Brief for Respondent Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc — FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
Supreme Court brief1961
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Teas SCONTINENTAL Gus Pres Loe Chaisestion. Cox
nara Eomox Conceare or New Your, Inc, and Tas
Crry or iw Ringed
aromas Coat ARSOCLTION,» sr x,
: reerers.
Taasiesdiasa Qk Wank tock: Chidemacoon, Sealsccs
pare Epmox Coxriwy or New Youx, Inc, and ‘Tax \
Cm: ee aay
of New York, Inc,
: 15 Broad Street,
New York 5, New York.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question PRESENTED |............ se R rn Baal Bite e ee ;
III SUI IID scsrbcchectcccanciesocie-dnntoiocpocncoronnasicinde
Dwsmany OF AGSUMERT oc. .ccncceseccese-sc-. Pe
-Arcument 2”
TR eS NTE Fe GOL
I—The Commissiow exeeeded its authority
under the Natural Gas Act when it pro-
hibited, in violation of Section 1(b) of the
Act, the non-jurisdictional sale by pro-
ducers in the field to Con Edison through
the device of refusing to certificate the con-
cededly unobjectionable transportation of
such gas by an interstate pipeline company
II—The Court of Appeals correctly held that
the Commission had exceeded its authority
in denying a certificate upon the secondary
or “hon-determinative” ground that it had
authority ‘over and disapproved of Con
Edison’s non- nen use of its
natural IID... <ctpsileseniesineahaneiinndtaislaaadeimiaaeanses
IIT—The Commission’s order is arbitrary, eapri-
cious and unlawful because it is based:
upon “policy considerations” that are un-
sujiported by any substantial evidence of
record and contrary to experience and
reason and to the express policies of
IIE - °5i..c.-ss dca ccninccscdecenstiasmmemanemnsanciis
IV--The Court of Appeals denniiy ordered the
eases returned to the Commission with
directions to issue the certificate applied
ee ~ prnvunnsalliivonndensintantenin _—
. Coxcivusion
IIE <<. ccucrapstdlasdeeeameasebesemntaammnsamecnaniie Pa
68
ii
. TABLE OF CASES CITED .
As . . “PAGE
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S.1 (1945) 34
Aflantic Refining Co. v.. Public Service Commisston
of New York, 360 U. S. 378 .( 1959) ...................0002-enee 32, 36
Capital Transit v. Public Utilities Commission of
District of Columbia, 213 F. 2d 176 (D. C. Cir.
III —ciscchisiiaitagbeniniiinatan «60
Chaniplin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission
of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932) -....2202.020...2.2--.-- 46
Charleston-€ Western Carolina Ratlway Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Cammission, 234 F. 2d 62 (1956) ........ 55
City of Pittsburgh v. Federal Power Commission,
i eh FS ee ee ee - 33
Colorado Intersiate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com-
_ mission, 324 U.S. 581 (1945) 2... eceeecececeee eee 35
Colorado interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com- —
‘mission, 185 F. 2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1950) ..................-. ~- &
Department of. Conservation v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 148 F. 2d asl cert. denied 326 U. S. 717
(1945) -...----o-veeeoeenn-- SS TES AR a Ol SSR Oe 55
Eastern States Retail Lumber pete snisiiatben
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) «2... 34
Federal Power Commission v. East-Ohio Gas Com-
pany, 338 U. S. 464 (1950) nn. c eee ceeeeeees “eecoge Dy $0
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas, Co., |
320 U. S. 591 (1944) 2... 18, 33, 36, 51, 56, 57, 61
Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern
_ Pipe Line Co., 337 U. S. 498 (1949) .......eeeeoce- 18, 31, 37
Klor’s, Inc.-v. Broadway-Hale venien Inc., 359 U. S.
a RS eae 34
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Federal ii Com- .
mission, 163 F. 2d 433 (D. C. Cir. 1947) —....0......... 59
National Coal Ass’n v. Federal Power Commission,
191 F. 2d 462 (D. C. Cir, RAS 54, 55
iil
. : | rie PAGE
‘Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 169 F. 2d S8P (D.C. Cir, 1948) 388
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. vy. Public Service ,
Commission of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507 (1947) —..18, 26, 29°
Public Service Commission of the State of New
York v. Federal Power Commission, appeal doc-
eeted, He. Tages, GC. Cle., BED ............:.a5.8.. 17, 24
Railroad Commission of Teras v. Rowan & Nichols
Oil Co., 310 YG. S. 573 (1940) Reicciudeseaeiccsnbeterans 46
Walls y. Midland Carbon Company, 254 U. S. 300
Peet REET SS esr eS hs ne RT 46 .
Federal Power Commission Cases
East Pineonins Natural Gas Co. 8 FLP.C, 836 (1949),
aff'd sub nom., National C cal - Ass'n v. Federal.
Power Commission, 191 F. 2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951) 5+
Cities Service Gas Co. 17 F:P.C. 516 (1957) oe. 55
Houston Texas Gas & Oil baci 16 F.P.C, 118
(1956), ecnaesaas : add, 63
Memphis Natural Gas eons 4 F.P.C. 197 (1944). 55
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company, 21 F.P.C.
OO IIE coors scheiesscimecsse nantes tpi eoreniaclipnenenaloninmai 27, 62
Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 12 FRC. 109 }(19539 55.
Northern Natural .Gas Co., 4 PPC. 1099 (1945), 7
2 MR ences Coenen 55
Northern Natural.Gas Co., ¥i F.P.C. 682 rdv’d 15
F.P.C. 1634 (1956), aff'd sub nom., National Coal
Ass'n vy. Fedtral Power Commission, 247 F. 2d 86
a ee oe
Panhandle Easterv:Pipe Line Co., et al., 15 F.P.C.
--46 (1956) .......... 18, 36
Panhandle Eastern ‘Pipe pray Co., BPC. “Opinion
No. 274 (1954), aff'd on othe - grounds, uh nom.,
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 232 F. 2d 467 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied
302 U. S. g01 (1956) oti tnseemenanesctmredomeeernnvdtnenmneatengnnten 55
{i
iv
, ei PAGE ~
Piedmont Natural Gas Corp., 9 F.P.C. 629, 7) (1950) 55
Southern Natural Gas Co., 14 ¥.P.C. *43 (1955)
aff'd suly nom., Charleston &° Western. Carolina
Railway Co, v. Lage Malaga Commission, 234
F. 2d 62 (D.C. Cir, 1956)... Fab cbaaeuensaratoeesanttion a
Tennexsec Gas and Transmission Company, 3 F.P.C.
A, RE ERA TONER, SRC rere nn cee AD
Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 10 F.P.C. 391 (1951) 55
Teras Gas Transmission Corp., 12 F.P.C. 658
SEED; detcnodadensaniecoetanceds Dciethiiheedsiaudasimesconamenenmnndeenes 54, 55
*Teras Gas Transmission Corporation, 22 F.P.C. 378
PIII satoconnienenuinadhicciasscormegusatackbebusasenictpsinienceisecnmecmamnaies 25
The Montana Power Company, 10 F.PC. 950 (1951) 14.38
franscontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 11 F.P.C. 605
1 ant ala I Sale CAR AN, SENET a 54, 5A
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation, 20
tg i RIE aR Mena a ce ee Tine . 63
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation, F.P.C.
A I a me 67
Trunkline Gas Company,.21 F.P.C. 704 (1959) _........ 27
Statutes .
Administrative Procedure Act 69, GO Stat. 243
(1946), 5 T. S.C. 81009 | aN)
Air Pollution Control Act oe 1955, 69 Stat. 322, 42
Wy, Bh, Ci SRR e REED CONEY wiecedeccecenccscscesecveceesscarennen 9,19
Natural oh Act, 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. $$717- iw, Raat et 0, 19, 20, 38, 40,
j* : 42. 46, 56, 64
{, -_ ne ~ SF & S 1 & R |
| 30, 34,37, 39, 41, 45, 53
AY cee PRINS Se ae? 3, 15,16, 18, 24, 29, 30, 36, 37,
‘39, 41, non 48, 50, 52, 53
icant SREB RRO STE AME Mantes Ratan vRe manne te 37, 45, 56
I S,. —* seealeaCiiceaie icpaaacaianiniiahe st Seaaldidicddcdatpstencance ta ead ca 37, 56
EISEN ET rater Le ES 20, 41, 42, 43, 45, 57
SUIT scieictcaninissssseduiceschectecaaseatpcsaecdueblatncaueninieiiade nies acicae 59
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as aunended, 15
U.S.C. §§1-7, 15 (1952) cee IV; 1957) steistiaaibtin 34~—~
Vv > a
Miscellaneous
aa aa eats | PAGE
Att'y Gén. Nat’l Comm. Antitrust Rep. (1954) 2.0... 33
SL Cong. Ree. 6726 (1937) (Remarks of Congre Ss-
Se aeRO ERED ALISA co ce $8
41 Cong. Ree. 9312 (1937) (Remarks of Se nators
Austin and Wheeler) 2.222.220.0000 ne
Be ee NN CIID secieasstittircicnnescetcedereonenses 46,47, 48, 51
Be i I IO siiscnsioecidensnsebapnicapianhencitionensren ees) 4
a Py ate. Ke Sh | ce peocecceceeeeeD Dy Day OD
eB CD sve caciccicievcncnnesenseinineesiccateced 39, 52, 53 -
Be Ss HI RD cxchenepesesvvnrecvenieniccentepevsnienedensni 39, 52 -
od te | renee 39, 52-
36 FPC Ann. Rep. (1956) .................: ee =
eae) 6g ee eer
dagk 2 3). eee eee seceesd Dy DO
39 FPC Ann Rep. (1959) ............. sa eabecinabcaien ORK See ==
FPC Brief in Public Service Commission of the
‘State of New York v. Federal Power Commission,
appeal docketed, No. 15412 (D. C. Cir.) 2.00.00... 17524 ©
FPC, The First Five Years Under The Natural Gas,
I a eS a caeenanen 50
FTC, Final Report to the Senate of the United
States, S. Doe. No. 92, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., Part
SEB, (UDG) anninnnrnnnmnnnnenenqnenrevsoneneaweenceevoreenerecrnesionnes 44
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th
Ll ER i ener a 45
Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1941) .. 48
H. R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941) .. _....36, 49
60 Pub. Util. Fort. 843 (1957) Siac codsccaseeasiceuneaneinecaae 63
S. 2959, S6th Cong. (1959) -...n..---n-ccncececccceecsecncesosbonetee 59
Senate Concurrent Resolution 73, 86th Goaneiae .
RRS EER eter ee eS Oe ee a On 54
Nee >
IN THE
3 Supreme wid of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1960
Nos. 45 and 4600,
e
— io Ga —
FEepERAL Power ComMISsSION,
: | Petitioner,
v.
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAs Pipe Linz Corporation, Conso.t-
DATED Epison Company oF New York, Inc., and THE
City or New York,
Respondents.
National Coat ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
TRANSCONTINENTAL Gas Pipe Live Corporation, Consoti-
DATED Epison Company oF New Yuzk, Inc., and THE
Crry or New York,
Respondents.
_ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY
| . OF NEW YORK, INC.
2
Questions Presented
Consolidated Edison Comneen of New York, Ine. (“Con .
Edison”), a New. York electric, gas and steam utility, con-
tracted witli natural gas producers in ‘l'exas for the direct
purchase of a long term firm supply of natural gas. This
gas was to be used as fuel in place of coal by Con Edison
in its Waterside steam and electric genefating station in
the heart of Manhattan in “order to combat a serious air
pollution problém. It was not tu be resold. The purchase
of the gas,-sine it would ‘not involve a sale for resale,
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission (“Commission”). Nor would Con. Edison’s
subsequent utilization of its own gas in New York City
- be subject to Commission jurisdiction.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (“T'rans-
co”), Con Edison’s principal natural gas supplier, which
was planning to enlarge its facilities, contracted to enlarge
them further and use them tq transport the gas for Con
Edison’s account.
Transco also agreed that, for not to exceed 60 days in
any year, it would reduce the transportation of Con
Fdison’s gas, at Con Edison’s election, and would supply
from Transco’s own reserves a like amount of gas which
Con Edison could use for resale during times of peak
demand by its consumers. This peaking gas for resale is
_ sometimes referred to herein as the “60-day peaking gas.”
‘This entire program, known by its tariff designation
as “X-20”, was designed te enable Con Edison to accom-
olish twa vital objectives:
(1) Abatement of air pollution in the vicinity of the
‘United Nations; and
(2) Securing additional gas service for its gas cus-
tomers during periods of their g greatest need.
‘ | 3
“fhe Federal Power Commission refused to permit the.
transportation of Con Edison’s gas by pipeline from Texas
to New York, although it had no objection to Transco’s
sale of the 60-day peaking gas or to the. transportation
arrangement itself. The Commission denied the pipeline
certificate for two reasons. First, and primarily, it did not .
approve of Con Edison’s non-jurisdictional purchase in
Texas prior to the commencement of transportation.
Second, it did not approve of ‘the proposed use of the gas
in New York subsequent to its transportation. The Com-
mission said that the latter reason was not “determinative”.
The questions presented are:
(1) Has Congress. vested i in the Federal Power Commis-
sion the power to regulate, prohibit or prevent, by direct
or indirect means,.a sale of natural gas for consumption
by the purchaser, which sale is exempted from Commission.
jurisdiction by §1(b) of the Natural Gas Act?
(2) Is the Commission’s power under §7 of the Act over
the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity to
a transporting pipeline so unlimited in scope that it may
deny a-vertificate for reasons having no relevancy to such
transportation, but which relate. to the non-jurisdictional
purchase of natural gas and _the subsegent consumption
by its owner?
(3) May the clause “required by the present or future
convenience and necessity” in §7(e), governing issuance
of certificates, be construed so broadly that it permits FPC
regulation of transactions expressly exempted from such
. ‘regulation by §1(b) of such Act?
(4) Has the Federal Power Commission acted arbi-
trarily in denying a certificate of public conveniénce and
necessity solely on the basis of “policy considerations”
that are unsupported and unrelated to’ any substantial
evidence of record, and are contrary to reason and the
expressed policies of Congress, and where the only evi- -
dence of record demonstrates the need for natural gas to
relieve air pollution in a highly developed metropolitan
area and to realize substantial economies in the rendition
of ‘utility service to the public?
4
a oe ew ee
_ Statement of the Case
The statements in the briefs of the Federal Power Com-*
mission and of the National Coal Association, United Mine
Workers of America and Fuels Research Council, Inc.
(sometimes referred to herein as “the coal interests” or =.
