Transcript of Record — Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers

Supreme Court brief1961

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VOLUME Tk :

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

Supreme Court of the United States

_ -. OCTOBER TERM, 1960

No. 315

POWER REACTOR as OAY EVOPMENT COSIPANY,.

; k PETITIONER,

US. , |

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEC TRICAL, RADIO

AND MACHINE ‘WORKERS, AFPL-ClO, ET AL.

-

UNLTED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS,

“0S. |

& - . : ¢ ,- “

NPERNATION AL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, BADIO

sf

AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, ET AE.

>

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO "THE UNATFED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Cilé oe |

§

i 315 PETITION FOR CERTIGRARE FILED ALG sT 12, 1960

NO. 454 PE TITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 1460

€ ERT IOR. ARE GR ANTED NOVE MBER } 1, 1960

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INDEX TO VOLUME HI

Additional proceedings before the Atomic Energy

Commission be a

Excerpts from testimony of Ernest R. Acker

Testimony of Hans A. Bethe .

‘Norman Hilberry °

W. Kenneth Davis

‘¢ Abel Wolman

Excerpts from cross examination- of ‘erent R.

Acket - aa = baked tcconcatecd

Comssinnied: Exhibit No. 3—“Theoretical Possi-

bilities,and Consequences of Major Accidents

” he Large Nuclear Power Plants, March, 1957”

Opinion and initial decision of Atomic Energy

Commission : ra.

Intervenors’ exceptions to - Opinion and Ini-.,

e

lial Decision - _.-.__..& eat. <

Proceedings i in the United States Court of Appeé als

for the District of Columbia Circuit

Amended petition. for review of aim order of the

Atomic Energy Commission

Order allowing intervention of Power Reactor De-

velopment Company

Order a]lwing intervention of ‘State of Michigan’

Statement of issues of intervenor Power Reactor

Development .Company *

Statement of issves for the respondents

Petitioners’ supplementary statement of the issues ©

Opinion, Edgerton, J.

Dissenting opinion, Burger, J.

Judgment

Order denying petition of Power Reactor Develop-

ment Company for a rehearing in bane

Order denying petition of Respondents for a re-

hearing in bane

Order staying transmission of certified copies of

opinion and judgment

Clerk’s certificate (Omitted-in. printing)

Orders allowing certiorari

’

Original

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4326

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. 6918

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6922

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6931

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6948

. 6949

6950

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Print *

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. .969

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-{ fol. 3920] - In evidence January 8, 1997, Tr. 42

. Sstom THe Aromic LNERGY COMMISSION

Dockot No. F. 16

In the Matter of |

-Power Reacpor DEVELQPMENT COMPANY

, “2 “As : :

Fol

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é

Testim§yy oF Ernest R. Ackrr, Vice-Presipen

: > Power Reacror DeveLopMENT ComMPANy

Background and ( ualifications

.

My name iS Ernest R. Acker. fam a member of the Board —

of it dae of Power Reactor Development Company

(VRDC). iam also a Vieo-President of PRDC, a member,

of the Executive Committee and Chairman of the Financial

Committee. Iam President of Central Hudson Gas & Elee?

tric Corporation, which is a member of PRDC.

I graduated from Cornell University with a degree in

mechanical engineering in 1917) During’ World War 1, |

served in the Chemical Warfare Service with the rank of

First Lieutenant. In 1919 L commenced my employment

with Central Hudson Gas & Electric (Company, predecessor

of the present corporation, and J have been with this or-

ganization continually since that date. I began my employ-

ment in the Engineering De ‘partient and subsequently be-.

caine General Superintendent of the Kingston District’ uf

the Company and later General Commercial Manager of

the Company. 1 have been’a Director of Central Hudson.

Gas & Eleetrie Corporation since 1927 and have held the

itol. 8921]. position of 1} esident and General Manager of

that cofporation since 1932. Lam a member of. Tau Beta Pi,

an honorary engineering society. I have been President of

Edison Electric Institute and the American. Gas Associa.

tion. L am’ also a member of the Board of Directors of

Atomie Power De ‘velopment Associ: ites, Ene. (APDA), and

. have been since its organization,

ofp

722

Organiz ation and Backaround of

Power Reactor Development Company

PRDC is a Michigan non-profit membership corporation

org nized to study and demonstrate the economic and techs

“nical feasibility’ of produc ug electricity from nuclear fuels

through the design, construction and operation of a develop-

mental nuelpar power reactor. PRDC is now engaged in the

design, development and construction of a full-scale. fast

neutron breeder reactor at a site on Lake Erie in Monroe

County, Michigan. This reactor wills provide steam which

will be used fer the productian of electricity in. facilities

owned by Fhe Detroit’Edison Company: “Phe entire plant

will be known as the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant.

Copies of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of

PRDC are included as Exhibit II] and Amended Exhibit

IV to the Application, as amended, fora license -under

Section. 104.b of the Atomic Energy ‘Act of 1954, filed by’

PRDC. PRDC is a membership corporation and as such

cannot issue shares ot stock or any other evidence of owner-

ship. The members of PRDC are twenty-one in pumber and

_are all corporations. ee

[fol. 3922 There are thirt en operating utility company

members as follows

Central Hudson Gas & Electric OC or poration

wl incinnati Gas & Electric Company

The Columbus and Seuthern Ohio Electr i¢ Company

Consumers Power Company

Delaware Power & Light Company |, -

The Detroit Edison Company .

lowa-Llinois Gas & Electrie C omipany

Long Island Lighting Company

Philade ‘Iphia Electrie Company

- Potomae Eleetrie Power Company

Rochester Gas & Electrie Corporation

The Toledo Edison Company

Wisconsin Electric Power-Company

¢ : : ; : te

There are seven industrial company members as follows:

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company — .

The Babeock & Wilcox Company ae

“pe

-by PRDC, and the By-Laws :

‘ Burroughs Corporation

Combustion Engineering. Incorpori ited

Fruchauf Trailer Company

Holley Carburetor Company

Westinghouse Electrie Corporation

‘ & Pre

Anothers member is“auservrree company, Southern. Ser-.

views, Ine. representing Alabama Power Company, Georgia

Power Company, Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power

Company, cach of which is an operating utility and a con-

tributor te PRDC, and the parent of those five Companies,

The Southern Company. Southern Services, Ine., ulso pro-

vides the Trustee representative.

The purpose of PRDC is to do rese areh and deve Jopment_

in?the field of the peacetime application of atomic energy

for the production of electrie power through the construe-

tion and operation of a developmental power reactor, and

toaake niformation acquired from these research and de-

| fol. 5923] velopment activities available, not only: to its

members buf also to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

for the use of the public, and to all others who may desire

such information, subject solely to AEC security regula:

tions. *PRDC is not organized ‘for profit. The Articles of

Incorporatidn provide that no part of the net carnings of

PRDC may inure to the benefit of any member, any private

individual, or any corporation. They provide further tuat

members may receive nothing on dissolution, since in the

ease of dissolution any remaining assets must be turned

over to an organization or organizations operated exclu-

sively for educational or scientific purposes. Under the.

By- Laws of. PRDC members are prohibited from obtaining

any Special privilege to use patents which may be developed

equire that all such

patents beemade freely available toO®anyone who may prop-

erly request their use.

Memberships in PRDC are non-transferable, and changes

cangoceur only when new members are elected or old-mem-

Ders resign, and members may he elected to me mbership

and resign membership. There Js, no written instrument

evidencing membership. Each me amber has one vote regard-

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less of the amount of its finaneial contr ibution to the activi-

ties of PRDC. :

The affairs of PRDC are pe by a Board*of Trus-

tees, twenty-seven in number, who are elected by the mem-

bers. No member may be represented on the Board ¢

Trustees by more tian one person. The Trustees are as -

follows:

lfol. 8924} Ernest R. Acker, President

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation .

Dy. Robert F. Bacher, Director

Norman Bridge Laboratory

California Institute of Technology

Walter C. Beeckjord, President

The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company

George Bisset, Vice-President

Potomac Eleetrie Power Company

Walker L. Cisleéer, President

The Detroit Edison Company

John S. Colethan, President a

Burroughs Corporation

Stuart Cooper, Chairman

Delaware Power & Light Company

Errol W. Doebler, President

-Long Island Lighting Company | :

Géorge D. Ellis, Vice-President Pee

Combustion Engineering, Incorporated ; oe

Robert E. Ginna, President.

‘Rochester Gas & Electrie Corporation

Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad, Vice-Preside ‘nt in

Charge of Research ee &

General Motors Cor poration

Daniel C. Hickson, Vice-Presidént

Bankers Trust Company .

George M. Holley, Jr., President

Hlolley ( ‘arburetur Company

Alfred Iddles, President

The Babcock & Wileox C ompany

Charles EF. Ide, President \

‘The Toledo Edison Company |

ty’

: | "929

[fol 6925) Dan BE. Karn, President

Consumers Power Company

Edward L. Love

Chase Manhattan Bank

= Jaekson Martindell, President

American-Institute of Management

Harry M. Millér, President

Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company

Alexander C. Monteith, Viee-President

Westinghouse Electric Cor poration |

"R. George Rinclitfe, President

Plriladelphig-Electrie Company

J. Frank Roberts, Vice-President

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company ,

Herbert J. Scholz. President

Southern Services, Ine.. % ey

Dean KE. Blythe Stason

Law School, University of Michigan

Gould W. VanDerzee, President

Wisconsin Eleetrie Power Company

Charles H. Whitmore, President

dowa-Llinois Gas & Electric Company

Dr. Theodore P. Wright, Vice-President

for Research

Corne!l University '

It will be observed that each member company, except

Frachaut Trailer Company, is represented by a trustee,

Each trustee is an officer of the: company he represents,

and in addition there are trustees who. are unconnected

with any member and who represent the fields of cducation,

finance-and seientifié research.

-[fol. 3926] The Hoard of Trustees elects the principal

officers of the company. They are as follows:

Walker L. Cisler, President

(The Detroit Edison Company) °

R. George Rineliffe, Executive Vice President

{Vhilad-lphia Electrie Company)

Dan EB. Karn, Vice President

(Consumers Power Company )

o* .m®

Herbert J. Scholz, Vice President

(Southern Services, Ine.) .-

Ernest R. Acker, Vice President ; Bry

(Central Hudson-Gas & Electrie Corporation)

John ‘A. Lagrou, Treasurer and Assistant Secretary

John Fk. Anderson, Ags ‘istant Treas surer and

Assistant Secretary “

George FE. Olmsted, Secre ee and Assistant

Treasurer

“Errol Doebler . |

(Long Island Power & L ighting) . ;

The Board of Trustees also functions through the foilow-

ing committees whose respective: responsibilities are ap-.

parent from, theirenaries: The Executive Committee (of

which | am a member), The Technical: a4 Engineering

Committee,eThe Administrative Advisory Committee, Phe

Legal Committee, The Financial Committee (of whith |

am Chairman), and The By-Laws Committee. While one

or more trustees serye on each committee, the gommittecs

also include others who are not trustees. |

a he utility company members. and contributofs provide

approximately 17¢¢ of the eleetriec generating capac ity of

(fol. 8927] the investor-owned utility §eompanies in the

United States, have a combined earned syugplus of approxi-

mate y $400,000,000, and have combined @@&sets in) excess

of $2,000,000,000, In addition, the industr#@J members have

_very substantial financial resourees and are important rep-

resentatives of various segments ef American industry.

It is the purpose of the members of PRDC to construct and

operate the reactor portion of the Enrico Fermi Atomic

Power Flant in order to provide themselves and the country

with the knowledge that will be gained in this important .

area of the utilization of nuclear materials.

The origin of the PRDC fast breeder reactor goes bak

to April, 1951, when The Detroit Edison Company and Dow

Chemical Company entered into a study agreement with

the AEC to conduct ‘research, looking to the feasibility of

generating electricity by th+ use of fissionable materials.

~

°

} 727

. .

In the period between 1952 and 1955 certain other coinpanies

joined the study group initiated by The Detroit) Edison,

Company and Dow Choanieal Company. In o4 Dow Chea

ical Company withdrew from the group to concentrate on |

the application of atomic energy To chemical processes.

APD AS was organized as a New York membership corpora-

tion in March of 1955 to carry onthe work whieh had -pre-

viously been conducted by this stady group. As a result

sof its studies, APDA determined that the fast’ neutron

reeder reactor heldgreat promise because of conservation

of nuclear fuels possible through the use of this type cof

ryactor. As Dr. Bethe has stated in his testimony, the

folesurs | development of breeder reactors igsof the utmost

jmportance to an ecoromic use of nuclear fuels for peace-

time purposes because of the fuel conservation possible,

The adoption by Congress oY the Atomic Bnergy Act of

1954 to encourage participation of private industry in ad.

Vaneing the peacetime application of the atom niade possible

amextetided mdustrial itortint+isarea, Ln January, 155,

the AEC announerd its) Powfr Demonstration Reactor

Program and invited indusiry tg submit proposals for the

construction of reactots of warious, types. On Mareh 50,

1955, The Detroit Edison Company; om behalf of a group

of companics, ath of which are now members of PRDC, sub

mitted to the A he a proposal under this program to design,

construct, own and operate a developmental fast neutron

breeder reactor,” On dwigust 8. 1955, the AKC announeed

that the Mareh 30 proposal was acceptable as a basis for

further negotiation. Copies of the proposal made by The

Detroit Mdison Company to the AEC and of the acceptance

of the proposal as a basis for negotiation are contaimed in

the PRC Application for License as Exhibits T and Tf,

respectively.» URDC and the AEC are now negotiating an,

operating agreement under the Power Demonstration Re-

detor Program. : ; mee

| think | should make clear‘the fact that Atemic Power

Development Associates, Inc. (APDA) and Power Reactor

Developm nt Company (PRDC) are completely separate

and distinct companies. [ have already desertbed PRDC

‘fol. 3928) in some detail. APDA is primarily a technical

wnd design research organization in'the field of fast brecder

‘ . : o e

reactors, ind i is re espons sible for the coneeptual design of the

PRDC reactor. Many of the twenty-one member companies

of P RDC are also members of APDA, although not ail of

them are, and APDA has many members whieh are not

members. of PRDC.

APDA, working with PRDC on thet fast breeder dexelop-

mental reactor, is performing design, technical and researeh

functions. APDA will also conduct non-nuclear tests of

certain reactor components, and upon the conelus sion of

such tests will deanster certain of the tested equipment and |

devices.to PRDC fer incorporation in its reactor. Arrange-

ments between PRDC and APDA have beén forma’. -d

in a contract dated December 14, 1... included as Exhibit

XX1 to the PRDC Application for Lic nse and incorporated

in this testimony by referenee.- ~

The management of PRDC has been guided and will con-

tinue to be guided by the design, technical and safety ree-

ommendations received from APDA from time to time.

PRDC will also conduet the pre-operational and other tests

~ recommended by APDA, in consultation with PRDC con-

sultants, and will adopt start-up, operational ang other

procedures in accordance with such recommendations. Much

of the testimony to be given in this proces eding with respect

to the research and test program for the Enrico Fermi. re-

accor is accordingly presented by ‘two APDA employees

whe are particnlarly gorge he this arga of APDA work,

Mr. A. Amorosi and Mr. . MeCarthy. .

{fol. 3930} On January 7, iF : PRDC filed an Applica-

tion for License under Section: 104 b of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954 to construct and operate a fast neutron breeder

reactor. This Application has been amended from’ time to

time and is now pending. On August 4, 1956, the AEC

granted PRC a provisional construction permit.

a -&

PRDC Safety Policy

* e * -‘* . os

Public safety, therefore, has been and is of prime con-

cern to the PRDC management. We are completely satis-

fied that there is no public risk, Whatever involved in goint

forward with the plaat construction werk-at this time. In

addition, we will certainiy not place the plant in operation

(fol. 3931] unless the safety expe riments to be condueted

(29

‘ satisfy both the AEC and the staff and consultants: of

PRDC-and APDA that the reactor can be operate d without

endangering the public health and safety,

Furthermore, the management of PRDC believes that any

financial risk in proceeding with the immediate construction

of the reactor—-and no other risk is) invelved—ise fully,

justified’ by the time. savings involved. By preceeding with

both the éonstruction and the researeh and experimental

program at the same time, we should be able to save sev-

erak vears in the time required to place in-operation a dem-

onstration power reactor of signifieant size which we believe

Will point the way to the economically feasible production

of electric power through the use of nuclear materials,

We believe that this time saving is important to the ad-

vancement of the technology of* nuelear power pr oduction,

us well as to the preservation of American leadership in

‘the peaceful tiene of atomic energy.

