Brief for Petition — Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
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; io i haiioad COURT. U. Se.
N THE SUPREME COURT OF THEO
ie Be oorOBER TERM, 186
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JAMES R. BROWNING, Clerk
“JOSEPH KERMAREC, "
re : Petitioner,
against -
" COMPAGNIE GENERALE TRANSATLANTIQUE.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIBCUIT |
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
©
Stanparp, WEISBERG, Haroips & Matament
Lous M. Votan
Attorneys for Petitioner
Epwarp J.MataMent . e
Matcoio B. Rosow
Of Counsel |
_.,
Furledistion pevionmniancieecaeees ae
Statement of the Case ... a
Questions Presented . :
Summary of Argument
Argument:
I—The basis of this action isa maritime tort
- pequiring the exclusive application of Fed-
eral maritime law. The application of New
York law was therefore error
: II—Since a maritime tort is present and federal
maritime law is applicable, respondent was
under a duty to provide petitioner with a
seaworthy wwessel. The Courts below erred
in refusing to apply the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness
11L_Whatever standard fe care was due ope
tioner, respondent was negligent ... nent,
_ A—Where, as here, federal - maritime law.
is exclusively applicable, the judicial
lawmaking powers of this Court can
and should be exercised as a matter of
public policy, to eliminate any distinc- .
_ tion between “invitee” and “licensee”
and this Court should substitute a
single standard of due care for all au-
thorized shipboard visitors .................
'B-Even if the federal maritime law ree-
ognizes a distinction between inyitee
and licensee, appellant was an invitee
to whom respondent owed a — of
‘reasonable care ....
¢
a oo we
19
ee 3 cantina Gene RAR 41.
sO . apex
Fa . : } : : Page
: C—If petitioner was a licensee the respon-
~~qent~ breached-a—dufydue him. The -
evidence supports the verdict. It was \
error to set it aside ..... 30
. Conclusion sonedd eae ra dcibicintesccite 1] Ry
Appendix: pAGRAE SEI ee cdiiabhadieates 37
Table: of CURRIE bv paeicicicrvnnens sai sicliitciloant ee
: Statutes iE SN ROO BT : aw : ix
Miscellaneous Sirona den eeas Pe vmsctinbshigadancapions ae |
CITATIONS :
| Cases Crrep:_
Aguilar v. Standard oil Company, $18 US. 724,
2.15 ge; SROane es Sear 1. 27, 29
Aho v. Jacobsen, 249 F. (2d) 309: (1 Cir. 1957),,
"Cert. pending Sidi lcdicnicdcaniitcesateasiimedvaliipapiabnes 19, 21,25 @
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Dalen. 347 USS. ee
396, 74 S.Ct. 601 (1954) .. : 12, 17, 20
Amer. Ry. Express Co. v. Gilbreath, 48 F. (2d)
=f Al A IAM MMI accisesecpec gutless scriciisaeiedondctecpene, 38
, Amerocean Steamship Company v. Copp, Jr.,
245 F. (2d) 291 (9 Cir. SINE Y iisadconcnnssccioniamnnbiasce / 45
) Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Newton, 131 F. (2d) .
a ee Re orn Neel eee 32
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52,
Sk FS CERIN) onscreen ioe
Barthowski v. Schrembs, 67 N.E. (2d) 922 (Ohio
PAM UD chicken ssalaeiebcidadsicichesadicasastionriniepececce 37
Berge v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers Corp., 251 F.' (2d)
‘717 (2 Cir. 1958), cert. den. 78 S.Ct. 4... 14,17
Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Lines, 238 F. (2d)
385 (9 Cir. 1956), cert. den. 354 U.S. 938, 77
S.Ct. 1400 (1957) .............. Saieipcsbuaalankcaels senses 13, 17
Biggs. v. Bear, 320 Ill. App. 597, 51 N.E. (2d)
Bird \v. Clover Leaf- Harris Dairy, 125 P. (2d) © |
bits (Utah S.Ct. 19RD) winceenecinnenndneonesecrenecerssnnsenes 37
ee
The E Blue Moon ul, 60 F. (2d) 653 (D.cwD..
W099) acs
_ Bogateroff v. Caplan, 108 N.Y.S. (2a) 205” (Sup. -
Ct. 1951), affd. 279 App. Div. 1357 (1st Dept.
1952). .: ee 38
Bowers v. City Bank “Farmers Trust Co, 282° ; 3
‘N:Y.442, 26 N.E. (2d) 970 (1940) ... . 29, 38
Bredenhender - v. Midtown | iPeoperiice Inc., 4 3
ae es (2d) *276, 164 N.Y.S. (2d) 276
Ce Fi. BOND sik scents 39
Briggs vy. John Yeon Co., 168 Ore. 239, 122 P.
(2d) 444 (1942) 0... BEA clears 2. RE * 37
. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. :
389, 242 S.W. 646 (Sup. Ct’ 1922) ... 3.
Byrd v. Napoleon Avenue Ferry Co.,.125 F. Supp. \
573 (D.C.E.D. La. 1954) aff'd 227 F. (2d) 958
(5 Cir. 1955), cert. den. 351. U. S. 925, 76 S.Ct.
Te TU? Giri eee eS eee 15, 16, 18
Byrne v. N: ¥. Central @ H. R. Ry. Co., 104 NY. poe
} a o_ g PR RRR Ee eee eee - 40
Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 US. 255 4
fl ARP RISA SIE SE I SAGER Se Em Me /. (Q™ -
Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 94/
Oe. Gn) GR ai
Caudill v. Victory Carriers Inc., 149 F.Supp. 11 |
CI Wh, TY sisi ests 15, 18
The Cayuga, 1937 A.M.C. 203 (9 Cir.) ................ 27.
Chelentis v. Luckenbach SS Co., 247 U.S. 372,
we YS YS eee 20°
Chic. Gr. Western Ry. Co. ‘v. Teecher, 150 F.
(2d) 394 (CCA 8th, 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. |
REE yrs Meer SHC LURE) SERRE LORY SEARS eon ee
Clapper v. Sabres, 261 App. Div. 858, 24 N.Y. 8.
_ (2d) 377 (3rd Dept. 1941) ..... ;
——— v. Watson Contracting Co., 219 N. Y.
1 AM NO
Coz v. Roth, 348 US. 207, 75 S.Ct. 242 (1955)
Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F° (2d) 834 (1 Cir. 1952)
Eckenrode v. Penn. R. Co., 335 U.S. 329, 69 S.Ct.
91. (1948) peu Sf | RAAT S EES OES
SSB B 2.
e
iv 3 INDEX
Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 Ny. 198 -
Bk: * Re eoaee. wae a
- Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ..
Faber v.:Meiler, 278: App. Div. S49, 104 N.Y.S.
(2d) 485 (2d Dept. 1951) ......... ~
Farrell v. United States, 336 U. S. 511, 69 S. Ct. :
ee. BI Clr Rae Rene Panna
Firfer v..United States, 208 PF. (2d) 524. (D.C.
Oir. 1968) soo. :
Flickenstein v. Great Ail. etc. Tea Co., 91 N.J.L.
. ' 145,402 Atl. 700 i 2) Sa eee
: Fogerty v. Bogart, 59 App. Div. 114, 69 N.Y.S.
: 47 (2d Dept. 1901) ......... vip litisinlitnnssbtaincsbcsbicticopauons
Foz v. Warner-Quinlan Aaakelt Co., 204 N.Y.
GOR CIMIE icici ee
The Francesca, 1937 A.M.C. 1006 (D.C.W.D.
pin Be RANE 2 Seta OSS SUE Se A One Sree Oe
Friedman v. Berkowitz, 206 Misc. 889, 136 N.Y.S.
: (3a) 81 (City Ct 10664) 55.
Garrett v. Moore-MeCormack Co.; 317 U.S. 239,
. 63 S.Ct. 246 (1942)
_ Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. i8, 18 “S.Ct. “yy
8g BARES ERKT I Sa ee Re ee ERAS MES Be ese
Gilcher v. McNulty Bros. Realty Co., 295 N. Y.
1 0 a
Gleason v. Academy of the- Holy Crees, 168 F.
(9d) S61 €D:0. Cir. 1948) no
Graber v. Grant Printing Corp., 26 N.Y.S. (2d) -
RR re i ee een ae
Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Petroleum Co.,
mee FS a Ry EPR eA Ace eee
Grogan v. O’Keefe’s Inc., 267 Mass: 189, 166
We Ms FRE (ROR) rissa cstv ati
Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 170.
(2 Cir.'1938), cert. den. 303 US. 660, reh. ‘den..
BONS RR ERC ASAS SIA Sota eh Abana eS
_. Halecki, Adma. v. United N. y: @N. J. S. H. P.
@, Assn., 251 F. (2d) °708 (2 Cir. =_— cert.
, granted June 9, 1988 ae eee SE
INDEX © rata
Hawkins v. Coulsdon and Purley UV. D: Co., 2 All.
. E.R. 364 (1953); affd' 1 All. E.R. 97 (Ct. of
~ App.) ssocalidhidioccieeecepiridedisaadisloctdalodigliestdeaisiianeietonibrceiiers 32, 34
Higyine v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104. eee) ieatela ~ 40-
_ Imperial Ou, Ltd. ve Drlik, 234 F. (2d) 4 (6 Cir. :
j | ERP RSNA TERS yA ac cece ee 14, 17
Jansson v. Boadich American Lanes, 185 F. (2d)
212, 30. A.L.R. (2d) 1385 (1 Cir. 1950) ...2....... 10
Jones’ v. Pa. Coaketc. Corp., 255 Pa. 339, 99 Atl.
Be COED peek ieee 37. .
Jordine v. Walling, 185 F. (2d) 662 (3 Cir. 1950). 10
Kermarec v. Compagnie ‘Generale Transatlan-
tique, 245 F. (24) 175 (2 Cir. 1957) ..........: weeeely 10, 21,
: a 26, 30, 31
Klotz v. Gane, 296 N.Y. 715, 70 N.E, -(2a) 538 - :
Fe | GPR SOR SE FS SNS SRL eer ey Sees Meee ae 29
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. "Stewart, 253 U.S. 149
(1920) pe Rela Wis bs A ok RRL RR Oa .20
Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1881) ....10, 19, 25
Lester v. U. S., 234 F. (2d) 625 (2-Cir. 1956),
cert. den. 352 U.S.. 889, 77 S.Ct. 130 (1957) .... 14, 17
The Lottawanna, 88 U. S. $66 (676) 8, 20, 21
McCann v. Anchor Line, 79 F. (2d) 338 (2 Cir.
1935) - Lio Sie SARTRE Soe 28
McDaniel v. The Lisholt, 155 F. Supp. 619 (D. C.
Sane .D.N.Y. 1957), aff’d —— F. (2d) —— (2.Cir.
I I cide ccicaopiceeraicenen 14, 16, 25, 39 ©
McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N. a.
RCN Si ek Seca Ae cE - 28
McLaughlin v. Mulqueen, 1929 A. M.C, 1626 ~
> 8 noe ae ee Se 27
-» Mahnich v. Southern SS Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S. Ct.
ge) RMA 9 RS TSE ae :.-3 8-12, 20 .