“eoal”) do not in our view accurately set forth the record
before the Commission, the nature of the issues or the
scope and nature of the Commission’s actions as stated
by it.° In fact much of Petitioners’ briefs is based on
* In addition to the briefs filed by the Petitioners, the Commission
and the coal interests, several briefs amici curiae were also. filed with
the Court by the thern California Gas Company and Southern
Counties Gas Company of California, the State of California, -the State
of Wisconsin and the Public Service Commission of the State of
Michigan. No arguments of substance are made in the briefs of the
coal interests and the briefs of the amici curiae that are not covered
in the 86 .page brief of the Commission. We therefore will avoid
repetition by directing our attention in this brief almost solely to ie
Commission's brief
The arguments advanced in the briefs of the coal interests are
repetitious of those in the Commiission’s brief. The purpose of the.
coal interests, as in prior proceedings, is clearly to limit as far as
possib! :, use of any competing fuel. The coal interests offered no.
evidence, however, at the hearing with respect to the impact of the
proposed X-20 service upon the market for coal.
- The briefs of the State of California, the State of Wi isconsin, the.
Public Service Commission of the State of Michigan, and the South-
ern California Gas Company and its affiliate add nothing to the
arguments made in the Commission's brief and appear to misappre-
hend the significance of recent decisions of this Court with respect
to the legal issues presented in this case which have never been
directly passed upon by this Court or any other Court, except for
the decision of the 3rd Circuit herein.
: 5
reports, news articles and factual interpretations which
are not only wholly outside the record, but were not, ard
in part could not, have been considered by the Commission
as a basis for its action.
Particularly Petitioners’ briefs seek to excuse the Com-
inission in ignoring the comprehensive reeord as to need
of the X-20 service and seek to create the impression that
ameliorating air pollution is merely a make-weight argu-
ment to cover up an allegedly anti-social “industrial use”
of Con Edison’s purchased gas. : ;
We recognize that if the Court-accepts the interpreta-
tion of the Natural Gas Act as found by the Court of
Appeals, the claims of benefit or of detriment to the public
interest, are not reached for decision. On the other hand,
if this Court reaches the question of the arbitrary
character of the Commission’s action it must decide that
question upon the evidence of record. :
We believe that the basic issue of Connpission juris-
diction has to be considered in the light of the actual
program as contained in the record and the Commission’s
decision must be judged by the factors which it stated in
its two decisions had determined its action—not by some
new and different reasox‘ng now advancéd for the first
time in its behalf by counsel in the “Commission” brief
herein.
Transco's X-20 service had its gen*sis in a number of
circumstances: the conclusions of the Board of Air Pollu-
tion Control of New York City and Con L.dison that a
vear-round, firm supply of vatural gas would be the only
satisfactory means of substantially reducing. stack emis-
sians at the Company's Waterside station (R. 9a, 50a),
the inability of Transco (because of tariff restrictions) to
provide the needed firm supply (R. 154a-157a), and Con
-
6
Edison’s need for the 60-day peaking gas to meet the
peak needs of its customers during the winter heating.
season (R. 5a).
To obtain a firm supply of gas for its Waterside station,
Con Edison. with Transeo’s eooperation, contraeted for .
the purchase of 50,000 Mef of gas per day from producers
in Texas and Transeo agreed to expand its facilities,
hevorid those then planned, sufficiently to’ transport. this
volume of gas to New “York (R. Ta). To supply Con
Edison’s need fer peaking gas, Transeo additionally
‘ agreed to substitute its own gas for the. transportation
gas upon request for up to 60 days in the fear (R. 5a).
The purchase of gas-by Con “dison in Texas for its own
use admittedly is not subject to Commission jurisdiction.
The use by Con Edison of its gas in New York City simi-
larly is non-jurisdictional. The transportation of such gas
in interstate commerce by Transeo and: Transco’s sale of
the 60-day peaking gas to Con Edison for resale, however.
require Commission authorization. The Commission denied
Transco’s’ applicaticn for a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity because it, did not approve of Con
Edison’s proposed non-jurisdicticnal purchase and, inci-
dentally, its proposed non-jurisdictional use. The Com-
mission did nét find fault with the jurisdictional trans-
portation’ service as + such® or with the 60-day peaking
service.
On review, the » Court of Appeals for the Third ‘Cirenit
held that the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction
in attempting to regulate the purchase of the gas by its
; attempted exercise of a general allocation and conserva-
by With the exception of one minor rate question which did not
bear upon its ultimate decision (R. —
7
tion power it did not possess. The Court also disagreed
with the Commission’s characterization of the proposed
use to generate and distribute electricity and tiem, as
“inferior”.
The record with respect to the realization of the two
separate objectives of the X-20 service in transporting
Con Edison’s own purchased gas and providing the 60-
‘day service shows: :
Transportation of Con Edison’s gas to combat air pollution
The Commission has persistently refused to recog-
nize the -stack emissions at tle Waterside -plant as
anything morg than a minor annoyance. The-Commis-
sion’s brief herein now complains that there are no studies
as to “actual damage” caused by Waterside and that the
part the Waterside station plays is not related to the
City’s total air pollution groblem. What other studies ©
would be required to convince the Commission of. what is
already plain upon the face of the record we do not know.
~The record shows that the burning of coal at the Water-
side station results in the emission from its stacks’ of
27,000 Ibs. of fly ash and more than 42,000 Ibs. of sulphur
dioxide each day (R. 27a, 42a). The particulate emissions
are seen with the naked ‘eye. The sulphur dioxide is
offensive to the nostrils. The larger pieces of particulate
matter rain on the passerby and on occasion the plur e of
smoke envelopes adjoining buildings such as the United
Nations, causing discomfort to the skin and irritation of
the respiratory system of ervposed observers (R. 48a, 52a,
_116a). Bitter complaints aboui stack emissions have been
received for many years. As long ago as 1950, when the
_ United Nations building was being constructed just to the
north of the Waterside station, Trygve Lie, then Secretary
fs
General of the United Nations, complained to the Mayor’ >
of New. York City abput this “serious and potentially
dangerous condition” (R. 47a). The Mayor considered
the complaint to be serious enough for him to communi-
eate with President Truman about the matter (R. 159a-
163a). As recently as immediately prior to the hearing
in this proceeding Mayor Wagner of New York received
a petition from 1,855 tenants of the nearby Tudor City
-apartments complaining about the dust, fly ash and sul-
phurous odors (R. 47a).
If the foregoing direct evidence of the Waterside stack
emissions gained by observers through the senses of sight, ©
sriell and touch ig not enough, the record dischoses that
the Department of Air Pollution Control under the direc-
tion of its Commissioner, Leonard Greenburg, carcfully
measured for eight months the quantity of particulate
matter accumulating in the immediate vicinity of the
Waterside station, as contrasted with other areas. This
study showed that fly ash and carbon were accumulating
around the station at the monthly rate of 180 tons per
square mile as compared to an average for the whole city
of 70 to 75 tona (R. 115a-116a). The particulate matter
collected near the Waterside station during this study
vas photographed, examined microscopically and was
identified as. having. emerged f.om the Waterside stacks
(R. 115a-116a).
The Commission’s criticism in its brief of the uncontra-
dicted testimony of Dr. Greenburg, one of the leading
authorities in-the world on the subject of air pollution
is niggling Dr. Greenbu.g reviewed the problem of air
pollution in the metropolitan area in general and in the
vicinity of the Waterside plant in particular. He sub-
seribed to the conclusions of the Interstate Sanitation
-8
9
Commission ‘as to economic losses caused by air pollu-
tion in the New York-New Jersey area and the fact
that health,may be adversely affected thereby (R-40a-41a).
He concluded that the. presence of the fly ash and sulphur |
dioxide mitted froin the Waterside station was detri-
mental to health and that the only practical solution lay
in conversion to natural gas (R. 48a, 50a). He referred
‘to Publie Law 159 of the 84th Congress® which declared
it to be a national policy, obligatory on all agencies subject
to its will, to take steps to reduce air pollution (R. 39a).
He pleaded. with the Commission “not [to] overlook the
fact that the very air we. breathe is perhaps our most
precious natural resource [which] is not replaceable”
~(R. 58a).
The Commission’ apparently does not cuarrel with the
general premise that air pollution is ecor omically detri-
mental and may. undermine health. The Commission does
not dispute the faet of the vast volumes of contaminants
released into the air each day by the Waterside station. The.
nub of its contention appe.rs to be that Dr. Greenburg did
not demonstrate that a particula~ structure was corroded,
or that a particular respiratory disease was cansed directly
by the Waterside plant. Whether such facts would ever be
susceptible of conclusive proof we do not know. What is
perfectly lear, however, is that a substantial: reductian in
‘stack emissions at the Waterside station would also*sub-
stantially reduce the air pollution in the vicinity of the
station, which the record shows far exceeds the average
pollution level in the remainder of the City of New York
(R. 52a). This cleaning up of the “envelope of air [which]
we cannot afford to * *** (have! become polluted to any
* Aix Pollution Control Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 322, 42 U. S. C.
§§1857-1857¢.
s
ao
10,
great degree” (R. 53a) in one of the most densely popu-
lated areas in the world would be an important step,
even if not a totally complete means of preserving the
health and omfort of those now werkng and living in
midtown Manhattan.
Commissioner Greenburg’s conclusion that the use of
natural gas at boilers 71 and 72 of the Waterside station
provides the only “practical solution” of effectively reduc-
ing stack émissions (R. 50a) is borne out by Con Edison’s
long struggle with the problem. The Commission brief
suggests by implication that Con Edison could have solved
the problem in other ways (FPC Brief, pp. 7-8). This is
contrary to all the testimony and has no foundation in the
record. —
In 1950, exhaustive wind tunnel tests were conducted to
determine whether increase in stack height might be a
solution. The results of these tests indicated that an in’
crease in height was not justifiable, in any event the
Company was limited in the height to which its stacks could
be raised by regulations (R. 87a-88a).
Mechanical dust collectors and electric precipitators have
been installed in series at great expense. Approximately
$3,600,000 was spent at the Waterside plant.alone to con-
trol stack.emissions (R. 49a-50a). Because of the location
of the plant and ground space limitations, further exper.
ditures for additional dust collecting equipment at Water-
side are not feasible (R. 50a). Oil as a fuel in the most
troublesome boilers, numbers 71 and 72, has been con-
sidered and rejected because of inadequate storage facili-
ties and the hazards to operating personnel. Furthermore,
it would not reduce the quantities of sulphur dioxide
emitted (R. 74a).
ll
To cure the problem without changing from coal would .
require a $12,000,000 rebuilding job on the two boilers that .
contribute most heavily to stack emissions. Aside from the
exorbitant cost, each boiler would have to be removed from
service for two years in succession. This means that it
would be impossible for Con Edison to maintain adequate
electric and steam service to the public in the area for
approximately four years without thesé boilers (R. 15a-
16a).
Other Benefits of the X-20 Service
Transco’s proposed X-20 service would render benefits
not only to the many thousands of New Yorkers who would
no longer be subjected to the fly ash and sulphur dioxide
emitted from the stacks of Con Edison’s Waterside station,
but it would also provide positive economic benefits to
Con Edison’s more than 2,800,000 electric customers, 2,000
steam customers® and 1,360,000 gas customers:
The savings.to Con Edison’s electric and ‘steam cus-
tomers which could be expected from institution of the X-20
‘service were presented at the hearing. The evidence
showed that as compared with the cost of rebuilding the
offending boilers for use with coal, the cost of bringing
natural gas to ‘ie Waterside station would be abont
$9,650,000 less. The operating savings which would result
from the use of gas would total about $1,820,000 additional
annually (R:.143a, 144a). ®
The savings to Con Edison’s gas customers, although not
susceptible of exact computation, would be substantial.
During wp to 60 days in each year Transco agreed to
substitute for Con menue Texas gas, at Con Edison’s
* Most of these are office and apartment buildings furnishing heat |
to large numbers of tenants.
a
}
|
H
i
:
i
12
.
election, up to 50,000 Mef of natural gas from Transco’s.
own reserves. The natural gas supplied by Transco would,
not be used in the Waterside station, but would be resold
by Con Edison to its gas customers during the cold .
weather periods of the year, when the needs of such —
customers are at their peak. . : ae
In order td reduce the Waterside stack emissions on a
year round basis, Con Edison planned. to utilize, as an
operating routine, 25,000 of the 50,000 Mef in the two most
troublesame of the ten Waterside boilers at all’ times;
and up to 60 days it planned to call on Transco to replace
up to 25,000 Mef to meet the peak needs of its gas cus-
tomers. However, in the event of an emergency. the a
50,000 Mef of Transco’s replacement gas would be avai'-
able for distribution to Con Edison’s gas customers (R:
_ 10a). 7 aoe SLY
Con Edison’s gas customers would receive a valuable
-peaking service during the cold weather when the gas would
be most needed, at the same low cost as other gas pur-
chaséd by Con Edison from Transco gn a year round 100%
load factor basis. At present prices this would mean that
the cost of the X-20 peaking gas would be roughly half of -
what the same gas would cost if purchased under a
storage* or peaking tariff. This low cost for peaking
gas is the direct result of the fact that the facilities used
' to supply such gas will be fully utilized during the entire
year. Since the cost of such facilities is borne during.
most of the year by the transportation portion of tie
X-20 service, the cost to Con. Edison’s gas customers of
the peaking service is correspondingly reduced. _
* Storage fields suitable to serve the New York metropolitan area
are few in number and at a considerable distance so that the avail- -
ability of such storage is limited and the service provided is not
inexpensive.
13
The economic factors here are exactly the same as those’
which have induced the Commission to approve the sale
' of natural gas by pipelines for true industrial consumption .
or for utility boiler fuel on an interruptible basis as a
means of increasing the load factor “thereby making it
possible to provide gas service to domestic consumers who
would not otherwise be served, or to do so at lower unit
costs than would otherwise be eset (FPU brief, pp.
41-42).
In addition to. permitting gas to be samihan cheaply
to Con Edison’s customers in the winter time the X-20
service has the additional advantage, not enjoyed by most
industriql or boiler fuel routinely approved by the Com- ©
mission, of being supplied from reserves other than those
. of the pipeline. The reserves from which Con Edison
_arranged to purchase its gas were reserves which Transco
did not wish to purchase becanse of the escalating effect
upon its contractual price provisions with other producers.
Hearing Examiner’s Decision
The Hearing Examiner dets-mined that a ovsttfiethe of
public convenience and necessity authorizing constriction
and operation of the X-20 facilities shone he ‘issued to
Transco.