S . * - : *

[fol. 3947] *° oi)

Henagement Responsibilities. As has been noted here-

tofore, the mapagement of PRDC did not authorize the filing

of the Appleation for Lieense with the AEC until it was

assured by its staff and consulting technicians, engineers

and physicists that the health and-safety of the public

could not possibly be endangered by the construction of

the fast breeder reacter at its ptoposed, site in| Monroe

County, Michigan, and that guy problems requiring. solution

with respect to the operation of the reactor could be satis-

factorily vesolved. The management of PRDE is, of course,

aware that further important research and experiments

are.to be conducted during the construction period, and in

fact has arranged for the conduct of a substantial amount,

of such research and experimental work, in order to provide

further experimental evidence that its redctor ean, when

constructed, be operated safely. We consider that the most

[f6l. 3948] important contribution we can make in expedit-

ing the development of the use of .atomie energy for the

production of Gretreify is to proceed with the construction

of the proposed fast brecder reactor in reliance upon the

advice of our staff and consultants, Before ‘be plant is

placed in operation all essential safety experiments will

have been conducted. We will not place the plant ini opera-

3 * * *

>

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—_ . ; e

tion unless these wey org nts satisfy both the AEC ‘and the

staffs and consultantNot PRDC and APDA that the reactor

ean be operated without endangering the‘health and safety

of the public. We are confident that this will be the case and

that it is in the best interest of the publie for the construe

tion of this project to go farward without unnecessary

Wemy.

[tol 39: 50] In evidence January 8, 1957, Tr. 43

e

"

Brerore THE AtoMic ENERGY CoMMISSION

In The Matter Of

Power Reactor Devel OPMEN NT COMPANY

.

rr 4 ‘

° Testimony or Hans A. Betrurt, Proressor or Piysics,

' CorNELL UNIVERSITY

(1) Biography and Qualifications

My name is Hans A. Bethe. [ am John Wendell Ander-

son Professor-of Phtsics at Cornell University. I was born

in Strassburg, Alsace-Lorraine, 6n July 2, 1906: 1 studied’

at the Universities of Frankfort and Munich and obtained

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in. Physiesefrom the

University of Munich in 1928. From 1928 through 1933 I

taught theoretiéal physics at the Universities of Frankfort,

Stuttgart; Munich and Tubingen. From 1933 through 1935 —

i was lecturer at the Universities of Manchester and Bristol

in England. [ came to Cornell University as an assistant.

professor in 1935 and have been a full professor since 1937...

My general field is ‘theoretical physics. My work from

1934 to 1940, and again Since 1946,-has been chiefly in

nuclear physics. In 1934 intensive study of this subject

was jist beginning. Many experimental data were con-

stantly obtained, and one of my main activities was to cor-

relate these data, to interpret them and to obtain from them

a theoretical understanding of the structure ofatomic nuclet

e ¥

v

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«

and of the reac trons between them. In 1936 and 1937 T wrote

three Compre hensive review articles, together of the length

of an average book, on nuclear physics. These. articles were

frequently reprinted and ee for about 15, vears as the

standard textbook from which students as well as active

research workers, in the field obtained their information, P

\in this country as‘well as abroad.

\[ fol. 3951 | A4large fraction of my research work before

the War was spent on investigating the properties of neu-

trons. While not doing any experiments myself, J kept in.

close contact with the experimental work on neutrons at

Cornell University. Our University was a pieneer in this

field; in particular we deve ‘loped the first accurate neutron

velocity selector to study the resgnances in the interaction

of slow. neutrons with nuclei.

J alsy worked on the energy generation in. stars by means

of nuclear reactions. My the ‘ory of this process, first de-

veloped in LOBS, is cenerally regarded as the explanation of

the large energy production in the-sun and other stars.

For this work | reeeived two A, Cressy Morrison prizes

from the New York Academy of Sciences and the Henry

Draper Medal from the National Academy of Sciences.

l am a member, among others, of the 2 National Academy

of; Sciences, the American Philosophical Society and. the

American Physical Society. I) was President of the latter

society in 1954. 1 hold fgur honorary degrees. of Doctor

of Science, frof Brooklyn P olyfechnie Institute and from

the Universities = Denver, Chicago, and Birmingham, Eng-

land. | .

Karlyjin the W ar ¢ became.engaged in war research. My

first’ war work, in 1940, was concerned with the penetra-

tion of armor by projectiles. This work has been extended

by other se jentists ‘and the results have been widely used

by Ordnance experts, and as far as I know still ‘form the

basis of understanding of armor penetratjon.

Next I was’ asked to work for Division 8S of the National

waves produced by explosives, expecially in air and water.

During 194i and 1942, I wrote three papers on the subject

of shock waves. :

“

‘Defense Research Council which was concerned with shock -

732° .

[fol. 3952 | Early in 1942 1 started work for the Radiation

Laboratory at MIT which was eoncerned with the develop-

ment of Radar.

In the summer of 1942 | was asked to join n snail group

of theoretical physicists int Berkeley, California, under the

direction of Jo K. Op pe nheimer which was set up by the

“Metallurgical Project” at Chicago. The purpose of the

Met tallurgical Project: was to obtain a chain reaétion in

uranium and then to, use this chain reaction for the manu-

facture of plutonium, The task of our theoretical group

was to study methods by which nuclear explosions epuld be

obtained from fissionable material. This group. was the

core of the later Los Alamos Scientific ‘Laboratory which

was started in April 1943.

I was a member of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

from its beginning. When a definite organization of the

Laboratory was adopted, I was appointed Chief of the

Theoretical Division of the Laboratory and remained in

that position until December 1945, after. the end of the

~War. Our Division was responsible for all calculations con-

cerning the atomic bomb, and for most of its conceptual

design. In particular we had to devise inethods to calculate

the diffusion of neutrons in fissionable materiai and in re-

flectors, methods which have later proved useful for the

study of reactors. _We had to calculate the course of a |

nuclear explosion before any one was ever observed. | am,-

therefore, thoroughly familiar with calculations of nuclear

explosions and with the conditions that are required for

such explosions. We also studied ordinary, nonnuclear ex-

plosions and the behavior of materials when hit by the

shock from ordinary explosions. While all this work was

carried out by a large group of people in my division, at

one time more than SO individuals, I kept in close contact

with all phases of the work and contributed my self to the

solution of many of ‘these problems.

For my work at Los Alamos, I received the Medal. of

Merit, the highest decoration that can.be awarded to. a

civilian by the United States Government.

[fol. 8953] After the War, L-returned to Cornell Univer-

sity. However, | kept in close contact with tie development ¢

of atomic energy both for war and for peaceful purposes.

La

Oy Se 7 "- 933

In the first place, } became a consultant to the Los Alamos

Sejentifie Laboratory, This involved further work on nu-

clear Weapons, but in addition it served to keep ne informed.

on new .methods to estimate nyciear explosions, and on

new caleulational methods for netitron diffusion. 1 also

kept informed on the néwest measurements of nuclear cross

sections and participated -in the interpretation of ‘some of —

‘these which are particularly, important for fast breeder

reactors. -*

- In addition, I Jecame a consultant to several Laboratories

eimenail with the design of atomic reactors. | worked

particularly intensively with the Knolls Atomic Power Lab-

oratory (KAP L) at Schenee ‘tady, from its founding in 1946

until approximately 1950. After this time, KAPL became

involved in very special problems relating to Naval Re-

actors, and although I continued as a consultant I spent

much less time on this work. From 1946 to 1950, when I

did participate actively, the major project of KAPL was

the desigit of a breeder. reactor, which was first intended

to’ work with neutrons ef. intermediate energy and later

with fast neutrons: In this conhection, I stimulated ‘and

closely followed a program to determine experimentally a

certain quantity, the ratio ‘of capture to fission in U**?

and Pu, which is decisive for the breeding qualities of the

breeder reactor. Many novel experimental techniques were

invented by the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in con-

nection with their fast breeder work. About 1949, L wrote

a report for KAPL on the safety of their proposed reactor,

in. partienlar on the mild nuelear explosion which could

occur as a result of a ‘possible nuclear accident. This re-

port is, to my kriowledge, the first report on the theory of

nuclear accidents vf power reactors. :

[fol 3954) 1 also consulted for NEPA, a svebeat for nu-

“aa propulsion of aireraft, from 1946 to 1951, and since

1951 for Oak Ridge. National Laboratory. ‘In these two con-

tracts, I was chiefly concerned with the theory of the shield-

‘ing of reactors.

Since the end of the War I have been a member of several

committees of the United States Government. They. in-

chided the Committee on Atomie Energy of the Research

and Development Board of the Department of Defense,

"TOF ee a

from 1952 to 19540 the: Nuclear Panel of, the Scientifie Ad-

visory Board to the U.S. Air Feree from 19535 to 1954, and

the Scientitie Advisory Committee to the Office of Defense

Mobilization at present, in ade dition to minor committees.

TL have continued iny teaching and my research ino plire

plivsie s at Cornell University. From September 195. to

July 1956, while on leave from ‘Cornell U niversity, | was

Visiting Professor of Physies at thre vU uiversity of Cain-

bridge, England. During this time, [had an opportunity

to study the British Atomie Energy effort, in particular on

tle fast breeder reactor. T wassa member of the United

States* team to exchange information on the fast reactor

with the United, Kingdom, I was also, a me mber of the

U.S. delegation to.the.Geneva Conferenee on Peaceful Ap-

-plieation of Atomic Energy in August 1955. :

Since 1953 1 have been’ a consnitant to Atomie Power

‘Development Associates, Inc. (APDA), and the Study

Ctroup which preceded it. This group was first known as the

Dow.Detroit Edison Study Group, and then was reorganized

as APDA. Pursuant to a contract between APDA and

Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC), APDA

prov ides nuclear and other technical services to. PRDC.

| ufiderstand that this eontract between APDA and PRDC

is included in the PROC Application for License as Exhibit

XXAI. In connection with inv work for APDA, I have be-

come generally familiar with. the proposed design for the’

- Enrico Fermi Reactor, as set forth in APDA-115, included

ffol. 3955] as Exhibit XA to the PRD€: License Application, * -

as amended. | have worked on some phases.of this design —

as'an-APDA consultant,-and in particul ar on problems. re-

lated to its safety and the testing of its safety. In connee-

tion with this work, I have beeome farhiliar with the work

of Argonne National Laboratory-on fast reactors, and with

the theoretical work of Nuclear Development. Associates,

Ine. (NDA) in White Plains, New York on the same sub-

ject. | have read the testimony to be given in this proceed-

ing by Dr. Norman Hilberry of Argonne National Labora-

tory, ‘as Well as that to-be given by Mr. A. Amorosi, Mr.

Walter J. McCarthy and Mr: Kenneth Davis.

}

(2) Principles of Fast Reactors

‘A reactor is a deve in whieh the ehergy of the fission

of uranium‘is converted intosheat. Ina power reactor this

heat is removed in ach a way as to pe rmut further con-

version into cleefricity by a conventional generator,

The most inportant ingredient of a reactor is the atomic

fuel which is*U>* in practically all the re actors so far con-

strneted. In the future, plutonium-and Ue" may also. be

used as reactor fuelsy The reactor works by means of

neutrons which cause fission in the U°’ nuechki. The power

produced is directly proportional to the rate 6f this fission.

When no neutrons are present in the reactor, no power will

be produced, nee .

In each fission of U** about 2.5 neutrons are set free

from the nucleus. Some of these neutrons leak out of the

reactor, others are captured in the structural material or

in the coolant, some willbe c iptured by another nucleus of

U: ss A certain fraction: of the ne utrons captured in U2

nuclei will cause another fission. If, on the average, one

“of the neutrons emittéd’in each fission causes another fis-

sign, a self-sustaining chain reaction will result: the num-

ber of neutrons will ‘then remain ¢onstant, and the power

Ww rill be steady. ‘

(Tol. : 3956 | In geneyal, this will, not be exactly the case,

We define the multiplieation fretor k which is the number

of fissions produced on. the average by the neutrons origi- ~

nating from ane fission. If k = 1, the power is steady. If k

is greater than’ one, the nurther of fissions in the next gen-

eration will be-greater than th at in the laste neration and

the power will increase with tune. If the multiplication

factor k is less than one, the power will decrease with time.

_The difference k — 1 is often éalled the reactivity or some-

times the excess reactivity of the re acne and is often

de ‘noted by , “k,

The reactivity is controlled by cantrat eis: Three dif-

ferent ways have heen proposed and ised for controlling. a

reactor, The first is to vary the amount of fuel in the

reactor, i.e. to have somé fol pods which can be moved in

and out of the reactor, The second method is to-have rods

tnade of a substance which absorbs neutrons strongly, these

are catled poison rods. Finally, part of the reflector may

706

be made movable, this the n controls thé leakage of neutrons

from the reactor.

The most common type: -of control as by poison rods.

When such a control rod is inserted into the reactor, more

neutrons will be absorbed by it, fewer neutrons will. be

available to make fission in U*° and hence the multipliea-

tion faetor will’drop, The control rod works like a com-

bination of brake and accelerator in an automobile, and

‘just as a cay can be accelerated or decelerated at will, so

the power of.a reactorcan lie regulated by the control rod,

The ease with which the reactors I have seen respond to

controls is most impressive. . S

By ‘the fission of Uy energy is developed. This energy

heats the.fuel U2." This heatgis taken away by the eookant,

which is normaliy ca fluid cireulating through the reactor,

Most of the reactors so far built are cooled with water.

Some are cooled with liquid sodium, including the proposed

[fol. 8957] PRDC reactor. The sodium will in turn give its

heat te water whicli is thereby transformed into steam, and

the sfeam drives the electrie generator. In several designs,

including the PRDC design and that of EBR-I1, which is to

be constructed by Argonne National Laboratory, the trans-.

fer of heat from sodium to water is not done directly but

through ai intermediate heat exchange fluid as an added

precaution to prevent release of radioactivity as a result.

of a chemical reaction between sodium and water.

The proposed PRDC reactor is a fast reactor. This name

refeys to the speed of the neutrons in the reactor. The neu-

trons come out of a fission with speeds of about ten thou- .

sand miles per second. In some types of reactors they are

pe ‘rmitted to collide many times with atomic nuclei, and

in each such coltision they lose some of their speed, until

> their speed is eoduced to about one milg per second. ‘They

‘are then called thermal neutrons, and reactors in which

_ this process goes on are called thermal reactors., In a

therinal reactor.most of the fissions are caused by thermal

neutrons, and only -very few neutrons are able to cause fis-

sions while they are fast.. The substance which slows the

-neutrons down from ten thousand to one mile per second is

ealied the mode rator. The West moderators are materials

which contain many nuclei of low Atomic weight such as

hydrogen or carbon, i.e. materials like water or graphite.

y

: , 737

‘Ina fast reactor the use of a moderator is avoided as

far as pdssible.. Then the neutrons remain fast and will

inake fissioms While their speed-is still Several tldusand

tutes per second rather thatyone mile per second. In order

to accomplish this all materials te ie livdrogen are

kept away*from the reactor core, This is one“of the main

_ reasons why sodium is used ay a coolant. Even the ambunts

of soditn and: of structural materials like ‘stainless steel

in the reactor core are kept to a minimum, in order not ta.

slow down the neutrons.

fol. ¢ 3908 | The purpdsweof keeping the neutrons fast is:

to. accomplish breeding. This means that the reactor re-

generates its own fuel, and if possible produces additional

fuel. In order to accomplish this, the materials in the re-

actor niust be-so arranged that most of the nentrons which

do not cause fission are captured in the common isotope of

uranium, U*. Tf this happens, U* is converted into plu-

tonium which is a very good atomic fuel. This conversion

is the process by which plutonium is produced in the big

* Hanford. and Savannah River reactors of the <Atomie

nergy Commission, However, in these reactors, which are

not fast reactors, less plutonium is produced than U** is

consume ‘d. It has been shown, both by calculation and by

‘experinient, that in a fast reactor the production of. plu-

tonium will be greater tian the consumption of U. Ulti- _

mately when plutonium can be used as a’ fuel for a fast

reactor, one hopes to produce in a breeder .at least’ 1.5

plutonium atoms for each plutonium atom used up as fuel.

Suth a breeder would then be like a coal furnace which

-makes more coal than it uses up.

[tis clear that a breeder will be of the utmost importance

for a large scale atomic power economy. It-is like ly that in‘

30 to 50 vears, aiarge fraction of our power. will be de rived

from atomic energy. This ning only be possible if the supply -

of atomic fuel is very great. Breeders seem to me indis-

peasable for. this purpose. Since power demands increase

constantly and at a rapid rate,a very Targe supply of atomic

fuel will be required,

Indeed, one of the most compelling reasons for develop-

ings atomic power ix to extend our fuel reserves. We hear

that our natural oil supply will become insufficient in two-

or three deeades, and that coal reserves, although much.

~

O

738

Jarger, are also limited. Atomic power wae discowered just

in time to prevent Serious worry about our fuel reserves,

However, if. we use only the Isotope U Which is directly

fissionable, ‘then all the uranium reserves now kyown to

| fol, 3959] exist in the world will give Jess ene rev than the

known reserves of coal. This is because toe is only 4 per:

cent of the uraniuin we find in nature. TP we learn to use

breeders we can use all the uraniun instead “of just. the

U*’, because a breeder will convert the non-fssionable but

fertile material k=, which constitutes 99.5 per cent of nat-

ural uranium, into thé fissionable material plutonium., This

will extend the supply of atomic fuel more than a hundred-

fold. Only if we kuice coed in doing this will ‘atomic energy -

give us.a real improvement in our fuel reserve; in this case

- the uranium reserves will outlast the’ reserves of our fossil

fuels more than 50 times, The development of breeders is,

therefore, a most important 1 measure of conservation of our

precious atomic fuel. .

