Brief for Libellant Respondent — The Tungus v. Skovgaard

Supreme Court brief1959

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

‘

”

. ”

Sue Court ot then te

- OctroBer TeRM, 1958

No. 43

3 ¢.@ . e P

The vessel M/V Tunaus, her boilers, ete. and Dex Norske

AFRIKA-OG, AUSTRALIELINIE, WILHELMSENS DaMPskKIBs-

AKTIESELSKAB, A/S Tonsberc,.A/S Tanxrart I, A/S

'TANKFART IV, A/S Tanxrart V, A/S TANKFART VI; and

BaRBER STEAMSHIP LiNEs, Ive. —

‘. Petitioners, >

fee? . —against—

OucA Sroveaarn, Administratrix ad Prosequendum of the |

Estate of Carl EK. Skovgaard, deceased; and Orca

Skoveaarp, Administratrix ‘of the Estate of Carl E.

Skovgaard, deceased,

nae Libellant-Respondent,

-—and against—

- “EL Dorapo Om Works,

Respondent. Impleaded.

oN J sg OF ceRtionaRt TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

“FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

a

‘BRIEF FOR LIBELLANT-RESPONDENT

NatHan Baker - f

Counsel for’ Libellant- Respondent.

1 Newark Street .

Hoboken; New Jersey

Dania, GARBER & CHazen |

‘Proctors for Libellant-Respondent .t

Bernarp CHazex a

Mixton. GarBeR . ae i:

- On the Brief — :

_ TABLE OF CONTENTS

Counter. SrarenENt OF QUESTIONS : Presexrep wes ais

_Counrer- STATEMENT. OR FEB ncsonsnistinensinsats

‘ ” Powr I:

The New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, N. J. 8: A:

2A :31-1 et seq. will be adopted and applied to sup-

plement the general: maritime law: and will permit _

recovery for both negligence and unseaworthiness

' where the injury and death occurred in navigable

waters within the spegeiphicel, limits of New

Jersey

(a)

¢°

(b)

mw!

A dian of (Admiralty applying the general

maritime law will adopt and: enforce a state

wrongful death act to supplement the general

maritime law where a maritime wrong occurs

within the geographical limits of a state upon

navigable waters ........... ‘ soe acieine

The Wrongful Death or of the State of New

Summary or ARGUMENT SE Pn TREE OS ALO Sa eS P

15

Jersey, N. J. S. A. 2A:31-1 et séq., permits

‘recovery for such “wrongful act, neglect or.

' default, such as would, if death had not en- |

sued, have entitled the person injured to main-

tain an action for damages * *** ;

PAGE

Point IT: <=

_ The petitioners. owed the deceased the mae

egable duty to provide the deceased a reasonably

safe place to work and its failure to fulfill its duty

constituted ‘negligence ‘such as would, if death had —

not ensued, have entitled the person injured to

maintain an action for Y mages deisinibnaidensiiiiiiias 28

oo ITI:

The petitioners: “owed the auiiiee the non-del-

egable duty to provide the deceased a seaworthy

vessel and its failure to do so constituted a wrong-

ful act, neglect or default such as’ would if death

had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to

maintain an action for damages aan 37

PoINnT IV:

‘The trial court erred in not wiking findings that

petitioners failed to provide.the deceased with a —

safe place to work and failed to provide him with

a seaworthy vessel causing his death ............. Seis 46

(a) Where a trial judge, sitting in admiralty dis- 7

misses a libel on an erroneouswlegal ground

and does not pass on the factual issues before

-- him, his decision is ‘fully. reviewable on ap

and the appellate court can make the proper

(b) The. pelitioners’ officers and:crew femained in

+ control of the vessel. and they actively partici-’

pated in the unloading operations .................... = i

lia :

/ PAGE

_ (e) The petitioners’ cliintin knew of the dangerous, “

/—-——hazardous and ‘unseaworthy_eonditions- whieh ———

- eaused the death of the decedent and they. ©

negligently failed to remedy the situation or

to-otherwise provide the deceased with. a safe

place to work SRR eee ea ~~

(d) The deceased came on board petitioners’ ves-.

sel to assist in repairing the pump and re-

storing it-to operation but he had no duty

to repair, remove or correct the dangerous °

Psp and unseaworthy conditions which caused his

death .

(e) The deceased exercised

ie anton toraanon Net hinwachetnveRennsnnnnimeniecemecenscees .. OD

Pont V:

The defenses contributory negligence and as-

sumption of risk are not available in a wrongful

death aetion based ona maritime tort and in addi-

_tion there was no evidence to establish that. the

ceased had been negligent or that he assumed the

risk of petitioners’ negligence or of unseaworthy

conditions ....: . Seewvensassnscnnsenawenie 61

CONCLUSION ........---- meapncenectemenafainies Kstorentiie iets 69

TaBLe oF Cases. |.

American President Lines v. Marine Terminals Corp.,.

234 F. 2d 753 (9 Cir. 1956) .. eae 53

American Steamship Company v. “opp, 245 F. 2d

EO I ncaa ke 38

Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F. 2d 173 (2 Cir. 1947) .... 28

—

-

e-

P,

iv |

PAGE

- Barbino v. Stanhope 8.8. Co., 151 F. 24 553 (2 Cir.

1945)... 46

Bastedo v. weaiing, 10K. J. L. 390, 162 A. 621 (EGA *

1932) wh 20

Berquist v. Penterman, 46 N. J. ——s 74, 134 A. 2d :

20 (App. Div. 1957), cert. den. 25 N. J. 55, 134 A. 2d

- $32 (1957) ...... 34

| Boat’ Dagny v. Todd, 224 F. 2d 208 (1. Cir. 1955)... 45

Broecker vy, Armstrong Cork Co., 128°N. J. L, 3, 24

A. 2d 194 (E. & A..1942) . : 32, 33, 34, 35

Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co. 163 F. 2d 720 (3 Cir...

1947), cert. den. 333 U. S. 828, 68 8. Ct. 451, 92 L. Ed.

uae tape) | 41, 42

Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N. J. 37, 118 A. 2d .

544 (1955) . : ! 24

Carianni v. Schwenker, 38 N. J. Super. 350, 118 A. 2d

‘847 (App: Div. 1955)... 22

_ Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co., 78 N. J. . 662, 75 ~~

913 | RAERORDS HERS: URREAES COS aeaeteaee cata reel ee 22

Chelentis v. Lackenhiich S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384, ae

38 S. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171. (1918) .. 7 66

Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 59 N. = L. 275, 35

A. 899 (Supr. Ct. 1896) ..

Coulter v. New Jersey Pulverizing Co., 11. N. J. Mise. :

0, 163 A. 661 (Supr. Ct. 1932) 200... 21

Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207, 75S. Ct. 242, 99 L. ‘Ed. 260

(1955) enn. | 17, 18, 62°

Crawford v.. nee & Talbot, Inc., 206: F. 2d 784 (3 Cir.

1953) . —_ oa wes senewennnenenveeeens 39

Di bnd State Tel. Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 205 ; =

F. 2d 402 (2 Cir. 1953) .... , ae

Dixon v. United States, 219 F. 2d 10 (2 Cir. 1955) ........ 34

ome

7)

——., ae

—Farreli v. Diamond Alkali Co, 16 N. ri Super, 163, aie

A. 2d 900 (App. Div. 1951) ............ 29

Fodera v. Booth American Shipping Co ws

(2 Cir. ee siclinililensiaen

Gill v. United. States, 184 F. 2d 49 (2 Cir. 1950) . Seas ots. fe

Gindville v. American-Hawaiian St teamship ioscan tole Screener arama,

___ 204 F. 24 746-(3 Cir. 1955) ........... ii dlssusaateaiadeliccs cist —e":

Giordiano v. City Commission of Newark, 2 N. J. 585, aon

GT A. Oa G4, 458 (1009) . 62

Graham v. Lusi, 206 F. 2d 223 (5 Cir. 1953)" Gemcaece 18

Greco v. Kresge, 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938) .. 24

' Greenwood v. John R. sr, 213 Ml. sia o71

NE aetna srr nctreepetoimrecics 25

_ Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd, 1 K. B. 50 (1936), 2

ee ee © A ee 25

Grillea v. United States, 232 F. 2d 919 2 Cir. mee). 54

Haggerty v. Central Railroad Co.,. 31 N. J. L: 349

. (Supr. Ct. 1865) 21 .

Halecki v. United N. Y. & N. J. Ship.- -Ass’n, 251 F. 2d

708 (2 -Cir. 1958) RS ener ne ote reer :23, 61°

Hartman v. City of Brigantine, 42-N. J. Super. 247,

126 A. 2d 224 (App. Div. 1956), aff’d 23 N. J. 530,:

129 A. 2d 876 (1957?) ...... Ea 29

Hendrikson v. Reppere Co., 11 N. J. 600, 95 A. >” Bs |

_ (1953) : aS on at we

aan Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4.(6 Cir. 1956),

cert. den. 352 U. S. 941, 77 S, Ct. 261, 1 Ed. 2d ©

236 (1956) © ecimipsbanieaetess at rhccicsndabeeaesesec 35, 43

r

Jeckson v. Watson & Sons, 2 K. B. 193 (1909) ..1............. 25

Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Westfield, .

a ere ree Sencninsoosteonenfeaneonsscnneee 23

ees

ee }

PAGE

Just v. Chambers, 12 U. 8. 668, 61 8. Ct. 697,85 1. Ba

903 (1941)... renee AB, 16 -

og 8! 2 | eee 3

| Klisnhenowshi v. Pacific: Atlantic Steamship. Ca, 246 \

42 :

___Klingseisen v. Costanzo Transp. Co., 101 F. 2d 903 (3

‘Cir, 1939) ... - 68

7 ‘talialeas v. Acheson, 206 -F. 2d 592 (3 Cir. 1958) cca 46

_ Levinson v. Deupéee, 345 U. 8. 648, 73 8. Ct. ms 9 cae

ee ‘L. Ed. 1319 (1953) | B.o

Martucei Vv. _Koppers Co., 58 P- Supp. 707, - c N. J.

I csicisihne an

Mason v. Lynch Brothers Company, 228 F. 2d 709 (4 igs 8

cae, te: | eee , 45

Mayes v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., Re. N. J. L.. 460, 11

A. 10 (E. & A. 1920) Gee eve Soe 31

_ McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum ae ——U.S..

—, 78S. Ct. 1202, —— L.Ed. —— (1958). ...........: . 26

McAllister v. United States, 348 U. S. 19, 75 S. Ct. 6, ;

99 L. Ed. 20 (1954) ‘ oe

McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N. Y. 314,

-107 N. E. 2d 463 (1952) ieaueicianeniei neosie, OL

Mormino v. Hess, 119 F. Supp. 314 (S. D. N.Y. 1953), >. -

aff'd on opinion aalow in 210 F. 2d 831 (2 Cir.

Co ...d3, 44, 57

Murphy v. Board of Chosen Fresholders of Mercer |

County, 57 N. J. L, 245, 31 A. 229 (Supr. Ct. 1894) .. 22 |

New York & Long tisiel Sicsuiiens Co. v. Johnson,

195 F. 740 (3 Cir. 1912) edict : ss 28

_. Oakes v. Graham Towing Co., 135 F. Sapo. 485 (D: 0:

Pa. A) petesomennnnepevscsnssnenSicctocs wtbette"V a

> ee,

. Vii

PAGE

_ Old Dominion 8.8. Co. v. Gilmore, ”.* U. 8. 398, 28 ~

S.Ct. 133, 52,L. Ed. 264 (1907) ce csereee eS

-O'lgary v. United States Line Co., 215 F. 2d 708 (1 Cir.

1954), cert. den. 348-U. 8. 939, 158. Ct. 360, 99 L. Ed.

bh ccs fC EY oat a REE 28, 65

'

Oroz v. American President. Lines, 154 F. Supp. 241.

a Se Fe 1957), affirmed —— F. 2d —— [2 Cir.

‘Sept. 1958] soctoten 2 penne +

7,

- Paulmier v. The Erie R.R. Co., 34 N. 4; L ‘151 (Sup.

Ct. 1870) etree ee acdc petite, eee 20.

Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F. 2d 418 (9 Gir. ~.

1953), aff’d per curiam 347 U.S. 396, 74.8. Ct.-601, ’

Pee Bite TO CO I isoprene ead 40, 46

; Pinion v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 156 F. Supp. 652

8D. ia OS) Ge 39, 43 =

_ Pioneer Steamship Company v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262 (6. .

Lt ke | SUL GSR Ser Cee ase Rei er @......28, 32, 39

Pope & Talbot Ine. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 74 S.Ct.

* 202, 98. L. Ed. 143 (1953), aff’g 198 F. 2d 800. (3 Cir.

1952) ........... wenn 28, 31, 35, 36, 37, 43, 64, 65

Roche v. St. Jdpn’s Riverside Hospital, 96 Mise. 289,

160 N. Y. S. 401 (1916), aff'd 161 N.Y. S. 1143 (App. -

SI Te siete 25

Rodriguez v. The Texas Company, 254 F. ad 295 {2Cir.

BUTE sapshapeissictesniyetieeiinies vdnsiiatuna biaciee tea nic at a 45

Ryan Toe ae Co. Ine. v. Pe Atlantic Steamship

~ Corp., 350 U. S. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232, 100 L. Ed. 146

_ (1956) ectonaeon ’ PRES! { BicccsateZ CARRE 32

Se aiaoalaes & Holt Line Ltd., 119 N. J. L.

467, 196 A. 706 (E & A 1938) w-2+---29, 30, 31

Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872,

90 L. Ed. 1099 (1946), aff’ 149 F. 2d 98 (3 Cir.

1945) ....0....0. sicakabeulabssibamnaieia Tokers sssteseeneD0y 29, 37, 40

Me : ase Vail | |

\ Sas e 23 es Gee PAGE

Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252 F. 24°14 (3 Cir. 1957) .. 23.

Socony-Veeuut: Oil Co. v . Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 59

S. Ct. 262, |

Spragie v. The Texas-€o., 250 F. 2d 123. (2 Cir. 1957) 4.

Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F. 2d

555 (2 Cir. 1950), cert. den. 341 U. S. 904, 1 S. Ct.

ae SS eee ee 23

Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923 (1900) 23°.

The Devona, 1F. 2d 482 (D.C. Me. 1994) ..............1 .-.62, 66

The H. S. Inc. No. 72, 130 F. 2d 341. (3 Cir. 1942) :....... 25

Torres;v. The Kastor, 227 F. 2d 664 (2 Cir. 1955) ........ 39

‘Troupe v. Chicago D. & G. Bay Transit Co., 234 F. 2d --

253 (2 Cir. 1956) ...... seliiicainaacacenitetsciatccssalllgt canst — 26

Turon v. J. & L. Const: Co., BN. J. 543, 86 A. 2d 192°:

" (1952) -isedahicenaieddseiaiidbamoiaieieibuceaties on ae

United States v. Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F. 2d°329 - .

‘9 Cir, 1949) ...... scitehpnenseversiaiwinereeenmsensetsiees “OW” @

United States ; v. Harrison, 245 F: 2a 911 (9 ig :1957) 51

Watn v. Fidioeiiveni Railroad Co., 255 F. 2d 856

10 i nS 59

-Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109 N. J. L. 332,162 A. 601

| 2) SP | AIR ARC eae F ANC Mehd 2 eRe 24

Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257. U. S. 233, 42 S. Ct.

89, 66 L. Ed. 210 (1921) ....... PR EEA PENNER A Reece Oe: 15, 16.

Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating .

‘Co., 355 U. S. 563; ee O.. 438, —— L. Ed. ——

( 1958) LESS Fah nO EM Meter ear i Rew BV adhe N.C Bore 32 |

Wilburn Boat Company v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance —

Company, 348 U. S. 310, 75 S, Ct. 368, 99 L. Ed. 337

+: | pee ic emeaied sadeahieheabbcatabidiedeniaiiomassia bakin 63

¥

\ os oer - PAGE

ety Srarures..Crrep ,

OU0646 6 oo

46 U. S.C. A. §688 5 GEE 2

UR COE eo 16

NISA 2A:31-1 et seq. ......-._.....2, 15, 19, 23, 28; 62, 67 :

12 Purdom, Penna. Statutes Anno. -ss1601 ...............° 68 :

OTHER CrraTioNs

Moore Federal Practice (2nd Ed. )s Vol. 5, ened 52. 03(2)

at page 2630 .. pislitideacaamonctiioraes dacesnteabutandoge 46

Restatement, ae Sic. 332 PEST LEn eae ce 31

13 NACCA L. J. 188-189 (May 1954) 2.2 .cecstjeccee IT."

: . \\ _

4

-

Spee Gaur ot the Maited tates

? ‘OctosEr ‘Term, 1958

| : No. 43

- ‘The vessel M/V Tunevs, tal boilers, ete. aa Dex ein :

- Arrika-Oc Au IELINIE, WILHELMSENS DaMPsKIBS-

. AKTIESELSKAB, A/S Tonsere, A/S’ Tanxrart I, A/S

yy Pan xpart IV, A/S Tanxrart V, A/S Tanxrart Vi; and

7

' . BaRBER Sreaqsnie Lings, Inc. ‘ soe

| , é Petitioners,

_—against—

; Oxoa Smoveaann: ‘Administratrix ad Prosequendum of the -

Estate of Carl: E. Skovgaard, ‘deceased, and Oxea.