The Examiner eonciaded; as did the lower Court, that
there was no jurisdictional basis for inquiry by the Com-
mission into the proposed oft be made of the natural
gas purchased by Con Edison in Texas. The Examiner
pointed out that if Con Edison had been abr to use its
gas in Texar. the Commission would have hed no authority
to interfere with such use, and if Con Edison had arranged
for the transportation of the natural gas to New York by.
4
other means such as carriage in a ref rigerated state by
barge or tank car, the Commission would have had no
interest in or right to examine Con Edison’s purchase or
proposed use of such gas (R. 170a-171a).*.
* The Examiner could find \no objection to the transporta-
_ tion service, and in fact found that “there is no -evidence
‘ of any prospective adverse effect by \reason of this
proposed .transportation service on a
regulated ‘aétivities” (R. 171a)-
The Examiner dismissed as irrelevant! the contention |
’ that other distribution companies might follow Con
_ Edison’s example. He said that if there were anything
harmful to the public volved in’ * such activity it maf
function of Congress and not of the Commission to pro
vide for regulation or even eee of such activity
(R. 171a).: :
’ (The Examiner’s order, granted the. certificate of public
convenience and necessity for. these reasons.
“The Opinion of the Commission
The Commission, however, reversed the Examiner and
denied the ‘ertificate: The Commission found that the
“conventional requirements of public convenience and
necessity”** had been met (R. 178a, 215), but reversed :its
Examiner on the basis of what in essence were two
“policy considerations”.
First, it objected to the SOTO in the field. by a non-
pipeline company of natural gas for consumption by ‘the
* The Commission itself has decided it has no jurisdiction over the °
interstate transmission of natural gas for consumption by the direct
— where the pipeline is. provided by such purchaser. The
tana Power Company, 10 F.P.C. 950 (1951).
** Meaning those standards it had — ages in its prior
administration of the Act since 1938.
of Transco’s
the
.
———-- -
——-_,-
15
>
purchaser. A number of. purported reasons were advanced
in support of this objection by the Commission. Neither
the objection nor the supporting reasons had ever pre-
viously been stated by the Commission in any decision.
None of the reaséns was supported by any evidence of
record, nor, as we shdll show, were any of the Commis-
sion’s grounds based upon the Commission’s experience
in matters outside of the record of this proceeding. .
Second, the Commission did not approve of Con Edison’s »
proposed use of fatural gas for the generation of elec- —
tricity and steam for distribution at itg Waterside plant
‘for the pu of minimizing stack emissions. Appar-
ently ‘it had sog> ‘nebulous belief that the denial would
force this gas to be transported and sold to gas customers
somewhere in the nation, and if such use should eventuate
it was deemed to be “superior”. All of the evidence of
record relating to the proposed use. of Con Edison’s
natural gas, however, demonstrated that such use would
be beneficial to Con Edison’s gas, steam and electric
customers, as well as to those persons living and working
. in midtown Manhattan.
_ The Commission admitted, however, that the planned. |
_« end use was “but one factor and that not of —
importance” (R. 189a).
Commissioner Hussey dissented | on the ground that all
of the usual tests of Section 7 of the Act had been met,
that there was no evidence that the X-20 service would
deprive any customer of Transco of any needed service,
and sthat the majority opinion’ ignored precedent, went
beyond the record, and some of its conclusiéns were not
sustained by the evidence (R. ae
a
TAY
16
'. The Decision of the Lower Court
The Court of Appeals set aside the Order of the Com-
mission and returned the proceedings to the Commission
with orders to issue the certificate applied for subject to
further hearing on a minor rate question (R. 324).
The Court reviewed these basic objections, held that .
the Commission had gone beyond its Congressional .
authority in denying the certificate, and characterized
what the Commission had done as the assertion of “a
general allocation and conservation authority over the
natural gas fields of the United States” (". 312a). It
found that the Commission’s attempt to limit purchases ~
of natural gas in the field to pipeline companies alone’
“puts a consideration into the statute which the.Congress
did not envisage. See §1(b) of the Act” (R. 323a). The
conclusions of the Court were’ based upon a thorough
analysis of the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act,
pointing out particularly that the Commission had re-
peatedly asked Congress for the specific authority it was
here attempting to exert and Congress each time had
— the grant.
Summary of ‘Siainias
The Federal Power Commission has employed its 47
certificate power over the interggate transportation of
. natural gas to invade areas outside its jurisdiction and,
-» specifically, to bar Con Edison’ from purchasing natural
‘ gas from producers in the field, and to prevent Con Edison
from using its own gas in New York City. The Commis-
_ sion achieved-these results by refusing to permit Transco
°
to transport Con Edison’s gas from Texas to New York |
although it did not object to ara transportation service
itself.
oun SS a ae ee
e 17
The Commission premised its denial ofa certificate to °
Transeo on two grounds: Primarily, the Commission dis-
approved of Con Fdison, or any out-of-state purchaser
other than an interstate pipéline, buying natural gas
directly from producers in the field; and secondarily, -
the Commission “objected to Con -Edison’s plan for using
its gas at its Waterside electrie and steam generating
_ station to combat air pollution in the mid-Manhattan
area. Both the purchase in the field by Con Edison and
‘its use of its own gas.in New York are exempted from
Commission jurisdiction by §1(b) of the Act.
- The Commission’s brief avoids discussing what it’ has
actually done, although in its brief in another judicial
_ forum it has candidly stated that it denied the X-20
transportation certificate in order to “foil” Con Edison’s
purchase.of natural gas in, the field.* The Commis-
sion’s attempt to ‘frame the question before this Court
in terms of what it may “consider” in a, pipeline. cer-
tifieate case avoids the real issues. Whatever euphem-
isms are employed, the plain fact of the matter is that
the Commission intended to and did defeat Con Edison's
purchase of gas in the field and with similar deliberate
_ intent prevented Con Edison from using its natural gas
at its: Waterside station to combat air pollution.
The direct sale of natural gas to Con Edison for its own *
consumption is excluded from Commission régulation by
§1(b) of the Act. Congress delegated to the Commission
authority over only three things: (1) the transportation
of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in
_ interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas com-
panies engaged in such transportation or sale. Direct
* F.P.C. Brief in ’ Public Service Commission of the State of New,
York v. Federal Power Commission, D.C. ‘Cir. No. 15412. See
ae en Oe a
18
sales for consumptive use are specifically exeluded from
‘Commission jurisdiction by §1(b) of the Act, and this
_ Court has so held (Panhandle Eastern Pine Line Co. v.
' Public Service Company of Indiana, 332 U. 8S. 507. (1947)).
The Comission in its bricf/concedes that “Con Edison’s
purchase and industrial use * * * are not. in themselves
regulable by the Commission” (FPC brief, p. 20). It
. describes the purchase, sale and use of the gas by Con
Edison as being “wholly outside the rate-setting and other
powers of the Commission” (FPC brief, p. 21). . Th
Commission contends, in effect, however, that although it
could not order Con Edison to cease purchasing gas in
' Texas, it can reach the same result by.refusing to permit
Transco; a pipeline subject to its jurisdiction, to transport _
Con Edison’s gas to a location where it can be used hy its
owner. This flies in the face of established law, recognized |
both by this Court and the Commission itself, that the
Commission cannot accomplish by indirect means what it
lacks the power to do directly (FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Company, 320 U. S. 591 (1944);- Panhandle Eastern 7
Line Co. et al., 15 FPC 46 (1956)), F
The plain and unambiguous wording of the Natural Gas .
Act and its legislative history refuta any claim that it
was the intention of Congress when it enacted §7 to pro-
vide the Commission ‘with a weapon that could be used to
strike down, as it has in this. ease, matters. expressly ex- -
empted from its jurisdiction. This Court has specifically
held that §1(b) of the Act delineates the Commission’s
jurisdiction and the limitations there prescribed cannot be
extended by the Commission through the exercise of its
‘powers under §7 of the Act in violation of such limitations.
In short, §7 certification may not be employed as a means
_of .regulating in areas specifically exempted by §1(b).
.of the Act (Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle
> Latins csdee ReMi ge SI TS!
—— wore enene “gS ae!
atest OR Oe me! hee *
ee,
ne ee
19
Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949)). In that case
his Court noted that any extension of the Commission's
powers must be provided by Congress. In fact, on a
“number of occasions since that time the Commission has
unsuccessfully asked Congress for the powers it now seeks
to exercise. - a
Not only did the Commission err in attempting to pre-
vent Con Edison from purchasing natural gas in the field,
but in addition, the policy it ho o effectuate, i.e., the
exclusion of all interstat other than pipelines
from the producing fields, runs counter ‘to the policy of
the antitrust statutes. There is no foundation, either in
the Act or its legislative history, to support the position
that Congress intended to grant pipelines a monopoly
in the interstate natural gas market. To the contrary,
all expressions of Congressional intent have favored com- ~
petition among purchasers and one of the eoncerns of the
framers of the: Natural Gas Act was the allegedly monop-
olistie position of the interstate pipelines. ;
°
The Congressional . limitation on the Commission’s
authority applies with equal foree to Con Edison’s use
of its Texas-purchased natural gas to relieve air pollu-
tion in mid-Manhattan. The Commission’s attack upon
Con Edison’s non-jurisdictional use of its gas was premised
upon the conclusion that such use was “inferior”, a con-
clusion with which the lower Court did not agree and
' which is contrary to the policy expressed in the Air Pollu- -
tion Control Act of 1955°. The Commission made it clear,
however; in accordance with its own previously expressed
views, that it did not consider this ground of its decision
to be “determinative”.
° ben: 322, 42 U. S. C. §§1857-1857(g).
20 .
; The Natural Gas Act does not give the Commission the.
power to interfere with the lawful use by Con Edison of
its natural gas. Congress has nowhere, either in the
Natural Gas Act or in any other statute; enacted a
national fuels policy. The Natural Gas Act itself does not
favor one locality, use, or user over another. The only
“conservation powers” granted the Commission in the Act
are those ministerial duties in aid.of State action set forth
in $11.
The legislative history of the Natural Gas Act Sines oat
the conclusion that Congress did not delegate to the Com-
mission any conservation power, including control of end
use. The Commission in reports published subsequent to
the 1938 Act and the 1942 amendments thereto recognized
this fact. During the past 10 years the Commission has
repeatedly and with uniform lack of success asked Con-
gress to grant it the very powers it has tried to exercise ~
over Con Edison’s use of its gag. In view of the language
of the Act, its legislative history and the record of Con-
gressional denials of Commission requests, itis clear that
. Con Edison cannot be deprived by the Commission of
its right to use the natural gas it lawfully purchased in
Texas as a substitute for coal in the operation of its
Waterside plant. .
The Commission’s order in this proceeding is arbitrary ©
and unlawful. It is purportedly based upon “policy con-
siderations” that are unsupported by any substantial evi-
dence 6f record. Not only is there nothing in the record
to support the Commission’s policy conclusions, but they
are clearly erroneous in that they are contrary to experi-
ence, reason and the policies of Congress.
Pe ee
7 iu » =
——eVe dm“ ee t—i‘( (‘iar —
21
All of the .evidence presented at the hearing was in
support of the proposed X-20 service. It was shown that
__ the transportation of Texas gas would not only relieve |
the air pollution problem in midtown Manhattan, but also
that it would result in savings to Con Edison’s electric
and steam customers. The value_of the 60-day peaking
service to Con Edison’s gas customers in terms of economy
and reliability of service was also demonstrated. No
evidence was adduced in opposition to the X-20 proposal.
The Commission, however, has virtually ignored the record
and improperly attempted to Substitute “expertise” for
' evidence.
An attempt has been made in the Commission’s brief to
shore up the groundless conclusions adopted by the Com-
mission, but there are simply no facts to support the
Commission’s basic conclusion that certification of the
' X-20 service would open up a vast new acre inter-
state market for boiler fuel.
The Commission pointed in its brief to oaly two
instances in its entire history, other than this case, in
which a consumer purchased natural gas in the producing
fields for its own use, arranged for its interstate trans-
portation to the point of consumption and submitted the
proposed service to the Commission for its approval. One
of these projects was abandoned as uneconomic; the other
was certificated by the Commission. —
The striking absence of proposals of this typg in the »
Commission’s files points up the fact that the decision —
‘ as to what fuel to use for industrial purses is dictated
by unyielding economic considerations. Absent. special
cireumstances, like Con Edison’s air pollution problem
and its need for peaking gas, the purchase of natural gas
es *
22
in the field at the present high price levels, plus the cost of
long-distance transportation, render such an arrangement
unattractive to the ordinary industrial -user who can
obtain fuel, coal, oil or pipeline gas at a cost less than ss
that involved-in-an X-20 type service.
The Commission has failed ir its orders and in its .
brief to demonstrate by any facts, within or without the
record, that its speculation and conjecture have a rational
basis. Without support for its conclusions, its orders must _
fall as erultvary and unlawful.
The judgment of the lower Court, directing that this
case be returned to the Commission “with directions to
issue the certificate applied for”, should be affirmed, The
_ Commission-made it clear-in its original order that it had
no objection to the proposed X-20 service*. except for t
policy considerations which did not relate to the t
portation service. Specifically, the- Commission uid
that all of the established reyuirements of public con-
venience and necessity had been met (R. 178a, 215). Since
the lower Court found that the Commission could not
properly rely upon any of the “policy considerations” as
the basis for its decision, and since all the established
requirements for a certificate had: been met, there was no
need for further hearing or exercise of the Commission’s
certificate powers except for the issuance of the certificate °
_ -apptied for as directed by the Court.
* Aside from a minor rate questién.
~~
ARGUMENT
.