Other catintries have fully recognize’ + the importance of-

breeders. This is partic larly true of Great Britain, which

has the greafest need for atomie power because of tue high

eost.of mining coal from partly exhausted coak fields and

because of an actual shortage of coal which goes hand in

hand with this. Britain has therefore taken the. lead in the

actualiconstruction’of atomic power reactors, and in its pro-

‘gram is including fast breeders in an important way. . They

started their breeder development in 1941, and are now ex-

pecting to put a full scale breeder reactor into operation in

1958. This means that they are now several years ahead

of our development“in this field. Even little Belgium is

thinking seriously of the development of kreeder, reactors.

In the United States, we had an initial lead in this field.

The Argonne Natione] Laboratory built -an experimental

breeder reactor of about 1000 kilowatts power as far back

as 1950. ‘his reactor, EBR-I, has given imuch scientific in-

fprmation, and in particular, has definitely established that

breeding is possible. But high power breeders will not be

completed for several vears. As I hav? already mentioned,

Argonne is planning another breeder, EBR-H, this ‘one to

be of intermediate power, Phe only. full seale power breeder

on which design has progressed substantially, however, is

fol. 2960} the proposed PRD reactor,

The construction of this plant,-and the simultaneous re-

‘search and development program of APDA, and of the

. ee

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, will help to restore to

the United States the leadership in this important section

of the gtoinic power program, and will substantially ex-

tend the frontiers of teclinical knowledge in this area. The

siuultaneous pursuit of programs of fesearch, development

and construction has become standard in the fast-moving

field of atomie energy and: is: necessary in order to keep

abreast or ahead of our competitors.’ The expeditious con-

struction of a full-scale breeder is in my opinion an essen-

tial step in any large-scale program of developing economi-

‘ cally feasible nuclear power. “

(3) Hazards — a : r

The mere constenection ef d.reactor without the introdue-

tion of nuclear fuel involves no hazard te the public, since

“Such construction is performed in the same manner as the

4

construction of any building, industrial plant or power

plant. No possibility of the creation of any nuclear hazard

exists until nuclear material if present. 1 can envisage no

danger-to the United States or its security arising from the

construction of a reactor plant. ; iioiee

After nuclear fuel has beén introduced into the nuclear

reactor and the reactor is put into operation, it is still im-

possible that the reactor ever explode like an-atomie bomb.

There is no ‘way in whieh this ould ever happen. The

diazards we aré speaking of in nuclear reactors do not lie in

any violent explosion, but in the possibility that the radio-

active fission products which have been formed by the opéra-.

tion of the reactor get released into the atmosphere and

thereby cause a radiation hazard for the surrounding area. |

‘fol. 3961] When we talk about these hazards, .we must

have clearly in mind that we are talkingpabout extremely te-

mote possibilities, The probabilit® of nuclear accidents

- leading to dangerous release of radioactive substances from

? : . *:

a reactor ts inéomparably smaller than that of the most

freakish accidents we oceasio tally read of in the newspapers

sand very mueh smaller than that of the rarest diseases. The

y |

reason Why accidents to reactors are so unprobable ts that.

they areadesigned in such a way that one failure, such as

earelessness of the operator or failure of one techantedl

component ofthe reactor, by itself can never lead to an.

aceident. Of: course, every inechanical Component is de-

signed and built with the greatest of caresand the operators

are highly.trained and competent. But still, an evemight

by the “Gperator will.not by itself lendeto an accident: be-

cause mechanical devices will take over und mesure safety,

and the tailureof the mechanical component Will not cause

trouble, since other inechanieal devices will still opertte

cand shut the repetor down if necessary, Only if twe or

three, or im important @ases even more, major failures

occur simultaneously is there even a chance of an aceident.

Since each component has only avery stunall chance to fail,

heeause of TR careful cons ruction, the simultaneous fail-

ure of several independent compbnents is almost unbeliev-

ably small, We have, as it were, in each, situation several

strong and independent fines of defense,

As T have said, the hazard of miclear reactors. is due to-

the radioactive substances in it. Their, Presence Arises as

follows. In the fissiom progess the jarani nucleus splits

into two sinaller nuclei. Most of the resulting fission fray:

ments are reidipgactive, that is, they change into still other

nucle in the course of, time and is doing so eb emit radio-

active rays. The hazard potential ina reactor is, therefore,

[fol.: 3962 | detertiined by the smount of Sadan products

which are contained in the reactor, This amount ‘he

primarily upen the power of the reactor, The reactor which

PRDC proposes to brild las omy mode rately nigh power,

100,000 kilowatts of electrics t power or SOO .000 kilowatts

of- heate At least ene other reactor whose construetion has

been approved will have more than twiee this power,

The wmount of fission products in a reactor doex not

depend on the mass of U'" in the reactor. This mass is

indeed high in a fast reactor. In the PRDC reaetor, for in-

stance, it will he about 485 kilograms er a little over 1,000

Ibs., which is about twice as much as ina thermal reactor of

similar power working with enriched and solid fuel. Flow-

ever, this is comipe nsated (for the. present consideration)

hy the fact that at any given time there are fewer radio-

741

aetive fission product mue clei per pound of -U°" in the fast

reactor, Tn facet, if a reactor is operated: fer: avery long

time—many veats—-alwayvs ‘at. the same power, and if

none of the fission: produets are removed, ther the total

wmnount of radioactivity in the reactor will depend only on

tle power at whieh if has ra proseneta and will be pro-

portional to that power. «Even the distribution of fission

products among various chemical species -is, nearly. the

same for a fast as fer a thermal reactor, and the small

existing differences hate no inthierce on the hazard,

Actually, the fuel elements from a reactor are unloaded

periodically, and are reprocessed cheniic ‘aliy to remove

the fission produe ts. The used-up fined elements are replaced

by fresh ones ina reloading process. Ina fast reactor, the

reloading period ts usually relatively short: in the PROC

reactor, for example, it is eee to reload dnd replace

some of the fuel elenents every week, and any given. fuel

element will stay in the reae tas aa about T2 weeks. This

tucans that same of the lang-lived fission products will be

Pol, SOG. | present InomUcH smaller atmounts than in a.re-

aetor which is reloaded less freqhently, as is often the prac-

tice In thermal reactors, These long-lived fission produets,

and espe¢ ially stroptitan-SO whieh is among them, are gen

erally considered particnlarly harmful biologics ally, and. .

keeping their @neentration down will re “duce possible haz-

-pisciep Thus, the PRDC reactor will actually contain slightly

lesser aiieunts of danse rous fission products than a t€pied!

thermal reactor of the same pewer. But the main point is

‘that’ a fast reactor does not contgin any more fission prod:

‘ucts, or any more hazardous fissih, products, than a thermal

ene,

in norinal operation of any reac tor the fission produets

are enclosed within the rfhetor and cannot ese ape Their

radiation cannot wet out even inte the buil ling surrounding

the reac tor, let flotie to the surrounding country, This pre-

fertion from radiation is generaliy aceoimplished by oa

shield made of concrete and iron or lead or-other material

Which is expecially designed to prevent radiation from es-

capimg, A large amount of knowledge exists on shield de-

“igh, and substantiah protection can be afforded by a prop-

-*tily designed shield.. In my opinion, the shield prepared

-

“T4e

for the PRDC reactor is constrvative!y designed and no

fundamentak question exists as to its fuyctional safety.

The only hazard, then, could come from a re ‘lease of the

fission products from their normat confined location in the

uranium inside the reactor, Protection against this can be

provided by adequate containment; fission products can be

released only if the several containing vessels which usually

surround the reactor were fo break in succession. For ex-

amplt, in the proposed PRDC design, as disclosed in: the

License Application as amended, the reactgy itself is en--

closed‘in the reacter vessel, a strong steel vessel whicli

will stand up under considerable pressure, Outside: this is

the graphite primary neutron shield which is surrounded hy

(fol. 8464] the primary shield tank, azain of steel. A sheavy

conerete and steel hiolowient shield surrounds the primary

shield tank and the entire svsterr ts-located in the reactor

commzrtinent, a sealed region filled with an inert gas. The

reactor tompartinent is belaw the operating floor -of the

reactor building, and the outside wall of this building con-

sists entirely of a strong steel shell.

The primary contaimnuent is by the reactor vessel, and

every precaution ix taken te design this vessel with the

createst-care. Precautions are taken against a large num-

ber of conceivablé cattses for its mechanical faikure. One

of these inight be heat shock, ave. stidden change of tem

perature of the sedium coolant; elaborate precautions are >

taken against this-affecting the vessel. Another cause of |

‘trouble might bechemiéal action between sodium and water;

strong safeguards are taken against this. Mechanical shock

might be still another and this also ix guarded against.

Of course, none of tiese various conceivable causes of

failure of the reaetor vessels pecenhar to a fast reacter.

Heat shocks may aecur just as easily in water-cooled ther-

mal reactors as in fast reactors. Alse, sodium cooling is

not peculiar to fast reactors but has been used in inter-

mediate-energy ones and is being “Sncorporated. ino some

thermal reactors, due to its great advantages for sheat

transfer. There is still anothser possible cause for failure

of a reactor vessel, namely, men Seeere insid@ it, com-

bined with inechanieal fatigue of the material of the ves-

sel: many thermal reactors, especiaily the pressurized

143

water reactor, use high pressure, while fast reactors, in-

eluding the PRDC reactor, do not. In short, the possible

non-nuclear causes of failure are present in-thermal as much

“as in fast reactors, and in some cases morg so. Failure due

tonuclear accident is immy opinion far less likely than any:

of. the improbable. non-nuclear events which [| mentioned.

Of course, nuclear accidents also’ canbe conceived for ther-

| fol. 3965.) mal as Well as for fast reactors ; their discussidn

will form the main part of iy testimony. |

Even if the reactor, yessel in a fast reactor of the type.

‘proposed by PRDC should be breache ‘d, the fission prodacts

Will not be released to the outside? In the firstt plaice, the

fission products are still enclosed in-the fuel elements them-

selves, “These fuel elements auust lose their integrits. by

melting, harming, or crumbling into small fragments, before.

the fission products can escape,

_ Some fuel elements gnore or fewer, according to the type

of accident; .vay, of course, disintegrate and release their

fission produets.° But we must remember that most of the

fission products are solid or liqaid at normal tempera-

tures, Tie ‘se liquids or solids will then merely be sprayed

over the primary shield. Some fission products are gases,

These, in case of a breach in the reactor vessel, will still be

contamed in the primary slield tank, and if this alse fails,

in the: gas-tizht, reactor compartine nt. Tt would be very

difficuly for them to find their Way up to the operating floor

of the reactor building. If thes did, or if the reactor com-

partinent were to break also, the fission gases” would:still

bein a confined space, namely the reactor yilding.

To prevent them from esc aping from this building, we

have the last and strongpst line of defense, the steel shell

of the reactor building itself. This stee] shiell is madi gas

tight and thas can contain the gaseous fission products.

“Therefore, even if the reactor vessel, the primary shield

tank and the reactor compart cent should be biear hed this

Wilt net cause a hazard to the surrounding country but

Well mie rely nake the reactor biilding inaccessible fer a

number of cules or months, : aula

“Phe gas-tight shell of the PRDC reactor building is made

af steel so that it can withstand some pressure. This is to

Tol. 3966} > provide for the remote possibility that. the

oe ee se a

ee J

sodium in the reactor might burn if the reactor vessel

breaks which would heat the air ip the puilding and thus

increase the pressure, Even if all the sodium weregeo burn,

the steel shell is designed to contain the residual air and the

fission gases.

[fol. 3967] (4) Nuclear Accident.

One of the improbable events whic : tight release fission

produats from a reactor is a nuclear accident. This cquld

come about if the power of.the reac “i were suddenly to ex-

coed the normal power by a large ‘amount. Due to the ex-

cess of power, the fuel elements would heat up; they might

then melt and the coolant night vaporize. ,

Such nuclear accidents can come about by 4 malfunction-

ing of the reactor contrel. As T mentioned hefore, a reactor

has control rods which are moved mechanically and which

determine the multiplication factor k. If the control rods -

are set’inesuch a way thaf k is greater than one, then the

number of neutrons and the re&etor power will increase and

if this increase is not stopped, an aceident could’ oceur.

There are many safeguards built into all- reactors so

that this cannot happen. Perhaps the anost important is

the power seram meehanism. When the power exceeds a,

certain level which is previously determined, then an auto~

matic device will shut down the reactor. Phat is, the device .

will cause certain control rods to move rapidly into the re-

actor. This, ax we have said, will decrease tne re gn

tion factor k below. one and thus le ad to a quick drop in

the reactor power

These special comtyol rods which can he rapidly. pushed :

into the reaétor are called safety reds. In, the: PRDC re-

actor, for example, they will be normally suspended abeve

the reactor core by means of an electromagnetic clutch.

When the scram signal comes, the maynetie ch ch is. re-

- leased and the safety rods drop into the reactor. If for

some reason the apparatus does not ftnetion properly,

for ae ifthere is a power failure, the magnetic clutch

automatically. ceases to operate, the safety rods drop into -

the reactor and the reactor is shut down. In other words,.

[fol. 8968]: any failure in the system will lead to increased

safety, the safety rods fail safe.

- P 745

\

The power scram mechanism ana reactor is set at a power

level which may. be-some 20 higher than the normal

operating level, and some 20 ty 50° lower than the power.

level at which fuel elements would melt. Safety ret are,

“of course, frequently tested to insure their continued sate |

operation, a ane

Why is it nee ss#ry to ever let the multiplication factor k

become greater tllan unity? We must permit such‘excess re-

activit, (k greater than one) in order to get the reactor

started. When the reactor has heen shut down for any

reason, its power has to increase again from a low value

to the operating level. This requires reactivity greater than

one, : =

The higher the excess reactivity k — 1, the faster will the

power of a reactor increase, The rate of increase of power

is measured by the time which. would be necessary to have

the ‘reactor power increased by a factor of about 2.7; this

we call the period of the .reactor.: When the reactor. is

started up, this period is in ge ‘neral kept at a minute or

mere by suitable se tting of the ‘controls, but it may also

he hours or it may be as short as seconds. It is a possible

hazard to let the reactor power’ increase too fast bee ause

we might thereby lose control. For this reason another

‘safety device is ordinarily provided on reactors which pre-

vents’ the period from becoming’ too short. For instance,

we may ieeiée that we shall never operate at a reactor

_ period shorter than.ten seconds. In this case, a second —

scram device is provided which shuts-the reactor down if

its period becomes shorter than ten seconds. {his is called

the period scram in contrast to the power scram discusse d

be i. oe

Properly designed scram devices have always worked in

the. history of réactors. Jven in the few instances when

small accidents have oceurred in reactors, such as in the

accident of the experimental breeder reactor EBR-I of

[fol. 3969] the Argonne National Laboratory, the power

scram apparently worked. However, in this EBR-I ae-

cident, the period scram had purposely been ‘dise onnected

in order to perform a ee rtain experiment which will be dis-

cussed in more detail later on. For this reason, the period

Was permitted to become as short as one’second, ¢orrespond-

?

746

ing toa value of k considerably in excess of one.’ Now there

is necessarily a delay between the: power scram signal and

the aétual movement of control rods which substantially

reduces the reactivity of the reactor. This delay is usually

a second or so, and if the period itself is as short as a sec-

ond, then the power will have increased considerably beyond

. the seram power by the time the reactor is actually shut

down. For this reason, the EBR-I overheated and its ‘core

was partly melted, as deseribed in more de tail by Dr. Hil-.

berry in lis testimony.

However, if there is a period scrain set e.g. at ten seconds,

such an overshoot of the power cannot happen . Power will

then never rise very fast, and during the delay from the

scram signal to the actual shutting down of the reactor, the

power will not rise appreciably.. This hazard\ can be fur-

.ther minimized by making the delay from signal to shut-

down as short as possible. For — in any power re-

actor the period scram will be set at such a period that it

will be entirely safe from overshoot of the power. Power

react yr operators will never do any experiment) in Which

they eliminate the period sera, The PRDC reactor, for

example, will have a safe power scram set at a safe power

level, and a period scram set at a safe period, and this

combination seems to me to — very real assurance

of safe operation. — .

A further shfeguard i in the conivel of reactors which is

-incorporated in the PRDC reactor is that the control roas

| fol. 8970). which are used by the operator to control the re-

actor power, as well as the safety rods, can be removed

from the reactor only very slowly. Thus reactivity canein-

crease only very slewly. This is in contrast to rapid inser-

tion of the safety and control rods which can decrease -

the reactivity very rapidly. Mechanical means thus insure

_. that all motions which jead to higher power and thus to

hazard will be carried out slowly, while all motions leading

to greater safety take place very fast once they arg started.

Slow increase in, peactivity has the advantage “that. the

measuring instruments can follow the power and the reactor —

period very easily and that there can be no overshoot.

