Objections of the States of California and Florida to Motion of the State of Alabama for Leave to File Complaint — Anderson v. McKay

Supreme Court brief1954

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TOPICAL INDEX _

| Statement 5 ; EE : isi 1

_ Objections A - .

‘Argument : x eC? es : : eee 2

| : ; I. |

The complaint does not state a case or controversy. within

the jurisdiction|of this Court. nyeeee 4

vy A. The consti tionality of Public Law 31, is not subject

__ to attack if this guit by Alabama 5

. 1. ° Alabama has not been ats by the Passage of

(* Public" Law 31. | .

> Alabama. dons not have ‘standing to challenge the

*t constitutionality of Public Law 31 on behalf of

_ ” her citizens ...W.. . Se gs

3. The validity of Public Law $1 isa pial and

not a justiciable question...:.. sedi 19

e alleged actions of. Texps, Louisiana, and tie

afford no basis for ,

| 1. Alabama~has no dendicig to challenge the alleged

e _ boundary claims of Texas, Louisiana, and Florida. 25

: 3 This Court shauld not entertain Alabama's request

+ for at injunction restraining Texas, Louisiana, and

- Florida from. applying their statutes to ae :

citizens”

: a. The request fos an injunction is ——— and

: . " unwarrantéd | “

b. "Wikia aisle tats shades eats 5.

ie : * lower court seoscnesesecn . — . ine Oh

4 pipe oe ae, he LR ee =

The United States is an indispensable party and has not con:

_ sented to be. suéd...... « ibcoepienionincen 34

Conefision tant PRON } Vila cece ee

‘cee 78 4

; jurisdiction Ps | =a eR

Slee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED ©

| | ot cou a > Sab

. A. Magnano Co, v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40..c0-jecccccnom Bie

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S: 227..cceccnecennns 12

Alabama Vo: Arizona, Pe re a a he i cient 29, HK, 33

Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302. U. S. 464... hiceganiccesaiocaiiaipaenioeions 12

Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 Bieta: ie es 26

Arizona v. California, 298 U, S. 558.0... ....2, 35, 36, 37, 39°

, Ashwander v. bt gress Valley ne 297 U. S. 288..:...

si : : 11, 12, 23

‘Seawies v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249... ssiahaos ReMneaonea | Bg

. Butte City Water Company v. Baker, 196 U.S. 19...._. corre . ee

be & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 G. 3. Wb 21, 22° —

\ Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 12

\Colsenae v. Miller, 307 US, 433 shinies 12

Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Miller, 283 U. S. aan coasii 12

Communications Comm'n v. N. B. C., 319 U. S. 239.0. 12

Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 Nera oe 29

~ Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S: 429....... te

Eccles v. Pebples Bank, 333 U. S. 426 Bae al oes 7 ey

Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17... 19

Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S.12.nicnnnvnnennnnnnnl2, 15, 16

Frothingham v, Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 cccsceoron 27

. Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U. S. trae ale i 12.

ws Georgia v. care tienes R. Co., ae US a

a wn2, 4, 12, 16, 17, 19, 33

Gena v. Tennesse Copper Cosipatty, 206 U. S. 230.2. . &

Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218.............. Barmy Oh

Hopkins Savings Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 8: Mean: * 3 19

sci, al Company v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 49... ssbilisaac ane

International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601........37, 39

—_— ——

Ber

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v, McGrath, 341 U. S.

423: oa cco corey *

Jones v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 707... Pas Kaen) >

| Kattsas y, Colorado, 185 U.S. 125.2. -teeenenntnnenemtengee] 1B.

Kansas 'v. United States, 204 U.S. 33) sccececencenneeneenenne 39

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337° U.S, 682--cn-- 39

" Lévitt, Albert, Ex parte,-302 U. S. 633 cccenwenniesnninnnnnrne 12

Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U; S. 70ceccceconnne 12

- Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 20eccicnennngennecngnbengende ST

Louisiana v. Juinel, 107 U. S. 711....... a, aa

Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627........... Puno a aoe 39

_ Marine Ry. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U. S.A Lica 26

Marshall Dental Manufacturing Company, v. Iowa, 226 U. S. *

AD . eB

Massachusetts y. ie 262 U. S. 447: sdancncusoee

hi. ia te 14, 15: 16, 17, 18, 19

- Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1...... sai ~26, 32, 33 |

McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458... : sei 38

_ Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326, U. S. a7. =< 9

Minnesota v. United Stites, 305 U. S. 382 Reena ee 37, 38

Mtissouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416....j-00cinensecenscseeens 17, 18, 19

- Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 jeiaekc aa

_ Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. Ss. Eales REE Sas

Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 480 —eeesnceeectenneenintemmeeicene 38

Nashville, C. & Sty L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. IDS Ei

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 V. S. 589 eee

New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U;.S. 328... 2 48

New Mexico v. Lane, 243'U. S. 52... pbeaalg te laais

New York v. Illinois, 274 Uy S. 488...... ics 1:

New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296.20.....cccccccssessssseee aes

North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365..0c0-cnscscnesecon 2

Oklahoma v. United States Civ. Shes: Clin: 330 U. S. 17.12

Public Law (834 Cong., 1st Sess, G7 Stat. 29)...

Public Law 31: °

" iv.

PAGE

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 a:

Perkins v. Lukens “Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 4,12, 27.

_ Peru, Ex parte, 318 U. S. 578. seine 21

Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. eee *

Smoot Sand. & Gravel Coip. v. Washington Airport, 283 U:

3s 6: hes 26

Stark v. Wickard, 321 1U. S. 288 12, 27

Tennessee Power Co. v. T. V. A., 306 U. S. 118. 2 ee 12

__ Texas v. Interstate Commerce Coeeedlet, 258 U. S. 158... re + ys

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385- “aS 31, ad

_ Tyler-v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405... 11

United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1. ponies : :

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. w oe

United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16 secant: SP

United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707........ caine

United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. Mm aR.

‘Uni ‘States v. Wyoming, 331 U. S. 440 sieniteceece cme aa

* United States v. Wyoming, 335. U. S. 895...........: 20

Western Pacific Cal. R. Ge. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U. S. 47.. 12 :

_ Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78... 7 “12

Willing v. Chicago Auditorium, ce U.S 274... Z M2

S, STATUTES. —

2, 4,6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 23, 24; 25, 34

Sec. 2(b) —~ a ,

Sec. 3(a) i : . . 5,

Sec: 3(b)(3)_ .....---- a iid

Sec. 4 Reena ,

MG cemeniceententaecebie . case

Public Law 212 (83 Cong., Ist Sess., 67 Stat. 462)... “a

mnoan

¥.

: ee PAGE

Public Law 212: Sean ee :

Se Ee : RRC aOR,

Sec. 4(8) -neeeenn- iaceek nasi 25

es. hss | me

mS: | eis a ae

Sec. 9 ...... ; dee mone

Public Law 887 (July 2, 1948) chedistenadininctonsie 20.

United States Code Annotated; Title 43, Sess. 961-982, anno..... 24

United States. i care. Art. IV, Sec. 3, Clause 2..............:.. 19

% ‘

) ‘MISCELLANEOUS 5

Carson, The Sea Around Us, p. 188 (1951) ......-..scccsscssssessseees ieee

99 Congressional Record, pp. 2716, 2717, 2728, 2797 ..20........... 10

99 Congressional Record, p. 4330 .2.00...:.:ccccsesccconeessesseeese: Sinceailisie:

"9 Congressional Record, pp. 4628, 4629.....cccccnccecsssnsssessnssesee 9°

99 Congressional Record, p. 4646.00... sales oa

99 Congressional Record, pp. 5065-5066 : ccsnvegecnne

Executive Order 9633. ee

10 Federal Register, p. 12305 ) < 25

15 Federal Register, p, 8835... | — dake:

House Report 4198. : oa

Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, ‘Sept. ~ 1945 (59 Stat.

> 884) . 25

Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, Sept. 2, 1945 (59 Stat.