_ .Intreduction
; The Commission premised its denial of Transco’s appli-
x cation to render the X-20 service, primarily on “policy
' consideratidns”. .None of the, “policy considerations” relate -
to the merits or demerits of the combined transportation
and peaking service which Transco proposed to render, but
amount Wo an attempt to control’ a transaction which
) - Congress in §1(b) had clearly ngee from the Com- —
¢ mission’s jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals dealt with each “policy consider-
ation” separately, showing that most are based upon the
exercise of a non-existent national fuels policy, which
would permit the Commission to decide who may buy gas
from the producers, i.e., an allocation of natural resources
of the states, and how suis gas may be used by its owner,
_ the enforcement of a doctrine of relative superiority
and inferiority of end-uses. In our view, the Commis-
sion’s decision, when reduced to its simplest terms, con-
‘sists of a dual invasion by the Commission, through the
. “device of denying the pipeline certificate, of two greas
; clearly. outside its jurisdicti ion: the non-jurisdictional pur-
+ chase of natural gas in tHe producing fields, and the non-:
jurisdictional use of such/ gas by its owner. -
The first, and what the Commission in’ its opinion
indicated was the determinative ground for decision, was
". the ‘Commission’s general policy conclusion that no out-of- _
state public utility except a natural gas pipeline purchaser
should be permitted to buy natural gas from producers
in the field. Although the Commission had no jurisdiction .
in this instance over either the purchaser, Con Edison,
= the sales transaction between Con Edison and the
CT SEA a
24
producers, it was able by the indirect means of deny-
» ing the use of an interstate pipeline to thé purchaser to
prevent the purchase and, to use its own words, “to foil
that transaction”*. This was no mere enlargement of the
generality of the phrase of public convenience and neces-
sity in §7(e) as the Commission’s current brief now claims. ©
It was a deliberate invasion of the area of regulation
exempted by ‘§1(b) because the Commission believed the
creation of a‘monopoly over gas purchases in the hands
of interstate: pipelines was desirable, putting “a
consideration into the statute which the Congress. did
not envisage”.** - | ae
_ The Court of Appeals, having held the Commission to
_ have violated the clear limits of its jurisdiction, properly,
and contrary to Point V (pp. 82-86) of the Commission’s
brief, remanded the matter to the Commission with direc:
tions to certificate. Since only Congress could legislate
the power attempted to be usurped, there was nothing
further for the Commission to act. upon.
The secondary objection raised-by the Commission, to
the X-20 service, namely, the nature of the intended use
of Con Edison’s gas in New York, (also a matter not
subject to Commission jurisdiction) has repeatedly been
* In the Commission’s brief filed in the Court of Appeals for the
District of‘ Columbia Circuit in July of this year in Public Service
Commission of the State.of New York v. Federal Power Commis-
sion, appeal docketed, No. 15412 (D. C. Cir.), the Federal Power
oa sion characterized its own action in this proceeding as
Ws : : ;
“One such purchaser, Consolidated Edison Company of New
‘York, Inc., is an out-of-state electric utility which directly pur- ~
chased gas for boiler fuel. The Commission's attempt to foil
that transaction by denying a transportation certificate was set
aside by the Third Circuit. The Supreme Court has granted
petitions for certiorari” (FPC brief, page 11, footnote 23).
(Emphasis supplied.) ©
** See opinion of Court of Appéals (R. 323).
+ ht payers =”
I
a ae ee * *
——
OO...
designated by the Commission as a non-determinative
-factor in its decision, i.e., one which taken alone would
not support denial of a certificate.°
The,Commission in its current brief before this Court }
has steadily avoided discussing what it has “done” and has
/ not used the plain words that it has used elsewhere to
describe its attempt to “foil” the purchase. Instead ‘its ,
brief now tries to escape from its acts by discoursing
broadly along lines of what the Commission might “con-
sider”. Whatever euphemisms are employed, however, the”
. plain faet of the matter is that the Commission intended to.
and did defeat Con Edison’s purchase of natural gas in the
‘field and.with similar deliberate intent prevented Con
Edison from utilizing its natural gas in Manhattan to com-
bat air pollution.** It is the propriety or impropriety of
these “acts” which this Court must determine.
*The Commission in its brief states at page 43: “Actually, the
Commission did not consider the end-use issue as — Ss its
’ decision in this case; in its order denying rehearing (21 F. P. C.
399, 401) it said (supra, p.9):..
“Contrary to applicants’ contentions, andcan wh eeiee
posed end use of the gas involved in this case as of decisive
importance. In accordance with the National Coal Ass'n case,
it's is but one factor, and that not of determinative importance,
fee we consider in the exercise of our judgment on all the |
$
9). Texas Gas Transmission C orporation, 22. FE. P.C. 378
(1959)
26
S.«
The Commission exceeded its authority wader the °
Natural Gas Act when it prohibited, in violation of
Section 1{b) of thesAct, the non-jurisdictional sale
the :
by producers in the field to Con Edison through
state pipeline company. ©
The Commission’s decision to “foil” Con Edison’s ~
non-jurisdictional purchase, to bar all utilities and other
out-of-state purchasers from the producing fields, and to
grant a monopoly in the interstate market for natural
gas.to pipelines is in direct violation of §1(b) of the Act®
and seems to fly in the face of Federal anti-trust statutes.
The Court below stated in this regard, “This puts a
consideration into the statute which the Congress did not
envisage. See §1(b) of the Act.” (R. 323(a))
This Court has been explicit in defining those areas over .
which the Federal Power Commission has been and has not
been granted regulatory power. under the Natural Gas Act.
In Panhandle Eastern -Pipe Line Co. v. Publie Service
Commission. of Indiana, 332 U. S. 507 (1947), this Court
*“(b) The of this act shall apply to the traneper-
sie re Ae we O08 a) m Oe mere.
state commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public
consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other
use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transporta-
tion or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or -
sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or
to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production
or gathering of natural gas. i (1938) ; 15 U. S.C.
§717 yr. or supplied.
eee
or
ad
ET TE LE IO CLT EIT Ee Ay ee
° *.
2
ate : e
reviewed the histoty of the Natural Gas‘ Act and the scope
of the Commission's jurisdiction, stating:
* «Tiree things and three only Congress drew within
its own regulatory pewer, delegated:by the Act to
its agent, the Federal Power Commission. These -
were: (1) the transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce
for resale; and (3) natural,gas companies engaged
in such’transportation or sale.” (p. 516)
Plainly, none of these “three things” include direct sales
for consumption. In view of the argument in Commis-
sion’s brief that the 1942 Amendment enlarged the Commis- .
sion’s jurisdiction over such sales, it is noteworthy that
the Court’s. decision was hapded down in 1947, after such «
amendment. This Court stated: |
“The omission of any reference to other sales, that
is, to direct sales for consumptive use, in thé affirm-
ative declaration of coverage was not inadvertent.
‘It was deliberate. . For Congress ‘made sure ‘its in-
tent could not be mistaken by adding the explicit
prohibition that the Act ‘shall not apply to any
other * * * sale * * *’ (Emphasis added.) Those
words plainly mean that .the Act shall not apply
to any sales other than. sales ‘for resalesfor ultimate
, public consumption for domestic, commercial, indus-
trial, or any other. é.’ Direct sales for consump-
tive use of whatéver sort were excluded.” (pp.
516-517) - . ® :
* That the Commission in the instant case had its sights trained on
a sale which this Court has declared to be outside the ambit of its
authority is underlined by the statement . “ Commissioner Kline made
subsequent to the time that he cast nis vote against the proposed —
X-20 service. Commissioner Kline said that in the X-20 case the
Commission had denied an application “to permit the sale of natural
gas for boiler fuel.” Midwestern Gas Transmission Company, 2]
F.P.C. 653, 670 (1959). (diss¢nting opinion, emphasis supplied. y
See also Trunkline Gas Company, 21 F.P.C. 704, 725 (1959).
%
¢. “ "gg
' The distinction between those transactions within -the
jurisdiction of the Commission, i.e., sales for resale and
transportation, and those matters reserved to the states,
- i.e, direct, sales for consumptive uses, was recognized by
this Court.
“The hn of the statute was thus clear and com-
plete. It cut sharply and cleanly between sales for
resale and direct sales for consumptive uses. No
exceptions were made in either category for parti-
cular uses, quantities or otherwise. And the line
drawn was that one at which the decisions had
arrived in distributing regulatory power before the ,
Act 1 was passed.” (p. 517).
On these matters there is no ambiguity in thg,Act; the
power to determine whether a direct sale for consumption
is in the public interest has not been delegated to the Com-
mission, and ‘the Commission’s usurpation of the author-
ity of the states, by the means of expanding a jurisdic- —
tional transaction, which in itself is unobjectionable to’ the
Commission, to regulate indirectly ‘a non-jurisdictional
- transaction, is in violation of the Act.
- While conceding that “Con Edison’s purchase and indus-
trial use of the Texas gas are not in themselves regulable
by the Commission”,* the Commission’s brief now contends
that it can prohibit the transaction that it cannot regulate,
that it can do the greater but not the lesser.
In essence, what the Commission, despite protestations
to the contrary, did here was to treat the proceeding before
. it as though the non-jurisdictional sale by the producers
to Con Edison were on trial rather than the proposed
transportation and peaking service. In efféct, it found
-* FPC brief, page 20.
Wend
29
that this sale was not required by the public convenience |
and necessity and seized upon a subsequent jurisdictional
function—its-contro! over pipeline expansion—to deny a
certificate for the concededly unobjectionable transporta-
tion service proposed by Transco. The Commission’s
position that it can thus indirectly regulate a producer’s
sale for consumption, which is ontside its jurisdiction, —
makes a mockery of the carefully delineated bounds upon
. Commission jurisdiction set ferth in §1(b) and explained
“in this Court’s decision in the Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line case, supra. . .
In the absence of any supporting authority bearing
directly upon the problem, the Commission in its brief
has been forced to ignore §1(b) and fall back on the argu-
ment that the broad phrase “present or future public con-
‘venience and necessity” contained in’ §7 of the Act em- ©
powers the Commission to “consider” and thereby to
regulate a wide range of actions including those expressly
excluded from its jurisdiction. .
It is not an answer to attempt to stretch and alter the!
words of §7,° which have been given a uniform meaning
-* Section 7(c), 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U. S. C. 717f(c):
“(c) No natural-gas company or.person which will be a
natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construc-
tion or extension shall en in the transportation or sale of
natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or
undertake the construction or extension df any facilities therefor,
or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof,
unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas. company
a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the
Commission authorizing such acts or operations. * * *
In all other cases the Commission shall ‘set the matter for
hearing and shall give such: reasonable ~etice of the hearing
thereon to all interested persons as in its judgment may be
necessary under rules.and regulations to be prescribed by the
Commission ; and the application shall be decided in accordance
through more than twenty years of regulation, to permit
regulation of a transaction expressly exempted by Con-
gress in §1(b). No interpretation of general phrases in ~
one section of an Act can ever justify the violation of ex-
press prohibitions in another section—particularly the very
one that outlines one defines the Commission’s scope of
jurisdiction.
Finding no support for its pallial in the Act or in any
decided case, the- Commission’s ‘brief seeks refuge in the
legislative history of the Act, but ef all the thousands of.
words that have been recorded in Committee hearings and
repgrts and in the Congressional Record about the powers
of the Commission and the. purposes of the Act, not one
‘ quotation is found for the principle that the Commission
- ean deliberately strike ‘down an exempt sale by use of its
certificate powers over transportatidn, or that Congress
intended to grant the interstate pipelines a monopoly in
‘purchasing natural gas to be used outside the producing
state. ;
’ with the procedure proviled in subsection (e) of this section
. and such certificate shall be issued or denied accordingly: * ** —
Section 7(e), 56 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U. S. C. 717£(e):
“(e) Except in the cases governed by the provisos contained in
subsection (c) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any
qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of
the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisi-
tion covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant
is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the
service proposed and to conform to the provisions of the Act.
and the requiremests, rules, and regulations of the Commission
thereunder, and that the proposed service, sale, operation, con-
struction, extension, or acquisition, to the extent authorized by
the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future -
public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application
shall be denied. The Commission shall have the power to attach
to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights
gtanted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the
publie convenience and necessity may require.”
a es oy metas
ee
31 >
The Cominission’s present brief urges ‘it has the power
to “consider” a broad spectrum of factors. including
matters outside its jurisdiction. We do not contend that
the Commission may not consider matters outside its juris-
diction so long as those matters are relevant to, and
its subsequent action is within, the specific regulatory
daties assigned by the Congress to. the Commission under
the Natural Gas Act. .
In certificating a pipeline expansion, the Commission
properly receives evidence from the distributing company
as to the adequacy of the market to sustain the investment
. in the pipeline. To “consider” such a factor is, of course,
proper. To deny the certificate, however, on the ground ©
' that the rates of one of the distributing companies under
-the jurisdiction of local regulatory bodies are excesgive,
would be clearly improper. Such action, however, is com-
parable to the Commission’s denial of the certificate to
Transco herein.
Similarly, the Commission “considers” plans for financ-
ing pipeline extensions, though it has no jurisdiction over
the issuance of securities by the pipeline, or over the
lenders, and the Commission requires proof of adequate
gas reserves although this Court has held that such
reserves may subsequently be disposed of by the pipeline
company owning them, and that the Commiesion § is power-
less to prevent it:*
The distributing companies and the state commissions
have long urged the Commission to condition certificates
for producer sales. This Court accepted the distributing
* Federal Power oidiithitien v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
- 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
companies’ position, having held in the CATCO case*
that the Commission has the right to condition ‘a certifi-
cate for a jurisdictional sale for resale by a producer
with respect to initial rate until, after adequate review,
the propriety of the rate can be determined. The
“consideration” of a price which was within its full
jurisdiction was, of course, proper, and one of the specific
_ purposes stated by Congress to be achieved by the 1942
Amendments. It seemed unbelievable, however, that the
Commission would argue that it has the power to deny
a certificate-for a producer’s sale because the producer in
* question also supplies vast quantities of non-jurisdictional
gas to be used as boiler fuel by electric companies within
the producing state.
In the. X-20 proceeding, however, the Commission did
not merely consider matters foreign to its jurisdiction as
an incident to its lawful ambit of regulation. It denied
the transportation certificate for no reason having to do
with transportation, but solely in an attempt to regulate
or “to foil” the producer’s lawfully exempt onle to Con
Edison. |
The sweep of the Commission’s decision is a flat pro-
hibition against Con Edison and all other ‘companies
similarly situated, making a direct purchase and having
their gas transported in interstate commerce under any
circumstances. The result is that Con Edison and all
others, except the pipe lines, have been permanently
barred from making direct purchases of gas in another
state ugh the medium of prohibiting interstate pipe-
. lines increasing their capacity to transport such gas
for the account of its owner. The only alternative left to
* Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 360 U. S S. 378 (1959). .
r
—— Ooo
ee ee
C~-
33
such a purchaser, which would generally be impractical
or impossible, would be to build its own private pipeline,
_or as the Examiner here suggested, to condense the vol-
ume of the gas and transport it in tanks.° The Commis-
sion’s actién would leave the field of purchase free to
interstate pipelines—an anomalous result that would
undoubtedly shock the framers of the Act, whose greatest
concern wag the unregulated and allegedly monopolistic.
activities of these same pipelines. See Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.; 320 U. S. 591, 610 -
(1944).°° . ‘ a
_ Paradoxically, the Commission, in attempting to demon-
strate the broad range of matters that it may “consider”,
cites Cityof Pittsburgh v. Federal Power Commission, 237
F. 2d 741, 754 (D. C. Cir. 1956), for the proposition that
the Commission, in denying a certificate, could not “ignore
the ‘national policy’ against monopoly expressed in the
antitrust laws * * °”***. Yet in X-20 the Commission’s
“consideration” of the suppdsed consequence o/™Con
Edison’s direct purchase led it to enforce a monopoly con-
trary to the policy of the anti-trust laws to foster com-
petition.°*** hs
°1f, , Con Edison had built its own pipeline from Texas
to New York \to transport its gas for its own consumption it would,
according to ission precedent, have been free of Commission
jurisdiction and not ired to obtain a certificate, The Montana
Power Co., 10 F.P.C. 950 (1951).