. SkSvoaarp, Administratrix of the Estate of Carl E.

Ss gaard, Sarai

3 - Libellant-Respondent,

- and against—

Eu Douino On Works,

: Respondent-Impleaded.

' ON. WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UN ITED STATES cou RT OF APPEALS ‘

J ine _ FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

>

BRIEF FOR LIBELLANT-RESPONDENT

- Counter-Statemen?of Questions Presented _

_' 1. Whether a state, in enacting a Wrongful, Death Act,

may refer the standards of liability to the standards to be

applied if the deceased had lived which, in the case of an

a accident on navigable waters of the United States, would

be the general maritime law? .:

a“

2. Whether the words “wrongful act} neglect or default”

_ as used in the New Jersey Wrongful mite Act include an

Be: action based on unseqworthiness ?

ek Whether the New ersey Wrongful Death hist, which

does not specify in the statute what defenses, if any, are

available under its terms but uses a referral test for lia-.

_ bility thereunder, incorporates the Maritime Law Rule of

. comparative negligence. where such. Rule would have —

- applied to an action by the deceased if bc had lived? -

- Counter-Statement of Facts

- This case involves an eens in pidsitralty from a , judg-

ment dismissing a libel (R. 579), which judgment was re-:

‘versed and the case remanded after an en bane decision of

the United States-Court of Appeals (R. 597). - :

The libel states four causes of action. The first cause of

action is based on unseaworthiness, the second is based on

negligence. Both plead the Wrongful Death Act of New

Jersey, N. J. S, A. 2A:31-1 et seq. (R. 4-8). The third and

- fourth ‘causes of action are survival counts based on unsea-

worthiness and on negligence respectively, and were for the

ws pain and suffering ete. of the deceased himself (R. 8-11).

On December 6, 1952 at approximately 1:25 p.m. the

m/v Tungus, petitioners’ vessel carrying a cargo of coconut

oil, among other things, was tied up,at Bayonne, New Jer-

- ‘gey. The vessel had been docked :at aljout 5:30 p.m. the prior

afternoon and had been i in the process of discharging some

coconut oil from the port tank of the vessel (R. 559; R. 560;

' Exh, R-6, R. 563). El Dorado Oil Works, the respondent-

impleaded and employer of the deceased, was receiving the

oil from the. vessel. |

_ The Chief Officer. of the <i and the. paneer

were on-duty (R. 299). In addition the Chief Officer had

\ 3

Py tose ahd

ordered two men to remain on board all night to help in

discharging oil. These men were “to be used: on ship’s

equipment, to drive winches, and to hoist their equipment

* on board the ship” (R. 299). These men were paid overtime

by the vessel for remaining on duty (R. 338). The Captain

of the vessel had remained on board the vessel that night

(R. 316) as did other members of. the crew (R. 190; R. 350).

‘According to’ Mr. Wagner, an.employee of El. Dorado,

called to testify by respondent-impleaded, he had: received

orders from the deceased to repair the pump to to be used in

~fhloading petitioners’ vessel and to check it on the morning *

_ of the day before the accident. (R. 453). ‘They checked it

“after Wagner finished, found it in good working order and

_it was then taken to the pier to await the arrival of: respon-

dents’ vessel (R. 454). The deceased had nothing further to

_ do with this pump until he boarded petitioners’ vessel about

1:25 a.m. the following day (R. 460). | =

The pump and hoses were. taken. on boast at about 6:30.

p.m. and they commenced to pump oil at snout 8 205 p-m.

(R. 560, Exh. R-6).

_ ~ Mr. O’Leary, an El Dordao employee, was called by re-

_ spondent-impleaded to testify. He was the one who had |

— the job of getting the pump installed and started (R. 456).

He stated that the ship’s crew had taken off the tank cover

with the ship’s winches and.were turning it to an angle ©

ie across ihe tank top when he went on board to’ place the

- pump (R. 457). The Mate was giving signals to ‘the persons

“who were manipulating the tank lid” (R. 457). O’Leary —

told the crew to place the pump “so that the suction side

would be et the open hole” (R. 458). The ship’s crew helped

him by holding the hose while he bolted the hose in place _

_ (R. 462). ‘The pump operated in a “satisfactory conditidn

~ until he was relieved at 8:30 or 8:40 p.m, by Mr. oa

another El Dorado employee 459; R. 463). wee was

z

: ‘ataadiy on the pump” aati 11:00 p.m. and he e testified that

the pump “was working good, very good”: (R, A476).

The Chief: Officer claimed that at about 9:00 p.m. he re-

ceivéd a report from the Second Mate, who was on. watch

-'(R. 302). As a result he went over and looked down in the.

hatch. He saw-no orie attending the pump so he went to Mr.

Sexton’s’office on the pier and told Mr. Sexton, the man in

charge of shipping and receiving for Et Dorkdo, that they

should have. aman standing by on the pump and that

there was something wrong with the pump because it

smoked (R. 303). Somebody came on board and took care.

of that (R. 303). This alleged incident was not recorded

in the ship’s log (B. 560, Exh. R-6). —

_ Another incident was related by Mr. Mallet, a cargo sur-

veyor,. whose firm is still rétained by Barber Lines, the -

agents for respondents in New York"who testified for re-

spondents (R..51; R. 70; R. 258; R. 273). He had ‘finished

his duties at about 8 00 p.m. (R. 266). He remained on

board the vessel that night as a matter of personal’co nven-

ience (R. 267). At about, 11:45 p.m. the Third Officer told

him that there was some: ‘oil leaking from the pumip. It

* wasn’t much of a leak. When he came out again, later he

_ observed that “oil was now spurting at'a great rate” (RB.

268). He stated that “there .was oil on everything, all over

the place” (R. 276). He stated that the smaller léak he first

. observed was the start of the larger leak that developed (R.

280). At that point he stated “the Chief Officer and I went

down below to the ’tween deck to inspect the cargo down

there” (R. 270). According to Mr. Mallet’s, ‘notes at 12:45

p.m. the leak was repaired and the: El Dorado men were

‘trying to start the pump again but they failed: He then left

and went into the “officer” s accommodations” (R. 271).

’The fact that the pump was leaking came to the attention

of the Chief C fficer at - :15 a.m. from the officer on watch

ad

(R.'304). The Chief Officer went on deck and he looked

down and saw “oil was spurting out of the hold” (R. 304).

‘The officer ‘on watch went to get the El Dorado. men., The

Chief Officer went down in the hold “because a lot of oil had

been thrown around by the leak, and cargo had been dam-

aged” (R. 304). After the inspection he had an argument

with. Mr. Sexton about’ responsibility for the damage to the

cargo on the vessel and he “told also to sweep the tank hold 7

—tank covers, where the crew was working on.” The Chief .

- Officer also-claims he offered ‘sand and sawdust to Mr. Sex-

ton “in order to minimize the danger of slipping in the oil”

(R. 305). He stat@ that the leak had caused oil to be on the

tank lids and_on the shelter deck and oil “was.all over the

place” (R.. 346). He stated that the reason he “suggested”

to Mr. Sexton that he put sawdust on the oil was “in order .

to secure safety” (R. 347). However, he stated that he was

not concerned with the safety of the. El Dorado men who ..

might have been working around there (R. 329). |

Prior to the occurrence of the leak and at about 11 :00

pm. Mr. Sampson was relieved as standby on the/ pump |

by Mr. Russo, .a maintenance mechanic’s helper (R. 476).

Russo was under the jurisdiction, of Mr. Sexton, the El

Dorado receiving foreman at that time (R. 187). He re- |

ported to Mr, Sexton for duty (R..220). Mr. Sexton testi-

fied that Russo “was loaned from the Maintenance Depart-

ment, which was due to a union deal that we had down.

there” (R. 498).

- About 20 minutes after he got there, Russo testified that

he went out to the pier for some rags and when he came

back “one of the crew. yelled that there was a break in the

pump, a leak” (R. 188; R. 505). Russo testified that he

‘shut off the pump and the ship’s crew, with a sledge ham- |

mer, put a peg into the nipple opening on the pump to

‘Stop the leak (R. 188-190). This occurred according to

Russo at about: 11:25 or 11:30 p.m. (R. ig0)..

___ respondent-impleaded, E] Dorado Qil Works, as a mainte-

¢

Vv

After the pufhp had been shut off and the oil stopped

Russo went to the pier to inform Mr. Donohue, the assis-

tant maintenance foreman (R. 194; R. 143). “Donohue

~ went on board with Russo and. they. survey ed the situation,

obtained some more fittings and repaired the pump. Then

they tried to “get suction” on the pump but couldn’t (R. 194;

R. 157). While’ Russo and Donohue’ were working, there

were officers and crew members on the same deck in the

. area (R. 190; R. 195; R. 155). aot one

_ When Russo and. Donohue started to work around the

pump they “‘squeeged” some of the oil from the tank lid

around the immediate working area, but they didn’t clean .

the tank lid completely (R. 159; R. 199; R. 443; R.. 444).

At this time Russo was not working under Donohue, who

was assistant to the deceased: in “supervising maintenance

“work,” but was working as “standby on the pump” for

Sexton (R. 142; R. 143; R. 187; R. 444). :

When they couldn't get suction on the pump, Dondkil

| talked to Sexton and they or to call the si

". (R. 156; R. 484). :

The deceased, Carl E. Skovgaard, was xiployed by .

~ «nance foreman abouts214 to 3 years before his death (R. 129;

R. 246). Prior to the time he worked, for his concern, he

worked for Westinghouse in “the machine shop” and he

- worked for Sperry Gyroscope (R. 132). On the night of

the accident, the deceased was hom with his wife haviig

coffee and pizza pie. when a call came from the plant (R.

eo aera

_ Mr. Sexton, a witness for respondent-impleaded, testified

‘that he was the “shipping and receiving.foreman” for

EI Dorado at the time of the accident (R. 481). He checked

the temperature and the. depth of the oil in the tank with

the surveyor when the vessel'came in (R..481). He went

Q

~. _— ee a

a

on board again after they started pumping oil (R. 482).

Later he received notice from either Russo or Donohue

that there had been a break in the pumping operation (R.

482). He went, on board again approximately at midnight

(R. 482). Later when he returned from calling the deceased,

he had a conversation. with the Chief ‘Officer of the ship

(R. 484; R. 508). They had a “heated discussion” about a

- statement for damaged materials which the Chief Officer

wanted Sexton to sign (R. 484). Sexton denied that any.

- eonversation was had about the placing of sand-and saw-

dust on the oil in the shelter deck (R. 484). During the

time Sexton was talking to the Chief Officer, the deceased

came on board (R, 484). :

Before proceeding with. the uarrative,. we. consider the

situation which -existed. The positioning of the tank top.

‘cover is shown in Exh. R-10. (R. 567). This picture was |

taken in 1955 when the scene was recreated by Mr. Mallet ;

~‘on behalf of petitioners (R. 274; R. 279). ‘The hatch coam-

_ ing on the tank was stated to be 35 inches high (R. 285).

After the accident he made measurements and found the

oil. 22 feet down from the tank coaming on one side and

21 feet 734 inches down on the-other side giving the vessel —

a list of 2 degrees 6 minutes (R. 291). The tank was about

30 feet deep (R. 72). The witness stated that the tank

cover was 9 feet 8 inches long but he didn’t measure its .

width (R. 292). Russo stated that the tank was about half

open (R. 185). From the photograph it: would appear that

the unguarded tank opening-at the time of the accident was

‘atleast 4 feet by 5 feet, and the depth of the hot oil was

at least 8 feet (R. 567, Exh. R-10). The temperature of

- the oil was 117° F»(R. 559, Exh. R-6). Russo and Donohue 3

' testified that there wasn’t sufficient light ahve by the

vessel -(R. 161; ‘R. 214). :

Exhibit R-10 (R. 567) shows the location of beams be-

| tween the two tank sie (R. 275). Mallet _— that these .

- the Chief Officer of the’ vessel knew that the El Dorado |

8

>

beams were 9 inches high at the end and 12 inches at the

middle (R. 285). This means that these - ‘iron. beams laying-

between two tank coamings were not completely level. The:

vessel had placed the two iron hatch beams in the walkway

between the two tank coamings. ‘The wooden hatch covers

’ were put “out of the way” in another spot by the crew.

The iron beams were not removed from their location in

the walkway between the two tank coamings even though -

' men were to work im, that area (R. 326). Donohue stated

that the beams took up most of the walkway between the.

- hatch coamings (R. 150). The deck near. the tank was made

of steel (R. 151). ee

. There was testimony by Russo that when the crew had

put a peg into the leaking hole immediately after the leak

was discovered no more oil came out of the pump o ,

» pump connections (R. 190). Russo estimated the time to

. be 11:25 or 11:30 p.m. (R. 190). It appears that coconut

oil remained on the tank cover, the hatch beams and: ad-

joining area for at least one hour before the accident to

the deceased without any action being - taken by .the officers

and crew of the vessel to reduce the hazard created by

this oil near an open unguarded tank of hot oi] where men’

had to work (R. 200). 'The petitioners. admit that no guards

or ropes were placed around. the tank sprang (R. 198;

R. 180).

‘This was the situation which existed when the oak

came on board. The court below stated that at 1:25 a.m.

the deceased boarded respondents’ vessel. He went down

to the shelter deck to assist Donohue and Russo. He moved.

from the foot of the ladder which led from the main deck.

As he walked aft of the port tank he stepped on the. hatch

beams and while attempting to step on to the tank top, he

“slipped: on the spilled oil and ch to his death into 8 feet |

of hot oil” (R. 573). oe

v

Russo described the: > accident, He stated that he first _——

noticed the deceased At the port side ladder while he and :

Donohue ‘were trying to get suction on the’ pump after

it had been repaired (R. 196). There. was-no oil aft of :

the port tank where the deceased had been standing (R..

205). From this position at the ladder the deceased had”

instructed them to start the pump and to shut it off. When .

_ they couldn’t get suction he walked around to the starboard

side. He “walked over casual: like, the way he normally -

would” (R. 198).: He “stepped up on a beam and com-

‘menced to come forward” (R. 197).” He had one foot on

the tank top and the other foot slipped. and the deceased

-went into the open unguarded tank (R. -198; R. 225). No- |

,body had given the deceased any warning of any kind

such as “Be careful, it is slippery around here” (R. 198).

" Donohue also saw the deceased ‘fall into the tank. He

stated that the deceased slipped on oil from between the

hatch beam and the hatch cover (R.-159). Sexton testified

looked down into the shelter deck after his argument

ith the Chief Officer. He observed the decegsed in the .

after port corner of the shelter deck (R. 485). Then he

observed the deceased walking around the after end of.

the port tank and he saw the deceased put one foot up on

the beami between the tanks. When the deceased “attempted

to put the other foot on the hatch cover” he slipped . (B.

486). So,

Russo went down. the ladder inside the tank and : ‘then

Donohue went down, too. They climbed down oh @ walk- |

way in the tank and they looked for the deceased but di dn’t

‘see him. Then a rope was dropped to them. They tied it.

to the ladder across the top of the dil. Russo grabbed hold

of the rope and probed for the body in the oil with his feet.

In the meanwhile a light was dropped. Finally they recov-—

ered. the iesciad of the deceased which was removed in a

sites ates ee es

ony o

basket (R. 160; R. 214; R. 438-441). Sexton left the vessel

and called an ambulance (R. 487). Sexton brought back a

metal stretcher from his office with the Chief Officer of the

vessel, but he stopped at the top of the gangway an| did

‘not go aboard the vessel (R. 487). The death —*

the deceased states among other things that the

death was “suffocation and shock following submersion in-

oil” (R: 133; R. 547, Exh. L-7). |

The pump crew left the ship after the qecident. A new

pump gang came on ‘board at 3:30 a.m. (R.°561, Exh. R-6).

‘O’Leary, who was the first man to return, found that.every-

thing had been “sawdusted down” and ropes were being

put up by the ship’s ¢rew (R.'466; ‘R. 467).