885) . * 25

Report of the Director of the Buresn of Land Managemeitt, De- ‘

_ partment of the Interior (1952), p. 136... ‘dese 24

Report of National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands Ca-

_ pacity, p. 22 (May 28, 1953) SS HEE SEE 5 ES SSP IOS Re 8

Senate Hearings on S-1901, 83d Cong., Ist. Sess. Pp. 579-581". 21

Senate Joint Report No. 133 (S. J. Res. 13, 83d Cong, 1st

- Sess., p. 7) see we

United states Supreme Court Bulletin (1953-1954), i Wiis a

Sqm Cu te Ud Sats

October. Term, 1953 -

NO. onssneseneers » Original

4 eam sommes

. STATE OF ALABAMA,

ee Complainant,

' vs. cf

Strate or. Texas, State oF Louisiana, STATE oF Fior-

mA, StaTe oF Cauirornia, Geonce M. Humpueey,

Dovcias, McKay, Rosert B. Anperson, Ivy Baker .

Prikst,

“Objections of the States of California and Floride to

adothan of sin Ghats of Aiithanas the Saane ey

On September 26, 1953, the State of Alabama ied |

with this Court « motion for leave to file a complaint age

against the States of Texas, Louisiana, Florida, and Cali-

fornia and George M. Humphrey, Douglas McKayy Rob-

ert B. Anderson, and Ivy Baker Priest. The motion was .

accompanied by 2 supporting briei and a copy of the

proposed complaint. In the complaint, Alabama prayed

for a declaration that Public Law 31, 83d Cong., Ist Sess,

67 Stat. 29, is unconstitutional and void, and for an in-

diction in offchore waters, restraining the individual

“defendants from sing. in euch assertions, and re-

straining the individual defem from making pay

"ment of certain funds to the defendant States. “

a Subsequently defendants filed motions for leaye to file

objections to Alabama's motion for leave to file a com-

piaint. On October 26, 1953, this Court granted de-

fendants’ motions and allowed 40 duye for the filing of

_ Cbjections. 1953-54 U. S. Sup. Cr. Bull. 34.

| The following objections are presented jointly by Cali-

fornia and Florida, These objections are directed solely

to Alabama’s motion for leave to file a complaint and are

limited to jurisdictional arguments which make it “plain

that no retief amy be granted in th: exercise of the origi-

nal jurisdiction of this Court.” Georyia «. Peuneylvania -

R.Co., 324. U. S. 499, 448\(1948) ; Arisone ». California,

| 298 U.S. 558, 599° (1996). For that reason, no argu-

~ taent-on the merits is being submitted et this time: = = —

~~;

le on

1. ‘The complaint does not state a case or contro-

versy within the jurisdiction of this Court in that: . |

(a) Alabama ‘has not been injured by the passage

of Piblic Law 31. ee

-, (b) Alabama does not have standing to challenge

- the constitutionality of Public Law 31 on behalf of

(¢) The validity’ of Public Law 31 is-a political

and not a justiciable question.

(d) Alabama has no standing to challenge the al-

a ee ee ae

| ae Alabama's request for an injunction restrain-

ing Texas, Louisiana, and Florida from applying

their statutes to Alabania citisens is premature and

+. "2

oa -

is Mien dine ten ao teins on

a ae 6 ot aeay 0 tm at _

—_

The Complaint Does Not State atCase or Controversy

_ Within the Jurisdiction of This Court. ag

The original jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised

only in “cases” and “controversies” within the confines

_ Of judicial power granted by the Constitution. It is not

"-\_¢nough that a State is a party. United States v.. West

Virginia, 295 U: S. 463, 470-471 (1935); Georgia v.

Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 445-446 (1945)...

This jurisdictional requirement rests, not upon a “mere

formality,” but rather “upon reasons deeply rooted in

the constitutional divisions of authority in our system

of Government.” Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S.

113, 132 (1940). In this brief, ee es Paste

will show that, measured by the long established rules of

this Court for determining the existence of a “justiciable

a See eee ee

shore, = ia

3 ‘The tet cadeit ot hlahama's ‘amelatat te to stack

the constitutionality of an: Act of Congress, namely, Public

Law’ 31, enacted May 22, 953,67 Stat. 29. Alabama's

other arguments appear to be “makeweights” advanced

im an attempt to satisfy the Court’s jurisdictional require-

ments and thereby bring this constitutional question be-

fore the Court. These other arguments will be consid-

ered in due course, but attention is first directed ‘to the

challenge to the validity of Public Law 31.

Alabama, exactly alike. Section 3(a) of

Ss Ne

kf Ths Conetiantionatity of Public Law 31 Is\ fier Subject

to Attack in This Suit by Alabama,

1. ALABAMA Has Not BEEN INJURED BY this F PASSAGE

or Pustic Law 3]. | ,

Public Law 31 treats all forty-eight Stat , including

t Act de-

_ Clares that ownership and management of the “lands be-

neath navigable waters within the boundaries of the re-

' spective States” are confirmed and vested in said States. -

The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs hss as which —

was principally responsible for draftiiig the provisions

of the bill which was finally enacted,’ emphasized this,

equality of treatment in its Report, as follows

“The joint resolution treats all of the States alike,

both inland and coastal, with respect to lands\benéath _

_ navigable waters within their respective boundaries.”

Report_No, 133 to accompany S. J. Res. 3, 83d

Cong. 1 Ist Sess. p. 7.

“With respect to the seaward boundary of coastal ae

g Public Law 31 treats Afabama,gs well as or better than

other coastal States. Under Section 4 of the Act, the

seaward boundary of each coastal State is either con-

firmed as being three geographical miles from her coast

Tine, or thesState is authorized to extend her boundary

OS Gees, Citas. woe

ie:

sions shall not prejudice the “existence nal any State’s

seaward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it

was so provided by its constitution or laws prior’ to: or

at the time such State became a member of the Union,

or if it-has been heretofore approved by Congress.” This

provision, however, is qualified by Section 2(b), which

states that “in no event shall the term ‘boundaries’ or

the term ‘lands. beneath navigable waters’ be interpreted

as extending from the coast line more than three. “ffeo-

_ graphical miles into-the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific

Ocean, or more than three marine oe can into the Gulf

\ of Mexico. se

The effect of these statutory provisions “on “Alabama

can be summarized. as follows: Like all other States,

Alabama’ s ownership and management of all lands beneath

navigable waters within her boundaries is confirmed and

established. Alabama’s seaward boundary is confirmed

as being at least, three miles from- her coast "line. If,

Alabama or any other Gulf State has a claim that her

historic coastal boundary if farther than three’ miles,

seaward, the Act does not prejudice’ the claim. At the

same time, the Act does not ratify or in any way deter-

mjne the merits of any such claims beyond three miles.

The net result is that Alabama has been benefited, and

__ eertafaly not injured, by the passage of Public Law 31,°

Ce rem e

“it is. apparent that this provision differentiates between States

betterieg oH te Gulf and States bordering on the. Atlantic or

Pacific

s. Without going into the valid reasons for this dif-

ferentiation, it is enough to point out that Alabama, as a State bor-

dering on the Gulf, if, is in n> position to complain of this provision:

®Since the actual result of Public Law 31 is to benefit

, Alabama,

there ie no subetance to Alshems’s vague suggestion (Br. p. 18)

that Public Law 31 in effect “ her sovereignty.

ae aa att

. * Yet Alabama argues, in the face of these clear statutory

: ‘provisions, that Public Law 31 deprives her of important

rights. Alabarga recognizes that like other coastal States

she has been granted ownership and management of the

_ area three miles seaward from her coast line. .But Alabama

‘complains (Br. pp. 61-63) that her three-mile belt is n¢&

as valuable as those of other States and, in particular,

_ that no oil has yet been-discovered in Alabama waters.

This. circumstance, she contends, vier, the “equal

footing’ ” clause.

That this argument misconceives the effect of the

“equal footing” clause is shown by the following state-

ment of this Court in United States v. Texas; $39 U.S.”

— 707, 716 (1950): ,

"The ‘equal footing’ clause has ice been held to

refer to political righ and to sovereignty. See

Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 245. It does

not, of course, include economic ‘stature or standing.