** See also Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power
en 169 F. 2d 881 (D. C. Cir. 1942), where the Court
noted :
“® * * nothing in the Natural Gas Act suggests that Cougress
_. thought monopoly better than competition * * *” (p. 884).
*** R. 186a-187a. *
% offs Att'y. Gen. Nat'l. Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1 (1955) (“The
Seneral objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in
open markets”).
/
ee
vf 34
‘
A correct determination, and the only one consonant with
the national policy of the antitrust laws to foster com-
petition (assuming the Commission may ignore the express
exemptions of $1(b)), would be to permit Con Edison to
compete. Excluding Con Edison- from thé market is a
restraint of trade, which if practiced by the pipelines or .
‘the producers or both would clearly be an illegal trade
—— proscribed by the She ‘rman. Act.*® Kor's, Tne.
* Broadway-Hale Stores,’ Inc., 359 U: S. 207 (1959);
; Eastern States Retail iiaher Deaters’ Association v.
. United - States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914) ;- Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945)... —
Sight: must not be lost of the peculiar structure of the
natural gas industry. At one end of the long lines are the
predacers who,- subject to state conservation laws, own.
the gas in place. At‘the other end are the state-regulated
distribution utilities who have the dual object: of obtaining
sufficient gas for their customers’ needs at the most reason-
able consistent price. These are the real parties in interest.
In between are the pipelines, the middlemen who bring the
producers’ gas to the distribution companies. To date
their costs of purchased gas have been passed on to the
distributors without serious question. The Commission’
has now decreed the universal policy that pipelines are
to have a complete monopoly in negotiating with the
producers -for gas for out-of-state consumption. | Under
these circumstances, it is net unreasonable to fear that the
sheltered position of the pipelines which permits them. to
pass on their gas purchase edsts could lead to the very
eXCESSHES that anti-trust statutes attempt to thwart 7 the
effectiveness of competition.
. © 26 Stat. 209 pia. seen ISU.S.C. §§1-7, 15 (1952)
(Supp. IV, 1957):
ra.
te
*
Such policy however, is beyond the ambit of the Com-
mission and one which Congress would have to_pass=
upon——if, in fact, the ae policy does. not violate
|____ existing anti-trust statutes
The Commission relies upon this Court's decision in
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. vy. Federal Power’ Com-
‘mission, 324 U.-S. 581 (1945), as authority for its prohibi-
tion of Con Edison’s non-jurisdictional purchase of natural
gas in Texas. This points up the Commission’s apparent
misconception of the differenee between, on one hand, the
Commission's authority to consider a non-jarisdictional
fact for a lawful purpose and, on the other hand, the
absence of that authority to consider and act upon a non-
jurisdictional fact for the purpose of controlling a tragy-
action over which it has not been granted jarisdie(on
In that case the Commission had considered, for
the purpose of fixing rates, the cost of facilities outside
its jurisdiction. The Court approved the Commission’s
action. The case did not involve, however, an attempt by
the Commission’ to discourage, prohibit or regulate the -
Company’s non-jurisdictional activities: by the manner im
which it fixed rates. Such attempt would, obviously, havé
been unlawful. © >
SMr. Justice Jackson in his concurring Opinion noted that
lie ‘would have held the Commission had exceeded its
jurisdiction if. the Commission. had imposed regulation
upon the non-jurisdictional portions of the subject
Company’s business but, as he points out, “the orders in
question have no immediate ‘impact’ upon production or
gathering of gas” (324 U. S. 581, 609). Mr. Justice
Jackson correctly recognized that in many instances lawful
regulation will have a necessary and indirect effect upon
some matter outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. How-
. 36
ever, that is not the case here. No defect was found by
the Commission in Transco’s proposed X-20 service. Con
Edison’s pufcliase of gas in Texas was not the indirect
casualty of a legitimate exercise of the ‘Commission's |
powers. Instead it was the intended casualty of an illegal)
exercise by the Cotmunission of its certificate authority. *~
Similarly, the CA7TCO case* provides no support for the‘
Cormission’s contentions. The certificate power of the
Commission was not enlarged by that decision to permit
control of non-jurisdictional matters. The Commission
was merely told by the Court that when certificating a sale
. for resale by a producer subject to its jurisdiction, that it
should take into account the level of the rate, also subject
to its jurisdiction, at which the sale was to be made.°*
The statement of the Court that “Section 7(e) requires
the Commission to evaluate -all factors bearing on the
public interest” referred in that case to jurisdictional. rates
and does not, by implication or otherwise, mean that the
Commission should “consider” and thereupon strike déwn
transactions expressly excluded from the Commission’ 7
jurisdiction by the Natural Gas Act.
_. The impropriety of the. Commission attempting to ac
complish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly has
been recognized by the courts and by the Commission
itself***. In Parhandle Eastern Pipe Line Cg., et. al,, 15
FPC 46 (1954), when faced with the probleniioe whether
* Footnote on p. 32, supra.
** This requirement is consistent with our position and with the
ee ede cee ane Act. By these
was given “an Opportunity to scruti-
j of the rate structure in connection with
the proposed or extension at a time when such vital
matters can readily modified asthe pubic interest may y demand.”
H. R. Rep. No.’ 1290, 27th Cong., Ist 2-3 (1941). ~
*** Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company,
supra; Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,
185 F. 24 357 (3rd Cir. 1950).
+
37
to condition the issuance of a certificate tqa pipeline upan
_ the requirement of an increase in service, which would in
turn require-the pipeline te enlarge its facilities, the Com- —
mission stated: — |
“To impose such a requirement would put us in the
position of doing indirectly what we are forbidden
to do-directly. Familiar rules of law and our own
regard for a proper observance of the limitations
which Congress and the courts have placed upon
our authority both restrain. us from pursuing such
a course” (p. 57).— ‘
Translated into terms of statutory interpretation, the .
- question of whether the Commission has power deliber-
ately to prevent a Congressionally exempted purchase is
the question of whether §7 of the Act negates the express
limitati on the Commission’s jurisdiction imposed by
<1(b). This Court held it does not in Federal Power
Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
337 U. S. 498 (1949}, where the Commission, relying upon
the broad language of §7 as well as upon other sections
of the Act, had tried to prevent the transfer. of substantial
gas reserves by.Panhandle. The reserves had previously
been included in applications for certificates made by
~ Panhandle and the Commission had granted the certifi-
cates in reliance upon-their existence. This Court stated :
“Nothing in the sections .[4, 5 and 7] indicates
that the power given to the Commission over
natural-gas cempanies by §1(b) could have been —
intended to swallow all the exceptions of the same
. section and thus extend the power of the Commis-
sion to the constitutional limit of congressional
authority over commerce. * * * The power to do
the things appropriate to carry out the provisions -
of the Act can hardly be taken to rescind a pro-
hibition against certain actions.”. (p. 508)
38
- This Court further stated at page 509: .
’ “To accept these arguments springing from power
to allow interstate service, fix rates, and contro] .
“abandonment would establish wide control by the
Federal Power -Commission over the production
and gathering of gas. It would. invite expansion
of power into other phases of the forbidden area.
It would be an assumption of powers specifically
denied the Commission by the words of the Act as
explained in the report and on the floor of bo
Houses of Congress.”
‘This Court exhibited considerable prescience when it |
asked in a footnote: ; oe |
‘ “Would it soon be contended that statutory
power to require extension of service, §7(a),
- included power to require exploration or acquisition
of leases or allocation of .production to interstate
pipe lines in order to serve the public interest?”
(p. 509, emphasis supplied.) ;
This Court concluded that opinion by calling to the
attention of the Commission that its remedy lay with the. -
Congress rather than the courts.
The Commission is well aware of the limited powers
it has been granted ynder the Natural Gas Act and it
knows that as a creature of Congress it may .only obtain
additional powers through action of Congress. Perhaps
the most strikingly vulnerable feature of the Commission’s
position is, in the final analysis, the fact that the Commis-
‘sion has asked Congress again and again for amendatory
legislation that would give it autliority over sales for
‘consumption by the purchaser and over certain conser-
“4
et el pa
a ae
EPO WA RD Mule bet Pmt mo
‘
39
vation matters.” Each time Congress has refused to.
grant the authority requested.
The Commission cannot now fairly claim after its -
repeated requests to Congress and after its repeated
failures to obtain such enlarged. jurisdiction from Con-
- gress, that Congress intended to grant it such powers
in the 1938 Act or the 1942 amendments. ' And regardless
of how the’ Commission may chafe ‘at the restraints of
the Natural Gas Act, it cannot by administrative action,
‘or by broadening its interpretation of $7, negate the limit-
ing words of §1(b) of the Act.
Ir |
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the Com-
mission had exceeded its authority in denying a cer-
tificate upon the secondary or “non-determinative”
ground that it had authority over and disapproved of
Con Edison’s non-jurisdictional use of its natural gas.
~The Commission stated that one of the factors militating
against issuance of a certificate to Transco, although not
the determinative fa¢tor, was Con Edison’s proposed utili-
zatién of-the naturak:gas purchased in Texas for the gen-
‘ eration and distribution of electric power and steam, with
the consequent reduction of air pollution at Con Edison’s
Waterside station. ,. \
*FPC 31 Ann. Rep. 145; (1951)
FPC 32 Ann. Rep. 152; °(1952)
‘FPC 33 Ann. Rep. 154; (1953)
FPC 34 Ann. Rep. 170; (1954)
FPC 35 Ann. Rep. 182;. (1955)
. FPC 36 Ann. Rep. 18; (1956)
FPC 37 Ann. Rep. 24: (1957)
FPC 38 Ann. Rep. 16; (1958)
FPC 39 Ann. Rep. 19; (1959).
40
° @
The lower Court, after a precise and painstaking exain-
ination of the legislative history of the Natyral Gas Act
and all of the Commission and Court decisibns touching ~
_ upon the question, concluded that Congress had not vested_.
the Commission with the authority to pass upon and in-
directly prohibit Con Edison’s proposed use of its gas and ©
that the Commission was in fact attempting to exert a
conservation power which Congress had refused to grant
to it.
This secondary legal issue before this Comet with respect
‘to the Commission’s authority over Con Edison’s use’of its
natural gas in New York City is a relatively narrow one:
does the Commission have the power to deny a certificate
for the interstate transportation of natural gas on the
- ground that the ultimate non-jurisdictional use of such gas
does not meet with the Commission’s approval even though ~
the gas in question became the property of the owner
prior to its transportation in interstate commerce and
was not purchased from the pipelines subject to Com-
mission jurisdiction? This question has properly been |
labeled as the “end. use” issue. A broader characteriza-
tion of the question, however, has been applied both in - |
the briefs and in the opinion of the lower Court, where
the matter at issue has been referred to at times as the
question of the Commission’s “conservation” power. The
Commission apparently assumed that the prohibition. of
& particular end use thereby conserves natural gas for |
utilization in some other manner; by some other entity,
| ao in some other place, which in the Commission’s
lief might be “superior” in person, place, or use. In
any event, for purposes of this proceeding, the distinc-
tion between end use and conservation is not significant -
because the Commission was not granted any conserva-
Rannngrantenwres mere
1 ag nme Yo .
wees »” eeu ea oe
41
tion power by Congress, either in the broad-sense or in
the narrow sense of control of end use.®* ae
As a matter of statutory construction it is not neces-
sary for this Court to go beyond the explicit and unam-
biguous terms of the. Act itself. Subsections (b) and (c)
of Section 1 of the Act exempt from the: Commission’s
. jurisdiction Con Edison’s direct purchase of gas in Texas
.and its consumption of. such gas within the boundaries of
the State of New York where Con Edison is subject to the
regulatory jurisdiction of the New York Public Service
Commission. Nothing in §7 of the Act, under which the
Commission denied Transco’: X-20 application herein,
directly or by implication overrides the plain language of
§1(b). Nothing .in §7 or etsewhere in’ the Act vests the
Commission with the power to consider and directly or .
indirectly prohibit the ultimate utilization of natural gas °
by its owner. There is no statement in the statute which
suggests that Congress intended to enact a national fuels ©
policy or any indication that one locality, use or user of
natural gas is to be preferred to another.
‘Congress, in $11 of the Act, specifically left conserva-
tion matters to the states and limited the powers’ and |
duties of the Commission i in that regard to the assembling
of current information concerning state-compacts and the
reporting of such information to Congress. 411 is the
only place in the Act where the word “conservation”
appears. In the light of the tinequivocal langnage of the
Act, we submit that this Court should determine, without. .
the necessity of farther investigation, that, as the Court
* For purposes of simplification, we will in most instances in this
section of the brief simply refer to the broad term “conservation”,
Since, if the ‘Commission does not have’ any conservation power, it
quite obviously would not have any control over end use.
Y
42 .
of Appeals held, the Commission does not possess and
may not exercise a conservation power. ‘Certainly it is
not authorized to control the nature of the use of gas
‘by an owner who has lawfully made a direct purchase
thereof from the producer. a
-.- The Commission’s brief rejects this basic canon of,statu- .
tory.construction and turns to the legislative histoyy of the
Act in the hope of there finding some support for its
position. Challenging the detailed and comprehensive
analysis ofthe legislative history of the 1938 Act and the
. 1942 amendments thereto, set out in the opinion of the
lower Court, the Commission’s brief sets forth a separate
_ statement: of the Act’s history. This statement contains
significant omissions. We therefore feel obliged to show
those omissions. Fairly read, the legislative history
corroborates the plain meaning of the Act. It shows
_ that Congress was aware of the problem of conservation ,
and that it reserved Hie resolution of such problem to the .
States. by the provisions of §11 of the Act. It shows
that it was the opinion of the-members of the Federal |
_ Power Commission, subsequent to enaétment of the
Natural Gas Act in 1938, and after enactment of the
1942 amendment, that the Commission did not possess
the conservation powers for which it argues in this case.