There is no difference between the control of a fast

reactor and the control of a slow reactor. Perhaps dif-

x

747

ferent materials and a higher velumetrie concentration of

poison may be used in a fast reactor than in a thermal

“one, However, the reactor periods which are involved are-

the same in both eases; they are of the order of seconds *

or minutes, and do not depend on the speed of the neutrons,

The reason for this is that some of the neutrons that are

emitted in fissien do not come ont of the nucleus immedi-

ately but are delayed by times varying from about a second

to about aminute. The control of a reactor, either thermal

or fast, depends essentially on these delayed neutrons. In

the case of U-” oe woe of all the neutrons emitted in

fission are delayed, et

if the multiplication Yactor k is éxactly one, the chain re-

action wi!l bé self-sustaining, but this will be true only if

we use all the neutrons, including all the delayed ones. If

‘Wwe raise the multiplication factor k above one, we need less

and less of the delayed neutrons. Finaliy, if k. becomes

about 10075 the delayed neutrons are no. longer needed.

For in this case it suffices to use 9014. of the neutrons,

those which are emitted promptly, ian we shall still get as

any neutrons in the next generation-as in the last, and

~ [fol 3971] thus be able to sustain the chain reaction. Thus, -

for k=1.0075, a reactor is critical with prompt neutrons”

alone, and: this condition is called prompt critical.

_-It is imperative to keep a reacior always below prompt

critical, and reactor controls must operate chiefly in the

jonny hetween the ordinary critical eérdition, called de-

laved critical, and prompt critical. For convenience, re-

actor scientists bave called the interval from del aved critical

to prompt eritical one dollar.’ This dollar is used as the

unit of reactiv. vy and corresponds for U* fuel to’ an in-

terval of 0.075 ink. This interval is subdivided into a hun-

dred “cents”. Thus a reactivity of 10-cents means a multi-

plication facter of k ef 1.00075. Ordinarily reactor controls

are set at no more than a few conts of reactivity.

There is a definite relation between reactivity in cents

und the reactor period. For instance, one cent of reac-

Hivity corresponds to a reactor period of about 20 minutes,

In general, this relation is expressed by a rather ‘com-

plicated mathematical formula known as the in- hour egua-

tion, This equation depends almost entirely on the prop.

&

748 0 Diag ;

érties of the delayed neutron: and is very nearly indepen-

dent of the speed of the neutrons which cause the fissions.

This statement is accarate to a sinall fraction.of one per-

cent at the low exeess reactivities ‘at which reactors are

nerimalivy operated, But even if the reactor verfod. were to:

get as short as one second, thie corresponding excess re-

‘activity is 75.5 cents fora tas st reactor, and 76.0 cenfs for

a rather slow the rinal react or. For thi§ reason reacter con-- -

trol is the same for fast and for thermal reactors.

Only if a reactor were permitted to operdte very near to

or above prompt eritical would there be any influence of the

speed‘of the neutrons. In this case indeed the power in a

fast reactor would increase more rapidly with time than

(fol. 3972] that‘of a thermal factor. However, no. reactor

is ever operated above prompt critical. In the operation of

the PRDC reactor, excess reactivity will be limited at the

most to about 70 cents, and wilicneversbe allowed to even

-approach the dollar which would make the reactor prompt

critical and thereby hazardous. |

As a matter of fact, it is perfectly feasible to "design

a reactor in.such & way, and to load it: with fuel in such

manner we it will be impossible ‘for the operator to in-

crease the reretivity to a full dollar or close to it ‘even if os

were to rans all rules of operation. This safeguard ca

‘be applied.in addition te period seram and’ power revel

scram, and, im fact it will be incorporated in the PRDC

desigh. We simply shall not have a dollar excgss reac-

tivity available. - -

j

We are able ‘to: incorporate this safety feature because

of the special properties of a fast reactor. The main prop-

erty is that the fuel in tae reaetor burns up very sloyly,

Heeause the critical mass is so large and the power per unit

mass not particularly -high. Now in the PRDC’ reactor,

fuel will be reloaded every week, and betaveen two such

reloadings only about .5% of the fuel will burn. It is eon-

servatively estimated that this burn-up, together with all

accompany ing changes like the accumulation of fission prod-

uct poisons, will consume less than 42 cents of reactivity.

It is planned to provide an additional 50 cents as a control

margin for the operator. This means. that even directly -

after reloading no more than 72 cents of excess reactivity

tore eties ee ilad IS

2

x .

2

are available anyehere’ in the reactor onee it is at the

operating teraperature even Pall tle eomirol rods and satety

rodsare withdrawn, Ns b bare sliown, up te 72 cents and

somewhat higher, theres noappreciabl ditference bet Ween

the belravior of a Yast and oot a tuerual reactor No eon-

Piok pt Head | es ceivpbie dais crtier the iméchanical devices

or the Opens perater ean “brie the renetor ta protiipe Bae oc)

* OGnCe itis opefativiv aiter 3 VEL p vit trol at a re ote: ny

Thermal reactors require far greater provisions of ox.

GURS reactivity, This is because the fuel in. these regetons

burns relatively faster since the total aivount of fuel

initially provided as lowey than taat in a typical fast re-

actor. lence atthe same power level a therimal reactor

~ has a greater-crate of reactivity change due to fuel burn-up

than a fast reactor, ‘ ire

Moye serious than this fact f6r the cont: ‘ol of thermal re-

actors is the nuclide Xe-135. This nuclide is a fission product

Which hasan enormous capture cross section for therniat

neutréns, but almost mone for fast neutrons. Pnta reactor

operating at high power, Jarge amounts of this muclide

will be present whieh will greails decrease the reactivity?

On the other Shand, before the reactor has operated,

XNe-135 will not Le present. Therefore, in this “clean” state

a large amount of excess reactivity lias to be provided so

that it can then gradually be given fo pee: Feactor as the

Xenon-135 builds up. Por theruial react eer high power,

ten dollars or mere of excess rea cuvity nitist be avatlable -

for this xenon ov: or-ritle, No nuciide of similar properties

Is expected te exist in the case of yet reactors: for these:

reactors, all nuclei will have OTs or tess the same cross

section and unnsually teh eroks bahia are unpossihle

the laws of nuclear plyssics. “Therefore, it will now ie

necessary in a’ fast retictor to provide darge excess rene:

tivity when the reactor is clean for the purpose.of over-

riding the absorption of some nuclide when the reacter is

filled with fission produc ts. From this very impertant stand-

point then, a fast reaetor cau te made sater than a- slowhone,

(fol. 89741 (5) Special Hazards in Fast Reactors

| heheve; therefore, that a gt redetor of the genera!

type proposed by PRDC ean be desimed and operated

790

2

safely. However, fhere have been some adverse statements

dnede about the savety of this reactor type, and fb believe

such statements are based on certain naclear characteristics

of a fast reactor whieh are not found ooa thermal reac tor.

There are three main characteristics of this type.

1.” Probably the ioest important of these fies in the faet

that if ever the reaetivity becomes greater than prompt

critical, the powet in a fast reac tor will rise with a faster

period than ina thermal one. b have explamed before

that this is net the case asdong as the reactor stays below

prompt critical, and that many independent precautions are

taken to assure that a reactor never ets hevond porompit

* critical oreven near it.

2

Although TP see no way in whi prompt eritieal ean ever

he exceeded ina reactor such as that propesed by PRDC,

we are nevertheless, prepared te consider what could hap

pen if through a completely unforeseen combination of

circiistanets, we sheuld execed preiapt eritieal,

In this case indeed a fast reactor would. heat up tore

tapidw than aahermal one, and a nuclear adecident would

occur, However, even if prompt eritieal were exceeded this

does not result in an ¢ sxplosion Which jm any way would be

comparabi® to an atomle homh, In order te obtain an atomie

explosion, one has te raise the reactivity of the fissionable .

thaterials in the atomic bomb vy¥ry suddeniv tea high value;

infact a reactivity of perhaps-one hundred dollars hes to he

reached in ga few mijliqnths of a second. Moreover, even

then a bomb explosion will not result if a large mumfer of

netitrons is present to becun with, as will be the ease in an

(fol. SOTO) operating reactor. Tn short. itd Jextremely if.

fieult ahd jcenires special designs toaake an storie onab,

and one ezamet obtain an atémie bomb by accident. The high

level of neutrons ina reactor is in itself anabsoluce yuaran-

tee that nocatomie bomb explosion esin-ever result, 7

Is reactor ever has and aecident, thy ain be at the worst,

comparable to av boiler explosion in Qeconventional power.

plant. Its severity depénds prjifarily on the rafetat whieh

the reactivity increases beyond prompt critical. New, all

the imdtions of cartrol rods in reactors? are designed in

such a wav that reaetivity can Inerease ONES ‘ata very slow

rate. For example, in the PRDC design, an increase of 1¢

~~.

get iol

per second is the most thatthe mechanism will parmit.

APDA has carried out caleuMitiins with whiehld ai

familiar, ta determine the course of th? accide nt Which

would resuit if all serani @fechuanisnis were to fail and

re tle LAVILY, Were to lie ili ent ted at the rate of le 8 second,

even bevond prowpteritieal Phese eale ations have shown

that im this case the matural therzsal expansion of the ura-

nium in the reactor would, autoimaticnliv shut down. the

reactor even tikouy pprotipt eritieanl was exceeded. In other

words, even Tf all-ghut down ime Ms anisius were to’ fail, the

natural ie ‘havior of the uranium when heated wotld prevent

an aecident, We would mere Hwecet solue rise in temperature

which Would subsequentiy die down, |

\nother caleulation with which tan: familiar wes made

in oh tel the reactivity was allowed to increase 1000 Tites |

faster. at sho per second: alibeorih beaanet eoneerve ef any

movement OF the contrals which weyido make the reactivits

Herease at anything near that-rafe. This caleulation avas.

carried out oy Nuclear Development “Corporation ONDA)

a? White Plains. N.Y. a fuelear consultant to APDAL The

result ef thos caleulation was that even this rapid Ine rease

oF renetivity would net lead to serious trouble, and would

fol. S976) -presumats not burst the reactor Vessel,

2. The second Special nuclear characteristic found in fast

reactors is that their reactivity would incréase if moderna:

tors were introduced inte the rehetor. Por instatee, if

Sedum In a& fast reactor coolant ~\stem Were partially re-

parted Ly sonie material comtaimine lvdroge wh Abr instance |

Wimoor Wate br - the reactivity would increases Tf this, were -

(lone te an ap pree iatblevextent, the pemetiv ity meh increase

les onal jieinpt eritieat kxclusion of niederaters from

i. fant reme for ~\ story) cloves Theol, however, sresent any vipat

thle proliems. In the PROG reactor, tor example, there is

no conceivable wax in which oil or water aight getcinto the

sedi svstem: which is campletely sealed. To make doubly

sere, Water-is tebe completely excluded from the reactor

be idiug—-there are ne dr: nking fountains, ne wash- stands,

hething eise containing water in the building. Oil and grease

Bs Kept to an absolute minitnum; there are no. ceservoirs

Polubricants as gre eouminern wit! large. motors, but each

ahs of equipment whieh requires it is hubricated only by a

stall cartridge of lubricant.

- @rs a .

(du

Thus only very small amounts of livdrogenetus material

are available anywhere ino the buildine,, and these small

amounts cannot get into the sodiuni xv'ste in. Nevertheless,

NDA has also carried out calentations with which Pam

familiar about the effeet? of substituting Moderator for

sodium mm the PRDC reactor. Even making unduly -pessi-

nh tie asstinptions, no serious aceidgnt, resulted unless an

immense amount of moderator was introduced, and | con-

sider this incredible. :

Tam acyuaintéd also with what | consider to be a some-

What more realistic calculation, made by APDA, which en-

visaged the possibility. that suddenty the sodium entering

the reactor was 100 degrees cooler than the sodium normalpy

entering.” Howeverl this should come about, PE eannot con-

(fol. 3977 | ceive, but this possibility again uid uot load a

— nuclear accident,

«

3. A-third relevant characteristic of fast reactors iS the

large amount of rather lightly enriched fissionable material

contained in them. if ali this. material ig the PRDC re-

tetor, for example, were assembled in one solid: bail, and

then surrounded tightly by a good neutron reflector such as

solid natural uraninin, we would have about six times a

eritieal mass. Gf brought tagether suddeniy, sacha lio rge

winennt of material would explode but as b have pointed

out alréady, with nothing remotely resembling the force

associated with an atomic bombs Therma! reactors of equal .

|

power working on enriched Uo o contain less t- and there-

fore de not inyeive this hazard, especiaily if the US? as

not highly enriched. In fast veactors, only. the geometric

dispersion of the tuel for eooling purposes prevents the re-

actor from, bemg supereritical for this neason,-it is “essen-

tial to make sure that the fuelin a fast reactor can never

assemble im one large mass. fi is feared that sueh an as-

sembly qnight result if a fast reactor melted down, At

present, APDA, Argonne, and others are conducting very

thorough mvestigations to make sure th: at ary conceivable

melt-down willnot lead to the asse nibs ly oo a large volume of

enriched wrannun. :

(7 course, overs pres auutipn ix takenwin any well-designed

I

fast yenétor’ (such as the PRDC rracBr) so that even the

es

“~

703

re ; ;

first part of this hypothetical accident; namely, the melt

mye down of the uranium, will never-oceur, | have discussed

some of these precautions hefore and will discuss others

later on. Hiowever, it is argued, the experimental ‘breeder

reactor EBRD did partially melt down, in an incident in

November, 1955, and this ¢meident has caused most of the

‘fears concerning fast reactors. ft is miv sincere helief that

these fears are groundless and that the causes which made

the EBR-Loamelt down will sot exist in the PRDC reactor.

{fol 3978] This is because the structute of the PRDC reae-

ter will be different from EBR-I, anid the reactor will be

opie ‘rated inva different manner, I shall dise uss the ‘se dit:

ferences further in. this testimony. i

4. Finally, a fourth characteristic relevantte safety is

sometimes attributed to fast reactors and not te slow ones

as a class, “Phis is the observation that EBR-P had a posi-,

tive temperature coefficient of reactivity which Was the im-

inediate case of its accident and it is sometimes argued

that a positive tempe —e coeflicient might be a general

feature of fast reactors. [do not believe that this is the’

ease, and T shall give my reasons for this opinion in the

next section in whiel EP shall also explain the meaning of the

‘term positive temperature cooficient,

The positive tempera’ ire cocilicient ard the consequences

of a vossible melt down of a fast reactor are provlems

which do require further experimental and theoretical.

study. In the next three sectiéns of this testimony, I shal!

deal with the studies which have already been made on these

prohlens,and with those which are now leing eendueted and

are? plained for the coming months. In any opinion, this

work will establish that geeflicients of reactivity and meit—

down problems m fast redetors do not repder this type of |

reactor hace rdéus for operation in populated areas.

To summarize, there are many safety features of reac-

tors. They inelude well-trained operators, good imstryunien-

tation, many independent automatic shut-down mechanisms,

control svsteus designed to fail safe, a sealed-up. coolant

“)stem, and many independent, strong containing vessels.

There are some features peculiar to fast reaetors. which

fend to make them even safer than thermal ones, e.g. that

tie system is at low presstire, that the reloading cycle of the

.

jot

fuel is short, and gspecially that only a very small amount

of exe ess re ac tiv its Tee “ds to bye provided heecmuse there ix he

ffol, OOF Of need for Xenon override, Taken: ell together,

it is any opinion that on ihe | wsix of present knowledge

there is as minel assurance of designing and operating a

fast reactor safel?‘1in a populated area as there is of de.

- signing and operating a thermal peactor, with the sale pos.

(6) Temperature Coefficient

sible exception of the two areas ‘of tempexature coe fherent

amd meit dewn whieh are still being exatined Hoth theo-

Yetreally and experanentaily. Et is my further opiroon, that

4 fast reactor can be so designed and constructed a» to pre-

vide ‘Adequate siifeguards in thse two areas. gmd that the

theoreticaPand exnerinental work-now underway im these

fields will confirm this.

oe : aie

=

.

It is generally tene that an ingrease in the temperature

bf a reactor willlead to an expansion of the Tuel and of the

restof the reaefor, and™ hat this e Spansion will decrease the

reactivity. Pf this is the “ease, we say that the reaetivits

has a negative te Isperature coefficient. In caleulating ilies

efteet of anild accidents; e.g. in the ealeulations of APD ap

ane span ekaatin linentioned before, a negative temperate

coefficient is wenernlls assumed and its value ix caleutated

from thie elk n thermake \panston of dwraniun and the other

constituents of the reactor, Af the normal mechanical -

safety devices of a reactor should fail, the negative tem-

perature coefficient is the chief mechanism woich prevents

severe aceidents.. ery:

‘Unfortunately, the EBRD accident ins Nevember, 15,

which Pomentioned befire has shown thatthe EBRD reae-

ter had a positive ten oerature coefficient. The power and

the reactivity. were carefully recorded. during the coarse of

the accident and there is ne doubt that the reactivity of

EBRD inereased.as the reactor heated up. In faet, it had

been known for @nore than twe veass before the aecident

that EBRD bad a positive temperature coeficient. Clearly.

the positive coeflicien was the direct cause of the accident

1, 3980) of November, 1955: as the power increased the ”

.

reabtivite. of he veaeroer iner sed. whieh caen led to an,

even faster rise of power, and so on. : .

