Brief for Petition — Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique

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; io i haiioad COURT. U. Se.

N THE SUPREME COURT OF THEO

ie Be oorOBER TERM, 186

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JAMES R. BROWNING, Clerk

“JOSEPH KERMAREC, "

re : Petitioner,

against -

" COMPAGNIE GENERALE TRANSATLANTIQUE.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIBCUIT |

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

©

Stanparp, WEISBERG, Haroips & Matament

Lous M. Votan

Attorneys for Petitioner

Epwarp J.MataMent . e

Matcoio B. Rosow

Of Counsel |

_.,

Furledistion pevionmniancieecaeees ae

Statement of the Case ... a

Questions Presented . :

Summary of Argument

Argument:

I—The basis of this action isa maritime tort

- pequiring the exclusive application of Fed-

eral maritime law. The application of New

York law was therefore error

: II—Since a maritime tort is present and federal

maritime law is applicable, respondent was

under a duty to provide petitioner with a

seaworthy wwessel. The Courts below erred

in refusing to apply the doctrine of unsea-

worthiness

11L_Whatever standard fe care was due ope

tioner, respondent was negligent ... nent,

_ A—Where, as here, federal - maritime law.

is exclusively applicable, the judicial

lawmaking powers of this Court can

and should be exercised as a matter of

public policy, to eliminate any distinc- .

_ tion between “invitee” and “licensee”

and this Court should substitute a

single standard of due care for all au-

thorized shipboard visitors .................

'B-Even if the federal maritime law ree-

ognizes a distinction between inyitee

and licensee, appellant was an invitee

to whom respondent owed a — of

‘reasonable care ....

¢

a oo we

19

ee 3 cantina Gene RAR 41.

sO . apex

Fa . : } : : Page

: C—If petitioner was a licensee the respon-

~~qent~ breached-a—dufydue him. The -

evidence supports the verdict. It was \

error to set it aside ..... 30

. Conclusion sonedd eae ra dcibicintesccite 1] Ry

Appendix: pAGRAE SEI ee cdiiabhadieates 37

Table: of CURRIE bv paeicicicrvnnens sai sicliitciloant ee

: Statutes iE SN ROO BT : aw : ix

Miscellaneous Sirona den eeas Pe vmsctinbshigadancapions ae |

CITATIONS :

| Cases Crrep:_

Aguilar v. Standard oil Company, $18 US. 724,

2.15 ge; SROane es Sear 1. 27, 29

Aho v. Jacobsen, 249 F. (2d) 309: (1 Cir. 1957),,

"Cert. pending Sidi lcdicnicdcaniitcesateasiimedvaliipapiabnes 19, 21,25 @

Alaska Steamship Co. v. Dalen. 347 USS. ee

396, 74 S.Ct. 601 (1954) .. : 12, 17, 20

Amer. Ry. Express Co. v. Gilbreath, 48 F. (2d)

=f Al A IAM MMI accisesecpec gutless scriciisaeiedondctecpene, 38

, Amerocean Steamship Company v. Copp, Jr.,

245 F. (2d) 291 (9 Cir. SINE Y iisadconcnnssccioniamnnbiasce / 45

) Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Newton, 131 F. (2d) .

a ee Re orn Neel eee 32

Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52,

Sk FS CERIN) onscreen ioe

Barthowski v. Schrembs, 67 N.E. (2d) 922 (Ohio

PAM UD chicken ssalaeiebcidadsicichesadicasastionriniepececce 37

Berge v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers Corp., 251 F.' (2d)

‘717 (2 Cir. 1958), cert. den. 78 S.Ct. 4... 14,17

Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Lines, 238 F. (2d)

385 (9 Cir. 1956), cert. den. 354 U.S. 938, 77

S.Ct. 1400 (1957) .............. Saieipcsbuaalankcaels senses 13, 17

Biggs. v. Bear, 320 Ill. App. 597, 51 N.E. (2d)

Bird \v. Clover Leaf- Harris Dairy, 125 P. (2d) © |

bits (Utah S.Ct. 19RD) winceenecinnenndneonesecrenecerssnnsenes 37

ee

The E Blue Moon ul, 60 F. (2d) 653 (D.cwD..

W099) acs

_ Bogateroff v. Caplan, 108 N.Y.S. (2a) 205” (Sup. -

Ct. 1951), affd. 279 App. Div. 1357 (1st Dept.

1952). .: ee 38

Bowers v. City Bank “Farmers Trust Co, 282° ; 3

‘N:Y.442, 26 N.E. (2d) 970 (1940) ... . 29, 38

Bredenhender - v. Midtown | iPeoperiice Inc., 4 3

ae es (2d) *276, 164 N.Y.S. (2d) 276

Ce Fi. BOND sik scents 39

Briggs vy. John Yeon Co., 168 Ore. 239, 122 P.

(2d) 444 (1942) 0... BEA clears 2. RE * 37

. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. :

389, 242 S.W. 646 (Sup. Ct’ 1922) ... 3.

Byrd v. Napoleon Avenue Ferry Co.,.125 F. Supp. \

573 (D.C.E.D. La. 1954) aff'd 227 F. (2d) 958

(5 Cir. 1955), cert. den. 351. U. S. 925, 76 S.Ct.

Te TU? Giri eee eS eee 15, 16, 18

Byrne v. N: ¥. Central @ H. R. Ry. Co., 104 NY. poe

} a o_ g PR RRR Ee eee eee - 40

Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 US. 255 4

fl ARP RISA SIE SE I SAGER Se Em Me /. (Q™ -

Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 94/

Oe. Gn) GR ai

Caudill v. Victory Carriers Inc., 149 F.Supp. 11 |

CI Wh, TY sisi ests 15, 18

The Cayuga, 1937 A.M.C. 203 (9 Cir.) ................ 27.

Chelentis v. Luckenbach SS Co., 247 U.S. 372,

we YS YS eee 20°

Chic. Gr. Western Ry. Co. ‘v. Teecher, 150 F.

(2d) 394 (CCA 8th, 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. |

REE yrs Meer SHC LURE) SERRE LORY SEARS eon ee

Clapper v. Sabres, 261 App. Div. 858, 24 N.Y. 8.

_ (2d) 377 (3rd Dept. 1941) ..... ;

——— v. Watson Contracting Co., 219 N. Y.

1 AM NO

Coz v. Roth, 348 US. 207, 75 S.Ct. 242 (1955)

Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F° (2d) 834 (1 Cir. 1952)

Eckenrode v. Penn. R. Co., 335 U.S. 329, 69 S.Ct.

91. (1948) peu Sf | RAAT S EES OES

SSB B 2.

e

iv 3 INDEX

Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 Ny. 198 -

Bk: * Re eoaee. wae a

- Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ..

Faber v.:Meiler, 278: App. Div. S49, 104 N.Y.S.

(2d) 485 (2d Dept. 1951) ......... ~

Farrell v. United States, 336 U. S. 511, 69 S. Ct. :

ee. BI Clr Rae Rene Panna

Firfer v..United States, 208 PF. (2d) 524. (D.C.

Oir. 1968) soo. :

Flickenstein v. Great Ail. etc. Tea Co., 91 N.J.L.

. ' 145,402 Atl. 700 i 2) Sa eee

: Fogerty v. Bogart, 59 App. Div. 114, 69 N.Y.S.

: 47 (2d Dept. 1901) ......... vip litisinlitnnssbtaincsbcsbicticopauons

Foz v. Warner-Quinlan Aaakelt Co., 204 N.Y.

GOR CIMIE icici ee

The Francesca, 1937 A.M.C. 1006 (D.C.W.D.

pin Be RANE 2 Seta OSS SUE Se A One Sree Oe

Friedman v. Berkowitz, 206 Misc. 889, 136 N.Y.S.

: (3a) 81 (City Ct 10664) 55.

Garrett v. Moore-MeCormack Co.; 317 U.S. 239,

. 63 S.Ct. 246 (1942)

_ Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. i8, 18 “S.Ct. “yy

8g BARES ERKT I Sa ee Re ee ERAS MES Be ese

Gilcher v. McNulty Bros. Realty Co., 295 N. Y.

1 0 a

Gleason v. Academy of the- Holy Crees, 168 F.

(9d) S61 €D:0. Cir. 1948) no

Graber v. Grant Printing Corp., 26 N.Y.S. (2d) -

RR re i ee een ae

Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Petroleum Co.,

mee FS a Ry EPR eA Ace eee

Grogan v. O’Keefe’s Inc., 267 Mass: 189, 166

We Ms FRE (ROR) rissa cstv ati

Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 170.

(2 Cir.'1938), cert. den. 303 US. 660, reh. ‘den..

BONS RR ERC ASAS SIA Sota eh Abana eS

_. Halecki, Adma. v. United N. y: @N. J. S. H. P.

@, Assn., 251 F. (2d) °708 (2 Cir. =_— cert.

, granted June 9, 1988 ae eee SE

INDEX © rata

Hawkins v. Coulsdon and Purley UV. D: Co., 2 All.

. E.R. 364 (1953); affd' 1 All. E.R. 97 (Ct. of

~ App.) ssocalidhidioccieeecepiridedisaadisloctdalodigliestdeaisiianeietonibrceiiers 32, 34

Higyine v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104. eee) ieatela ~ 40-

_ Imperial Ou, Ltd. ve Drlik, 234 F. (2d) 4 (6 Cir. :

j | ERP RSNA TERS yA ac cece ee 14, 17

Jansson v. Boadich American Lanes, 185 F. (2d)

212, 30. A.L.R. (2d) 1385 (1 Cir. 1950) ...2....... 10

Jones’ v. Pa. Coaketc. Corp., 255 Pa. 339, 99 Atl.

Be COED peek ieee 37. .

Jordine v. Walling, 185 F. (2d) 662 (3 Cir. 1950). 10

Kermarec v. Compagnie ‘Generale Transatlan-

tique, 245 F. (24) 175 (2 Cir. 1957) ..........: weeeely 10, 21,

: a 26, 30, 31

Klotz v. Gane, 296 N.Y. 715, 70 N.E, -(2a) 538 - :

Fe | GPR SOR SE FS SNS SRL eer ey Sees Meee ae 29

Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. "Stewart, 253 U.S. 149

(1920) pe Rela Wis bs A ok RRL RR Oa .20

Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1881) ....10, 19, 25

Lester v. U. S., 234 F. (2d) 625 (2-Cir. 1956),

cert. den. 352 U.S.. 889, 77 S.Ct. 130 (1957) .... 14, 17

The Lottawanna, 88 U. S. $66 (676) 8, 20, 21

McCann v. Anchor Line, 79 F. (2d) 338 (2 Cir.

1935) - Lio Sie SARTRE Soe 28

McDaniel v. The Lisholt, 155 F. Supp. 619 (D. C.

Sane .D.N.Y. 1957), aff’d —— F. (2d) —— (2.Cir.

I I cide ccicaopiceeraicenen 14, 16, 25, 39 ©

McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N. a.

RCN Si ek Seca Ae cE - 28

McLaughlin v. Mulqueen, 1929 A. M.C, 1626 ~

> 8 noe ae ee Se 27

-» Mahnich v. Southern SS Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S. Ct.

ge) RMA 9 RS TSE ae :.-3 8-12, 20 .