The Captain | of the petitioners’ vessel had testified on

* deposition concerning the duties of. the ship’s officers. He

stated that it was part of the duties of the Chief Officer

on the vessel “to look after the cargo, upkeep of the ship,

and to look after the crew; all the work-as to the ship

comes under him” (R. 74; R. 523). It was the Chief

Officer’s duty to conduct’ inspections of the vessel while

' discharging operations are going on’ (R. 75; R. 523). It

was the duty of the officer on watch to be on the lookout

for any defective conditions which might arise and with

respect to any unsafe conditions, it was his duty to correct

them (R. 76; R. 78; R. 524).

The Chief Officer of the petitioners’ vessel testified con-

cerning his duties. He ‘stated that everything concerning

the cargo is the Chief Officer’s duty (R. 316). As Chief

~ Officer, he inspected the vessel, while in port at least onee

an hour “going around the ship, looking in the hatches,

and see that the cargo is discharged. properly” (R. 317).

He considered these inspections as part of his” duty “(B

318). He stated that if he observed, any unsafe condition

which might cause, injury to ksstiites eeed the ‘veseel,

4a

it was. his duty to do cuiuibiee about it “as. long as it

is possible” (R. 318).

At the time of ‘his death, the donenieed was 43 vears.

infant children, Christine, age 4, Carol, age 13, and Mary

Elizabeth, age 16, survi€ed him (R. 127; R. 128). He was

in perfect health and his -earnings “exceeded $6,000.00 per.

‘year at his death (R. 129; R. 130; R. 485, Exh. L-4). He

gave all. of his earnings to the support of. his wife and .

-children with the exception of about $500.00 per year which

he retained for himself (R. 131).

The opinion of the trial court is reported in 1 141 F. ihe

653 (D. C. N. J. 1956). The court did not consider the issue

of unseaworthiness and did not make any fact findings on

this issue. The court found that there was no negligence

on the part of petitioners’ vessel in leaving the tank

open, and in leaving the hatch beams between the tank .

coamings. The court found that there was sufficient light.

As to the presence of oil on the tank lid, beams, and deck

area near the tank, the court stated (R. 576) :

_ .“T am not persuaded that the owner of the vessel is

under any duty to protect the workmen of the inde-

pendent contractor, El] Dorado Oil Works, engaged by

_ the owners of the cargo of coconut oil, against the .

dangerous conditions created by the very work for

| which the independent contractor was hired. see

>

The libel was dismissed and the impleading petition was

dismissed (R. 577). Libellant appealed to the United States .

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (R. 577). The.

respondents: then appealed from the. dismissal of the im-

pleading -petition (R. 579). The ‘argument on appeal was

heard first by three judges and subsequently _was set down’

for rehearing before the Court en Banc (R. 581). “The ~

| dismissal of the libel was reversed: and the case was re-°

of age (R. 547, Exh. L-7). His widow, age 40, and three

12

-manded (R. 597). Judge Staley, writing the majority

opinion, stated that the trial judge had misconceived the

nature of the wrongful death cause of action (R. 584).

He interpreted the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, stat-

ing that he words “wrongful act, neglect: or default” as

used in the statute permits recovery for unseaworthiness .

as well as negligence. With reference to the statement of

the trial court, quoted above, Judge Staley stated (R. 587):

oe “While it may be true that El Dorado supervised

the pump repair operation, this would hardly lessen

the duty of the vessel to provide a reasonably safe

_ place to work, * * °. The personnel of the Tungus were

SS eras St Oe seein Se ee ae

created: by it..

oo°, & is relevant to note at this point that Skov-

mae we ‘aled for the purpose of repairing the

pump, not to clean up the oil spill. It is alleged that

his death was caused by the condition of the deck

sat ak od on © the tan premetaity be lawns

. to repair. °°”: |

This court: has granted cuttiaiaties R. 597 ).

a

2S a

€ oo

a Summary of Argument

The deceased, if he had lived; would have had his rights

and duties with relation to petitioner’s vessel, which was

not on the high seas but was in-the navigable waters of the .

United’ States, ‘determined by the general maritime law. -

However, since his injuries resulted in his death an addi- -

tional factor appears. The general maritime law, which:

has no positive rule denying recovery for wrongful death

| but merely has a void in the general body of maritime law .

‘this question, in order to permit a remedy in this situa-

tion adopts and enforces a state wrongful death act where

it would otherwise apply. Where, as in the case of the New

Jersey Wrongful Death Act, it appedrs that the statute

itself makes the test of liability the rights of the deceased

if he had lived there is no conflict between the general —

maritime Jaw and the state statute. The maritime law would

determine the rights of the deceased if he had lived and

hence the state statute incorporates the general marine

law by reference in this situation. )

Only if it were concluded that the state » satan, in spite

of its referral language, required the application of state-,

lew principles of analogous land situations does the pos-

sibility of conflict between state law and general maritime —

law-arise. The New Jersey Wrongéul Death Act does not

present such a problem. If it did, the general | maritime law

would ‘adopt only so much of it as-is necessary to fill the

‘Void i in the general maritime law and the rest would fall in

the face of the positive rules of maritime law. The rule

“of comparative negligence is a & positive rule of the mari-

time law. ee

' The rule of comparative negligence would be applied in

this case because the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act

does not specifically list the defenses which would be avail. .

< evidence that the injury and death of the deceased were

“44

’ able to a person sued der its provisions . but uses lan-

guage referring to the right of” the deceased to maintain

an action if he had lived. addition, even if the New

Jérsey statute did provide speci |

contributory:negligence of the deceased where an action was

instituted by a non-negligent widow » and children the gen-

‘ eral maritime law would apply its own positive rule of

comparative negligence rather than the dis edited com-

‘mon-law rule of contributory negligence.

In- addition to the referral features of the s atute, it

uses the words “wrongful act, neglect, or default” which

are broadly construed in accordance with the remedial

intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. It there-

fore includes an action based on. unseaworthiness as p wells as

" on negligence. |

Since the deceased was doing work on equipment being

used to discharge oil from..a vessel, he was entitled -to

both a safe place to work and a seaworthy: vessel. Herwas

given neither. |

The issue concerning the duty. owed to. one pitied by

a defective appliance or condition which he’ is employed

to correct does not arise in this case. It is clear from ‘the

caused by the condition of the deck in the area of the

- open tank of hot oil. It was not the duty of the deceased

to remedy that situation. The petitioners-admit that they

had knowledge of..that situation. They had an absolute

and non-delegable duty to’ remedy it. They did not do. so.

‘The trial court had misconceived the law to be applied

in this case, and consequently no findings of facts were

made on the pertinent issues. The facts in the record justify

findings in favor of the libellant...The decision and judg. |

ment of the Court of Appeals.should be affirmed. 4

ds Sees SS fF

POINT I 4

“The New en Wrongful Death Act, N. J. S: A. :

2A:31-1 et seq. willbe adopted and applied to supple- °

ment the general maritime law and will permit recovery.

for both negligence ‘and unseaworthiness where the

injury and death occurred in navigable waters within

. the geographies! limits. of New Jersey.

| (a) A Court of Admiralty oiling the general maritime

law-will adopt and enforce a state wrongful death act

to supplement the general maritime law where a mari-

time wrong occurs within the geographical limits of

a state upon navigable waters. :

_ A Court of Admiralty will adopt a state wrcugtel ests

act to-supplement the general maritime law. Old Dominion

| SS Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U. S. 398, 28S. Ct. 133, 52 L.° Ed.

264 (1907); Western Fuel Co. v.. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233,

42 S. Ct. 89, 66 L. Ed. 210 (1921); Just v. Chambers, 312.

U. 8: 668, 61 S. Ct. 687, 85 L. Ed. 903 (1941) ; Levinson v.

_ Deupree, 345 U. S. 648, 73 S. Ct. 914, 97 L. Ed. 1319 (1953). :

In the Old Dominion Ss Co. case, supra, the appeal was

from a decree allowing claims for a loss of life in a limita-_

‘tion proceeding. The accident happened on the high seas

between two vessels owned by Delaware corporations.

, Certiorari was granted to review the question whether a

Delaware Wrongful Death. Statute applied to a claim for

death on the high seas arising purely from tort in pro-

~ceedings in admiralty. Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for

the court answered in the affirmative. Among other things

he stated at page 135 of the Supreme Court Reporter:

“We pass to the-other branch of the first question, =

‘whether the state law, being valid will be applied in:

the admiralty. Being valid, it created an obligatio—

. @ personal liability of the owner of the ‘Hamilton to

“the claimants. ° oo

16.

In 1920 Congress passed an act relating to actions for

‘death on the high seas, 46 U. S. C. A. 761 et seg. The

statute covers the specific situation.in the Old Dominion

SS Co. case, but-does not affect the principle of law

involved. ee =

In the Western Fuel Co. case, supra, it was held that the

limitations -period of the California statute prevented an

action from being filed. in admiralty for wrongful death

“after the time prescribed ‘by the California statute. How-

_ever, in the course of his opinion Mr. Justice McReynolds

stated at page 242: | oe es

“As the logical result of prior decisions we think it fol-

lows that where death upon such waters follows -from

a maritime tort committed on navigable waters within

-a state whose statutes give a right of’ action on account

of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will

entertain a'libel in personam for the damages sustained

_ by those to whom such right is given. * * *”

In the Just v: Chambers case, supra, the court reviewed

the question of the enforceability of claims for personal

_ injuries against the estate of a. deceased tortfeasor.’ In

holding that such claims could be heard in admiralty, among:

other things, Mr. Chief. Justice Hughes in the course of

’ the court’s opinion stated at page 388:

«* * * > With respect to maritime’ torts we have

~~ held that the State may modify or supplement .the

maritime law by) creating liability which a court-of-

| admiralty will récognize and enforce: when the state:

action is not hostile to the characteristic features of the

maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation.

ees § - . ¢ °

“This is illustrated, in the cases cited, by the effect

given in admiralty to state legislation creating liability

for wrongful death. -The leading continental States

of Europe, whose jurisprudence was: developed from |

~ the civil law have given a remedy in such a case, but

/

/

~ |

Ya ik cciaaed:

_.a right of action was denied by the common law and

likewise by the admiralty in England. And the Court,

upon an elaborate review of the decisions, concluded

that no suit for wrongful death would lie ‘in the courts.

of the United States under the general maritime law.’

***. The absence of a federal or state statute giving” .

a right of action was emphasized. But when a state, .

acting within its province has created liability for.

- wrongful death, the admiralty. will enforce it.”

In Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207, 75 S. Ct. 242,99 L. Ed. 260

(1955), the issue before the court was whether an action

under the Jones Act survives the death of: the tortfeasor.

The difficulty which faced the court was that neitlier. the

Jones Act,.46 U. S. C. A. §688, nor the F. EF. L. A. 45

U. S. C. A.°§57, which it incorporates by reference, sp

cifically ‘provides for the survivorship of actions agains

deceased vessel owners. The court liberally construed these —

acts and found that such actions did survive on the basis

of the “policy” of the act and the harshness of a contrary

result. In addition Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the

court, commented at page 210:

“#9 *. Since the decision here is 5 confined to. an.

interpretation of the Jones Act, there is no need to

consider the ‘slender basis’ for the general admiralty

rule against such survivorship of actions. See Just v.

Chambers, 312 U. S. 383,387, note 4, 61 S. Ct. 687,

691, 85 d. 903. . Nevertheless, in considering the

harshness: of the rule sought to be imposed under the

___ Jones Act, we do note that advancing civilization and

- social progress have brought 43 of our States. to iriclude

in their general law the principle of the survival of

causes of action against deceased turtfeasors, and that

.° such recovery, rather than being exceptional, has now

become the rule in almost every common-law jurisdic- -

- tion. See the discussion of Roscoe Pound: on death

_ 8tatutes as part of the eons law, 13 NACCA L. J.

188-189 (May _— ‘

ae

: Ne er,

The Cox case, supra, while it involves the as

is significant because the last cited reference is a comment’ 7

by Dean Pound on the casé of Graham v. Lusi; 206 F. 2d -@

_ 223 (5 Cir. 1953). This case held that the Florida Death by

Wrongful Act Statute, as interpreted by the Florida Su-

preme Court, was not broad enough to cover an action

_ based on utiseaworthiness. Dean ‘Pound apparently feels |

that it is time for the entire concept that wrongful death |

is non-remediable in.a common-law or maritime action to

be overhauled fo meet current conditions. Among other

- things, Dean Pound stated at page 189; |

. Be Zk’ Lord Campbell’s Act is now well over a century

__._-~"*"old and has been adopted in every common-law juris-

| diction. To think of recovery for wrongful causing of

... death as something exceptional not to be treated as &

part of the general law but to be provided for specifi- |

cally as to application to every item of recent legis- §

lative improvement of the law is an anachronism. |

Today we should be thinking of the death statutes as @&

part of the general law. * * *.” |

The Supreme Court casesdiscussed herein: reveal that,.

while ‘the general rule that the general maritime law does

not provide for recovery for wrongful death is not over- 3

thrown, there has been: developing a broad liberal view

in adopting the wrongful death acts of states, where ap-.

plicable, to supplement the general maritime law in this

respect. It would seem that as a matter of construction,

in view of this tendency toward a broad liberal construc-

tion, that a state ‘wrongful death act should be construed

to include maritime actions based. on both negligence and

- unseaworthiness unless there is a clear legislative intent

manifested in the act to discriminate agajnst one or the

other ground. The New Jersey Wrongful )Death Act ex-

hibits no such discriminatory tendency. 7 .

eae ey

baa

ae

(b) The Wrongful Death Act ‘a the State of New Pare

_N. J. S. A. 2A:31-1 et seq., permits recovery for ren

“wrongful act, neglect .or default, such as would,

. if death had not ensued, have entitled the persan in-

jured to maintain an action for damages oe

It has been held that ‘the maritime law will enforce a

gause of action for death based on negligence. applying

the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act. Gill v. United States, .

184 F. 24 49 (2 Cir. 1950). The maritime law will enforce -

‘a cause of action for death based on unseaworthiness ap-

plying the New J ersey Wrongful Death Act.

This accident happened aboard a vessel docked at Bay- .

onne, New Jersey (R. 69) and therefore the Wrongful

Death Act: of the State of New Jersey is applicable.

The action for death in the case at issue was based on

two distinct gro nds of recovery: (1) for negligence, and

(2) for unse worthiness.

°N. J. S.-A. 2A:31-1 sets ae the following test of

| liability:

- “When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful

act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had ‘not

ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an -

_ action jor damages resulting from the injury, the person

who would have been liable in damages for the injury

if death had not ensugd Shall be liable in an action. for

—. ad iel ay -(Italies ours.)

¥ There are two a phrases. i in the part of the statuté

quoted above. The first is the phrase “wrongful act, neglect

or default.”. The other is the descriptive phrase “such as.

would, if death had .not ensued, have entitled the —.

injured to maintain an action for damages.”

First we discuss the “such as” phrase which directly

indicates that the “wrongful act, neglect or defait” whigh.

it describes has the same scope as the “wrongful act, ne-,

glect or default” which would give rise to an action by

the deceased himself for personal injuries if he had lived.

It is stated in relative terms and it avoids fixing’ the basis

of liability as. that existing at. the time the statute was

enacted. It permits ‘the concepts of liability to develop

“with the rights. of the individual. This is not the kind of

statute that requires amendment with every new develop-

ment in the substantive law of liability for personal in-

juries. It is rather an act designed to provide for depen-

dents described in the act the same basis of liability as

‘the individual has. It provides for neither more nor less.

While the measure of damages may differ in the case of

dependents, the basis of liability is coextensive in both

wrongful death and personal liability cases. ‘The “such as”

clause establishes that the legislature did not intend it to

be otherwise. Since the accident happened on navigable

’ waters, the liability of the defendant to the deceased would

be determined by the maritime law.

In an older case, Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone,

59 N. J. L. 275, 35 A. 899 (Supr. Ct..1896), Chief Justice

Beasley had stated in interpreting the New Jersey hasten

ful Death Act at page 900 of Atlantic: ;

. “*** Prom these extracts trees the statute it will

be at once perceived that in t is suit, founded upon it,

as in all others of the same class, but two questions

are raised, and but two can be raised upon the record,

.. vis: First, could the deceased, if he had survived, have

_ maintained an action? And, second, this being 80,

what ‘pecuniary loss has fallen on his next of kin by

reason of his death? * * *” (Italics ours. )

The above is quoted with: peatttee in Bastedo v. Frailey,

109 N. J. L. 390, 162 A. 621 (D. & A. 1932).

In the case of Paulmier v. The Erie R. R. Co., 34 N. J: Li:

_¢ 151 (Sup. Ct. 1870) Chief Justice Beasley. had commented

at page 157:

ao

«*** Tt seems to me that the literal language of the

’ statute is to be followed, that is, a right of action exists

in all cases in which such right would have existed in

the party injured if death had not ensued, * * * ”

The referral nature of. the statute was recognized in

the case of Coulter v. New Jersey Pulverizing Co., 11 N. J.

