Brief for the Petitioner — Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates

Supreme Court brief1959

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Argument:

i 1 pe 88

fieldmen and clerical employees) are engaged both in

commerce” and “in the production of goods for com-

merce” within the meaning of the Fair Labor, Stand.

ards Act ..... ii bike whe dats TTT ; 19 5

A. The employees ee ee e

specifications essential to the construction of

projects for improvement of interstate instru-

mentalities and facilities brings them within

the Act’s in commerce” coverage 20

B. ‘The interstate communications and transmission 5

of documents and materials and the interstate

travel, in which respondents’ employees regu-

larly and substantially engage, is engagement : i

in commerce” within the Act’s coverage. 34

* The preparation of plans, specifications and

drawings for transmission across state lines,

or for use in the construction of repairs or im-

provements to interstate instrumentalities and

facilities, constitutes “production — for 7

; IIS ᷑ bs Ses os awk x ve beban 41

Conclusion .......... 8 i „ JJJJCCVVCVV el: a

RS iin ds aes ike Än—. 1 52

23 . 0 d

8 CITATIONS ee :

Aetna Finance Co. v. Mitchell, 247 F.2d 190 affirming

144 F.Supp. 528 keke ke bandh aN «+++ 16, 35, 38, 30, 40.

411. Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 US. 13,

?

*

13, 18, 22, 28, 28, 30, 42, 8

Archer v. Brown 4 Root, Inc., 241 F. ad 663, certiorari

. Sis cccvnsciees 1; 22, 28, 20, 48

Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 301 .

US. 103 ...... * e e 35

Atlantie Co. v. Welling, 131 F.2d vss Salen ee es — a

(1)

E u

Cases—Continued

l a . . 3 a N . Page

Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 150 F.2d

524, certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 767 ö 43

Bay City v. Frazier, 77 F. ad 570. e 36

Bennett v. V. P. Loftis Co., 167 F.2d 286060. 21, 27

Borden Co. v. Borella, $95 US. . vidas 18, 40

Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787...... — . . 42, 48, 44

Caminetti v. United States, 242 US. . . . 37,47

Chapman v. Home Ice Co. of Memphis, 136 F.2d 353,

certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 71. R

Cleveland v. United States, 320 US. — 37

_ Darr v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 169 F.2d 262, cer-

tiorari denied, 335 U.S. 871. F 44

Davila v. Porto Rico Ry. ne & ee, Co., 143 F.2d

„% Sea a a FEE a ree oe

Durkin v. Joyce Agency, ‘lee: 110 F.Supp. 918, affirmed =

per curiam sub nom. Mitchell v. Joyce Agency, Inc.,

%% ( ĩ SE ES . 40

Durkin v. Sone, 112 F Supp. 375 e as

Edwards v. California, 314 US. BE espe aepine 8 37, 4

Federal Trade Commission v. etd Service 7. Bureau,

WPM NESS AR 30

Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen: 224 US. RA 2%

Hanel v. Hooven Letters, Inc., 44 N. V. S. 2d 398...... 44

Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, certiorari de-

„ i e 3’

_ Hogue v. National ne ‘Parts Auen, 87 F. Supp.

JJ a m- 5: “ 5 4!

International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 US. 91 —ͤ—wũꝗ 35-30

Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 5177/77... 25, 20

Laudadio v. White Construction Co., 163 F. 2d 383.13, 22, 26, 2

Lenroot v. Western Union Telegraph. Co., 141 F.2d 400.. 17, 4:

Leis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 F.2d 3 31, 3:

Lofther v. First National Bank of Chicago, 48 F. Supp.

602, affirmed, 138 F. ad 209. 4

Mathisen v. Evanston Trust Bank, 6 WH Cases 882, 12

— Labor Cases Para. 68, 7e. 4

- McComb v. Turpin, 81 F.Supp. 86....... 5 5 44,5

Meeker Cooperative Light & Power A. v. Phillips, -

. 158 F.2d 698, affirming 63 F Supp. 733............ 31, 32, 4

Mitchell v. Brown Engineering Co., 224 F.2d 350, certi-

orari denied, 350 U.S. 87 6̃)˙ 12, 13, 22, 23, 25, 3:

Mitchell v. Empire Gas Engineering Co., 13 WH Cases

721 (not officially reported) ........ ä —ͤ** *** 2

S ¢ N

—— a Oy Nt PRI k,n% . —ñmł—̃ COG

| 5 m N

— N es

Mitchell v. elie Contracting Co., 238 F.22380...... 22

Mitchell v. Joyce Agency, Inc., 211 F.2d 241. Naas cet. ae

Mitchell v. Kroger Co., 248 F. 2d 935.:.... . «+16, 35, 38, 39

Mitchell v. Mercer Water Co., 208 F.2d 900. .

Mitchell v. Raines, 238 F. 2d 186. . 21

Mitchell v. Tippett, 13 WH Cases 774, 35 Labor C

Para. 71, 723 e a 45

Mitchell v. * w. Vollmer ck Co., 349 U.S. 427,

f 12, 13, 16, 21,22, 23, 33, 35, 358

New Mezico Public Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F.2d 636. .

North American Co. V. S. E. C., 327 U.S. 688666. 35

anne North Shore Cop, 318 US. 125,

13, 14, 16, 22, 25, 33, 38

Pie Dae R. R. Co., 229. US. 146... 23

N Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497,

16, 18, 38, .

. Ritch v. Pyget Sound Bridge and Dredging | Co., 156 F.2d

N . . 13, 21,22, 26,27

Roland Electric Co. Walling, 326 US. 1 14, 15, 30, 32

Schmidt v. Peoples elephone Union of Maryville, 138 :

BER PCS er tel ya Mina ß RN sere 31

Schmitt v. War Emergency Pipelines, 175 7 336, cer-

tiorari denied, 338-U.S. 8660¶ũ 99999! .. „

Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U. 8. 108 . f „ patric Wes

10 East 40th Street v. Callus, 326 US. 578.......... 13, 14,29

Thomas et al. v. Associated Cleaning Contractors, 15 é

WH Cases 777, 35 Labor Cases Cases Para. 71, 1. *

Tomas v. Hempt Bron, 345.US. 19,

13, 14, 18, 23, 28, 30, 42, 48

Thornton v. United States, c *

Tobin v. Johnson, 198 F.3d 130, eertiorari dented, 345

WR DUB a iii 6s d VJ ec bee 22, 30

15 Tobin v. eee ee Construction Co., 198 F. 2d

334, certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 9156. 13, 21, 22, 28, 29

Tobin v. Ramey, 205 F.2d 606, rehearing denied, 206

F.2d 505, certiorari denied sub nom. orang Const.

Co. v. Sec. of Labor, 346 US. 0 ... : 21,28 |

. Ullo v. Smith, 177 F.2d 101, affirming 62 F Supp. 757. 44

Union National Bank e Rock v. Durkin, 207 F.2d

848 3 J.. ͤ ͤ ͤ c 45

Iv.

. Cases—Continued , ‘ee 2

United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222... . . 36, 37

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., dt ae

yhhhhhTͤſhh!!!!! thuwecievessee 417

United States v. Underwriters Assn., 322 US. 533. age 36

ene denied Co. 317 U.S. 564, 5

16, 25, 26, 27, 33, 38 ;

voertiorari We ek — ĩ⅛ - 22

Walling v. — Transportation Co, 134 F. 2d

TT.! p., ̃ ̃ ̃ ̃⁵md( ] 5

West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Walling, 153 F.2d 52. 31,32

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. . Lenroot, 323 US. |

nnd —— three hclapethe mia ob 17, 42

: Western. Union Telegraph Co. v. aue 122 US. a

„ i B „ 42

et Of 1938, e. 676, 52 Stat. 1060,

910, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.:

U—U—U—T!. T ike 2, 17, 41

. K accedies . ee eee

/ A . 3, 17, 19, 41, 9

Section 13 (a) (1) — 5 e e ee 18, 46

\ ͤĩ2?3ĩ huang ceed eae ches 5 3

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 (Public ! Law 627

an Cong., 2d Sess., 70 Stat. 374ꝶʒ . — 25

1 :

Annual Report of the 3 of Public Roads for Fiscal

F (o — AA n „

20 C. F. R. (1957 Supp.) Pt. 541.3. „ : 4

% TPW 22 15, 19, 32, 49

95 Cong. Rec. 14928-29 ...... 3 W 19, 49

95 Cong. Rec. 149290 ... 2... eee cee 8 15, 82-33, 40, 50, 51

Consulting Engineer, 8 pi February 1957 ‘issues. 24

Dept. of Labor Interpretative Bulletin on General Cov-

erage, Part 776.10 (May 1950), 15 F. R. 2925......... 41

$6 i ahs Wie chon bh re ⁵ d aiendces's a

H. Doe. No. 300, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 4, Table G, p. 6. |

H.R. 7500 Toth Cong, te Sen 5 43

43

SN 00. ...

Nn

Wise gart. duelle d Unie Sites

Ooronxn TERM, 1958 | |

No. 37

* *

J AMES P. Mrronklx, SECRE?ARY OF Lazor, UNITED

Srares DEPARTMENT OF LaBoR, PETITIONER

v.

: Lomax, McGavony & AssocLA TES, Er AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE.UNITED STATES COURT OF ~

|. 4PPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

‘BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER :

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court (R. la-ga) is not

officially reported (13 WH Cases 211). The opinion of

the Court of Appeals (R. 1423-1830) is reported at 250

F. 2d 253. .

JURISDICTION ;

So ae 88 of the Court of Appeals was entered

on November 25, 1957 (R. 154a). The jurisdiction of

this Court rests upon 28 U. S. C. 1254 (1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Respondents are partners in a consultant architec-

tural-enginering business—with offices in Norfolk,

Virginia and in Washington, D. C., and foreign asso-

05

Cases Continued Page

5 Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Pn Bank, 150 P2d- |

524, certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 767.............. 3 43

Bay City v. Frasier, 77 F. 2d 570 . 36

Bennett v. V. P. Loftis Co., 167 F. 2d 286. „

Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 67 ũ ũ . ꝑ( 18, 46

Hosant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 42, 48, 44

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470. „ 37, 47

Chapman v. Home Ice Co. of Memphis, 136 F. 2d _ 3

certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 76. „

Cleveland v. United States, 329 US. 14...... F „„

/ , / . eee 80

Pit Co. v. Pedersen, 224 US. Te „ ae

> Hanizely v. Hooven Letters, Inc., 44 N. V. S. 2d 308. 45

Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, certiorari de- : ne ie

_ Darr v. Mutual Life Insurance Co:, 100°F-2d 208, cer-

Davila v. Porte Bice By: Light & Power Co., 143 730 E

e wil Gai 7

| ‘Durkin v. Shone, 112 F Supp. NS „„ 45

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160. 37, 7

Hederul Trude Commission v. Civil Service 7. Bures

. nied, 332 US. SOE. eee pees 66*42ã2½%½ 2 6 6 6 „ 37

Hogue v. e, Automotive Parts Assn., 87 . i

%%% md dd d ee „„ MS

International Tertbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 US. 8 35-36

Kirschbaum Co: v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 25, 26

Laudadio v. White Construction Co., 163 F.2d 383.13, 22, 26, 27

\ See ae

tiorari denied, 385 US. 87-II . 4

JJ AER OE „

Durkin v. Joyce Agency, Inc., 110 F.Supp. 918, affirmed

per curiam sub nom. “Mitchell v. Joyce Agency, Inc.,

Lenroot v. Western Union Teleghaph Co., 141 F.2d 400... 17,42

Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 F.2d 751 5 31, 32

Lofther v. First National Bank of Chicago, 48 F. ‘Bupp. oe)

692, affirmea, 138 F.2d 299. . — 4 „25 45

Mathisen v. Evanston Trust, B k, 6 WH Cases 882, 12 15

r 2... 500. cece herteue 45

McComb v. Turpin, 81 F Supp. i - 51

Meeker Cooperative Light & Ase’n . Phillipe,

158 F. Ad 698, affirming 63 F.Supp. 733 31, 32, 45

Mitchell v. Brown Engineering Co., 224 F.2d 359, cert• :

orari-denied, 350 U.S. 875. 12, 13, 22, 23, 25,33

Mee v. Empire Gas Engineering Co, ‘13 WH Cases :

721 n E 1 3

* 0 N : atin A

*

Page

Mitchell v. Hodges Contacting Co, un 2 65. 22

Mitchell v. Joyce Agency, Inc., 211 F. 2d „ a

Mitchell v. Kroger Co., 248 F.2d 935...:......... 16,35, 38, 20 a

Mitchell v. Mercer Water Co., 208 F. 2d 900 31

- Mitchell v. Raines, 238 F.2d 1868. e ri 21

Mitchell v. Tippett, 13 WH: Canes 774, 35 Labor Cases

„% ̃ ᷣ᷑ ä ̃ ok a es vas es Se 45

~~ Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 300 US. 427,

12, 18, 16, 21, 25,23, 33, 35, 37, 38

Ver Mazico Public Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F.2d 636.. 1

North American Co. v. S. E. C., 327 U.S. 6868 bak sigs . 35

Overstreet v. ‘North Shore Corp., 318 US. 125, i

: 13, 14, 16, 22, 25, 33, 38

: Pedersen v. Delaware, L & W. R. R. Co., 229 US. 146.. 23

Powell v. United States Cartridge Co, 339 U.S. 497, 3

— 1, 18, 38, 44, 46-47

5 Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge-and Dredging Co., 156 F. 2d

CVP) ( So nce 13, 21, 22, 26, 27

Roland Electric Co. v. ‘Walling, 326 U.S, 657. 14, 15, 30, 32

Schmidt v. Peoples Telephone Union of Mary. Ue, 138

JJV 31

Schmitt v. War Emergency Pipelines, 175 F.2d 336, cer-

tiorari denied, 338 U.S. 869 „ S 3 22

Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 US. NP Senge ee em 14,31

10 East 40th Street v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578......... 13, 14, 29

_ Thomas: et al. v. Associated Cleaning Contractors, 13

WI Cases 777, 35 Labor Cases Cases Para. 71, 724. 45

| Thomas v. Hempt Bros., 345 US. 19, |

\ 13, 14; 18, 28, 28, 30, 42, 48

Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414........ 79 47

: Tobin v. Johnson, 198 F.2d 130, oertiorari denied, 3⁴⁵

UAG van cves „„ e . 0

Tobin v. Penninqton- Winter Construction Co., 198 F. 2d

334, certiorari denied, 345 US. 918. 3, 21, 22, 28, 9

Tobin v. Ramey, 205 F.2d 606, rehearing defied, 206

_ F.2d 506, certiorari denied sub nom. Hughes Const.

