scheduled for the immediate future. The ARBOR
reactor has been approved, and an. architect-engineer ‘is
A
785
being selected préparatory to proceeding with final design
and construction. As the Laboratory's acting chief executive
officer, Tam ee responsible for the ‘execution
of this program. .
In all of these many reactor projects, commencing with
the construction of the first nuclear reactor under the West
Stands at the University of Chicago, ¢onsiderations of
safety and site location have been matters: of primary
concern to me, and to others charged with responsibility for
these projects. With other senior laboratory officers, I have
taken an active part in the discussions upon which the.
decisions were based as far as most of these reactor projects
liave been concerned, and | have, of course, shared.in the
Gecisions as to site and safety features for those for which _
the Laboratory has had respensibility for construction and
oper ation. . - Se 7
Gaueval Program
Iam generally acquainted with the design of the proposed
Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC). reactor and
with the material included in ‘its Application for License,
as amended. [ have also read the direct testimony to be
‘given in this proceeding by Messrs. Amorosi, McCarthy,
[fol. 4019} Bethe and Davis.” I agree that the most
important areas in which additional technical information
must be supplied with respect to fast breeder reactors of
the general type proposed are those which concern stability,
temperature coefficients and effects of any credible melt-
down. My testimony will be largely directed toward a brief
summery of the information presently available in*these
areas, and an outline of the researeh program which is
heing carried out by Argonne National Laboratory in -con-
junction with other Atomic Energy Commission labora-
tories, ‘Atomic Power Development. Associates, Ine.
(APDA), and others. ‘Jn my opinion this program will
not only provide much of the technical information in these
areas which is needed to complete the PRDC License
Application, but it will provide -confirmation of the’
assurance which. I believe we already have that a fast
breeder reactor of the general type’ proposed can be 0°
piernnaey per constructed that it can be operated in a
786
populated area without undue risk to the health and safety
of the public, There is, ofcourse, no possthle public hazard
invelved in any event in the mere construction of such a
caetor, prior to the introduction into it of nuclear fuel.
“The | ‘ast-reactor program of Argonne National Labora-
tory is even older than the Laboratory itself; since before
“its establishment as a permanent laboratory-in July, 1946,
ANL and its predecessor have been actively engaged with
the problem of fast breeder reactors. One of the final acts of
the Manhattan District was to approve the Laboratory’s
proposal forestudies leading’ to the design and eventual
construction of a fast breeder reactor. These studies started
in 1945 and-have been carried on continuously to the present
[fol. 4020] time. First as Associate Director and sub-
‘sequently as Deputy Director of the Argonne National
Laboratory, I was continually advised of and informe
‘upon the planning and execution of this program.
These studies led to the design, construction, and oper-
ation of the first Experinental Breeder Reactor, EBR-I,
which was completed in 1951. This was the first nuclear
reactor to produce significant quantities of elegtrical power,
providing sufficient power for self-contained operation of
the .plant and associated, laboratory facilities. Initial
uperation was carried out on the Mark I core from 1951
to 1954. Measurements on this first core proved that even
in this design the amount of plutonium produced was at
least equal to the quantity of uraniwn-235° burned. Addi-
tional experiments were carried on with a Mark IL core until
. November 29, 1955; at which time this core was rendered
inoperative as the residt of a fast excursion experiment,
which IT shall discuss further below.
Arising out of the studies of EBR-I, the Laboratory has
undertaken a critical suévey of the kinetic behavior of fast
reactors, with the objective of determining more precisely
the safety characteristics inherent in this class of reactor
designs. These investigations will include studies of possible -
positive temperature coefficients and of possible operating
instabilities which could arise as a result of temperature
feed-backs. -In-addition to these kinetie studies which it is
proposed to carry out on the present: EBR-I reactor, the
Laboratory, in cooperation with the Los Alamos Scientific
.
+>. *,
ee
Laboratory, is also -xamining the possibilities of hazards |:
which might arise in this type of reactor due to a postulated
sudden compacting of the core arising from meltdown or
{fol. 4021] other imagined nuclear incident.
In the ineantime, in connection with the planning for a
sevond experimental breeder of considerably larger size,
a zero power reactor or critical experimental facility
(ZPR-II1) has been designed and constructed to carry out
the necessary nuclear studies required in the design of a
fast breeder reactor, This facility. was placed ;in°operation
in October, 1955, and is presently engaged # a program
of fast reactor studies. °
Concurrently, design and.development work needed to
establish a definitive design for the new experimental -
breeder, EBR-I1, has been carried out. As of the present
time the first phase of: the design work has been completed
and an arehitect-engineer has. been chosen to. assist the
Laboratory in producing the complete engineering design,
including the necessary coerstruction drawings. ?
In connection with design’ of the new Experimental
sreeder, EBR-II, two ancillary programs are of .signifi-
cance, The one deals with the irradiation studies which
the Laboratory is carrying on in connection with the
determination of the irradiation stability of various fuel
elements and fuel components and in particular, prototype
designs for the EBR-L! reactor and for the PRDC reactor.
The other program deals with the continuing engineering’
studies associated with the technology of the use of sodium
as a reactor coolant. This-involves the engineering test of.
full-scale components, pumps, valves, seals, ete., using
liquid sodium under the tempetature conditions planned:
_ for the EBR-II reactor. | .