Mise. 5, 163 A. 661 (Supr. €t. 1932). The plaintiffs had»

brought an action under the New Jersey Wrongful Death

Act where the Statute of Limitation had barred the’ claim’

of the deceased. before death. The action was dismissed -

on motion. After quoting the statute Justice Bodine stated

at page 664

“It is, of course, arguable that, since the actions are

“a separate, the only bar to the action under the Death ~

Act is the bar contained in the act itself. But the statute

only gives an action if the decedent had one. In the

present cases, the decedents’ actions were lost by lapse

of time.. Since the decedents had no cause of action,

their representatives had none. * * * ” (Italics ours.)

It would be an unjust result and a harsh construction

to interpret the statute with respect to some given basis

of liability to say that the deceased, if he had. lived and

were totally disabled as a result of an injury, could re-

ceive (in addition to other elements of damage) his past

and future loss of earnings ; while if he died, his widow

and infant children whose lives and happiness depend in

large part on such earning power would be left remediless

and in many cases penniless. It would thwart the obvious

policy of the wrongful death act ‘and certainly would -not

give the act the liberal construction intended.

In Haggerty v. Central Railroad Co., 31 N. J. L. 349

(Supr. Ct. 1865), Chief Justice Beasly had stated in con-

nection with the interpretation of this act at page 300:

oe ‘design of the act cannot be mistaken.

“It is entirely and in the highest sense remedial in its

nature. Its object was to abolish the we um technical

rule of the common law-actio personalis moritur cum ©

persona. The rule had nothing but prescriptive au- 4

thority to support it; it was a defect i in the law, and this |

statute was designed to remove that défect. It is, there- ~

fore, entitled to receive the liberal construction which |

appertains to remedial statutes. 3 '

> The remedial nature of the statute was recognized again | a

. in Murphy v. Board of Chosen Freeholders -of Mercer

County, 57 N. J. L. 245, 31 A. 229 (Supr. Ct. 1894). It

was claimed that the word “corporation”: used in the New

Jersey Wrongful Death Act was not broad enough to

‘ permit actions to be instituted under the act against public, 4

municipal, or quasi municipal corporations. This argu: %

ment was rejected by the court, Judge —" statin ng“

at page 231 of Atlantic:

_«* * ® Tn the construction of a nailed statute, the rule

is to avoid all subtle inventions and evasions for the

continuance of the remedy, et pro privato commodo. ~

The duty of the court is to add force and life to the —

eure and remedy, according. to the true intent of the 3

‘maker of the act, pro bono publico. * * * ”

See also Hertuan v. City of Brigantine, 42 N. J. Super. -

247, 126 A..2d 224 (‘App. Div. 1956), aff’d 23 N.-J. 530,

129 A. 2d 876 (1957); Turon.v. J é L Const. Co., 8 N. J. |

543, 86 A: 2d 192 (1952); Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co, =

78 N. J. L. 662,75 A. 913 (1910); Carianni v. Schwenker, ~

38.N. J. Super. 350, 118 A. 2d 847 (App. Div. 1955). Es

In this case, the deceased would have had two: causes of |

action for personal i injuries : (1) for negligence’(2) for un- |

seaworthiness. The intention of the legislature was in the |

O=ent of his.death, to give his dependents. the same causes

of action which he would have had,-if death had not en- |

sued. It follows that the legislative intent was to give to"

the dependents of the deceased both causes of action (1) 4

|

for negligence and (2) for unseaworthiness which he. would

have had if he lived. ? a ;

Keeping in mind the reniedial nature of the statute we

now consider the meaning of the phrase “wrongful act,

_ neglect or default.” If the phrase were intended to be con-

“fined td, acts of “negligence” the words “wrongful act” and

“defau t” are unnecessary. I'n construing a statute, courts

do not readily assume that words in a statute are superflu-

ous.

° mere neglige ce.. Negligence in a legal sense is always a

rongful-act” and‘is sometimes the result of a “default.”

However not all “defaults” constitute negligence, nor do

all wrongful acts fall within that classification. Judson v.

Peoples Bank & Trust Company of aera 17 N. J. 67,

110 A. 2d 24 (1954). ae

Judge Lombard, who dissented in the Hatecki case has

subsequently stated that unseaworthiness is included jn

_ the phrase “wrongful act, neglect, or default” as those

words are used in the New Jersey statute law. The case |

: involved a construction of the New Jersey statute of limi-

tations which uses that phrase. In Oroz v. American Presgi-

dent Lines, -Ltd., —— F. 2d —— (2 Cir. Decided Sept. 30,

1958), affirming 154 F.,Supp. 241 (S. D. ‘N. 1957), he -

stated:

“*** Only recently we held that the same languagé,.

‘wrongful act, neglect, or default,’ as used. in ‘the state’s

-wrongful death act, N: J. S. A. 2A:31-1, encompassed:

_.ah action based: upon \anseaworthiness. Halecki v.

. United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook. Pilots

_ Association, 251 F. 2d 708 (2 Cir. 1958), cert. granted ©

June 9, 1958. See also Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252

F. 2d 14 (3 Cir. 1957), cert. granted June 9, 1958. Fur-

‘ther, this Court has suggested that breach of the im-

plied warranty of .seaworthiness is a tort, Strika v.

_ Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558

(2 Cir. 1950), cert. den. 341 U.S. 904.

-

/

\

oth the words “wrongful act” and “default” in their |

natural meaning connote something much. broader than —

*/

ape ee eg nie a

_ In any event, the construction of the New. Jersey |

statutes by the New Jersey courts is determinative, &

and they have uniformly held that the two-year pro-

vision applies to all personal injury claims, whether

_ based upon tort or contract. Burns x. Bethlehem Sted

Co., 20 NJ. 37, 118 A. 2d 544 (1955) ; Weinstein v. &

Blanchard, 109 N. J. L. 332, 162 Atl. 601 (Err. & App.

1932). See Martucci v. Koppers. Co., 58 F. Supp. 707

(N J. 1945)” tis | pee

The phrase “wrongful act, neglect or default” has been- =

construed to include an action based on a breach of war- |

ranty of fitness for use under the New York. statute. In t

"Greco v. Kresge, 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938). the |

plaintiff’s wife died as a result of eating infected pork a

frankfurters purchased from the defendant. The plaintiff’s |

cause of action for negligence was dismissed by consent. |

The motion to dismiss the cause of action based on a breach |

of warranty was denied. Justice Rippey speaking for the |

New York Court of Appeals posed the issue-at page 31:

« * * * The inquiry here is whether the breach of the |

‘implied warranty. as alleged in the complaint, negli- |

gence being disclaimed, was a ‘wrongful act, neglect

or default’ within the meaning of-the statute. * °°”

After considerable discussion of the history and nature |

_ of the wrongful death acts, he stated at page 34: 3

« *'# © At times the same facts may warrant proce-

dure ex contractu or ex delicto. At such times recovery

is not conditioned on definition nor measured by a de-

termination of whether it is grounded in a violation |

- .of a duty owing to another or in a breach of a con-

tractual obligation. * * * Violation of a duty owing to

another is a wrongful act; breach of a contract involv-

_ ing violation of duty may be likewise a wrongful act.

- Here the duty rested on defendant to see, at its peril, §

that the food was fit for human consumption and it is }

based on considerations of public health and: public «5

.

oo

policy. * * * Though the action niay be brought solely

for the breach of the implied warranty, the breach is a

wrongful act, a default and, in its essential nature, a

tort. ‘*e @ 6 é

“We conclude that the breach of the warranty in a

case such as this was a ‘default’ or ‘wrongful act’ within -

the meaning of those terms as used in the statute not

only as a:matter of definition but within the clear legis-

lative intent. * * *

_ «*** Anropos are the words of Judge Cardozo in

the closing paragraph of his opinion in Van Beeck v.

Sabine Towing Co. * * * where he refers to the con-

struction to be giverttdeath statutes. ‘Death statutes,’

_ he writes, have their roots in dissatisfaction with the

‘origin in the course: of this opinion. It would be a mis-

fortune if a narrow of grudging process of construction

. were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be

‘-remedied. * * * There are times when uncertain words

are to be wrought into consistency and unity with a

‘legislative policy which is itself a source or law, a

‘new generative impulse transmitted to the legal sys-

tem. eee \.

Cf. also Sullivan v. Ducati 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E.

923 (1900) ; Greenwood v. John R. Thompson, 213 Ill. App.

3871 (1919); Roche v. St. John’s Riverside Hospital, 96

Mise. 289, 160 N. Y. S. 401 (1916), aff’d 161 N. Y. S. 1143

(App. Div. 1916) ; Grein v. Imperta Airways Ltd., 1K. B.

503 (1936) 2 All. E. R. 1258, C. A:; Jackson v. Watson &

| Sons, 2K. B. 193 (1909) ; The H. 6. Inc. No. 72, vist F. 2d

341 (3 Cir. 1942). a

There is every reason. in logic and in justice to consider

unseaworthiness a maritime tort which is a “wrongful act,

neglect | or default.” In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 149.

F. 2d 98 (3 Cir. 1945) Judge Goodrich after pointing out

that so far as “warranty” depended on contract, a steve-

_dore was not a perty to a contract, he concluded at page

101:

-archaisms of the law which have been traced to their ~

bee

Be: cee And so an injury to a stevedore pon within

‘the classification of a marine ogg Metered

= The United: States Supreme Court in the same case jin

_ 328 U. S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872,-90-L.-Ed_.1099 (1946), M

Justice Rutledge speaking, stated at page "877:

“* * * It is essentially a. species of liability without

fault, analogous to other well known instances in our

law. . Derived from and shaped to ‘meet the hazards

which: performing the service imposes, thé liability is

neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor con-

tractual in character. * * * . Carlisle Packing Co. v.

Sandanger, supra, it is a form of absolute duty owing |

to all within the range. of its humanitarian policy.”

A seaman’s remedy for unseaworthiness and his nani

for negligence are considered two aspects of a single cause

of action. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Company,

—- U. §——, 78 8 Ch 1901, —— L. Ed. —— (2908:

In the case of Troupe v. Chicago D. € G. Bay Trausit, Co.,

234 F. 2d 253 (2 Cir. 1956), Judge Waterman considered.

the various theories on which a federal court, sitting on\ the

civil side, could ‘have jurisdiction of an action based\ on

unseaworthiness where an action.for negligence under the

Jones Act is also pleaded. In considering “pendent ju

diction” as a ground he reviewed the nature of the two

theories of recovery. He stated at page 258: |

« © © © The Jones Act claim for negligence and the

maritime claim for unseaworthiness provide seamen

with two different grounds of relief for the commission

of the same wrong. A judgment on one claim bars &

second suit based on the other claim. * * * Since both

claims are based on the same operat: ‘ve facts, they con-

stitute a single ‘cause of action.’ * * * Because of the

extremely close relation of. the two claims, and the

’ virtual identity of their factual components, it is argv

able that a federal district court, having properly taken -

| sagcan tae at law under the Jones Act over the negli-

related unseaworthiness claim. * * * ”

. In view of the “close relation” of causes of action based

on negligence and unseaworthiness it is difficult to conceive

why the broad “wrongful act, neglect or default” classifica-

_ tion does not apply to both. See also the comment of Judge

Learned Hand in Gill v. United States, 184 F. 2d 49, 57 .

(2 Cir. 1950).

Rates falls within the broad Sanitation

is no reason. suppose that the legislature, while using .

referral language, intended to exclude “unseaworthiness”

from the New. Jersey Wrongful Death Act whenever it

would otherwise apply. The. broad language of the statute

~ indicates a. contrary intent. The liberal construction to

- which the statute is entitled also compels.a contrary result.

recovery which the deceased himself would have had if he |

had lived, if the basis of liability is unseaworthiness, but to

_ permit recovery where the- basis is negligence. | ;

- - Two Courts of Appeal have accepted the ‘respondents’

~ construction of the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act. They

construed it remedial, referral in nature as to liability, and

‘broad enough to include an action based on unseaworthiness

as well as negligence. This construction is supported by

the decisions of the New Jersey courts. -:

_ Not only-was the deceased entitled to have a seaworthy

- vessel at the time of his injury on petitioner’s.vessel, but

the widow and children of the deceased are entitled to sue

under the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act for a breach of

_ the duty to supply a seaworthy vessel where such breach of

duty- resulted i in death. | |

'

“, gence claim, has hesiatiaiten at law over the closely \ |

of 1 acts” or “defaults” if not “neglects.” There -

- it certainly is not just, to deprive dependents of a right to —

o>

\i- Omer a

‘Cie eiiibeatnn anit tie tnieabe Oo cenit

duty to. provide the deceased a reasonably safe place

to work and its failure to fulfill its duty constituted —

negligence such as would, if death had not ensued, have

entitled the person injured to maintain an action for

Although the action for negligence arises by ‘the ‘applica-

tion of the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act in admiralty,

the standard. of care is determined by the. general maritime

law and not by the substantive law of negligence of the

. State of New Jersey. Sirice the accident occurred in navig-

' able waters, the general maritime law rather than New Jer-

sey common law would apply. The New Jersey courts would

have to apply federal concepts. See Pope € Talbot, Inc. v.

Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202, 98 L. Ed: 143 (1953); .

Pioneer Steamship Company v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262, 264 (6.

Cir. 1955); O’Leary v. United States Line Company, 215 —

_F, 2d 708, 711 (1 Cir. 1954); New York & Long Branch

Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 195 F. 741 (3 Cir. 1912). In ad-

__ dition-the “such as” clause of N. J. S. A. 2A :31-1, by defini-

tion, incorporates such rights of the deceased as he would

have had if he had lived, which would refer to his rights

under: federal maritime law. - Gee, Pe

. However, there does not seem to be any great variance

between federal maritime law and the common-law of the

State of New Jersey relative to concepts of negligence, ex-

cepting the matter of common-law defenses. The reference

to federal maritime law: is more for the purpose of ‘ace

curacy of legal theory than fer difference in aucun ef- -

fect. 7

In Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F. 2d 173 (2 Cir. 1947) the

plaintiffs were longshoremen who. contracted dermatitis —

° —e-

caused by handling leaky steel drums containing cashew nut

oil. Plaintiff’s employer knew that the liquid was a cor-

_rosive and even had a special preventive cream on the dock.

Judge Chase, affirming a verdict for paints stated at

| page 174: 4

“The defendants-appellants have argued that, since

the employer of the stevedores. who unloaded the liquid

- was aware of the danger, they were under no duty to

‘warn those who. worked for that independent con-

tractor. We cannot agree. The defendants-appellants

not. only owed the duty to provide a seaworthy ship

on which these stevedores ‘who unloaded the‘ cargo

might work, Seas Shipping Co. Ine. v. Sieracki, 328 -

U. S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872, but they owed them, as invitees,

or business visitors, the duty to provide a reasonably

safe place to do their work. Fodera v. Booth American

Shipping Corp., 2 Cir., 159 F, 2d 795. This duty was

non-delegable and persisted despite any concurrent

_ duty onthe part if the stevedoring or: ” (Italics

ours:) ° d

‘The Anderson case, supra, was cited in a New Jersey case

involving the common law, Farrell v. Diamond Alkali Co., |

16 N. J. Super. 163, 83 A..2d 900 (App. Div. 1951).. The -

Farrell case ‘applied and followed the amas negligence

} concepts stated in the Anderson ease.

_ In Santamaria v. Lamport & Holt. Line,. 119 N. J. L. 467,

_ 196 A. 706 (E & A 1938) the plaintiff sued for the death

of her husband which occurred while he was engaged in re-

moving his employer’s cargo from a vessel. A judgment

against the defendant shipowner was affirmed. Among other

"things, at page 707 of Atlantic Judge Wolfskeil stated :

“ee? The consignee was an invitee, and its em-

ployees as consequential invitees shared in the incum-

bencies due from defendant with respect to providing

a reasonably safe place to work. ** * *” (Italics ours.)

In McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N. Y. 3t4, @

107. N. E. 2d 463. (1952) a judgment for a plaintiff long. |

shoreman. was -affirmed.. He claimed he was overcome by

fumes from cargo while working on defendant’s vessel and

he sued also the marfufacturer, shipper, and purchaser of |

the cargo. No claim of unseaworthiness was raised against

the vessel. After stating that the state courts will. look to

the federal “substantive maritime law” for the principles

and rules to be applied, J _ Conway. then continued at |

page 320: °

“Under the maritime law-a longshoreman who is

| employ ed by an independent contractor 46 load its ship, “

occupies ‘the status of an invitee aboard the vessel.