There has never been equality among the States in

‘that sense . . . Area, location, geology, and lati-

tude have created great diversity in the economic

aspects of the several States. The requirement of

equal, footing was designed not to wipe out those

diversities but to create parity as respects , political

snnting ye a :

“| This i makes it clear” that the clause — not

| guarantee that the property owned by Alabama shall be

equal in “economic stature or standing” to that held by

other States. Area, location, geology, or latitude may have

created ‘diversities between the value of the resources id

Alabama’s three-mile belt and those of other States, but

the equal footing clause was not designed to, and could

not, wipe out. those. diversities.’

> . pet ie i

Nothing in the Texus case affords support for Ala-

lated because tl the resources of her three-mile belt are .

less valuable than those of other States. There was no

suggestion that if the coastal States are permitted to

hold a portion of the offshore area, the area each State

holds must have resources of equal character and value.

Alabama’s argument that the value of her three-mile

belt is “highly speculative” (Br. p. 63) points up the

fallacy of her contention, The ultimate value > of all the

offshore areas~is indeed _hi ative. Scientists

| and engineers are in agreement that these areas are‘ only

in-their earliest stage of development.‘ Thirty years ago,

California’s three-mile belt may well have been worth

less than the shrimp beds in Alabama’s offshore waters.

If, at present, Alabama’ regards her three-mile belt as

less valuable than: those of- other States, this situation

could at any time be reversed by the discovery of minerals

. or other valuable substances in Alabama’s offshore waters.

In connection, with her argument based on the equal

footing clause, Alabama also objects to the return to

California, Texas, and Louisiana under Section 3(b) (3)

of the Act of rents and royalties which have been. im-

pounded or held in escrow since the decisions of this

Court (Br. p: 7). This objection overlooks the nature

of such funds. The impounded rents and royalties were

derived from lands beneath navigable waters within the

“Carson, The Sea Around Us, 188 et seq. (1951); Statement of

: Dr. Harold F. Clark, Professor i ‘Charge of Educational Econom-

_ jes at Columbia University, Hedrings before Senate Interior and

‘Insular Affairs Committee on S. J. Res. 13 and. other Bills, on

Cong., Ist Bess., 354 et 59 Rep. Pye Petroleum Council,

' merged Lands Capacity, 22 (May, 28 dares

_ boundaries of the States. They accrued because both the

_ United States and the States concerned recognized the

* vital importance of continued: oil production and urged

the-holders of State-issued leases to maintain their oper-

ations pending the resolution of the offshore controversy.*

If the oil on which the royalties were paid had remained

in the ground, its ownership and control would have been

vested and confirmed in the coastal States by Séction

3(a) of Public Law 31. Thug it was appropriate and

fair for Congress to turn the- “escrow” funds derived

from the areas within State boundaries over to the respec-

tive States. That Congress so viewed the nature of these

_ funds is shown by the following reply of Senator Spessard

Holland, a chief sponsor of the bill, to Senator Estes

Kefauver : | ’

“The reason for my calling, attention to it at this

time is that all these stipulations show that the Sena-

‘tor was exactly right in the use of the word ‘escrow’ ©

as applied to these funds, because the funds were

‘ neither the property of the United States nor of the

State of alifornia, but were, instead, put up in ,

lieu of the oil which was taken from the ground, in

order to be available to carry out any final decision

which was made with respect to this controversy.”

. * 99 Cong. Rec. 4330. See also 99 Cong. Rec. 4628,

4629.

’The Stipulafion between the United States and the State of

California, entered into. on July 26, 1947, and thereafter revised

and extended, was designed “to insure the production of

gas necessary to meet the critical need now existing” and i

to remain in effect until ' t legislation is enacted by the

Congress.” The Notice of the Secretary of the Interior dated

Dec. 11, 1950, as thereafter revised and extended, stated that “un-

due interruption of the present operations in the Gulf of Mexico

would involve the risk of injury to our national security and

economy. IS F. R. 8855. )

—A0— :

| Alibbmna also. Yanplies (Br. Pp 63) that Public Law 31

infringes her “rights” by unconstitutiohally authoriziag.

A; Texas, Louisiana, :and Florida. to’ extend ‘their boundaries

nine nautical miles into ‘the Gulf of Mexico.: However,

both, the Act and its legislative history emphatically show

that there As no warrant for such an argument. ,

“Section 4 of the Act authorizes any coastal State which.

has not. done so to extend her, seaward: besmoeutd se ae

line three miles from her coast line. But ‘neither Section Ss

4.nor any other part of the Act authorizes a State to

extend her boundary beyond three miles, ar grants new _

territory beyond that distance that was not within a

State's historic legal boundary prior to the Act. If. a

Gulf State has a claim that her historic legal boundary

is. aetually more than three miles seaward, the, Act does

not ratify or in any way determine the merits of that.

claim.- Indeed, the debate in the Senate makes it clear

- that it was the firm purpose of ‘Congress neither to

_ | prejudice nor to aid the proof of such claims. 99 Cong.

“. Réc. 2716, 27 17, 2728, 2797.° Consequently, there is no

_ support for ‘Alabama’ s repeated assertions that the claims

of certain — States td boundaries extending nine nauti-

’

; eSpasabe Gui Condens’ Floor Masgger of the Bil, stated : “The

States of the. United. States -have legal boundaries . . . When-

ever’ a question arises as to-a boundary, it will be determined ex-

ee actly as any other question in law is determined, and the boundary

' will be established. The pendirig measure does not seek to preju- .

dice that issue, or to determine it.” 99 Cong. Rec. 2716.

tee ie Wee ce ——~

cal miles into the Gulf, of Mexico are made “under color

of. Public Law Cg min ate ye Rates ‘hot

‘

_. The sum. of the matter is’ that the, passage of. Public

: oo 31 results in no injury to Alabama. This fact brings

Alabama’ s ‘complaint squarely within the well-settled prin- °. -

3 ciple that the Court “will not pass upon the validity of a

statute upon complaint of. one. who fails to show that he -

is injured by its operations.” Concurring’ opinion of

Mr. Justice Brandeis in Ashwander, v: Tennessee V alley 5

Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347-348 (1935); “Tyler v.

Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 410 -

( 0) 5" see Barrows. v. "Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255 -

2 (1953), seer eeY ee :

_ The leading case in which the Coals has. refused’ to

exercise the original jurisdiction on this ground is Massa-

_ chuseits v. Melloh, 262 U. S. 447. (1923). There the -

-conttitutionality of the Maternity Act of November 23,

1921, was. assailed on the ground that it: invaded and

usurped the rights and powers of -Massachusetts as a

sovereign State and’ of its citizens. Upon analyzing the

statute, however, the Court found that no legal Tights

* ‘Even if Public Law 31 had. sotigad @ claims to submerged lands.

~ more than threé miles from the coast line (which it did not); there

would be no basis for an exercise of the original jurisdiction. As

pointed out at pages 19-24, infra, the validity of provision’

granting offshore lands, to the States is a political and not a jus-

ticiable question. Moreover, as: we show at pages 25-28, infra;

the area seaward of a State’s legal boundary is an exclusively

Federal area, and invalid assertions in that area could injure only

the United States and not any individual State.

of the State were adversely affected: by its operation.

Therefore, the Court dismissed the action, holding’

“No rights of the State falling within the scope

_ of the judicial power have been brought within the

- getual or threatened operation of the statute, and

. this court is as much _without authority to pass ab-,

stract opinions upon the constitutionality of acts of.

Congress as it was held to be, in Cherokee Nation

v. Georgia, supra, of state statutes.” e U. S. at

4852,

-*The’ authority . of this ‘case, which is relied on extensively

‘throughout | this brief, has not~been questioned since it was ‘ren-

dered in 1923. On the contrary it has been followed or cited

with approval more than twenty. times by this Court. Barrows v.

Jackson, 346 . S. 249, 255 (1953) ; ‘Deva v. Board of Educa-

tion, 342 Y. S. 429, 433 (1952) (and see dissenting qpinion at.

435) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee-—Committee v. McGrath, 341 -

U. S. 123, 151 (concurring opinion); Oklahoma v. U. S.. Civ.

Serv. Comm., 330 U. S. 127, 139 (1947) foo 1 case distin- —

guished ) ; Gange Lumber Co, v.. Rowley, * S. 295,- 305

#1945) i Sears Vv, Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 445-446

(1945) (p principal case distinguished) ; Jones v. Bowles, 322 U.