Masek v. Bubenheimer, 229 Wise. 194, 281 N.W. |
924 (1938) ......a......... SU ilapicsnstclactacbtthetiosinissonstois sae
The Max Morris, 13NU.S. 1: (1890) pec ae ae
- Mayer v: Temple Prop 168 37 N.Y. 559 (1954) 41
Mazey v. Loveland, 133 Minn. 210, 158 N.W. 44
Ve SNS Ea SCE. SE ES ea eC - 42
: bed :
‘
‘ ,
‘Meek v. Corbisello, 266 App. Div. 1044, MNS.
(2d) 529 a Dept. 1943) .. ee = 3041-7
ol
(1920) srsssees
x. ES v. ig 258 oe ial (i930)
_ Mercier v. Bushwick Sav. Bank, 261 App. Div. ~
151, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) 666 (2d Dept. 1941), .affd .
~
40
261 App: Div. 1105, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 1003 (1941): 29, 37
_ Messel v. Foundation. Co., 274 U.S. 427 (1927) ..
Middleton v. P. eaarorn “Ross Inc.,.213 F. 6 ce
Cir. 1914)
Milis v. Heidingsfiled, “192, So. 786 (La. App.
-- 1939) .....:
Millspaugh v. Northern fedions Pub. Serv. Co. =
~ 104 Ind. App. 540, 12 N.E. (2d) 396 (1938) ..
Morrison v. Carpenter, 179 mich. 207, ‘146 N. Ww.
106 (1914) 7
New York Lubricating Oil Co. v. Pusey, 211 F:
622 (2 Cir. 1914),
Nowery v. Smith, 69 F Supp. 755, D.CED. Pa.”
] “wie, 27-28
affd. 161 F. (2d) 732 (3 Cir. 1947 ).:
~ O'Donnell v: Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 63
— §.Ct. 488 (1943) ......
Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal, A2d) 133, 148 P.
' (2d) 19 (1944) .- i
Olderman v. Bridgeport City Trust Co. -» 125. -
- Conn. 177, 4 Atl: (2d) 646 ...:....
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483 (1903) ...
Palermo v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 355 U. Ss.
"18,78 S.Ct. 1 (1957) °..
Panama R. Co. v.- - Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct.
391 (1924)
Paquet v. Barker, 950 App. Div. 771, 293 N. Y. Ss. °
983 (2d Dept. 1937) ps
Pearson. v. Lambeth Borough Council, 2 K.B. ‘
353 (1950), affd. A All. E.R. 682 (1950 Ct.-of -
/ _ App.)
. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F. (2d) 577
(De. a ATE
——— re
. 20
32, 41
28
. 8, 20
38, 39
32
ee F 2
82
99
INDEX |
__ Petree v.Davison-Pazon Stokes Co., nif Ga.
App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923) 2... eesceectenenee 37
Petterson v. Alaska ‘8.8. Co., 205.F. (2d) 478 °
> (9 Cir. 1953), affd. per curiam, 347 U. 8. 396,
74 8.Ct. 601 (1954) _.: 14
‘Phillips v. United States, 103 F. ‘Supp. 943 (E.D. BEES
Tenn. 1952) .......: MT. «
Pincock v. McCoy, 48 “Taaho 227, 281 P. 371 ¢ :
: (1929) 39
Pope & Talbott, Ine. v. gy 346 US. 706, 14
ro ~~ SEO: 2028 (1953) eta sa We -6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 20, 25
Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 8.W. (2d) °°. *
Pee Oe | eee Sito Se eene ~eeneeee 41
Cwion v. Staten [sland R. T. Ry. Co.; 224 N.Y.
493 .(1918) . 27, 28°
Radio Cab Inc. v. Hauser, 128 i (2d) 604 (C. CAL
D.C. 1942) : 32..
- Radoslovitch v. Baviiiiives. Libera Trisling, a
S.A., 72 F. (2d) 367 (2 Cir. 1934) ms St, 20
' Raidy v. U. S., 252 F. (2d) 117 (4 Cir. 1958), - .
_affd. 153 F.Supp. 777 (D.C. Md. 1957) ............ 14,17
Read v. United States, 201.F. (2d) 758 3 Cir. -
~. 1953) - : 2 1.
Reardon v. Thompson, 149 -Mass. 267, 21 N. E.
369 (1889) .... 42
Recreation Centre Corp. v. ‘Zimmerman, 172 Md.
see eS “ee a eee
: Rogers.v. Missourt Pacific Ry. ra 352 USS. 500, ue
% 2: Be 5 SBne eRe teria ewene memreler wate 34
Ross v. Steamship Zeeland, 240 F. (2d) 820 (4 . on
‘he: TO a ee ci ee 15
Roth v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 266
App. Div. 872, 42. renner (2d) 592 (2d Dept.
- 1943) 38
St. Louis R. Co. v. Wirbel, 104 Ark. 236, 149°
BAR, OR 203909) 7. $8
Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.
“CORe GR (IO oe cc » 38
Seas Shipping Co. v. . Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 .
S.Ct. 872 (1946) nn i--ceeecneseen---8, #2; 18, 15, 19,20 ~
\
Page
Shepard v. United States, 290 U. 8. 96, 54 S. Ct. |
~, 32 (1938) 21
Slater v. Clay Cross Co. Ltd., 3 W.L.B. 232 (Ct.
of App. 1956) ....... . 82, 33:
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 Uz s. » 205
pg RUBEN Ne repel BURT NSIT aio o gt RRR OER a 4 Ce 20
The State of Maryland, 85 F. (2d) 944 (4 Cir. ey
1936)... a Aa
The Sudbury, 14 F. (2d) 533 (D. C: Ore. 1996) 25
Bide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Richardson, -
_ Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. _App. 609, 162
-_Unjon-Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 256 F. (aay 449
) re ae 14,17 &
Voirin v: Colapagnie Generale Transatlantique ©
|) SRE Re eee =; 88, 37
Warren v. U. &., 340 U.S. 523, ‘i S.Ct. 432
eS” ae eS - 20, 27
West v. U. S., 143 eho. 473 (D.CED. Pa.
I the TIES CEE BOS AS 14
Wilder v. aes: 2 App. Div. 2a) 354, 156 N.Y.S.
"INDEX
In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.
(2d) 771 (5 Cir. 1952); aff'd 346 U.S. 15, 73
S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) 22.2.0... 33
'169-F. (2d) 802 (9 Cir. 1948) -....0..........eecceeneee 27
Oe ee 1 ee 39
Vaughan v. Transit Development Co., "238 N.Y.
79 (1917) ASE MEN BEE IS le PR > 42
(The Champlain), 151 Misc. 498, 270 N.Y.S. - mente
AR SE Tas Oe ese 6-28
Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, mat Atl. 502
_ (2d) 85 (1st Dept. 1956), affd. 3 N.Y. (2d) 725°
8 ieee MADR: RRA EOE 38 .
Wilson v. Goodrich, 218 Towa 462, 252 N. W. 142
ste sastacububisabnhicuideaiaieccsaudset as Uaioe } 37
: a Page
SraruTEs — a
- ° United States Constitution, Art. II, ‘Bes. ceases ake Rana
Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 9, 1 Stat. 6, 28 oo
U.S.C. 1333 .... 20
Occupiers’ Liability Act of 1957 2
5 & 6 Eliz. 2c. 31 oe . sesee 9, BO DBy BO
28.U.S.C. See. 1254(1) ........ echt 2
i OA We, BOO os a | pei,
28 U.S.C. See. 2101(e) ........... oe a
/ 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1331 ...... RRR MER C* BNE
" MisceLtaxzovs: ec | =,
Cooley, Law of Torts, 3rd Ed. Beals Vol. , &
p.. 1259 .. 26
2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts ( 1956) . 1, 24
Law Reform Committee, Third Report ( 1954) .. 2, 23
. 1 Restatement, Agency Sec. 27 2, Comment ="
(1933) ........ 33
2 Restatement of. Torts, See. 332 Comment d,
TAA 9 OR eI MII cece bonis idea enh Shirvecincencaions 28
oe Restatement of Torts, Sec. 332, Comment h,
p. 901 .. en 2
2 Restatement of Torts, ‘Sec. 360, p - 976 Seana ae
Salmond on Torts, 10th and p. ant seceetneeeeetnne 22
1 TRE SPREME HORT OFTHE UNTED SHES
OCTOBER TERM, 1958 ©
No. 22
+ : |
- JOSEPH KERMAREC,
3 against
COMPAGNIE GENERALE TRANSATLANTIQUE.
Petitioner,
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Opinions Below .
_ The opinion of the District Court (S.D.N.Y., Murphy, -
- D.J., BR. 93-94) does’ not appear-in the Official Reporter:
' The opinions of the Court of Appeals (R. 94-108) are
reported in 245 F. (2d) 175. Petition for rehearing was
denied by the Court of Appeals without written opinion
(R. 109).
Jurisdiction
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit was entered May 21, 1957 (R. 108-109).
‘The petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed on Septem- ’
ber 23, 1957 and granted on December 16, 1957 (R. 110).
\
"aS
The jurisdiction of this Court to review the final judg- 4
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second -
Circuit. is provided by Sections 1254(1). and 2101(c) .of
Title’ 28, U.S. Code.
ian
Statement of the Case
On November 24, 1948, sseuk noon, Kermarec accom-
: | panied by Henry Yves, a member of-the crew, boarded the
~~ —$.S. Oregon ‘while berthed in the North River at New York
- City (R. 46-48). In accordance with customary practice
permitting crew members to entertain guests aboard the:
vessel, Yves had obtained a pass from the exécutive officer
of the vessel specifically authorizing Kermarec’s visit (R.
20, 46). Yves retained the pass and it was neither shown,
read. nor explained to Kermarec (R. 48). The visit, con-
cededly, was personal and social (R. 8).:
Petitioner remained on the vessel until 4 :00.or 5:00 p.m.
While leaving the vessel under the guidance of Yves, peti-
tioner began, to descend a 12-14. step crew and passenger
stairway covered with 4 continuous white canvas runner
0
about 1/8” thick (R. 11, 12, 15, 57, 69, 73, 90, 91). The stairs
. appeared “normal” and “look ‘alright all the way down”
'(R. 12, 24). Holding on to the handrail, Kermarey con-
tinued his descent without ee mishap until he reached .
the fourth step from the bottom. At this point the canvas,
suddenly slipped from under his foot and he was precipi-
tated to the bottom of the stairway striking his, right hip
(R. 12). ‘While lying at the bottom of the stairway, peti-
tioner saw the cahvas hanging” off ths ledge of-the step
(R. 13, 26). |
The canvas had been fastened to the step by Sidon. 4 a
ship’s porter, as part of his regular duty to clean and |
‘cover the stairway upon arrival in port (R. 53, 55, 56, 57).
The ay instruction received from the Chief’ Steward, his -
ieee
superior officer, was that“the canvas cover must be tight,
' that you don’t have any trouble with it” (R. 66). The vessel
’ had arrived in port the day preceding the accident (R. 55).
After the passengers had left, Bourdon cleaned the stairs
_ and laid the canvas runner (R. 55, 56). On the following
day, the day of the accident, at 8:00 a.m., less than 24 hours
after he had first cleaned the stairs, he had to pick up the
canvas a second time, clean the steps and reset the canvas
_ because they. were “not quite clean, somewhat ‘dirty, from re
the crew of the ship” (R. 56). The picking up and laying.