As such he is entitled to a reasonably.safe place to |

work. The duty of exercising reasonable diligence to ”

provide such a place and warn the longshoreman of 7

hidden dangers devolves upon the owner of. the ship. |

For a breach of that duty liability follows. * * *

“The duty is non-delegable and the fact that there |

is a concurrent duty imposed upon the longshoreman’s |

‘employer to furnish him with a safe place to work does

not alter the owner’s liability. * * * ” (Italics ours.) .

In distingyishing the McFall case the trial court com- |

mented ihat in that case the longshoreman was employed by |

an independent contractor “engaged by the owner” while in

the present case, the employer of the deceased was engaged -]

by “the owner of the cargo who was not the owner of the }

ship” (R. 576). Compare this, however, with Santamaria

~ vy. Lamport ¢ Halt Line, Ltd., quoted supra, and cited by |

the trial court as well (R. 575) where it was held that the

employee of a consignee unloading cargo from a vessel was

a consequential invitee entitled to a reasonably safe place

to work and the duty ‘to provide one devolved on the owner ~

of the vessel. While the trial court did not say that the * |

deceased was not an invitee with respeet to the owners of the ,

2

ge

vessel, that would seem to be the inp ication of the dis-

- tinetion made. Compare Mayes v. 'Splitdorf Electrical Co.;

- 94 N. J. L. 460, 111 A. 10. (E & A 1920); Restatement,

Torts (1934), See. 332. In footnote 6 in Pope & Talbot Inc.

'v. Hawn, cited supra, Mr. Justice Black speaking for. the

—eourt at page 413 cited cases illustrative of “the unbroken

. line of federal eases holding that persons working on ships

for independent contractors or persons, rightfully transact-

ing business on ships can recover for damages due. to ship-

owner’s, negligence.” . 7 ‘

In discussing the Santamaria case, quoted supra, the trial

- eourt stated (R. 576):

sediestta Son Sentamatta does not hold that a Shipowner

is liable to a worker for a condition create by his’

fellow: employ ees, * 4,°.” eh

This statement ignores the established law that the seal

owner has the non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably

- safe place to work, regardless of who creates the hazardous \.

conditions, That the employer of the deceased may have had

-aconcurrent duty to provide the deceased w ith a safe place

te work does ‘not relieve the owner of the vessel of his

primary duty. Suppose for- example a fellow employee of

"the deceased had dropped a banana peel or other slippery

substance on the deck of the vessel and the ship’ s officers

_ knew of the condition. Would they not have a primary duty

to the deceased to have removed the hazard? It can hardly

be argued‘as a matter of common-law or maritime law that

they had no such continuing duty.

The shipowner was ‘held liable for failure ta’ ‘provide a

safe place to work where the unsafe conditions were created °.

by. the employer of the’injured party and his fellow em-

ployees in McFall v. Compagnia Maritime Belge, supra,

where the -plaintiff’s fellow employees created the unsafe

" conditions by the rough handling of drums of carbon tetra-

chloride; in Ryan Stevedoring Co. Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic

_ Steamship Corp., 350 U. 8. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232, 100 L. Ed. 146

(1956) where the hazardous condition of improper storage

was created by the plaintiff’s. employer, and in Pioneer |

Steamship Co. v. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262 (6 Cir. 1955) where the

unguarded hole through which the plaintiff fell had been cut.

-in the bunker by the injured man’s fellow euiployees | some-

time before his accident. : Sires

As a'matter of fact, in ‘almost. all cases of this nature,

under maritime law, whee recovery by a shipowner is al-

lowed against the employer of an injured party it is im-

- plicit that the-employer or the injured party’s fellow’

‘employees caused: the unsafe conditions. to exist which

caused the injury. See for example Weyerhaeuser Steam-

ship Co. v. Nacirema verre Co., 355 U. S. 563, 78 S. Ct.

438, L. Ed. (1958). ; .

ee Staley in the opinion written- ‘below ain &

“The duty of providing Skovgaard with a reasosabiy

safe place to work, * * * would not be lessened even

if there were a concurrent duty on’ the part of. Skov-

gaard’s-employer. * * *”

The trial court erroneously, as a-matter of law, found

there was no duty on the part of the vessel owner to pro-

vide deceased: with a safe place to work. The court stated

(R. am)

“** * ® Moreover under New Jersey law when the

\ employee of-an independent contractor enters the prop-

\\ erty at the instance of the owner to correct the precise 3

\condition which later causes the employee’s injuries the

- Owner is not liable unless he supervised or controlled

~ the employee. Broecker-v. Armstrong CorkCo., 128—

N. AL. 3 (E. & A. 1942). Here, Skovgaard boarded

the vessel to help repair the defect and restore to

opefation the pump which caused the oil spill. The

entire operation was conducted by El Dorado, and there

* is no evidence from which to infer that any m/v Tungus |

personnel supervised or: controlled either the dis-.

.charge of the oil from the: tank or the repair of the

" pump. *¢6*4#7

°

The trial court relied on the Broecker case, supra. In

that case the decedent, an employee of a roofing concern

fell through a defective roof which the decedent was re-

pairing. Justice Case after citing a — of cases deal-

ing with the duty to provide the employees of contractors

a safe place to work stated at page 196 of Atlantic:

“An effective distinction. between. the instant case

_ and the decisions to which we have been cited is that

here we have an: injury caused by the verv condition .

- which the plaintiff was engaged to correct : was

in the act of coreetting, sah ties

- The important thing to note is that the Ricscher case,

_supra, the. deceased was caused to be injured and ‘killed

‘by the very condition he was in the process of repairing,

_ Le, a hole in the roof. In the present case, it was not

the duty of deceased to open the tank or to put up the

lights, or to place or remove iron beams between hatches, -

_.or to clean up oil on the deck. There was no proof of such

duty. If a man was repairing a hole in a roof and -he

fell into the hole that would be one thing. However, if

water had come in through the hole and made. the floor —

below wet, slippery and dangerous, that would be. an en-

tirely different matter. Cf. Mormino v. Leon Hess, Inc.,

119 F. Supp. 314 (S, D.'N. Y. 1953) aff’d on opinion below

in 210 F. 2d 831 (2 Cir. 1954).

Sudge Staley, writing for the court below stated (R. 588) :

_.' “*** Tt is relevant to note at this point that Skov-

sage was called for the purpose of repairing the

/

s\ 2 et ee

* pump, not to a up the oil spill. It is 5 alia that”

his, death was caused by: the condition of the deck and

« tank and not by the, instrumentality he intended to

repeir.* °°”. ai ey ; /

Even-if maritime law did not ‘Dkovide the test of liability, -

the New Jersey law does not help the petjtioner. In the .

ease of Berquist v. Penterman, 46 NN Super. 74, 134

a ‘Ada 20 (App. Div. 1957), cert. den. 25 N. 3.55, 134, A. 2d

‘832 (1957), Judge Goldman made the’ same distinction that .

Judge Staley. did i in this case. “At "page 25 of Atlantic, -

. stated: Gee hnd

| “The general rule. is’ that an owner or occupier of

premises who, by invitation, express . or implied, in-

duces a person to come upon ‘the premises, is under a

duty to exercise ordinary care to render the premises :

, reasonably safe for-the purposé embraced in the invi-

tation. * * * Point Pleasant seeks to escape liability

¢ under that rule by arguing the applicability of the ex-

ception engrafted upon it by the court in- Broecker v.

. Armstrong. Cork Co., 128 N. J. L. 3, 7, 24 A. 2d 194

(E. & A. 1942)> ‘that an owner is not liable where ari

‘c. independent contractor or his employee comes upon

lands by invitation, ‘to correct the precise condition

which causes the injury.’ * * * Wedo not consider the

exception applicalje to the instant. case. Berquist’s

. injury and eventual death did not stem from a danger- '

ous.condition he was called on to correct, or one which

<

~~

“eq

necessarily inhered in the work: he was doing. oon |

: (Italics ours. )

| The Broecker case, supra, .is essentially an assumption |

of risk case and should be contrasted with Dizon v. United

States, 219 F. 2d 10 (2.Cir.. 1955). In that ease the chief

— of a vessel brought an-action for injuries ‘sustained -

a

Il. when the top rungs of a ladder gave way while he .

was inspecting the ladder. Thc, case was remanded for

_ further hearings on the 1 issue of negligence. Among other

rs things, Judge Harlan stated at page 16:

a

~ - -fense of comparative negligence, and not the common-law ~

defenses of asumption of risk and contributory negligence

) ov 4

; :

“The lower ‘Court held assumption of risk. to be no

defense .because it found that Dixon had no reason

to believe that the ‘upper rungs of the ladder were in .

a dangerous condition, and also because as a matter .

of law the defense was invalid. We think both grounds 7

were correct. * * * As to the second, the American

courts have uniformly refused ‘to allow’ assumption of

risk_as a defense to a seaman’s--action. for injuries

under the general maritime law. ' delta ;

While the above case involved a.seaman and member of }

, ‘the crew, it is significant as a statement of the principle

of maritime law involved, i,e., that only the admiralty: de-

is available. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. :

406, 409, 74 S. Ct. 202, 205, 98 L. Ed. 143 (1953) ; Socony-

Vacutim Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 431, 59.S. Ct. 262,

266, 83. L. Ed. 265 (1939) } a Oil Limited v. Drlik,

234 F. 2d 4,9 (6 Cir. 1956). .

Basically the Broeckér case, supra, is no more nor jess

than a recasting of the assumption of risk doctrine. Instead

of setting-the matter forth as a defense, it is cast as a rule

of “no duty.” The fallacy of this device is demonstrated °

when it is considered what the situation would be if some-

one else, say a telephone lineman, installing a telephone

line, had been injured. The duty of the landowner to the —

‘invitee would exist,. but the eommon-law defense of assunip-

tion of risk would not be available. The common-law de-

_ fenses are more fully discussed under Point V, infra. They

- are mentioned here only to show the unsound basis of the’

Broecker decision as applied to negligence under the gen-

eral admiralty law.

The evidence establishes that the petitioners, their offi-

cers and men, at all times were in control of the vessel .

- and the place where the deceased was working. While it is

ee}

_ true that El Dorado people were repairing the pump it is

equally true that the officers and crew of the vessel actively

- inspected the area and they participated in. all activities —

conducted. | ate

‘In this connection it would be well to keep in mind the

. facts in Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., cited supra, which

are stated in the Court of Appeals opinion by Judge

McLaughlin. In that case the injured party was “a ship’s

carpenter foréman.”: At the time of the accident he and —

other employees “were making certain. minor adjustments

to the grain feeders.” He “slipped on some loose grain

underfoot, fell:through an opening caused by the absence

of a hatch board to the hold below.” There was testimony

that the hatch covers: had been missing the day before and

- the morning of the accident.' A jury found that the vessel

was unseaworthy and also that both -plaintiff’s employer.

and the defendant bare-boat charterer were negligent. In.

discussing negligence, Judge McLaughlin stated at: page

803: ° 7 : ‘ ees

«* * * Hawn was working for an intermediate em-

ployer. That employer, third party Haenn Corpora-

tion, was functioning under its contract with the record -

owner of the ship: However, there is not the slightest

indication that as. the ship was temporarily berthed at

-, Philadelphia ¢he appellant had surrendered actual con-

trol over it. Under those circumstances appellant was

faced with its duty of providing Hawn who was en-

gaged in the ship’s service a reasonably safe place to

woe **.*" - |

- In view of the facts and the iaw cited above the conclu-

sion of the trial court that the owner of the vessel was not

under any duty “to protect the workmen of the independent

contractor, El Dorado Oil Works” was erroneous as a mat-

ter of law (R. 576). The petitioners, as the owners of the es

vessel had a primary non-delegable duty to provide the ~~

.

3i

eased a reasonably safe place to work, This they know-

, ing failed to do.

POINT Ill

The petitioners owed the deceased the aieeibsicaelite

duty to provide the deceased. -a seaworthy vessel and its

- failure to do so constituted a wrongful act, neglect or

default such as would ‘if death had not ensued, have en-

‘titled the person injured to maintain an action for

of this. brief.

—

That the libellant has a cause of ‘action for acath based

on unsegworthiness under the New Jersey Wrongful Death

Act as well as for eaaneree, * was discussed under Point I

o

The deceased, although not a member of the crew of

the vessel, had come aboard for the° purpose of repairing

equipment being used in discharging oil cargo and was en-

_ titled to the protection of a seaworthy vessel.

"The U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in Tine & Talbot

_ ¥. Hawn, 346 U. 8. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202, 98 L. Ed..143 (1953)

extended to persons occupying the status of the deceased,

_ the: shipowner’s liability for unseaworthiness énunciated

o

'_.in the ease of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. 8. 85,

66 S. ‘Ct. 872, 90 L. Ed. 1099 (1946).

In Pope é. Talbot v, Hawn, supra, the plaintiff, a car-

penter, employee of # refitting company, recovered against

the owner of a vessel for an unseaworthy condition. Mr.

Justice Black, in affirming the decision of this court, hetd

_ that a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was owed to plain-

tiff. He stated at page 413:

weoe The ship on which Hawn was am was being

loaded ‘when the grain loading. equipment developed

38

a slight defect. Hawn was wut to work on it 80 “that

‘the loading could go on at once. There he was hurt.

His need for protection from unseaworthiness was

neither more nor less than that of the stevedores then

working with him on the ship or of seamen who had ~

been or were about to go on a voyage. All were sub-

‘jected to: the same danger. All were entitled to like

treatment under law.” ie

Except for the fact that Netitioner’ s vessel was unloading

oil rather than loading grain, the above quotation could be

directly applied to ‘the present case.

_. The employees of El Dorado were bavaeia | in prereencns .

oil from the respondent’s vessel. The oil was cargo in the

. same sense that rubber bales or cartons of goods, or sacks ©

of flour would be cargo: Certainly those engaged in dis-

charging oil are no less engaged in work traditionally done

by seamen than those discharging other forms of cargo

would be. Their functions are basically the same as long-

shoremen.

_ Some ships have their own ictiaieein for discharging

oil (R. 501). Where equipment is. brought on board by

those discharging the oil, it merely means that equipment

from the shore was used in lieu of ship’s equipment. The

situation is not uncommon in -longshore work. We note

-tRat the equipment which was brought on board was used —

in conjunction with the ship’s —— 1.€., the winches,

the heating coils, etc. ,

The deceased had a function to perform in connection

with the unloading of the cargo. It was his job to put in

working order the pump used to discharge cargo. Cer-

tainly if this. were the ship’s equipment for discharging oil,

this function would be performed by a member of the ship’s

crew if the work was within the ambit of his. skill. It

normally would be. Compare: American Steamship saniecs

: 39

pany v. Cons: 245 F. 2d 291 (9 Cir. 1957) where the em-

ployee of an independent contractor who was dismantling

grain fittings, removing charterer’s property and refurnish-

ing a ship was held to be entitled to a seaworthy vessel; _

Torres v. The Kastor, 227 F. 2d 664 (2 Cir. 1955) where ~

it was held that a workman employed by an independent

contractor engaged in cleaning loose pitch from a vessel

was entitled to a seaworthy vessel; Pioneer. Steamship

Company y. Hill, 227 F. 2d 262'(6 Cir. 1955) where it was

stated that'a shipfitter’s helper employed by a contractor.

| _ who was making repairs to a vessel. during its winter lay-

up was “probably within the broadened class of workers”

to whom a duty to provide ‘a seaworthy vessel was owed;

Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F. 24°784 (3 Cir. 1953)

where a, duty of seaworthiness was held: to be owed to

‘employees of a contractor hired “to clean the accumulated

rust and dirt from the four deep tanks.”

The test based on analogy of work was: applied in ‘Pinion 3

v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 156 F: Supp. 652 (E. D. La.

1957). -In that. case the libellant, a plumber-machinist,

employed by an independent contractor was injured while

on a scaffold replacing some salt water pipe on the véssel. .

The court held that the scaffolding used, whether furnished

by libellant’s employer or by the vessel, rendered the vessel

‘unseaworthy and allowéd recovery. Judge Wright rejected

the view that the work of the libellant did not entitle him.

to a seaworthy vessel because it did not involve loading |

equipment as in the Hawn case. He stated at page 697:

2a. an short answer to this argument is that

the S.S.. Del Mar herself regularly carries a plumber-

machinist as a member of her crew. And a plumber-

-machinist is precisely thé type of seaman. qualified .

to repair or replace short lengths of one-inch pipe.

If warranty of seaworthiness applies’ to landsmen

aboard a vessel pene wees: i per-

\

as Rat

seis by seamen, it anes certainly be applied. to

landsmen aboard performing work army performed -

by seamen.” —

Any ‘qualified member of the ship’ s crew could have done

the work done by the deceased in. getting the pumps to

operate again. This is.typical “ship’s work.”