Lge eeedt Seay, Coun opinion) ; Stark v, Wickard,

321 Uz (1944) ; Communications Comm'n v. N.BC.,

319 U. ¢ 239; x6 (1943) ( os opinion) ; Singer &- Sons

v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. 295, 303 (1940); Perkins-v.

Lukens-Steel Co., 310 U. S. fred 125 (1940) ; Coleman v. Miner,

807 VU. S.. 433, 440’ (1939): Piny 4. 7a =.

' nessee Power Co. v. T.V.A., seu 118 17 (1 39) ;

Albert Lévitt, 32 U. S. 633, 634 (1937) ; Alabuma Power ;.

Ickes, W2 U. S. 464, 478 (1938) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hamarth;

300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937) ; Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297: U.’S: 288, .

- 348 ot (Brandeis, . concurring); Unsted States v. Butler,

297 U.S

Federal Seip . & Loan Assn. v. , 296 U. ae 315... 1" €1935)

fs pal case distinguished ) ;, 4. Co: v. Hamilton, 292 |

(1934) ; ay ct C. & St. LR. Co. v. Wallace,

us. 9 261 (1933) incipal case distinguished) ; Cham-

‘lin Rig. Co. v. Commission, 4 U. S. 210, 238 (1932) ; W estern

Pacific Cal R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 ve S. 47, 51 (1931) ;

Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. a 283 U.. S. 96 100 (1931) ;

Williams v. Riley, 280 U. 5. Mg (1929) ; Willing v. Chicago

Auditorium, 277 os. 274, 289 (1928) (princi case distin-

guished); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. ~ in

(1927) ; Florida’ v- Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 18 (1927); N.

Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 334 (1926).

7, 73 (1936) (principal’case distinguished) ; Hopkins

The same rule applies in the converge factual situation

presented by Alabama’s complaint. Alabama challenges

the constitutionality of Public Law 31 on the ground that

F it oS in the respective States certain rights and: powers

3 which Alabama says should properly be reserved to the ©

Federal Government. ’ But the legal rights. of Afabama

are not injured by the operation of the statute. As a

result, this Court is as much without authority to pass an

abstract opinion as it was in M assachusetts Vv. M ellon.

_ New Jersey v. ssl 269 U, S. 328 (1926), is equally

pertinent. There an action by New Jersey seeking to.

question the constituti nality of the Fedefal Water Power

Act of June 10, 1920, was dismissed because of. the failure

of the State to show that it had. suffered any injury.

The Court said: >

“On reading the present. bill. -we-aré- brought to-

3 the conclusion, first, that its real purnose is to obtain

a judicial declaration that, in making certain parts —

of the Federal Water Power Act applicable to waters

within and bordering on the State of New Jersey, —

Congress exceeded its own authority and encroached

‘on that of the State, and secondly, that the bill does

not show that any right of the Stace, which in itself

is an appropriate subject of judicial cognizance, is

being, or about to be, affected prejudicidlly by the

- application or enforcement of the Act.” 269.U. S.

at 3345 3 K:

Likewise in Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission,

258 U. S. 158, 162 (1922), the Court: refused to pass on

“an abstract question of legislative power” where there

had been no showing that the complainant’s rights “are

being, or about to be, affected prejudicially by: the applica-

tion or cngeone. st of the statute invoived. | This prin-

: | , a ° 3

ciple was also applied i in United States v..West Virginia,

295 U. S. 463, 473-474 (1935). and New, York v. iiieets,

274 U. S. 488, 490 (1927).°

| Applied to the Alabama complaint, these cases indicate

tHat this Court should. refuse to take jurisdiction of the

_ State’s attack on Public Law 31. Since the legal interests

of Alabama are not injured but in fact are benefited by

the operation of the statute,’the request of Alabama for

4 declaration as to the constitutionality of the Act should

be denied. To rerder such a declaration would be to pass

on an abstract question of legislative power. |

2. Arapama Dogs Not Have STANDING TO CHALLENGE

THE CoNSTITUTIONALITY oF PuBLic Law: 31 on BE-

HALF OF HER CITIZENS.

‘The ‘argument in the preceding section showtiig that

Alabama has not been injured by the passage of Public

Law 31, of course applies equally to citizens of Alabama.

However, even if it be assumed for the purpose of argu-

ment that Alabama citizens have been injured by the Act,

the State of Alabama does not: have standing to represent

her citizens in attacking: the “constitutionality of the Act.

This fact is ‘conclusively ceetene by prior decisions of —

this Court 5 7 .

_*Alabara a to recognize this principle, for, in apt

assachusetts v.. Mellon, Alabama says. = Pp. 36)

‘ that this Court refused to permit Massachusetts to sue }

7 p. 35.) The te & tue bale for, as we have shown,

_ Alabama like the other\forty-seven States has been granted owner-

ship of all lands beneath navigable waters

Moreover, the provisions of the Act regarding her seaward bound-

| ary aré at least as favorable as those relating to “bay:

ees.“

egg 2 ;

ee °.

| ¢

: i" ‘

; : .

t :

: -

4 -< e

: .

$ € e ™\o -.

In Mussachusstts v. Mellon, supra, ‘the State sought to |

assail the constitutionality of the Maternity. Act as a

> “representative of its citizens.” 262 U. S. at 485. This

+ ‘

Court held that a State did not have standing as parens

patriae to challenge the, es. of that Federal statute,

ida :

ges While the State, \under some circum-

stances, may sue in that capacity forthe protection

of its citizens (Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, °

241), it is no part of its duty or power to enforce

_ their rights in respect of their relations with the

Federal Government. In that field it is the United

States, and not the State, which represents them as _

parens patriae, when such representation becomes ap- -

propriate; and to the former, and not to the latter,

they must look for such protective measures as flow

from that status. ” 262 U: S. at 485-486."* 7

This pgjnciple was: applied and reiterated less than four

years later in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1927).

: There, this Court refused to permit the State of Florida to

challenge as a representative of her citizens the constitu-

tionality of the Federal cap apoce ee Una The Court

art

| iter tak tee to be socetnindd Whe site be

cause of any injury to its citizens. They are also

citizens-of the United States and subject to its laws.

In respect, of their relations with the federal govern-

ment ‘it is the United States, and not the State,

- which fepresents them as parens patriae, when such

-fepresentation becomes appropriate; and to the for-

“ta, sei ot fo he-lapter, they emuat look for ack

) -.

‘ oe

See iiitiesie 8, supra.

—16—

| protective measures as flow from that status.’ Massa-

chusetts v. Mellon, supra, PP. 485-486." as U.

Sat 18.

The continuing vitality J this orticigte is clearly

on by Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. |

S. 439 (1945), which has been much relied upon by Ala-

partes In setting forth the categories of cases not within

its original jurisdiction, the Court said :

“_. .. Moreover, Massachusetts v. Mellon and -

Florida v. Mellon, supra, make plain that the United

States, not the State, represents the citizens as parens ,

patriae in their relations to the federal atures ee

324 U. S. at 446.

The Court then distinguished the case bilan: it by

saying:

“The present controversy, iiver. Seed not fall

Pe within any of those categories, _This is a civil, not

—— a criminal proceeding. Nor is this a situation where

the United States rather than Georgia stands as

parens patriae to the Citizens of Georgia. This is not -

a suit like those 'in Massachusetts v. Mellon, and Flor-

ida v. Mellon, supra, where a State sought to protect |

her citizens from the operation of federal statutes.

Here Georgia asserts rights based on the anti-trust

laws.” 324 U. S. at 446-447. en

“The salt by Abstons cn ball of ter citieus falls

‘squarely within the principle enunciated by these cases.