Legislative History
The 1938 Act
The Commission in its brief states categorically that
_ the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the 1942 amendment
lodged a .consideration of questions of end-use with the
Commission (FPC brief, pp. 27-28). Its brief, however,
is completely devoid of any reference to primary legis-
lative ‘sources relating to the 1938 Act such as committee
a
eo
| 43
hearings, committee reports or statemegts of members ‘of
Congress which support such assertion. It relies instead .
upon inconclusive general comment in the earlier 1936
r@port of the Fedéral Trade Commission: The Federal
Power Commission's brief fails to include, although
prought to its attention in the proceedings before the
lower Court, any reference to the only section of the
Act containing the word or concept of “conservation”
i.e. §11. It fails to report the statement of Congressman
Mapes, a member of the committee that was responsible
for the bill under consideration,
“The only provision in the bill which seems to
look to the conservation of the natural gas resources
of the country is contained in the provision relating
to the State compacts.” (81 Cong. Ree. 6726 (1937) )
The. brief of the Commission also fails, with respect to
conservation, to report the following colloquy between
Senator Wheeler, Senate sponsor of the legislation and
‘ Chairman of the committee handling its enactment, and
Senator Austin:-
“Mr. Wheeler. * * °
“In other words, all the bill would do would ‘-
to give the Commission power to furnish to the
States such information as it has, and require the
States to furnish the Commission such information
- as they have. Then the Commission would report
to the Congress its recommendations with reference
~ to the compacts, and it Would be for the Congress
- to act:
“Mr. Austin. Then, it would leave to the future
the right to meet any effort on the part of the
‘ central government to acquire the natural resources
’ of the State of Montana, or the Piate of Vermont,
or any other State?
Oe ay el
“Mr. a Oh, yes. It does not touch it in
any way, shape, or form, except to require the
furnishing of information.
“Mr. Austin. I have great fear of these occult
methods of acquiring the natural resources of our
several states” (S1 Cong. Rec. 9312 (1937)). ¢
The Commission’s brief relies solely upon the 1936.
report of the Federal Trade Commission to Congress
concerning the natural gas industry. A's the lower Court
observed, that report, consisting of more than 600 pages,
touches only briefly on the question of conservation. A
more pyecise reading of the report reveals that the quota-
tions contained in the Commission’s brief as to the conser-
vation.concern of the Federal Trade Commission related
almost wholly to wasteful practices in the producing |
areas, auch as the flaring of natural gas, and its use in
gasoline extraction and the manufacture of carbon black.*
The Commission brief states that the “Trade Commis-
sion did not offer final answers to the end-use problems
which its investigation raised” (FPC brief, p. 27). A
more accurate and complete statement would be that the
only recommendations of the Trade Commission which in
any way related to conservation were the recommenda.
tions that the producing states should enter into compacts
with each other providing for State regulation of conser-
vation, that the federal government should make recom- .
mendations’ as to production volumes and that the Con-
gress should assist in enforcement of the State laws’ by
barring from interstate commerce any quantities of nat-
ural gas exceeding the volume set by State regulation.
* Federal Trade Commission, Final Report to the Senate of the
United States, S. Doc. No. 92, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., Part 84-A,
_ 125-126, 608 (1936).
eee
.
ee ee at ei ieee ee
ere + oe
Ste ttt tel
a .
45
~
~
These recommendations, but substantially modified, formed
the basis of §11 of the Act.
The actual final recommendations of the Federal Trade
Commission on this subject in fact are to the direct con-
trdry of the general discussion set forth in the quotations
relied on by the Commission brief herein. Such testimony
was supplied by William Chantland, the attorney who
directed the Trade Commission’s investigation and who
was authorized to appear as its spokesman before.the sub- .
committee of the "House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. Colonel Chantland testified that the
federal government should not attempt directly to regulate
the natural gas industry for conservation purposes, but.
rather should act merely in aid of State laws.°*
In sum, there is not a shred of evidence to indicate that
Congress intended to give the Commission any conserva-
tion power whatever other than as prescribed in §11.
Ther®is no foundation for the present claim that the .
Commission was to classify uses of natural gas as superior
or inferior and grant or deny certificates on the basis
of such classification. To the contrary, Congress recog-
nized that there would be consumption of natural gas for
“domestic, commercial, industrial” and other uses (§1(b))
and no preference for any particular use was expressed,
but instead direct sales for consumption by the purchaser
of the type here involved were excluded from all regu-
lation and rates for sales for resale for industrial or
boiler fuel use were°exempted from the Commission’s au-
.. thority to suspend rates pursuant to §4(e) of the Act. By
enacting §11 the Congress demonstrated that it was aware
- *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
raed and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 66-67
). |
46 .
of the problem of conservation and that -it intended to
leave the control of conservation in the hands of the
' States* in accordance with the only recommendation on
the subject by the Federal Trade Commission and its
official spokesman. No possible ground for Commission
action in the field’ of conservation appears in the 1938
Act or its legislative history. .
The 1940 Annual Report of the Commission to Con-
gress** reported the Commission’s dissatisfaction with its
limited powers in thjs specific respect under the Natural
Gas Act. The Commission expressed its concern with its
inability to deal with problems of conservation and recom-
mended that the Natural Gas Act be broadened to provide _
the Commission, among other things, with the payer to
resolvé conservation problems. The Commission’s Brief
now claims that the Commission’s 1940 admission of its
lack of conservation’ power was the basis of the action
taken by Congress in amending the Act in 1942, although
there is no support for this position in the legislative
history of these amendments. ;
This seems strained to the point of alsurdity. The 1940
report advised Congress that the Commission lacked power
over certain interstate pipeline expansions, power to
consider the effect of expansions on other fuels, and power
* This Court has recognized that such power rests in the States
in decisions both preceding and following enactment of the Natural
Gas Act. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of
Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932); Walls v. Midland Carbon Com-
pany, 254 U. S. 300 (1920) and Railrvad Commission of Texas v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940). In these cases this
Court sustained the right of the States to — and enforce legis-
lation designed to conserve natural reserves including natural gas.
** 20 FPC Ann. Rep. (1940).
BN ate ae
a
a ET
4
a va
over conservation.® The 1942 amendments were snb-
mitte ‘d for and related solely to purposes other than con-
“serv ation.
As the lower Court found, ne ‘ither the 1942 amendments
nor the legislative history support the Commission’s eon-
tention. The Commission’s 1940 report does no more than
confirm its recognition as of that time that the 1928 Act ©
did not endow the Commission with the powers here
claimed, and the Congress, having had the lack called. to
its attention, did not see fit to grant the authority —
The 1942 Amendments a °
_ The Commission’s brief relies heavily upon the 1942
amendments to the Act to support its argument that
the Congress intended to vest conservation powers in
the Federal Power Commission. However, a detailed
analysis of the amendments, the Committee hearings and
the Committee reports fails to reveal a single mention
of the conservation question. In fact, as far as we can
_ determine, the word conservation was not mentioned by
any witness except in connection with a proposed amend-
ment that was rejected by that Committee.
The’changes of the Natural Gas Act effected hy Con-
gress in 1942 consisted solely of a revision of §7(c) and the
addition of §§7(d), (e), (f) and (g). For the convenience
of the Court, and to permit comparison, §7(c) as originally
enacted and the 1942 amendments to the Act are set forth
in an appendix to this brief. It will be observed that the
Commission’s present contentions with respect to the sig-
nificance of the 1942 amendments ‘are not borne out by
the statutory language used by Congress. There is no
*20 F.P.C. Ann. Rep. 78-80 (1940).
2
mention of-a grant of conservation power to the Commis-
sion. The only tepic which remotely Miated to conser-
vation was the intent, as appears in the Report of the
House Committee, that the C ommission, in weighing. the
effect of a proposed pipeline expansion, might consider
the effect upon the producers or the carriers of competing
fuels. This merely meant that if new or additional gas
‘was to be used in a locality, for whatever purpose, the
Commission might consider the. economic impact on, com- .
peting fuel interests.
Chairman Basil Manly of the Federal Power Commis-
sion testified before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce and had full opportunity to press
the Commission’s request previously made to Congress in
the 1940 report. Significantly, he did not do so.*
The report of the House Committee summarized the
new matters which the bill would authorize the Commis-
sion to consider in a certificate proceeding upon the adop-
tion of the amendments, as follows:
“Phe bill when enacted will have the effect of giv-
ing the Commission an opportunity to scrutinize the
financial’ set-up, the<adequacy of the gas reserves,
the: feasibility and adequacy of the proposed serv-
ices, and the characteristics of the rate structure in |
connection with the proposed construction or exten-
sion at a time when such vital matters can readily
be modified as the public interest may demand. * * *
“The bill, as amended, eliminates the objections
to the present section 7(c) above mentioned. By
this legisiation, the present jurisdictional disputes
are eliminated, and the door is opened to the con-
sideration by the Commission of the effect of con-
"© Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign.
Commerce, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-6 (1941).
ee ae ee eee et ee ee
49
struction and extensions upon the interests of pro-
ducers of competing fuels and competitive trans-
portation interests. This result is accomplished,
moreover, without undue disturbance of existing .
operating arrangements of natural-gas- companies.”
_(H. R. Rep. No. 1290, vith Cong., Ist Sess., 2-3
" (1941). ;
Cleariy, the primary purpose of the 1942 onentinutii
was to extend the certificate power ‘to cover all-interstate
pipeline expansions, to permit intervention in Commission
proceedings by producers and carrier’ of competing fuels
and to permit consideration of the impact of any pipeline
extension upon such fuel producera and their carrier in- .
' terests.
The coal and transportation interests were concerned
solely with the loss of ‘business. It made no difference to
them whether coal was displaced for domestic purposes
..or to-relieve air pollution. It was the loss of market that
hurt, not the nature" of the sale, or the character of the
end use,
In this. connection, it should 7" noted that although
the coal interests participated actively .in the hearings
in this’ case before the Commission, they did not intro-
duce any evidence to show damage through loss of
market, and the Commission did not premise-its decision
upon the ground that the use of natural gas at the Water.
side station would have an adverse effect upon competing
fuels. Such adverse effect on the producer, and not the
specific end use in substituting gas for existing fuels, was -
the only consideration within the scope of the 1942 amend-
ments. The power granted the Commission to consider
the effect on competing fuels cannot be equated with the
power to act as an arbiter of the area? end-use of te
supplantigg natural gas. ~ ;
50
That the 1942 amendments did not extend the Commis-
sion’s jurisdiction to include matters of conservation was
recognized by -the unanimous views of the Federal Power
Commission, published in 1944, after more than a year’s ‘
experience in administering the Act under the+942 amend-
ments. The Commission reported to Congress, in a docu-
ment entitled “The First Five Years Under the Natural
Gas Act”, that in hearings on pipeline certificate cases
under §7 of the Act, as amended,.coal, railroads, lumber
afd other interests had intervened and had “strongly
arged the Commission either to deny certificates on the
general grounds of conservation, or to attach restrictions
which would severely nls the uses for which natural ”
might be sold”.
The Commission went on to say:
“It has been the unanimous view of the Con.
mission that, inasmuch as the Congress had not
given it comprehensive powers to deal with the end
uses for which natural gas is consumed, and has
granted the Commission no authority to regulate
- rates for the direct sales of natural gas -to indus-
try, it was the duty of the Commission not to seek
to exercise such authority antil the Congress
amended the Natural Gas Act to confer on the
Commission such specific powers as Congress
desired it to exercise.”*
Th a footnote to the above quoted statement the Com-
mission cited-its decision in Tennessee Gas and Trans-
mission Company, 3 F.P.C. 574 (1943). That case involved
certification of a pipeline from Texas to West Virginia.
+ The coal interests complgined that the proposed use of
natural gas for industrial and space heating purposes
(ey The First Five Years Under: the Natural Gas Act, 15
ee ae,
im)
was a dissipation of the natural gas resources and
threatened the coal industry with ruinous competition.
The Commission stated: ,
“*We recognize the force of these arguments and
are not unmindful of the economic and social —
aspects of the problem posed by these interveners.
‘We are not authorized, however, to regulate rates
for natural gas sold directly to industrial consum-
ers, which class of gas sales furnishes the keenest
competition to the, coal industry. Nor does our
power to suspend rates extend to indirect sales
- of natural gas for industrial purposes. It appears,
therefore, that the Natural Gas Act docs not vest
this Commission with complete and comprehensive
authority which would permit us to act as arbiter
over the evd uses of natural gas.: (pp. 578-579)”
(Emphasis supplied.)
_As the Court Xelow comments, “this report® followed —
closely on the heels of the Hope decision on which the
Commission so heavily relies” (BR. 316(a)). The Com-
mission in its brief in the instant case, however, attempts
to explain away the foregoing statements of the Commis-
sion in 1944 by arguing that the Commission did not
mean that it had no power to deal with conservation, but
merely that it did not have a “comprehensive” power over
_ conservation and end-use. The Commission’s contention
is fallacious. It is perfectly obvious that if, as the Com-
miésion now claims; Congress “accepted” the Commis-
sion's Annual Report for 1940, when it amended the
Natural Gas Act of 1942 (FPC brief, page 37), then the
‘Commission would not in 1944 have complained that the
power it had requested in 1940 was not sufficientay compre-
*Jd., at 15.
52
hensive. The fact of the matter is that the Commission
had been granted no power whatever in this afea, and if,
as the Commission said in 1944, it did not then have the
authority to “act as arbiter over the end-uses of natural
gas” it does not have such power now, since there has
been no amendment of the Act on that subject in the
. interim period. y :
After 1945 the Commission pursued a sii incon-
sistent course. On the one hand, under continuing pres-
sure from the coal interests, the Commission began to ©
insinuate into its decisions statements to the effect that
the use of boiler fuel was an inferior use and might weigh
against the granting of ‘a certificate, a although in almost
all cases it proceeded to certificate the transaction for
such allegedly “inferior” beiler fuel purposes. On the
other hand, being aware of the complete lack of legislative
» authority to allocate’ natural gas on an end-use basis, the
Commission continued to request Congress for control
over end use.
In its Annual Reports for 1951, 1952, and -1953, the
Commission recommended that §7(c) be amended “to
provide specifically for control by the Commission of the
end use of natural gas when required for national defense
or to safeguard the available supply.*.* *”*
In each of the years 1954 through 1959 the Commission
requested, in its Annual Report, that §7(c) be amended
to’ provide specific authority to allocate natural gas
- for defense purposes or to safeguard the — for
emergencies.**
* 31 Ann. Rep 148 (1981), 32 FPC Aan. Rep. 152 (1952),
and 33 F ‘fam, ton int
** 34 FPC Ann. Rep. oo (1954), 35 FPC Ann. Rep: 182
(1955), 36 FPC Ann. Rep. 18 (1956), 37 FPC Ann. Rep. 24 -
(1959) 38 FPC Ann. Rep. 16 (1958), and 39 FPC Ann. Rep. 19
(1959).