The nature of the duty to provide a ‘seaworthy vessel |

was stated in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra, by

Mr. Justice Rutledge in footnote 11 at page 94:

“Ty this connection is pertinent also the frequently

stated rule that the obligation of a “ig wierd to pro-

vide a seaworthy ship i is non-delegable. * *-*.”

i Petterson v. Alaska S.S; Co., 205 F. 2d ‘a8 (9 Cir.

1953) affirmed per curiam in 347 U. S. 396, 74 S: Ct. 601,

98 L. Ed. 798 (1954), Chief Judge Denman stated that

the. question presented in that case was whether a vessel

owner is liable for injuries received by an employee of a

: stevedoring company on board a ship where the injuries

are caused by a breaking block brought on beard by the

stevedoring company. It was argued among other things

_ that the vessel was not liable because control of that portion

of the vessel on which the stevedore had been working

had been surrendered to the stevedoring company. After .

| - reviewing several cases in the Courts of Appeals for the

' Second and Third Circuits, the — concluded

page 480: |

usta tes “The analysis of the relinquishment of ‘control

doctrine above made shows that its major premise is —

that. the liability of the shipowner to the stevedore is

based on negligence. We have shown that major prem-

ise to be incorrect ; thus the entire gio is sneorsest,

and it should not be e applied here.”

\ ae,

ia

_ Mention: should be made of the decision in Bruszewski

- v. Isthmian 8.8. Co., 163 F. 2d 720 (3 Cir. 1947) cert. den.

_ 333 U.S. 828, 68 S. Ct. 451, 92 L. Ed. 1113 (1947), which ..

-is relied on by the petitioner (P. br. 15, 40, 55). The plain-

tiff was one of a group of longshoremen assigned to assist

the crew of a vessel in Aemoving a broken boom. It was

held that there was no evidence ‘of negligence in the oper-

ation of removing the boom, so that a directed verdict on

that count was affirmed.’ As to unseaworthiness, Judge

O’Connell, speaking for the majority of the court, stated

in denying the claim that the Sean was unseaworthy at

page 722:

“*** To state that a vision boom is warranted as

seaworthy would require distortion of the meaning

generally accorded those terms. * * *”

‘The Bruszewski decision does. not apply factually to .

_ the present case. If the deceased in the present case, while

assisting in the repair of the pump cut his hand on a

broken part in the course of the repair operation, then —

' @ situation analogous to the Bruszewski case might be

present.. The deceased was: interested only in the job of

getting the pump to operate. That was his only duty.

He had no duty with reference to the oily condition of |

the deck and tank cover, of the unguarded tank opening,

of the placing of beams between the tanks, or of the light- |

ing. He did not come aboard the vessel to “repair” any

of these conditions. The court below did not find that

the deceased had the duty to repair any of these con-

ditions and the evidence ‘establishes that he had no such

duty. In addition, as respondent has pointed out in the dis-

cussion of the Broecker case infra,..under Point II, the

Tule announced in those two cases is really an assumption -

of risk rule rather than a “no duty” rule. In the Bruszewski -

case, if the boom had injured another stevedore, not en-

=

42

gaged in the job of removing it, the duty to supply a

seaworthy vessel would have been recognized. Since as- .

sumption of risk is not a defense under the general mari- _

‘time law, the Bruszewski case brings in through the side

door, a doctrine which was ejected via the front door. The

Bruszewski decision states a-narrow rule which is to be

strictly interpreted.

7 In Gindville v. American-Hawaiian Reemihig Line, 294

FB. 2d 746 (3 Cir. 1955), a longshoreman was injured in

_ the course of unloading a vessel. Suit was instituted for

both negligence in loading the cargo and: unseaworthiness |

_ because of the unsafe manner in which the cargo was

stowed. A verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. In the course

| of his opinion Judge Goodrich stated at page 746:

ot 2) ae defendant asserts broadly that our |

‘decision in Bruszewski v. Isthmian SS Co., * * *,

settles this case in its favor arguing that the danger, a

if any, was perfectly apparent and that the plaintiff

assumed the risk when he went to work in the face of

such apparent danger. We think the Bruszewski .case

does not stand for any such sweeping proposition as

this. Indeed, it is quite narrow. It means.no more than

-if.a carpenter is called in to repair a hole in a roof.

_’ he cannot complain that a roof with a hole in it is an

unsafe place to work. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.) |

Judge Goodrich again considered the point raised in

Klimaszewski v. Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Co., 246 F. 2d °

875 (3 Cir. 1957). A longshoreman had been injured. when /

- a winch cable slipped and a beam being loaded on the

vessel struck him. He stated at page 877:

“The appellant complains about the court’s instrue-

tion on assumption of risk. /This question need not

trouble us either.’ As in Gindville, we say here that

one need only refer back to Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.

cenit, 1939, 305 U.S. 424, o's. Ct. 262, 83 L, Ed. 265,

”

°c

x ate

" .

_to get the rtile with ial to the Sree of the

doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negli-

gence in a maritime case. The extension of the rule

_stated in the Socony-Vacuum case to longshoremen is

_ shown in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 1953, 346 U.S. |

406, 74S. Ct. 202, 98.L. Ed, 143, and the Gindville |

case, supra. The new decision of the Sixth Cireuit in

Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4, certiorari deé-

_ nied, 1956, 352 U. S. 941, 77 8. Ct. 261, 1 L. Ed. 2d 236,

_ is squarely in point with just about every issue raised

in this case. A Longshoreman does not assume the risk

of. negligence or unseaworthiness and this is so whether.

_ his action is based on negligence or _wnseaworthiness.”

7 (Italics ours. )

' The narrow application of the Deusienati opinion ‘was:

recognized in Pinion v. Mississippi Shipping Company,

. supra. In that case a repairman was injured when a de-

fective pipe on which he was working broke causing him

to lose his balance on a narrow scaffold and fall to the

‘deck. Judge Wright held that the repairman could not

complain of the defective condition of the pipe on the

basis of the Bruszewski case. However, he went further

and stated at page 656: ;

“Libellant, however, is on much firmer aaall with.

respect to his charge of unseaworthiness by reason of

the scaffolding he was required to use in. effecting the

repairs. * * * It unquestionably was unsafe equipment

with which to work. As such it rendered the vessel un-

seaworthy and her owner liable in damages.

Respondents’ suggestion that the eight-inch seit

which formed part of the scaffolding may have been

brought aboard the vessel by Ferran cannot save the

_ shipowner from liability for failure to furnish a sea-

worthy vessel. Whoever furnished the scaffolding, it

was still the nondelegable duty of the shipowner to

farnish Pinion adequate equipment and a safe place . |

to work. *** * The fact that Pinion was injured. as a

4

result of the wadeuwerties equipment ‘aiitien the ship-

owner liable for his damages, irrespective of fault. * * *

Respondent also suggests that if the scaffolding was

inadequate, Pinion was in the best — to make

~ that appraisal. -

The court below found that the deceased had boarded

the vessel “to help repair the defect and ‘restore to oper-

ation the pump which caused the oil spill” (R. 576). There

is no finding that it was the duty of the deceased to clean

up the oil spill. In the case of Mormino v. Leon Hess, Inc.,

119 F. Supp. 314 (S. D. N. Y. 1953): affirmed on ‘opinion

below in 210 F. 2d 831 (2 Cir. 1954), the libellant was -

chief pumpman on a vessél. While repairing a valve which

had leaked oil onto the deck, he stepped into the oil and |

fell. His action was based on the Jones Act and on unsea-

worthiness. Judge ‘Leibell' found, among other. ee at”

page 317 in awarding a decree for libellant: a

a,

“There is no controversy in respect to respondent’s °

- . assertion that it was libelant’s duty as chief pumpman

to fix the' faulty valve. But Mormino was under no

_ duty to clean oil from the deck while it was accumu-

‘ etio. °° *

* * * * .

«*** As has been stated heretofore, Mormino’s

duty was limited to repairing the valve. Jt did not:

extend to the consequences of his delay in making that

repair, namely to cleaning oil from the deck. That .

was for some member of the deck crew to do.

“Nor is libellant barred from maintaining this action

_. because he sustained his injuries in performance of -

- an act designated to remove the condition which caused

his injuries. In relying on such a proposition respon-—

dent impliedly invokes the doctrine of assumption of —

risk. * * *, a defense which is not available in a suit

' brought under the Jones Act. * * *” (Italics ours.)

eee

In the case of -Rodriguéz vy. The Texas Company, 254

F. 2d 295 (2 Cir. 1958), the plaintiff, a seaman was injured

- when he slipped on oil on a platform in the engine room.

* In affirming a judgment for plaintiff and curiam, the court

stated at page 297: ,

“* * * She fact that plaintiff was charged with

maintaining the platform in a clean condition and the

. question of whether or net he should have noticed the

“presence of the oil on the platform, whilé issues to be

_ . considered by the jury in determining the plaintiff's

contributory negligence, if any, did not destroy the

"prima facie case. 7” core rc

In this connection compare Boat aes v. Todd, 224

F. 2d 208, 210 (1-Cir. 1955), where the court held that a

trial court -rightfully refused to charge in effect that it

‘was the duty of the plaintiff as master of a vessel to see |

that defective conditions aboard the vessel were repaired,

and that his failure to have brushes replaced on a gen-

erator, causing the failure of light on a ‘vessel and his

consequent injury, barred recovery under both the Jones

. Act and for unseaworthiness. Compare also Mason vy.

. Lynch Brothers, 228 F. 2d 709 (4 Cir. 1956) ; Sprague v.

The Texas Co., 250 F, 2d: 123 (2 Cir. 1957).

_ It is submitted that the petitioners owed to the deceased °.

an absolute, non-delegable duty to provide the deceased with

a seaworthy vessel. This they knowingly failed to do.

qe

4

46

The trial court erred in not making findings that peti-

tioners failed to provide the deceased with a safe place

to work and failed to. provide him with a. seaworthy

vessel causing’ his ceath. | GaP ait

(a) Where-a trial judge, sitting in admiralty dismisses a.

libel on an erroneous legal ground and does not pass

on the factual issues before him, his decision is fully

reviewable on appeal and the appellate court can

make the proper findings.

An admiralty appeal is a trial de novo, except that find-

ings of fact based upon credibility of witnesses who testified.

in open court will not beset aside unless “clearly errone- _

ous.” McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 75 S. Ct. 6,

99 L. Ed. 20 (1954) ; Petterson v. Alaska SS. Co., 205 F. 2d

478, 479 (9 Cir..1953) aff’d per curiam 347 U. S. 396, 74

S. Ct. 601, 98 L. Ed. 798 (1954). See also Diamond State Tel.

Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 205 F. 2d 402, 409 (3 Cir. 1953) ;

‘ Barbino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F. 2d 553, 555 (2 Cir.

1945). A same scope of review applies under Rule 52(a)

F. R. C. P. -See. Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F. 2d° 592, 594

(3 Cir. 1953). Moore, Federal Practice (2nd Ed. Vol. 5,’

See. 52. 03(2) at page 2630,

' The crux of the opinion of the trial ¢ourt is the statement

that the court was not persuaded “that the owner of the

vessel is under any duty to protect the workmen of the inde-

pendent contractor” (R. 576). This conclusion is a conclu- .

_ sion of law and is fully reviewable on appeal. There were

‘no findings made as to unseaworthiness. There was no

direct finding by the court that petitioners were free from

negligence. By implication ‘the court did find negligence

when it stated that the owner of the-vessel had no duty to

protect .he workmen of the independent contractor.“against

4

\ a . ;

the danyerous conditions created by the very work for which .

. the independent contractor was hired” (R. 576). A large-

- -part of the factual background is undisputed. The appeal

tothe Court of Appeals was essentially based on erroneous

application of the law to the facts andthe legal conclusions

to be drawn from those facts. It'was.therefore fully review-

able both as to facts and the law applied to those facts.

(b) The petitioners’ officers and crew remained in

control of the vessel and they actively partici-—

pated in the unloading operations. ;

_ * Tn their answer filed in this case, the petitioners admit-

ted “the owners * * * were in possession of and operated,

managed and controlled” the vessel involved although they

claimed portions of the véssel had been turned over to re-

pairmen, stevedores, ete, (R.. 24). 3

The facts, establish that the vessel incline the portion

of the vessel where the deceased was: killed was and re-_

mained under control of petitioners, their officers and crew

at all times while the incidents invalved in, Saas case Oc-_

curred. . :

The Chief Officer of the .vessel stated that he “gave

_ orders to two menibers of the crew to be on board all night”

‘(R. 299}. These crew rnembers were not loaned by the ship

to El Dorado (R. 338). In fact they received overtime from

the ship (R. 338). They were there to help El Dorado “to

be used for ship’s equipment to drive winches, ahd to hoist

their equipment on board ship” (R. 299). The Captain of

the vessel remained on board ail night (350a), as did the

Chief Officer and the officer on watch ( R:; 299). ~When-the

crewmen operated the winches they were directed by the

Second Officer, who was the officer ‘on-watch (R. 301). In

short, aside from other crewmen who might have been on

board there were two crewmen who remained on duty

ao : 7 48 .

: specifically i in ‘connection with the. unloading operations, a

‘well as the. Chief of ita and the officer on watch who were :

also on duty. |

Once it is ddmitted that the Chief Officer « and the PSS Xo

on: watch wer ‘on duty, it is ridiculous to claim that they |

were not masters in their own house. This is borne out by ‘i

- additional facts which were developed. The Captain stated 1

in his depésition that it was part of the duties of the Chief :

* Officer’ “to look after eargo, upkeep of the ship, and to look

‘\after the erew;-all the work as to the ship comes under him”

fee 74; R. 523). The Chief Officer stated that one

,concérning with the cargo” was his duty (R. 316).

The Captain stated that it was the duty of the officer on

‘watch to, be on the lookout for any defective conditions.

which might arise and wif respect to any unsafe conditions ©

it was his duty to correct them (R. 76; R. 78; ‘R. 523).

s

The Chief Officer stated that he inspe ted the vessel,

_ while in-port, at least once an hour, “going Young ship;

looking in the -hatches, and see that the cargo is properly

discharged.” Thése inspections. he considered part of his

_ duty (R. 318). The Captain also. stated that these inspec-

_ tions were part of the Chief Officer’s duties (R. 74; R. 523).

The Chief Officer admitted that if he observed, any uk.

‘safe condition which might cause injury to anybody aboard /

_the vessel, it was his duty to do something about it (R. :

318). When asked with relation to oil which might be

dropped by stevedores while working on the vessel, whether

‘it was his duty “to. see it is corrected; no matter who does

it,” he answered, “I guess so, if Peron it to the notice of —

‘the foreman who ‘knew him job, he-would do it. He wouldn’t. *

let oil stand around” (R. 320)... See Serres

From the testimony of the Chief Officer _ the Captain |

it appears that — Fevogatined | it was the du of the vessel

: ha

49°

to inspect, ‘to look for, and to correct any unsafe, hazardous,

or unseaw orthy condition which existéd on the vessel. This

duty to provide a safe place to work aud a seaw orthy vessel ©

_ was an absolute and non-delegable one. The contention of _

. the Chief Officer that it was the duty of El Dorado to remove

‘ the oil becauseygf the circumstances under which the’ oil

.. Came on the detk (R. 320),- -is a matter which may have

‘relevance to the i issue of indemnity between the petitioners.

and tlie employer. of the deceased, but it does not modify

\

- 4 ie recognized duty ow ed to the deceased. : : >

There is additional evifiniee which establishes that the }

vessel not only retained control of the place where the

deveased had been injuréd, but. that the officers and crew |

actively participated. in the eve — to the death of

the} deceased. poe : olan R

he ship’ i ae CS the main deck hatches first.

* (2: 299; R. 339). -The ship’s crew remov ed and pos#tigned

the tank cover and brought the pump on board (RM#MH46;.

_”R, 147; R. 266; R. 339; R. 457; R. 560, Exh. R-6). The:

ship’s crew in operating the winches. were directed’ by

the Second Officer, who was the officer on watch (R. 301;

’ > R: 339; R. 276). The ship’s crew helped an El. Dorado }

se mechanic bolt a suction hase toa pump (R. 462).

‘The leaking” of the pump was discoveréd by members of

the ship’s crew (R. 188; R. 302; R. 304; R. 560, Exh. R-6).

The ship’s. crew put a peg into a nipple opening on the .