In contrast to Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., where a

- State in effect sued under and by virtue of a Federal

statute, Alabama’s attack on Public Law 31 this _

suit one in which, as in Massachusetts v. M on and

Florida #. Mellon, supra, a State seeks to protect her

citizens from the operation of a ‘Federal statute. As -

| —17— eee |

those cases indicate, this is a situation involving the rela-

tions of citizens of’ Alabama to the Federal Government

~ \where the United States-rather than Alabama stands as

perens patriac. In this situation, the citizens of Alabama

aumt louls.to the United States. and not.to the State fer

~ protective measures. “ | ~

Alabama’s attempt to escape the application of this prin-

_ Ciple is not persuasive. The attempted distinction (Br.

pp. 34-37) of Massachusetts v. Mellon relates largely to

Massachusetts’ suit in her own behalf as a ‘sovereign State

and does not detract from. the holding that with regard

to relations with: the Federal Government, the United

States and not the State represents the citizens as parens

patriae." The reliance on Georgia v. Penssylvania R.

Co. is misplaced because, as the Court said, Georgia 7

| sought to protect its citizens from a price fixing. con-

Spiracy by asserting rights “based qh federal laws” (324

_ U.S. at 447), whereas Alabama, ete ctl eh, opt /

to invalidate a Federal statute.

Nor is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920),

" properly cited in support of Alabama’s position. That

case arose from: the enforcement in Missouri of a Federal

lying

There-.

Holland, nor any of the cases

- cited therein, is authority for the proposition that a State

Congress respecting Federal lands and re

State were directly affected.”

issouri v.

(262 VU. S. at. 482.

-_- @mough that the bill is a_reasonable and proper means to

Missouri v. Holland on the ground that it involved “the .

quasi sovereign right of the state to regulate the taking —

in support of this terse statement shows that in each of

them, as in Missouri v. Holland, natural resources within’

has standing as quasi sovereign to question an act of

opinion in Massachusetts v. Mellon expressly distinguished

fore, neither

. -

Se ee © ete

is. added. ) :

yineagyaye

See oi

psi

| ee es al

| Alahema also places reliance (Br. pp. 39-40) upon Hop-

kins Savings Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315 (1935).

However, the Court expressly recognized the validity of

the Massachusetts case and based its decision authorizing

Wisconsin to sue on the special relationship between the

| ene S| The Court said:

- . + The ruling [in Massachusetts v. Mellon).

was that it was no part of the duty or power of

__a@ state to_enforce the_rights_of -its-citizens in respect -——-

. of their relatiogg to the Federal Government. Cf.

Florida v. Melion, 273 U.S. 12. Here, on the con-

trary, the state becomes a suitor to protect the inter-

ests of its citizens-against the unlawful acts of cor-

Se S. at

‘The fact that such cases as Missouri v. Holland and Hop-

kins Savings Assn. v. Cleary do not qualify Messachu-

setts v. Mellon is shown by this Court's emphatic restate-

- ment in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. of the principle -

_ that the United States, not a State, represents citizens

im their relations to the Federal Government. 324 U.

S.at 46. |

5. Ran Velaeied an Petins Kiak hie Pansoese

anb Not a JusrictasLe Question. eae

Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution

vests in Congress — “Power to dispose of and make ail

needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or

‘other Property belonging to the United States,” This

mart ‘has explicitly held that Congress, in exercising its

powers over Government property, is not subject to judi-

cial interference». Federal, Power Commission v. Idaho

Power Co., 344 U. S.-42,_21 (1952); United States v.

MESES aes : ttt

San Francisco, so v. S. 16, 29-30 (1940). In the Son

Francisco case, the Court ‘said:

“. . . The fowerover the public land thus en-

trusted-to Congress is without limitations. ‘And it

is not for the courts to say how that trust shall. be

administered. That is for Congress to determine.’

Thus, Congress may constitutionally limit the dis-

position of the public domain to a manner consistent —

with” its views of st el 310 UL S. vat

29-30. |

ila iis Gene: ak Cease te gum quent °

‘States is/ilustrated by the action of this Court in con-

nection United States v. Wyoming, 331 U. S. 440

(1947). That case involved a suit b) the United States

against Wyoming and its lessee, Ohio Oil Company, in

which-the Federal Government claimed ownership of land

which Wyoming had leased in the belief that it was State

school land. The unanimous decision of the Court in 1947

upheld the contentions of the United States but retained

jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the amount

of damages due from the defendants.

: Thereafter Congress passed Public Law 887 of July

2, 1948, which directed the Secretary of the Interior to

issue to the State a patent, antedated to- july 10, 1890,

the oil-producing portion of the property.

thereafter, this Court ruled that there was no

need to consider the United States’ claim for dam- |

of Congress to grant this Federal property to Wyoming.

335 U. S. 895-896 (1948). Implicit in the Court’s rul-

ing was the principle that Congressional action in dispos-

ing of Federal property is not open“to judicial inquiry.

—2l—

. It is true, of course, that- the offshore lands involved —

here have a special status. In 1947, the Solicitor of the

Interior Department ruled, with the concurrence of the

Attorney General, that although the Federal Government

<}as paramount rights in the offshore submerged lands

under the decision in the Californi , such lands do not -

fall into the category of “ lands.”"™ Moreover,

__this Court ized in the California case that actions

taken in the offshore ®aters involve—foreign relations."*

332 U. S. at 35.

Sicsiic, tk social sinnen of theses Oitiltore binds only

_ serves to emphasize that the rule against judicial inter-

“ference is especially applicable to the actions of Congress

and the President in this case. It is a well-settled prin-

ciple that, the actions of our political agencies in thé ‘field

of foreign affairs are not subject to!review in this Court.

United States. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 3044,

319-321 (1936); Ex porte P. , 318 U. S. 578 (1943).

In C7& S. Air Lines v. Wetermon Corp, 333 U. S. 103 |

(1948), the Court said that _— in the field of

ated | |

the Judiciary has neither aptitude, Yacilities nor re}.

"sponsibility and which has long’ been held to belong

in the domain of political power not subject to judicial

intrusion of inquiry.” _ 333 3 U. S. at Ut.

In view of the general vale as to the ‘dessa ai az tox |

ernment property and having in mind the special status

of the property here involved, it seems clear that the,

action of the political-agencies in vesting. ownership and_

- management of the lands involved here in the respective

States is not open to review. In addition to the above cited.

precedents, this Court’s’ decision in the California case

also provides strong support for this view. In that case,

the Court, aftér noting the general rule +imt the power

of Congress to dispose of Federal property is “without

limitation,” said with reference to the offshore lands:

. “Thus neither the courts nor the exectitive’agencies could

proceed cofttragy to an Act of Congress in this congres-

sional area:of national power.” 332 U. S. at 27. Ala-

bama’s insistence (Br. pp. 47-48) that this statement be

limited tog context relating to the power of the Attorney :

General to commence actions on behalf pf the United

_ States cannot overcome this Court’s emphatic statement

that the ofshore lands are a “congressional area of

national power.” 5

In stating the question hadore it in the Galifornis case

. this Court gave ful} recognition to the fact that develop-

ment of the marginal belt would have to be delegated to

some agency. [he Court said, “our question is whether

itie state or the Federal Government has the pa

right and power to determine in the first instance when,

how, and by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil |

and other resources of the svil of the marginal sea, known.

or hereafter discovered, may be exploited.” 332 U. S.

at 29. Mofeover, the Court also speaks of a “congres-

wee eh >»

a ¢

-—23—

| _ sional surrender of title or interest” in a manner that

indicates that the authority for such action is unques- .

tioned. 332 U. S. at 39. | |

The conclusiveness of the actions of the political

agencies in the offshore waters is also shown by the

Court’s reference to this nation’s establishment of a three-

mile marginal belt. The Court said: -

. “. , . That the political agencies of this nation

both claim and exercise broad dominion and control _

over our three-mile marginal belt is now a settled

fact. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S..

100, 122-124. And this assertion of national domin-

‘jon over the three-mile belt is binding upon this

Court.” 332 U. S. at 33-34. )

Be Wee heh Weep men oh TH Rly

ee one ee

ELAINE ATE Oe Rae NRRHSEE Alen te! GARSON MAI fi IRE RE AE RN. ome Nee

—24—

Alabama's approving Tae (Br. p.- 56) to the

‘swamp land grants provides -an illustration of this. broad

- and binding power of Congress in disposing of Federal

‘ property. Only fifteen § States have received swamp land

grants, and Alabama is ee of them, having received

nearly a, half million acres."* Thus, not only do such

grants fail to give each State resources equal in char-

2cter and value, but ‘the majority of States have received

" ocheing a aa Yet these grants are of unquestioned valid-

ity." They provide firm precedents! for the action of

Congress in passing Public Law 31, which vests in all the

States ownership and management of the lands beneath

navigable waters within their boundaries.