Masek v. Bubenheimer, 229 Wise. 194, 281 N.W. |

924 (1938) ......a......... SU ilapicsnstclactacbtthetiosinissonstois sae

The Max Morris, 13NU.S. 1: (1890) pec ae ae

- Mayer v: Temple Prop 168 37 N.Y. 559 (1954) 41

Mazey v. Loveland, 133 Minn. 210, 158 N.W. 44

Ve SNS Ea SCE. SE ES ea eC - 42

: bed :

‘

‘ ,

‘Meek v. Corbisello, 266 App. Div. 1044, MNS.

(2d) 529 a Dept. 1943) .. ee = 3041-7

ol

(1920) srsssees

x. ES v. ig 258 oe ial (i930)

_ Mercier v. Bushwick Sav. Bank, 261 App. Div. ~

151, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) 666 (2d Dept. 1941), .affd .

~

40

261 App: Div. 1105, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 1003 (1941): 29, 37

_ Messel v. Foundation. Co., 274 U.S. 427 (1927) ..

Middleton v. P. eaarorn “Ross Inc.,.213 F. 6 ce

Cir. 1914)

Milis v. Heidingsfiled, “192, So. 786 (La. App.

-- 1939) .....:

Millspaugh v. Northern fedions Pub. Serv. Co. =

~ 104 Ind. App. 540, 12 N.E. (2d) 396 (1938) ..

Morrison v. Carpenter, 179 mich. 207, ‘146 N. Ww.

106 (1914) 7

New York Lubricating Oil Co. v. Pusey, 211 F:

622 (2 Cir. 1914),

Nowery v. Smith, 69 F Supp. 755, D.CED. Pa.”

] “wie, 27-28

affd. 161 F. (2d) 732 (3 Cir. 1947 ).:

~ O'Donnell v: Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 63

— §.Ct. 488 (1943) ......

Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal, A2d) 133, 148 P.

' (2d) 19 (1944) .- i

Olderman v. Bridgeport City Trust Co. -» 125. -

- Conn. 177, 4 Atl: (2d) 646 ...:....

The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483 (1903) ...

Palermo v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 355 U. Ss.

"18,78 S.Ct. 1 (1957) °..

Panama R. Co. v.- - Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct.

391 (1924)

Paquet v. Barker, 950 App. Div. 771, 293 N. Y. Ss. °

983 (2d Dept. 1937) ps

Pearson. v. Lambeth Borough Council, 2 K.B. ‘

353 (1950), affd. A All. E.R. 682 (1950 Ct.-of -

/ _ App.)

. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F. (2d) 577

(De. a ATE

——— re

. 20

32, 41

28

. 8, 20

38, 39

32

ee F 2

82

99

INDEX |

__ Petree v.Davison-Pazon Stokes Co., nif Ga.

App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923) 2... eesceectenenee 37

Petterson v. Alaska ‘8.8. Co., 205.F. (2d) 478 °

> (9 Cir. 1953), affd. per curiam, 347 U. 8. 396,

74 8.Ct. 601 (1954) _.: 14

‘Phillips v. United States, 103 F. ‘Supp. 943 (E.D. BEES

Tenn. 1952) .......: MT. «

Pincock v. McCoy, 48 “Taaho 227, 281 P. 371 ¢ :

: (1929) 39

Pope & Talbott, Ine. v. gy 346 US. 706, 14

ro ~~ SEO: 2028 (1953) eta sa We -6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 20, 25

Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 8.W. (2d) °°. *

Pee Oe | eee Sito Se eene ~eeneeee 41

Cwion v. Staten [sland R. T. Ry. Co.; 224 N.Y.

493 .(1918) . 27, 28°

Radio Cab Inc. v. Hauser, 128 i (2d) 604 (C. CAL

D.C. 1942) : 32..

- Radoslovitch v. Baviiiiives. Libera Trisling, a

S.A., 72 F. (2d) 367 (2 Cir. 1934) ms St, 20

' Raidy v. U. S., 252 F. (2d) 117 (4 Cir. 1958), - .

_affd. 153 F.Supp. 777 (D.C. Md. 1957) ............ 14,17

Read v. United States, 201.F. (2d) 758 3 Cir. -

~. 1953) - : 2 1.

Reardon v. Thompson, 149 -Mass. 267, 21 N. E.

369 (1889) .... 42

Recreation Centre Corp. v. ‘Zimmerman, 172 Md.

see eS “ee a eee

: Rogers.v. Missourt Pacific Ry. ra 352 USS. 500, ue

% 2: Be 5 SBne eRe teria ewene memreler wate 34

Ross v. Steamship Zeeland, 240 F. (2d) 820 (4 . on

‘he: TO a ee ci ee 15

Roth v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 266

App. Div. 872, 42. renner (2d) 592 (2d Dept.

- 1943) 38

St. Louis R. Co. v. Wirbel, 104 Ark. 236, 149°

BAR, OR 203909) 7. $8

Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.

“CORe GR (IO oe cc » 38

Seas Shipping Co. v. . Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 .

S.Ct. 872 (1946) nn i--ceeecneseen---8, #2; 18, 15, 19,20 ~

\

Page

Shepard v. United States, 290 U. 8. 96, 54 S. Ct. |

~, 32 (1938) 21

Slater v. Clay Cross Co. Ltd., 3 W.L.B. 232 (Ct.

of App. 1956) ....... . 82, 33:

Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 Uz s. » 205

pg RUBEN Ne repel BURT NSIT aio o gt RRR OER a 4 Ce 20

The State of Maryland, 85 F. (2d) 944 (4 Cir. ey

1936)... a Aa

The Sudbury, 14 F. (2d) 533 (D. C: Ore. 1996) 25

Bide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Richardson, -

_ Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. _App. 609, 162

-_Unjon-Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 256 F. (aay 449

) re ae 14,17 &

Voirin v: Colapagnie Generale Transatlantique ©

|) SRE Re eee =; 88, 37

Warren v. U. &., 340 U.S. 523, ‘i S.Ct. 432

eS” ae eS - 20, 27

West v. U. S., 143 eho. 473 (D.CED. Pa.

I the TIES CEE BOS AS 14

Wilder v. aes: 2 App. Div. 2a) 354, 156 N.Y.S.

"INDEX

In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.

(2d) 771 (5 Cir. 1952); aff'd 346 U.S. 15, 73

S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) 22.2.0... 33

'169-F. (2d) 802 (9 Cir. 1948) -....0..........eecceeneee 27

Oe ee 1 ee 39

Vaughan v. Transit Development Co., "238 N.Y.

79 (1917) ASE MEN BEE IS le PR > 42

(The Champlain), 151 Misc. 498, 270 N.Y.S. - mente

AR SE Tas Oe ese 6-28

Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, mat Atl. 502

_ (2d) 85 (1st Dept. 1956), affd. 3 N.Y. (2d) 725°

8 ieee MADR: RRA EOE 38 .

Wilson v. Goodrich, 218 Towa 462, 252 N. W. 142

ste sastacububisabnhicuideaiaieccsaudset as Uaioe } 37

: a Page

SraruTEs — a

- ° United States Constitution, Art. II, ‘Bes. ceases ake Rana

Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 9, 1 Stat. 6, 28 oo

U.S.C. 1333 .... 20

Occupiers’ Liability Act of 1957 2

5 & 6 Eliz. 2c. 31 oe . sesee 9, BO DBy BO

28.U.S.C. See. 1254(1) ........ echt 2

i OA We, BOO os a | pei,

28 U.S.C. See. 2101(e) ........... oe a

/ 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1331 ...... RRR MER C* BNE

" MisceLtaxzovs: ec | =,

Cooley, Law of Torts, 3rd Ed. Beals Vol. , &

p.. 1259 .. 26

2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts ( 1956) . 1, 24

Law Reform Committee, Third Report ( 1954) .. 2, 23

. 1 Restatement, Agency Sec. 27 2, Comment ="

(1933) ........ 33

2 Restatement of. Torts, See. 332 Comment d,

TAA 9 OR eI MII cece bonis idea enh Shirvecincencaions 28

oe Restatement of Torts, Sec. 332, Comment h,

p. 901 .. en 2

2 Restatement of Torts, ‘Sec. 360, p - 976 Seana ae

Salmond on Torts, 10th and p. ant seceetneeeeetnne 22

1 TRE SPREME HORT OFTHE UNTED SHES

OCTOBER TERM, 1958 ©

No. 22

+ : |

- JOSEPH KERMAREC,

3 against

COMPAGNIE GENERALE TRANSATLANTIQUE.

Petitioner,

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Opinions Below .

_ The opinion of the District Court (S.D.N.Y., Murphy, -

- D.J., BR. 93-94) does’ not appear-in the Official Reporter:

' The opinions of the Court of Appeals (R. 94-108) are

reported in 245 F. (2d) 175. Petition for rehearing was

denied by the Court of Appeals without written opinion

(R. 109).

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit was entered May 21, 1957 (R. 108-109).

‘The petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed on Septem- ’

ber 23, 1957 and granted on December 16, 1957 (R. 110).

\

"aS

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the final judg- 4

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second -

Circuit. is provided by Sections 1254(1). and 2101(c) .of

Title’ 28, U.S. Code.

ian

Statement of the Case

On November 24, 1948, sseuk noon, Kermarec accom-

: | panied by Henry Yves, a member of-the crew, boarded the

~~ —$.S. Oregon ‘while berthed in the North River at New York

- City (R. 46-48). In accordance with customary practice

permitting crew members to entertain guests aboard the:

vessel, Yves had obtained a pass from the exécutive officer

of the vessel specifically authorizing Kermarec’s visit (R.

20, 46). Yves retained the pass and it was neither shown,

read. nor explained to Kermarec (R. 48). The visit, con-

cededly, was personal and social (R. 8).:

Petitioner remained on the vessel until 4 :00.or 5:00 p.m.

While leaving the vessel under the guidance of Yves, peti-

tioner began, to descend a 12-14. step crew and passenger

stairway covered with 4 continuous white canvas runner

0

about 1/8” thick (R. 11, 12, 15, 57, 69, 73, 90, 91). The stairs

. appeared “normal” and “look ‘alright all the way down”

'(R. 12, 24). Holding on to the handrail, Kermarey con-

tinued his descent without ee mishap until he reached .

the fourth step from the bottom. At this point the canvas,

suddenly slipped from under his foot and he was precipi-

tated to the bottom of the stairway striking his, right hip

(R. 12). ‘While lying at the bottom of the stairway, peti-

tioner saw the cahvas hanging” off ths ledge of-the step

(R. 13, 26). |

The canvas had been fastened to the step by Sidon. 4 a

ship’s porter, as part of his regular duty to clean and |

‘cover the stairway upon arrival in port (R. 53, 55, 56, 57).

The ay instruction received from the Chief’ Steward, his -

ieee

superior officer, was that“the canvas cover must be tight,

' that you don’t have any trouble with it” (R. 66). The vessel

’ had arrived in port the day preceding the accident (R. 55).

After the passengers had left, Bourdon cleaned the stairs

_ and laid the canvas runner (R. 55, 56). On the following

day, the day of the accident, at 8:00 a.m., less than 24 hours

after he had first cleaned the stairs, he had to pick up the

canvas a second time, clean the steps and reset the canvas

_ because they. were “not quite clean, somewhat ‘dirty, from re

the crew of the ship” (R. 56). The picking up and laying.