‘pump with a sledge hammer.to-stop the leak (R.'190; R. 194; ih

R. 208). After the oil was ‘spilled and up. to the time of

the accident ship’ s officers were in the vicinity of the oil ea

spill (R..154; R. 190; R. 195). At the time of the. accident

there were crew members ‘on thie ’tweer deck but they ws

were “up forward” (R. 210; R. 350), : xe

‘

ss A

of 150°

After the accident to ‘the deceased, ‘when work was re-

suméd, the ship’s crew ‘removed the iank cover so that they

‘could tower the pump (R. 472). They had also put up ropes _

around the tank opening after the aceident (R. 467; ‘R. 469).

It can‘also be inferred that they threw ‘sawdust on the oil

becanse when the first El Dorado man returned to resume

operations after ‘the accident (the El Dorado men hatihg

left the vessel after the accident to the deceased) he found\ .

that “everything had been sawdusted down” (R. 467),

On the basis of the undisputed facts there can only be >

\

a finding that the petitioners, their officers and crew |

fever gave up control of any portion of their vessel to the

employer of the deceased but on the contrary they actively .

. participated in all the operations conducted by the em-

ployer of the deceased. Under the doctrine of unseaworthi-

ness, as discussed under Point III of this brief, the element “tg

of control does not. present an issue. Nevertheless it was

there. . | | .

(©) The setittenien? officers sie of the deine,

hazardous and unseaworthy conditions which caused —

_ the death of the decedent and they negligently failed .

‘to remedy the situation or to otherwise provide the -

deceased with a safe place to werk.

' It was established that the oil came ‘from the break on

the fitting in the hose leading from the pump (R. 153;

' R. 188; R. 572). The court found that the deceased “slipped .

- on the spilled oil and fell to his death into 8 feet. of hot _—.

(R. 573). a ° «¢

‘When the El Dorado men frst. saw Pat oil spill, sin :

‘of the vessel were in the vicinity of the pump (R. 154;

R. 190). Ship’s officers were present while the El Doradoy

men were inserting a new fitting: (R. 154; R. 155). There

| _ was.testimony that before: the accident, ° ‘pout | midnight,

members of the crew did some cleaning i the forward

- tt

rao aan ners a Ea a

a4

part of the vessel (R: 224). te view of all this it enh

be denied that the.vessel, its officers and crew had’ knowl-

edge of the dangerous and anseaworthy condition which

existed at least one hour before the death of the deceased.

The vessel’s own log entries bear-this out (R. 560, Exh. R-6).

In addition, the petitioners’ Chief Officer stated that at ~

about 15 minutes past midnight, he went on deck follow-

ips a report from His Third: Officer, who was on watch,

cand | he observed oil spurting out of a hole. in the pump .

line (R. 304). After he had. examined. the cargo for dam-.

'- age, he talked to Mr. Sextons—the receiv ing foreman of:

a : Dorado. He claimed that he told him (R. 305) :

eS) ee told also to’ sweep the tank hold— —

the tank covers, where the crew was working on. And .

L offered to give them sand and sawdust to strew around

’ the platform. where they were working on,:-in order -

to minimize the “danger. of slipping in the oil.” ~*~

This statenient also establishes that the’ vessel, by its...

‘ officers, had knowledge of the dangerous condition resulting _.

from oil being on the deck’ prior to the time the deceased -

came on board and was injured. The part of the conversa-

_tionfrelating to the putting the sand or sawdust on the oil

- iwas denied by Sexton (R. 484). However, in so far as

_libellant is concerned it makes no difference whose version:

of this,allegation is accepted. The duty-of. the vessel to

provide a seaworthy vessel and a safe place to work was a

non-delegable one so far as the deceased was concerned.

The. admitted knowledge of the danger and the method of

removing it which was available was not used and this

establishes not. only that an unseaworthy condition existed

but negligence on the part of ‘the vessel as- well.

In the case of United States v. Harrison, 245 F. 2d 911

OG (9 Cir. 1957) a longshoreman had slipped on an oily deck.

The deck had been covered with oil when. the work. started.

ates , eae ae

The ‘evidence showed that the stevedore gang boss had

a complained of the condition to the officer in control of the

vessel... A judgment for. plaintiff was affirmed. —_

other things, Judge Fee ifshis opinion stated at page 916:

se'ee

“ment to render her seaworthy immediately. The defect

‘was not latent, but.was patent to everyone who saw

«the deck. If the defective conditiowtad been concealed

and the Stevedoring Company had been the- first to

discover it, then a burden might have been placed upon

the latter ‘ander the contract. But the duty to keep

the ship seaworthy, where the conditions are open and

notorious to all who looked, is not only non-delegable,

but continuous upon the shipowner, master and a ”

In United States v. Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F. “2a

329 (9 Cir. 1949) the libellant, a longshoreman, was injured

when a large hatch cover fell on him. The appellate court

found as.a fact that the sole proximate cause of the- ‘injury.

to the libellant was the negligence of his-employer in its

use of the hatch with knowledge of its defects of dogs and

pins.. The court gave indemnity to the’ government, as”

owner of the vessel, against libellant’s employer. In the |

‘eourse of his, opinion, Unter 7? Denman stated at

page 329: :

“The government idee liability to the stavedoré

because it had a continuing duty to him to see that at

all times he had a safe place to work, and is so liable ~

to him for a failure to keep the vessel seaworthy. in

that regard. Such liability exists even though tlie sole :

‘proximate cause of such unseaworthiness and the in.-,

jury to,Williams was not the defect in the hatch cover

but, as the government claims, its conscious use wita

knowledge of .its defect, by the stevedore’s superin-

* tendent in a way makirig it cengerons and heaters the ,

injury to Williams.”

(

The. unseaworthiness of this vessel created ~~

a non-delegable duty upon the agents of the govern- .

pie

In Ametican President Lines v, Marine Terminals Corp.,

234 F. 2d 753, (9 Cir. 1956) a stevedore had sued a ship-

owner for injuries received when’ a strongback with a %

defective locking device was dislodged by a bridle and -

- hook manipulated by a winch operator causing injury to,

“the-‘stevedore. He sued on theories of negligence and un:

seaworthiness. The shipewner settled and +thien sued his.

employer. The .court: Teversed a. judgment below and

granted indemnity. In concluding that the employer, Marine —

Terminals Corp. was primarily negligent, Judge Hamlin

. stated, among other things at page 759:

oY Ta) Shashi was charged with notice before

the accident from the ship’s officer that some strong-

_backs were defective and from its own employees that

' the particular strongback involved here -had no lock

_and was unsafe. It would have taken little time to

’ remove the lockless beam. .* * *”

In both of the above cases, the vessels, ‘ their respec-

tive officers, had knowledge of defective, dangérous, and un- |

seaworthy conditions on board. In both cases it was recog-

nized that the shipowner had b ached its duty fo provide

a, safe piace to work and a seaworthy vessel even though

. the shipowner successfully transferred its liability. on a

theory of indemnity to the employer of the injured party.

As far as libellant is concerned it is immaterial whether

petitioners , in this case are successful in transferring

their liability to the respondent-impleaded. The duty of

petitioners to the deceased is the same whether indemnity

is granted or not.. fs

As has been pointed out in our prior discussion, it makes

no difference who or what creates the unsafe and hazardous

conditions, the duty-of the shipowner. to provide a sea-_

worthy vessel and a safe place to work remains the same.

For example in Oakes v. Graham Towing Co., 135 F. Supp.

Cn iene

485 (E. D. Pa. 1955) a seaman settled his “case against a

‘ shipowner. The shipowner. successfully. sought indemnity .

_from the drydock. Before granting indemnity against the

shipyard where the vessel had been drydocked at the time,

Chief Judge Kirkpatrick had to find that the shipowner -

- was justified i in making a settlement with the seaman and.

- he did.’ The seaman had been injured because of grease

and, oil on a ladder he used to get on the ship. The court .

- stated among other things at page 486: ~ °

“The-floorof the drydock was littered with equip-

ment and covered. with oil and grease. Men- ‘traversing oS.

it were bound to get grease on their shoes, which is

undoubtedly the way in which the grease came to ‘be

on the ladder.

“Regardless of who furnished the ladders, they con-

stituted the only means for the ship’s ‘crew to get off

and on the ship and, as:such, became a part of the ship

itself. The shipowner’s failure to keep the ladder

free of dangerous accumulations of grease made the

ship | ‘unseaworthy . and, in ancien, constituted negli-

4 gence.”

A

In the Oakes case the grease and oil came on the ladder,

- because of a condition created by the drydock company

ana not by the shipowner, yet the cdurt found not only that |

‘an unseaworthy ‘condition existed but that the ae

_ was negligent in spite of this fact.

In Grillea v..United States, 232 F. 2d 919 (2 Cir. 1956)

a longshoreman was. injured when he fell through an open

hatch while working on board a vessel owned by the defen-

dant but chartered to another. A decree for respondent

was reversed with directions to enter a decree for libellant.

“In the course of his opinion Judge Learned Hand stated

that although the libellant and another longshoreman. had

laid the wrong hatch cover over a “pad-éye” so that it -

9

” VV °

. ° Y mys ee

. ene Bt

wobbled causing him to fall subsequently: when he stepped. -

on it, thé vessel was unseaworthy because of the condition

' created. The court’s statement onothis point was reempha-

' sized on a petition for rehearing where the court per

curtam stated at page 925:

“The respondents are right in saying that it was

not the libellant and DiDonna who misplaced the cover

that later rocked and made the libellant fall. This was

misplaced by two’ other m@mbers of the same gang

before the libellant and DiDonna walked over it. It

is impossible to see what conéeivable difference this

“our ruling.”

In view of the law as set forth i in the above eases and in -

3 the cases discussed under Points II and III concerning the

_»non-delegable duty of the vessel owner to provide a sea-

worthy vessel and a safe place-to. work, it follows as..a

‘matter of law that the Chief Officer of. the vessel could not

avoid the responsibility of the vessel ‘by any statement. or

lass aerial he made .to Mr. Sexton. hare

“The Chief Officer admitted that sawduet is put on oil me

‘ 2. “not to slip” and he.stated he would “consider it safer to

have. sawdust on oil instead of faving nothing” (R: 322).

After the accident the ship’s crew put ropes around the ©

tank opening (R. 469), and everything was “sawdusted

down” (R. 467). If the oil had been cleared away and the

\ area sawdusted before the accident to the deceased, the

» accident could have been av ‘cided.

The evidence indicates that the last oil came from the ‘

break when the ship’s. crew put the peg in the nipple of

\the pump and stopped. the leak (R. 190). This was before - |

midnight accordj to the recollection of Russo and Dono-. -

hue (R. 157; R/ 190), although the ship’s log entry for

this was 15 minutes after midnight (R. 560; Exh. R-6).

can-make in the result ; indeed, if any thing, it confirms _.

_. The log entry dealing with the death of the deceased is

- timed at.1:25 arm. (R..560; Exh, R-6). This means that.

the ship’s officers had knowledge of the unsafe and dan-

gerous condition created by the existence of oil on a tank

cover, hatch beams, and adjoining | area near an open un-

guarded tank of hot oil for at least. one hour before the

deceased came on board. —

The officers of the vessel eae of the Sennsini and un-

| seaworthy conditions which caused the death ‘of the- de-

ceased. They had the means to remove them or to guard

‘against them. “They had’ ample time to do so. In so far

- as unseaworthiness i is concerned this element of. notice and

knowledge is immaterial. It was there nevertheless.

. (d) Phin danny conte: sin honed ‘peittaiiand i

assist in repairing the pump and restoring it to opera-

tion but he had no duty to repair,‘ remove or correct

_ ae dengerens and wnscaworthy conditions | which

The court below specifically found that the deceased, “a

maintenance foreman employed by El Dorado, was called -

from his home to assist in repairing the pump and restor-

ing it to operation” (R. 573).

Before petitioners’ vessel came in the deceased had

checked the pump, with a machinist named Wagner. They

were satisfied ‘that it was in good working condition and

it wag then taken.to: the pier, to await the arrival of pe-

_ titioners’ vessel (R. 454). The deceased was not there

when the pump was placed on board: petitioners’ vessel

_or when it started operation (R. 460).. He was home with

his wife having coffee and pizza pie when he. received a

call to come down to the pier to assist in getting the pump -

operating again after it had developed the leak which was

stopped and then repaired (R. 134; R. 484:\R. 156). The

deceased did-not go on board and did not have any duty

OEE : “

to perform on board petitionets’ vessel until ‘he boarded

it in response to a call-a short time before his death.

‘No claim éan be made that it:was the duty of the de-

ceased, or that the deceased in any way, placed or even

supervised the placing of the pump on petitioners’ vessel, _

that the deceased placed or even supervised the placing-ef-

the tank lid on the tank top, that the deceased placed or —

supervised the placing of the beams in the walkway be-—

tween the tank tops; that the deceased-had the duty to_

———elean or even the duty to supervise the leaning of oil

from the area around the tank lid. The uncontradicted evi-,

dence shows«that the duty of the deceased prior to and. ~

at the time of his death was “to help repair the defect and —

restore to operation the ,pump which — the oil spill” .

- 576).

jo eevee

In Maui. v. | Hess; quoted supra under “Point III of

this brief, the « court found the vessel owner negligent. and

liable to:a chief. pumpman. who was injured on oil from a

leaking manifold valve. The court found that the libellant .

"had the duty “to fix-the faulty valve” but that he was under

“no duty to clean the oil*from the deck while it was ac-

cumulating.” Judge Leibell found that ‘cleaning oil from

the deck would fall under the heading of ‘general cleaning’ ”

_ pursuant to a union coftract and that these duties could’.

not be assigned to a chief pumpman (119 F. Supp. 314, 317).

- In the:present case it is clear that the deceased was a main-

tenance foreman. Everything which. had to do with the

receiving of oil was under the jurisdiction of Mr. -Sexton

who had been there all night (R. 165; R. 491). The plant

superintendent who was supérior to both the deceased and

Sexton was Mr. Blaney ¢R. 227). In explaining the duties

.of Mr. Russo, a maintenance mechanic, ‘who had been on

_ duty that night, Mr. Sexton stated” {R. 498) :

: “Salvatore Russo was loaned from the Maintenance

Department, which was due to a union deal that we,

vd

had down there, Salvatore Russo was connected with

the Maintenance Department. and. we’ hud to have. a

maintenance man on the pump.” 3 :

This indicates that there was a clear and definite division

_of ‘functions at the El Dorado plant. Cleaning oil from

the deck, beams, tank top of petitioners’ vessel was not

a function assigned to the deceased.

-. There was some dispute. relating to the issue of who

h the duty; to clean up the spilled oil as —s the

ssel and El Dorado.

‘There was testimony . that it was Rin sanilien for the

ship’s crew to clean: up oil from pumps (R. $15; R.°208).

The Chief Officer claimed that. if oil was spilled on the’

‘ deck by the ship’s crew he recognized that it way, the ship’s

duty to remove it, but he felt that if it was a stevedore

who soiled the deck it was the. stevedore’ 's duty and not

that of the ship (R. 319). Obviously if.the ship had a non-

-delegable duty to'provide a safe ‘place to work and a sea-

‘worthy vessel, the distinction claimed by the Chief Officer

has no validity as far as libellant i is concerned.

In this connection we note that the Chief Officer admitted

that the vessel carried sawdust,. although he denied the

statement of his own Captain that the purpose of the

sawdust being catried was to.dry up oil and water if spilled -

(R. 92; R. 325). He admitted that sawdust ‘is put on

oil so that it would not be-too slippery (R..322). The Chief .

’ Officer claims he “suggested” to Mr. Sexton, the El Dorado

receiving. foreman, that sawdust be applied (R. 347; R. 560;

Exh. R-6). The El Dorado foreman denied this (R. 484).

The fact that the vessel transported oil and had sawdust. »

on-board which was used to dry up il and water lends

credence to the fact that the ship recognized its duty to

clean the oil or to reduce hazards arising from its presence.

‘

: ak

’

e .

ee ee

oye Tt

‘The evidence does not establish ‘that ‘it was the duty

of the deceased to remedy the dangerous and unseaworthy

condition created by the .existence of. oil on a tank lid,.

beams, and deck area near. an open. tank of hot oil.

(e) The deceased mi due c care for his own safety.

The dissent in the Court of Appeals, based. on New

Jersey law stated that it appeared that the. deceased had

. known of the dangerous condition and: had’ therefore as-

_» sumed the risk as the New Jersey courts would apply the

doctrine (R. 595). In the first place it does not appear as

a fact that the deceased knew that the oil on the deck

in the area of the tank had not been cleaned “up 6r- that

some steps had not been taken .by the vessel to correct

anyshazards created by the oil spill. It would have been

- reasonable for ‘the deceased to havé assumed that all was’

safe because work was being. done in the area when he

arrived. Secondly, there is a presumption that the ——

used due care. Watn v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 255

F. 2d 856 (3 Cir. 1958). Finally, the matter is regarded

in. New Jersey law as a question of fact involving the

defense of assumption of risk, a defense. which must be

proved by the defendant. Cf. Hendrikson v. Koppers Co.,

11 N. J.-600, 95 A. 2d 710 (1953). :

The deceased was not aboard petitioners’ vessel\ when

the oil spilled. He was not on duty at that fime but Was

at home. At the -time’ he left the plant, he had checked tlie.