B. The Alleged Actions of Texas, Louisiana, and Florida

Afford No Basis for an Buercise of “This Court's Orig- |

inal Jurisdi

In the preceding sections it has been demonstrated that

* Alabama’s complaint fails to state a justiciable case or

_ controversy with respect to Public Law 31.. In that con-

nection we have shown (p. 10, supra) that there is no

basis for Alabama’s statements that the boundary claims .

. of Texas, Louisiana, and Florida i in the area between ‘three

and nine nautical miles off shore have been made “under

color of Public Law 31.” ‘In this\section we will first

consider the boundary claims bein, made by Texas,

Louisiana, and Florida, independently of Public Law 31.

Terentia we will consider the actions which those three

States are alleged to be taking and threatening in the

J _— waters against Alabama citizens. fit

191952 Report of the Director of the Bureau/of Land sine

ment, Department of the Interiog, p. 136.

17See annotation in 43 U. S Be As wee a Ris

: ies Tol .

—25—-

.1. Arapama-Has No STAnpING. To CHALLENGE THE

°. ALLecep Bounpary Ciaims oF TExas, LOUISIANA,

\ AND FLorRIDA. na

The submerged offshore lands outside historic . State

boundaries constitute an exclusively Federal area. This is

_ established by Public Law 212, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 67

Stat. 462 (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act). This

Act provides in Section 4(a) that the Constitution and

Federal laws are to apply to the subsoil and sea-bed. out-

side State boundaries” to the same extent as if it “were

an afta of exclusive Federal jurisdiction.”” Under the .

Act the leasing and administration of this offshore’ area:

are delegated tothe Secretary of the {nterior ( Sections

5 and 8), and all the revenues theyefrom go, into the

Federal treasury (Section 9).

- Even before the passage of Public Law 212, it was

clear that the submerged land outside State jurisdiction

was a Federal area. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667,

dated September 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884, declared that the

natural resources ef the subsoil and sea-bed of tht Con-

tinental Shelf appertain to the United States,and Execu-

tive Order 9633 issued the same’ day placed the resources

'. of that area under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of .

the Interior. 10 F. R. 12305. This assertion of juris-

‘ diction contained_in the Proclamation was confirmed by

Section 9 of Public Law 31. Furthermore, Presidential

Proclamation 'No. 2668, also issued September 28, 1945,

oe ee

asserted the intention of the United Std¥es to establish,

. conservation zones in the off.hore waters. 59 Stat. 885.

Thus it is evident that if “Texas, Louisiana, and. Flor-

ida have made invalid territorial ass rtions Un the off-

shore waters, they are invading rap rights, not the .

rights of the.State of Alabama. The territorial asser-

~ tions, if they are improper, are claims to submergedNJands

undér the jurisdiction and control of the~United States, —

not.of Alabama... The Suate of Alabama is no more _

directly. injured by these territorial claims than she would

- ‘be if the State of Virginia ‘asserted a claim to a saunas

_ of the District of Columbia.” . -

_ The absence: of atly special injury to Alabama brings

her complaint concerning territorial assertions by the de- —

fendants squarely within the principle of the cases cited

in the first section of this brief, pp. 11 et seq.,,supra. Those

casés’ establish that this Court, will refuse to exercise

the original jurisdiction in the absence of a “showing that

there is an actual or .imminently threatened invasion of |

‘the rights of the complainant State. “As the Court said in

Massachusetts \v: Missouri, 308 U. S. 1; 15 (1939), to

constitute a justiciable controversy, “it must appear that

* the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the

- action’ of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial

redress, or is asserting a right against the other State

which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to

the accepted principles of the commori law or equity

systems of jurisprudence.” See also Arizona v. Califor-

wie, 283 U. S. 423, 462 lee It is apparent that the -

There was at one time a "pmitcecied- 1 dappte iiaans Virginia

and the District «f Columbia congerning their mutual boundary in

* the vicinity of the Potomac River. - Smoot Sand & Gravel

‘Corp. v. Washington mg 80 283 U. a es (1931); Marine Ry.

_& Coal Co. v. United

earcy be contended that Alabama: ‘was injured - Virginia’ s Slaims._

States, 257 U. S. 47 (T921).* ¥t. could

. —

—27—

State of Albee has yenae no epecial wrong at ‘the

hands of the defendants; nor is she ae to vindicate a

right held by her as a State. i

Properly considered, defendants’ tleged iedooichcoe’

upon the Federal offshore area is of no more concern to

Alabama than it is to the other States and to the public

at large. It is well settled that this Court will not en- -

, tertain cases where, as here, the complaingnt’s injury is

‘.. only that suffered in common with, people generally.

-” Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487-488 (1923):

see Stark v. Wickard; 321 U. S. 288, 304 (1944). In

Perkins v. Lukens Steel 'Co., 310 U. S. 113, 132 (1940),

this Court spoke of the ‘ ‘impropriety of judicial inter-

pretations of law at the instance of those who show no

more than a mere possible 1 injury to the public.” ©

The decisions cited by Alabama (Br, pp. 22-23) as

showing her standing to sue are not in point, for the

wrongful actions alleged i in those cases had a territorial or

otherwise special inapact upon the complainant States. Thus

each of the eight cases cited by Alabama to show that

“this Court has allowed states to present of tie con-

_cerning their boundaries” (Br. p. 23) involved the boun-

dary of the complainant State, not some other State. In. :

the cases cited involving the diversion of flow from an

interstate stream, the wrong alleged’ had the effect of

reducing - the water available within the complainant

State. Likewise, the case involving ‘the overflow of waters _

. from ‘Minnesota into North Dakota involved a direct im-

_ pact. in the nature of a trespass upon the “complainant

: State.” :

——

". $In: attempting to establish her claim of injury Alabama alleges

that the boundary laws of Texas, Louisiana, and Florida “demean”

her sovereignty. (Br. p. 18.) However, as we have shown, the |

area seaward of historic State boundaries is i Federal area, and

invalid claims in that. area invade Federal no those of

~ Alabama Raed ht ae Ghee Se

te,

oan a

- aoe

Indeed, we have found no case where-a State sii been

permitted to sue in its sovereign capacity where there was

no territorial or other special impact upon the complainant

State. -Cases involving such an impact, like those cited

by Alabama, are clearly not authority for Alabama to

challenge the alleged territorial claims of defendant States

which do not ‘affect Alabama’s boundaries or have any

- special impact upon Alabama’s ‘sovereign interests.

2. THis Court SHoutp Nor Entertain ALABAMA’S

REQUEST FOR AN INJUNCTION RESTRAINING TEXAS,

LovISIANA, AND FLorIpA From ApplLyINc THEIR

STATUTES TO ALABAMA CITIZENS. | ane

_ Alabama complains that Texas, Louisiana, and Florida :

_are: (1) threatening Alabama citizens with discrimina- ~'

tory license fees and excise taxes and with the complete

denial of the privilege gf fishing in the offshore waters,

and (2) requiring ‘Alabama citizens, under pain and risk

of severe penalties, to pay license fees amd excise taxes

‘nine nautical miles from the coast line of the respective

States. Br. p. 30. Alabama, in her capacity as quasi

sovereign and parens patriae for her citjzeris, seeks to

enjoin the application of Texas, Louisiana, and Florida

_ Statutes in the offshore waters. However, it is clear that. .

“these allegations of the complaint do not warrant the exer-

cise of the Court’s oti iginal jurisdiction: .

~ (a) The Request ‘for an "Injunction. is Premature and 7

‘Unwarranted. This Court: has frequently emphasized

’ that, in a suit-between States, “Before this Court ought to

intervene the case should. be of serious magnitude, clearly |

and fully proved | “. 2”, Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. .

496, 521 (1906) :: New York v. New. Jersey. 256 U..

296, 309 (1921); North: Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. ..

‘

365, 374 (1923); Connecticut v. Massaciusetts, 282 U.