-,

Obviously a pesitive temperature coefficient cannot be.

tolerated. [ts existence had given grave concern to the

scientists at ANL. APDA and NDA ever sinee it was dis-

covered, and the experiment of November, 1955, whieh led

to the accident was part of an ext ded program to find out

nore details about the positive temperature coe ‘ficient and,

if possible, to detertmine its eatise. A further progran for

investigating its cause and possible cure is well under Way.

It is necessary to qualify the statement tat the FE RRA

hatha positive temperature coefficient. Actually, if the whole

-reactor was heated slowly, the reactivity of EBR-E de-

creased as it does for all reactors T know, The positive

cool he ‘lent was observed only if the fue! Was heated very

rapidly se that there was no time tér the sodium coolant

tocarry the leat away. We therefore sav that the prompt

temiperature coefficient is positive; on the other hand, if one

waits long encech, the total temperature coefficient is nega-

tive. Therefore E BRET behaved alk right im normal opera-

tion Indeed, E BRL oawas aperated for four vears without

any troub lie, ups tnany exspernbentol results were obtained

Yromdt. Only when a special e xperiment was made in which

the operatinieona ions were entirely different from those

Uoporinal epevation and ine which the reactor Was pur-

cosély puconoa fast vising period by inserting consider:

able extess reget tivity, then the berernnipat eoethiciont came

into play whieh finally led tothe accident,

The facet that in this ease we have to do with a prompt

temperatuit coefficient: shows pumediately that this co-

efficient. must be assoeigted with the temperature ‘of the

uel itself. “Phe-question advises now whether the positive

Fol 3UST 1" temperature coefficient is in any way pecahiar

to fast renetors, and whether perhaps if as unavoidabie in

fast reactors. Lan contident that this is Pe the ease,

It is trne that an effect exists whieh could givera posittye

contribution to the temperature coeflicient in EBR-L and —

Which ¢ characteristic of fast reactors: This is the so-eatled

Doppler effect. Investigations on this effeet lave pro-

Pace} 1 alinost te noVears, nies thy at the Nnolis Atom

Power ¥diboretory at Seherieet adv. However, that Lahora-

tory Was primarily meres a Intemaediate reactors in

“hich the neutrons are neither thermal nor fast. For fast.

ys

Fb

reactors, the firs€ therough -theoretical treatment of the

Doppler effect’ was given two vears age by Dro Goertzel |

and his associates at NDA. Loara famitiar with therm cal-

culations and in fact followed this work very. closely due to

its extreme importance, Their main results were, first,

that the. temperature coefheient due té Doppler effect is

very small and second, that it depends critically on the dilu-

tion of Ue with US. In EBR-T in which nearly pure U*

is used,’ the Doppler, effect may indeed cause a: snuall posi-

_tive temperature coefficient. But if Ue is diluted: nh at

east one atom: ef .U- per atom of 235, then the Doppler

effeet will give-a negative temperature coeficient.” In the

PRDC reactor, for example, there’ will be about 3 atoms of

23S per atom of 255 and this will make the. Doppler ¢o-

efficient certainly negative and its value somewhat larger

than for “EBR-L Therefore, according -to the -best theo-

retical information now available, the Doppler effect can be

cmmade to contribute to safety ino fas< power reactors “and

will do so in the PRDC reactor.

Even in the EBR-I, the Doppier effect cannot have been

. the cause of the observed positive temperature coeficient.

fol. S982] Aceordins omy own latest calculations, it could -

have contributed no more than 56 of the observed) posi-

‘tive temperature coethcfent, ; :

Mx periments.re under way at Arco, Idake, to measure

the Doppler coeficient ia evitieal assembly, ZPR-3, whieh

c@ntains the same caatertals as EBR-E A eritical assembly:

isa reactor which operates at extremely low power, perhaps

a few watts, a condition which is particularly suitable. for

exadet measuements of -the reactivity. The experiments se

far carried ou have given the. fesult. that the Doppler’

effect may be evey smaller. than the caleulated value, cer-

tainly not varger. These difficult experiine nts are continu-

‘ing, and are discussed by Dr. Hilberry in his testimony. At

present they give confidence in the theereticab caleuiations

and confirm the conclusion that the Doppler effect cannot

have been responsible, for the positive temperature © o-.

efficient in EBR-L and will certainly not 4ive a positive

temperature coefficient inthe PRDC reactor.

The experiments prove in’ facet somewhat more. The

experimental fact is that the heating of a piece or i

ii

. ° = a. . é

by itself, without heating-the rest of the reactdr, does not

eaitse ao ineasurable inerease in reactivity, as long as the

draniiin does net move. this excludes not only an unde-

sirable Doppler effect but rieans that there is,also-no other

internal effeet of any kend in-the fuel which gives an ap-

preciable positive teniperature cocfiicient. Thus the eX

periments show that we have not overlooked any pliysical

phenomenon Which might give a positive temperature co-

‘efficient. Thus we. have direct assurance that there is no

intrinsic property of fast reactors which eauses a posi-

tive temperagure coeflicient.: : &

It intherefore generally agneed that the positive tempera. -

ture caefficient observed in EBR-L was due to some features

ffol. 3985] /in the mechanical design ef this reactor rather

than to the high speed of the neutrons. “Now the EBR-F

was désigned to make certain physical measurements, in.

particnlar te establish that breeding is possible. It was not

intended for engineering testsy and ‘was therefore not de-

sygned with the ear, and did not have the mechanical

rigidity, that one should demand of a power reastor.

The fuel elements in EBR-T are rods of U* whieh are

eld at their fop and bottom.” When the reactor operates, .

the side feae! fuel rod which is closer to the center of thes

regetor will become hotter than thé side*away. from the

eent oy This will make the inner side expand relative to

the outer, and the fuel clements will bow. Since its top and

ottom are fixed in vertical position, the middle of the fuel

forment will be pushed closer to the center of the reactor.

‘Thos will lead to an inerease of reactivity.. 2

It is rather generally beheved that this was the cause

the Positive temperature coefficient in ABRIL. One can

estimate the amount of bowing that abould occur at a given

reactor power, and this is just abowe the right aniount to

exnlain the observed positive temperature coefficient. Un-

fortunately, if is not possible to make measureMents of the,

pesition of fuel elements in the reactor white i®is in opera-

tion, and therefore, we hav ono positive proof that bowing

of the estimated Amount actually took place in the reacter

~. ‘To find out whether bowing was responsible a program

is at present under. way to’ relitild the EBR-L with a dif-

ferent mechanical design, as explained 4n more detail in the

x

TOs

testimony of Dr. Hilberry and Mer. Davis. The fuel elements

will be made more msgid and will be held rigidly tn place see

that howing will be wreatly — This program is being

carried out at Arco; Idahe, by personnel of the Argonne

National Laboratory. APDA and PRDC are vitally inter-

ested in the program and are he ping to the best of their

fol. S984] abilities. . o

In the design of the PRDC reactor, for example, the en.

gineers have been aware for some tine that inward bowing

‘of the fuel elements must be avoided, and several alterna-

tive methods are being examined. The testimony of Mg.

McCarthy will describe thesaglexigns more in detail. rT)

intentidfi is to assufe either that no bowing occurs at all or

that bowing should pu) | the fuel elements farther apart in

the core rater, than “loser, together, and if this can be

achieved, the reactivity will “decrease rather than, increase

due to bowing. |

The gutcome of the test of the new EF BRA désign will

greatly influence the further design of fast power. reactors,

including the P RDC reactor. [fit is found that the posi-

tive temperature coefficient has been removed as | anr con-

fident will be the case, we shall feel justified in going ahead

on the basis of present design criter‘a; if it ts not, we shall

make turther changes in designsand further experiments

‘to insure a negative temperaturé coefficient. The EBR-!

test is scheduled to také piace in. the summer of i257.

If vowing can be made to contribute a negative tempera-

ture coefficient, or if it can be eliminated, the total prompt

temperature coefficient of the -PRDC reactor will be nega-

tive, because of the thermal expansion of the fuel elements.

With a negative prompt tentperature coefficientan accident

of the EBR-I type cannot-occur, the reactor will shut itself

Coww when heated even if the.heating occurs rapidiy, and

the reactor will then be safe. :

The EBR-F experiments also revealed another type of

instahilityca resonance. When the reactor was operated at

{fol 8985] its normal power and the How of sodium was

reduced, a point was reached where the reactor power

would begin to oscillate with a period of about fiiteen

seconds, without any: external canse. These oscillations

were investigated in ‘considerable detail by means of a re-

4

° . G09

actor oseilater, a device which Eb shall dtseribe im more

detail later in this testimony, The resonance is somewhat

but not too ciosely related to the vositive temperature CO--

eficient. The resonance does not constitute a direct“hazard —

“butat would linut the power at White ‘+h the reactor could be

operated,

| have every reasonable expectation that the projected

work on EBERT will isolate the causes of instability, both

with resp ect to temperature coefficient and resonance, and

Here is no reasow to expect that any real difficulty wall, he’

‘encountered in designing a fast stable reactor with newa-

tive temperature coeflicrent of: adequate: magnitude and

sign. } further expect that the experimental program will

show the design of the PRDC reactor to be stable; at the

least, | am confident that it will indieate design changes

Which can be made to accomplish stability.

(7) Meltdown in the Presence of Sodium

In normal operation all Known. reactors are extremely

stable. Even the EBR-I which had a: positive prompt

telnperature coefficient operated with gree mn stability and re-.

lialytity for four vears. Normal operation will, therefore,

not lead to meltdown with. its possible consequences,

Meltdown js conceivable when a radical change Has been,

made in the composition of the reactor. One major change

Which oceurs regularly is the reloading of. the re ‘actor with -

new fAel elements. investigations have made whether and

in which way meltdown could occur in the P RDC rea¢tor.

atter reloading.

‘fol. 8986.) Of course, reloading is ¢ -ondue ted in such a way

that malian yill actually not occur.- The new fuel ele-

ments will contain just as much U** as thie old fuel elements

did when they were fresh. “As a precaution, care is taken

that the new fuel clenrents are not inserted in the center

{ the reactor where they would contribute most to the

reatieiey but ouly in the outer parts of the core where the

reactivity contribution is nruch smaller. The used-up cen-

tral fuel elements will-in turn be r®placed by partly-used

-fuel elements which were previously located in the outer

parts of the reactor eore.. This procedure will minunize

any possible excess reactivit’ introduced by reloading.

ya

760 ee ue ee -

The main concern then would be that) perhaps one fue!

elemgnt- might slips in which contaid® € | of a higher en--

richment than is required for the reac ai It is not clear

how this could come about, but to make: ddubly sare, APD.A

is at present considering testing procedutes to which eda ‘hh

fuel element. pin would be subjected before insertion inte

a sub-assembly. This testing would be direc fed toward) in

surance that each fuel pin ~~ exactly thie Us enrichinent

required. § @ | :

_Let us assume that in spite of these.precautions, a fue]

sub-assembly is inserted which 4s too highly enriched and:

therefore gives a larger contribution to reactivity than- re-

quired. If this were to happen, it would be immediately

aliscovered even while the reactor is being reloaded, because

- the instrumy nts would indicate a rise to a higher néutron

level. THe instruments which are used. in the shut-down

condition during a reloading are sensitive enough to detect

a reactivity which excéeds the required one by a fraction

of a dollar. If: such extra reactivity is> discovered, the

reloading will be immediately interrupted, some of the

freshly loaded fuel element: sub-assemblies taken out and

replaced by others until the instruments indicate fhe correct:

[fol. 3987 | reactivity.

' Let us assume, however, that ithe operators responsible’

for the reloading (who of course will be particularly com-

-petent) fail to discover the extra reactivity. Then after

‘the reloading process ‘is completed the safety rods will be

withdrawn and thereby: the reactivity allowed to approach

unity. As.I have pointed out beggre, this will be done very

slowly, at a rate not exceeding 1¢ per second, and the.

instruments will be operating all the time. If the neutron

detectors-do not work properly, an interlock will prevent

the withdzawal of the safety rods: Assume now that the

reactor has been loaded: with too much fuel, that the op-

erators have failed to notice this and that the safety rotls

are withdrawn. Then as soon as the reactor period becomes

shorter than the setting of the period trip, the scram wil!

operate and the reactor will be shut down. The same would

happen if the power exceeded the operating power. There.

fore, no meltdown will result even if the wrong type of fue!

>

.

a

ee ey ae ae

element has slipped through the. fuel element testing and

-even if the operators have failed to notice this.

An excess of power-can only result if, in addition to these

two unlikelyeevents, there is a complete failure of the satety

mechanism, if for instance the safety rods which wre

just withdrawn cannot fall back into the reactor. It is quite

inconceivable to me just hoav this could happen. “If it were-

to happen, and if in additjon the moveinent of the safety

rods out of the reactor could not be stopped—another most

unlikely asswnption—then the: reactor —— overheat and

melt down.

These supposed Msiitions « of a reactot evtihion, and

other even more unlikely chains of events, would be quite

similar to the conditions which were purposely created for

experimental purposes when the EBR-I meltdown occurred.

The postulated conditions would be somewhat worse than

[ fol. 3988] those: under which the EB R-F accident occurred,

‘however, @ecause it is postulated that none, of the safety

mechanisms would werk.

Let us, therefore, have a closer look into the meltdown

incident of the EBR-I. The Argonne National Laboratory,

as Dr. Hilberry has explained in bis testimony, has studied

in great de tail the conditions of the core of EBR-I after

its melting, and I am familiar witli these studies; in fact,

Il chave ‘also examined the EBR-I core ,after meltdown.

They have found that uranium was expelled from the center

of the core. .The density of the core before the incident

was about 10.5 grams“per cybie centimeter; after the ig-

cident the density at the center. @f the core was reduced

“to about four grains per cubic centimeter, and this remain-

‘ing material was very porous. Apparently inoreethan halt

of the uranium which was originally at the center of the

core had been pushed out by the melting to a position

near the edge of the core. Indeed, both on the sides of the

reactor core and nea? its lower ‘edge, one finds material

which apparently was pitshed into .these positions from

. somewhere else, in addition to th 1e material which was in

these positions from the beginning and which shows. no

signs of melting. Bglow.the' center of the.core there is a

region in which.the density was increased to 14 or 15 grams

‘per cubic. centimeter by addition,of extra material. Thus

762

there is ample evidence that material from ‘Y center. of

the core was pushed toward the outside. ,

- Now it is well known that the contribution of U*° to the

reactivity is greatest when the U*° is near the center of

the assembly. Material near the edge of the core con-

tributes far less‘to the reactivity, and material pushed into °

the blanket would contribute less still. Therefore, the me!t-

down incident of EBR-L, fr from assembling the materia!

into one big mass of uranium, disassembled it and the reby

reduced the ‘reactivity. i

[ fol. 3989] .While there is no positive evidence ‘on the

mechanism of this disassembly, it is reasonable to specu-

late that it might have happened like this. The molten ura-

nium ‘ame in contact with liquid sodiuin, after eating its

way through the steel claddmg of the fuel. elements... The

boiling. point of sodiuin is below the melting point-of ura-.

nium; therefore the sodiun immediately started to boil. :

Because the processes. were rapid, the ‘boiling sodium did

not find an outlet along the normal coolant channels. In-

stead its, pressure pushéd the uranium away from the cen-

ter ofthe core into the outer parts of the reactor.

Whether. this mechanism is the correct explanation can

only be determined by further examination of the EBR-I

core, and by further theoretical work. However, it seeins

clear “already that there was a rather strong force propelling

the uranium outward. If the accident had been more severe,

this’ force would have been stifl stronger and would have

reduced the reactivity of the reactor even more.

It is not known whether the movement of U** in fact

shut down the EBR-L in its incident. The operator of the

EBR-I hit the scram button when he noticed the fast power

rise, and the automatic power scram Was also functioning?

' property. It is therefore possible that the EBR-I was shut”

down by these seram mechanisms. rather than by the expul-

sion of uranium from the center of the core. However, had

all the scram mechanisms failed, it is clear in my opinion

that the movement of fissionable material awity from the. .'

center, would itself have shut down the reac tor. ’

Therefore, it appears that the melting*of uranium in the

presence of sodium which can vaporize does not lead to an

| a“

e

*

; Jae : ; 763

; ra

assembly of a supercritical mass but is instead a powerful

mechanism for the shutdown of the reactor.. At the same

time, the pressures generated (presumably in the sedium

| fol. 3990 |" Vapor) are not likely to be enormously great.

One eviderce for this is the fact that gravity had time to

operate in the EBR-I incident and assemble more uranium

near the bottom than near the top of the.reactor. Further, ,

the forces were far: too wei ik to burst the reactor vessel.

Ind-ed, in the EBR-I- incident, even. the rather weak blanket

‘was left infact. .

Further eareful’analysis will be needed to establish -all

these points more reliably. However, even now it seems

very likely that a me ‘Itdown in the presence of Sodium will

' not bring the reactor above prompt critical but will provide

ameffective automatic shut-down mechanism.