53
Pursuant to the Commission’s request in its 1958 Annual
Revort, a bill was introduced in Congress which would
add the following language to §7(e):
“and, when the public convenierice and necessity
so requires, the Commission shall be authorized to
allocate the available supply of natural gas author-
ized to be transported or.sdid by a natural gas
pipeline company under such certifieate, for utiliza-
tion in-such areas or for such purposes as afford the
most advantageous benefits to the publie:” (S. 2252,
86th Cong. (1959), introduced by ‘Senator Mag-
nuson).
The Commission also. requested ih 1952 and 1953
that §1(b) be amended to vest jurisdiction in the Com-
mission over direct tales | in interstate commerce of natural
gas for industrial use.°
The Court’s attention is called to the language of the
bill introduced by Senator Magnuson, quoted above, since
it expresses exactly the type of authority that would be ,
required by the Commission for. it to take the action which’
it has taken in the instant case. :;
The significant matter is that Congress, faced with these
requests for 8 consecutive years for the very ‘authority
and jurisdiction the Commission now claims to possess,
refused to grant them in any detail or respect. There
ean be no more compelling legislative history or demon-
strated Congressional intent that a regulatory body lacks
a specific jurisdiction, than when it has pointed to the lack _
‘in its reports in 1940 and 1944 and requested the grant in |
1951 through 1958 and Congress has denied it year in
and year out. |
* 32 FPC Ann. Rep. 182 (1982 and 33 FPC Ann. Rep. 154
(1953).
54
_ It is also noteworthy that the nature of this power which -
Congress refuses to grant relates to the allocation of the.
_ nation’s fuels, as* pointed out by the Court of Appeals.
During this -same span of years, Congress has been wres-
tling with the development of a National Fuels Policy akin.
to the National Transportation Policy which affects the
application of the transportation acts.* Until such guiding
principles are established as a result of the Congressional
Committee hearings, it is both natural and orderly -that
Congress refuse to permit the Commission to exert juris-
diction as -to natural gas which may upset the ultimate
plan and balance of the whole relationship of the nation’ 7
competing fuels.
Ganediien and Court Decisions Relating to Conservation
This case represents the first instance in which the
Commission has denied a certificate upon the ground of
allegedly inferior end-use and such denial has been con-
tested in the courts. In fact, the Commission has denied
an application for a certificate on this ground in only
four instances in its entire*history, and in only: one of
these did the denial remain completely unchanged. In that
proceeding, Court review was not sought on that -point.
The Commission cases involving boiler fuel sales, in which
the use ig mentioned as a factor are collected and dis-
cussed in the lower Court's decision (R. 316a-318a).** .
*S. Con. Res. 73, 86th Cong. (1959).
** The Commission granted certificates in the following cases:
East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 8 F. P. C. (1949), aff'd sub
nom., Natiomal Coal Ass'n. v. Federal Power ission, 191 F. 2d.
462 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (use as boiler fuel by Atomic Energy Commis-.
sion) ; Transcontinental Gas sty Line by 11 F. P 605,615
(1982) (use as boiler fuel a company) ; Texas Gas Trans-
ee Se 12 F. P.C. (1953) (use as boiler fuel by a power
;
_ LL aT eT TTT
The three cases reaching the courts’ in’ whieh the
Commission’s power to control end-use was discussed were
all proceedings involving the use of boiler fuel in which:
the Commission had-granted certificates, and had defended
its action on review brought by other interests. All of the
company); Mississippi: River Fuel Corp., 12 F. P. C. 199, ‘114
(1953) (use as boiler fuel by a power company) ; Southern Natural
Gas Co., 14 F. P. C. 243 (1955), aff'd sub nom., Charleston, &
Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Federal Power Coinmission, 234
F. 2d 62 (D. C. Cir. 1956) (use as boilér fuel by power com-
pany}; Northern Natural Gas Co., 15 F. P. C. 682, rev'd
15 F. P. C. 1634 (1956), aff'd sub nom., National Coal Ass'n V.
Federal Power Commission, 247 F. 2d 86 (D. C. Cir. 1957) (use
as boiler fuel by a power company); Houston Texas Gas & Oil
Corp., 16 F. P. C. 118 (1956) (use as a boiler fuel by two Florida
power ‘companies) ; Cities Service Gas Co., 17 F. P. é. 516 (1957)
(use as boiler fuel by.a power company); Memphis Natural Gas
Company, 4 F.P.C. 197 (1944). | * ;
The Commission originally denied a certificate in Northern Nat-
‘ural Gas Co., 4 F. P. C. 1099 (1945), but subsequently granted a
certificate in the same proceedings, 7 F. P. C. 296 (1948).
The Commission denied a certificate in another case; Piedmont °
Natural Gas Corp., 9 F. P, C. 629, 70, 83-90 (1950), but the cus-
tomer seeking the gas was ultimately ‘successful in: obtaining it,
* Transcontinental Gas Pipe _ Corp., 11 F. P. C. 605, 615 (1952).
In Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 10 F. P. C. 391 (1951), a
pipeline’s application to supply boiler fuel gas to two customers was
denied, but the pipeline was eventually granted a- certificate to
supply one of them, Texas Gas Transmission Corp. @2a Aa
658. (1953). :
In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line’ Co., F. P. C. Opinion No. 274
(19545, aff'd on other grounds, sub nom., Panhandle Fastern Pipe
Line Co. ¥. Federal Power Commission, 232 F. 2d 467 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied 352.U. S. 891 (1956), certificates were granted for
service to three industrial companies and were denied for service to
a fourth, a paper company. ce
*National Coal Ass'n v. Federal Power Commission, 191 F.
2d 462 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Department of Conservation v. Federal __—-
Power Commission. 148 F. 2d 746, cert. denied 326 U. S. 717
(1943): Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, 234 F. 2d 62 (1956).
.
56
.
cases, unlike the instant case,pinvolved sales by pipelines
of their own gas. In each instance, the Commission’s
action was upheld by a Court of Appeals and in none of
the cases does it appear that an analysis of the Commis-
. sion’s powers bearing on the point at issue -herein and
the legislative history relating thereto was made. The
three Court of Appeals cases which touch on the subject
were considered by ‘the lower Court in its. decision and
rejected ‘as precedents (R. 318a-319a).
The questions at issue here have never been presented
to, er passed upon, by this or any other Court. The Com-
mission in its brief cites dicta in the opinions of this Court
in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Com-
pany, 320 U. S. 591 (1944) and. Federal Power Commis-
sion v. East Ohio Gas Company; 338°. S. 464 (19% 50). In
- neither case, however, did the Court rest-its decision upon
the language cited by the Commission. The Hope case was.
a rate case under the 1938 Act and did not involve the
Commission’s certificate powers under either the 1938 Act
or the 1942 amendments thereto. One of the fundamental
questions confronting this Court was. whether the Commis-
sion under the rate provisions of the Act, §§4 and 5, could.
fix rates that would disallow or discourage resales for
industrial use. The Court found that the Act provided for .
rate regulation along recognized and more or less standard
lines, and that to require the Conimission to fix rates in
. order to discourage particular uses would be to inject into
rate cases a “novel” doctrine withowt any — statutory
sanction (p. 616).
- The same basic principle is controlling in this case. The
conventional standards of the certificate section of the
Natural Gas Act. make no provision for the control
directly or — of the direct industrial sale of natural
Cc?
87
gas or the use by its owner thereafter. In the Hope case
this Court could find no basis in the le ‘gislative history of
the Act to sanction the extension of the standard of just-
ness and reasonableness to permit the discouragement by
rate fixing of jurisdictional resales for industrial use.
Applying the same rule of statutory construction this .
Court should find that the standard of,“public convenience
and necessity” like that of “just and reasonable” should not
be stretched to -encompass ‘the regulation of matters
' specifically ——— from Commission jurisdiction by
Congress. . |
The East Ohio case, quoted - the Commission in its
‘brief at page 39, was not concerned with whether the Com-
mission did or did not have conservatiop power. It con-
cerned the extent and applicability of the Commission’s
’ jurisdiction over the transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce and provides no support for the Com-
. Mission’s position in this ease. ~*~
The Commission in its brief has been enciile to. direct
this Court’s attention to any decision which held that the
Commission has any conservation or related power. The
’ Commission has been unable to unearth any support in the
legislative history for its contention that it has authority
over conservation matters. It has failed‘to explain why it
has requésted and Congress has refused to grant the very
powers which it purported to exercise in this case. ‘The
statute is unambiguous that the Commission has no con-
_ - Servation power other than-in §11. It’ appears, therefore,
-clear beyond any doubt that the ruling of the; lower Court
on this point, which was adverse to the edntentions of
the Commission, was correct and should be sustained.
Con Edison eannot be deprived by the Cammission of
‘its right to ise its lawfully purchdsed Texas gas.
‘ |
soe
' 58
Ill
The Commission's order is arbitrary, capricious and
unlawful because it is based upon “policy considera-
tions” that are unsupported by any substantial evi-
dence of record and contrary to experience and
reason and to the express policies of ‘Con ngress.
By well established legal standards, and wholly apart
from the questions of ‘Commission authority discussed —
in Points-I and II,. supra, the Commission’s action in
denying Transco’s X-20 application was arbitrary.
The Commission was asked to decide this case upon a_
_. record in which .all of the evidence supperted the pro-
posed service and none was offered in opposition. All of
the previously established requi nts for a pipeline
certificate had, as conceded by the Commission, been met
(R. 178a, 215). In addition to the evidence of the kind
‘ customarily presented in a pipeline certificate case, which
¢ demonstrated the adequacy of reserves, financeability of *
the project, the market .and other related matters, a full
showing was made. at thg hearing of the compelling rea-
sons: in the public interest for authorization of the-
proposed peaking and _ transportation § service: — the
reduction .of air pollution in Manhattan, the sub-
stantial savings to ‘Con _Edison’s electrie and steam cus-
tomers resulting from the use of natural gas at the Water-
side station, and the much needed and inexpensive peaking
service designed to meet the needs of Con Edison’s gas
customers. Against this. wealth of evidence favorable to
issuance of a certificate to Transco, the Commission had
no evidence of record to weigh in the balaneé except the
—_
simple fact that Con Edison planned to reduce air pollu-
tion by burning natural gas instead of coal at its Water-
side plant to generate electricity and steam for distribu-
tion to the public.
Even assuming arguendo that the Commission could
properly dictate Con Edison’s proposed use of its own
natural gas, the Commission could not, consistent with
- the record before it, deny the certificate solely upon this —
ground. ua
The Commission’s flagrant disregard of the evidence of
record and its reliance upon unsubstantiated and patently
erroneous “policy considerations” as the grounds for its
decision exceeded the limitations upon agency action pre-
scribed by ‘the Administrative Procedure Act*® and the
Natural Gas Act.**
As stated in Mississippi Fuel Corp. v. Federal Power
"Commission, 163 F. 2d 433, 439 (D. C. Cir. 1947): “* * *
Congress has forbidden arbitrary action and has imposed
upon the Courts a duty of review in that respect. Arbi-
trary action, if it means’anything, means action not based |
on fact or reason * * °”.
What the Commission did was to discard the general
certificate requirements prescribed in the Act that had
been particularized in the legislative history and through
years of Commission practice and substitute in their stead
new standards not based either upon evidence or experi-
ence. Since.the Commission had never previously prem-
ised a decision upon the so called “policy considerations”
here involved, respondents had no opportunity to present
evidence that would demonstrate the Commission’s error:
* $9; 60 Stat. 243 (1946),5 U.S.C. $1009.
** §19(b), 52 Stat. 831 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717(r).
ey
60
The Conimission now defends its action as a permissible
‘exercise of its expertise, but the courts have held that
“expertise” cannot be substituted for evidence. In C@pital
Transit Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of District of
Columbia, 213 F. 2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1953) thé Court
stated: “* * * The ‘expertise’ of a commission usefully
serves it in evaluating the.evidence but that expertise can-
| not supply evidence and cannot without findings made.
upon the critical issues before it, guide a commission to a —
rational and lawful decision.” ‘
The lower Court has discussed each of the so-called
“policy considerations” in detail. It is not necessary to
recount the errers in the Commission’s reasoning there
pointed, out. The Commission in its brief has attempted
by rhetoric to. buttress the rationale of its opinion. The
argument in the brief, like that in the opinion, however,
is marked by the absence of supporting asa either
within or without the record.
Rather than reargue each of the “policy considerations”
we will address ourselves to the fundamental fallacy upon
which the Commission’s entire argument is built: the
erroncous assumption that the issuance of a certificate to
Transco for the X-20 service would open the flood gates
to a vast unregulated interstate market from which would
flow the alleged.evils enumerated: in the Commission’s
opinion. If, as we shall demonstrate, the Commission is
wrong in its basic assumption, and the practice of pur-
‘chasing gas directly in the field for consumption by the
purchaser is to be adopted only by those few companies
having special problems, such as Con Edison, then the
impact of such scattered purchasers upon prices and sup-
ply would, even accepting the Commission’s other argu-
ments, be negligible:
1
“DY
61
If the Commission now feels it is justified, as evidenced
by its brief, in going outside the record; it can find evi-
dence on every hand to substantiate the fact that prac-
tically no industrial consumers at any distance from the
producing states would or could afford to avail themselves
-of the opportunity to purchase natural gas in the field and
use the pipelines merely - for transportation purposes.
Natural gas has been used by purchasers for their own
consumption for more years than the Natural Gas Act has
been -in effect. The transportation function, of interstate
pipelines as distinguished from the sale of natural gas for
resale has been recognized by Congress, by the courts
and has been availed of by occasional direct purchasers
of natural gas for many years. There is nothing novel
about the idea of purchasing natural. gas in the field for
consumption by the purchaser. Yet few companies have
attempted ‘such an arrangement. The reason is obvious:
in most instances, the cost would be prohibitive.
Mr. Justice: Jackson in his dissenting opinion in -the
Hope case noted that industrial use is induced less by
the uiique qualities of natural gas than by “low cost in:
edmpetition with other fuels” (320: U..S. 591; 635). The
fact is that natural gas is customarily used as beiler fuel.
for oné reason and for one reason only—when and if it
is cheaper than competing fuels. In order for a purchase
plus transportation arrangement to be attractive to indus-
trial consumers, it must provide a source of energy at the _
point of consumption that is cheaper than that provided
bt coal or oil. Not only must the immediate cost be
Jess, but also, as far as can be predicted, the long range
cost must be less, because the ‘“X-20.type of arrangement
doessnot permit change from one type of fuel to another
as prices fluctuate, since the purchase and transportation
arrangements, involving expansion of pipeline facilities;
must be made on a long term basis. .