Co. v. Sec. of Labor, 346 U.S. 925... .. . 21, 28

- Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101, affirming 62 F Supp. 757. . 44

Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F.2d

ãã 4 4 eee 45

United States v. International Boring Club of New York, 7

240 US. 26060 ...— eedeerens e bee 36

*

Cases—Continued — Beh 3 ie

United States v. Shubert, 348 US. 2ꝶ22 . 36, 37

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Aisn., *

US. 533. i . ö 7 . 47

United States v. Underwriters Assn., 322 US. 533. . 36

Walling \ v. Jacksonville Paper Co, 317 US. 564, Sie

: 16, 25, 26,27, 33, 38

Walling v. MeCrady Construction Co., 156 F.2d 932,

certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 788. Parlcecs evens 22

Walling v. nme Transportation Co, 134 F.2d Siem

6117 dean wee oie rae as tie’ dae he es 21

West ‘Kentucky Coal Cod. Walling, 153 F. 2d 582. . 31, 32

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 US.

(Mn /aihinee ͥ ðiu⁵ EK race bewe ences ueheeseee . 17, 42

| Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 122 US. maar

TTW erecedewes Ved’ RJ —7*— eens r 42

‘Federal Statutes: bere

| Poig Laber Standards Act of 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060,

Bection 30) 1 17,10, 41.40

%% res chien Shes 18,08

JJ A . 3.

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 “Public Law 627—

5 Stn Cons, 2d Sess., 70 Stat. 374)... /.. 5

Annual Report of the Bare of Pub Rode fr Fal

JJV el oi pia Bh:

20 CFR. (1067 Supp.) Pt. 5413.. . . 43

95 Cong. Rec. ———

95 Cong. Rec. 14928-29 . „ den

95 Cong. Nee. 14030 ũ ũꝙ6hnʒn ewes cceeves 15, 82-83, 49, 50,51

3 24

i Dept. of Labor Interpretative Bulletin oa General Cov-

erage, Part 776.10 (May 1950), 15 F. 2925 8 .

% NUN ⁊ð W ⁊ ̃᷑⁊⁊ / 4

H. Doe. No, 38 aan Gong, bd Sea, 5 Tabs Ge. 25

as” H.R. 7200, 75th Cong, let Sese............ ene 43

8. 2475, Toth Cong Ast Bes ec eee a 43

N

1 ited Sus

Ooronm 9 1958

No. 37

JAMES P. MitcHEL., SECRETARY. OF Lion, Uxrrro

STaTes DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, PETITIONER °

5 0.

N

“fies Soman, . & e 1275

*

| ON WRI OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

| 4PPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT : N

»

‘BRIEF FOR T THE PETITIONER |

OPINIONS BELOW

ie The opinion of the District Cour̃t (R. 1a-9a) is wiih

e reported (13 WH Cases 211). The opinion of

3 Court of Appeals (i R. 14%a- 1884) is — at 250

2 F. 2d 253. .

-. JURISDICTION

The en of the Court of Appeals was 1

on November 25, 1957 (R. 154a). The jurisdiction of

P Bion az

| QUESTION PRESENTED

‘Resfendente ate partaian in, k este cds

tural-enginering busizies—with . ‘offices in Norfolk,

Virginia and in Washington, D. C., and foreign asso-

(1)

. ‘

2

ciates 5 in preparing plans and

specifications essentially for industrial, as distinguished

from residential, projects. A substantial proportion of

their work is for out-of-state clientele or projects, and

the great bulk of it consists of the preparation of plans

and specifications for federal, state and municipal

_ governmental projects, many of which are for the

improvement, repair, or enlargement of interstate in-

strumentalists or facilities. ve

The question presented is: Whether 1 =

non- professional employees (draftsmen, fieldmen, and

clerical workers) 0 work on the plans and specifica-

tions for projects for improvement of interstate instru-

- mentalities or facilities, and whose regular duties also

include the preparation of drawings, plans, specifica-

tions, ete., transmitted across state lines, or direct and

substantial interstate communication by telephone and

correspondence, or travel across state lines —are en-

gaged in commerce or in the production of goods. for

commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor

ö Standards Act. | i N

STATUTE INVOLVED 3 |

Pertinent provisions of. the Fair Ladin 8 ae)

Act of 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, e. 736,

63 Stat. 910 (29 U. S. C. 201, et geg.), are set forth in

full in the record (R. 116a-119a). The provisions par-

ticularly involved here are Sections 3 (b), , and (j),

as follows: 5

_ See. 3. 152 Stat. 1061; 63 Stat 914). As used i in

this Act— ee }

* 33 . . 7 / * a 7

( b) Commerce“ means trade, commerce, trans- *

portation, transmission, or communication among

3

the iia States or ‘between any State and .

rok place outside thereof. 25 pai

* ao a ae Fie iat —

Meee 00 Goods“ means sade a Lincialling ships and

N . marine equipment), wares, products, commodities,

merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of

any character, or any part or ingredient thereof,

but does not include goods after their delivery into

the actual physical possession of the ultimate con-“

sumer thereof other than a producer, manufac. |

turer, or ye thereof. , 55 fe

(j) “Pr uced’’ means produced, e

: factured, ined, handled, or in any other manner

worked ol in any State; and for the purposes =

this Act an employee. shall be deemed to have been

engaged in the production of goods if such em-

ployee was employed in producing, manufacturing,

mining, haridling,. transporting, or in any other

manner working on such goods, or in any closely:

related process or occupation, directly essential, to

the e thereof, in any State.

a

*

STATEM ENT.

This action was s brought by the e of cuba”

under Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act to

‘ enjoin respondents from violating the overtime and

record-keeping requirements. of the Act with respeet to

their non-professional employees—draftsmen, field-

men. and stenographer-bookkeepers.* 5

: Iti is stipulated that, if the Act covers these employees, overtime —

and record-keeping - violations exist (Stip. R. 11a; R. O4a-97a).

This action is not concerned with “professional” ‘employees who

may meet the requirements for exemption 2 * (a) a)

of the Act, which —. | : :

.

on { Wf 9

+ admittedly a substantial amount of their work is for

4 |

1. Respondents are partners engaged in a consultant

architectural-engineering business, with a principal

_ office in Norfolk, Virginia, and a branch office in Wash- _

ington, D. CO., ff.

and Italy.

ae Respondents’ business . essentially to 38

trial, as distinguished from residential, projects, and

8

out-of-state projects and out-of-state clientele, at least

500% of the' work of the Washington office relating to

out-of-state projécts (R. 13a). As summarized in tho

opinion below, It Jhey have worked and are now em-

ployed on numerous projects in Virginia, Maryland

and the Distriet of Columbia, and have worked on some

projects in North Carolina and overseas” (R. 143a-

_/ \144a). These activities require constant coordination

and communication, as well as transmission of informa-

tion and materials between the two offices” (R. 144).

The plans and specifications are frequently transmĩit-

ted out of state (R. 6a), both between respondents’

offices for correlation, integration or review (R. 68a,

72a), and, as indicated in more detail, infra, pp. 7- 10,

' to out-of-state clients with copies for out-of-state bid-

ders, contractors and 5 of materials (R. athe).

: “tad, Ss eotdven A cadines © Ged Vale ie woaly

C 0 bees, Be Cane:

administrative, professional, or local retailing’ capacity, or in the

-eapacity of outside salesman (as such are defined and de-

limited by regulations of the in . N

* ‘The exemption issue was not raised by respondents in the courts a

below and is not presented here, the only issue being whether em-

who do not qualify as exempt “professional” employees as

rt eee cee Oe

coverage of the Act. on C.F R. (1957 Supp.)- Pt.

deres n a total of 65 to 70 enployees:

_- (ineluding professional and non-professional), of |

= whom about 30 are in the Norfolk office, about 20 in the

Washington office, and about 15 to 20 overseas (R. 12a,

Sia). With a direct private telephone line between

the Norfolk and Wa in offices, telephonie com-

: munications are n and the line is used for the.

purpose of controlling, supervising and coordinating |

the work of the W n office from Norfolk’’ (R.

5a). Also, payrolls for \poth offices, as well as for

employees in foreign offices are made up in the Norfolk

B ._ mitted across state lines, and many of which

office and checks are mailed | Washington and foreign

countries“ (ibid). No set e is maintained with

respect to where a set of plans is prepared if we

want to do part in Washington we do it; if we want to

do part in Norfolk, we do it“ (R. 68a). As both the

— en dende engage substantially in the

State communications or interstate travel incident to

pared for interstate projects (R. Sa-Ga; 144a

2. The great bulk of respondents’ business consists

of the preparation of plans, specifications and draw- :

ings for federal, state and municipal governmental \_

projects. As stated in the opinion below, they “‘inelude, .

primarily, projects for the improvement, enlargement.

and repair of installations at military bases, airfields,

shipyards and radio stations for the United States

military services, and also a substantial number of state

and municipal undertakings and projects.” (R. 144a:)

6

os About 60 percent of the work of the Virginia office i is

done pursuant to contracts with United States Army

and Navy agencies, and about 85 percent of the work

of the Washington office is for the Army and Navy

or for state and municipal government agencies

(R. 2a). Projects for the improvement or repair. of

interstate instrumentalities on which the defendants

have worked include airfields and airplane facilities

for which streets are widened or constructed, hangers

are repaired or altered, and extensions are built. Radio

and television facilities are relocated, repairs to govern-

ment buildings at shipyards and machine shops are

5 made, and other work in Maryland, Virginia and North

~ Carolina is constructed” (Op. below, R. 146).

3. he plans and specifications furnished by respond-

ents for such projects contain detailed drawings, blue- |

prints, surveys, estimates and other data together with

specific detailed instructions to the builder on every

aspect of the actual construction work. The industrial-

type projects, and particularly the government proj-

ects, - on which ‘respondents have been primarily .

engaged are intricate in design and construction and

could not be constructed without the plans and spec-

: ifications prepared by the [respondents'] employees’’

(0p. below, R. 144a; R. 48a-49a). These plans and

specifications obviously include much more than a pro-

fessional architect’s designs and advice. As is illus-

_ trated by the voluminous sets of plans and ‘specifica-

tions ‘prepared by respondents for projects listed in

For details of the numerous projects for improvement, repair,

or enlargement of interstate instrumentalities or facilities, on which

respondents worked for the two year — ending April 1956, see

the * infra, pp. 52-54 N

ak ~t

a A to tha stipulation (R. 18a-29a),” most of

the work is evidently more engineering than architec-

tural in nature, and it involves the assembling and com- -

pilation of detailed estimates, measurements, field sur-

vey information, materials and equipment specifica-

tions, carpentry, electrical and other construction data,

and similar routine work of a non-professional nature.