[ fol. 3991] (S) Meltdown After Loss-of Sodium

Meltdown therefore can lead to: serious trouble only if

it oceurs after the sodium from the reactor has been lost

first. This is an even more unlikely eventuality than the

startup accident which I discussed in the last section. In-

deed, every precaution has been taken in the PRDC reace

tor design against the: possibility of loss of sodium. ‘Even

if the pumyrs fil and if the power fails, the sodium will

still remain.imthe system. As a matter of engineering, it

is certainly possible so to design a reactor vessel and cool-

ing system that the presence of sodium in the reactor will

be ; giaranteed at all times, and | believe that the PRDC de-

-sign as deseribed in the License Application. verbally “does

this.° 1 believe that the sodium’ system of the P RDC reac-

tor has.been designed with greater care than that of any

similar.reactor, and-that we can really be sure that a sud-

den loss of sodium, will never occur.

— Even if there should be a compound leak in the system,

the sodium flows into a sump tank, and afump pump takes

it back into‘the reactor vessel tank. is, it has to be

postulated that anew with, a gompound leak in the

system, there is a failure-of the sump pimp.

Tn this most unlikely contingency, the further course of —

events depends on the size of the leak. With any credible

764

leak, it will take many hours before the large sodium reserve

tank is emptied of its 13,000 gallons of sodimm. During these

hours, the reactor can be unloaded beginning with the cen-

. tral fuel elements which contribute most to the reactivity.

Even if this unloading cannot be completed before the com-

plete loss of sodium, ‘the remainder of the fuel in the per-

iphery of the reactor is likely to be too dispersed to lead to a

critical mass even if it inelteq down under the most unfa-

yorable conditions.

[fol. 3992]. If there were a loss of sodium ‘through a leak

of enormous proportions which persisted in spite of all the

precautions taken such as double containment and the ability

to recirculate, the sodium might run out of the large reserve

tank in a few minutes. This would still give time for

‘some precautionary measures, but [ will consider. the case

when such measures are not taken, except that of céurse

the safety rods are inserted and the reactor shut down

immediately after the loss of sodium begins.

The reactor is then left after a few minutes without

sodium “and without power. However, the fission products

accumulated from the prior operation of the reactor will

continue te develop heat by radioactive decay. At a time

of one second after shutdown, the fission product heat is

about 6.5 per cent of the reactor power before -shutdown.

It then decreases as the 1/5 power of.the time. Five minutes

after shutdown, it amounts to about 2 per cent of the pre-

shutdown power of the reactor.’

In the absence bs sodium, there is no way to dissipate

this power. The réactor core will, therefore, heat up- and

melt, beginging perhaps half’ a minute after, the sodium

has been lost. The fuel at the center of the reactor will melt

first, and then the melting will spread to the outer parts of

the core in a time of another minute or, so.

The details of the melting process-are complicated and

are only partially known at present. At the outset, there-

Fore, it seemed desirable to try to avoid detailed considera-

tian of the melting. To this end, two hypothetical situations

were considered, both of them far worse than any credible

situation. If these hypothetical situations had led to caleu-

lated accidents of moderate size whieh could have been

safely. contained in the reactor building, we would not have

e

%

See

765

needed to itivestigate in detail the probable course of a

meltdown in the absence of sodium. Unfortunately, both

| foi. 3993) calculations ted to substantial release of nuclear

energy ; detailed investigation of the mettdewn conditions

has, therefore, become necessary, and is being undertaken

both: theoretically and e xpe ‘rimentally by APDA and NDA.

The first study of an Aneredible maximum accident was

made by NDA at’ the request of APDA. They assumed

that after the loss of sodium, the soditm suddenly rushed

in again, that it did so with the same ‘speed it has.in normal

operation, and that in addition the sodium was able to

move the (much heavier) molten uranium at the safne

great speed (30 feet per second). !* is clear that these’

assumptions are little short. of fantastic, and could not. be

realized under. any. conditions, not even if we purposely

tried to do so. The energy release found by NDA was

“equivalent to 10,000 Ibs. of TNT.

The second calculation of an incredible accident was

done by Dr. Tait, a member of the British Atomie Research

I’stablishment-at Harwell, and myself. We did not assume

that the sodium returned to the reactor. However, we.

assumed that all the uranitim in the reactor melts without .

changing its pesition and then’ collapses under its own

gravity. Although slightly: more realistic: than those of

NDA, these assumptions clearly are still in the realm of

fantasy. With these assumptions, | have calculated that a

ineltdown accident of the PRDC reactor would release an

energy equivalent. to about 1,000 Ibs. of TNT. A more

accurate calculation is still under way:

‘This figure I consider to be a gross ove1 restimate. For

instance, Dr, Tait and I assumed that the uranium. does

not fill the voids left by the loss of sodium, and this assump-

tion, certainly incorrect, tends to oe the energy

release, pr obably by a factor between 2 and 4. We assumed

that all the uranium melts at the same time’and then

“collapses all together; actually, the center-of the reactor

core will melt first.and’ may flow’ away even before the outer

parts of the core melt. Further, the ‘uranium will trickle

| fol. 3994] down rather than fall freely under gravity. Ail

‘these and other considerations will tend to lower the energy

2

M6 (cee oP a eee

release very much. How much can only be determined by

detailed investigation.

~The original calculation by Tait ‘iad mvself yielded ‘an

energy redease of 350 Ibs. of TNT rather than of the 1,000

ibs: which row obtahrn—Phe difference between these two

figures is mainly due to two causes. In the first place, the

sinaller figure referred to the British fast reactor whieh is °

being constructed at Dounreay, Scotland. The PRDC reactor

has about twice as much ‘uranium as the British reactor,

and this increases the energy release in the postulated

-aceident by a factor somewhat greater than the ratio of

the masses, ; S :

Secondly, Dr. Tait and | inman that no safety rods

would be inserted into. the reactor after the loss of sodium.

Then the reactivity before collapse will be negative only

because the sodium has been lost; this gives a negative

reactivity of about $2. It is.a sounder procedure to insert

the safety rods as soon as the loss of sodium becomes

apparent. If this is done, thé reactivity is $10 negative, and

it is very likgly that no reasonabie flow, of uranium will

bring the res actor back to critical again. will diseuss this

further below, in connection with more realistic calculations

cf the accident which are at present being done at NDA.

liowever, if we make the arbitrary and unrealistic assump-

tions of Tait and myself, namely that the accident never-

theless will happen in any case, and that the core collapses

‘under gravity, we. find the somewhat, surprising result

‘that the accident gets worse if the negative reactivity’ be-

fore collapse is greater. This is because a greater, amount

‘of collapse is required to compensate a. great negative

reactivity, and if a greater amount of collapse is assumed,

a higher part of the core may be assumed to be ineluded in

the.coliapse and so to fall from: a greater height and there-

| fol. 3995] fore to acquire a greater speed due to gravity.

This means that at the time when criticality is reached

again, the reactivity increases at a faster vate if the’ safety

rods have been inserted than without this insertion, and

this m turn éauses the energy release: in the accident to

increase. ™ .

~ An inter ‘esting result of the caleulations.of Tait and=imy-:

self is that the energy release does | not depend, strongly”

‘, | 767

on the speed of the neutrons in the reactor. This speed is

most conveniently measured by: the neutron lifetime, Le.,

the average time whichea neitron takes, from its birth in

one fission to its absorption in the next fission. The energy

_ release is-inversely proportional. ty- abet the fourth root

of the lifetinae. Since the’ lifetime in fast reactors is about

1/100 of that in thermal ones, the energy release in the.

Bethe-Tait type accident is only about three times -what: it

woudl he in.a thermal reactor, Thus, the intluence of the

“fast” character of the reactor, is only moderate, -even

though prompt critical is exceeded inthis type of accident.

It is not known whether an explosion of 1,000 Ibs. of

TNT equivalent gan be contained in the many containers

*

provided in the proposed PRDC reactor. The explosion:

would. certainly burst the reactor vessel. Much of its:

violence would be dissipated in compressing the blanket and

deforming the shield.” Presumably some shock wave will

still .ye transmitted into the air of the reactor building.

Whether or not this shock wave can be contained in the

steel shell of the reactor building ts not Known at present.

If the answer is negative, it is again. not known how much

smaller the energy release has te be before it can be con-

tained. ¢ i

I understand that the Atomic Knergy Commission is.

sponsoring am investigation of (he whole containment prob-

lem. This investigation, which may include model experi-

[| fol. 3996] ments, may give us a much better idea on the

limitations of coniainment. In principle of course, any

explosion: can be contained. in+a building of sufficient

strength.

We should ietiiaiet, however, that.the model of Tait

and myself is only an extreme assumption which has. no -

relation to reality. The relatively large amount of explosive

energy which was obtained in ‘these calculations only in-

dieates the necessity for a more detailed investigation of

the actual sequence of events in the meltdow n in the absence

of sodium. ei .

Such detailed. investigations are now under way. As

Dr. Hilberry has stated in his testimony, the . Argonne

National Laboratory is planning to construct a meltdown

facility for the. investigation of. the actual process in the

? ¢

768

melting of uranium fuel elements, and of the subsequent

flow of the molten material down the reactor, ANE om

collaboration with the Los Alamos Seientifie Laboratory

_plams to take the results of ANL meltdown studies as the.

basis of calculations of the energy which might be released

‘if a eritical mass should be reassembled by the meltdown,

The special knowledge of the Los Alamos Scientific

Laberatory on nuclear explosions and on the behayier of

matter at high temperatures will be very useful for these

- calculations.

APDA has also initiated similar. stulies of itis oi.

Nuclear Metals, Inc., at Cambridge, Massachusetts, under -

the direction of Dr. A. R. Kaufimann, is setting up experi-

ments to study the melting and flow of uranium, using

similar geometric configurations to those which will @xist .

in the reactor, but using natural uraniumvather than U**,

and electric rather than nuclear heat. It is hoped that these

studies will give detailed ‘information on the melting of

the zirconium ¢ladding which ts around the uranium fuel

elements in the PRDC reactor, on the tlow of molten

uranium, and on the possible refreezing of this Granium.

| fol. 3997] ~ At the sang time NDA at the request of APDA

is making theoretical studies of the same problem. One of

their problems is whether the molten uranium will freeze

again as it flows down the reactor, In principle, such re-

freezing is possible because the U** in the lower part of

the core contains ‘less fission products. than that in the

center and, therefore, will not vet be up to the melting point

when the center melts and begins to flow down. In the

lower blanket section, below the reactor core, there is

depleted’ uranium in which the fission product heat is

negligible, so that the temperature is very low. The present

tentative conclusion from the NDA calculations is that the

molten uranium which flows from the center of the core

will not freeze again in the lower section of the core but

may at least partly refreeze when it comes into the lower

blanket. These caleulations are incomplete, and ever after

their completion we shall await confirmation of the theo-

retical results by the experiments at Nuclear. Metals and

Argonne National Laboratory,

oe “769

The question Whether the molten uranium freezes again

While flowing through the bettom uf the reactor is.of prifhe

4

importance for the further course of events. If there is

no refreezing at all, then in the proposed PRDC: reactor

the material will leave the reactor region and drop down

into the special ineltdown compartment which is provided

at the bottom of the reactor. In this meltdown compart-

“ment, the molten uranium is permitted. to distribute itself

over a very wide area, 8 feet in diameter, which will make

the laver of uranium in this compartment:very thin evene

if all the fuel should drop down into it. Such a thin layer

will not be critical even if it is surrounded by godd neutron

reflectors. Detaled calculations will be made to insure that:

the full amount of uranium in the meltdown compartment

will reniain far below. critical, taking into account reflection

of the neutrons from the materials which may. actually -

surround the fuel wher it is in the meltdown | compartment,

For instance, it will he taken into account that the blanket

| fol. 3998] may drep inte tie meltdown ‘compartment .in

the course of events. Special care will also be taken to

design the meltdown compartment in such a way that thé

fuel is certain to distribute itself uniformly over the area

povided. If necessary, knobs or dividing walls containing

a nuclear poison such as boron-10 will be provided. in the

meltdown compartment in order’ further to reduce. the

te activity of the fuel when it isin that compartment.

If*there is no refreezing, the-fow~of fuel through the

reactor will be fast enough so that all of-the fuel flows out

very shortly after it Thelts. For instance, the fuel from

the center-of tha reac tor vcore will have flowed out long

hefore the fuel near the edges begins to melt. In this way

accumulation of fuel in any one section ‘of the reactor,

whether in the core or in the lower blanket, is minimized.

I am confident that under these conditions the reactor will

not get wp to critical again if, by insertion of “the safety

rods, the reactivity starts out at $10 negative. NDA has -

started a more accurate calculation: of the inultiplication

factor of the*reactor as a function of time after melting

begins. Onee the: flow of molten tranium is known, one

‘an. calculate the distribution of fuel at any instant of

7

.

‘moder

of critical mass. It. will, therefore, reduce the ecenomic

770.

time and can then ealeulate the value of the multiplication

factor k for this distribution. ~

On the other hand, if uraninn freezes again, for instance

on its way through the lower blanket, thi channels for its

flow become clogged and further-molten uranium wilk then

accumulate on top of the’ clogged channels. and“ mainly

in the bottom of the reactor core. Lf this were to happen,

.eonditions somewhat sinalar to those postulated in the

Bethe-Tait accident calculations might arise. However, the

rates of assembly of the fuel would undoubtedy be much

slower than assumed in the Bethe-Tait- éale ulation, first

beeaiise not all the uranium would drop down at once and

secondly because it: would ‘merely trickle down rather than

[ fol. 3999] fall freely by gravity. With the much smaller

rate of assembly of the fuel would undoubtedly be much

smaller and would appear to. be containable in the many

containers surrounding the reactor and finally in the reactor-

building.

However important it is to investigate the course of a

possible meltdown accident with the present PRDC. design,

it is far, more important that these same investigations:

may ‘point the way te improvements in the design, It is

very likely that no serious freezing.of the uranium can,

occur in: the-lower part of the core but only in the lower

blanket. If this is confirined, and if the NDA calculations

and the experiments at Nuclear Metals and ANL indicate

a reasonable possibility that the uraniuin will refreeze in

the lower blanket, APDA wil! seriously consider eliminating

the loygr blanket from the reactor. This, will entail some

6 loss. of breeding and sqme moderate increase

‘ralue of the reactor, though not too seriously. However,

under the conditions outlined, the saczifice of the lower

blanket would eliminate entirely the nuclear accident after

meltdown, even after the loss of soditm.

The possible removal of the lower blanket is only one

example of positive action which can be taken in changing

the reactor design depending on the results of the current

research program... Other design changes may be made if

called for. At present, we do not have sufficiently’ realistic

information on the course of meltdown accidents, but only

~‘ ‘

”

of

7

eo SR

T71

.

. : P . sd a

educated guesses. However, a.vigorous research program

is under way to fill the gaps of our knowledge, and the

design of the PRDC reactor is sufficiently tlexible so that

it can profit from the results of this program, + have

reasonable hopes that this combination of research and

design change will lead to a reactor which cannot have any

nuclear accident after meltdown. [ am confident that the’

[fol. 4000] reactor can be designed in such a way that no

ceredible meltdown situation ‘can result in an: accident of

sufficient energy to breach the containment building.

(9) Pre-Operational Testing

To the greatest extent possible, advance: experiments

dnd engineering evaluation. are performed to assure the,

safety of any reactor, and this will, of coupse, be the case

with the PRDC reactor. However, a reactor should be

subjected to’a rigid pre-operational testing which can be

earried out safely at every step. Pre-operational testing

ix. carried out following completion of the construction of

‘a reactor. This procedure’ provides a method for further

check on experimental and theoretical results, and to be

most effective must be carried out on the reactor itvelf.

Consequently, such tests cannot be conducted until a reactor

is completely constructed and ready for the introduction

of nuclear fuel.

sefore the PRDC reactor is asseinbled in Michigan, its

critical mass and ‘many other nuclear properties will be

measured in a critical assémbly in the Arco, Idaho, facility

of the Argonne National Laboratory. Because there are

some nécessary differences between’ the. structure of a

critical assemb'y and of an engineered reactor, it Is ex-

pected that the criticalémass of .the final PRDC reacter

may differ from that measured im the critical assembly by

- ° . vr . . .

up to 5 per cent, either way. The reactivity value of the

control and safety rods, and ‘of fuel elements in various

~positions in the reactor, will also he measured in the Arco

critical assembly. Moreover, it will be passible to measure

the-suberitieal multiplication of a neutron source, with

various percentages of a critical mass loaded in the reactor,

and with various neutron detectors. — ,

&

*

.

ii2 ° a"

When the reactor is re uly for assem) lv in Michigan, the

fissionable material will be put in place piece by piece, in.

the presence of a strong neutron source, The details of the

| fol. ep start-up) procedure are described by Mr.- Me-

Carthy in his. testimony, The central fuel el@nents are

loaded first, and then the logdjng proceeds spirally out-

wards so that, as criticality ‘is approached, ‘the reactivity

value of each of the last fuel elements Is mueéh less than &.

dollar (ubout 40 cents).

The suberitical multiplication of the neutron source bys

the fissionable material will be measured at each stage of

loading with several .neutron detectors of different

characteristics. From these. measurements, the critical mass

can be predicted in various different ways. The most

common method is to plot the reciproeal of @e multiplica-

tion, 1/M, as a function of the mass of fuel. AAs the critical

inass is approached, these plots become straight ines which

-point to the critical mass (at infinite multiplication M).