-down of the canvas runner was “routine” and involved |
‘ “always the same kind of work” (R. 56). The canvas was
fastened by means of two small carpet tacks, one. on each
side of the canvas to the front edge of the steps (R. 58).
Nothing held the canvas to the rear of the step or up the
_ riser to the step above (R. 60). The lifting and removal of
the canvas runner could be done quickly. The tacks were
pulled out by hand alone. As Bourdon put it, “It is not
hard at all, you just get hold of the canvas and then the
tacks come out by themselves” (R. 32, 60). :
‘Asa result of his fall, petitioner sustained a fracture of
hospitalized from November 24, 1948 until February 12,
1949, and was disabled from work until October 16, 1949.
There was no dispute during the trial as to the injury, loss
_ of wages, hospital or medical expenses (R. 79).
The . case was tried twice, before the same Judge and
two different j juries. The first jury disagreed and the Court -
denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint after
f discharging the jury.. At the end of -the stcohd .trial, the .
jury rendered. a verdict for the petitioner in the sum of
The size of the tack is indicated by Bourdon’s own drawing
(R. 89, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5). The typical location of: the two tacks
in each step is shown by Bourdon’s two crosses on the top step of
the stairway photograph (R. 90, Defendant's Exhibit C).
the right femur with displacement and shortening. He was
eee
\
ot $7500. The Court sian intial siesta motions —
to set aside the verdict and dismiss the complaint (R. 2).
The trial judge charged the jury ‘that petitioner was a
“gratuitous” and “bare” licensee .and that the law of the
forum, i.e., New York, applied; pursuant to which plaintiff
- could recover only if the jury found that the respondent .
knew of the unsafe condition created: by the canvas and *
‘failed to correct it or warn the petitioner about it (R. 74, :
79, 93). He refused to charge that petitioner’s accident
was a maritime tort, and accordingly, refused to apply the.
federal maritime doctrines of comparative negligence dnd .
unseaworthiness (R. 74, 77, Transcript of Proceedings
. Below, pp. 99, 220). In his opinion setting aside the verdict
and dismissing the complaint, Judge Murphy conceded that
“there was evidence as to the size of the tacks and * * *
. that they could be removed easily.” He nevertheless found
that there was a “complete failure of proof” that the re-
_spondent “had actual knowledge of the dangerous eondi-
tion” or_that such knéwledge could be imputed to the
respondent because its servants had used tacks inadequate
for the purpose (R. 93, 94, 96). 7
. Cireuit Judge Lumbard speaking for the majority of
the-Court-eoneeded: that “evidence was adduced at trial
from which a jury could find” that the canvas was fastened
'. to each step by two tacks only; that these could be removed
‘simply by taking hold of the canvas, and that Kermarec
had sustained his injury when the canvas had slipped under .
his foot.- The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, affirmed the
dismissal below and sustained the trial Court on its inter-
pretation of ane bi sateenenee: law: (R. 95-100).
2 Since the’ /pey verdict was in ‘plaintiff's ne, the Court’s
- refusal to apply the principle of comparative negligence was not
prejudicial. ilialag the failure to apply the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness was prejudicial; since it would have obviated the proof.
of knowledge which, according to the Court, petitioner had failed.
to prove.
LS
Phe sharp dissent of Chief Judge Clark sets forth sub-
_ stantially the basis for this appeal (R. 100-108). _
‘Questions Presented ite:
_ 1, Whether shipboard i injury, in navigable waters, to
an duthorized guest of a crew member, due to a defectively
- affixed stairway canvas runner, constitutes a maritime tort
requiring the exclusive application of federal maritime
law!
2. pee ae the ‘appibenkility. of federal maritime law,
was respondent under a duty to the petitioner to provide _
_ aseaworthy vessel? Did the Courts below err in refusing to ©
, apply the doctrine of unseaworthiness? ;
3. Assuming the applicability of federal maritime law,
the doctrine of unseaworthiness aside, what was the scope
of the duty owed to the petitioner to determine whether
respondent was negligent? ey
(a) Should federal maritime law require from the ship-
owner a single standard of care for all authorized visitors
. aboard the vessel—or does it adopt the common -” dis-
tinetion between licensee and invitee?
(b)- Assuming that the federal maritime law perpetuates
the common law distinction between licensee and invitee, —
did the Courts below err in refusing to hold that petitiones <a
was an invitee?
(c) Assuming that the. Courts below sinaiihe found that
‘petitioner was a licensee, was there sufficient evidence to
support the. verdict for the petitioner under the charge .
which the Trial ourt gave to the jury? Do the decisions |
- of the Courts below, constitute a interference with —
the jury verdict? | .
———
-§ eae
Tes
_ Summary of Argument
LThe basis of this action is a maritime tort and federal |
" maritime law, not state or common law, should apply.
The Trial Court, therefore, erred in refusing to apply
_ the doctrines of comparative negligence and unsea-‘
'. worthiness. It also ‘indicated confusion as to the ad- |
miralty jurisdiction of the Court on the civil side.
Pope & Talbott v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 706 resolved ‘these
issues, but the District Court refused to follow, and
the majority of the Court of Appeals failed to correct.
Hence, the need for,a definitive adjudication as to
_ the definition of a maritime tort and the applicability.
| ‘of federal maritime law on the civil side of the Court,
' whether or not diversity is present where maritime
’ tort is involved. ‘e
: II—The application of the doctrine of unseaworthiness -
has resulted in decisional conflict and confusion: The
majority and minority opinions below reflect two .
divergent views: The restrictive “ship’s work” theory ~
"which would limit the doctrine-only-te-those doing
/ work essentially of a seaman’s nature; the more -
liberal approach which would extend the doctrine to
all lawfully present shipboard visitors. The issue is
before -this Court for the first time. The majority
below erred in refusing to apply the doctrine to licen-
sees. This Court should not now engraft upon the
federal maritime law the repudiated common law
categories of invitee and licensee (Point HI, A). For
_ the same reason, it should not now similarly burden: |
_the doctrine of: mncaworthiness. eee =
I11—Whether ae to be an invitee or licensee, ‘Tespon-
dent was negligent.
7
A~This Court has never definitively decided whether | :
the rigid common law categories of invitee and.
licensee are part of the federal maritime law.
‘lawmaking powers to declare the maritime law,
this Court may refuse to accept this concept as
it previously refused to accept the doctrine of
contributory negligence. Both are harsh rules ©
- incompatible with modern admiralty policy. The
_ English Occupiers’ Liability Act of 1957 has done
away with the distinction between invitee and
_ licensee in favor of’a single standard of due care.
This Court should act similarly in furtherance
of a progressive maritime law.
B—If. the federal maritime law does veccgnise éi
distinction between invitee and licensee, petitioner
was in fact an invitee to whom respondent owed
a duty of reasonable care. The development of
this. point is essentially the same as in the dis-
- senting opinion...There is no body of precedent
that a social guest of a seaman is a licensee.
-. Kermarec’s presence on the vessel satisfies both
the “invitation” and “economic benefit” criteria
in determining his status as an invitee.
—Even if petitioner-is held to be a licensee, respon-
dent breached its duty. There was ample evi-
~ dence of a dangerois condition. The Courts
below palpably erred when they limited their _
3 _ finding solely to the inadequacy of the carpet
.tacks. Respondent is chargeable with knowledge
~~~ of the condition-of the stairway because Bourdon,
; its employee, created the condition in thé regular.
\ eourse of his employment. ‘Respondent's liability
ean, therefore, be predicated either upon-the —
| Reece activity” or “condition of the prem-
Under its unique, coristitutionally vested,. judicial. -
ee
ises” theories. There was evidence to support
the jury verdict. Setting it aside was an im-
proper interference with the jury fanetion. The,
; verdint should be reinstated.
1.
Ths Basis of This Action ts & Maritime Tort Requiring the
Exclusive Application of Federal Maritime Law. The
Application of New York Law Was Therefore Error.
' Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 US. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202,
should have resolved any residual doubt as to (a): what con-
stituted & maritime tort; (b) the “necessary dominance” .
of the general maritime law doctrines of comparative —
negligence and unseaworthiness over any contrary state
law, where a maritime tort was involved’ and (c) the appli-
_eability of these admiraity principles notwithstanding that
_ jurisdiction wa based on diversity and that the case was
_ brought on the’ w side of the Court to be tried before a
-¥et, in the case at aS the Trial Court refused to find
that the subject matter of Kermarec’s action was a mari-
time tort. Accordingly, it refused to- apply. the principles
of comparative negligence and unseaworthiness, and it
\«
*
*The terms “federal” and “general” maritime law are used
synonymously and refer to those “* * * federal maritime policies
© * © (and). substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling
Acts of Congress or interpretative decisions of this Court.”
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, p. 410: See also O’Donnell v.
Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40 40, 63 S.Ct. 488; 490; The Lotta-
wanna, 88 U.S. 558.
' See also, Panama R. Co. v. Jéhneon, 264 US. 375, 391, 44 S.Ct.
391, 395, and Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, $28 U.S. 85, 88-89,
66 8.Ct. w78, 076, | ag
7 ar
=
expressed uncertainty as to whether petitioner’s right to
invoke these principles was not otherwise forfeited because
‘the suit was tried to a jury onthe law side of the Court.
Because of these misconceptions, the Court felt obliged to
apply the law of New York {B,74-77).
The majority of the Court of ‘Appeals, except for its
specific ruling on the issue of unseaworthiness, did not .
deem it necessary to correct these errors. Thus it remained
silent as to whether a “maritime tort was here involved; _
whether it was non-prejudicial error to have applied the —
New York law of absolute contributory negligence, and it
expressed no opinion as to whether admiralty principles _ :
could be invoked only on the admiralty side of the Court.
Nor is it clear from the opinion, moreover, whether its
affirmance that petitioner| was a licensee who had failed
to prove respondent’s actual knowledge of agdangerous ©
condition, was based on its interpretation of New York..
_. law, or, whether it was declaring this to be the applicable
federal maritime law principle.
A definitive resolution of these issues is spells needed _-
for several reasons. Any lingering uncertainty at this late ~
date as to what constitutes-a-maritime-tort and-whether in
a case involving such tort the federal maritime law must
be applied, whether on\the law or admiralty side of the .
"Court, will result only in needless error and unnecessary
appellate litigation. In this. connection we respectfully
submit ‘that in the interest of maximum certainty and uni-
formity in the application of admiralty doctrine, this Court
‘should ‘no longer withhold its judgment as to whether
- diversity of citizenship is essential to the jurisdiction of a.
District Court to try a maritime tort which does not involve
a federal statute.’ Finally, as we shall show at a later
*“In this situation we ‘need not decide whether the District
Court's jurisdiction ean be_rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C.A.
; § 1331, as arising ‘under the aes acc laws or treaties of the
sounded in negligence and unseaworthiness.
10 =
point, this Court now has the opportunity, in its discretion,
‘to eliminate the confusion-ridden doctrine of “invitee” and
“licensee” and to adopt as part of the general maritime law
a single standard of care for all. lawfully present persons .
who are injured as a result of a maritime tort.