‘The plans and specifications include in minute detail

all of the data, information, and instructions needed to

guide the clients and their contractors, subcontractors

and material suppliers, i in bidding, financing, purchas-

ing materials and equipment, as well as in carrying out

the actual construction work (R. 100a). The specifica-

tions inelude not only the general conditions, which are

to govern the construction work, but also specific data

In regard to the kinds, types, sizes of materials to be

used, and where and how they enter into the construc-

tion. For example, on projects requiring substantial a

brick’ work or concrete, the composition and precise

proportions of the mixture of brick mortar and con-

erete, as well as the method of mixing, are specified in

detail. It is common knowledge that plans and specif-

ications for government construction projects, in par-

ticular, require such detailed data and instructions.

_ 4, The plans and specifications prepared for various

federal, state, and municipal government agencies

(which have been the source of the bulk of respondents’

business, Stip. R. 13a) are submitted to these agencies

in their original form and become the property of the

Representative samples of such plans and spetifiestions were

attached: to the stipulation as Appendix C (R. 12a, 33a) and an

illustrative set of specifications was introduced as Plaintiff’s Exh. 4

(R. 44a-45a).” Because of their bulk, they were filed in —

form and were not printed i in a the record.

eo ns \

agencies (Stip. R. 14a). Since such government

agencies frequently require numerous copies of the

specifications, respondents prepare and furnish ‘‘orig-

inal; reproducible drawings and tracings (plans), and

stencils for making multiple copies” (Stip. R. 13a). As

stated in the findings of the trial court, the “‘govern-

ment contracts admittedly require a great number of

specifications which are reproduced by an independent

blueprint company and. are eee sent. by the

8. many of

whom are without the State of Seta and the Dis-

triet of Columbia! (R. 2a-3a ; 145a). * 5

A large portion of the governmental work (the full

- percent at the Norfolk office) is done for the United

States Army and Navy (R. 2a-3a). The plans, draw-

ings, specifications, estimates, and advance-planning

reports prepared by respondents’ employees for these

projects are furnished primarily to the Corps of En-

gineers, the Fifth Naval District, and the Potomac

River Naval Command (R. 112a, 113a, 68a). Copies of

all preliminary plans, specifications, and analyses of

design furnished to the Norfolk Distriet Corps of En-

gineers are transmitted to'the Division Engineer, North

Atlantic Division, N ew York, for review and approval;

for large projects, marked-up drafts of final specifica-

tions are also transmitted to New York for review and

approval; and in all cases, a set of the completed final

plans and specifications as furnished to prospective

bidders are transmitted to the North Atlantic Division

in New. York for record purposes (Govt’s. Exh. No. 2,

R. 113-114 a). Similarly, all advance-planning reports :

and copies of all plans and specifications furnished ‘by

respondents to the Fifth Naval District at Norfolk are

9

forwarded to the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Wash--

ington, D. C., for review and ent (Govt's. Exh.

No. 1, R. 112a-113a).

Copies. of the final plans and endes are also :

Sent to any out-of-state contractors who are interested

in submitting bids (Govt’s Exhs. 1, 2 and 3, R. 112a- _

115a). In connection with any proposed large project,

it is the regular practice of the Corps of Engineers to

send out advance notice to approximately 400 general

Contractors, major subcontractors and suppliers, and

this notice always results in requésts for sets of plans

and specifications from several out- of- state contracting

firms,“ in response to which gets are sent, “several...

firms outside the State of Virginia to them to

prepare and submit bids“ (R. 115a). Since general

contractors need more than one set, two or three sets

of plans and specifications are sent upon request

(ibid.). With respect to projects for the Army and

N avy agencies, respondents have reason ; anowledge” .

to expect that copies of the plans and. cations

furnished by them will be thus sent out-of-state to pros-

pective bidders (R. 46a-47a).

There is, also, interstate transmission of olen, draw-

ings’ and specifications for municipal governmental —

projects. The numerous surveys, drawings, plans, ste.

for the approximately 50 individual projects for the

is Washington Suburban Sanitation Commission, located

in Maryland (Jobs Nos. 893-893-3, 939-939-24; R. 23a,

' 26a-27a, 65a), were prepared in respondents’ District

.. of Columbia office and submitted to the Commission at

its headquarters i in Hyattsville, Maryland; in addition

to the final plans, several drafts of preliminary plans

and oe ig to particular is ani were thus

10

. for commerce” within d. cove

tien of plans and mee by an independent

architectural-engineering consultant: firm is an essen-

_____ tially local“ business and that any ‘interstate activities

are „merely ineidental to the local enterprise (R.

15 1a). Although. recognizing that the plans And spec-

' ifieations consist of physical material“ and that

“many * are transmitted across state lines“ (R.

14400), the Court of Appeals held that their preparation

was not production of goods for commerce' within

the meaning of the statutory definitions because they are -

“only the written embodiment of professional advice

e. specifically prepared to meet the particular prob-

lem of a specific, client and: are. not sold or offered for

‘ There is 5 likewise . interstate transmission of plans

for non-governmental projects to out-of-state .

bidders (R. 61a-62a), or to out-of-state fepresentatives of im-

portant prospective tenants for approval (R. 58a-59a, 63a-64a).

here respondents’ employees supervise the actual construction of

tze projects (for about 50 percent of their non-governmental clients,

X. ta), “shop drawings” on articles, materials, and equipment to

be installed or used in the construction are submitted by subcon>

trastots (through the contractor) to respondents, for checking and

approval to make sure that the specifications are met. These draw- .

ins relate to such equipment and materials as doors, windows,

floor material, bricks and prefabricated partitions. Some of the

112 |

materials or equipment is submitted in the form of samples, After

or samples have been checked and/or corrected they

to the contractor and then sent back to the manufac-

turer or supplier. According to an employee in the Norfolk office,

_. -qne-half of the drawings examined and corrected by him were from

‘manufacturers located outside the State of Virginia (R. 81a-83a).

Hn .

ae the public generally”” (R Mia). 950 admitted

direct and substantial participation in interstate com-

munieations and transmission of information and ma-

- terials, and interstate travel, by individual employees,

and their work in preparing plans and specifications ö

for specific interstate projects, were held to be outside

the scope of the Act on the ground that ‘‘fa]ll of these

activities related t e production of: plans, ‘partook

: of their intrastate e ter, and cannot be fairly char-

acterized as commerce between states” (R. ee).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3 undisputed facts, as described. in the opinions of

both courts below, contradict any characterization of

. respondent’ s business as essentially local“ and estab-

lish beyond doubt that respondents’ non-professional —

employees regularly and substantially work on plans,

+ specifications and materials for transmission across

. State lines and for projects for the improvement of

_ interstate facilities, as well as engage extensively in the ..

. interstate communications or interstate travel neces-

sitated by the nature of respondents’ multi-state organi-

_ gation and out-of-state clientele and operations. These

facts amply suffice to bring respondents’ employees

within the terms of both phases of the Fair Labor

Standards Act’s coverage (‘‘in commerce”’ and in the

production of goods for commerce) on ~~ one of.

several separate grounds.

ok :

The Res ES regular preparation of plans iia

specifications essential to the construction of projects

for improvement of interstate instrumentalities and

— kacilities brings them within the Act’s ein e

NG

| 1 | kee

coverage. That employees engaged in the construction

of projects for the improvement or repair of interstate

instrumentalities (such as the airfields and airplane

| facilities, shipyards and radio and television facilities |

here’ involved) are engaged in commerce’’ is now well

established and was not questioned below (see e. g.,

_ Mitchell v. Vollmer d Co., 349 U.S. 427). The ruling

below that such coverage does not inelude the prepa-

ration of plans, specifications. and other materials spe-

cifically designed for such interstate projects is incon-

_ sistent with the principles of this Court’s decisions

(most recently reaffirmed in Vollmer, 349 U.S. 427),

and conflicts with decisigns of every other 8 of |

appeals which has ruled on the issue. 7

1. The Eighth Circuit in M itchell v. 8 Engi-

neering Co., 224 F. 2d 359, certiorari denied, 0

U.S. 875, with whose reasoning and result the deci-

sion below is in direct conflict, correctly applied Voll-

mers principles of liberal construetion”’ and practi-„

cal consfderations, and its test of coverage, 7 pe

whether the employees’ work is so related to the inter-

state improvement project as to be, in practical éffect,

a part of it, rather than isolated, local activity” (349

U.S. at 429). Viewing the pre ion of plans and

speeifleations in a prac pect in relation, to the

whole construction project”’ for which the plans and

specifications are specifically designed, the Eighth Cir-

cuit coneluded that such work is no more isolated local

activity than actual manual labor on the projects

under repair and improvement“ (224 F. 2d at 364-365).

The Fourth Circuit’s contrary, view, which would ex-

_clude such work because the employer is an independ-

ent enterprise or because the work is not performed

Lat the site of construction,” ignores practical con-

5 13

ee pensar such as the vital and intimate relation of

plans and specifications to such interstate improvement

projects (Vollmer, 349 U.S. at 429). It is also incon-

. sistent (a) with the well-settled principle that coverage

is determined on the basis of the employee’s activity

and not by the nature of the employer’s business

(Brown Engineering, supra, at 365; Overstreet v. North —

Shore Corp., 318 U.S, 125,.132), as well as (b) with

this Court’s decisions rejecting the distinction between

Lon: the· road“ and off- the- road workers (Allstate

Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 16; Thomas

v. Hempt Bros., 345 U.S. 19; see also Tobin v. Penn:

__-Angton-Winter Construction Co., 198 F. 2d 334 (O. A.

10), certiorari denied, 345 U. 8. 915).

‘Even prior to Vollmer, the Second and Ninth Courts |

of Appeals (in Laudadio v. White Construction Co.,

163 F. 2d 383 (C. A. 2) and Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge

and Dredging Co., 156 F. 2d 334 (C.A.9)) upheld the

coverage of ‘‘off-the-site’ draftsmen and clerical

Workers preparing plans and drawings for projects of

the same kind that comprise a. primary part of the

business of respondents’ firm here, on the ground that

no distinction could rationally be drawn between the

so-called white collar“ workers (the ‘‘draftsmen en-

gaged i in designing and laying out the work to be done

by others”) and the workers engaged in the actual

dredging and construction operations which were per-

formed all pursuant to the draftsmen’s plans (156

F. 2d at 337, emphasis added). 7

5 = The decision below mistakenly relied mainly, if

not solely, upon 10 East 40th Street v. Callus, 325 U.S.

578. In marked contrast to the instant case, neither

the * nor the — in Callus engaged di-

14

6 in any interstate activities and none of ites em-

_ ployees’ work (general building maintenance service)

Vas specifically designed for particular interstate proj-

» ects, the claim of coverage resting solely upon thin?

evidence of a general relationship to interstate manu-

facturing carried on by some of the building tenants

—

elsewhere. Callus thus lends no support to the conelu-

sion that individual employees engaged substantially oe

and directly in interstate activities are excluded from

the Act’s coverage, even if the employer’ 8 business were

shown to be an essentially local“ enterprise. as

pointed out it above, the rule is to the contrary- this

Court has “repeatedly said, the application of the Act

depends upon the character of the enfployees’ activi-

ties“ (Overstreet, 318 U.S. at 132). The interstate

aspects of respondents' business here, and the individ-

ual employees’ regular participation in such, interstate

activities, are unquestionably substantial enough ‘to re-

quire application of this principle, and to preclude the

sweeping general exemption from the Act that the deci- Si

sion below would provide.

Nor is Callus authority for eichiding from the Act’s

coverage the interstate activities of respondents’ em-

ployees simply. because they are employed by an in-

dependent enterprise“ performing work „for a general

miscellany of clients”. This is evident from, the nu-

merous decisions holding the Act applicable to em-

ployees of independent enterprises dealing with a

miscellany of customers where a regular and substan-

tial proportion of the customers were interstate pro-

~ ducers or interstate instrumentalities (Roland Electric

Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657; Thomas v. Hempt Bros.,.

345 U. S. 19; and Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108).

6 Also, it 18 well. settled that the Act rer to a wide

0 ' >

15

variety of businesses serving locally a general miscel-

lany of customers including electric and gas companies,

panies and telephone companies. The application of

the Act to such businesses was expressly approved by

Congress at the time of the enactment of the 1949

Amendments as was the coverage ruling of · Roland

Electric, supra, the Congressional reports specifically

stating that employees of such companies ‘‘will remain

subject to the Act, notwithstanding they are employed

59 an independent employer * * (House Report,

95 Cong. Rec. 14929, — added; Senats Report,

95 W Rec. 1487475).

B aes: #

| The interstate communications and transmission. of

documents and materials and the interstate travel, in

which respondents” employees regularly and substan-

tially engage, is clearly engagement i n commerce” 8

within the Act’s coverage. These ee tivities,

which are admittedly necessitated by the nature of re-

8 spondents’ multi-state’ organization, are not only

ee “transportation, transmission or communication“

within the literal terms of the statutory definition, but

are undeniably so directly and vitally related to the

functioning of“ and so „integral a part of respond-

ents’ extensive interstate operations as a Whole, as

_to be a part of those interstate operations, „rather than

isolated local activity,“ under any liberal“ or ‘‘prac-

tical’’ view of the case. Even in the absence of express

statutory inclusion of interstate communication,“ this

Court has repeatedly held that the interstate use of

the mails to transmit communications of the same or

similar type here involved constitutes interstate com-

d

.

water companies, ice companies, coal distributing com- -.