Since several different neutron detectors afe-tised, several

different. straight lines are obtained whiel should all ex-

trapolate to the critical mass and thus provide a check

on each other. This method, which has been used on many

reactors in the past, permits a very accurate prediction ,

of the critical jnass.

Another method which {s even more aceirate; especially

at earky stages of the assenibly, makes use of the previous

experience with the Arco critical assembly, If the same

neutron source and neutron detector are used, then the

same multiplication will be measured in the P RDC reactor

and in the Arco critical assemdly, when the samme fraction

of the critical mass has been assembled. Thus, it will be

possibhe to deterinine the frac tion of eritical ass assembled

at every step. .

The last steps before criticality is reached will he taken

with especial care. Multiplication will be measured after

the addition of eachenew subassembly with the safety and

control rods in, and after every three subassemblies. also

with the rods out. Close to criticality, the procedure of

[ fol. 4002] plotting the reciprocal of the multipli¢ation

- factor against mass hecomes especially accurate, and it will

rt te

AB

weed tS

be easy to predict exactly which subassembly will make the

reactor critical. _

The approach of a reactor to eriti¢al is no longer a

hazardous procedure, but one which has been carried out

dozens of times ahd has become routine. Moreover, the

start-up of the PRDC reactor will be carried out) by

pecially coumpetent personnel who lave, been, trained

previously in this operation. Especially when ¢riticality

is near, the most competent members of the APDA staff

and of its consultants, as well as experienced AEC repre-

sentatives, will be present. I, therefore, believe that there

ix no hazard involved in the assembiy of a ¢ritical mass in

a populated area

When the er tie ‘al-mass 1 : finally reached, . the control

rods will be pulled out ~ang and the neutrons will be

allowed to- multiply until some low powe# level is attained,

perhaps a few watts. At this low power level, the control

rods will be calibreted, the safety rods tested, and the

neutron responses to changes of reactivity measured.

At. such low power level, the operation of the reactor can

be completély predicted from theory because the fuel will

not be heated, and there can be no effects from the bowing

of fuel elements or from-ather mechanical features’ of the

reactor. The behavior of the reactor then depeads gry on.

the properties of fissfon neutr@ms, in particular of the de-

layed neutrons, and is the same for fast and. thermal

reactors, as I have pointed out before. Thé test at this

low power level is, therefore, completely redictable and

completely safe. Furthermore, the fuel is not radioactive

‘at this time, because the r eactor has not operated at high

power levels.

If the reactor is found to behave satisfactorily at a

power of a'tew watts, the power will then be raised to about

300 kilowatts of heat, which is only 0.1 per cent of the

[fol. 4003] power at which the reactor is supposed to be

normally operated. The coolant wil] be permitted, to flow

at its regular rate so that,the temperature of the fuel will

rise by only about 1/1000 of the amount it would rise at

full poweiy ie., a fraction of a degree. Such slight tempera-

ture changes cannot change Me reactivity measurably, and

in 1 particular cannot lead to noticeable bowing. So the be-

-

oe

e

© ae

Me

o

%

é

havior should. still be the same as at a power of a few

watts, and this will be checked by experiments. ‘The same

will then be done at 1 per cent-of the operational power

level, where the same considerations still hold.

Then the power will be raised in slow steps. The steps

presently proposed are 5, 12.5, 25, 50 and 100 per cent of

the normal operating power, but this schedule is only

teritative. At every stage a full set of experiments will be

made to check ‘the reactor behavior. “The power will not

he raised to the next level before a complgdely satisfactory

result. is obtained at*the lower power level: As the power

is raised, the fuel will expand and may possibly how, and

we shall ther8by have a chance to examine the effect of

fuel temperature on the reactivity and make sure that no

positive temperature coeffic ient exists. ‘7

The chief instrument for studying the reactor behavior

will be the reactor oscillator. This is a special control rod.

which ean begmoved rapidly in and out of ‘thes reactor. This -

control rod is made in the form of a evlinder, one half con-

taining graphite, a good neutron moderator, and the other,

containing boron- 10, a strong neutron absorber, in’ the

form’ of boron carhide. The rod can be rotated at any

frequency from 0.01 to 25 eveles per second, and if it ‘is

so rotated, the reactivity will) change regularly and

periodi¢ally by a certain small amount. This amount can

_ be selected by putting a suitable amount of boron-10 into

the rod; it is planned to restrict. the reactivity change*to

| fol. 4004] 6 tents. Then the rotation of this oscillator rod. .

from the position where the boron is “out” of the reactor,

to the “in” position, will cause sueh a small change of

reactivity that no danger could result even if the rod staved

in the out position. Its 6 cents could easily be compensated

many times dyer by any safety or control rod or hy a rise

_of only about 30°F in the average reactor temperature,

When the ose itor is used to change the reactivity of

the reactor, the reactor pewer will also oscillate with the

same frequency. One can then measure the aniplifieation,

ie., the ratio of the amplitude of the power oscillation to

that ‘of the reactivity oscitlation. One can also measure

whether or no® the power-is in phase with the reactivity,

i.e, Whether the maximum of power is reached at the same

~

- ee im ®

, | .*

tiie as the maximum reactivity, or if this is not the ease,

one can measure the difference in phase between the two

oscillations. These two data, the phase lag and the amplifi-

cation, Will be measured with the oscillator oscillating at

different freque neies, -and all tts ee ee ,

will give a picture of the reactor characteristics.

"1 have’ developed the theory of these measurements in

some detail and have published the results in-a report,

APDA-117, which is ingluded as an exhibit to the PRDC

License Applic ation, as amended, and ts incorporated by

‘reference in this testimony. The theory ‘shows that if the

reactor has an instability (for instance, a resonance)

some high power, lets say at S00 megawatts of heat, one

can predict this instability very well from experiments at

igi lowey power, let us say at 50 to 100 megawatts. gthis

s precisely the purpose of these experiments, namely to

pe advance warning of instabilities long be fore these in-

stabilities actuaily occur, and this feature great® , con-

tributes to the-safety of oscillator experiments,

[fol. 4005] To make them still safer, we shall not simply

increase the.power by steps While keeping: the coolant flow

constant, but we shall first do ering at lower power

with reduced-coolant Hoy. What we really want to study

ix the hehavior of the reactor at diffe ap fuel temperatures

because it f& the temperature of the fuel which determines

its expansion, its bowing, and its Doppler ‘effect. There-.

fore, we should.get essentially the sme result if we operate.

at one-quarter of full power und one-quarter of full coolant

flow as if we operated-at full power and full coolant flow.

Staving at relatively low power and reduced coolant flow

has several advantages. First of all, the total accumulated

radioactivity will be kept.low, so that if against all expecta-

tions there should be an accident, not many fission products

would be released. * Secondly, the slower the coolant flows,

the slower also will be the responses 6f the reactor. We

can then operate ‘the: cscillator at. ‘ow frequency which is

easier mechanically anfagain increases the safety, f

To measure in particular the prompt positive tempera-

ture coefficient, we shall reduce the flow of cookint to a

very small amount, possibly shutting it off completely, and

we shall use very low power, perhaps 1 per cent of normal

operating power. If then the power oscillation is in phase

476

\ %

with the reactivity oscillation, this indicates a positive

prompt temperature coefiicient ; if it has the opposite phase,

then the temperature coefficient, ts negative. If in this

‘experiment, contrary to what I believe will be the fact, the:

teniperature coe flicient should turn out to be positive, we

shall take the reactor be, inch ‘and redesign it.

This method. for sneasuring the prompt temperature

coefficient is quite different from the. transient one used in

the EBR-I. Even if the. proinpt temperature coefficient is

positive, our method will be conipletely safe.. This is bé-

®@[ fol. 4006] cause on the .avgrage the reactor fuel is not.

~ heated up. The power is alternately higher and lower than

it was without tlre oscillator working, so that on the average -

it is. uot changed*° and the avérage fuel temperature and

the average reactivity likewise remain unchanged. If there

were any small change of average reactivity, this could

he « compensated by re-setting the main control rod. If

there were any increase of average temperature, this could

eniv be very siow and would then be communicated to the |

whole reac tor, and, as | have Snentioned before, the over-all

temperature coefficient, corresponding to heating of the

Whole reactor, was negative even in EBR-I, and, therefore,

this procedure is safe. |

4o measure the prompt temperature coefficient, we nrust

change the temperature of the fuel alone, and we imast

do this very rapidly. This rapid change is proVided in

our method byrotating the reactor oscillator with high

-frequency. it ix quite unnecessary to oscHlate the reactivity

with a large amplitude; a few cents is sufficient if we have

sensitive instruments to observe the power ose ation. Even

at the moment when the oseillator is completely “out,” the

excess reactivity will only be a few. cents (which causes no

hazard), and a moment-later it is minus the samé number

of cents.

Jn the EBR-I transient experime mr on the other hand,

- the way by which the fuel temperature could be changed

rapidly Was to provide a large excess reactivity, in the end

about 75 cents. Tivis is relatively dangerous; the fuel heated

rapidly without heating the rest of the reactor structure,

and the reactor went out of contrel, We have no intention -

of using this hazardous procedure. /By- providing rapid

a Po as posal

hm

-~

TT

change without appreciable excess reactivity, our procedure

will be safe and will still give the same information.

If, contrary to my expectations, our measurements do

show a positive prompt temperature coefficient, we shall,

“of course,-try to find its cause, which is likely to be some

{fol..4007| feature in the mechanical design. of the fuel

element. We shall then redesign the relevant part of the

reactor core, put it together again, and repeat the tests.

Tlie reactor structure is sufficiently flexible to >ermit. re-

design without rebuilding the reactor vessel, the shield

and other major parts.

A positive prompt temperature coefficient, is not the only

possible reactor instability; there is also the possibility of.

a resonancé, As I have mentioned before, the EBR-I had

such a_resoaance, at a frequency of about 0.4 eyeles per

second at full power and reduced coolant flow, Such a res-

onance is not in jtself dangerous, but it makes if impossible

to operate the reactor above the critical power at which it

oceurs. There is good hope that the resonance of EBR-T,

tovether with the positive température coerfficgent, can be

eliminated by a fetter: mechanical design and that the

mechanical. design of the PRDC reactor has in fact ae-

complished this. The reactor oscillator is particularly

suitable. for finding a-resonance, and if one exists, how-

ever, just as in the case of the positive temperature Co-

effic ent, it will be possible to predict the existence of a

resonanee at a much lower power than that at which the

resonance occurs.

Summarizing, it is my opinion thet safety tests with the

help of a reactor oscillator can be carried out without:

danger to public safety and that the tests will give all the

information zequired to insure safe operation of the reac tor

subsequently.

(10) Safety Consciousness of PRDC

As a .eonsultant, b am not directly a-smember of the

APDA staff, and thus T have an Popportunity to observe their

operation from. the outside, though very closely. Tam

also in a position. to make comparisons with other reactor

laboratories ‘with which T have been. or ain presently

associated.

778 | ao

(fol. 4008} To am happy to be able to state that, in my

experience, PRDC,and APD.A, as well as the Dow-Detroit —

Edison group, have always been filly conscious of the

requirements of ‘safety. Because of their concern about

safety, APDA arranged a meeting on the safety of fast

reactors-in Detroit in the Fallvof 1954. This was the first

mecting on this subject of such broad scope. Only one —

similar meeting had been held previously, under the

auspices of the AEC, in New York City about 1949, but

“that meeting was much smaller and less comprehensive.

The safety. meeting at Detroit was attended by many

scientists from- AEC and industrial laboratories and was

considered very muchgworthwhile by all participants. The

full record of the me@ting has been published. It was the

consensus of the participants in the meeting that the safety

of fast reactors was not an extremely difficult: problem and -

that most of the outstanding rs lis Were on-the way to

being solved:

Further evidence of the concern of APDA for safety

is shown by the fact that in my consultant's contract with

this company, reactor safety and reactor design were spe¢-

ified as the two major problems with which T should be.

concerned.

Karly in 1955, APDA ov ced that oscillator experiments

be done on- EBR-I, and these led to the discovery ofa

resonance in. that reactor, Scientists from APDA and

NDA, at the request of APDA, made major contributions

to the early analysis of the -resonaneé experiments, The

fact that the resonance re ‘anained tine ‘xplained Was the main

reason ANL undertook the further experiments whieh

finally led to the often mentioned accident to EBR-T. Full:

understanding is the primary. requirement for safety, and

even the lessons from the EBR-I accident itself are Likely to

help us to insure that no accident will occur In the PRDG

reactor. , ° ; .

_ [fol. 4009] APDA initiated calculations at NDA of

possible reactor accidents, considering, the worst possible

circumstances. At the sequest and expense, of APDA,

NDA made the first reliable caleulations of the Doppler

effect in fast rea¢tors, which were then followed by caleu-

lations of the British Project and by some of my own.

Psi in 1956, APDA initiated designs of the PRDC

actor, which would either avoid bowing or make the-

— -

-

>

yy

. 49

temperature coefficient due to bowing negative. APDA had

long been aware of the problem ofthe positive temperature

coefticient of EBR-I and of the meltdown préblem, and

Was engaged in prograqus for their solution. Since last

sununer, these programs have been intensified. There lis

close coordination between APDA and Argonne National °

Laboratory, both in fast reactor design and in safety

programs. | ‘

(11) Sum mary

By the application of theoretical physics to what we now

know, it is my opinion that a fast breeder reactor of the

general tyyie proposed by PRDC can be constructed ands

operated inva popylated community without undue risk

to the publie, and that it can be demonstrated, when such

reactor has been built, that its operation is safe.

The information to be developed by the projeeted pro-

gram of APDA, including pre-operational testing, and by

the related programs of ANL and other agencies of, the

AEC, will in my opinion eliminate any uncertainties that

may now exist with respect to operation of: the proposed

PRDC reactor. 1 believe that this information will be’

sufficient to enable “PRDC to furnish such additional

technical information as is required to complete its Applica-

tion for License under Section 104 } of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954. |

On the basis of what we already know as a result of

experimentation and research, operating experie nee with

reactors, and theoretical calculations, it is ay further

[fol 4010]: opinion that such additional information will

in fact show, with very high probability, that, a reactor

constructed in accordance with the present PRC design

can be safely operated. E-verr if the planned investigations

should not demonstrate safety on the basis of the present

design, they will at least substantially eliminate areas of

uncertainty and point the-way-to-charges’ in’ particular

features of the design so as to assure safety. The design of

the PRDC reactor is: sufficiently flexible “to ‘accommodate

such changes.

780

-[fol. 4012}. In evidence January S. 1957, Tr. 43

———

_Brrort- tue: Atomic ENEngy C CoMMIsston

Doc sai 0, F- 16

% . ————

~ In The ‘Matter of

Power Reactor DEVELOPMENT. COMPANY

itcaaaciaon

Testimony oF NorMAN HiLperry,

Deputy Director, ARGONNE. NATIONAL LaporaTory

Background and Q wal tfica ti ons

My name is-Norman Hilberry. | am the Deputy Director ,

of Argonne National Laboratory. Since July 1, 1956 1.

have been acting in this capacity as the Laboratory's chief

executive officer. |

~-. was born in ussewood, Ohio, now a suburb of Cleve-

land, on.March 13, 1899. 1 received my Bachéfor’s degree

with majors in eal physices and mathematics from Oberlin

College in 1921, started graduate work in physies at the

UniveTsity of Chicago in the fall of-1921, and accepted a

position.as instructor in the Physies Department at New

York University in the fall of 1925. [taught both under-

vraduace and graduate physics courses at New York

University, first at Washington Square College from 1925

to 1928 and then at the U niversity Heights campus as an

instructor from 1928 to 1930 and as an Assistant Professor

from 1930 until the summer of 1940, at which time |

returned to the University of Chicago ‘on sabbatical leave

and completed’ my vraduate work, I received the Ph. D.

in physics from the U niver rsity of Chicago in the spring

of 1941. The summer of 1941 was spent as a member of

a State Department-sponsored cosmic ray expedition to

South America. After a month utilized in making high

altitude cosmic ray measurements in the Andes of southern

Peru, I was a member of a symposium on cosmic rays

sponsored by the -Brazilian Acadeniy of Sciences in Rio

ot

wor,

: 751

- Janiero, returning to wee See Univer sity in the fall

of 199T

ffol. 4018! In December of 1541 1 was asked by Dr Arthur

H. Compton to serve ap his assistant on a war project

which was just then heing organized. This project was

known during the war as the Metallurgical Project and

since has been renamed the’ Plutonium Project. 1 reported

for fullftime duty on January 1, 1942 and have served in

the national atomic energy “activities icrmaentaars since

that time: ea .