_ pump with a machinist named ;Wagner and they found

the pump in. good working. order (R: 455). The pump

was then left on the pier to await the arrival of the vessel.

O’Leary, another mechanic, installed the pump when the -

vessel arrived. He found the pump. working satisfactorily

(R. 459). Mr. Sampson, who was.a standby on the pump

from 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., found the pump operating -

_ “very good” (R. 476). . There certainly was no evidence

ov.

that the dannioed knew o or should have known of the de..

fective condition of the pump or. that he should have an-

ticipated the way in which it would be sig on the tank

top.

_ When the deceased came to/ the vessel that night, he

was entering the area where the tank and the pump were —

for. the first time. He had not conducted any general in-

- spection of the premises as the Chief Mate had done.’ He

~had‘not been working in the immediate area of the pump >

where Russo, And Donohue had been -working._He had

not been standing around as the officers of the vessel had

_ been doing. He was concerned with one immediate problem ,

‘and that’ was: to help Russo and ‘Donohue to get suction

on the pump (R. 158; R. 197).

When the deceased walked to the pump, Mr, Ruses

testified that he had been walking “inet normally like

taking his step” (R. 199).

Not only does ‘the deceased have the benefit of the pre-

sumption that he exercised due care, but there is no evidence

in the record that would justify a finding to the contrary.

ul «

POINT Vv see a iia

The defenses of contributory. neglignce ‘cad assump- |

tion.of risk are not available in a wrongful death action |

based on a maritime tort and in addition there was no

evidence to establish that the deceased had been negli-

gent or that he assumed the. risk of petitioners’ negli- .

gence or of unseaworthy conditions. 3 =

We haye already discussed the referral nature of the Q.

New Jersey Wrongful Death Act: Since the New Jersey.

' statute, by its terms, gives a right to recovery, based on

the maritime rights and duties relating to unseaworthi-

ness, then it incorporates. all of the maritime law relating —

to standards of care, ete., that: %o with it. In Halecki-v.

United New York & New Jersey S. H. P. Ass’n, 251 F.‘2d

708 (2 Cit 1958), Judge Learned Hand stated at page 712:

“***. Although, as we have said, we are not deal-

ing with “federal maritime law,’ we ‘should remember

that so far as we can we ought to construe the statute.

so as to’ avoid capricious and irrational distinctions. =

We leave open whether New Jerse¥ is without. power —

to take as much or as little of the rights ‘rooted in

, federal maritime law’ as it chooses as the model for

the right it confers upon the next of kin; but the courts

--of that state have never passed upon the ‘question, and

to deny the exemption to the next of kin seems to us.

to the last degree capricious and. irrational. * * *.

Obviously, the answer is not certain; we. must do as--——

‘ best we can with what we have, and we hold that the :

New Jersey statute should be construed as taking over

\ as a part of the model it accepted the exemption of

\eontributory negligence as a bar.” ‘are {

n

The trial court made no findings either as to assumpti

of risk or contributory negligence. The. Court of Appeals,

in view of the lack of findings in this regard did not “decide

factually what defenses, if any, might be available to the .. :

respondent” G 588). Se eet | ime 2

- 4 er " . i: :

baad ; J ;

: : : ee

; ; :

z

We note that the New Jersey Ww rongful- Death, Act,.’

N. J.:S. A. 2A23]-1 et sq! does not anywhere state that

contributory ietigenee is a‘defense to an action under the. .

eee: \ act. Cf. The Devona, 1 F. 2d 482, 484 (D.C. Me. 1924).

The substantive law relating to liability is incorporated: by.

‘refgrence and is co xtensive with the stbstantive. law of

liability for. pay injufy as distinguished from Ww ia ae

ful death. Fi

It is not questioned. that in 4’ Goninon: law actions arising

under the. New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, common- law

defenses ure applied. The act itself measures liability by the.

test of whether or not the deceased, if death had not ensued, ©

would have been able to maintain an action. Obviously in

_@ common-law action, which is what is involved in all the °

_Neéw Jersey decisions cited by petitioners in their brief, the

common-taw defenses would bar recovery. Logically, there-|

‘fore, in a maritime case, the maritime defenses should pre-

_ vail because. the act itself refers: to: the. Substantive rules

of. maritime law i in such cases.

e

Even as a ‘matter of . statutory. construction, the courts -_

must imply a sang-froid to the New Jersey legislature a

order to hold that whereas'a seriously injured father and —

husband. is entitled to a recovery under the maritime law.

even if contributorily negligent, his wholly innocent chil-

dren and wife would be denied such recovery if he dies |

from his. injuries. The legislature has not set forth this

defense in the statute. Courts-do not construe statutes in

such a way as to produce harsh or absurd results. ‘See

Cox. v. Roth, “348:U. S. 207, 209, 75 S. Ct. 249, 99 ‘L. Ed.

3- 260 (1955) ; Giordiano v. City Commission of Newark, 2—

“ON. J. 585; 67 A. 2d 454, 458 (1949). This statute is a

remedial one and is entitled’ to a m2 construction. .

Thétefore under the terms of the New Jersey statute itself,

independently of any comp Ision from a positive rule of

5 maritime law, the rights - of a widow and children’ with » ~

‘Ov

reference to the sontetutory negligence of a deceased work.

man are coextensive with the riglits he would have enjoy ed

had he lived.

~ There is nother ground for holding that. con ributory

‘ negligence is not a defense under the maritime lAw where-

a state wrongful death act is applied. The Teason that |

maritime law permits a state wrongful death act to be

applied where certain individuals die as a result of injuries

received on navigable waters within a state’s geographic

-boundaries is that there is a void in‘the maritime law on

‘this point. Congress in the development of maritiyne: law

has not afforded‘any remedy by statute for wrongful. death

in such circumstances. While there is a void as‘to W rongful

death this is not true concerning the defense of contributory

negligence. . Admiralty courts. have fashioned a strong posi- |

_ tive rule concerning: comparative negligence. While the

+, enforcenient of a state statute giving a remedy for wrong-.

ful death merely. fills 2° void, the enforcement of a state

rule of contributoty negligence: would collide with the posi- _

tive, . well established rule of comparative negligence - in ,

maritime law. es : :

In the case of ap inii Boat Conan Vv. Fis ireman’s Fund ©

, Insurance Company, 348 U. S, 310, 75 S. Ct. 368, 99 L, Ed.

337/(1955) Mr., Justice Black, in holding that state laws -

: eotild be applied in disputes arising from a maritime insur-"

i: ance policy stated at page 370: Pre

“Since the insurance poliey here sued on is a mari-

time contract the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution

brings it within federal jurisdiction, * * * But it does

not follow,.as the courts below seemed to think, that

___ every term in every'maritime contract can only be con- |

trolled by some federally . defined admiralty rule.. Fn

the field of maritime contracts as in that of maritime -

torts, the National Government has left much regu, -

latory power in the States. As later discussed im more

detail, this state ee. ‘power, exercised with |

F .

°- ° , .

. e ‘

? ° ‘

° e .

A -

tt

fi

ae . 2 ad

| . y - E

federal consent-or acquiescence, has always been par-—

-_ ticulagly ire ‘in relation to insurance companies and

the contracts they make. ep eee Pree ce

Congress has not taken over the regulation of marine

insurance contracts and lias not dealt with the effee

“marine insurante warranties at all; .hénee+hére is no

_ possible question here of ¢onflict ‘between state law

and any federal statute. But this does not answer the

questions. presented, since in the absence of controlling

Acts of Congress this.Court has fashioned a large part .

of the existing rules that govern admiralty. And States

. can no more override such judicial rules vatidly fash-

~ toned than they can override Acts of Congress. * :

(Italics ours.) .~ ; as en ? ge

. What, then, is the substantive maritime law as it relates

_ ta liability. for personal injury? In Hawn v. Pope & Talbot,

. Ine., 198 Fy 2d 800 (3 Cir. 1952), Judge McLaughlin. stated

at page 806: ‘ as

“* * * Appellant advances the flat proposition that

since it is a diversity action the Pennsylvania con-

tributory negligence ‘rule which defeats recovery must

be applied. *** ~* : - eet

“We think that appellant’s view is incorrect, * * *”.

On appeal the judgment of the court was affirmed in 346

U. S. 406; 74 S. Ct. 202, 98 L. Ed. 143 (1953). Mr. Justice

Black stated at page 408: “s Sricpt elec gon

“ “(a) Lhe harsh rulé of the commgn law under which

contributory negligence wholly bgFred ain injured per-

son from.recoveryis complefely. incompatible with

modern. admiralty. policy aud practice. Exercisyg its

_ traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and now -

follows its own fairer and. more: flexible rule which

al®ows such consideration of contributory negligence in

mitigation of damages.as justice requires. Petitioner

presents no persuasive ‘arguments that admiralty

should’ now adopt a discredited doctrine which auto-

° .

* Oe

. matically destroys all claims of injured persons who

have contributed to their. injuries. in any, degree, how-

ship to* enable i

asserted no claim created by or arisin

_ sylvania law. His right of recovery for un aworthi-

ness and negligence is, rooted in federal maritime law.

Even if Hawn were seeking to enforce a state-crea

erson of any substantial admiralty rights as defined

in} controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative

décisions of this ‘Court. (These principles have been fre-

yy ently declaredand we adhere to them. ** * ” (Italics

ae. kei " oe Maes

/ bes igs ye

ey!

t

;

t

t ‘

t |

.

|

In O'Leary v: United States Line Company, 215 F. 2d

708) (1 Cir. 1954); cert. den..348 U. S. 939, 75 S. Ct. 68D,

99 L. Ed. 735 (1955), Judge ‘Woodbury reviewed several

3

“the question of contributory negligence under a ‘state

: ‘wrongful death act. He stated at page 711:

f «* * * But these cases were all decided prior to

| 2 | Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 1953; 346° U. S. 406,

d { . 74S, Ct. 202 wherein the Supreme Court of the United

‘. States in a civil action on the law side under the sav-

} ~ degisions, including one from this circuit, and discussed ~ “

. transportation of its cargo by water. Consequently, the ~ |

remedy for this right, federal maritime law would be 3

controlling. While states may sometimes. supplement we

federal maritime enti a state may not deprivea _._—-

eX es ou! ‘

- ing clause for the first time held categorically that the

Tights of, a shore: worker to recover for personal in-

juries short of death“occurring on a vessel in the nayi-

gable waters of-a state resulting from either the negli-

gence of the shipowner or ‘the unseaworthiness of the

vessel are to be détermined hy the general maritime

_ law and not by the law of the state within whose waters

the accident occurred. That case, -of_ course, :is’ not

squarely in point here, but in the Court’s opinion 346

U.S. at page 409, 74 S. Ct. at page 205 it is said by way

of dictum. that ‘Even, if Hawn were seeking to enforce

. 4 state-created remedy for this right (referring to his

right of recovery for unseaworthiness and negligence),

‘ federal maritime law would be controlling.’’ Indeed, -

in our opinion it would be incongruous to hold, in

conformity with Pope & Talbot, Ine.*v. Hawn, supra,

ry 3 that the maritime law determined the respective rights: -

of the parties in the event of personal injuries short of .—

death, but. that state law determined their; rights in

the event of injuries resulting in the ultimate conse:

querice of death. And, it would be even more jgcon- ’

" gruous to hold that the hushand’s right of action, which

|. the-plaintiff here asserts in her count two’. nder the

7% local’ survival statute, is to be determined under the

Tule of Pope-&-Tatbot by the maritime law, but that

the right of aetion arising out of the ‘same accident

_ conferred directly upon her by the local death act is See

~ to be determined by local law. Furthermore, as the ©

Supreme Court pointed out in Chelentis v. Luckenbach |

S.S. Co., 1918, 247 U.S. 372, 384, 38 S.. Ct. 501,62 L. »

. 1171, the saving.clause reveals no intention that

liability as‘well as remedy, shall be/detergined by the

common law rather than the maritime law, and to apply

state substantive law to determin¢ the rights of the

" + parties would create divergence in a field where uni-

formity has long heen considered important. * * *”

In The Devona, 1 F, 24 482 (D: C. Me./1924) the court

had before it the Maine Wrongful Deatli Act which. uses _

the sare kéy phraseology as- the New Jersey Act. In *

e * N

a

41

ere NR / Bee

re PO

67.

denying the applicability. of the ‘common-law defense of |

--eontributoty negligence, Judge Held stated among other

= at page 484: = an

“The case at‘bar also discloses rights distinctly mari-

time and ‘recognized by the Jaw of the sea,’ without

regard to the court where the libelant may seek relief.

The lidelant must take-the state statute with its limita-

tion; but the limitation of contributory negligence is

not found in the statute. A state court may well find

that it cannot settle a maritimie case by the common-

law rules of procedure, and must enforce the libelant’s

rights under the maritime provisions as disclosed in

‘the Jensen Case, which has held that ‘no state has the:

power to abolish the well-recognized maritime rule

eoncerning the measure -of recovery, and substitute

_ therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law.’”

(Italics ours:)) =~ - : |

~ ‘Phere are two distinct grounds for holding that contribu-

tory negligence is not. a defense to'this action under the

New Jersey. Wrongful Death Act. The first is based on the

‘interpretation of the act itself. The act does not state

“that such defense is available in an action for wrongful

~. death. On the contr@gy, the referral phrase “such as would,

if death had not erisued, have entitled the person injured

to maintain an’ action for damages” is used, N. J. S.A.

2A :31-1. This phrase, by referring to the rights of the per-

son injured, if death had not ensued, indicates ‘that not

only is the substantive law relating to the nature and scope

of liability.for personal injury incorporated into the wrong- ;

ful death, act, but the defenses are incorporated as well.

There is certainly no reason to suppose the legislature _

intended to give any better or stronger defense to the pe-

- titioners where a widow and dependent children sue than

where the injured himself sues. . eee

The second ground is based on the fact that the injury

occurred on navigable waters of the United States and is

EO * hs ng ae

@ | . 68 se

covered by substantive maritime law which canal: and,

overrules inconsistent state law. The doctrine of compara- |

tive negligence is a positive. rife of maritime law and is’

firmly embedded in maritime law. There certaitly - is no

reason why it should be. replaced by a harsh and ineon-

sistent state doctrine. ~ | : an .

In this connection we note that Klingseisen v. Costanzo:

Transportation Co., 101 F. 24-903 (3 Cir. _1939) cited by’

defendant, held that j in an Action under maritime law apply-

ing the Penngylvania Wrongful Death Act, the absohite

- defense of contributory negligence would be applied. In

that case the deceased was. drowned in a collision. between

his own boat and a steam boat. No issue of ‘unseaw orthiness ‘

was involved. Since this case involved an application of.

/ vania courts it is not creer in an interpretation of

@ \e

a Pennsylvania statute and its interpretation by ion

New Jersey statute. Sas | yan gr

oe

In. the Pennsylv ania statut , 12 Purdon, Penna; Statutes

) Anno. ss1601, the test of liability is merely set forth as -

“unlawful violence or negligence” rather than “wrongful

; act, neglect or default” as set forth in the ‘New Jersey

* statute. shapes Pennsylvania statute does not

not employ the “suc test of the New Jersey statute

- which incorporates the test of liability based on the

. of the deceased if he had lived.

Chief Officer of the vessel who knew

_ Bernarp CHazen.

. Minton GarBER

69

CONCLUSION

"he evidence is overwhelming that. the presence of oil

on. the tank lid, beams, and area near the opén unguarded

tank of hot oik fendered the place of work dangerous,’

hazardous, and ‘unsafe and the vessel unseaw ~ The

xf these conditions,

at least’an-h je accident to the deceased, stated

as much. There were means on board by which the Chief

Officer and his crew could have remedied the conditions. .

‘They were not used.

sie

Whatever may have been the duty of, the employer of

) the deceased, the duty of the vessel to provide a safe place — |

‘ to work and a seaworthy vessel was non- delegable. Respon-.

dent has established her claim ‘against petitioners and .

... Should be given an award for the monetary damages sus- .

tained by herself and ‘her three infant children.

WHEREFORE, respondent requests that the judgment of |

the United States Court of Appeals be affirmed with, costs

on this appeal.

es Respectfully submitted,

. { NarHan Baker

. Counsel for Libellant-Respondent . -

": Bangs, GaRBER & oe

Proctors for Libellant- Respondent ; erat

On the Brief

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.