: 5. 660, 669 (193r). “A state asking leave to sue another

to prevent the enforcement of laws must allege, in the

‘Complaint offered for filing, facts that are clearly suf-

ficient to call for a decree in its favor.” Alabama v.

Arizona, 291 VU. S. ,786, ‘291 (1934). In another context \

the Court has emphasized that “Caution is appropriate

against the subtle tendency to decide public issues free

‘from the safeguards of critical. scrutiny of the facts,

through use of a declaratory summary judgment.” Eccles

». Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426, 434 (1948).

Viewed in the light of these considerations, it is evi-

dent that Alabama is unwarranted or at least premature

in bringing this complaint on behalf of its citizens against

, Texas, Louisiana, and \Florida. First, with respect’ to

the discriminatory fees and taxes and the denial of the —

privilege of fishing in ‘the three-mile belt, the complaint

concedes that there is only a threat of «such action.

(Complaint, paragraphs XXIV, XXVII, and XXX.) —

That such threatened. injury is insufficient is shown by

the following statement of the Court in Nebraska v.

Wyoming, 325 .U. S. 589, 608 (1945):

*, _-The argument is that the case is not al s

sh ikea medals sak tu dneaie 6 tot, 20

- fully and clearly proved as to warrant the inter-

vention of this Court under our established practice.

_. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 521; Colorado v.

Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 393-394. The argument is |

that the. potential threat of injury, representing as it

does only a possibility for the indefinite ‘future, is no

‘basis for a decree in an interstate suit since we can-

not issue declaratory decrees. Arizona v. C. alifornia,

283 U. S. 423, 462-464, and cases. cited.

“We fully — those principles.”

“s a, ae | | a, “. |

Second, with respect to the assertions that the-three —

_ States are now requiring Alabama citizens to pay taxes”

and excises in the offshore area between three and nine _

/ miles seaward from the coast line, there is only Alabama’s

bare allegation, unsupported by. instances or details.

(Complaint, paragraphs XXIV, XXVIL, - and XXX.) |

There is no showing that Texas,. isiana, or Florida 3

have enforced any-statutes or stale at that area against

and over the protest of Alabama citizens. . In the absence

of such a showing, there is no justiciable controversy

between the States, as this Court indicated n Alabama

v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286 (1934).™° In that’ case this

- Court denied- Alabama leave to file a complaint seeking

to enjoin five other States from enforcing their statutes

against open market sales of products made by prison

labor: In the course of the opinion holding that there —

- was no “direct issue” between Alabama and the defen-

dants, thef Court said:

“Inthe absence of specific icveine to. the con-

trary, it will be presumed that no Staté will attempt

~to-enforce an unconstitutional enactment to the detri-

‘ment of another.” 291 U. S. at 292" So

“

toe reliance upon Pevartanis West

S. 553 (1923), is misplaced, or in at rn Se ae eee

that case differs significantly from the one now i.

unde the West Virgins sue ivaved inthe gee ayer tomr

vere faced .

—— ‘Hee, however, "Alabaus suggests cae her citizens

“threatened” with cananey treatment by Reggae Louisi-

at lorida; the, fees and taxes alleged to be presently in

| effect ve not claimed to be discriminatory. | 7

et,

° 4

: 3 . . .

(b) Alabama citizens have an adequate remedy in a

lower court. If Alabama citizens desire to challenge the

enforcement of Texas, Louisiana, or Florida statutes in

: the waters offshore from those States, such an action can

be conveniently and effectively brought in the Federal —

District Court of any of the States involved. The avail-

' ability of such. relief. is demonstrated by the strikingly

: parallel case of Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948).

- There, fishermen who were Georgia citizens sued South

Carolina officials in a South Carolina Federal District |

Court to challenge the validity of South Carolina statutes

“which imposed a tax of one-eighth cent a pound on green |

shrimp taken.in the marginal belt, required non-residents —

0 pay a $2,500 fee for each shrinfp boat and residents

- fishing in the. marginal belt must dock and —_——e at a

South Carolina port.”

: The three-judge Federal District Court ‘gid the stat-

utes, and a direct appeal was taken to this Court. This

Court, after stating that it was agreed that South Caro-

lina officials were attempting to enforce the statutes

| against the Georgia fishermen, upheld the right of. the

: fishermen to bring the action, saying:

a ere It is also clear that compliance with ainy

ssid Seng: tien sd thet ‘altedeneeh teem

further fishing until a test case ‘had been taken

through | South Carolina courts and perhaps to -

this Coust would have resulted in a substantial loss

of business for which no corapensation could be ob-

conclude ,that appellants sufficiently. showed the im-

_minence of irreparable injury for which there was

oS ee

(334 :U. S. at 391-392,

On the merits, the Court sustained the validity of the one-

. eighth cent a’ pound tax™ but held that the discriminatory _

Aicense- fee violated the privileges and_jmununities clause of —

the Constitution; and that the requirement of docking: and

unloading at a South Carolina port constituted an invalid -

burden on interstate commerce. :

The precedent of Toomer v. Witsell vie it certain

that s\labama citizens can challenge in local Federal courts

any attempt by Texas, Louisiana, and. Florida_to-enforce —

invalid statutesyagainst them in the offshore Sijis. This

Court has frequently indicated that the presence of such

: an adequate alternative remedy in a lower court is a

| sound ground for’refusing to. exercise the original juris-

_ diction. In Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939),

the Court declined to take jurisdiction of Massachusetts’ -

suit against Missouri citizens because “In this instance

: We doce: tnst agpeor thet Massachusetts ty thins « pruper

“The Court construed this tax to apply only to shrimp caught

within the three-mile belt, but it left little doubt that Federal

courts would consider, atthe instance of citizens of other States,

the validity of State statutes affecting the area outside the three-

‘mile belt when a “concrete factual situation™ is. sea 344

U. S. at Hove : + RES

se)

sak sinite cone” 308 U. S..at 19. In Alaboma

v. Arizona, supra, 291 U. S: 286 (1934), the Court based

_ its denial of leave to file a complaint in ‘part on the fact

that the complaint “fails to show that .... Alabama’s —

. ‘assertion of right may not, or indeed will not, speedily

and conveniently be tested by the contracting company

that apparently is directly concerned, or-by a seller of -

such goods.” 291 U. S. at 292, In Georgia v |

. vania R. Co., supra, 324 U. S. 439 (194), a

scuiecla ts sien eos aint Wied

Se dcaag fon ag Peri ro

_ Court to withhold the exercise of its jurisdiction “

‘there hes been no want of another suitable forum to which

ter geaee sabe emelted bn the lasers of extarenienen, |

_efficiency, and justice.” 324 U. S. at 464-465.-~

In view of the fact that Alabama citizens have another

Ei of heft at Ana hi ear

Louisiana, and Florida, it appears that this Court should |

decline to exercise its original jurisdiction for that pur- .

. pose. In that way’ this Court will be spared “the duty

of making an independent examination of the evidence,

a time-consuming process which seriously interferes with

_ the discharge of our. ever increasing appellate dutits.” -—

ae.

11 ES

5 ~

——

The Court noted, A id tte ities tte Olin fu

sia Mead. us eo ao SOU A ed een each duce bo Gee

Ke be de om oe en SOUS DOS

ee 8B U. S.

_ vw

| i EN

Ree

; | Not Consented to Be Sued.’

The complaint asserts that the United States has par.

‘méunt rights in afd exclusive jurisdiction and control

over the lands, minerals, and other natural resources lying

Bees seaward of the coast ,line of the defendant States. ( Para-

_ graphs IX, X, ‘XIU, and XVI). The prayer asks that

: Public Law 31 be

or plant life. w was, prior fo the enactment of such _

/ "aw, hy the Constitution in the United States to

be ¢: i for the benefit of .all the states and citizens

the United States.” (Paragraph 2.) In her brief, Ala-

bama asserts (p. 32) that the State and her citizens have

an: “equitable “interest in the vast sums to be derived from

the continued and ever-increasing development of the

~fiataral resources” deseribed in the complaint. Alabama

—

Suggests that her share, at least of the impounded funds,

i momething between two and two and one-half per cent.

= p.. 32.)

_ These allegations and cate eee th te

—_— the considered attempt tie Ggien sn.