16

meree, and the Court’s decisions f are ate clear that

interstate travel or movement of persons across state

lines, even for non-commercial een is interstate

erce. 3

_ There is nothing in the ae 1 purposes of the

Labor Standards Act which would warrant

to restrict its in commerce’’ coverage more

narrowly than the same or comparable statutory lan-

guage in other federal regulatory acts. On the con-

trary, such a restrictive construction is inconsistent

with this Court’s ruling that the purpose. of the Act

was to extend federal control in:this field throughout

the farthest reaches of the channels of interstate com-

merce’’ (Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 US. :

564, 567) and that the policy of Congressional abnega-

tion with respect to occupations affecting commerce is

no reason for narrowly circumscribing the phrase ‘ en-

gaged in commerce (Overstreet v. North. Shore

Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 128). It is also inconsistent with

the principles that this Act’s coverage provisions must

bé given a liberal“ constriction (Vollmer, 349 U. Sf

at 429) and -accorded the ‘‘breadth of coverage con-

_sistent with its terms of substantial universality” .

Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497,

516). These principles clearly support the recent deci-

sions of the Eighth and First Circuits upholding the

coverage of interstate travel and ‘interstate communi-

cations in circumstances comparable to the instant case.

Mitchell v. Kroger Co., 248 F. 2d 935 (C. A. 8) and

Aetna Finance Co. v. Mitchell, aft F. 2d 190 e 9.

O

he e ee eee preparation of duns s

* and . for transmission 1 Across

—

state lines, or for use in the construction of repairs or

improvements to interstate instrumentalities and facili-

ties, also constitutes “production of. goods for com-

merce.“ As both courts below apparently conceded, .

the plans, specifications, etc. are goods“ within the —

meaning of the statutory | definition of Section 3(i),

the employees preparing them are „producing“ (han-

dling, transporting, or in any other manner working

‘on’’) them for commerce (“transmission be-

tween any State and any place outside thereof“)

within the terms of Sections 3 (j) and (b) of the Act.

1. The view that plans and specifications are not

‘‘articles or subjects of commerce”’ simply because they

represent the einbodiment of ideas“ (R. 148a) is

difficult to reconcile with the ruling in Western Union

Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, that ‘‘tele-

graphic messages are clearly ‘subjects of commerce’

and hence that they are ‘goods’ under this Act,“ or with

the unmistakable evidence [in the legislative history]

of a purpose to extend the definition * * * to every-

thing which had been considered a ‘sybject of com-

~ merce’; that is, to whatever Congress could regulate as

such a subject” (see 141 F. 2d 400 at 403). The physi-

cal embodiment of mental ideas into tangible and bulky

plans and specifications obviously involves considerable

routine, clerical and other physical labor by works

of the type with whom this Act was concerned,

the préducts « ‘of this labor are tangible materials which

enn be and are. “subjects of commerce” (i. e., interstate

‘‘transportation”’ or transmission“) within the literal

terms of the Statutory definitions.

2. The position ‘that such work is outside the ia

because incidental to * e and advice. ef

| 18

is contra lieted by Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679,

where employees of Borden’s central office

building for its executive officers and administrative

employees were held within the Act’s coverage, on the

ground that the ‘‘economic production with which

this Act is concerned includes ‘‘not simply the manual,

physical labor involved in changing the form or utility

of a tangible article“ but also planning and control“

and the work of one Who conceives or directs a

| productive activity“ (325 U. S. at 683). The Act’s —

professional exemption (Section 19{a)(1))—not'

involved in present case must be sharply distin-

guished from its coverage provisions, 325 U.S. at 684.

3. The view that: plans and specifications are not

goods for commerce’’ because they lack the éharacter-

istics of ordinary articles sold reially to the pub-

lic generally (R. 148a-149a) is tontrary to the basic

_ rationale of Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.,

339 U.S. 497, which explicitly repudiated the contention

that coverage is limited to ‘‘commercial’’ transactions

or to ‘‘articles that are intended for sale, exchange or

other trading activities (339 U.S. at 512), while em-

phasizing the terms of substantial universality” in

which the broad statutory pu and the statutory

eoverage definitions are stated (id. at 509-516).

_ 4, The plans and specifications prepared specifically

for use in the repair or improvement of interstate in-

strumentalities or facilities are also produced ‘for

commerce’’ under the principles of this Court’s deci-

sions in Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S.

13, and Thomas v. Hempt Bros., 345 U. S. 19.

_ While’ the road materials there involved may be

physically incorporated into the road, the plans and

2 guide and determine the execution of the

19 | a

improvement in every detail ineluding: the instrue-

tions and specifications for the supplies and materials oa

tures) fi from the beginning to the end of the construc- _

tion work. Even if such plans and specifications, were 5

not themselves goods,“ their preparation is a closely

-. related process or occupation directly essential’’ to the

“‘goods’’) for such commerce es

: tion of “tools, dies; designs, patterns * * or other |

equipment“ used by the purchaser, in the producti

of other goods for interstate commerce, or the fur-

nishing of gas, electricity, fuel or water for use in the

expressly recognized by Congress as “closely related

commerce” within the terms of Section 3(j), as

amended in 1949. See House Conferees’ Report of the

1949 Amendments, 95 Cong. Rec. 14874; and Report

of the tated of Senate n 95 . Ree. .

14928.

“ARGUMENT ©

3 .

f men and Clerical Employees) Are Engaged Both “in Com-

merce” and “in the Production of Goods for Commerce”

Within the Meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act :

The undisputed facts regarding the activities of re-

spondents non-professional employees, as described in

the opinions of both courts below, undeniably fall within

Fair! Labor Standards Act. Not only is respondents’

business admittedly organized to operate in two states

and e as well as transmission of ee

production of the supplies and materials (indisputably Keo

production of goods for commerce, which have been |

and directly essential to the production of goods for :

the literal terms of both phases of tlie coverage of the ~

(and. overseas) 80 as to require constant coordination .

20

‘tion 1 materials beben the t two offices” . 144),

but both offices admittedly deal substantially with out-

of- state and overseas elients and with out-of-state -

bidders, contractors and suppliers, and perform work

for out-of-state projects, and primarily for the improve -

ment, enlargement and repair of interstate instrumen-

talities or nen e the ee supra, Fy

2

f Factially, W ee business is unques- 8

tionably of an interstate character in almost every as-

pect, and the regular activities of the individual em-

ployees concededly include frequent and numerous in-

‘terstate comimunications and transmission of informa-

tion and materials by all stenographic personnel,“

frequent interstate travel together with interstate trans-

mission of data by fieldmen, and preparation of draw-

ings, specifications, plans and estimates („many of

which are transmitted across state lines“) by drafts-

: men (R. 5a. 6a, 144a), as well as substantial work by

3

all on plans and specifications essential to projects for

the repair or improvement: of interstate instrumentali-

“ties (see the Statement, supra, pp. 5-6).

These conceded facts; we believe, contradict the char-

acterization of respondents’ business ‘as “essentially

local, and amply suffice to meet. the statutory Stand-

ards tar coverage on any one ol several separate

eS A. The We W W of Pluns and

Specifications Essential to the Construction of

Projects for Improvement of Interstate Instru-

_ mentalities and Facilities Brings. Them Within ag

the Act’s “In Commerce Coverage.

s found by the court below, the great eee

8 spondents business consists of preparation of plans,

— cat

—

—

—

—

0

~ at

55 specifications and e for 1 ele 5

which include, primarily, projects for the- improve-

ment, enlargement and repair of installations at mili-

tary bases, airfields, shi pyards and radio stations for

the United States 1 services, and also a sub-

stantial number of state and municipal undertakings

and projects” (R. 144a). The court further found:

Projects for the improvement or repair of interstate

instrumentalities on which the defendants have worked

include airfields and airplane facilities for which streets

are widened or constructed, hangers are ‘repaired or

altered, and extensions are built,” relocation of

„Ir ladio and television facilities „repairs to gov-

-ernmenit buildings at shipyards 4 1 * (R. 146a).

5 That construction of such projects i is in commerce

within the meaning of the Act was not questioned by

the Court of Appeals and is now well-settled.” : , The

Ar

. 5

5 Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co, 349 U.S, 47 (construction of

ne lock and dam for the improvement of the Gulf Intercoastal

Waterway); Tobin v. Pennington-Winter Construction Company,

' 198 F.2d 334 (C. A. 10), certiorari denied; 345 U.S. B15 - (construc-

tion of a multi- purpose dam for improvement of the Arkansas and

Mississippi Rivers); Walling v. Patton-Tulley Transportation Co,

134 F.2d 945 (C.A. 6) (construction of new dikes and revetments

on the Mississippi River); Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredg-

ing Co., 156 F.2d 334. (GA. 9) (dredging of a new channel and

construction of a new pier with retaining walls at. Bremerton

Harbor); Tobin v. Ramey, 205 F. 2d 606 (C. A. 5), rehearing denied,

206 F.2d 508, certiorari denied sub nom. Hughes Const. Co. v. Sec-

retary of Labor, 346 U.S. 925 (enlargement of a set-back levee,

which, though a segment of the Mississippi levee system, was three

to six miles from the river’s banks); Bennetf v. V. P. Loftis Co,

167 F.2d 286 (C. A. 4) (construction of a new bridge for highway

n Empire Gas Engineering Co., 13 WMH ‘2

721 (not officially’ reported) (C.A. 5) (construction of jet-

Te ee Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F.2d

663 (C.A. 5) (construction of a new 25-mile causeway and bridge

e Raines, 238 F. 2d

le ar NN I

~

3 ne . 9

issue is whether the preparation of plans and specifica-

tions for the projects is not also in commerce

. 1. The ruling that the employees work on the plans

and specifications prepared specifically for the projects

is “essentially local,“ rather than a part of these inter- .

state repair or improvement projects, conflicts directly

with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Mitchell v.

Brown Engineering Co., 224 F. 2d 359, eertiorari de-

nied, 350 U.S. 875, and is also inconsistent with every.

other eireuit which has had occasion to rule on similar

issues (Laudadif v. White Construction Co., 163 F. 2d

383 (C. A. 2); Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredg-

ing Co., 156 F. 2d 334 (C. A. 9); see also Tobin v. Pen-

nington - Winter Const. Co., 198 F. 2d 334 (C. A. 10),

certiorari denied, 345 U. S. 915, and Archer v. Brown

4 Root, Inc., 241 F. 2d 663 (CA. 5), certiorari denied,

355 U.S. 825). We submit that the plain statutory .

terms, as well as the decisions of this Court construing |

the Act’s coverage, support these other rulings rather

than the holding of the court below. Mitchell v. C, W.

Vollmer & Co., 349. U.S. 427; Overstreet v. North

Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125; Fitegerald Co. v. Pedersen,

185 (C. A. 5), (improvements to Georgia State Highway 8 15

Mitchell v. Brown Engineering Co., 224 F.2d 359 (C.A. 8), certiorari

denied, 350 U.S: 875 (highway improvement rojects); Mitchell v.

Hodges Contracting Co., 288 F.2d 380 (C. A. 5) (radio-TV improve-

ment and replacement); Walling v. McCrady Construction Co., 156

F.2d 932 (C. A. 3), certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 785 (road improve- .

ment projects); Laudadio v. White Construction Co., 163 F.2d 383

(A. 2) (construction of extensions to airport runways and addi-

"* tious to hangars). See also Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin,

345 U.S. 13 (production of road materials for use in highway im-

_ provement projects) ; Tobin v. Johnson, 198 F.2d 130 (C.A. 8), cer-

tiorari denied, 345 U.S. 915 (same as Alstate); Schmitt v. War

Emergency Pipelines, 175 F.2d 335 (C. A. 8), certiorari denied, 338

US. US. 800 (construction of extensions to oil 8

23

324 U.S. 720; Alstate Const. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13;

Thomas v. He pt Bros., 345 U.8. 19. ae

The work of preparing surveys, plans, specifications,

and designs: for use in the repair or improvement of

; existing interstate instrumentalities and facilities is

as much a part of the work of improving existing

ae facilities of interstate commerce and of the rede-

— Signing of an existing facility_of interstate commerce

(see 349 U.S. at 430), as was e building of guide.

levees — an initial step in the construction of the lock

and canal improvement to an existing interstate water- _

way—held covered in Vollmer, supra. These necessary

preliminary tasks are nonetheless “essentially a part

of the larger one” of accomplishing the repair or im-

provement of the interstate facility (see Pedersen v.