Kermaree’s complaint necessarily invoked the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the District Court and tendered
a maritime tort for adjudication. He was injured on an
ocean-going vessel; the vessel was in navigable waters; a
member of the crew, in a foreign port, had requested and
obtained permission for Kermarec to visit him. The acci- |
dent was attributed to a defectively affixed and maintained —
‘ship’s appurtenance, i.e., a canvas runner fastened to a —
ship’s stairway to keep it clean between voyages pending
the embarkation of the ship’s passengers. The complaint
That the vessel was within New York waters and was not
in actual navigation at the time of the accident are not con-
trolling considerations. Nor is it necessary in this case,
though otherwise desirable, to determine “whether location
in navigable. waters was alone sufficient to make a tort
‘maritime’ or whether’ further - nautical flavor: was re- —
quired.”* Under either test, the subject. mattér of peti- -
tioner’s suit congtituted a maritime tort. Leathers v. Bles-
sing, 105 U.S, eB; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 .
~ US. 52, 34 S.Ct. 733; Foye d &é Talbot: Ine. v. Hawn, supra, |
P. 409.
If petitioner’ s suit does in fact involve + aeltionn tort, .
extended discussion should be unneces | "to establish
at
United States.” See Doucette v. Vincent, 1 ‘Cir. ‘194 F. 2d 834 and ©
Jansson v. Swedish American Lines, 1 Cir., 185, F. 2d 212, 30 A.L.R.
' 2d 1385. Cf. Jordine v. Walling, 3 Cir., 185 "F.2d 662. » heste &
- Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, p . 410, ftn. ‘4. \
¢ Kermarec V. Compagnie Generale Transstiontique, 2 Cir., 245
eT :
\
mt
the satin principle that ‘iad tort is to be adjudicated
' solely by reference to federal maritime law and not by
. application of-the forum: state law. “The ‘complaint * * * -
- shows that the claim rests on a maritime ‘tort which under
the Constitution is subject to.dominant control of the Fed-
eral Government.”* “In many other cases this Court has
declared the necessary dominance of admiralty principles
in’ actions in vindication of rights arising from admiralty
law.”* “While states may sometimes supplement federal
maritime policies, a state may not deprive a person of any
‘substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling Acts
- of Congress or by interpretive decisions of this Court.”* '
This is not in —— of Erie R. Co. v. hctctst sae “paed
U.S. 64.
. “The constant shtiatine of legiuidtion and jurispru-
dence is to assure_litigants full protection for ail sub-
_ stantive rights ‘intended to be afforded them by: the
- jurisdiction in which the right itself originates. * * *
—~ So here, in trying this case the state court was bound
’ to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights
of the parties under controlling a law would be
-_protected.”.”° :
"Pope & Talbot Ine. v. Sein, noha. 410 ftn. 4.
' 8 Garrett v. Moore-MeCormack Co., 317 ‘US. 239, 244, 63 S.Ct.
246, 250. |
' ,* Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, supra, pp. 409-410,
Pes Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra, p. 245.
sf ‘
are
ae
12
Since » Maritime Tort Is Present and Federal Maritime
‘ Law Is Applicable, Respondent Was Under a Duty to
Provide Petitioner With a Seaworthy Vessel. The
Courts Below: Btred in Refusing to Apply the Doctrine
.of Unseaworthiness.
The shipowner’ 8 absolute duty to provide a ‘meworty
vessel and to indemnify persons injured in. consequence of .
a breach of such duty is an established concept of admiralty
‘. law, notwithstanding its ancient and “perhaps unascertain-. "
able” origins.” In England, seamen first obtained the pro-
tection of this “humanitarian policy” in 1876;” in this —
country not. until 1903. Since The Osceola, the ap lication
_ of the doctrine has required the attention of this Court on’
several occasions. Thus far the principle adjudications —
have established that it is not-limited solely to the immedi-
ate employees of the shipowner, but extends .to other cate- F
-gories of workers who are injured in the service of the ~
vessel; it is immaterial whether the unseaworthy condi-
tion was latent or could have been avoided by due dili-
~, gence ;** “or that the unseaworthy- appliance-was—not—part—
of the ship’s equipment but was brought aboard by an inde-
7 pendent contractor.”*
Two basic ‘considerations have motivated these recent
- decisions: (a) the, hazardous nature of marine operation
remains unchanged, but with modern specialization of labor,
?
11 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 US. 85, 91, 66 S.Ct. 872, 875.
2 The Osceola, 1p9 US. 158, 171; 23 8.Ct. 483, 487 (1903).
18 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracks, supra; Popé & Talbot Inc. v.
Hawn, supra.
14 Mahnich v. Southern BS Co., 321 US. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455.
% Alaska Steamship Co. v./ Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 74 8.Ct. 601.
13
‘many different categories of workers are now exposed to.
the. dangers which originally | confronted seamen only ;’
(b) the brunt of the-loss to the victim of an unseaworthy -
vessel and his dependents should be assumed by: the ship-
‘owner becausé of his ability to distribute the loss over the
i industry. Otherwise, unable to discover or remove the
cause of the evil, the person injured might not. recover
under orginary rules of negligence. givin
The’ ‘application of these principles, however, has re-
sulted in some degree of uncertainty as. to the ultimate
scope of the doctrine. The current decisions are in ¢onflict
and the conflict, in the main, stems from a restrictive and
_ exclusive application of the first of the two premises. Were ~~"
* the lower courts have adopted the “ship’s. work” criterion
_ as the sole test, an unseaworthy vessel and its owner have
been exonerated," unless “the work on which the plaintiff
46 “These and other considerations arising from the hiirds which
‘maritime service places upon men who perform it, rather than any
consens is of responsibility, have¢..been the paramount in- .
the shipowner’s liability for unseaworthiness as
its absolute character. * * * this policy is not confined to
“seame who perfbrm the ship’s service under immediate hire to
éxtends to those who render it with his consent or
by his arrangement. * * * The risks themselves arise-from-and_are .
incident in fact to the service, not merely to the contract pursuant
to which it is done.” Seas Shepping Co. v: Bieracki, pp. 94-95.
/ “These (hazards of marine service), together with their help-
‘ lesaness to ward off such perils and the harshness of forcing them
to shoulder alone the resulting personal disability and loss, have
_ been thought to justify and to require putting their burden, in so
- far as it is measurable in money, upon the ownef regardless of his —
fault. Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent that
they may result from negligence. And’ beyond this he- is in posi-
_ tion, as the worker. is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping .
community which receives the service and should bear its cost.”
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracks, supra, pp. 93-94.
_ * Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Lines,9 Cir. 1956, 238 F.2d 385,
-. cert. den. 354 U.S. 938, 77 S.Ct. 1400. Shoreside machinist injured
on drydocked vessel by grinding wheel furnished by employer
which disintegrated while repairing propulsion machinery. Doc-
tet CF
yom
‘14
was waged was of a kind that the crew of a vessel was —
accustomed to perform.”.° Where, however, the Courts
have not attempted to’ match or sought equivalence in the’
operating requirements of ancient and modern maritime
serviee, the test applied has been simply lawful presence on —
So Ore es
a
pera of undsaworthiness held not applicable because person injured
erat was not doing. ship's work “to be performed historically or cur-
al
~ the ship”
rine by the crew” p. 387. The same Court in Petterson v. Alaska
/Co., 9 Cir. 1953, F505 F.2d 478, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 396,
ase Ct. 601 (1954) had permitted recovery to a longshoreman
ured by a defective block which his’ employer had brought
ghoerd the vessel. Cf. Read v. United States, 3 Cir. 1953, 201 F. 2a ‘a
58 holding warranty extended to “business. guest” engaged in.
changing a Liberty ship into a, transport. because of “failure to
‘supply rs keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to
762. Per contra, Berge v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers Corp.,
2 ‘Cir, 1958, 51 F.2d 717, cert. den, 78 8.Ct.. 994, where a sheared
shackle pin, admittedly unseaworthy, did not make’ shipowner —
liable, because vessel was undergoing “virtual rebuilding” and
“reconstruction” of a ship was not traditionally the task of the
crew” p. 718. In accord, Raidy v. U. 8., 4 Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 117
- affg. 153 F.Supp. 777; West v. U. 8. (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1956), 143 F.
Supp. 473, 479. Halecki Admz. v. United N.Y. & N. J. 8. H. P.
Assn., 2 Cir. 1958, 251 F.2d 708, cert. granted June 9, 1958. Shore-
side repairman engaged din cleaning engine room of pilot bout,
drydocked for annual repairs, died of tetrachloride poisoning.
Recovery allowed because deceased’s activities were essentially
crew work “and as to that it makes no difference. that the means °
employed .have changed with time” p. 711. See also: Lester v.
U. S., 2 Cir. 1956, 234 F.2d 625, 629, cert. den. 352 U.S. 889,77 |
» $:Ct. "130. Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 6 Cir. 1956, 234 F.2d 4, 8,
where Court found that ‘doctrine extended to a shoreside electrician
and shipyard worker on a drydocked. vessel, bat found no unsea-
worthy condition. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 4 Cir. 1958;
256 F.2d 449, a sandblaster was .denied recovery because. a vessel,
drydocked for repairs and structural changes, could not be ‘sea-
worthy, following the Berge, Raidy and |Lester decisions, supra.
-In McDaniel v. Lisholt, 155 F.Supp. 619 (D. C.S.D.N.Y. 1957)
F.2d ——, a Canal Zone fireman injured by |
affd. 2 Cir. 1958,
an explosion on a previously fire-disabled vessel, was’ denied re-
covery because he was not performing any traditional « or customary |
work of a seaman.
39 Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Cort ¥ oupre, p. 718.
—
~ the vessel with the owner’s consent or by his arrangement.”
The majority and minority opinions of the Court below © |
reflect this divergence and it is assumed that certiorari was
_granted-in the instant case in order that this issue might —
be finally resolved. 3 | ty
ag
‘The majority of the Court below, in denyitiz Kerm
- the’ protection of a seaworthy stair ray declared + *.*'* f
cannot say that this guest of a1 hemberof the-crew, wid WY
came aboard for a social visit, even’with\the- ws 3 ace” /); ke
quiescence, should be-classed as a’seaman’and entitled to — | aes
sue for unseaworthiness” pp. - | The NOourt s was thus> }——
limiting its application of the Sier cki.and Hawn decisions f+
‘solely to. those shoreside workers who demonstrably were
_ engaged in activity previously performed by seamen. For
- the Court also stated “Kermarec did not make any contri-
_ bution to the ship’s safety, preservation or progress; he
* ‘did not submit his life and safety to the ship as a seaman
does; he did not load her for voyage as a stevedore does; /°
~ consequently he does not have any right to recover for)
- unseaworthiness” p. 178.
This Court could not havé intended so narrow and un- a
realistic a limitation of the principle. Were it to have dae.
2 Ross v. Sinattibitn Zeeland, 4 Cir, 1957, 240 F.2d 820. Night
watchman employed by port service. “injured - by coil of wire on
tween deck which was inadequately illuminated. “It (the vessel)
was not reasonably fit to permit libellant to perform his task with
‘reasonable safety” p. 823. Amerocean Steamship Company v.
Copp, Jr., 9 Cir. 1957, 245 F.2d 291. Rigger on vessel drydocked
. for refurbishing slipped on, oily déck. Recovery allowed. “Any
vestiges of immunify from liability for negligent -_ toward ~
’ giders who are not seamen have disappeared” ‘293. By
Napoleon-Avente Ferry Co., 125 F.Supp. 573 (D.CE.D. La. 4).
aff'd 5 Cir. 1955, 227 F.2d 958, cert. den. 351 U.S. 925, 76 S.Ct. 783.