-down of the canvas runner was “routine” and involved |

‘ “always the same kind of work” (R. 56). The canvas was

fastened by means of two small carpet tacks, one. on each

side of the canvas to the front edge of the steps (R. 58).

Nothing held the canvas to the rear of the step or up the

_ riser to the step above (R. 60). The lifting and removal of

the canvas runner could be done quickly. The tacks were

pulled out by hand alone. As Bourdon put it, “It is not

hard at all, you just get hold of the canvas and then the

tacks come out by themselves” (R. 32, 60). :

‘Asa result of his fall, petitioner sustained a fracture of

hospitalized from November 24, 1948 until February 12,

1949, and was disabled from work until October 16, 1949.

There was no dispute during the trial as to the injury, loss

_ of wages, hospital or medical expenses (R. 79).

The . case was tried twice, before the same Judge and

two different j juries. The first jury disagreed and the Court -

denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint after

f discharging the jury.. At the end of -the stcohd .trial, the .

jury rendered. a verdict for the petitioner in the sum of

The size of the tack is indicated by Bourdon’s own drawing

(R. 89, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5). The typical location of: the two tacks

in each step is shown by Bourdon’s two crosses on the top step of

the stairway photograph (R. 90, Defendant's Exhibit C).

the right femur with displacement and shortening. He was

eee

\

ot $7500. The Court sian intial siesta motions —

to set aside the verdict and dismiss the complaint (R. 2).

The trial judge charged the jury ‘that petitioner was a

“gratuitous” and “bare” licensee .and that the law of the

forum, i.e., New York, applied; pursuant to which plaintiff

- could recover only if the jury found that the respondent .

knew of the unsafe condition created: by the canvas and *

‘failed to correct it or warn the petitioner about it (R. 74, :

79, 93). He refused to charge that petitioner’s accident

was a maritime tort, and accordingly, refused to apply the.

federal maritime doctrines of comparative negligence dnd .

unseaworthiness (R. 74, 77, Transcript of Proceedings

. Below, pp. 99, 220). In his opinion setting aside the verdict

and dismissing the complaint, Judge Murphy conceded that

“there was evidence as to the size of the tacks and * * *

. that they could be removed easily.” He nevertheless found

that there was a “complete failure of proof” that the re-

_spondent “had actual knowledge of the dangerous eondi-

tion” or_that such knéwledge could be imputed to the

respondent because its servants had used tacks inadequate

for the purpose (R. 93, 94, 96). 7

. Cireuit Judge Lumbard speaking for the majority of

the-Court-eoneeded: that “evidence was adduced at trial

from which a jury could find” that the canvas was fastened

'. to each step by two tacks only; that these could be removed

‘simply by taking hold of the canvas, and that Kermarec

had sustained his injury when the canvas had slipped under .

his foot.- The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, affirmed the

dismissal below and sustained the trial Court on its inter-

pretation of ane bi sateenenee: law: (R. 95-100).

2 Since the’ /pey verdict was in ‘plaintiff's ne, the Court’s

- refusal to apply the principle of comparative negligence was not

prejudicial. ilialag the failure to apply the doctrine of unsea-

worthiness was prejudicial; since it would have obviated the proof.

of knowledge which, according to the Court, petitioner had failed.

to prove.

LS

Phe sharp dissent of Chief Judge Clark sets forth sub-

_ stantially the basis for this appeal (R. 100-108). _

‘Questions Presented ite:

_ 1, Whether shipboard i injury, in navigable waters, to

an duthorized guest of a crew member, due to a defectively

- affixed stairway canvas runner, constitutes a maritime tort

requiring the exclusive application of federal maritime

law!

2. pee ae the ‘appibenkility. of federal maritime law,

was respondent under a duty to the petitioner to provide _

_ aseaworthy vessel? Did the Courts below err in refusing to ©

, apply the doctrine of unseaworthiness? ;

3. Assuming the applicability of federal maritime law,

the doctrine of unseaworthiness aside, what was the scope

of the duty owed to the petitioner to determine whether

respondent was negligent? ey

(a) Should federal maritime law require from the ship-

owner a single standard of care for all authorized visitors

. aboard the vessel—or does it adopt the common -” dis-

tinetion between licensee and invitee?

(b)- Assuming that the federal maritime law perpetuates

the common law distinction between licensee and invitee, —

did the Courts below err in refusing to hold that petitiones <a

was an invitee?

(c) Assuming that the. Courts below sinaiihe found that

‘petitioner was a licensee, was there sufficient evidence to

support the. verdict for the petitioner under the charge .

which the Trial ourt gave to the jury? Do the decisions |

- of the Courts below, constitute a interference with —

the jury verdict? | .

———

-§ eae

Tes

_ Summary of Argument

LThe basis of this action is a maritime tort and federal |

" maritime law, not state or common law, should apply.

The Trial Court, therefore, erred in refusing to apply

_ the doctrines of comparative negligence and unsea-‘

'. worthiness. It also ‘indicated confusion as to the ad- |

miralty jurisdiction of the Court on the civil side.

Pope & Talbott v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 706 resolved ‘these

issues, but the District Court refused to follow, and

the majority of the Court of Appeals failed to correct.

Hence, the need for,a definitive adjudication as to

_ the definition of a maritime tort and the applicability.

| ‘of federal maritime law on the civil side of the Court,

' whether or not diversity is present where maritime

’ tort is involved. ‘e

: II—The application of the doctrine of unseaworthiness -

has resulted in decisional conflict and confusion: The

majority and minority opinions below reflect two .

divergent views: The restrictive “ship’s work” theory ~

"which would limit the doctrine-only-te-those doing

/ work essentially of a seaman’s nature; the more -

liberal approach which would extend the doctrine to

all lawfully present shipboard visitors. The issue is

before -this Court for the first time. The majority

below erred in refusing to apply the doctrine to licen-

sees. This Court should not now engraft upon the

federal maritime law the repudiated common law

categories of invitee and licensee (Point HI, A). For

_ the same reason, it should not now similarly burden: |

_the doctrine of: mncaworthiness. eee =

I11—Whether ae to be an invitee or licensee, ‘Tespon-

dent was negligent.

7

A~This Court has never definitively decided whether | :

the rigid common law categories of invitee and.

licensee are part of the federal maritime law.

‘lawmaking powers to declare the maritime law,

this Court may refuse to accept this concept as

it previously refused to accept the doctrine of

contributory negligence. Both are harsh rules ©

- incompatible with modern admiralty policy. The

_ English Occupiers’ Liability Act of 1957 has done

away with the distinction between invitee and

_ licensee in favor of’a single standard of due care.

This Court should act similarly in furtherance

of a progressive maritime law.

B—If. the federal maritime law does veccgnise éi

distinction between invitee and licensee, petitioner

was in fact an invitee to whom respondent owed

a duty of reasonable care. The development of

this. point is essentially the same as in the dis-

- senting opinion...There is no body of precedent

that a social guest of a seaman is a licensee.

-. Kermarec’s presence on the vessel satisfies both

the “invitation” and “economic benefit” criteria

in determining his status as an invitee.