Delaware, L. & V. R. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 152). The

surveys and specifications are indeed the immediate

foundation upon which all of the succeeding (admit-

_ tedly covered) construction work depends. It is clearly

not “isolated, local activity“ but is rather in practical

effect, a part of the improvement of the interstate 1

\ facility (Vollmer, 349 U. S. at 429). ,

Ahppbhying the principles of this Court’s Vollmer deci-

sion, the Eighth Circuit in Brown Engineering, supra, i

. _ which involved precisely the same type of employees of

a firm engaged in precisely the same kind of consultant, |

-architectural-engineering business, found no difficulty

in holding the non-professional employees to be en-

gaged in commerce by reason of their participation —

in the preparation of plans and specifications for the

repair and improvement of reads, highways and power

plant facilities. Even though the Brown Engineering:

* firm limited its operations to such projects within the

same * ald had no out-of-state branch offices or asso-

W

operation

sion will continue” (February issue, p 5. 79)

lated, we Righth Circuit 3 the Sant ten

(strenously urged there with much more reason than

the facts of the instant ease would justify) that con-

sultant: architectural-engineering work is an essen-

tially local“ business and that the preparation of plans |

and specifications was too remote from the repair and

2 improvement of the interstate instrumentalities x 1

55 within the 2 . of the A e ee a

a

Not. aay w the chatacterisation. of ‘easentially local” contra-

‘dicted by the facts in the record of the instant case, but it is con-

trary to the well-recogn recognised fact that the business of most-consultant—

architectural engineering firms in the modern industrial pattern is,

not limited to one State and depends substantially upon interstate

operations. As pointed out in the.Government’s petition for a writ

of certiorari in the present case (pp. 25-28), a recent comprehensive

survey of the private practice of engineering in the United States

dy the publication Consulting Engineer (January and February 1957,

issues). reports that most of the firms in this field do not limit their

eh operations to any one state; 72 percent of the consulting firms being

active in more than one state, and 28 percent having expanded their

geographical range to foreign projects. The survey ‘emphasises that

engineers are greatly expanding their geographical

range,” the situation being “quite different” today from “the scope

“of opsiations of s when e ee, st whlels tipae 58% of

the firms’ (in contrast to only 28% today) limited themselves to

within one state, and adds 97 igs geographical expan-

In addition to this expansion into direct interstate operation, the |

survey shows that industrial work (particularly for federal, state,

and municipal governments) constitutes a major part of the busi-

ness in this field and is constantly increasing (February issue, p. 81,

Table 4, p. 82). Some indication of the substantiality of this type

of work is evidenced by the expenditures of the Army and Navy

for architectural and engineering contract. work during the year

1957, which totaled over $113,000,000 (on almost 2,000 contracts

for $10,000 or more éach). Another major source of the business

| of such firms is highway construction. According to the Annual

Report of the Bureau of Public Roads for Fiscal Tear 1955, the

state highway: departments had committed 3.5 million: dollars. for

fees to private engineering firms in connection with their federally-

Vp : se

In contrast with the Fourth Circuit's narrow * be

mi view of the nature of this type of work, the

Eighth’. Circuit correctly viewed the preparation of

plans and specifications ‘in a practical aspect in rela-

tion to the whole construction project“ for which the

plans and specifications were specifically designed, and

concluded that such work is no more “‘isolated local

activity than actual manual labor on the projects

under repair and improvement (224 F. 2d at 364, 365).

The fact that the employer was engaged in an inde-

pendent enterprise, which the Fourth Circuit evi-

dently regarded as of major significance, was correctly

described by the Eighth Circuit as of minor signifi-

cance, in view of the settled principle that coverage

oe determined on the basis of the employee’s activity

‘and not by the nature of the employer’s business i

(eiting this Court's decision in Overstreet v. North

12 Shore Corp., 318 US. 125, 132 (224 F. 2d at 365)); see

also Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 524;

Walling v. Jacksonville — Co. 3 U.S. 564, 871

572. 5

aided road projects slone (Annual Report, p. 7). This type of

business will, of course, be considerably increased under the gigantic

‘road construction program initiated by the 24 billion dollar Federal-

Aid Highway Act of 1956 (Public Law 627—S4th Cong.,-2d Sess.,

70 Stat. 374). The Department of Commerce has estimated that

the cost of preliminary engineering (surveys, detail plans, specifica-

tions and contract documents) required for this program wili-exceed _.

1% billion dollars A 300, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.,

p. 4, Table C, p. 6), i 1

TAs this Court has “repeatedly said, the n of the Act

depends upon the character of the employees activities” (Over-.

street, 318 U.S. at-132), andtherefore “the fact that all of respond-

ent’s business is not shown to have an interstate character is not im-

portant” (Walling v; Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 571-572).

* although. the “bulk of * merchandise” handled in the ware

© va 4

*

. — Bode

‘ t — *

— Pe Fourth Cireuit stated this eats

(n 182), it proceeded to follow the opposite course,

not only taking the occupation of the employer * * *

into consideration but manifestly making it the con-

trolling factor. For the opinion below itself eoncedes

that · u jndo ubtedly the term ‘in commerce’ covers not

only the activity of workers who share directly in the

work of construction but also those who do the paper

work such as the preparation of lists of material or pay-

rolls, or who serve as fieldmen and timekeepers on tile

job.“ It also recognizes that other Courts of Appeals

(the Second and Ninth in Laudadio v. White Construc-

tion Co., 169 F. 2d 383, and Ritch’ v. Puget Sound

: —— 150 F. 2d 334) have held the

preparation of plans or drawings * by employees

of the [construction] contractor” were engaged i in com-

merce (R. 151a).“

In the Laudadio and Ritch cases, the Courts of 47 |

— — that the Act covered draftsmen and clerical

* in Jatheoaville Paper was s for “local disposition” (317 US.

at 566, 570), the Court specifically ruled that (at 571): )

The use of the words “in commerce” entails an analysis of the

various types of transactions and the particular course of busi-

„ness The fact that all of respondent's business is not

shown to have an interstate. character is not important. The

applieability of the Act is ee on the character of *

- employees’ work..

This principle applies even where the employer is sink himself

engaged in an industry partaking of interstate commerce,” and in

any event, to the extent that his employees are engaged in commerce _

i or in the luction of goods for commierce,’ the employer is himself.

so engaged” within the meaning of this Act eee, Co. v.

Walling 316 US. at 524).

v These‘ decisions were distinguished by the 3 below solely on

the ground that they furnished “no clean-cut holding that the work

of employees of independent architects, such as are before us in this

case, is ‘commerce’ wader the Act.” 8

te 8 Hi 3 27

Workers preparing the plans and drawings for, as well

as the workers engaged in the actual construction of,

projects for the improvement and expansion of inter-

state instrumentalities. The project in the Laudadio

case was extension of runways at a naval air base, and

the project in Ritch was dredging channels for the im-

provement of the harbor at the Bremerton N avy Yard,

die., both projects of the same kind that comprise a

primary part of the business of the respondents. In

opposition to the Fourth Circuit’s view that the Act's

coverage is limited to employees participating actively

at the site of construction’’ (R. 153a), the Ninth Cir-

ceuit in Ritch ruled that no such distinction could ra-

_ tionally be drawn between the so-called white collar

workers (the draftsmen engaged in designing and

_ laying out the wor be done by others“) and the

workers engaged in the actual dredging and construc-

tion operations which were performed ‘all pursuant

to the draftsmen’s pla e his ruling, rather than

that of the Fourth Ciseuit,. clearly accords with this

. Court’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit’s restriction of

coverage to workers at the site of construction’’ cor:

85 8 } :

The restricted view expressed in ihe 5 below is 410 con-

trary to the Fourth Circuit’s own earlier decision in Bennett v. V. P.

Loftis Co., 167 Fd 286: In that case, the court held the night-

watchman ‘guarding a road bridge under construction to be engaged

in commerce” within the coverage of the Act, “although [the

_ watchman] took no part in the actual construction of the bridge in

the sense of driving nails, or pouring concrete, or the ke," on the

ground that (167 F.2d at 288):

If the declared purpose of the Act is to be accomplished, a

project should be considered as a whole, in a realistic way; not

broken down into its various phases so as to defeat the purpose

of the Act. This latter unrealistic. approach was eondemned by

the Supreme Court in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., at

N 8. 564. ene =

| 8

responds to, and i is no more tenable than, the distinction

between on- the- road and “‘off-the-road’’ workers

which this Court rejected in Alstate Construction Co.

v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 16, and Thomas v. Hempt Bros.,

345 U.S. 19 (discussed-infra, pp. 30-31, 47-49).

. While these decisions were predicated on the -

5 duetion of goods for conzmerce phasé of coverage, a

comparable distinction has similarly been rejected in |

cases predicated on the * commerce phase of the

ie Act’s s coverage. Tobin v. Pennington-Winter. Const.

8 Co., 198 F. 2d 334 (C. A. 10), certiorari denied, 345 U. S.

915 (holding preliminary ‘‘ off-the-river’’ work of clear-

ing a reservoir site for construction of a dam designed

as part of a broad comprehensive plan for the improve- .

ment of a navigable river to be in commerce“); 5

Tobin v. Ramey, 205 F. 2d 606 (C. A. 5), certiorari -

denied, 346 U.S. 925 (holding ‘‘off-the-river”’ construe-

tion of a set-back levee to be in commerce); Archer

v. Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F. 2d 663 (C.A.5); certiorari

denied, 355 U.S. 825 (where the construction of a plant

to be used for prefabricating bridge slabs and materials

needed in the construction of a causeway commana in-

terstate highways, was held to be in commerce“ as

„part of the- main job even though preliminary to it

and unseen or nonexistent in the final product.“ Id.

2 669). The preparation of Preliminary plans and

10 This * was held covered a the fact that the work was

not in the river and was preliminary or preparatory to the main :

construction work, and was performed by an independent con-

tractor, and despite the further fact that its beneficial effect upon

navigability depended upon the future construction not only of the

particular dam to be served by the reservoir’ but of a number of

other similar tributary projects to be constructed over a period of

years. The petition for certiorari in Pennington-Winter, which had

been pending for over five months, was denied on the next decision

day immediately after the Alstate e.

ff 9

1

29

6 part

of the interstate project for which they specifically are

designed, than the preliminary reservoir clearance in

Penmngton-Winter, or the construction of the pre-

fabricating plant in Ar

2. The court below eee ee

Streei Co. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578, as authority for

eluding respondents’ employees from the coverage of

the Act because respondents ‘‘may be likened to the“

owners of the general office building in the Callus case?

in that they work for a general miscellany of clients” ?

(R. 153a). In no respect material to the Act’s coverage

can either respondents’ enterprise or the employees

activities in this case be likened to Callus. In marked

contrast, neither the employer nor the employees i in Cal-

lus engaged directly in any interstate activities, none of

the employees’ work (general building maintenance ser-

vice) was specifically designed for particular interstate

projects, and the claim of coverage rested solely upon

thin“ evidence of a general relationship to interstate .

es manufacturing carried on by some of the building

tenants elsewhere. Even on the ‘‘thin’’ evidence theré

presented, Callus found the question of coverage to be

a very close one. Plainly, no such close borderline

question is presented with. respect to respondents’

employees who are admittedly engaged directly, regu-

larly, and substantially in interstate activities, includ-

1 ing preparation of plans and specifications designed

specifically for designated interstate projects, as well

as transportation, transmission, or communication”’

within the literal terms of the nr definition ( see

infra, pp. 34-41). ee

“That th Fourth Circuit Nee 3 the

Callus d ion in extending it to the admittedly inter-

aA.”

ae ie et eae

state activities of respondents’ employees is evident

from the numerous decisions of this Court holding the

Act applicable to. employees of independent enterprises

dealing with a miscellany of customers. Thus, in

_. Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, the Court

upheld coverage: of employees of an independent elec-

trical contracting company serving a general miscellany

of customers, on the basis of evidence that the em-

Ployees regularly performed work for 33 customers

(out of a total of approximately 1,000) who were en-

- ‘gaged in commerce or in production of goods for com-

merce. Similarly in Thomas v. Hempt Bros., 345 U.S.

19, the Act-was held applicable to employees of an

independent enterprise operating a stone quarry and

_ preparing cement mixtures and other materials for a

miscellany of customers, among whom were the Penn-. —

sylvania Turnpike, the Pennsylvania Railroad Com-

pany, an airport, an army depot, and a navy depot,

and other purchasers [who] used their

conerete on ‘projects which aided the flow of commerce’

„ (345 U.S. at 20). The Court drew no distinction |

between this independent materialman, who dealt with

the general miscellany of eustomers, and the Alstate

Construetion Company which prepared materials pri-

marily for use in its own road construction work

| (Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13, 15).