Recovery allowed to. injured passenger on unseaworthy ferry. —
Caudill vy. Victory Carriers Inc., 149 F.Supp. 11, 15 (D.C.E.D.
{ Va. 1957). Doctrine applied to soldier assigned to a floating crane -
and injured descending defective Jacob’s ladder of. defendant's s
vessel, used for access to crane from the vessel.
16
so, the aharkhic living and working conditions of seamen
which prevailed on the sailboat would now determine and.
cireumscribe those who require the same protection, even
more so, in the era of the atom-powered vessel." But
assuming, as we must, that this Court intended no such
-dead-hand shackling, and opened the benefits to all ship _
- workers, regardless of their activity or the nature of their *
‘employment, what of the host of shipboard visitors, whose
‘presence on the vessel is not immediately related to its —
operation? . Was it intended to deny the protection of’ a
seaworthy vessel to the governmental agency inspector,
ie, Custom House, Coast Guard; Immigration, ete.” or
_ to the marine insurance claim investigator, the labor union
representative, the ship’s passenger” and his guests, cargo
agents, the family and friends of the crew. members, who,
because ‘of modern quick turn-around voyages, might not
have time to leave the vessel? This question we believe is
tendered te the Court for the first time. 3
Three answers are possible: (a) the absolute liability
’- of a shipowner for an unseaworthy vessel is to be limited
only to workers performing a “ship work” function’: (b).it
extends also to those whé under common law would be
classified as “business invitees” but not to “licensees”;
(c) it extends to all who are lawfully present « on the vessel.
We. ‘submit that logic as well as the “urgent and. sound
reasons of public policy” oe pscacaed gave rise to the
1 See excellent summary by Parker, J. in The State of Maryland.
| 4 Cir. 1936, 85 F.2d 944, of the new age of navigation and its
requirements.
2 McDaniel v. The Lisholt, 155 F.Supp. 619 (S.D.NY. 1947) -
affd. —— F.2d —— (2 Cir. ‘July 10, 1958) where a Canal Zone
fireman was denied recovery.
*3 Byrd v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., 125 F.Supp. 573 (E.D. la.
1954) affd. 5 Cir. 1955, 227 F.2d 958, cert. den. 351 U.S. 925,
76 8.Ct. 783, where recovery was allowed.
doctrine of unséaworthiness, dictate the adoption of the
last formulation, Otherwise, the law would permit the irra-
tional result that the same defectively affixed canvas runner
- could create different degrees of liability dependent solely
upon the wholly fortuitous-cireamstance that it was a crew
-member, or a longshoreman and not Kermarec who was in-
jured when the canvas gave way. Thus, had Yves and
Kermarec been injured simultaneously, the majority of
the Court below would have had to hold:that Yves, alone,
could recover. To limit the doctrine solely to “ship workers”
' would ignore the many non-manual services which are both ©
required by and imposed upon.the shipowner in order to
conduct safely a modern maritime operation. It would
compel the Courts, moreover, in slow, piecemeal fashion,
to analogize every injured worker's activity in terms of the
original function of seamen in a pre-industrial era.* The
inevitable conflict \ in the findings would perpetuate the cur-
rent uncertainty d decisional disharmony, the elimination ©
” of which has been the historic function of admiralty law.
To extend the doctrine to “business invitees”. would be a
welcome clarification. But, as we shall develop in a later
point, it would import into the field of admiralty the need-
less confusion which has totally destroyed the utility of the
invitee-licensee concept at common law. It would also pro-
duce the rather anomalous result that the injured invitee
would be given the added protection of the shipowner’s
absolute liability; whereas the less legally protected licensee
would be denied it. Finally, if it be sound public policy to
* Judicial resistance to Alaska Steamshtp Co. v. Petterson, 347
‘U.S. 396, 74 S.Ct. 601, is reflected in the “structural alteration”
limitation adopted recently in Berge v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers,
Berryhill v. Pacific Far East, Raidy v. U. 8., Lester v. U. 8., Union
Carbide v. Goett and Imperial Oil v. Drlik, supra, ftn. 18. This
’ issue is not involved here. Kermarec was injured or a functioning
vessel. Quaere, however, whether antipathy to any further -exten- .
sion of the doctrine of Uunseaworthiness has noi obscured the
essential determinant in these cases-—has a maritime tort occurred?
This and not the nature or extent.of ship repairs should control.
of
© 1
compel the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for any
specific group of workers, that duty realistically is not
enlarged, but its salutory purpose is that much more effec-
tively achieved by extending the duty to all persons who
may be exposed to the same marine peril.
’ In Byrd v. Napoleon Avenue F erry Co., supra, the Court
declared : aes bdr
“It is true that in ; Powe & Talbot, the plaintiff was a
ship repairman, whereas here libellant was a passenger
_ on a-ferry. Nevertheless, the basis of her action, like
Hawn’s, was maritime tort and there is nothing in
Pope and Talbot which'would limit its application to
maritime tort relating only to ship repairmen’’ p. 577.
(Emphasis added.)
In Caudill v. Victory Curriers,. aupre, the Conrk went
further and stated:
“The day may come, if it has not already arrived, when
the doctrine of unseaworthiness will be extended.to all
business invitees aboard ship, for Sieracki holds that
o «
- liability arises as an incident of performing the ship’s *
service with:the owner’s consent” p. 15. (Emphasis
added.) eat
In neither case, it is submitted,-did the Court go far
~—enough. For the essential justification of the doctrine is. ,
best formulated in the reasoning of Chief Judge. Clarkin
his dissenting opinion, below.
“While it is true that the eine. Court referred
to the type of work done by Hawn as one reason for
allowing him to recover for unseaworthiness, I do not.
believe performarice of ‘ship’s work’ is a sine qua non .
' to recovery on that theory. The Sieracki case, which
Pope & Talbot, Inc., followed, gave as the reason for
19 .
extending the unseaworthiness doctrine to certain non-.
seamen the similarity of such individuals to seamen
as regards exposure to the same dangerous appliances,
| inability to bear the expense of injury, inability to
eapegied or remove the dangerous condition, inability
\to recover for the loss. from their employer, and in-
, lability to distribute the loss to the shipping industry
~ as well‘as the shipowner. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
supra, 328 U.S. 85, 93-96, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099.
Plaintiff meets these criferia” p.: 183. -
ny |
Whatever Standard of Care Was Due Petitioner, ©
7 Respondent Was Negligent.
A. Wuenz, as Here, Feperan Maritime Law’ Is
ExciusivELy APPLICABLE, THE JupDIcIAL Law-
Max1inc Powers oF Tus Court Can AND SHOULD.
Be Exercisep as A MatTrer or Pustic- Pouicy,
To Eximrnate Aut Distinctions Between “Iy-
VITEE” AND “LICENSEE” aND THIS Court SHouLp
-. Susstrrvre a Sincrz Stanparp or Due Care . .
FoR ALL AUTHORIZED Suipsoarp Visitors.
This Court has never definitively decided the iiiiladtite
standard of care due an authorized shipboard visitor. Nor
has it made any clear pronouncement adopting and incor-
porating the rigid common law categories of licensee/’
invitee into the federal maritime law. Leathers v. Blessing,
105 U.S. 626, 629 (1881). See, Aho v. Jacobsen, 1 Cir. 1957,
249 F.2d 309, 313 (cert. pending). The instant case affords
an opportunity, therefore, for a further contribution of .
maritime law towards a liberal and socially responsive
American jurisprudence.
That this Court is empowered to Pare the general
maritime law, and in its discretion to reject contrary state
1 GB {
. ing the licensee-invitee categories in favor of a single stand-
or common law, cannot be questioned.” “The question as
to the trug, limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdic-
tion is undoubtedly * * * exclusively a judicial question.” *
The power is derived from the Constitution” and the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789,” Accordingly, “the main source of
maritime law” has been the decisions of this Court.” Thus,
- it-has rejected the common’ law rule of contributory neg--
ligence as an absolute defense and enforced the principle
of comparative fault.” It has adopted and extended the
rule of liability without fault for unseaworthiness and
maintenance and cure without regard to the common law
doctrines of assumption of risk or the fellow servant rule.” :
“In many other cases this Court has declared the necessary
dominance of admiralty principles in actions in vindication
of rights arising from’ admiralty law.” * ak
It is submitted that the time is long overdue for discard-
"3 The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558; O’Donnell v. Great
Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40-41, 63 S.Ct. 488, 491; Pope & Talbot
Inc. v. Hawn; supra, pp. 409-410. :
2° The Lottawanna, supra, pp. 575, 576.
27 Art. III, §2.
2869, 1 Stat. 76; 28 U.S.C. 1333. 3 .
* Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, supra, p. 418. ae SS ewe
» The Max Morris, 137 U.S: 1, 14-15; Chelentis v. Luckenbach |
88 Co., 247 US. 372, 382-384, 38 S.Ct. 501; Pope & Talbot v. Hawn,
supra, pp. 408-411.
"The Osceola,. supra, p. 175; Mahnich v.. Southern SS Co.,
supra, pp. 102-104; Warren v. U. 8., 340 U.S. 523, 529-30, 71 S.Ct.
432. ‘Seas Shipping v. Steracki, supra, pp. 89-96; Alaska SS Co. v.
Petterson, supra, pp. 401-402. See also Coz v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207,
' 210, 75 8.Ct.’242.
82 Garrett v. Moore-MéCormack Co., supra, p. 244, citing South-
ern Pacific: Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; Chelentis v. Luckenbach
SS Co., supra; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 159;
‘Carlisle F wking Co. v. Sandanger, 259 US. 255, 259; Messel v.
Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 434.
oe ae 21
ard of care for all persons lawfully. on tlie premises. x :
may now be too late to accomplish: this in the civil law,
- except by: remedial state legislation. But within the sphere
of the general maritime law, this Court is. unencumbered
by precedent and may in its discretion refuse to engraft
_ upon the maritime law an ancient concept which has out-
lived whatever justification it originally possessed.
In determining the advisability of establishing one stand-
ard of care for all authorized shipboard visitors, the
Court will undoubtedly take judicial notice that the present
‘status of the common law in this area is characterized
by confusion, conflict and contradiction, often within the —
same jurisdiction or court. Predictability and uniformity
—especially significant in admiralty*—have no place in
the current maze. The just decision today is frequently
impossible except through such skillful use of semantics as —
to recall Mr. Justice Cardozo’s comment “discrimination
so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds. thes
It is true, as Chief Judge Clark. remarked, that the .
“distinctions (invitee, licensee and trespasser) have been
more and more obscured during the last century as Courts ©
have moved toward imposing on owners and occupiers
-a single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances.” **
But the very fact that his appeal to reason came in dissent, |
points up the’ need to exorcise a concept feudal in =
and rooted in class privilege.**
_ The chaotic state of the common law in the area of the
occupier” s liability to the invitee and licensee is strikingly
33 The Latemedin supra, p. 575. : aS,
** Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104, 54 S.Ct. 22, 25.
"3 Kermarece v. Compagnie Generale Frensaltentique, supra, p.
Q Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 27.1, p. 1432 (1956).