Since each of the above activities in the program of
Argonne National Laboratory has a bearing on consider-
ations of the inherent safety of the PRDC reactor, each will
be presented in some detail.
[fol. 4022] Experimental Breeder Re actor —EBR- |
The Experimental Breeder Reactor, EBR-I, was designed
initially to prov ide a facility to study the physics of fast
788°
rer sors, particularly the breeding characteristics of such
a reactor and secondly, to, study the: technology involved
in. the use of liqujd metals as coolants for fast reactors.
At the time tigese investigations Were first started, fission-
able material svas scaree and urgently needed for military
objectives. “As a result, the reactor was designed for
minimum critical size.« This requirement resulted in’ an
active core of very small size. The core volume was a,
hexagonal section essentially seven and one-half inches
_ between flats and seven and one-half inches long. Since
a major problem in fast reactot design is-that of neutron
leakage, it is clear that amihor deviations in geometry in
such a small core produce relatively mueh larger changes
than would be produced by the same geometric deviation
ina much larger core, T he-use‘ot the small core also tends
to- make the heat transfer and temperature gradient
problems more serious.’ Both of these problems would
have dictated the use of a diluted core of larger volume
which would simultaneously have increased the he: it transfer
area, reduced temperature eradients, ana reduced the
sensitivity to minor geometrical deviations. The diluted
core, however, would ‘have required larger quantities of
fissionable material, and it was therefore not recommended.
To determine the breeding inherent in this system, the-
enriched core was surrounded with a blanket of normal
uranium. Radially this blanket consisted of an inner blanket
of normal uranium rods cooled by the’ sodium-potassium
[fol. 4023] alloy, and an external blanket outside the stain-
less steel vessel which contained the core, inner blanket and
the coolant. This external blanket was composed of normal
uranium “breks”,which were perferdted with holes so that
the “bricks” could be air-cooled, Longitudinal blanketing
of the core was accomplished by placing normal uranium
slugs in the stainless steel tubes, both above and below the
highly enriched uranium-235 core slugs.
Since the EBR-I was to be an experimental unit, it was
necessary the: each fuel element be separately removable
from. the reactor. To accomplish this, ithe fuel elements,
weye fabricated by inserting uranium 2 into properly
fitted stainless steel tubes and bonding the uranium to the
stainless steel with sodium-potassium alloy within the tube.
¢ on, “|. 989
Such a fuel ele sare then consisted of central uranium ikaw
of highly enriches uranian with normal uranium slugs
inserted above and below to provide the upper and lower"
blankets. In the Mark I core, eac ‘hi stainless steel tube was
provided with ribs-which were milled on the outer surface.
When the fuel element was inserted through the upper
holding plate and into the lower holding plate and rotated,
these ribs came almost in contact with the surfaces of the
adjoining fuel elements. The sodium coolant then flowed
through the apertures between these fuel elements.
The milling of these ribs on the steel tubés* was an’
expensive and. time-consuming operation, so that in the
second core made tor EBR-L, which we called the: Mark II
core, the ribs were elmminated and in consequencg, the
clearance between fuel elements was ine reased by about 50
mils. ‘Two types of geometrical distortion are, obviously
possible within this core. One would be a bowing of the
[fol 4024] uranium slugs themselves awithin the sthinless
steel tubes. The thickness of. the liquid bond between the
uranium slags and the stainless steel wall was 10 mils,
so that a bowing of 29 mils within the stainless steel jackt
would be possible, Since the flux across the reactor is not
uniform but drops off from the center toward the edge,
‘it is clear that. the side of each slug toward. the center
is somewhat hotter than the side away from the center, and
~ consequently, bowing can occur due to temperature
differences across the slug. With the coolant flowing over
the surface of the steel jackets, thes® tenaperature differ-
ences are clearly minimized. Tf the: flow. of. coolant. is
stopped and in ‘addition, the power. is in¢reased rapidly,
these temperature differences are magnified, and bowing
effeets become much more probable, «
~The second source of geometrical deviation would be in
the actual bowing of the stainless steei tubes themselves. In
the Mark I core, the presence of:the ribs reduced. the
possibility of this bowing. to a matter, of a few mils
most throughout the entire length of the tubes. Ino the
Mark IL core,-nowever, howing due to irregular heating
could have amounted to as much as 50 mils. It should be
noted that the temperature differentials are such that
any bowing arising from either source would tend to move
- . .
eek , ‘
790 | .
the fuel slugs closer tog@ther at the center of the reactor
and thus tend to Increase the reactivity “of the reactor as
a whole, ai
Construction of EBRA was completed in August, 1951,
and the reacter placed in operation. During the lifetime
of the Mark T core, the. major ‘emphasis was ons steady
operation to obtain* breeding information as qtickly as
[ fol. 4025] possible, and while some experiments were done,
no extensive experimental -program was carried out. The
emphasis was on building up total megawatt days” of
operation and upon study of the engineering behavior of
the system, including the electrical power production.
Under certain start-up conditions, particularly when doing
foil irradiations, certain operational ano‘nalies were_ob-
served. These eccurred only under extreme operating
conditions and were totally absent duri ing routine operation,
With the introduction of: the second, or Mark IL core,
rather extensive exper
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