—Even if petitioner-is held to be a licensee, respon-

dent breached its duty. There was ample evi-

~ dence of a dangerois condition. The Courts

below palpably erred when they limited their _

3 _ finding solely to the inadequacy of the carpet

.tacks. Respondent is chargeable with knowledge

~~~ of the condition-of the stairway because Bourdon,

; its employee, created the condition in thé regular.

\ eourse of his employment. ‘Respondent's liability

ean, therefore, be predicated either upon-the —

| Reece activity” or “condition of the prem-

Under its unique, coristitutionally vested,. judicial. -

ee

ises” theories. There was evidence to support

the jury verdict. Setting it aside was an im-

proper interference with the jury fanetion. The,

; verdint should be reinstated.

1.

Ths Basis of This Action ts & Maritime Tort Requiring the

Exclusive Application of Federal Maritime Law. The

Application of New York Law Was Therefore Error.

' Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 US. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202,

should have resolved any residual doubt as to (a): what con-

stituted & maritime tort; (b) the “necessary dominance” .

of the general maritime law doctrines of comparative —

negligence and unseaworthiness over any contrary state

law, where a maritime tort was involved’ and (c) the appli-

_eability of these admiraity principles notwithstanding that

_ jurisdiction wa based on diversity and that the case was

_ brought on the’ w side of the Court to be tried before a

-¥et, in the case at aS the Trial Court refused to find

that the subject matter of Kermarec’s action was a mari-

time tort. Accordingly, it refused to- apply. the principles

of comparative negligence and unseaworthiness, and it

\«

*

*The terms “federal” and “general” maritime law are used

synonymously and refer to those “* * * federal maritime policies

© * © (and). substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling

Acts of Congress or interpretative decisions of this Court.”

Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, p. 410: See also O’Donnell v.

Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40 40, 63 S.Ct. 488; 490; The Lotta-

wanna, 88 U.S. 558.

' See also, Panama R. Co. v. Jéhneon, 264 US. 375, 391, 44 S.Ct.

391, 395, and Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, $28 U.S. 85, 88-89,

66 8.Ct. w78, 076, | ag

7 ar

=

expressed uncertainty as to whether petitioner’s right to

invoke these principles was not otherwise forfeited because

‘the suit was tried to a jury onthe law side of the Court.

Because of these misconceptions, the Court felt obliged to

apply the law of New York {B,74-77).

The majority of the Court of ‘Appeals, except for its

specific ruling on the issue of unseaworthiness, did not .

deem it necessary to correct these errors. Thus it remained

silent as to whether a “maritime tort was here involved; _

whether it was non-prejudicial error to have applied the —

New York law of absolute contributory negligence, and it

expressed no opinion as to whether admiralty principles _ :

could be invoked only on the admiralty side of the Court.

Nor is it clear from the opinion, moreover, whether its

affirmance that petitioner| was a licensee who had failed

to prove respondent’s actual knowledge of agdangerous ©

condition, was based on its interpretation of New York..

_. law, or, whether it was declaring this to be the applicable

federal maritime law principle.

A definitive resolution of these issues is spells needed _-

for several reasons. Any lingering uncertainty at this late ~

date as to what constitutes-a-maritime-tort and-whether in

a case involving such tort the federal maritime law must

be applied, whether on\the law or admiralty side of the .

"Court, will result only in needless error and unnecessary

appellate litigation. In this. connection we respectfully

submit ‘that in the interest of maximum certainty and uni-

formity in the application of admiralty doctrine, this Court

‘should ‘no longer withhold its judgment as to whether

- diversity of citizenship is essential to the jurisdiction of a.

District Court to try a maritime tort which does not involve

a federal statute.’ Finally, as we shall show at a later

*“In this situation we ‘need not decide whether the District

Court's jurisdiction ean be_rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C.A.

; § 1331, as arising ‘under the aes acc laws or treaties of the

sounded in negligence and unseaworthiness.

10 =

point, this Court now has the opportunity, in its discretion,

‘to eliminate the confusion-ridden doctrine of “invitee” and

“licensee” and to adopt as part of the general maritime law

a single standard of care for all. lawfully present persons .

who are injured as a result of a maritime tort.

Kermaree’s complaint necessarily invoked the admiralty

and maritime jurisdiction of the District Court and tendered

a maritime tort for adjudication. He was injured on an

ocean-going vessel; the vessel was in navigable waters; a

member of the crew, in a foreign port, had requested and

obtained permission for Kermarec to visit him. The acci- |

dent was attributed to a defectively affixed and maintained —

‘ship’s appurtenance, i.e., a canvas runner fastened to a —

ship’s stairway to keep it clean between voyages pending

the embarkation of the ship’s passengers. The complaint

That the vessel was within New York waters and was not

in actual navigation at the time of the accident are not con-

trolling considerations. Nor is it necessary in this case,

though otherwise desirable, to determine “whether location

in navigable. waters was alone sufficient to make a tort

‘maritime’ or whether’ further - nautical flavor: was re- —

quired.”* Under either test, the subject. mattér of peti- -

tioner’s suit congtituted a maritime tort. Leathers v. Bles-

sing, 105 U.S, eB; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 .

~ US. 52, 34 S.Ct. 733; Foye d &é Talbot: Ine. v. Hawn, supra, |

P. 409.

If petitioner’ s suit does in fact involve + aeltionn tort, .

extended discussion should be unneces | "to establish

at

United States.” See Doucette v. Vincent, 1 ‘Cir. ‘194 F. 2d 834 and ©

Jansson v. Swedish American Lines, 1 Cir., 185, F. 2d 212, 30 A.L.R.

' 2d 1385. Cf. Jordine v. Walling, 3 Cir., 185 "F.2d 662. » heste &

- Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, p . 410, ftn. ‘4. \

¢ Kermarec V. Compagnie Generale Transstiontique, 2 Cir., 245

eT :

\

mt

the satin principle that ‘iad tort is to be adjudicated

' solely by reference to federal maritime law and not by

. application of-the forum: state law. “The ‘complaint * * * -

- shows that the claim rests on a maritime ‘tort which under

the Constitution is subject to.dominant control of the Fed-

eral Government.”* “In many other cases this Court has

declared the necessary dominance of admiralty principles

in’ actions in vindication of rights arising from admiralty

law.”* “While states may sometimes supplement federal

maritime policies, a state may not deprive a person of any

‘substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling Acts

- of Congress or by interpretive decisions of this Court.”* '

This is not in —— of Erie R. Co. v. hctctst sae “paed

U.S. 64.

. “The constant shtiatine of legiuidtion and jurispru-

dence is to assure_litigants full protection for ail sub-

_ stantive rights ‘intended to be afforded them by: the

- jurisdiction in which the right itself originates. * * *

—~ So here, in trying this case the state court was bound

’ to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights

of the parties under controlling a law would be

-_protected.”.”° :

"Pope & Talbot Ine. v. Sein, noha. 410 ftn. 4.

' 8 Garrett v. Moore-MeCormack Co., 317 ‘US. 239, 244, 63 S.Ct.

246, 250. |

' ,* Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, supra, pp. 409-410,

Pes Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra, p. 245.

sf ‘

are

ae

12

Since » Maritime Tort Is Present and Federal Maritime

‘ Law Is Applicable, Respondent Was Under a Duty to

Provide Petitioner With a Seaworthy Vessel. The

Courts Below: Btred in Refusing to Apply the Doctrine

.of Unseaworthiness.

The shipowner’ 8 absolute duty to provide a ‘meworty

vessel and to indemnify persons injured in. consequence of .

a breach of such duty is an established concept of admiralty

‘. law, notwithstanding its ancient and “perhaps unascertain-. "

able” origins.” In England, seamen first obtained the pro-

tection of this “humanitarian policy” in 1876;” in this —

country not. until 1903. Since The Osceola, the ap lication

_ of the doctrine has required the attention of this Court on’

several occasions. Thus far the principle adjudications —

have established that it is not-limited solely to the immedi-

ate employees of the shipowner, but extends .to other cate- F

-gories of workers who are injured in the service of the ~

vessel; it is immaterial whether the unseaworthy condi-

tion was latent or could have been avoided by due dili-

~, gence ;** “or that the unseaworthy- appliance-was—not—part—

of the ship’s equipment but was brought aboard by an inde-

7 pendent contractor.”*

Two basic ‘considerations have motivated these recent

- decisions: (a) the, hazardous nature of marine operation

remains unchanged, but with modern specialization of labor,

?

11 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 US. 85, 91, 66 S.Ct. 872, 875.

2 The Osceola, 1p9 US. 158, 171; 23 8.Ct. 483, 487 (1903).

18 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracks, supra; Popé & Talbot Inc. v.

Hawn, supra.

14 Mahnich v. Southern BS Co., 321 US. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455.

% Alaska Steamship Co. v./ Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 74 8.Ct. 601.

13

‘many different categories of workers are now exposed to.

the. dangers which originally | confronted seamen only ;’

(b) the brunt of the-loss to the victim of an unseaworthy -

vessel and his dependents should be assumed by: the ship-

‘owner becausé of his ability to distribute the loss over the

i industry. Otherwise, unable to discover or remove the

cause of the evil, the person injured might not. recover

under orginary rules of negligence. givin

The’ ‘application of these principles, however, has re-

sulted in some degree of uncertainty as. to the ultimate

scope of the doctrine. The current decisions are in ¢onflict

and the conflict, in the main, stems from a restrictive and

_ exclusive application of the first of the two premises. Were ~~"

* the lower courts have adopted the “ship’s. work” criterion

_ as the sole test, an unseaworthy vessel and its owner have

been exonerated," unless “the work on which the plaintiff

46 “These and other considerations arising from the hiirds which

‘maritime service places upon men who perform it, rather than any

consens is of responsibility, have¢..been the paramount in- .

the shipowner’s liability for unseaworthiness as

its absolute character. * * * this policy is not confined to

“seame who perfbrm the ship’s service under immediate hire to

éxtends to those who render it with his consent or

by his arrangement. * * * The risks themselves arise-from-and_are .

incident in fact to the service, not merely to the contract pursuant

to which it is done.” Seas Shepping Co. v: Bieracki, pp. 94-95.

/ “These (hazards of marine service), together with their help-

‘ lesaness to ward off such perils and the harshness of forcing them

to shoulder alone the resulting personal disability and loss, have

_ been thought to justify and to require putting their burden, in so

- far as it is measurable in money, upon the ownef regardless of his —

fault. Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent that

they may result from negligence. And’ beyond this he- is in posi-

_ tion, as the worker. is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping .

community which receives the service and should bear its cost.”

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracks, supra, pp. 93-94.

_ * Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Lines,9 Cir. 1956, 238 F.2d 385,

-. cert. den. 354 U.S. 938, 77 S.Ct. 1400. Shoreside machinist injured

on drydocked vessel by grinding wheel furnished by employer

which disintegrated while repairing propulsion machinery. Doc-

tet CF

yom

‘14

was waged was of a kind that the crew of a vessel was —

accustomed to perform.”.° Where, however, the Courts

have not attempted to’ match or sought equivalence in the’

operating requirements of ancient and modern maritime