Nor did it differentiate the independent materialman

in Tobin v. Johnson son (198 F. 2d 130 (C. A. 8), certiorari

denied, 345 U.S. 915) who supplied a general mass of

customers, coverage there having been sustained on

1 This case was cited i in Alstate as one involving “similar facts“

(345 USS. at 15), certiorari was denied March 16, 1953, the next

deeision day i 1 after the Alstate decision.

| taining coverage even of building maintenance employ-

ees in an independently operated building tenanted by

the ground thint a substantial proportion poral 50%)

of the materials were furnished to various customers

for use in road construction or in maintenance and

repair of dikes and revetments. on a. navigable river.

See also Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 US. 108, 118, sus-

a a general miscellany of occupants, where the evidence

22

showed that a sufficiently substantial proportion of the

occupants were. regularly engaged in producing various

kinds of goods for shipment in interstate commeree.

The Fourth Circuit's mistaken view of the local

activity“ which the Act does not attempt to regulate”’

(R. 152a) also appears from the well-settled applica-

tion of the Act to a wide variety of businesses serving

locally a variety of customers, ineluding electric and

gas’ companies, water companies, ice companies, coal

—— companies and — 1 In

e

0

12 Lewis v. Florida Pint & Light Co., 15⁴ 724 751 (C. A. 5)

(some ‘of. the electricity ‘furnished for use in -gperating railroad |

signal lights and airport beacons); Meeker Cooperative Light &

“5 7

Power Ass’n v. Phillips, 158 F. 2d 698 (C. A. 8); New Merico Public

Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F.2d 636 (C. A. 10) (supplying power,

inter alia, to the Civil Aeronauties Authority for operating airline

beacons and to miscellaneous other interstate instrumentalities and

e Davila v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 143 F.2d

236 (C.A. 1) (supplying power, inter alia, to a number of. interstate

producers); Mitchell v. Mercer Water Co., 208 F.2d 900 (C.A. 3)

(supplying substantial quantities of water and gas, inter alia, to .

interstate producers); Atlantic Co. v. Walling, 131 F.2d 518. (C. A.

5); Chapman v. Home Ice Co. of Memphis, 136 F.2d 353 (C. A. 6),

oertiorari denied, 320 U.S. 761 (ice companies among whose cus-

tomers were. fruit growers or railroads using the ice for refrigerator

freight cars); West Kentucky Coal Co, v. Walling, 153 F.2d 582

(A. 6) (supplying substantial quantities of coal, inter alia, to some

15 or 18 interstate producers) ; Schmidt v. Peoples Telephone Union 2

of Maryville, 138 F.2d 13 (C.A. 8) (telephone company serving

0 :

i . :

* — — — *

—— — . . N 32 e

7

° :

— coverage has been snitained by reason .

of the fact that among the general miscellany of eus-

tomers were some interstate instrunientalities and

interstate protien whe were regular and substantial

customers.

The application of tha Act to such businesses was

| expressly approved by Congress at the time of the

_ enactment of the 1949 Amendments,” as was the cover- .

age ruling of Roland Electric, supra, p. 30. See

Statement of the Majority of the Senate Conferees (95

Cong. Rec. 1487475), which states that the work of

such employees is covered by the Act “whether they

are employed by the producer of goods or by someone

else who has undertaken the performance of particular

‘tasks for the pro weer” . emphasis added). Simi-

larly, the House report stated that the 1949.

Amendments are not intended to remove from tlie Act

maintenance, custodial, and clerical employees of the

type held covered in Kirschbaum and in the publie

utility decisions, also expressly stating that such em-

pleyees “will remain. subject to the Act, not withstand-

ing they are employed by an ee employer

—

local customers We whose calls were —— local but in-

eluded a few regularly recurring interstate calls). Lower court

decisions to the samé.effect are too numerous to cite. 1

e House Report on the amendinents specifically stated that

| “empl ees of public utilities, furnishing gas, electricity or water to

fl ithin the State engaged in manufacturing, producing, or min-

ing goods for commerce, will remain subject to the act.” [State-

ment of the Managers on the Part of the House, 95 Cong. Rec. 14920.

Similarly, the Senate Report listed among the employees remaining:

within the coverage of the Act those engaged in “producing and

- supplying fuel, power, water * , citing with approval Meeker

Coop. v. Phillips, Lewis v. Florida Power & Light.Co., and West

Kentucky Coal Co. v. ee supra, fn. 15 ag * Rec. 14875}.

oe. (8 Cong. Rec. 14929, Fan aneh Wulle

these statements were made with reference to the pro-

duction for commerce’’ phase of coverage (which was

the coverage provision modified by the 1949 Amend-

ments), the statements were obviously premised on a

prineiple equally applicable to determining coverage

of the in commerce phase (see Jacksonville and

Overstreet, supra), i.e., that the determining factor is

the relationship of the employee’s work to the inter-

ar state commerce regardless of the independent character

of the employer’s enterprise.

The nub of it is that the Fourth Circuit’s criticism of

the Eighth Circuits ‘Brown Engineering decision,

supra, p. 22, for “‘seem[ing] to ignore’’ the ‘‘local’’

nature of the employer’s business—which, according |

to the decision below, gave color to the employees’ ©

admittedly: interstate activities (R. 153a)—reveals that

the Fourth Circuit has missed the point that it is the .

functional relationship of the employees’ particular

work or activities to interstate commerce, rather than

the general nature of the employers’ business, that is

_ decisive of coverage. The test is, this Court has

said, ‘‘whether the work is so directly and vitally re-

; lated to the functioning of an instrumentality or facil-:

ity of interstate commerce as to be, in practical a

a part of it, rather than, isolated, local activity,“

Michell v. C. M. Vollmer d Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (em-

phasis added), and this must be determined by prac-

tical considerations, not by technical conceptions”

(ibid.). A determination ignores „practical consider-

ations,’’ and relies on technical conceptionis,’’ when it

is based not on what the employees ar- doing and not on

what their work has to do with the instrumentalities of

eres, but on whether the —- is a construc-

—

tion company or an —— firm, 5

and on whether the employer undertakes other kinds of

contracts as well. The practical effect on the improve-

ment of an airfield or a shipyard is not measured by

the independence of the employer or the character

of his other clients. It depends on the role played by

the work of the employees in the particular improve-

ment projects. ‘To transpose the language of the court

below, It is this element which the [court below and

respondents] seem to ignore” (R. 153a) |

n. The Interstate Communications. and 5

of Documents and Materials and the Interstate

, Pravel, in which Respondents’ Employees Regu-

‘larly and Substantially Engage, is Engagement

n Commerce Within the Act Coverage. :

KK ²³ .

concurred, are that respondents’ two-state offices are

closely coordinated and in continous communication,

and that ‘‘all stenographie personnel employed in both

offices” are freely conceded” to be employed in the

extensive interstate communication by telephone and

and between Wess offices and out-cf-state clients and

contractors, and that the draftsmen. work on plans,

specifications, estimates, ete. many of which are trans-

mitted across state lines, and that the fieldmen fre-

‘quently travel across state lines to gather data for the

plans, specifications and estimates which, in turn, are

frequently transmitted out-of-state’ (R. 5a-Ga, 144a-

146a). In view of these findings, the conclusion that.

: none of these employees is engaged in commerce” _

een inexplicable. ae ;

35

— — 2

r ————— a

Ki . K

mail and telephone and interstate travel, which are ad-

mittedly a regular and substantial part of their duties

required by the nature of respondents’ geographic or-

ganization and multi-state operations; are not only

„transportation, transmission or communication

within the literal terms of the statutory definition, but

are undeniably 80 directly and vitally related to the

7 functioning of and so integral a part of” respond-

ents’ extensive interstate operations as a whole, as

to be a part of those interstate operations, ‘‘rather than

isolated, local activity,“ under any liberal, “‘practi-

cal” or realistic view of the case. See Mitchell v.

Vollmer d Co., 349 U. S. 427, at 429; Mitchell v. Kroger

Co., 248 F.2d 935 (C.A. ©)) anh Acton Fineness om v.

Mitchell, 247 F.2d 190 (C. A. 1). '

1 — 5

interstate ‘‘communication,’’ this Court has repeatedly

communications of the same or similar type here in-

interstate eommeree, in order to maintain its other

relationships and contacts with its own subsidiaries,’’

Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 103,

| Whatever the means of such communication, is inter-

x ots eee 25 Snes Seen Ge, » .

held that the interstate use of the mails to transmit

volved constitutes interstate commerce. See North —

American Co. v. S. E. O., 327 U.S. 686, at 694-695 (a

holding company’s use of the mails and facilities f

. . held to constitute interstate commerce); Associated

at 128 (‘‘interstate communication of a business nature,

Pig. 217 U. S. 91, at 107 ne ta ee 8

cation between persons in different States, by means of

e er eee eee eee

the States).“

3 Sadenecitere

Assn., 322 U.. 533, holding insurance companies to be

in interstate commerce by reason of the ‘‘interrelation-

ship, interdependence, and integration of activities” in

all States · in which they operate, which resulted in fa

continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among

the states composed of collections of premiums, pay-

nients of policy obligations, and the countless docu-

ments and communications * * * ” (322 U.S. at 541);

United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, where the

transmission of applications, letters, memoranda,

communications, commitments, contracts, money,

checks, drafts and other media of exchange across _

State lines, occurring in the conduct of the business of

producing locally legitimate stage attractions, was simi-

- larly held to constitute trade or commerce within the

meaning of the ‘Sherman Act; and United States v.

International Boring Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236,

another Sherman Act case, decided the same day. These

decisions, und the Court, accord with the ‘‘iberal en.

4 Bee aleo Federel Trade Commission b. Civil Servies T. Buréau,

79 F.2d 113, at 114 (C.A. 6) “intercourse or communication between

persons in different states by means of correspondence through the

mails is commerce among the states * * *, especially where such

nitercourse and communication relate to regular continuous business

and to the making of contracts and the transportation of books,

papers, ete., pertaining to such business”); and Bay City v. Frazier,

77 ‘F.2d 570, at 574 (C.A. 6) (holding an engineering contract for

tze construction. of an out-of-state orks system

to be an interstate transaction because its perf required,

among other things, regular and continuous interstate communica-

— a

r

struction’? that had been given the 8 Aet (348

U.S. at 226). The Court has similarly emphasized that

_ the Fair Pabor Standards Act, also, is one that has

been given a liberal construction? (Mitchell v. C. F.

Vollmer Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429). While admittedly

there are differences in the scope of the Sherman Act

and this Act, the Court's decisions in the above cases

were not predicated on the affecting commerce’? scope

-of the Sherman Act, but were construing the statutory

language trade or commerce * * * among the several

States“ (see Shubert, 348 U.S! at 226-227)—language

identical to that of Section 3(b) of the Fair Labor

Standards Act, which indeed goes further and ex-

_ pressly includes * transmission, or com-

munication.“

The Court’s decisions are équally clear that ! inter-

state travel or movement of persons across state lines,

even for non-commercial purposes, is interstate com-

‘merce. Edwards v. California, 314 1 S. 160 (move-

ment of indigents aerosssstate lines is interstate com-

merce) ; see also Hema v. United States, 163 F. 2d

228, 239 (C. A. 6), certiorari denied, 332 U.S. 801 (up-

holding the validity of the Fugitive Felon Act, which

_ restricted the movement of one who travels in inter-

state commerce to avoid giving testimony in the state

from which he flees’’) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242

U.S. 470 (transportation of women across state lines

for non-commercial immoral purposes is interstate

conimeree prohibited by the Mann Act) ; Cleveland v.

United States, 329 U. S. 14 (transportation of a woman

across state lines for purposes of a polygamous mar-

riage is interstate commerce).

There is certainly nothing in the policy and purposes

of the Fair Labor et am which would warrant.

8 to restriet its 8 coverage as the

decision below has manifestly done. On the contrary,

such a restrictive construction of this Act is plainly

inconsistent with this Court’s ruling that the purpose ©

of the Act was to extend federal control in this field

throughout the farthest: reaches of the channels of

’ interstate commerce” (Walling v. Jacksonville Paper

Co., 317 U.S. 564, 567) and that ‘the policy of Congres-

Sional abnegation with respect to occupations affecting

commerce is no reason for narrowly circumscribing the

phrase engaged in commerce (Overstreet v. North

Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 128). It is also inconsistent

with the well-settled pitadiple, most recently empha-

sized by this Court in Mitchell v. Vollmer, that the

\ statutory terms of coverage of this Act must be given a

- “‘Fiberal” construction (349 U.S. at 429), and that the

literal terms of the statutory definitions should be ac-

corded the ‘breadth of coverage’’ consistent with the

terms of substantial universality”’ in which the broad |

purposes of the Act aré stated (Powell v. United, States

: Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516). These were the prin-

ciples derlying recent decisions of the Eighth and

First Cire its which upheld the coverage of interstate

travel and interstate communications in circumstances

comparable to the instant ease. (Mitchell v. Kroger —

Co., 248 F. 2d 935 (C. A. 8), and Aetna Finance Co. v.