See also Aho v. Jacobsen, ie pp. es.
- "prehensive or exhaustive. Rather, it is intended to high-
: | the licensee-invitee concepts to the case at bar.
22
iain a Seaipavtaon‘of-the cases.””. The extended
footnote appended to this brief is not intended to be com-
light some of the glaring conflicts and contradictions, which
this Court would inevitably perpetuate, were it to apply
“In this connection we respectfully cal! the Court’s atten-
tion to the passage of the Occupiers Liability Act, 1957
(5 & 6 Eliz. 2c. 31) which has finally abolished the distine-
tion between licensee and invitee in favor of a single
standard of duty.
“The Act had been preceded by sharp criticism of the
- state of the law in England. - .
“The law on the whole wihiedt is still in a a confeie’
state. The delimitation between the different cate-
gories (sc. of persons entering on premises occupied
by others) is far from. settled, nor is it possible to
state with certainty the duties owed) to persons fal]-
~ ing within those categories. Had it been earlier and
_-more generally recognised that the topic is only one
- branch of the law of negligence it might have been
seen that the occupier’s duties cannot conveniently
- be put into strait jackets to fit the character in which
the plaintiff comes on to the premises and thé law
would then have been freed of some needless refine- —
ments and profitless distinctions.” Salmond on reseed
10th ed at p. 471." _—
The enactment had been yecommended in the “Third Repert:
of the Law — Committee (1954),” a body of leading
© Bee ini
' % For a more tolerant attitude see ‘Pollock on Torts, 15 Ed.
pp. 409-410 (1951).
il
English. Saitete who found the eommon n law-concepts entirely
unnecessary and in some aspects even absurd.” S
ed eed
“Tt is, indeed, really impossible withont lapsing into ,
absurdities to adhere strictly to the criterion of actual
_knowledge: nor in our view is it a desirable test. It
seems to us to put a premium on negligence. An occu-
pier who inspects his property periodically may actu-
_ ally know of dangers of which an occupier so careless
that he never inspects may remain ignorant. Thus the
“mere licensee’s’ prospect of recovering damages from —
some injury sustained through a defect in the premises
may vary with the occupier’s habits as regards inspec-
tion, If the oceupier is so negligent as never to inspect —
at all, he may not know of the trap which causes the
damage, in which case the mere licénsee has no remedy.
If the oceupier takes the trouble to inspect from time
to time he may know of the trap, in which case, if he
has omitted to warn the mere licensee of its presence}
the latter on suffering damage from it has a good
‘cause of,action.. We cannot think it is satisfactory to—
- make the injured licensee’s position depend on the idio- ’
syncrasies of the particular occupier.” Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, pp. 31-32. — .
' The Occupiers Liability Aet of 1957 establishes a single
standard of duty toward al! persons who visit the premises
of the occupier upon his invitation or with his consent. -
This duty is ‘defined in the following terms:
“The e wornmon duty of care is a si to: take such
care as in all the circumstances of the case is reason-
able to see that the visitor will be” reasonably safe in
* Gang the premiises for the purposes for which he is
% Copies of the Act and Law Reform he Report have
been deposited with the Clerk for the Court’s convenience.
—
4
invited or oicaaiiail by the occupier to be there.”
Bee. $(2).:. , fee
The Act further provides that the single standard of
cate is applicable to regulate |
- * “the obligations of a person: occupying or having
control over any fixed or moveable structure, including
any vessel, vehicle or aircraft.” Sec. 1 (3)(a). (me.
' phasis added.) - ei
" The disability of the licensee vis d vis his host rests upon
two assumptions: (a) he assumes the risk that the premises
may be dangerous, and (b) if injured, is contributorily
negligent poemnse he — exposed maou ad to this
risk.”
We suggest this Senwadition only to iaieiiaiihe that
- the issue now before the Court was in fact resolved when |
the Court refused to incorporate the common law defense
of contributory negligence into the general maritime law.
-Its reasoning then is equally applicable now:
“The harsh rule of the common law ender which'con-
tributory negligence [a licensee’s legal disability]
wholly barred an injured person from recovery is com- -
- pletely incompatible with modern admiralty policy and
- practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admir-
alty has developed and now follows its own fairer and
more flexible rule which allows such consideration of
-eontributory negligence in mitigation of damages [the —
safety of the premises and of all the circumstances
attending an injury to a lawful visitor) as justice re-
quires. Petitioner presents no persuasive arguments —
that admiralty should now adopt a discredited doctrine
” «2 Harper-& James, The Law of Torts, 1956, p. 1162.
25
which automatically destroys all claims of injured per-
sons who have contributed to their injuries in any de-———
gree, however slight [solely by reason of the fortuitous
nature of their lawful visit).”“* (Interpolations
added.)
B. — IF THE Fecenit. Maritime Law ReEcoc-
-yizes a Distinction Between Inviree anv Li-
CENsEE, APPELLANT Was aN ExvitEE TO WHOM
RESPONDENT Owep a Duty or REASONABLE CaRE..
, “Should the common law distinction between. invitee and Vi
licensee, be held to apply to federal maritime law,‘ the ap-
pellant is still entitled to recovery since the evidence was
3 sufficient to establish that he was an invitee on respondent’s
vessel.. ¢ fie as : rote
i? Whe majority of the Court below rests its conclusion on
‘ three erroneous assumptions. Kermarec was not an invitee,”
‘it declared, because ( a) the law “has long been settled that
the guest of a seaman ‘is nothing more. than a licensee”
p. 177; hence it could not consider any “novel question.”
(b) Precsdeai aside, only a business visitor can be an -in-
vitee. Since a shipowner degives no economic benefit from
the social guest of a crew member, the guest by definition,
cannot be an invitee. (c) Were the Court free to consider
the analogy of a landlord’s duty to the guest of a tenant,
it would reject it as inapplicable because a shipowner is.
not a landidrd and his “relationship to his seamen is very
different from that of a landlord to his tenant” p. at.
“| Pope & Talbot Inc. v.: Hawn, supra, pp. 408-409. °
2 McDaniel v. The Lisholt, supra, p. 627; Kermarec v. Com-
pagnie ge Transatlantique, supra, p. 177; Aho v. Jacobsen,
supra, p. 311.. Cf. Leathers v. Blessing, supra, p. 629 with The
Sudbury, 14 F.2 533 (D.C. Ore. 1926).
26
The dissenting opinion ieee exposes the fallacies:
First: “Economic benefit” i is not the sole criterion in de-
termining an invitee status. “Invitation,” of whatever na-
ture, equally controls. “If invitation is the touchstone, ‘it
must be shown that persohs authorized by the defendant-
‘hed the pint to believe . that the owner intended’ os ;
the premisés for that use” p. 180. |
In Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 2 Cir. 1938, 94 F.2d
170, cert. den. 303 U.S. 660,-reh. den. 304 U.S. 588, Judge
“The doctrine is well settled; the relation with its ©
‘ resulting duty arises only-when the person who enters
__ the premises does so in the interest of the owner, or
: wpon some business of his own, of which the owner has
notice and to an entry in pursuit of which he consents,
directly or brit ol p. 171. (Emphasis mee).
: This ‘formulation of ‘the alternative test was not new. In —
Cooley, Law of Torts, 3rd ed. (1906) Vol. 2, P. 1259, the
same statement of the law is found:
“When one expressly or by implication invites others
to come upon his. premises whether for business or
for any other purpose, it is his duty to be reasonably
sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and to -
that end he must exercise ordinary care and prudence
to render the premises safe for the visit.” (Emphasis
. sdded. )
‘Second: There is ‘no- body of pretedent that the social
guest of a seaman is a licensee. The cases cited by the
-majority are distinguishable, as Chief Judge Clark dem-
onstrated, by the absence of -both elements, i.e., there was °
neither “invitation” nor “economic benefit.”
*. . ad
27 sy
“e >
Third: In the instant case, Kermaree was an invitee
because he met both requirements. There was “invitation”
because the shipowner had expressly authorized his visit,
by the issuance of an official visitor’s pass. The shipowner
here, therefore, unlike those in the cases cited by the Court
below, had notice. of Kermarec’s intended visit, and had
consented to it. This was an implied if not an express
~ invitation,*. which alone could create an invitee status de-
spite the absence of any economic benefit to the shipowner.“
There was also . “economic benefit” to the respondent
: from -Kermarec’s. visit, albeit of an indirect. nature. We
need not expand on the cogent reasoning of Chief Judge
Clark which led him to. this conclusion. “In view of the —
shipowner’s liability to the\ seaman for injuries ‘suffered
in shoreside recreation, it is in, the owner’s economic inter-
est to encourage recreation aboard ship, rather than ashore,
thus making the seaman’s activities subject to control and
the men available on ship whenever needed.” ** Nor‘is there
** Should it make any difference chebie ‘the host or guest initi-
ates the invitation provided it is accepted?
“ Radoslovitch -v. Navigazione Libera Trienine , S.A. 2 Cir!
72 F.2d 367; Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Pet roleam Co., 33
AMC. 917; Cf. The Francesca (D.C.W.D.N.Y.), A.M.C. 1006;
The Cayuga, 9 Cir., 37 A.M.C. 203; McLaughlin v.
-EDN.Y.), 29 AMC. 1626. See, also, Tide Water
‘Co. v. Richardson, 9 Cir. 1948, 169 F.2d 802,803.
Dani chen Sites Ge aalieiie imeeadiine air tote te the
mate * * ° as was the likelihood of (plaintiff's) passing thru the
ee ee ee ee ee eee ot
taten Island R.T. Ry. Co.,
224 N.Y. 493, 496 (1918). Coal barge captain injured on defen-
_dant’s dock had “implied i invitation” to go ashore to. ogee ch
services.- Phillips v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 943, 946 (E.D,.
Tenn. 1952). Plaintiff injured in pass office of Oak Ridge Reserva-
tion, where she was seeking a pass to investigate her son’s accident ©
in the reservation, was invitee.
“P. 181, citing Warren v. United States, 340'U.S. 523, 71 S.Ct.
432; Aguilar v. Standard Oil Company, 318 U.S. 724, 63 8.Ct. 930;
Farrell v. United States, 33h US. 511, 69 S.Ct. 707 and Nowery v.
28
'. any logic in labelling the guest of a passenger an invitee,
but refusing such status to the guest of a seaman. McCann
v. Anchor Line, 2 Cir. 1935, 79 F.24 338, Voirin v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transqtlantique (The Champlain), 151
Mise. 498, 270 N.Y.S 643, 1934 A.M.C. 25. In the maritime —
cases particularly, “economic benefit,” though' slight and
most indirect, has been held sufficient as a matter of law.
"and policy, to clothe the plaintiff with the status of invitee.“
“It is not necessary that the visitor should himself be upon
the land for the ‘purposes of the possessor’s business, The
visit may be for the con'venience or arise out. of the neces-
‘sities of others who are themselves upon the land for such
a purpose” 2 Restatement of. = § cio comment d, 1934,
p. 990.
Fourth: The vessel, forall practical purposes, is a sea-
man’s home and the tenant-guest-landlord analogy is perti-
nent. 2 me iA , .