serviee, the test applied has been simply lawful presence on —

So Ore es

a

pera of undsaworthiness held not applicable because person injured

erat was not doing. ship's work “to be performed historically or cur-

al

~ the ship”

rine by the crew” p. 387. The same Court in Petterson v. Alaska

/Co., 9 Cir. 1953, F505 F.2d 478, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 396,

ase Ct. 601 (1954) had permitted recovery to a longshoreman

ured by a defective block which his’ employer had brought

ghoerd the vessel. Cf. Read v. United States, 3 Cir. 1953, 201 F. 2a ‘a

58 holding warranty extended to “business. guest” engaged in.

changing a Liberty ship into a, transport. because of “failure to

‘supply rs keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to

762. Per contra, Berge v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers Corp.,

2 ‘Cir, 1958, 51 F.2d 717, cert. den, 78 8.Ct.. 994, where a sheared

shackle pin, admittedly unseaworthy, did not make’ shipowner —

liable, because vessel was undergoing “virtual rebuilding” and

“reconstruction” of a ship was not traditionally the task of the

crew” p. 718. In accord, Raidy v. U. 8., 4 Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 117

- affg. 153 F.Supp. 777; West v. U. 8. (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1956), 143 F.

Supp. 473, 479. Halecki Admz. v. United N.Y. & N. J. 8. H. P.

Assn., 2 Cir. 1958, 251 F.2d 708, cert. granted June 9, 1958. Shore-

side repairman engaged din cleaning engine room of pilot bout,

drydocked for annual repairs, died of tetrachloride poisoning.

Recovery allowed because deceased’s activities were essentially

crew work “and as to that it makes no difference. that the means °

employed .have changed with time” p. 711. See also: Lester v.

U. S., 2 Cir. 1956, 234 F.2d 625, 629, cert. den. 352 U.S. 889,77 |

» $:Ct. "130. Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 6 Cir. 1956, 234 F.2d 4, 8,

where Court found that ‘doctrine extended to a shoreside electrician

and shipyard worker on a drydocked. vessel, bat found no unsea-

worthy condition. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 4 Cir. 1958;

256 F.2d 449, a sandblaster was .denied recovery because. a vessel,

drydocked for repairs and structural changes, could not be ‘sea-

worthy, following the Berge, Raidy and |Lester decisions, supra.

-In McDaniel v. Lisholt, 155 F.Supp. 619 (D. C.S.D.N.Y. 1957)

F.2d ——, a Canal Zone fireman injured by |

affd. 2 Cir. 1958,

an explosion on a previously fire-disabled vessel, was’ denied re-

covery because he was not performing any traditional « or customary |

work of a seaman.

39 Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Cort ¥ oupre, p. 718.

—

~ the vessel with the owner’s consent or by his arrangement.”

The majority and minority opinions of the Court below © |

reflect this divergence and it is assumed that certiorari was

_granted-in the instant case in order that this issue might —

be finally resolved. 3 | ty

ag

‘The majority of the Court below, in denyitiz Kerm

- the’ protection of a seaworthy stair ray declared + *.*'* f

cannot say that this guest of a1 hemberof the-crew, wid WY

came aboard for a social visit, even’with\the- ws 3 ace” /); ke

quiescence, should be-classed as a’seaman’and entitled to — | aes

sue for unseaworthiness” pp. - | The NOourt s was thus> }——

limiting its application of the Sier cki.and Hawn decisions f+

‘solely to. those shoreside workers who demonstrably were

_ engaged in activity previously performed by seamen. For

- the Court also stated “Kermarec did not make any contri-

_ bution to the ship’s safety, preservation or progress; he

* ‘did not submit his life and safety to the ship as a seaman

does; he did not load her for voyage as a stevedore does; /°

~ consequently he does not have any right to recover for)

- unseaworthiness” p. 178.

This Court could not havé intended so narrow and un- a

realistic a limitation of the principle. Were it to have dae.

2 Ross v. Sinattibitn Zeeland, 4 Cir, 1957, 240 F.2d 820. Night

watchman employed by port service. “injured - by coil of wire on

tween deck which was inadequately illuminated. “It (the vessel)

was not reasonably fit to permit libellant to perform his task with

‘reasonable safety” p. 823. Amerocean Steamship Company v.

Copp, Jr., 9 Cir. 1957, 245 F.2d 291. Rigger on vessel drydocked

. for refurbishing slipped on, oily déck. Recovery allowed. “Any

vestiges of immunify from liability for negligent -_ toward ~

’ giders who are not seamen have disappeared” ‘293. By

Napoleon-Avente Ferry Co., 125 F.Supp. 573 (D.CE.D. La. 4).

aff'd 5 Cir. 1955, 227 F.2d 958, cert. den. 351 U.S. 925, 76 S.Ct. 783.

Recovery allowed to. injured passenger on unseaworthy ferry. —

Caudill vy. Victory Carriers Inc., 149 F.Supp. 11, 15 (D.C.E.D.

{ Va. 1957). Doctrine applied to soldier assigned to a floating crane -

and injured descending defective Jacob’s ladder of. defendant's s

vessel, used for access to crane from the vessel.

16

so, the aharkhic living and working conditions of seamen

which prevailed on the sailboat would now determine and.

cireumscribe those who require the same protection, even

more so, in the era of the atom-powered vessel." But

assuming, as we must, that this Court intended no such

-dead-hand shackling, and opened the benefits to all ship _

- workers, regardless of their activity or the nature of their *

‘employment, what of the host of shipboard visitors, whose

‘presence on the vessel is not immediately related to its —

operation? . Was it intended to deny the protection of’ a

seaworthy vessel to the governmental agency inspector,

ie, Custom House, Coast Guard; Immigration, ete.” or

_ to the marine insurance claim investigator, the labor union

representative, the ship’s passenger” and his guests, cargo

agents, the family and friends of the crew. members, who,

because ‘of modern quick turn-around voyages, might not

have time to leave the vessel? This question we believe is

tendered te the Court for the first time. 3

Three answers are possible: (a) the absolute liability

’- of a shipowner for an unseaworthy vessel is to be limited

only to workers performing a “ship work” function’: (b).it

extends also to those whé under common law would be

classified as “business invitees” but not to “licensees”;

(c) it extends to all who are lawfully present « on the vessel.

We. ‘submit that logic as well as the “urgent and. sound

reasons of public policy” oe pscacaed gave rise to the

1 See excellent summary by Parker, J. in The State of Maryland.

| 4 Cir. 1936, 85 F.2d 944, of the new age of navigation and its

requirements.

2 McDaniel v. The Lisholt, 155 F.Supp. 619 (S.D.NY. 1947) -

affd. —— F.2d —— (2 Cir. ‘July 10, 1958) where a Canal Zone

fireman was denied recovery.

*3 Byrd v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., 125 F.Supp. 573 (E.D. la.

1954) affd. 5 Cir. 1955, 227 F.2d 958, cert. den. 351 U.S. 925,

76 8.Ct. 783, where recovery was allowed.

doctrine of unséaworthiness, dictate the adoption of the

last formulation, Otherwise, the law would permit the irra-

tional result that the same defectively affixed canvas runner

- could create different degrees of liability dependent solely

upon the wholly fortuitous-cireamstance that it was a crew

-member, or a longshoreman and not Kermarec who was in-

jured when the canvas gave way. Thus, had Yves and

Kermarec been injured simultaneously, the majority of

the Court below would have had to hold:that Yves, alone,

could recover. To limit the doctrine solely to “ship workers”

' would ignore the many non-manual services which are both ©

required by and imposed upon.the shipowner in order to

conduct safely a modern maritime operation. It would

compel the Courts, moreover, in slow, piecemeal fashion,

to analogize every injured worker's activity in terms of the

original function of seamen in a pre-industrial era.* The

inevitable conflict \ in the findings would perpetuate the cur-

rent uncertainty d decisional disharmony, the elimination ©

” of which has been the historic function of admiralty law.

To extend the doctrine to “business invitees”. would be a

welcome clarification. But, as we shall develop in a later

point, it would import into the field of admiralty the need-

less confusion which has totally destroyed the utility of the

invitee-licensee concept at common law. It would also pro-

duce the rather anomalous result that the injured invitee

would be given the added protection of the shipowner’s

absolute liability; whereas the less legally protected licensee

would be denied it. Finally, if it be sound public policy to

* Judicial resistance to Alaska Steamshtp Co. v. Petterson, 347

‘U.S. 396, 74 S.Ct. 601, is reflected in the “structural alteration”

limitation adopted recently in Berge v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers,

Berryhill v. Pacific Far East, Raidy v. U. 8., Lester v. U. 8., Union

Carbide v. Goett and Imperial Oil v. Drlik, supra, ftn. 18. This

’ issue is not involved here. Kermarec was injured or a functioning

vessel. Quaere, however, whether antipathy to any further -exten- .

sion of the doctrine of Uunseaworthiness has noi obscured the

essential determinant in these cases-—has a maritime tort occurred?

This and not the nature or extent.of ship repairs should control.

of

© 1

compel the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for any

specific group of workers, that duty realistically is not

enlarged, but its salutory purpose is that much more effec-

tively achieved by extending the duty to all persons who

may be exposed to the same marine peril.

’ In Byrd v. Napoleon Avenue F erry Co., supra, the Court

declared : aes bdr

“It is true that in ; Powe & Talbot, the plaintiff was a

ship repairman, whereas here libellant was a passenger

_ on a-ferry. Nevertheless, the basis of her action, like

Hawn’s, was maritime tort and there is nothing in

Pope and Talbot which'would limit its application to

maritime tort relating only to ship repairmen’’ p. 577.

(Emphasis added.)

In Caudill v. Victory Curriers,. aupre, the Conrk went

further and stated:

“The day may come, if it has not already arrived, when

the doctrine of unseaworthiness will be extended.to all

business invitees aboard ship, for Sieracki holds that

o «

- liability arises as an incident of performing the ship’s *

service with:the owner’s consent” p. 15. (Emphasis

added.) eat

In neither case, it is submitted,-did the Court go far

~—enough. For the essential justification of the doctrine is. ,

best formulated in the reasoning of Chief Judge. Clarkin

his dissenting opinion, below.

“While it is true that the eine. Court referred

to the type of work done by Hawn as one reason for

allowing him to recover for unseaworthiness, I do not.

believe performarice of ‘ship’s work’ is a sine qua non .

' to recovery on that theory. The Sieracki case, which

Pope & Talbot, Inc., followed, gave as the reason for

19 .

extending the unseaworthiness doctrine to certain non-.

seamen the similarity of such individuals to seamen

as regards exposure to the same dangerous appliances,

| inability to bear the expense of injury, inability to

eapegied or remove the dangerous condition, inability

\to recover for the loss. from their employer, and in-

, lability to distribute the loss to the shipping industry

~ as well‘as the shipowner. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,

supra, 328 U.S. 85, 93-96, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099.

Plaintiff meets these criferia” p.: 183. -

ny |

Whatever Standard of Care Was Due Petitioner, ©

7 Respondent Was Negligent.

A. Wuenz, as Here, Feperan Maritime Law’ Is

ExciusivELy APPLICABLE, THE JupDIcIAL Law-

Max1inc Powers oF Tus Court Can AND SHOULD.

Be Exercisep as A MatTrer or Pustic- Pouicy,

To Eximrnate Aut Distinctions Between “Iy-

VITEE” AND “LICENSEE” aND THIS Court SHouLp

-. Susstrrvre a Sincrz Stanparp or Due Care . .

FoR ALL AUTHORIZED Suipsoarp Visitors.

This Court has never definitively decided the iiiiladtite

standard of care due an authorized shipboard visitor. Nor

has it made any clear pronouncement adopting and incor-

porating the rigid common law categories of licensee/’

invitee into the federal maritime law. Leathers v. Blessing,

105 U.S. 626, 629 (1881). See, Aho v. Jacobsen, 1 Cir. 1957,

249 F.2d 309, 313 (cert. pending). The instant case affords

an opportunity, therefore, for a further contribution of .

maritime law towards a liberal and socially responsive

American jurisprudence.

That this Court is empowered to Pare the general

maritime law, and in its discretion to reject contrary state