The Commission in its brief notes that thé cost of the
X-20 gas is higher than the cost of coal to Con Edison.
Under these circumstances it is apparent that no industry
~ would “burn X-20 gas instead of coal, absent the special
circumstances of air pollution and the 60-day peaking
provisign. — . | i;
The importance of even a slight difference in price
between competing fuels is emphasized in Midwestern Gas -
Transmission Company, 21 F.P.C. 653 (1959), decided by
the Commission in 1959. Evidence was there introduced
that the project would not be feasible unless.the com-
modity component of the pipelines’ prices for natural gas
were low enough so that distribution companies could sell
gas to industrial users. This required a commodity price
below the going price of gas in the field.* |
Since the cost of gas has risen and continues to rise~
at a more: rapid rate than competing fuels, the Commis-
sion’s concern that industry will pay the current high field
prices for natural gas and, in addition, pay for its trans-
portation, rather than purchase coal, oil or pipeline gas,
would seem to run counter to all the data now available
4
‘
63
to the Commission and counter to the Commission's past
experience,
Although the Commission has at its disposal bulging
files containing thousands of certificate applications, and
has available all of the pertinent data relating to the
natural gas industry as well as coal and oi! prices, it has
obviously been completely unable to put together a factual
presentatior which would support the Commission's con-
tention tha ‘avorable action on the X-20 proposal will
create a large, new, unregulated market. The two specific
examples that it does cite prove nothing. The first is tue
' Houston Texas’ Gas & Oil Corporation case, 16 F.P.C. 118
(1956) which involved in large part the transportation of
boiler fuel purchased by a consumer in the field. Cer-
tainly, if any single Commission action could start a rush.
of indastrial purchasers to the producing fields the favor-
able Commission action in the Houston casein 1956 would
have had that effect. :
_ The second instance cited in the Commission’s brief was
that involving Virginia Electrie & Power Company.
Transcontinental: Gas Pipe Line Corporation, 20° FPG.
843 (1958)... This proposal was denied by the Commission
because the transportation rate was found to be too low.
The project was thereafter abandoned by the Company
since it would not have been economically feasible if the
gas were to be transported at a higher rate. These are
the only two instances cited by the Commission where
the purchase of natural gas in the field for boiler fuel
use has even been attempted. For the rest of its pres-
*See the statement of the then Commission \ ‘ice-Chairman
Connole in 60 Public Utilities Fortnightly 843, (1957) : “This indi-
cates that if natural gas prices and coal prices on a national average
basis continue their relative trénds of recent years, natural gas prices
will be beyond competing with coal sometime before 1960."
ay
04
entation the Commission relies upon the predictions’ of
writers tm trade magazines and excerpts from daily papers
and an Examiner’s decision.
The references to the attempts of Southern California
Edison Co. to obtain supplies of natural gas for boiler
fuel do not make clear that the only purchase agreements
entered into by that Company have been with pipelines |
and not producers. These contracts would, therefore,
presumably not be subject to the same objections raised
in this case by the Commission with respect to direct
purehases in the f.eld from producers. These attempts
by Southern Califo.nia Edison to obtain natural gas for
fuel purposes had as their goal the same fundamental
purpose underlying Con Edison’s X-20 plan, that is, the - —
reduction of air pollution. The smog problem in the Los
Angeles area is s6 well known as not to require elabora-
tion. As we have stated, it is our view that it is only
in this type of situation, where the unique burning quali-
ties of natural gas as a fuel outweigh other consideéra-
_ tions, that purchasers ‘will be found attempting to obtain
supplies for their own consumption. The failure of the
Commissian to distinguish this type of. situation from the .
ordinary industrial use of natural gas is one further evi- |
dence of the arbitrary nature of its decision.
We are sure that the Court is ‘aware of the implication —
throughout the Commission brief that Con Edison is ignor-
ing the interests of small consumers and that it stands in
the position of a vast industrial user. The Commission
states that the X-20 arrangement poses a threat “to the
small consumer, the person for whom the protections of the
Natural Gas Act were designed” (F.P.C. Brief, p. 11). As
. & proponent of the .X-20 service, Con Edison, a large
utility, is therefore cast in the role of one callously indif-
2
65 €>
ferent to the interests of the “sinall consumer”. This- por-
trayal by insinuation is utter nonsense. Actually, Con
Edison is in the business in the New York metropolitan
area of serving approximately 1,300,000 gas customers, the
great majority of whom are “small consumers”, and of
serving electricity to some 2,800,000 customers, and steam
to over 2,000 customers.* It feels keenly its responsibility
to provide all of these millions of consumers with reliable
gas, electric and steain service at reasonable rates. - Con
Edison would he short sighted, indeed, if, as one of the
largest gas distributing companies in the country, it sup-
ported a project that would have the ultimate effect of
raising the cost of.the gas it buys for resale. If it had had
the slightest doubt about the wisdom of the proposed X-20
service it would not have pressed for review in the lower
Court and would not“now defend the correctness of that
(ourt’s decision. Nothing could be more unrealistic than
the suggestion that this major gas distributing company
would open the’ Pandora’s box portrayed by the Commis-
sion in order to obtain natural gas as a fuel for a single
electric and steam generating station. _
Con Edison serves more “small consumers” than any
of Transco’s other customers. Tc. discriminate against a
large utility does not protect the “small consumer”. It
merely serves to affect adversely the interests of a larger
number: of the very consumers for whose protection the
Natural Gas Act was passed.
* The number of steam customers does not reflect the number of
persons served by Con Edison steam heat since most “customers’’®
_are large buildings, each of which contains a substantial number of
customers. .
IV
The Court of Appeals correctly ordered the cases
returned to the Commission with directions to issue
the certificate applied for.
The lower Court set aside the Commissjon’s order,
which is the subject-of this review and diregted that. the
cases be returned to the Commission “with directions to
issue the certificate applied for” subject to further hear-
_ ing on-a minor rate question (R. 324a-325a).. The Court:
did so because.the Commission had made ‘it clear that it
had no objection to the proposed X-20 service® except for
those extra-jurisdictional matters upon. which the lower
Court found the Commission could not lawfully base its
decision. ‘In other words, ‘since the Commission had indi-
c&ted the acceptability of the proposed service, absent
“certain policy considerations”, there existed no, reason
for any further exercise of the Commission’s discretion
once such policy objections had been stripped away. The
Court’s action also may have reflected an awareness of the
history of these. proceedings before the Commission, the
unreasonable delays expérienced by the applicant and Con
Edison, and the knowledge that relief that is provided too
late is no relief at all.
Transco’s original application was filed October 28,
1957.. Hearings were held in the spring of 1958. The
Examiner issued his decision gn July 9th and _ thereafter
the Commission, despite repeated pleas for expedition,
severed and decided all but one of the other dockets from
the X-20 proposal, deferring decision on the X-20 service
*Aside from the minor rate question.
67
until almost seven months after the Examiner's decision.
The Commission’s decision, when it did come on January
30, 1959, was based on “policy. considerations” that required
* neither legal research nor study of the record and could
have been expressed in a matter of days after the issu-
ance‘of the hearing Examiner's decision.
The Commission ‘in its brief states several reasons s why
it believes«the Court below should not have ordered issu-
ance. of a certificate. None of the reasons presents any
-teal obstacle to Commission eompliance with. the Court’s
order, “All of the reasons justify the concern the’ lower
Court might have had about the delay which might occur
once the matter was back in the hands of the Commission.
The Commission now argues that the original X-20. pro-
posal is, as a matter of engineering design, out-of-date,
since Transco has continued to expand and different facil-
ities would now be required. The Commission fails to
‘inform this Court, however, that Trarisco included in its
certificate application for 1960 pipeline construction .
‘(Transcontinental Gas’ Pipe ‘Line , Corporation, F.P.C.
Docket Nos. G-16603 et al.) the additional facilities: which
will be made necessary should the X-20 service be author-
ized. These plans are not only on file with the Com;
mission, but were introduced as evidence of record at the
hearings. upon said certificate application. Nor is it noted
that the Commission in its decision in that case severed
and deferred action upon those. additional facilities. until
final disposition of the instant case. With that record
before it, the Commission will be in a position to render .
almost immediately a decision should this ease be
remanded to it and there will be’no justification for any
further significant delays.
68
The Commission's other objections to the lower Court’s .
direction involve no matters ef substance requiring Com-
mission reconsideration, but appear to be merely after-
thoughts which, if recognized, may cause further and.
“needless delay.
The Commission having found that the established
requirements of ‘a certificate for the X-20 service had been
met, -the. case should be returned to the Commission in
accordance with the order of the lower Court and. the
Commission should be directed to issue the certificate
applied for.
_ CONCLUSION
For the forégoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the judgment of the’ Court. of Appeals should be
affirmed. ; ;
+ Bespecifally submitted,
Rawpatt J. LEBoevr, JR.,
_ Attorney for Respondent,
Consolidated Edison Company |
; of New York, Inc.,
’ 15 Broad Street,
New York 5, New York.
Hatcyox G. Sxrxwer,
Ronatp D. Jones,
LeBoevur, Lams & Lery, _
Of Counsel. _-*
October 21, 1960.
APPENDIX
Ewactep Versions oF §7(c) oF THE NaruraL Gas Act
1. Natural Gas Act, §7(c), as originally enacted June, |
91, 1938, by Public Law No. 688, 75th Congress, 3d Ses-
sion, 52 Stat. 825: | .
“(c) No natural-gas company shall undertake
the construction or extension of any facilities for
the transportation of natural gas to a market in
which natural gas is already being served by an-
other natural-gas company, or acquire or operate.
any such facilities or extensions thereof, or engage
in transportation by means ofany new or addi-
tional facilities, or sell :fatural gas in.any such -
market, unless and until there shall first have been
obtained from the Commission a certificate ‘that.
the present or future public convenience and neces-
sity require or will require such new construction
or operation of any such facilities or extensions
“thereof: Provided, however, That a natural-gas
company already serving & market may enlarge or
extend its: facilities for the purpose of supplying
increased market demands in the territory in which
it: operates. Whenever any natural-gas company ~
shall make application for a certificate of con-
venience and necessity under the provisions of this
subsection, the Commission shall set the matter for
hearing and shall give such reasonable notice of the
hearing thereon to all interested persons as in its
judgment may be necessary under rules and regu-
lations to be prescribed by the Commission. In
passing on ‘applications for certificates of conven- .
jence and necessity, the Commission shall give due
consideration to the applicant’s ability to render
‘and maintain adequate service at rates lower than
those prevailing in the, territory to be served, it
* ' (e), (f) and (g), as added, by amendments enacted Feb-
2a
being the intention.of Congress that.‘natural gas
shall be sold in interstate commerce’ for resale for
. ultimate publie consumption for domestic, commer-
cia}, industrial, or any other use ‘at the lowest pos-
sible reasonable rate consistent with the mainte-
nance of adequate service in the public interest.”
. .
2. Natural Gas .Act, §7(e) as amended, and §§7(d),
ruary 7, 1942, by Public Law No. 444, 77th Congress, 2d
. Session, 56 Stat. 83, 84, 15 v. S. C. STLTF (Ce), (d), (e), (f)
and (g): :
“(e) No natural-gas company or person which
_ will be a natural-gas company upon completion of,
any proposed construction or extensign shall en-
gage in the transportation or sale of Matural gas,
subject to the jurisdiction of the Co mission, or
undertake. the construction or extension of any
facilities therefor, or acquire. or operate any such
facilities. or extensions thereof, unless there is in -
_foree with respect to such natural-gas company 4
certificate of public convenience and necessity issued
by the Commission authorizing such acts or oper-
ations: Provided, however, That if any such -
natural-gas company or predecessor in interest was
bona fide engaged in transportation or sale of nat-
ural gas, subject to the. jurisdiction of .the Com-
mission, on the effective date of this amendatory ~
Act, over the route or routes or within the area
- for ‘which application is made and has so operated
_ since that: time, the Commission shall issue such
certificate-without requiring further proof that pub-
lic convenience and necessity will be served by such |
. operation, and without further procéedings, if
application for such certificate is made to the Com-
mission within ninety days after the effective date
2 | 2
3a
of this amendatory Act. Pending the determination
of any such application, the continuance of such
operation shall be lawful.
In all other cases the Commission shall set the
matter for hearing and shall give such reasonable
notice of the hearing thereon to ail interested per-
sons as in its judgspent may be necessary ‘under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Com-
mission; and the application shall be decided in
accordance with the procedure provided in -subsec-
tion (e) of this section and such certificate shall
be issued or: denied accordingly: Provided, how-
ever, That the Commission may issue a temporary
certificate in cases, of emergency, to assure mpain-
Aenance of adequate service or to serve particular
customers, without notice or hearing, pending the
determination of an application for a certificate, and
may by: regulation exempt from the requirements
of this section temporary acts or operations. for
which the issuance of a certificate will not be
required in the public interest. _,
(a) Application for certificates shall-be made in
writing to the Commission, be verified under oath, . ©
and shall be in such form, contain such informa-
tion, and notice thereof shall be served upon such
interested parties and in such manner as the Com-
mission shall, by regulation, require.
(e) Except in the cases governed by the pro- .
visos contained in subsection (c) of this section, a
certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant:
therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the
operation, sale, service, construction, extension,, or
acquisition covered by the application, if it is found
that the applicant is able and willing properly to do .
the acts and‘to perform the service proposed and to
conform to the provisions of the Act and the re-
quirements, rules, and regulations of the Commis-
~
da
sion thereunder, and that the proposed service,
sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisi-
. tion, to the extent anthorized by the certificate, is
' or will be required by ‘the present or future: public
_ convenience and necessity; otherwise such applica-
tion shall .be denied. The Commission shall have
- the ppwer te attach to the issuance of the certifi- '
cate gnd to the exercise of the rights granted.
thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions
as the public convenience and necessity may require.
(f) The Commission, after a hearing had upon
its own motion or upon application; may determine
the service area to which eath authorization under.
this section is to be ‘limited. Within such service
area as determined by the Commission a natural-
‘ gas company may enlarge or extend its facilities for
the purpose of supplying increased market demands
in such service area without further authorization.
(g) Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed. as a limitation upon the power of the
Commission to grant certificates of public con-
venience and necessity for service of an area
already being served by another natural-gas com-
pany.”
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.