Mitchell, 257 F.2d 180 (OA. 15.

Kroger involved the coverage of interstate travel sa

interstate communications of auditors employed by a

multi-state chain organization to make audits at its

local retail units in two states, and to transmit their

auditing, reports to branch/headquarters. ~~ *

\ t . 2

0 * *

@ =

that such n and travel are pr

tation, transmission and communieation’ between states

within the méaning and the literal terms of the statute”? |

(248 F. ad at. 989), the Eighth Circuit held that there is

„nothing to justify Congressional intent to the con-

_ trary,’’ and that, ¶ instead of a striet or limited con- .

struction,’’ this Court’s decisions required a liberal

eonstructionꝰ of the statutory terms of eoverage in

particular a construction that does not narrowly cir-

cumseribe the meaning of the phrase ‘engaged in com-

meree or detract in any way from the statutory defini-

tion as to the meaning of commerce itself (id. at 938,

emphasis added). Kroger held not only that the audi-

. tors’ interstate communication and travel were liter- i

ally within the Act’s coverage” (ibid), but also, on the

basis of practical facts comparable to those here, that

such interstate communication and travel were not

„merely incident to a, local retail business but were

a part and parcel of the Kroger rere s interstate

activity“ (id. at 939). :

In Aetha Finance, the First Cireuit held that em-

ployees of a branch office of a small loan company were

| engaged ein commerce” by reason of their interstate

communication, correspondence and transmission of -

various reports and documents; even though over 95%

of the branch office’s business consisted of loans to

local borrowers within the same state. Thẽ court

found no difficulty in agreeing with the District Court’s |

ruling that.coverage of these activities was sufficiently

sustained either by reason of thé small proportion of -

the branch’ s business with out-of-state borrowers. or

= reason of the relationship o “ . branch employees’

é

work to the conduct and furtherance of defendant's

' nationwide. business under the broad guiding prin-

ciples” of this Court’s decisions (247 F. 2d at. 192;

affirming 144 F.Supp. 528 at 533). ;

The sole reason stated in the decision below tor not

applying what the court itself recognized as this well-

established line of authority (R. 150a) was its mis-

taken assumption that the employers’ business here is

not interstate in character but is essentially local“

and that, therefore, the interstate communication and

ental to the local enterprise”

| sun , as pointed out supra, pp.

20.21, 24 fn. 6, 31-35, 4s contradicted by the undisputed

‘evidence. in this record. The interstate communica-

tions and travel by respondents’ employees are unde-

niably necessitated by and essential to respondents’

two-state administrative organization, its overseas

Associations and its extensive interstate operations

both for out-of-state clients and for interstate. instru-

mentalities or facilities. Whatever justification there

might be for excluding from the coverage of the Act

interstate communications and travel which are merely

ineidental to an otherwise purely local business,“ there

i The ruling below on interstate communication is also in con- f

flict with the decision of the District Court in ‘Durkin v. Joyce

Agency, Inc, 110 F.Supp. 918 (N.D. III.), which was affirmed per

curiam by this Court sub nom. Mitchell v. Joyce A „Inc., 348

US. 945, reversing the Seventh Circuit 's decision (211 F.2d 241),

a which had held specifically, inter alia, that. so-called “internal”

interstate communication was not within the coverage of the Act.

. 18 It is not the Government’s position that any interstate corres-

pondence, even though merely incidental to a purely local business

or professional practice, is within the Act’s coverage. On the con-

trary, the administrative interpretation has expressly stated that

the Act’s coverage of interstate communication ‘does not mean that

any use by an employee of the mails and other channels of com-

munication is sufficient to establish coverage,” but only where the

41 te.

is no reasonable ground to be found in either the terme

or purposes of this Act for excluding from its coverage

‘employees regularly engaged in the interstate activities

necessitated by the nature and organization of a busi-

ness which has the admitted interstate aspects and ex-

tensive interstate operations of reapondents”’ business.

C. The Preparation of Plans, Specifications and Drew

ings for Tnansmission Across State Lines, or for

se in the Construction of Repairs or Improve-

ménts to Interstate Instrumentalities and Fucili-

ties, Constitutes enn 16 Goods 8865 Com- 5

— mer ce. a

. both courts below 3 that, if the

plans, specifications and drawings are goods“ within

the meaning of the statutory definition in Section 3(i),

the employees preparing them are “producing”

(handling, transporting, or in any other manner work-

ing on’’) them for ‘‘commerce”’ (‘transmission .

between any State and any place outside thereof)

within the terms of Sections 3(j) and (b) of the Act.

Since a substantial portion of these plans and specifi -

cations are prepared specifically for use in the repair

or improvement of interstate instrumentalities or facili-

| ties, they are also, we submit, produced for commerce

employees duties N such regular aad? recurrent” and con-

tinued” use. (Interpretative Bulletin on General Coverage, Part

7786.10, May 1950, 15 F.R. 2925). This distinction has been made

specifically with respect to correspondence and communications

merely incidental to an ordinary local practice of law, medicine or

other profession, so that coverage is asserted only where the practice

is 30 conducted as to necessitate regular and continuous interstate -

communication with out-of-State cliente or with closely affiliated

out-of-State offices or associates ins: ‘is — the nature of 8

„ operations).

N : 8 F 42 | es J *

no less than the preparation of road materials for these

same purposes held to be within the Act’s coverage in

Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, and

Thomas v. Hempt Bros., 345 U. S. 19. Moreover, this

work is production of goods for commerce, whether

or not tlie plans and specifications ne are

ä regarded as g a 3

1. The view that plans and specifientions are not

‘articles or subjects of commerce” within the statutory”

definition of Section 3(i) ‘simply because they repre-

sent the “‘embodiment of ideas” (R. 148a) is difficult to

5 Teconeile with the. ruling in Western Union Telegraph ©

' Ce. '%. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, that ‘‘telegraphic mes-

sages are clearly ‘subjects of commerce and hence that

they are ‘goods’ under this Act, since prior to the

adoption of the statutory definition it had been held

(in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, iZ2.

U.S. 347) that ‘ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence’

are ‘subjects’ of the interstate commerce in which tele-

graph companies engage“ (323 U.S. at 502-503). As

pointed qut by Judge Learned Hand in the Second

Cireuit’s decision in Western Union, the legislative his-

tory contains ‘‘unmistakable evidence of a purpose to

extend the definition of subdivision [3]i to areey thing

which had been considered a ‘subject of ecommerce’; —

that is, to whatever Congress could regulate as such

a subject” (141 F. 2d 400 at 403). The bill as originally

: ! oe

peals on the meaning of the statutory definitions of goods and

“produced” (323 U.S. at 502-504), although it reversed on the

“wholly different ground that the physical tangible “message” never 4

leaves the originating office” and hence was not “shipped” within

the terms of Section 12(a) of the Act, (id. at 505-506) —i. e., the

peg there was that the telegrams, taken as documents, were

not chipped across a state line” (see Bozant v. Bank of New York, :

156 F.2d 787, 790 (C.A. a emphasis added). .

43 .

introduced defined “goods” as goods wares, produets, |

commodities, merchandise, or articles of trade of any

character (Section 2(a) (21) of S. 2475 and of H. 1

7200, 75th Cong., Ist Sess.). The Senate Committee on

Education and Labor changed trade“ to commerce

and added the words or subjects” after the word

articles,“ thus putting the definition into its present

form. (See S. 2475, Committee Print to Accompany

S. Rep. 884, 75th Cong. Ist Sess.). [I]t must always.

be remembered,“ a subsequent decision of the Second

Circuit reiterated, that Section 3(i) ‘‘was amended in

Congress to go beyond ‘wares, products, commodities, —

merchandise, or articles,’ and in addition to include .

‘subjects of commerce of any character. (Bozant v.

Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787, at 790).

The physical embodiment of mental ideas into tan-

gible and bulky plans and specifications is obviously

the product of considerable routine, clerical and other

physical work, as is evident from a mere glance at some

of the plans and specifications for industrial projects .

involved in this case. These physical products are |

tangible materials which can be and are subjects of

commerce“ (i. e. interstate transportation“ or trans-

mission“) within the literal terms of the statutory

definitions; and their. physical production unquestion-

ably requires the type of routine, clerical, and ee

workers with whom this Act is concerned.

ie rationale of the Western Union decision has been

applied by other Courts of Appeals and by the district

courts to a wide variety of documents comparable to

the plans, specifications and documents in this case.

See Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,

150 F. 2d 524 (C. A. 2), cer Rorari denied, 326 U. S. 767

(mimeographing and setting type for advertising

ene

matter“ and „reading, editing, and preparing ea.

manuscripts for the printer held production of

goods); Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787,

790. (C. A. 2) (preparing, executing or validating

bonds, shares of stock, commercial paper, bills of lading

anid the like held production of goods); Darr v.

Iutual Life Insurance Co., 169 F. 2d 262, 264-265 (C. A.

2), certiorari denied, 335 U.S. 871 (insurance policy ap-

plications and insurance policies are goods produced

for commerce’’); Ullo v. Smith, 177 F.2d 101 at 104

(C.A. 2), affirming as clearly correct“ the ruling of the

district court (62 F.Supp. 757 at 762) that the gather-

ing, stenciling and mimeographing of news regarding

New York merchandising and markets“ for distribu-

. 18 While the Bozant ruling was. limited to “commercial” docu-

ments such as<{‘bonds, shares of stock, commercial paper, bills of

lading and the like,” and excluded mere writing of letters or tbke

drawing of papers, which have no value of their own except, as

records (156 F.2d at 790), it did not foreclose the conclusion that

“the preparation of advertisements, brochures, pamphlets and other

advices’ maile 1 out to customers,” also, “may be a production of

‘goods’ though it be only auxiliary to a business that involves no

other production” (id. at 789). The plans and specifications in tble

instant case, we submit, are plainly more of this tangible, utilitarian .

character than mere letter-writing or records.

Indeed, the use made of the plans agd 3 bidders,

contractors, suppliers. of materials, as well ‘as by the construction

crews—cau hardly be characterized as non-commercial.

Moreover, Bozant’s emphasis on the “commercial” character of

the documents must ‘be discounted by the fact that the decision

(banded down July 8, 1946) antedated this Court’s decision in

Powell v. United States Cartridge Co. (decided May 8, 1950), dis-

cussed in the text, infra, pp. 46-47). Similarly, the district court’s

decision in McComb v. Turpin, 81 F.Supp. 86 (D. Md.) (decided .

November 30, 1948), on which the court below heavily relied (R.

1460-147a) antedated Powell, and rested on the rationale (repu-

diated in Powell) that the statutory definition of “goods” includes

only products or articles of a “commercial character” that are

“sold or offered for sale to the — —" (81 88 at 89,

90).

2

45

tion to subscribers is ‘‘produetion of goods“; Union

National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848,

849, 850 (C. A. 8) (holding that it is no longer=* * *

open to question“ that preparation and handling of

stocks, bonds and other securities and checks, notes,

drafts, and other commercial paper by bank employ-

dees, and of ‘‘policy applications, policies, premium pay-

ments, claims and benefit-paymentS,’’ by insurance

company employees ‘constitute reden of goods

for commerce’’) ; Meeker Cooperative Lighi and Power

Assn. v. Phillips, 158 F.2d 698, 699 (C. A. 8) (affirming

the district court’s ruling (63 F.Supp. 733, 740) that the

preparation of correspondence, reports fiscal state-

ment, checks and other arate 5 constitu’ produe-

tion of goods

4 The view that such n is outside the contempl :

To the same effect are the following district, ‘court. decisions:

Loſther v. First National Bank of Chicago, 48 fr. Supp. 692, 697

(N.D. III.) affirmed on other grounds, 138 F.2d 299 (C. A. 7)

(banking documents, written reports, correspondsnee and accounts

prepared by an accountant); Hogue v. National Automotive Parts

Assn., 87-F Supp. 816 (E.D. Mich.) (gathering ard compiling statis-

tical data as to prices, business activity and similar matters, and

‘distributing it to members of a trade association); Mathisen v.

Evanston Trust Bank (not officially reported tut found in 6 WH

Cases 882, 12 Labor Cases {| 63,726 (N. III., 1947) (checks, drafts,

and other commercial paper); Durkin v. Sone, 112 F.Supp. 375

(E. D. Tenn.) (addressing, handling and mailing advertising ma-

terials); Hanzely v. Hooven Letters, Inc., 1 NVS. 2d 398 (City

Court N. V. 1943) (advertising letters); Mitchell v. Tippett (not

officially reported but found in 13 WH Cases 774 and 35 Labor

Cases, para. 71,723 (W. D. N. Car., June 25, 1958) (printing bank

check forms and miscellany of other commercial business forms);

Thomas et al. v. Associated Cleaning Contractors (not officially

reported, but found in 13 WH Cases 777 and 35 Labor Cases, para.