1 GB {

. ing the licensee-invitee categories in favor of a single stand-

or common law, cannot be questioned.” “The question as

to the trug, limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdic-

tion is undoubtedly * * * exclusively a judicial question.” *

The power is derived from the Constitution” and the Ju-

diciary Act of 1789,” Accordingly, “the main source of

maritime law” has been the decisions of this Court.” Thus,

- it-has rejected the common’ law rule of contributory neg--

ligence as an absolute defense and enforced the principle

of comparative fault.” It has adopted and extended the

rule of liability without fault for unseaworthiness and

maintenance and cure without regard to the common law

doctrines of assumption of risk or the fellow servant rule.” :

“In many other cases this Court has declared the necessary

dominance of admiralty principles in actions in vindication

of rights arising from’ admiralty law.” * ak

It is submitted that the time is long overdue for discard-

"3 The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558; O’Donnell v. Great

Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40-41, 63 S.Ct. 488, 491; Pope & Talbot

Inc. v. Hawn; supra, pp. 409-410. :

2° The Lottawanna, supra, pp. 575, 576.

27 Art. III, §2.

2869, 1 Stat. 76; 28 U.S.C. 1333. 3 .

* Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, supra, p. 418. ae SS ewe

» The Max Morris, 137 U.S: 1, 14-15; Chelentis v. Luckenbach |

88 Co., 247 US. 372, 382-384, 38 S.Ct. 501; Pope & Talbot v. Hawn,

supra, pp. 408-411.

"The Osceola,. supra, p. 175; Mahnich v.. Southern SS Co.,

supra, pp. 102-104; Warren v. U. 8., 340 U.S. 523, 529-30, 71 S.Ct.

432. ‘Seas Shipping v. Steracki, supra, pp. 89-96; Alaska SS Co. v.

Petterson, supra, pp. 401-402. See also Coz v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207,

' 210, 75 8.Ct.’242.

82 Garrett v. Moore-MéCormack Co., supra, p. 244, citing South-

ern Pacific: Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; Chelentis v. Luckenbach

SS Co., supra; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 159;

‘Carlisle F wking Co. v. Sandanger, 259 US. 255, 259; Messel v.

Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 434.

oe ae 21

ard of care for all persons lawfully. on tlie premises. x :

may now be too late to accomplish: this in the civil law,

- except by: remedial state legislation. But within the sphere

of the general maritime law, this Court is. unencumbered

by precedent and may in its discretion refuse to engraft

_ upon the maritime law an ancient concept which has out-

lived whatever justification it originally possessed.

In determining the advisability of establishing one stand-

ard of care for all authorized shipboard visitors, the

Court will undoubtedly take judicial notice that the present

‘status of the common law in this area is characterized

by confusion, conflict and contradiction, often within the —

same jurisdiction or court. Predictability and uniformity

—especially significant in admiralty*—have no place in

the current maze. The just decision today is frequently

impossible except through such skillful use of semantics as —

to recall Mr. Justice Cardozo’s comment “discrimination

so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds. thes

It is true, as Chief Judge Clark. remarked, that the .

“distinctions (invitee, licensee and trespasser) have been

more and more obscured during the last century as Courts ©

have moved toward imposing on owners and occupiers

-a single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances.” **

But the very fact that his appeal to reason came in dissent, |

points up the’ need to exorcise a concept feudal in =

and rooted in class privilege.**

_ The chaotic state of the common law in the area of the

occupier” s liability to the invitee and licensee is strikingly

33 The Latemedin supra, p. 575. : aS,

** Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104, 54 S.Ct. 22, 25.

"3 Kermarece v. Compagnie Generale Frensaltentique, supra, p.

Q Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 27.1, p. 1432 (1956).

See also Aho v. Jacobsen, ie pp. es.

- "prehensive or exhaustive. Rather, it is intended to high-

: | the licensee-invitee concepts to the case at bar.

22

iain a Seaipavtaon‘of-the cases.””. The extended

footnote appended to this brief is not intended to be com-

light some of the glaring conflicts and contradictions, which

this Court would inevitably perpetuate, were it to apply

“In this connection we respectfully cal! the Court’s atten-

tion to the passage of the Occupiers Liability Act, 1957

(5 & 6 Eliz. 2c. 31) which has finally abolished the distine-

tion between licensee and invitee in favor of a single

standard of duty.

“The Act had been preceded by sharp criticism of the

- state of the law in England. - .

“The law on the whole wihiedt is still in a a confeie’

state. The delimitation between the different cate-

gories (sc. of persons entering on premises occupied

by others) is far from. settled, nor is it possible to

state with certainty the duties owed) to persons fal]-

~ ing within those categories. Had it been earlier and

_-more generally recognised that the topic is only one

- branch of the law of negligence it might have been

seen that the occupier’s duties cannot conveniently

- be put into strait jackets to fit the character in which

the plaintiff comes on to the premises and thé law

would then have been freed of some needless refine- —

ments and profitless distinctions.” Salmond on reseed

10th ed at p. 471." _—

The enactment had been yecommended in the “Third Repert:

of the Law — Committee (1954),” a body of leading

© Bee ini

' % For a more tolerant attitude see ‘Pollock on Torts, 15 Ed.

pp. 409-410 (1951).

il

English. Saitete who found the eommon n law-concepts entirely

unnecessary and in some aspects even absurd.” S

ed eed

“Tt is, indeed, really impossible withont lapsing into ,

absurdities to adhere strictly to the criterion of actual

_knowledge: nor in our view is it a desirable test. It

seems to us to put a premium on negligence. An occu-

pier who inspects his property periodically may actu-

_ ally know of dangers of which an occupier so careless

that he never inspects may remain ignorant. Thus the

“mere licensee’s’ prospect of recovering damages from —

some injury sustained through a defect in the premises

may vary with the occupier’s habits as regards inspec-

tion, If the oceupier is so negligent as never to inspect —

at all, he may not know of the trap which causes the

damage, in which case the mere licénsee has no remedy.

If the oceupier takes the trouble to inspect from time

to time he may know of the trap, in which case, if he

has omitted to warn the mere licensee of its presence}

the latter on suffering damage from it has a good

‘cause of,action.. We cannot think it is satisfactory to—

- make the injured licensee’s position depend on the idio- ’

syncrasies of the particular occupier.” Law Reform

Committee, Third Report, pp. 31-32. — .

' The Occupiers Liability Aet of 1957 establishes a single

standard of duty toward al! persons who visit the premises

of the occupier upon his invitation or with his consent. -

This duty is ‘defined in the following terms:

“The e wornmon duty of care is a si to: take such

care as in all the circumstances of the case is reason-

able to see that the visitor will be” reasonably safe in

* Gang the premiises for the purposes for which he is

% Copies of the Act and Law Reform he Report have

been deposited with the Clerk for the Court’s convenience.

—

4

invited or oicaaiiail by the occupier to be there.”

Bee. $(2).:. , fee

The Act further provides that the single standard of

cate is applicable to regulate |

- * “the obligations of a person: occupying or having

control over any fixed or moveable structure, including

any vessel, vehicle or aircraft.” Sec. 1 (3)(a). (me.

' phasis added.) - ei

" The disability of the licensee vis d vis his host rests upon

two assumptions: (a) he assumes the risk that the premises

may be dangerous, and (b) if injured, is contributorily

negligent poemnse he — exposed maou ad to this

risk.”

We suggest this Senwadition only to iaieiiaiihe that

- the issue now before the Court was in fact resolved when |

the Court refused to incorporate the common law defense

of contributory negligence into the general maritime law.

-Its reasoning then is equally applicable now:

“The harsh rule of the common law ender which'con-

tributory negligence [a licensee’s legal disability]

wholly barred an injured person from recovery is com- -

- pletely incompatible with modern admiralty policy and

- practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admir-

alty has developed and now follows its own fairer and

more flexible rule which allows such consideration of

-eontributory negligence in mitigation of damages [the —

safety of the premises and of all the circumstances

attending an injury to a lawful visitor) as justice re-

quires. Petitioner presents no persuasive arguments —

that admiralty should now adopt a discredited doctrine

” «2 Harper-& James, The Law of Torts, 1956, p. 1162.

25

which automatically destroys all claims of injured per-

sons who have contributed to their injuries in any de-———

gree, however slight [solely by reason of the fortuitous

nature of their lawful visit).”“* (Interpolations

added.)

B. — IF THE Fecenit. Maritime Law ReEcoc-

-yizes a Distinction Between Inviree anv Li-

CENsEE, APPELLANT Was aN ExvitEE TO WHOM

RESPONDENT Owep a Duty or REASONABLE CaRE..

, “Should the common law distinction between. invitee and Vi

licensee, be held to apply to federal maritime law,‘ the ap-

pellant is still entitled to recovery since the evidence was

3 sufficient to establish that he was an invitee on respondent’s

vessel.. ¢ fie as : rote

i? Whe majority of the Court below rests its conclusion on

‘ three erroneous assumptions. Kermarec was not an invitee,”

‘it declared, because ( a) the law “has long been settled that

the guest of a seaman ‘is nothing more. than a licensee”

p. 177; hence it could not consider any “novel question.”

(b) Precsdeai aside, only a business visitor can be an -in-

vitee. Since a shipowner degives no economic benefit from

the social guest of a crew member, the guest by definition,

cannot be an invitee. (c) Were the Court free to consider

the analogy of a landlord’s duty to the guest of a tenant,

it would reject it as inapplicable because a shipowner is.

not a landidrd and his “relationship to his seamen is very

different from that of a landlord to his tenant” p. at.

“| Pope & Talbot Inc. v.: Hawn, supra, pp. 408-409. °

2 McDaniel v. The Lisholt, supra, p. 627; Kermarec v. Com-

pagnie ge Transatlantique, supra, p. 177; Aho v. Jacobsen,

supra, p. 311.. Cf. Leathers v. Blessing, supra, p. 629 with The

Sudbury, 14 F.2 533 (D.C. Ore. 1926).

26

The dissenting opinion ieee exposes the fallacies:

First: “Economic benefit” i is not the sole criterion in de-

termining an invitee status. “Invitation,” of whatever na-

ture, equally controls. “If invitation is the touchstone, ‘it

must be shown that persohs authorized by the defendant-

‘hed the pint to believe . that the owner intended’ os ;

the premisés for that use” p. 180. |

In Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 2 Cir. 1938, 94 F.2d

170, cert. den. 303 U.S. 660,-reh. den. 304 U.S. 588, Judge

“The doctrine is well settled; the relation with its ©

‘ resulting duty arises only-when the person who enters

__ the premises does so in the interest of the owner, or

: wpon some business of his own, of which the owner has

notice and to an entry in pursuit of which he consents,

directly or brit ol p. 171. (Emphasis mee).

: This ‘formulation of ‘the alternative test was not new. In —

Cooley, Law of Torts, 3rd ed. (1906) Vol. 2, P. 1259, the

same statement of the law is found:

“When one expressly or by implication invites others

to come upon his. premises whether for business or

for any other purpose, it is his duty to be reasonably

sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and to -

that end he must exercise ordinary care and prudence

to render the premises safe for the visit.” (Emphasis

. sdded. )

‘Second: There is ‘no- body of pretedent that the social

guest of a seaman is a licensee. The cases cited by the

-majority are distinguishable, as Chief Judge Clark dem-

onstrated, by the absence of -both elements, i.e., there was °

neither “invitation” nor “economic benefit.”

*. . ad

27 sy

“e >

Third: In the instant case, Kermaree was an invitee