During the early part of 1943 I had an active roie in

organizing the Metallurgieal Project, not only by assisting

in establishing it as an administrative unit dut also by

establishing and stafling new scientific divisions to meet the

swiftly broadening demands for the incorpsration of

‘additional scientifie and technigal disciplines. - During this

sume. period inv responsibilities inciuded erranging for the

necessary developmental work on methods for the produc-

tion of the extremely pure graphite necessary for auclear

reactor construction’ and for obtaining this -graphite in

quantities adequate to meet the project needs. My dnties

Jalso involved: an active part in the procurement of the

necessary high purity uranium nfetal. Twas one of a group

of three who served as the first site selection board for

an atonne energy facility, recommending the selection of the

present Oak Ridge. site in the spring of 194. Shortly after

“our selection of a site had been sade, the Manhattan

Djstriet of the tnited States Army Engineer Corps was

organized, and Gur recommendation was forwarded to them

for action, resulting in the acqipsition of the present Oak

Ridve site. As a member of the group present in the West

- Stands laboratory at the University of Chicago when the

| fol: 4014] first nuclear reactor went critical on December 2,

1842) it was my assignment to man one of the several

manual safety copprol devices provided for “emergency

shut-down.” © 9 - ;

During the calendar vear. 1942, the activities of the

Metallurgical Project ema rapidly. In addition to the

Metallurgical Laboratéry itself, additional project groups

became necessary and these were éstablished under separate

contracts at numerous other loce itions, such as Towa State

9 -

782 Ses

>

College at Ames, Iowa, the University of California at

Berkeley, California, Battelle Memorial Institute at Colum-

“bus, Ohio, and Washington University at. St. Louis,

Missouri. It was necessary to providd some organizational

mechanism to handle all matters of i al administration

for .these associated contracts and ‘to assure that the

scientific program of the project as a awhole was effectively

coordinated. For this purpose, a- Metallurgical Project

Office, independent. of, the Metallurgical Laboratory, was

_ established, with Dr. Arthur Hl. Compton, as Director, to

serve as the central execitive unit for the Project as a

whole. From January 1, 1942 until May, 1943, this Projeet

Office reported on matters of both program and admin-

istration to the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-

ment, which Was the governme ntal ageney. responsible dur-

ing’ this peried for the over-all atomic energy program.

‘From. May, 1943 until. July, [946 it. reported to the

Manhattan District, U. S. Army Engineer Corps, and it

“was discontinued July 1, 1946. First as assistant to Dr.

Compton and later as ‘Associate Project Director, L served

as the executive officer for this Project Office. a

In the spring of 1942, active steps were taken to design

{fol. 4015] a reactor of large enough power te produce

experimental quantities of plutonium and a chemical process

plant adequate to,separate this plutonium from the uranium

fuel elements in which if was forméd. These facilities

were designed with’ the assistance of KE. 1. duPont de

Nemours & Co,, Ine., and constructed at the Oak Ridge

site. They formed the key facilities of the Clinton Labora-

tories which were established, staffed, and operated during

the war by the University of Chicago. Construction of

these facilitics proceeded during 1943, nie the X-10 reactor

went critical in November of that vea As the re present-

ative of the Metallurgical Project Office, I was present af

Clinton Laboratories during the final stages of ‘the con- |

struction and throughout the start-up of this reactor.

During this period also, construction was completed in

the Argonne Forest section of the Palos Park Division of

the Cook © ounty Forest Preserve of facilities to house the

Q

first nuclear reactor. The reactor Itself’ was disassembled .

.

5

oa

’

—

sm

~~.

from its location in the. West Stands and reassembled in -

the new laboratory facilities. It was here also -that the

world’s first heayy water moderated reactor was buflt and

put into operation in May of F944. Although the Argonne

Forest’ laboratory was administered as a separate unit,

it was operated under’ the same prime contract as the

Metallurgical Laboratory itself..

In January, 1945, active design was started on a full-

_seale plutonium production plant. The MetaHurgical

“Project: was ‘responsible for all matters of basie scientific

-and technic il design, while E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,

_Ine., was responsible for all detailed engineering design

‘for construction and eventual. operation of the plant. As

_a matter of contractual obligation, the Metallurgical Project

was required to approval all final drawings, specifications,

(fol. 4016) and initial operating, procedures for the Hanford

plant. from the point of view of operability as far as basic

science and technology were concerned...

In July, 1944, 1] was ‘appointed Associate Project Director

of the Metallurgié al Project and assigned to Hanford as

the liaison between the duPont company and all of the

Metallurgical Project laboratories, in particular the

Metallurgical Laboratory itse!® and the Clinton Labora-

tories. This role called for an active part in the start-up

of the: Hanford reactors in the fall of 1944.

During 1945 and the first half of 1946, the responsibilities

of the Associate Project Director included the planning for

re-establishipent of the wartime atomic energy projects on

a permanent peacetime basis and for the establishment of

‘certain new atomic energy installations, including Brook-

haven National Laboratory and the reorganization of the

Metallurgical Laboratory and--the Argonne Forest Lab-

oratory into the present Argonne National, Laboratory.

With. the fimal establishment of Argonne National

Laboratory on July 1, 1946, I-beeame Associate Director,

and on December 1, 1950, [avas appointed Deputy Director.

As a result, throughout the past ten years I have been in

active contact with all of the Laboratory’s reactor aé-

tivities. These have included the first Experimental Breeder

Reactor, EBR-I; certa'n phases*of the design of the

Materials Testing Reactor; the design, construction, and

+

im

784

a use :

operation of the Laboratory’s heavy water research reactor,

CP-5; the conceptuat design and basic engineering of the

- Mark I Submarine Thermal Reaétor; the conceptual design

of the Savannah River, Production Reactors: the design,

construction, . operation, ang 2 expe rine ‘ntal: progvams

associated with the ‘BORAX reactors; the design and

[ fol. 4017] construction of. the FE xperimentai Boiling Water

Reacfor; the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor,

EBR-IT: the design of the Argonne Low Power ienctor,

to serve as a package reactor for use as a power supply

in remote locations; the design arid construction of the

‘Argonaut, a training and limited rese: irch type of reactor ;

and the conceptyal design of the ARBOR reactor, to meét

full-scale engineering deve lopme nt requirements. :

Incidental to these major reactox projects, my duties ©

have required continual contact with the Laboratory’ s Zero

Power Reactor program, which has included the zero power

version of the Submarine Thermal Reactor, ZPR-1; the zero

power mock-up of-the Savannah River reactor, ZPR-I1;

the zero pawer mock-up of the Experimental Breeder Re-

actor, ZPR-III: the fast ¢xponential experiments on fast

reactors, ZPR-IV; and the coupled fast-thermal zero power:

reactot, ZPR-V. These projects have spanned the ten-year

period sinca Argonne National Laboratory was established

and have provided esgentially continuous contact with highly

important and productive reactor development actiy ities.

The Laboratory is now preparing for the start-up and

operation of the Experimental Boiling Water Reactor and

of the Borax-IV reactor. Criticality experiments are under »

way with botii reactors, and full-scale operation is scheduled

~ in the immediate future. Argonne is also currently engaged

in. preparing detailed plans for rebuilding and operating

EBR-1, and for tae design, construction, start-up, and

operation of a new Experimental Breeder Reactor, EBR-II.

The Laboratory has completed the initial design of this

{fol 4018] new reactor, and is preséntly directing the

activities of the architect-engineer on producing the detailed. *

engineering design. The Argonaut reactor for university

training and reactor research is’ nearing conipletion, and - |

start-up is scheduled for the immediate future. The ARBOR

reactor has been approved, and an. architect-engineer ‘is

A

785

being selected préparatory to proceeding with final design

and construction. As the Laboratory's acting chief executive

officer, Tam ee responsible for the ‘execution

of this program. .

In all of these many reactor projects, commencing with

the construction of the first nuclear reactor under the West

Stands at the University of Chicago, ¢onsiderations of

safety and site location have been matters: of primary

concern to me, and to others charged with responsibility for

these projects. With other senior laboratory officers, I have

taken an active part in the discussions upon which the.

decisions were based as far as most of these reactor projects

liave been concerned, and | have, of course, shared.in the

Gecisions as to site and safety features for those for which _

the Laboratory has had respensibility for construction and

oper ation. . - Se 7

Gaueval Program

Iam generally acquainted with the design of the proposed

Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC). reactor and

with the material included in ‘its Application for License,

as amended. [ have also read the direct testimony to be

‘given in this proceeding by Messrs. Amorosi, McCarthy,

[fol. 4019} Bethe and Davis.” I agree that the most

important areas in which additional technical information

must be supplied with respect to fast breeder reactors of

the general type proposed are those which concern stability,

temperature coefficients and effects of any credible melt-

down. My testimony will be largely directed toward a brief

summery of the information presently available in*these

areas, and an outline of the researeh program which is

heing carried out by Argonne National Laboratory in -con-

junction with other Atomic Energy Commission labora-

tories, ‘Atomic Power Development. Associates, Ine.

(APDA), and others. ‘Jn my opinion this program will

not only provide much of the technical information in these

areas which is needed to complete the PRDC License

Application, but it will provide -confirmation of the’

assurance which. I believe we already have that a fast

breeder reactor of the general type’ proposed can be 0°

piernnaey per constructed that it can be operated in a

786

populated area without undue risk to the health and safety

of the public, There is, ofcourse, no possthle public hazard

invelved in any event in the mere construction of such a

caetor, prior to the introduction into it of nuclear fuel.

“The | ‘ast-reactor program of Argonne National Labora-

tory is even older than the Laboratory itself; since before

“its establishment as a permanent laboratory-in July, 1946,

ANL and its predecessor have been actively engaged with

the problem of fast breeder reactors. One of the final acts of

the Manhattan District was to approve the Laboratory’s

proposal forestudies leading’ to the design and eventual

construction of a fast breeder reactor. These studies started

in 1945 and-have been carried on continuously to the present

[fol. 4020] time. First as Associate Director and sub-

‘sequently as Deputy Director of the Argonne National

Laboratory, I was continually advised of and informe

‘upon the planning and execution of this program.

These studies led to the design, construction, and oper-

ation of the first Experinental Breeder Reactor, EBR-I,

which was completed in 1951. This was the first nuclear

reactor to produce significant quantities of elegtrical power,

providing sufficient power for self-contained operation of

the .plant and associated, laboratory facilities. Initial

uperation was carried out on the Mark I core from 1951

to 1954. Measurements on this first core proved that even

in this design the amount of plutonium produced was at

least equal to the quantity of uraniwn-235° burned. Addi-

tional experiments were carried on with a Mark IL core until

. November 29, 1955; at which time this core was rendered

inoperative as the residt of a fast excursion experiment,

which IT shall discuss further below.

Arising out of the studies of EBR-I, the Laboratory has

undertaken a critical suévey of the kinetic behavior of fast

reactors, with the objective of determining more precisely

the safety characteristics inherent in this class of reactor

designs. These investigations will include studies of possible -

positive temperature coefficients and of possible operating

instabilities which could arise as a result of temperature

feed-backs. -In-addition to these kinetie studies which it is

proposed to carry out on the present: EBR-I reactor, the

Laboratory, in cooperation with the Los Alamos Scientific

.

+>. *,

ee

Laboratory, is also -xamining the possibilities of hazards |:

which might arise in this type of reactor due to a postulated

sudden compacting of the core arising from meltdown or

{fol. 4021] other imagined nuclear incident.

In the ineantime, in connection with the planning for a

sevond experimental breeder of considerably larger size,

a zero power reactor or critical experimental facility

(ZPR-II1) has been designed and constructed to carry out

the necessary nuclear studies required in the design of a

fast breeder reactor, This facility. was placed ;in°operation

in October, 1955, and is presently engaged # a program

of fast reactor studies. °

Concurrently, design and.development work needed to

establish a definitive design for the new experimental -

breeder, EBR-I1, has been carried out. As of the present

time the first phase of: the design work has been completed

and an arehitect-engineer has. been chosen to. assist the

Laboratory in producing the complete engineering design,

including the necessary coerstruction drawings. ?

In connection with design’ of the new Experimental

sreeder, EBR-II, two ancillary programs are of .signifi-

cance, The one deals with the irradiation studies which

the Laboratory is carrying on in connection with the

determination of the irradiation stability of various fuel

elements and fuel components and in particular, prototype

designs for the EBR-L! reactor and for the PRDC reactor.

The other program deals with the continuing engineering’

studies associated with the technology of the use of sodium

as a reactor coolant. This-involves the engineering test of.

full-scale components, pumps, valves, seals, ete., using

liquid sodium under the tempetature conditions planned:

_ for the EBR-II reactor. | .

Since each of the above activities in the program of

Argonne National Laboratory has a bearing on consider-

ations of the inherent safety of the PRDC reactor, each will

be presented in some detail.

[fol. 4022] Experimental Breeder Re actor —EBR- |

The Experimental Breeder Reactor, EBR-I, was designed

initially to prov ide a facility to study the physics of fast

788°

rer sors, particularly the breeding characteristics of such

a reactor and secondly, to, study the: technology involved

in. the use of liqujd metals as coolants for fast reactors.

At the time tigese investigations Were first started, fission-

able material svas scaree and urgently needed for military

objectives. “As a result, the reactor was designed for

minimum critical size.« This requirement resulted in’ an

active core of very small size. The core volume was a,

hexagonal section essentially seven and one-half inches

_ between flats and seven and one-half inches long. Since

a major problem in fast reactot design is-that of neutron

leakage, it is clear that amihor deviations in geometry in

such a small core produce relatively mueh larger changes

than would be produced by the same geometric deviation

ina much larger core, T he-use‘ot the small core also tends

to- make the heat transfer and temperature gradient

problems more serious.’ Both of these problems would

have dictated the use of a diluted core of larger volume

which would simultaneously have increased the he: it transfer

area, reduced temperature eradients, ana reduced the

sensitivity to minor geometrical deviations. The diluted

core, however, would ‘have required larger quantities of

fissionable material, and it was therefore not recommended.

To determine the breeding inherent in this system, the-

enriched core was surrounded with a blanket of normal

uranium. Radially this blanket consisted of an inner blanket

of normal uranium rods cooled by the’ sodium-potassium

[fol. 4023] alloy, and an external blanket outside the stain-

less steel vessel which contained the core, inner blanket and

the coolant. This external blanket was composed of normal

uranium “breks”,which were perferdted with holes so that

the “bricks” could be air-cooled, Longitudinal blanketing

of the core was accomplished by placing normal uranium

slugs in the stainless steel tubes, both above and below the

highly enriched uranium-235 core slugs.

Since the EBR-I was to be an experimental unit, it was

necessary the: each fuel element be separately removable

from. the reactor. To accomplish this, ithe fuel elements,

weye fabricated by inserting uranium 2 into properly

fitted stainless steel tubes and bonding the uranium to the

stainless steel with sodium-potassium alloy within the tube.

¢ on, “|. 989

Such a fuel ele sare then consisted of central uranium ikaw

of highly enriches uranian with normal uranium slugs

inserted above and below to provide the upper and lower"

blankets. In the Mark I core, eac ‘hi stainless steel tube was

provided with ribs-which were milled on the outer surface.

When the fuel element was inserted through the upper

holding plate and into the lower holding plate and rotated,

these ribs came almost in contact with the surfaces of the

adjoining fuel elements. The sodium coolant then flowed

through the apertures between these fuel elements.

The milling of these ribs on the steel tubés* was an’

expensive and. time-consuming operation, so that in the

second core made tor EBR-L, which we called the: Mark II

core, the ribs were elmminated and in consequencg, the

clearance between fuel elements was ine reased by about 50

mils. ‘Two types of geometrical distortion are, obviously

possible within this core. One would be a bowing of the

[fol 4024] uranium slugs themselves awithin the sthinless

steel tubes. The thickness of. the liquid bond between the

uranium slags and the stainless steel wall was 10 mils,

so that a bowing of 29 mils within the stainless steel jackt

would be possible, Since the flux across the reactor is not

uniform but drops off from the center toward the edge,

‘it is clear that. the side of each slug toward. the center

is somewhat hotter than the side away from the center, and

~ consequently, bowing can occur due to temperature

differences across the slug. With the coolant flowing over

the surface of the steel jackets, thes® tenaperature differ-

ences are clearly minimized. Tf the: flow. of. coolant. is

stopped and in ‘addition, the power. is in¢reased rapidly,

these temperature differences are magnified, and bowing

effeets become much more probable, «

~The second source of geometrical deviation would be in

the actual bowing of the stainless steei tubes themselves. In

the Mark I core, the presence of:the ribs reduced. the

possibility of this bowing. to a matter, of a few mils

most throughout the entire length of the tubes. Ino the

Mark IL core,-nowever, howing due to irregular heating

could have amounted to as much as 50 mils. It should be

noted that the temperature differentials are such that

any bowing arising from either source would tend to move

- . .

eek , ‘

790 | .

the fuel slugs closer tog@ther at the center of the reactor

and thus tend to Increase the reactivity “of the reactor as

a whole, ai

Construction of EBRA was completed in August, 1951,

and the reacter placed in operation. During the lifetime

of the Mark T core, the. major ‘emphasis was ons steady

operation to obtain* breeding information as qtickly as

[ fol. 4025] possible, and while some experiments were done,

no extensive experimental -program was carried out. The

emphasis was on building up total megawatt days” of

operation and upon study of the engineering behavior of

the system, including the electrical power production.

Under certain start-up conditions, particularly when doing

foil irradiations, certain operational ano‘nalies were_ob-

served. These eccurred only under extreme operating

conditions and were totally absent duri ing routine operation,

With the introduction of: the second, or Mark IL core,

rather extensive exper

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Transcript of Record — Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers · 367 U.S. 396 | Frix