President td, vest this property in t he respective States

jagaememen.

Alabama’ asserts an equitable iftterest in. her equal share

=n of the assets which have been and will be produced from

“the Property. i

A$: .°

Per . i <¢ .

‘ide te.

ape

iat ane

(1936), is squarely in point to this effect. In that case,

—————

Bier Canyon Projet Achat oe “oe

be entitled to the stored water except. by. contract

| ©

By ni HH

im the stream not already appropriated. The Court denied

Arizona leave to file on the ground that the United States —

Under those circumstances the United States is an in-

_ dispensable party. Arisona v. California, 298 U. S. 558

setae to Alabama's complaint

The

of the

et ale

would alone

3 The eal |

teat tes

of its

Secretary

“very right which Arizona asserts is so subordi-

nate to and dependent upon the rights and the exer- _

cise of an authority asserted by the United States

that no final determination of the one can_be made

without a determination of the extent of the other.

Although no decree rendered in its absence can bind

or affect the United States, that fact is not an induce:

ment for this Court to decide the rights of the states

oe ~ which are before it by a decree which, because of the

\ absence of the United States, could have no finality.

NG oy A bill of complaint will not be entertained

: which, if filed, could only be dismissed because of

\ ee en ee (Em-

dase omen rt

It is apparent here, as it was in Arizona v. ‘California,

that a “decree could not be framed without an adjudica-

ee which are said to be held

by the United States. In terms of the Court’s language

in the Arisona case, every right which Alabama asserts

d with @ trust in Alabama’s fayor, and the

Si jes would have to be deprived of ‘ power

- of alienation/with respeet to this property. Tess doline |

bring Ala | squarely in conflict with the United States.

_ On the other bad, to hold that the property is vested in

the defendant ‘States would amount to a denial of the

eee /

EAN LE Ce ae

ee ee

re er

esteem Reet wearers co a Gren tne

Ban PR Dey

1 13h MARR. aes RRC RRR Ne i ialted antler ie GIT +

igh which labor, hime are bd by the United

- ‘The decision in Arigona ¥. \Califorvia is in sccord with 38

a long line of decisions: holding that the United States

is an indispensable party in cases in which its property

will be affected. In Minnesota v. United States, 305

U.S. 382 (1939), the State brought a condemnation

action to acquire a right of way over lands

United States owned in fee and held in. trust for: Indian

ees: Ta 9 exnntenons opinion by Dr. Justice Brandeis,

. the Court held:

“The United States te on indispensable y de-

fendant to the condemnation proceedings. A pro-

ceeding against property in which the United States

has. an interest is a suit against the United States

pot It is confessedly the owner of the fee ‘of

‘the Indian allotted lands and holds the same in trust

for the allottees. As the United States owns the fee

of these patcels, the right of way cannot be con-

eee See N.S * OEY: ee S. at

gp agate Gorfeld, 211 U. S. 70 (1908),

Lewin Lin. Ca

party in an action brought by the State against the Secre- me

States isan indispensable

tary of the Interior. to establish title to lands. claimed

under swamp \and grants. The Court said that there

were involved questions, affecting the interests of the

| United States which “cannot ‘be tried behind its back.”

— ee ieee @ tee ee ak Ot

-Jowns less than all the property rights in the subject matter of

Quit. International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. 5. @l,

C06 ia ie

—33—

5 ed

weer

52, 58 (1917). |

‘The United vena is no less lle dalsalite even if it

ie assumed that it holds the property in trust for Alabama

and its citizens. McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S.'458, 469

(1907) ; -Minnesota v. United States, supra, 305 U. S: :

382 (1939). In the Minnesota case the Court said that

-where/the United States holds allotted lands in trust for

_Wadians “it would seem clear that no effective relief can

‘be given in a proceeding. to which the United States -is

not a party and that the United States is therefore an

indispensable party to any suit to establish or acquire -an

iriter@t in the lands.” 305 U. S. at 386, note 1. To the

same effect is Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 722-723 -

= (1883), an action against fiscal officers of a State, where

the Court said, “If there is any trust, the State ‘is the

trustee, and unless the State can be sued the trustee

: cannot be enjoined.”

The requirement ‘that the United~ States be made -a

party cannot be circumvented by naming Federal officials.

as! defendants. Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481, 485-488

(1925).”* Indeed, the very nature of the relief here

prayed for against the individual defendants points up 7

the fact that the interests of the United States are directly _

involved. Thus,-in asking that the individual defendants

be — from — in the claimed assertions

.™To interfere with its management and disposition ok te iit :

or the funds by enjoining its officials, would, interfere with the

of the United States. It is therefore an indispensable party to this

_ suit.” 266 U. S. at 485-486.

\ ~

—jo—

of the defendant States (Complaiut p. 30), Alabama is —

not seeking to prevent their acquiescence as individuals

but rather as the heads of major departmerits of the

Federal Government. Cf. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234

U. S. 627, 632-633 (1914). Likewise, te’ request for

an injunction with respect to the funds in the hands of

the individual defendants is in reality an effort to control

property held b§ the United States. Goldberg v. Daniels,

231 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1913); International Postal

Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601, 606 (1904) ; Louisiana

v. Jumel, supra, 107 U. S. 711, 722-723, (1883) : Mine

Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 375

(1945). | |

The sum of the matter is

: at the United States is an

4 indispensable party because any decree would affect. the

: interests of the United States. Any,decree deciding the

rights of, the States in the absence of the United States

“could have no finality.” See Arizona v. C alifornia, supra,

208 U. S. at 572. The United States has not been sued,

and of course it cannot be sued without its consent.

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682

(1949)27 Where, as here, the complaint if filed would

have to be dismissed because of the absence of the United —

States, the Court should refuse to entertain the complaint.

Louisiana v. McAdoo, supra, 234 U. S. at 628; Arizona,

v. California, supra, 298 U. S. at 572. mens

_‘*The general rule that the United States cannot be sued without

its congent is applicable to a suit by a State. Kansas v. United

States, 204 U. S. 331, 342 (1907) ; Arizona v. California, supra,

298 U. S. at 568. :

;

- 7?

: a

CONCLUSION

~ On the basis of. the foregoing argument, the States of

California and Florida respectfully yrge thay the motion

of the StateSe Alabama for leave to file a complaint

shouldbe denied. ‘ >

ee ie re paeetely submitted, 9

-Epwmunp-G. ‘Brows, ‘ " Ricuarp W. Ervin,

California; Florida;

; Witttam V V, O'Connor, Howarp S. BatLey,

an, * hief D ebuty Attorney Assistant Attorney

Se General;

——Everetr_ W: Misroor, Frep M. Burns, |

Assistant Attorney Assistant Attdrney “

‘General; } 3 General; ,

-Ggorce G. Grover, Joun D. Mortrakry, - ;

ere

Deputy Attorney General; _-Special Assistant

| - Attorney General;

Aterass for the State of Attorneys for the State

. California. _ Florida.

December 2, 1953.

ee as

f. 3 ,. og

> ize a i a ee i — — _

e -

‘

ical:

Affidavit of. Service. | |

I, Leilani Kroll, being first duly sworn, certify that I

am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within

action; that on December 2, 1953, I served.a copy of the

foregoing Objections upon each of the following named .

individuals by mailing a copy of the Objections to them,

postage prepaid, at the following addresses:

Attornay; General of Alabama Secretary of

State - Department of the Interior

Montgomery, Alabama sy 7 Washinggon, D :

Hon John. Ben Shefperd ) Hon. Robert B. Anderson

General exas Secretary a

ate. Capitol evevtamet of Ge Savy

Austin, Texas mae Washington, D.C.

Hon._ LeBlanc Hon. Ivy Baker Priest ‘

A of Louisiara Treasurer of the United States

State Capitol Department of the Treasury

Baton Rouge, e Washington, D. C.

Hon. George M. Humphrey Hon. Herbert pro Be

soma at Se Sey A ~ the United States

Department reasury Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. Washington, \D. C. .

' "

8 -Lertan1 KRo.t.

State of California, County of Los Angeles—-ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this: ian day of

pa kee ; - Karuryé’ Cicntin

Notary Public in and for Said County and State.

} —

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