because he met both requirements. There was “invitation”

because the shipowner had expressly authorized his visit,

by the issuance of an official visitor’s pass. The shipowner

here, therefore, unlike those in the cases cited by the Court

below, had notice. of Kermarec’s intended visit, and had

consented to it. This was an implied if not an express

~ invitation,*. which alone could create an invitee status de-

spite the absence of any economic benefit to the shipowner.“

There was also . “economic benefit” to the respondent

: from -Kermarec’s. visit, albeit of an indirect. nature. We

need not expand on the cogent reasoning of Chief Judge

Clark which led him to. this conclusion. “In view of the —

shipowner’s liability to the\ seaman for injuries ‘suffered

in shoreside recreation, it is in, the owner’s economic inter-

est to encourage recreation aboard ship, rather than ashore,

thus making the seaman’s activities subject to control and

the men available on ship whenever needed.” ** Nor‘is there

** Should it make any difference chebie ‘the host or guest initi-

ates the invitation provided it is accepted?

“ Radoslovitch -v. Navigazione Libera Trienine , S.A. 2 Cir!

72 F.2d 367; Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Pet roleam Co., 33

AMC. 917; Cf. The Francesca (D.C.W.D.N.Y.), A.M.C. 1006;

The Cayuga, 9 Cir., 37 A.M.C. 203; McLaughlin v.

-EDN.Y.), 29 AMC. 1626. See, also, Tide Water

‘Co. v. Richardson, 9 Cir. 1948, 169 F.2d 802,803.

Dani chen Sites Ge aalieiie imeeadiine air tote te the

mate * * ° as was the likelihood of (plaintiff's) passing thru the

ee ee ee ee ee eee ot

taten Island R.T. Ry. Co.,

224 N.Y. 493, 496 (1918). Coal barge captain injured on defen-

_dant’s dock had “implied i invitation” to go ashore to. ogee ch

services.- Phillips v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 943, 946 (E.D,.

Tenn. 1952). Plaintiff injured in pass office of Oak Ridge Reserva-

tion, where she was seeking a pass to investigate her son’s accident ©

in the reservation, was invitee.

“P. 181, citing Warren v. United States, 340'U.S. 523, 71 S.Ct.

432; Aguilar v. Standard Oil Company, 318 U.S. 724, 63 8.Ct. 930;

Farrell v. United States, 33h US. 511, 69 S.Ct. 707 and Nowery v.

28

'. any logic in labelling the guest of a passenger an invitee,

but refusing such status to the guest of a seaman. McCann

v. Anchor Line, 2 Cir. 1935, 79 F.24 338, Voirin v. Com-

pagnie Generale Transqtlantique (The Champlain), 151

Mise. 498, 270 N.Y.S 643, 1934 A.M.C. 25. In the maritime —

cases particularly, “economic benefit,” though' slight and

most indirect, has been held sufficient as a matter of law.

"and policy, to clothe the plaintiff with the status of invitee.“

“It is not necessary that the visitor should himself be upon

the land for the ‘purposes of the possessor’s business, The

visit may be for the con'venience or arise out. of the neces-

‘sities of others who are themselves upon the land for such

a purpose” 2 Restatement of. = § cio comment d, 1934,

p. 990.

Fourth: The vessel, forall practical purposes, is a sea-

man’s home and the tenant-guest-landlord analogy is perti-

nent. 2 me iA , .

“Unlike men employed in service on land, the sea"

: ‘man, when he finishes his’ day’s work, is neither re-

lieved: of obligations to his employer nor wholly: free

! is dispose of his leisure as he sees fit. Of necessity,

‘Smith (D.C.E.D. Pa.), 69 F.Supp. 755, affd. 3 Cir., 161 F.2d 732,

It is not generally appreciated pp even when in port, seamen may

not have adequate opportunity for their affairs. Vesse

etn Sie ae career Sete tanker and passenger.

The short turn-around in port frequently compels the seaman to

con bik Say tok Selpuaas Oe Vaal ee pie. In fact, this is.

encbaraged hy the shipowner to oveid letmem and lest minute

crew shortages requiring “pier-head jumps.”

“ Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Petroleum Corp., supra; Rados-

lovitch v. Navigazione Libera Triestina 8.A., supra; Middleton v..

_P. Sanford Ross Inc., 5 Cir. 1914, 213 F-6; New York Lubricating

Oi Co. v. Pusey, 2 Cir. 1914, 211 F. 622. See also Quinn v. Staten

Island R.T. Ry. Co., supra; McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,

-304 N.Y. 314 (1952) and cases in the Appendix where economic

benefit in diverse situations similar to and often weaker than the

case at bar was found to justify recovery for an invitee. —

29

during the voyage he must eat, drink, lodge and divert

himself within the confines of the ship. In short, dur-

ing the period of his tenure the vessel is not merely

his place of employment; it is the framework of his

‘existence.” *

If the social iidati of the tenant can hold the landlord toa.

duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of the build-

_ing’s common stairways and approaches,” and if such duty

_ extends even to the-social guest of ‘the janitor,” a fortiori,

the authorized guest of a seaman should be entitled to the

same degree of protection from the shipowner. “A person

may be a business visitor of a lessor of land although he

is merely a gratuitous licensee of the lessee.” ©

When Kermarec started to descend the stairway, he had

a right to assume that it was safe to do so, [t was a common

stairway intended to be used by crew, passengers and any-

one who was lawfully on the vessel. Whether, in fact, it

.was safe should be determined by the usual rule of reason-

able care without regard to the status of the person injured.

If the licensee-invitee classification must be followed, how-

ever, it is submitted that petitioner was entitled to the

preferred status of invitee, and the Courts below erred in

- treating him as a licensee.

ad

- * Aguilar v. Standard Ou Ginnie, supra, p. 934.

' 4 Pessagno Vv. Euclid Inv. Co., D.C. Cir., 112 F.2d 577; Klotz v.

Ganz, 296 N.Y. 715, 70 N.E.2d 538: Bowers-v-City Bank Farmers

Trust Co., 282 N.Y. 442, 26 N.E.2d 970; Gitcher v. McNulty Bros.

Realty Co., 295 N.Y. 743.

Mercier v. Bushwick Sav. Bank, 261 App. Div. 151, 24 N.Y.S.

2d 666, affd: 261 App. Div. 1105, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 1003. ;

#2 Restatement of Torts, § 332; comment h, p. 901; § 360, Pp. 976.

¢. Ip Perrrioner Was A Coe RESPONDENT.

Breacuep a Duty Dus Hin. “Dae EVIDENCE

zk TO Ser

‘Supports THE vant. ‘Ir Was

Ir AsIvE. ;

If clearer evidence ‘wete. nécessary to prove the “eop-

fusion now. rampant in the law of licens¢e and invitee, and~-

the need for a single standard of care toward all lawful

visitors, the instant case provides it. adi

The Trial Court-and the majority o the Court aie

adopted the classic definition of the duty owed to a licensee,

“ie. “the shipowner shall not wilfully or wantonly injure —

a licensee, or expose him to hidden perils or fail to use due

care to prevent injury to him after discovering that he is

in danger.”” Pursuant thereto, two essential 1 issues were

presented ‘to the jury: Was there a dangerous condition, |

and did the shipowner know of it? The jury found in the:

affirmative, but both Courts disagreed. There was no evi-

dence of a dangerous condition, dedlared both Courts be-

cause “There was gy evidence that he, tacks were inade- ©

quate” or that “they were.not s ited: for the purpose.” * —

Probably intending the same ‘conclusion of law, the Trial

‘Court stated://* * * the ca whether the defen-

dant should hve known of the erous condition, if in

fact it was dangerous, but whether it actually did know of.

it.”** The Majority below put it this way: “ * * ° this

(lack of evidence that tacks were ‘inadequate) was not

enough to permit the jury to draw the inference that. the

a should have known: that oe ural tae of the otair- :

e

.

rn

* Majority Opinion, p. 178. Charge to jury (R. 79}. _

ae Majority Opinion, p. 178. Memorandum of Trial Court (R.

‘s Memorandum of Trial Court (R. 93).,

as

way presented a condition of danger to Kermaree of which

he should ‘have been warned.” “ a

It is submitted that on both isntiea— the dangerous con-

B dition and i areca 8. knowledge — Courts ,

erred. fie!

aoe ‘As to the first, the question was not ‘aids the size or

adequacy of the tacks, but whether, considering. the length

_ of the runner, and the heavy traffic on the stairway (R. 56,

" 61), two carpet tacks, removable by hand alone, and placed .

only at the front of each tread with nothing to hold the

canvas in place at the rear of the step, or against the riser

to the step ‘above, were sufficient to keep the canvas from

coming loose and slipping off the step under the cumulative —

weight arid’ repeated jarring of those using the stairway.

We may assume that had a sufficient number of tacks been .

used, the canvas could have been held in place. But the

question before the jury was simply whether two tacks

alone were enough under the circumstances. To say, there-

fore, that there was no evidence that the tacks were inade-

quate for their purpose, in whatever sense ‘the term “ade- .

. quate” was used, is simply. ‘to.ignore the evidence and defy

_ reality. The jury unquéstionably could ‘find, and did, that.

“wdangerous condition. existed on 1 the stairw ay as Kermarec.

started to descend. ;

With respect to the second issue—respondent’ s stent

edge of the dangerous condition—thereé is no need to en-

large upon Chief Judge Clark’s analy sis,** except to refer —

to a authorities.”

* Majority Opinion, pp. » 178-179. 3

* Dissenting Opinion, PP. 179, 182.

% Negligent Activ ity of Occupier: Meek v. Cordisello, 266 App.

Div. 1044, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 529. Plaintiff,°“an invitee or licensec,”

injured by falling tree, partially sawed wi defendant’ . employens

s

wr.

: 82

“The. opportunities for loose or bulging canvas to

trip users of the stairs are so obvious to anyone who

has ever mounted a stairway ‘that not surprisingly the

jury found Bourdon had actual knowledge of the dan-

ger ut was too lazy to remedy it by atacand the

material properly.

Neither under the ervoneous charge which the trial

- court gave the jury nor under. the more favorable in-

‘who left the tree before the accident, permitted to recover. Radio |

Cab ‘Inc. v. ‘Hauser, C.C.A.D.C. 1942, 128 F.2d 604. Defendant,

business invitee of gas station, injured plaintiff, licensee, and ©

_" invoked owners immunity. Defendant liable. Where “* * © the

injury results from negligent acts of the occupier or his servants,

the immunity ‘disappears and the. Jiabili ity of the oceupier is the

same, to a licensee as to an invitee.” p. 605. The active negligence

‘which imposes liability on the occupier need not occur while the

licensee is on the premjses. Masek v. Bubenheimer, 229 Wisc. 194,

281 N.W..924; Meek v. Corbisello, supra; see Atlantic Greyhound

: Corp. v. Newton, 4 Cir. 1942, 131 Fed. 2d 845. The doctrine of

/active negligence is said to be an “attempt to remedy a perceived

injustice by mitigating the old rule that the property owner was

liable to noninvitees only for wilful or wanton injuries.” 156 A.L.R.

-1226:.

Dangerous Condition of Premises: The Blue Moon III, W.D.

N.Y. 1932. 60 F.2d 653. Licensee directed aboard vessel by defen-

dant’s empléyee, knowing deck had recently been waxed. Owner

liable. “* © © A dangerous condition existed * * * which was —

within the knowledge of respondent’s employee * * *.” p. 654.

Gleason v. Academy of the Holy Cross, D.C. Cir., 1948, 168 F.2d

561. Defendant liable to licensee who féll from top step of school

baleony. “Dangers that reasonably eareful people are likely not.

to discover are latent or hidden.” p. 562. See, also, Recreation

_ Centre Corp. v. Zimmerman, 172 Md: 309, 191 Atl. 233 (defect

in step); Morrison v. Carpenter, 179 Mich. 207, 146 N.W. 106

(unexpected step down in dark).

Knowledge of Danger. Imputed When Knowledge of Condition |

Known—The Objective Test: The Blue Moon iit. + Supra, p. 654;

Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl. 502,. 503: Olderman Vv.

Bridgeport City Trust.Cy., 125 Conn..177, 4 Atl. 2d 646, 648, The,

English, law is in accord “Hawkins v. Coulsdon’ and Purley U_D.

Co. (1953, 2 All. E.R. 344,affd. 1 All. E.R. 97, 108 (Ct.-of App.)

(L. J. Romer); Pearsoy v. Lambeth Begguyh Couneil (1950),

2 K.B. 353, affd. (1950), 1 All. E.R. 682 (€t. of App.) ; —

Clay Cross Co. Ltd. (1956), 3 W.L.R. 232 (Ct of App.). .

33

structions to which the plaintiff was. entitled was it

necessary to show ‘that the- defendant company (i.e.,

-. its top officers) had actual knowledge of the danger:

‘(1) If liability rests on. Bourdon’s affirmative negli-

gence in improperly tacking the carpet, his employer