“Unlike men employed in service on land, the sea"
: ‘man, when he finishes his’ day’s work, is neither re-
lieved: of obligations to his employer nor wholly: free
! is dispose of his leisure as he sees fit. Of necessity,
‘Smith (D.C.E.D. Pa.), 69 F.Supp. 755, affd. 3 Cir., 161 F.2d 732,
It is not generally appreciated pp even when in port, seamen may
not have adequate opportunity for their affairs. Vesse
etn Sie ae career Sete tanker and passenger.
The short turn-around in port frequently compels the seaman to
con bik Say tok Selpuaas Oe Vaal ee pie. In fact, this is.
encbaraged hy the shipowner to oveid letmem and lest minute
crew shortages requiring “pier-head jumps.”
“ Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Petroleum Corp., supra; Rados-
lovitch v. Navigazione Libera Triestina 8.A., supra; Middleton v..
_P. Sanford Ross Inc., 5 Cir. 1914, 213 F-6; New York Lubricating
Oi Co. v. Pusey, 2 Cir. 1914, 211 F. 622. See also Quinn v. Staten
Island R.T. Ry. Co., supra; McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,
-304 N.Y. 314 (1952) and cases in the Appendix where economic
benefit in diverse situations similar to and often weaker than the
case at bar was found to justify recovery for an invitee. —
29
during the voyage he must eat, drink, lodge and divert
himself within the confines of the ship. In short, dur-
ing the period of his tenure the vessel is not merely
his place of employment; it is the framework of his
‘existence.” *
If the social iidati of the tenant can hold the landlord toa.
duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of the build-
_ing’s common stairways and approaches,” and if such duty
_ extends even to the-social guest of ‘the janitor,” a fortiori,
the authorized guest of a seaman should be entitled to the
same degree of protection from the shipowner. “A person
may be a business visitor of a lessor of land although he
is merely a gratuitous licensee of the lessee.” ©
When Kermarec started to descend the stairway, he had
a right to assume that it was safe to do so, [t was a common
stairway intended to be used by crew, passengers and any-
one who was lawfully on the vessel. Whether, in fact, it
.was safe should be determined by the usual rule of reason-
able care without regard to the status of the person injured.
If the licensee-invitee classification must be followed, how-
ever, it is submitted that petitioner was entitled to the
preferred status of invitee, and the Courts below erred in
- treating him as a licensee.
ad
- * Aguilar v. Standard Ou Ginnie, supra, p. 934.
' 4 Pessagno Vv. Euclid Inv. Co., D.C. Cir., 112 F.2d 577; Klotz v.
Ganz, 296 N.Y. 715, 70 N.E.2d 538: Bowers-v-City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 282 N.Y. 442, 26 N.E.2d 970; Gitcher v. McNulty Bros.
Realty Co., 295 N.Y. 743.
Mercier v. Bushwick Sav. Bank, 261 App. Div. 151, 24 N.Y.S.
2d 666, affd: 261 App. Div. 1105, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 1003. ;
#2 Restatement of Torts, § 332; comment h, p. 901; § 360, Pp. 976.
¢. Ip Perrrioner Was A Coe RESPONDENT.
Breacuep a Duty Dus Hin. “Dae EVIDENCE
zk TO Ser
‘Supports THE vant. ‘Ir Was
Ir AsIvE. ;
If clearer evidence ‘wete. nécessary to prove the “eop-
fusion now. rampant in the law of licens¢e and invitee, and~-
the need for a single standard of care toward all lawful
visitors, the instant case provides it. adi
The Trial Court-and the majority o the Court aie
adopted the classic definition of the duty owed to a licensee,
“ie. “the shipowner shall not wilfully or wantonly injure —
a licensee, or expose him to hidden perils or fail to use due
care to prevent injury to him after discovering that he is
in danger.”” Pursuant thereto, two essential 1 issues were
presented ‘to the jury: Was there a dangerous condition, |
and did the shipowner know of it? The jury found in the:
affirmative, but both Courts disagreed. There was no evi-
dence of a dangerous condition, dedlared both Courts be-
cause “There was gy evidence that he, tacks were inade- ©
quate” or that “they were.not s ited: for the purpose.” * —
Probably intending the same ‘conclusion of law, the Trial
‘Court stated://* * * the ca whether the defen-
dant should hve known of the erous condition, if in
fact it was dangerous, but whether it actually did know of.
it.”** The Majority below put it this way: “ * * ° this
(lack of evidence that tacks were ‘inadequate) was not
enough to permit the jury to draw the inference that. the
a should have known: that oe ural tae of the otair- :
e
.
rn
* Majority Opinion, p. 178. Charge to jury (R. 79}. _
ae Majority Opinion, p. 178. Memorandum of Trial Court (R.
‘s Memorandum of Trial Court (R. 93).,
as
way presented a condition of danger to Kermaree of which
he should ‘have been warned.” “ a
It is submitted that on both isntiea— the dangerous con-
B dition and i areca 8. knowledge — Courts ,
erred. fie!
aoe ‘As to the first, the question was not ‘aids the size or
adequacy of the tacks, but whether, considering. the length
_ of the runner, and the heavy traffic on the stairway (R. 56,
" 61), two carpet tacks, removable by hand alone, and placed .
only at the front of each tread with nothing to hold the
canvas in place at the rear of the step, or against the riser
to the step ‘above, were sufficient to keep the canvas from
coming loose and slipping off the step under the cumulative —
weight arid’ repeated jarring of those using the stairway.
We may assume that had a sufficient number of tacks been .
used, the canvas could have been held in place. But the
question before the jury was simply whether two tacks
alone were enough under the circumstances. To say, there-
fore, that there was no evidence that the tacks were inade-
quate for their purpose, in whatever sense ‘the term “ade- .
. quate” was used, is simply. ‘to.ignore the evidence and defy
_ reality. The jury unquéstionably could ‘find, and did, that.
“wdangerous condition. existed on 1 the stairw ay as Kermarec.
started to descend. ;
With respect to the second issue—respondent’ s stent
edge of the dangerous condition—thereé is no need to en-
large upon Chief Judge Clark’s analy sis,** except to refer —
to a authorities.”
* Majority Opinion, pp. » 178-179. 3
* Dissenting Opinion, PP. 179, 182.
% Negligent Activ ity of Occupier: Meek v. Cordisello, 266 App.
Div. 1044, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 529. Plaintiff,°“an invitee or licensec,”
injured by falling tree, partially sawed wi defendant’ . employens
s
wr.
: 82
“The. opportunities for loose or bulging canvas to
trip users of the stairs are so obvious to anyone who
has ever mounted a stairway ‘that not surprisingly the
jury found Bourdon had actual knowledge of the dan-
ger ut was too lazy to remedy it by atacand the
material properly.
Neither under the ervoneous charge which the trial
- court gave the jury nor under. the more favorable in-
‘who left the tree before the accident, permitted to recover. Radio |
Cab ‘Inc. v. ‘Hauser, C.C.A.D.C. 1942, 128 F.2d 604. Defendant,
business invitee of gas station, injured plaintiff, licensee, and ©
_" invoked owners immunity. Defendant liable. Where “* * © the
injury results from negligent acts of the occupier or his servants,
the immunity ‘disappears and the. Jiabili ity of the oceupier is the
same, to a licensee as to an invitee.” p. 605. The active negligence
‘which imposes liability on the occupier need not occur while the
licensee is on the premjses. Masek v. Bubenheimer, 229 Wisc. 194,
281 N.W..924; Meek v. Corbisello, supra; see Atlantic Greyhound
: Corp. v. Newton, 4 Cir. 1942, 131 Fed. 2d 845. The doctrine of
/active negligence is said to be an “attempt to remedy a perceived
injustice by mitigating the old rule that the property owner was
liable to noninvitees only for wilful or wanton injuries.” 156 A.L.R.
-1226:.
Dangerous Condition of Premises: The Blue Moon III, W.D.
N.Y. 1932. 60 F.2d 653. Licensee directed aboard vessel by defen-
dant’s empléyee, knowing deck had recently been waxed. Owner
liable. “* © © A dangerous condition existed * * * which was —
within the knowledge of respondent’s employee * * *.” p. 654.
Gleason v. Academy of the Holy Cross, D.C. Cir., 1948, 168 F.2d
561. Defendant liable to licensee who féll from top step of school
baleony. “Dangers that reasonably eareful people are likely not.
to discover are latent or hidden.” p. 562. See, also, Recreation
_ Centre Corp. v. Zimmerman, 172 Md: 309, 191 Atl. 233 (defect
in step); Morrison v. Carpenter, 179 Mich. 207, 146 N.W. 106
(unexpected step down in dark).
Knowledge of Danger. Imputed When Knowledge of Condition |
Known—The Objective Test: The Blue Moon iit. + Supra, p. 654;
Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl. 502,. 503: Olderman Vv.
Bridgeport City Trust.Cy., 125 Conn..177, 4 Atl. 2d 646, 648, The,
English, law is in accord “Hawkins v. Coulsdon’ and Purley U_D.
Co. (1953, 2 All. E.R. 344,affd. 1 All. E.R. 97, 108 (Ct.-of App.)
(L. J. Romer); Pearsoy v. Lambeth Begguyh Couneil (1950),
2 K.B. 353, affd. (1950), 1 All. E.R. 682 (€t. of App.) ; —
Clay Cross Co. Ltd. (1956), 3 W.L.R. 232 (Ct of App.). .
33
structions to which the plaintiff was. entitled was it
necessary to show ‘that the- defendant company (i.e.,
-. its top officers) had actual knowledge of the danger:
‘(1) If liability rests on. Bourdon’s affirmative negli-
gence in improperly tacking the carpet, his employer
is vicariously liable without fault of its own on prin-
ciples of respondeat superior; (2) if the “fault is the:
company’s failure to repair or warn of a hidden dan-
gerous condition, actual knowledge of the employee —
who created it may be imputed to the employer because ,
the knowledge concerns a matter as to which the em- |
ployee acts within the scope of the’ employment, e.g.,
‘1 Restatement, Agency § 272, comment a2 (1933); In
re Texas City Disaster Litigdtion, 5 Cir., 197 F.2d 771,
affirmed 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 ; Cashin
-v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co:, 96 Mont. 92, 168, 28 P.2d
862, 868 ;”
One year before the passage of the Occupiers’ Liability
Act of 1957,Lord Justice Denning, in Slater v. Clay Cross
Co. Ltd, (1956), 3 W.L.R. 232 (Ct. of App.), noted that
the modern English cases had effectively obliterated the
distinction in.the duty owed to an invitee and to 4-licensee
in the instant type of situation where the occupier had,
through its servant, actual knowledge. of the physical con-
dition. The Lord Justice states:
“The Law Reform Committee has recently recom-
mended that the distinction between invitee and |i-
_ -eensee should be abolished; but this result has already
- been virtually attained by the decisions of the courts. -
The classic distinction was that the invitor was liable
for unusual dangers of which heeknew or ought to
* know, whereas the licensor was only liable for con-
cealed dangers of which he actually knew. This dis-
tinction has now been reduced to vanishing point. The
34
_. decision of the court in Hawkins v. Coulsdon and Pur-
_ ley Urban Dist. Council; * * * shows that a.licensog,
as well as an invitor, is liable for unusual dangers of.
which he knew or ought to have known. The broken
_ step-in that case was not a concealed danger, but it
‘Was ‘an unusual danger; the loca! authority did not
know it was a danger, but they ought to have known ©
it; and they were held liable. The duty of the occupier
is nowadays simply to take reasonable care to see that
the premises are reasonably safe for people lawfully
‘- eoming-on-to them; and it makes no difference whether -
they are invit r licensees oan
At the risk of laboring the- point, we respectfully eapekt
‘that petitioner should never have become entrapped in the
' semantic quicksand of whether he was a licensee or invitee. |
The protracted litigation in this case' indicates the need for"
a single standard of care. But if Kermarec was a licensee,
he is nevertheless entitled to his verdict. The fact that this,
case was tried on two occasions with the first jury unable
- te agree and the second rendering its verdict for the peti-
tioner, presumptively indicates that there were questions
ef fact to be determined by the jury. The judges of the
Courts below also were unable to agree on their-findings of —
fact. Under such circumstances one cannot say that reason-
able men could not have differed and that there was no
evidence to justify the verdict. |
If the “single question” on this appeal is whether “ * * *
there was any evidence upon which the jury could have
found negligence on the part of the respondent * * * ,”*
that question here — be answered in the ellivnative.