71,724) (N.D. Ga., July 12, 1958) (preparation of printed and

mimeographed tariff catalogs, statistics and information reports

for members of motor carriers association, and preparation of

credit investigation reports for customers of retail ‘credit company).

46 :

tions of the Act because it is incidental to professional

planning and advice is contradicted by Borden Co. v.

Borella, 325 U.S. 679, where maintenance employees of

Borden’s central office building for its executive officers

and. administrative employees were held within the

Act's coverage, on the ground that the economie pro-

duction’’ with which this Act is concerned includes

„not simply the manual physical labor involved in .

changing the form or utility of a tangible le but

also planning and controlling“ and the wor of one

“who conceives or directs a productive activity’’ (325

U.S. at 683). The apparent confusion by the court

below of the. Act’s “professional” exemption (Section

13(a)(1)) with the Act’s general coverage provisions

is contrary to this Court’s explicit statement that:

Indeed, the fact that § 13(a)(1) specifically excludes

* * * those employees employed in a bona fide executive,

administrative or professional capacity is clearly con-

‘sistent with the conclusion that these activities are in-

cluded within“ the coverage of the Act, and “that full

effect should ‘be given that fact unlegs otherwise pro: |

vided’”’ (325 U.S. at 684).”

3. Similarly, the position that prvi and specifica-

tions are not goods for commerce“ because they lack

the characteristies of ordinary articles sold com-

mereially to the publie generally (R. 148a-149a) is

contrary to the basic rationale of Powell v. United

States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, which explicitly

repudiated the contention. that coverage is limited to

“eommercial’’ transactions or to articles that are

intended for sale, exchange or other trading activities

(339 U. 8. at 512), and emphasized the terms of sub-

20 The r exemption is; not involved in the present

ee 8

47 5

stantial dindverélity”* in which the broad statutory

purposes and the statutory coverage definitions are

stated (id. at 509-516). ‘‘Breadth of coverage was vital

to its mission“ (id. at 516), said the Court, and the

primary legislative purpose was concerned directly

with any widespread existence of substandard wages,

hours or working conditions“ which could be reached

by Congress through its regulation of interstate trans-

portation of the products of those conditions“ (id. at

509-510, fn. 12). Quoting the statutory definition of

“commerce” with emphasis on the language transpor-

tation among the several States or from any State

to any place outside thereof (ibid., emphasis the

Court's), the Court ruled that this language includes

e interstate chipments or transportation as such, and

not merely * * * shipments or transportation of articles

that are intended for sale, exchange or other trading

activities, citing at this point previous decisions hold-

ing that the federal “commerce’’ power extended to all

kinds of non-commereial“ interstate movements and

transactions (id. at 512): The broad scope of the

Powell decision’s construction of the term “articles,

or subjects of commerce of any character“ is indicated

by its reliance (ibid., fn. 14) upon such decisions as

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (movement of

_indigents across state lines) ; Thornton v. United States,

271 U.S. 414 {diseased ‘eattle ranging across state

lines) ; ; Caminetti v: United States, 242 U.S. 470 (trans-

portation of women across state lines for non- com-

‘mercial immoral purposes); United States v. ‘South-

Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (insurance |

transactions, including transactions and communica-

tions between local agents and their out-of-state home

offices). : ,

48

4. The reasoning belqw is ‘ale. inconsistent with :

Allstate Construction Co. v. Dur kin, 345 U.S. 13, since

the preparation of plans and specifications specifically

for use in the improvement of interstate facilities can-

not be distinguished from the preparation of road ma-

' terials for these same purposes, except on the unwar-

‘ranted assumption that thé statutory definition of

„goods“ i is limited to “‘products’’ ordinarily sold to the

public. The preparation of the plans and specifications

for a specific highway improvement project, no less than

the preparation of the road materials pursuant to those

plans and specifications, directly serves the interstate _

commerce on that highway. While the road materials

may be physically incorporated into the road, the plans a

and specifications guide and determine the execution

of the improvement in every detail (including the in-

structions and specifications for the supplies and mate-

rials to be physically incorporated in the nee

from the beginning to the end of the construction work,

and are thus equally for“ the main [interstate com-

merce] job even though preliminary to it and unseen

or nonexistent in the final product.“ Cf. Archer v.

Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F. 2d 663 (C.A. 5), at 669."

Both serve commerce and are produced specifically

and directly ‘‘for commerce”’ in the same degree.

Even if such plans and specifications are not them-

__ ‘selves goods, their preparation · is at least a closely

os related proes

or occupation directly egsential’’ to the

production of the supplies and materials for such

commerce. For there can be no question, under the

Alstate and Hempt (Thomas: v. Hempt Bros., 345 U.S.

19) decisions, that the materials and supplies en

n This statement, 3 in connection with the Fifth Cireuit’s i

holding in Archer that construction of the prefabricating plant was

“in commerce” (see supra, p. 28), . applicable here. _

for physical incorporation into the interstate Instru-

ghentalities are ‘‘goods’’ produced for commerce, and

the plans and specifications are no less closely related

or direetly essential“ to the production of these goods

than the preparation of tools, dies, designs, patterns

* or other equipment used by the purehaser in

the production of other goods for interstate commerce,

or the furnishing of gas, electricity, fuel or water for

use in the production of goods for commerce, which

| Congress has expressly recognized as closely related

and directly essential to the production of goods for

commerce within the terms of Section 3(j), as

amended in 1949. See House Conferees’ Report of the

1949 Amendments, 95 Cong. Rec. 14874, 14875;” and

Report of the Majority of Senate Conferees, 95 Cong.

Rec. 14928, 14929. See also, supra, p 32. z

un The work of employees of employers who produce or 1

_ ‘goods or facilities for customers engaged within the same State in

the production of other for interstate commerce may also be

covered as closely related directly essential to such production.

f

This would be true, example, ‘of employees engaged in the

following activities:

1. Production of tools, Jie ‘designs, patterns, machinery, ma-

chinery parts, mine props, industrial sand, or other equipment used

by purchaser in producing goods for interstate commerce. Holland

v. Amoskeog Machine Co. (44 F.Supp. 884 (D.C. N. H.)); Tormey

v. Kiekhafer Corp. (76 F.Supp. 557 (E.D. Wis.)); Walling .

Amidon (153 F. (2d) 159 (C.A. 10)); Walling v. Hamner (64

F Supp. 690 (W.D. Va.)); Roland Blectrical Co. v. Walling (326

‘U.S. 657)“ (Emphasis added.)

23 “The un —— Gass ant tie Ge.

coverage under the act of employees who repair or maintain build-

inge in which goods are produced for commerce (Kirschbaum v.

Walling, 316 U.S. 517) or who make, repair, or maintain machinery

or tools and dies used in the progiiction of gdods for commerce.

Likewise, employees of public utilities, furnishing gas, electricity or

water to firms within the State engaged in manufacturing, produc-

ing, or mining goods for commerce, will remain subject to the act.

All the employees mentioned in this paragraph are doing work that

is closely related and directly essential to the production of goods

for commerce.”

no ay

50

5. Pinailp, the Baste Cinvait’s seteniio onthe pase:

graph in the Labor Department’s Interpretative Bulle-

tin relating to employees of a local architectural firm,

(R. 1%) is misplaéed. The term local architectural

_ firm,”’ and the paragraph in the Interpretative Bulle-

tin, are patently not ve or respondents’ multi-

tate practice or of its extensive engineering operations.

The statement in the bulletin is merely a restatement

(indeed, a quotation) of legislative history from the

House Conferees’ Report on the 1949 Amendments,

~~ whieh refers only to ‘the preparation of plans for the

alteration of buildings within the state which are used

to produce goods for interstate commerece.”’ (95 Cong.

Ree. 14929, par. 5, emphasis added.) It is expressly

limited to a ‘‘lecal’’ business conducted within the con-

fines of a single state and related to interstate com-

_ meree only indirectly and remotely by resson of the

- fact that some of the local buildings for which it pre-

even sia mnaay Re —————

e commence.” This lo hasdly dausiptive of re

is not only spécifically organized so as to conduct its

operations across state lines, but is also engaged exten-

. sively in work for out-of-state projects and out-of-state =

clientele, and, in addition, engages directly. and sub-

stantially in work for the improvement and expansion

of interstate instrumentalities and facilities. The con-

tent of the term local architectural firm’’ is evident

from the other examples cited in the legislative history

‘immediately preceding and following the reference to

a local architectural firm’’—+.e., u local independent

> nursery concern” whose business might include ‘‘mow- :

ing the lawn around the plant of a customer within the

state engaged in producing goods for interstate com-

meree,’’ and u local exterminator service firm” whose

—

ee

employees work wholly within the state” serving gen-

—

“3 i a 112271

ik

— *

.

8

3

Fat

: i 10 li i

be used to produce goods for interstate commerce

The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be

‘erally buildings within the state” some of which may

(96 Cong. Ree. 14029, emphasis added).* ~~

1

1

ait l

i

1 PROJECTS FOR bm, ace. OR

ENLARGEMENT or INTERSTATE mee on

mann ee N

A — Ampcaxn Ficiirts

7 en ee ae e Gini et ta ts

= of the base motorpool and post exchange, and

extending and paving plane taxiways and parking

aprons at the Naval Air Station installation at

Oceana, Virginia, which is a naval jet base and part

of the East Ooast defense system for intercepting

enemy aircraft (Stip. R. 16a; Job No. 928, R. 25a).

Rep! eing paving between hangars at the Naval Air ;

Station at Norfolk, Virginia (Stip. R. 16a; Job No.

8581, R. 22a). It was agreed at the trial that the

Repair and alterations of hangars at the Naval Air

e e e e (2 navel jot cir bass, part

of the East Coast defense system for intercepting

enemy aireraft) (Jobs Nos. 892, 892-1; Stip. R. 16a,

Da, 23a); the. Naval Air Station in Washington,

— D. C. (Job No. 963, R. 29a, repairs to three hangars); ;

and the Naval Air Station at Norfolk, Virginia (Job

No. 901, R. 23a) (alterations to Hangars LP4 and

LPI); advance planning for runway extension,

Byrd Field (Job No. 822, R. 20a); advance planning

report for pneumatic test facility, Naval Air Station,

Norfolk, Virginia (Job No. 921, R. 25a) ; estimates for

Pinecastle Air Force Base, Florida (Job No. 833, R.

Aa); pile test, Langley Field, Virginia (Job No. 835,

55 R. Zia); estimates for Beaufort, South Carolina, Air- |

feld R. 22a) ; advance planning, Naval

Station, orfolk, va ae No. 748, R. 18a) é

53

. aa work seletiing to Fan Air nen Mary-

4. began (Job No. 869, R. Na).

— 2 SHIPYARDS

. Repeirs to buildings located at the United States

Navy Ship Yard, Portsmouth, Virginia {Job No.

948, R.28a—repairs to 10 buildings, and Job No* 952,

R. 28a—repairs to buildings) and other miscellaneous,

projects (Jobs Nos. 853 and 903; R. 21a; 23a); repairs -

to Pier 12, Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia

(Job No. 965, R. 29a); and work relating to the

‘machine shops and administrative buildings at the

Norfolk. Navy Yard and. Norfolk Naval Base, Nor-

folk, Virginia (Stip. R. 16a; Job No. 920, R. 25a).

3. Rapio AND TELEVISION Facmurries

Relocation of the Coast Guard Radio Station at

Oceana, Virginia (Job Nos. 785, 917, R. 19a, 24a).

Making the necessary site examination and preparing

the advance planning report for relocating the Coast

Guard Radio Station at Oceana, Virginia, which is a.

part of the Oceana Naval Air facility. When the

new station is completed, the old station will be

abandoned. A letter of intent to proceed with the

final plan and specifications for this project has been

‘received by appellees from the Navy (R.. 69a-70a).

Work relating to television station WAVY, Ports-

i mouth, Virginia (Job No. 754, R. 18a)..

4. TuRNPIKE AND Roap IMPROVEMENTS, Bus TERMINAL

: REPLACEMENT AND WATER anp Sewer Uriirrins |

| Road improvements, Oceana, Virginia (Job No, 911,

1 24a); Richmond Turnpike (Job No. 814, R. 20);

Old Dominion Turnpike Authority (Job No. 847, R.

21a); road survey, Columbia, North Carolina (Job a

No. 788, R. 19a). Replacement of the wares tt Bus

“)

a

\ 3

at

0

Terminal in Washington, D. C. (R. 90a). - Numerous

water and sewer designs for the Washington 2

Commission (Job Nos. 893, 893-1 through 893-3, 939

939-1 . 939-24; R. 185 28-27 ).

1

f 3 . 1

,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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