is vicariously liable without fault of its own on prin-

ciples of respondeat superior; (2) if the “fault is the:

company’s failure to repair or warn of a hidden dan-

gerous condition, actual knowledge of the employee —

who created it may be imputed to the employer because ,

the knowledge concerns a matter as to which the em- |

ployee acts within the scope of the’ employment, e.g.,

‘1 Restatement, Agency § 272, comment a2 (1933); In

re Texas City Disaster Litigdtion, 5 Cir., 197 F.2d 771,

affirmed 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 ; Cashin

-v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co:, 96 Mont. 92, 168, 28 P.2d

862, 868 ;”

One year before the passage of the Occupiers’ Liability

Act of 1957,Lord Justice Denning, in Slater v. Clay Cross

Co. Ltd, (1956), 3 W.L.R. 232 (Ct. of App.), noted that

the modern English cases had effectively obliterated the

distinction in.the duty owed to an invitee and to 4-licensee

in the instant type of situation where the occupier had,

through its servant, actual knowledge. of the physical con-

dition. The Lord Justice states:

“The Law Reform Committee has recently recom-

mended that the distinction between invitee and |i-

_ -eensee should be abolished; but this result has already

- been virtually attained by the decisions of the courts. -

The classic distinction was that the invitor was liable

for unusual dangers of which heeknew or ought to

* know, whereas the licensor was only liable for con-

cealed dangers of which he actually knew. This dis-

tinction has now been reduced to vanishing point. The

34

_. decision of the court in Hawkins v. Coulsdon and Pur-

_ ley Urban Dist. Council; * * * shows that a.licensog,

as well as an invitor, is liable for unusual dangers of.

which he knew or ought to have known. The broken

_ step-in that case was not a concealed danger, but it

‘Was ‘an unusual danger; the loca! authority did not

know it was a danger, but they ought to have known ©

it; and they were held liable. The duty of the occupier

is nowadays simply to take reasonable care to see that

the premises are reasonably safe for people lawfully

‘- eoming-on-to them; and it makes no difference whether -

they are invit r licensees oan

At the risk of laboring the- point, we respectfully eapekt

‘that petitioner should never have become entrapped in the

' semantic quicksand of whether he was a licensee or invitee. |

The protracted litigation in this case' indicates the need for"

a single standard of care. But if Kermarec was a licensee,

he is nevertheless entitled to his verdict. The fact that this,

case was tried on two occasions with the first jury unable

- te agree and the second rendering its verdict for the peti-

tioner, presumptively indicates that there were questions

ef fact to be determined by the jury. The judges of the

Courts below also were unable to agree on their-findings of —

fact. Under such circumstances one cannot say that reason-

able men could not have differed and that there was no

evidence to justify the verdict. |

If the “single question” on this appeal is whether “ * * *

there was any evidence upon which the jury could have

found negligence on the part of the respondent * * * ,”*

that question here — be answered in the ellivnative.

* Eckenrode v.. enn. R. Co., 335 U.S. 329, 330, 69 S.Ct. 91, 92:

‘ Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77.8.Ct. 443, ‘451;

Palermo v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 355 U.S. 18; 78 8.Ct. 1;

Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18; 78 S.Ct. 3.

CONCLUSION

a

i facts having been resolved i in favor of the petitioner,

even on a charge less favorable than that to which he was |

entitled, the jury verdict should not have been disturbed

and should now be reinstated. — .

Respectfully, submitted,

. STANDARD, WEISBERG, eee & MaLaMENT

' Louis M. Votan |

Attorneys for Pétitioner

Epwarp J. Matanane

-Matcoio B. Rosow.

Of Counsel

ee ee \

ia

Footnote 37—

Tue Coyrusion in THE Case Law

A. Distinction Between Invitee and Licensee :

3 ‘The friend of a customer in the owner’s store.

a. Invitee—Briggs v. John Y éon Co., 168 Ore. 239,

122 P.2d 444 (1942)

b. Licensee—Flickenstein v. Great Atl. etc. Tea Co.,

91 N.J.L. 145, 102 Atl. 700 (1917)

2 The child of a customer in the owner’s store.

a. Invitee—Grogan v. O’Keefe’s Inc., 267 Maas. 199, -

166 N.E. 721 (1929)

‘pb. Licensee—Petree y.: Davison-Paxon ‘Stokes Co., -

. 30 Ga. App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 °(1923)

3. Person entering business esteblighment for nogere-

lated purpose.

a. Invitee—Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl.

- 502 (1931)

-b, Licensee—Bird v. Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy, 125

P.2d 797 (Utah S.Ct. 1942)

4: Guest of janitor.

a. Invitee—Mercier v. Bushwick Sav. Bank, 261

App. Div. 151, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 666 (2d Dept. 1941)

b. Licerisee—Barthowski v. Schrembs, 67 N.E. 2d

“ 922 (Ohio App. 1944)

5. Doctor visiting employee in factory.

a. Invitee—Jones v. Pa: Coal etc. Corp., 255 Pa. 339,

99 Atl. 1008 (1917)

b. Lieensee—Wilson v. Goodrich, 218 lowa 462, 252

N.W. 142 (1934)

- 88

.. Inquiry in reference to vacancy on premises.

a. Invitee—Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133,148

rf P.2d 19 (1944) (No sign out; placecard indicat-

ing “office”) «

ae pd v. Bogart, 59 App. Div. 114, 69 N.Y.S.

47 (2d Dept. 1901) (‘Flat to Let” sign) :

b. Licensee—Mills.v. Heidingsfiled, 192 So. 786 (La.

' App. 1939) (No evidence of a general advertise-

ment) —

. Going on premises Seeking employment.

a. Invitee—St. Louis R.-Co. v. Wirbel, 104 Ark. 236, ©

-. 149 S.W. 92 (1912) (An industrial — no in-—

vitation) |

b. Licensee—Amer. Ry. Express Co, v. Gilbreath,

48 F.2d 809 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1931). (No invita-

tion, told to go to back of building to see person

in charge of hiring.) —

. The social guest.

a. Of the Occupier-Licensee—Roth v. Prudential

Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 266 App. Div. 872, 42 N.Y.S.

2d 592 (2d Dept. 1943)

Wilder v. Ayers, 2 App. Div. 2d 354, 156 N.Y.S.

2d 85 (1st Dept. 1956) affd, 3 N.Y. 2d 725

b. Of the tenant—invitee of the occupier-owner.

Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 282 N.Y.

442 (1940).

c. Of the host—treaied as pot in themselves: li-

_ censee—Seheibel ¥.. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102

N.E. 2d 453, (1951)

dd Business acquaintance ‘invited to private home

_ for supper—invitee of ; host—Graber v. Grant

Printing Gorp., 26.N.Y:S. 2d :990

e. Implieitly treated as invitee of host—-Bogaterof 3

_-y, Caplan, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 205 (Sup. Ct. 1951) affd. — .

279. App..Div. 1357 (ist Dept. 1952) °

39

f. Employee of tenant in two family house—invitee

of landlord-owner—Clapper v. Zubres, 261 App.

Div. 850, 24.N.Y.S. 2d 377 (3d Dept. 1941)

9. Policemen and firemen.

a. Licensee—Pincock v. McCoy, 48 fdahe 227, 281

P. 371 (1929) (Policeman) Todd v. Armour &

= 44 Ga. App. 609, 162 S.E. 394 (1932) (fire-

| man) McDaniel v. T he Lisholt, 155 F. Supp. 619

c.

_ put out fire on request.of owner—Buckeye Cotton

(S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd. 2 Cir. July 10, 1958,

. ie (fireman)

Occupier has duty of reasonable care to inake

passageways safe (invitee) —Bredenhender - a

Midtown Properties Inc., 4 App: Div. 2d 276, 164

N.Y.S. 2d 276 (1st Dept. 1957) Meiers. v. Fred

Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10 (1920)

City. fireman invitee when goes out of area to —

Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646

(Sup. Ct. 1922)”

B. Divergent Classifications of Lienbis

1. Three Categories : Licensee by express invitation; .

licensee by implied invitation; and, bare licensee—

Chic. Gr. Western Ry. Co, v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394

(C.C.A. 8th) cert. den. 326 U.S. 781 (lowa si '

2. Two categories;

a.

Licensee by invitation and licensee by permission

—Millspaugh v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co.,

104 Ind. App, 540,.12 N.E. 2d 396 (1938)

Bare licensee and licensee: by invitation—Firfer

v. United States, 208 ¥.2d 524 ~D.C. Cir. 4953)

(Federal Tort. Claims Act)

3. One Category—Gratuitous licensee: any person law-

*- fully on premises, other than a business visitor—

Oettinger v. Stewart, 2 Cal. 2d 133, 136, 148 P.2d

19 (1944)

40

¢. Standard of Care owed to a. ‘Lisviees

L. Different standards of eare owed to licensee in ;

New York.

a. Intentional or ‘wanton Seis Pe v. Warner- :

Quinlan Asphalt Co., 204 N.Y. 240, 245 (1912) (To

refrain from “intentional or wanton injury and ~

-from setting dangerous devices for the purpose

of harming trespassers.”) Mendelowitz-v. Neis-

ner, 258 N.Y. 181, 184 (1932) (“Toward mere

trespassers or bare licensees the rule is well set-

tled that the only duty owing-to them by the

owner or occupier of land is to abstain from in- ©

flicting intentional, wanton or wilful injuries un-

less he maintains some hidden engine of destruc-

tion eon ¢

b. Refrain ‘from acts of slbvmaties anes

Paquet v. Barker, 250 App. Div. 771, 293 N.Y.S.

983 (2d Dept. 1937) (“If he was a bare licensee,

*:* * the appellant owed the duty of refraining -

from -affirmative acts of negligence that. might

injure the former.”) Byrne v. N.Y. Central &

H.R. Ry: Co., 104 N.Y. 362 (1887) (Active negli-

gence distinguished from mere passive negli-

gence)... See, Constantino v. Watson Contracting

Co., 219 N.Y. 443, 445-446 (1916). (New York law .

recognizes “a distinction * * * between the con-

sequences of active and passive negligence.”)

2. “Objective or uidaaies standard of whether occupier

should have known the condition was unreasonably La

| dangerous to a licensee—New -York law—

a. Subjective standard—Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y.

104, 111 (1930) (Action by guests in auto against

owner-operator for injuries caused by defective

mechanism. “if Mason’s failure to realize that

the ‘something’ which was wrong with the auto-

mobile constituted-a dangerous condition was due

to his lack of mechanical knowledge, that was a

41

risk assumed ‘by the guests when they accepted

the invitation to take the trip”.):

3 b. Objective standard—Ehret v. Village of Scars-

dale, 269 N.Y. 198, 207 (1935) (“In this case it is

plain that by the exercise of reasonable vigilance,

the ‘defendant might- have anticipated that gas

might leak from a break ih the injured gas main

at the point where _it was encased in the pipe

drain * * * .”) Mayer v. Temple hap vite 307

N.Y. 559, .563-64 (1954)

. Time when‘ affirmative negligence takes place to im-

pose liability on occupier to licensee under | ew York

law.

a. At any time as long as eigen is affirmative

or active in nature—Meek v. Corbisello, 266 App.

Div. 1044, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (3d Dept. 1943) app.

den, 267 App. Div. 841; Mayer v. Temple Prop-

erties, 307,N.Y. 559 (1954); Friednian v. Berko-

witz, 206 Mise. 889,: 136 N YS. 2d 81 (City Ct.

1954)

b. Only while the licensee is on the premises—Faber

v. Meiler, 278 App. Div. $49, es N.Y.S.-2d 485 .

(2d Dept. 1951)

. Fall down unlighted steps by licensee.

' a. Occupier liable—Gleason v. Academy’ of the Holy

| Cross, 168 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (‘Dangers

that reasonably careful people are likely not. to

discover are latent or hidden.”)

*: Occupier not liable—Biggs v. Bear, 320 Ill. App.

597, 51. N.E. sabe (1943) "

. Injury to licensee caused by excavation on occupier’s

land. VP:

a. Occupier like Morison v. Carpenter, 179

46 ;

“Mich. 207, ¥46 N.W. 106 (1914)

b: Oceupier not liable--Porchey v. K elling, 353 Mo.

1034, 185 S.W. 2d 826 (1945)

'

a

“2

6. Injury to licensee caused by “obstruction placed on

land by defendant-occupier.

a. Gecupier liable—Masek v; Bubenheimer, 229 |

Wise. 194, 281 N.W. 924 (1938) (Top of iron

pipe extending above grass)

b. Occupier not liable—Mazey v. Loveland, 133

Minn. 210, 158 N.W. 44 (i) (Wire stretched

across lawn)

ay Whether darkness of night, concealing a dangerous

- eondition which otherwise the licensee would have

observed, renders the condition a hidden peril so as

to make the occupier liable to a licensee? — )

a. Occupier liable—Vaughan v. Transit Develop.

ment Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 84 (1917) (dictum)

b. Occupier not liable—Reardon v. Thompson, 149

Mass. 267, 21 N.E. 369 (1889)

0,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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