* Eckenrode v.. enn. R. Co., 335 U.S. 329, 330, 69 S.Ct. 91, 92:
‘ Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77.8.Ct. 443, ‘451;
Palermo v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 355 U.S. 18; 78 8.Ct. 1;
Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18; 78 S.Ct. 3.
CONCLUSION
a
i facts having been resolved i in favor of the petitioner,
even on a charge less favorable than that to which he was |
entitled, the jury verdict should not have been disturbed
and should now be reinstated. — .
Respectfully, submitted,
. STANDARD, WEISBERG, eee & MaLaMENT
' Louis M. Votan |
Attorneys for Pétitioner
Epwarp J. Matanane
-Matcoio B. Rosow.
Of Counsel
ee ee \
ia
Footnote 37—
Tue Coyrusion in THE Case Law
A. Distinction Between Invitee and Licensee :
3 ‘The friend of a customer in the owner’s store.
a. Invitee—Briggs v. John Y éon Co., 168 Ore. 239,
122 P.2d 444 (1942)
b. Licensee—Flickenstein v. Great Atl. etc. Tea Co.,
91 N.J.L. 145, 102 Atl. 700 (1917)
2 The child of a customer in the owner’s store.
a. Invitee—Grogan v. O’Keefe’s Inc., 267 Maas. 199, -
166 N.E. 721 (1929)
‘pb. Licensee—Petree y.: Davison-Paxon ‘Stokes Co., -
. 30 Ga. App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 °(1923)
3. Person entering business esteblighment for nogere-
lated purpose.
a. Invitee—Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl.
- 502 (1931)
-b, Licensee—Bird v. Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy, 125
P.2d 797 (Utah S.Ct. 1942)
4: Guest of janitor.
a. Invitee—Mercier v. Bushwick Sav. Bank, 261
App. Div. 151, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 666 (2d Dept. 1941)
b. Licerisee—Barthowski v. Schrembs, 67 N.E. 2d
“ 922 (Ohio App. 1944)
5. Doctor visiting employee in factory.
a. Invitee—Jones v. Pa: Coal etc. Corp., 255 Pa. 339,
99 Atl. 1008 (1917)
b. Lieensee—Wilson v. Goodrich, 218 lowa 462, 252
N.W. 142 (1934)
- 88
.. Inquiry in reference to vacancy on premises.
a. Invitee—Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133,148
rf P.2d 19 (1944) (No sign out; placecard indicat-
ing “office”) «
ae pd v. Bogart, 59 App. Div. 114, 69 N.Y.S.
47 (2d Dept. 1901) (‘Flat to Let” sign) :
b. Licensee—Mills.v. Heidingsfiled, 192 So. 786 (La.
' App. 1939) (No evidence of a general advertise-
ment) —
. Going on premises Seeking employment.
a. Invitee—St. Louis R.-Co. v. Wirbel, 104 Ark. 236, ©
-. 149 S.W. 92 (1912) (An industrial — no in-—
vitation) |
b. Licensee—Amer. Ry. Express Co, v. Gilbreath,
48 F.2d 809 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1931). (No invita-
tion, told to go to back of building to see person
in charge of hiring.) —
. The social guest.
a. Of the Occupier-Licensee—Roth v. Prudential
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 266 App. Div. 872, 42 N.Y.S.
2d 592 (2d Dept. 1943)
Wilder v. Ayers, 2 App. Div. 2d 354, 156 N.Y.S.
2d 85 (1st Dept. 1956) affd, 3 N.Y. 2d 725
b. Of the tenant—invitee of the occupier-owner.
Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 282 N.Y.
442 (1940).
c. Of the host—treaied as pot in themselves: li-
_ censee—Seheibel ¥.. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102
N.E. 2d 453, (1951)
dd Business acquaintance ‘invited to private home
_ for supper—invitee of ; host—Graber v. Grant
Printing Gorp., 26.N.Y:S. 2d :990
e. Implieitly treated as invitee of host—-Bogaterof 3
_-y, Caplan, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 205 (Sup. Ct. 1951) affd. — .
279. App..Div. 1357 (ist Dept. 1952) °
39
f. Employee of tenant in two family house—invitee
of landlord-owner—Clapper v. Zubres, 261 App.
Div. 850, 24.N.Y.S. 2d 377 (3d Dept. 1941)
9. Policemen and firemen.
a. Licensee—Pincock v. McCoy, 48 fdahe 227, 281
P. 371 (1929) (Policeman) Todd v. Armour &
= 44 Ga. App. 609, 162 S.E. 394 (1932) (fire-
| man) McDaniel v. T he Lisholt, 155 F. Supp. 619
c.
_ put out fire on request.of owner—Buckeye Cotton
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd. 2 Cir. July 10, 1958,
. ie (fireman)
Occupier has duty of reasonable care to inake
passageways safe (invitee) —Bredenhender - a
Midtown Properties Inc., 4 App: Div. 2d 276, 164
N.Y.S. 2d 276 (1st Dept. 1957) Meiers. v. Fred
Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10 (1920)
City. fireman invitee when goes out of area to —
Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646
(Sup. Ct. 1922)”
B. Divergent Classifications of Lienbis
1. Three Categories : Licensee by express invitation; .
licensee by implied invitation; and, bare licensee—
Chic. Gr. Western Ry. Co, v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394
(C.C.A. 8th) cert. den. 326 U.S. 781 (lowa si '
2. Two categories;
a.
Licensee by invitation and licensee by permission
—Millspaugh v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co.,
104 Ind. App, 540,.12 N.E. 2d 396 (1938)
Bare licensee and licensee: by invitation—Firfer
v. United States, 208 ¥.2d 524 ~D.C. Cir. 4953)
(Federal Tort. Claims Act)
3. One Category—Gratuitous licensee: any person law-
*- fully on premises, other than a business visitor—
Oettinger v. Stewart, 2 Cal. 2d 133, 136, 148 P.2d
19 (1944)
40
¢. Standard of Care owed to a. ‘Lisviees
L. Different standards of eare owed to licensee in ;
New York.
a. Intentional or ‘wanton Seis Pe v. Warner- :
Quinlan Asphalt Co., 204 N.Y. 240, 245 (1912) (To
refrain from “intentional or wanton injury and ~
-from setting dangerous devices for the purpose
of harming trespassers.”) Mendelowitz-v. Neis-
ner, 258 N.Y. 181, 184 (1932) (“Toward mere
trespassers or bare licensees the rule is well set-
tled that the only duty owing-to them by the
owner or occupier of land is to abstain from in- ©
flicting intentional, wanton or wilful injuries un-
less he maintains some hidden engine of destruc-
tion eon ¢
b. Refrain ‘from acts of slbvmaties anes
Paquet v. Barker, 250 App. Div. 771, 293 N.Y.S.
983 (2d Dept. 1937) (“If he was a bare licensee,
*:* * the appellant owed the duty of refraining -
from -affirmative acts of negligence that. might
injure the former.”) Byrne v. N.Y. Central &
H.R. Ry: Co., 104 N.Y. 362 (1887) (Active negli-
gence distinguished from mere passive negli-
gence)... See, Constantino v. Watson Contracting
Co., 219 N.Y. 443, 445-446 (1916). (New York law .
recognizes “a distinction * * * between the con-
sequences of active and passive negligence.”)
2. “Objective or uidaaies standard of whether occupier
should have known the condition was unreasonably La
| dangerous to a licensee—New -York law—
a. Subjective standard—Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y.
104, 111 (1930) (Action by guests in auto against
owner-operator for injuries caused by defective
mechanism. “if Mason’s failure to realize that
the ‘something’ which was wrong with the auto-
mobile constituted-a dangerous condition was due
to his lack of mechanical knowledge, that was a
41
risk assumed ‘by the guests when they accepted
the invitation to take the trip”.):
3 b. Objective standard—Ehret v. Village of Scars-
dale, 269 N.Y. 198, 207 (1935) (“In this case it is
plain that by the exercise of reasonable vigilance,
the ‘defendant might- have anticipated that gas
might leak from a break ih the injured gas main
at the point where _it was encased in the pipe
drain * * * .”) Mayer v. Temple hap vite 307
N.Y. 559, .563-64 (1954)
. Time when‘ affirmative negligence takes place to im-
pose liability on occupier to licensee under | ew York
law.
a. At any time as long as eigen is affirmative
or active in nature—Meek v. Corbisello, 266 App.
Div. 1044, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (3d Dept. 1943) app.
den, 267 App. Div. 841; Mayer v. Temple Prop-
erties, 307,N.Y. 559 (1954); Friednian v. Berko-
witz, 206 Mise. 889,: 136 N YS. 2d 81 (City Ct.
1954)
b. Only while the licensee is on the premises—Faber
v. Meiler, 278 App. Div. $49, es N.Y.S.-2d 485 .
(2d Dept. 1951)
. Fall down unlighted steps by licensee.
' a. Occupier liable—Gleason v. Academy’ of the Holy
| Cross, 168 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (‘Dangers
that reasonably careful people are likely not. to
discover are latent or hidden.”)
*: Occupier not liable—Biggs v. Bear, 320 Ill. App.
597, 51. N.E. sabe (1943) "
. Injury to licensee caused by excavation on occupier’s
land. VP:
a. Occupier like Morison v. Carpenter, 179
46 ;
“Mich. 207, ¥46 N.W. 106 (1914)
b: Oceupier not liable--Porchey v. K elling, 353 Mo.
1034, 185 S.W. 2d 826 (1945)
'
a
“2
6. Injury to licensee caused by “obstruction placed on
land by defendant-occupier.
a. Gecupier liable—Masek v; Bubenheimer, 229 |
Wise. 194, 281 N.W. 924 (1938) (Top of iron
pipe extending above grass)
b. Occupier not liable—Mazey v. Loveland, 133
Minn. 210, 158 N.W. 44 (i) (Wire stretched
across lawn)
ay Whether darkness of night, concealing a dangerous
- eondition which otherwise the licensee would have
observed, renders the condition a hidden peril so as
to make the occupier liable to a licensee? — )
a. Occupier liable—Vaughan v. Transit Develop.
ment Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 84 (1917) (dictum)
b. Occupier not liable—Reardon v. Thompson, 149
Mass. 267, 21 N.E. 369 (1889)
0,
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