Brief for the United States — Anselmi v. Attorney General of the United States (No. 225)

Supreme Court brief1953

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The certification and route transfer proceedings_-_-______-

The mall pay proceedings...................--s2656.-.-

1. The Board’s first decision___.________-_---_-_-_-

2. The Board’s second decision. _-_-_____-------_-_- 12

The decision of the Court of Appeals____-___-_________- 14

I I in corwee pene caal eben anna igs 15

Cocooanwnn =

I. Subsidies in the form of mail pay cannot exceed the

PR Or Cr oc kv Soe c wer cere case wets 18

II. Section 406 (b) requires the Board, in determining

a@ carrier’s subsidy need, to offset all—not just

some—other revenue of the carrier___-_-__------

III. Western did not ‘‘need’’ the $447,000 additional

subsidy mail pay, and the award thereof was not

made on the basis of Western’s need_-_-_-----_-

I ea ae eee en he me cng IAS Ss LEE A Wy Pe Peete

Cases:

American Airlines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 323___.----_-_-

American Overseas Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 695_-_-

Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C. A. B. 705___----------

Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 161-

Colonial Airlines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 71___-----_-----

Continental Air Lines and Mid-Continent Airlines, Order

No. E-5803, Docket No. 5173, October 23, 1951___-__-

Continental Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 825__-__-_-

Delta Air Lines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 645__----------_-

Inland Air Lines, Mail Rates, 1 C. A. A. 155_------------

North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C. A. B. 676____---

Northeast Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 291__----------

Pan American-Grace Airways, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 550_-

Pioneer Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 175___---------

Trans-Texas Airways, Mail Rates, 12 C. A. B. 101_____-_-

Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 184 F. 2d

66, certiorari denied 340 U. S. 941__.___-__---------

United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 198 F. 2d

8

88

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280856—53,

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II

Cases—Continued

United Air Lines-Western Air Lines, Acquisition of Air

Carrier Property, 8 C. A. B. 298.___._____ 6-8, 24, 25, 26

Western Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 196 F. 2d

933, certiorari denied, 344 U. S. 875.__.._.___.._..___

nautics Board, 155 F. 2d 169___-______.____________. 5,6

Western Air Lines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 441__..._____ 9

Western Air Lines, Mail Rates, 10 C. A. B. 285......_____ 9

Statutes:

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C.

401 et seq.:

I ite crt cist eusinvemeicussbinucce 3,17

RE ET tae pa eee 3

I al 4

Section 406 (b)_...........-........ 2, 4, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23

Miscellaneous:

Civil Aeronautics Board, Administrative Separation of Sub-

sidy From Total Mail Payments to United States Air

Carriers, September 1953 revision._____._________.____ 28

48 Columbia Law Review 88........_._...........____ 24

61 Harvard Law Review 523._..................______ 24

60 Yale Law Journal 1196.__................... 31

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Ynthe Supreme Court of the Wnited States

OcroBER TERM, 1953

No. 224

Civit AERONAUTICS BOARD, PETITIONER

v.

ArtHuR E. SUMMERFIELD, PosTMASTER GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, ON BEHALF OF THE PosTMASTER GEN-

ERAL, AND WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.

No. 225

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., PETITIONER

v.

Civiz AERONAUTICS Boarp, ARTHUR E. SUMMER-

FIELD, PosTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

oN BEHALF OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE POSTMASTER GENERAL AND THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit (R. 341-353) is

reported in 207 F. 2d 200. The opinions of the Civil

(1)

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Aeronautics Board (R. 54-125, 183-253, 258-281,

333-339) have not yet been published.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on May 4, 1953 (R. 354). The petitions for writs of

certiorari were filed on July 31, 1953, and were

granted on October 12, 1953. The jurisdiction of

this Court is conferred by 28 U.S. C. 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In fixing subsidy mail pay for a past period, the

Civil Aeronautics Board refused to offset the portion

($447,000) of the total profit ($1,099,000) made by

a carrier on the 1947 sale of one of its routes and

related equipment which represented the value of

the transferred certificate of public convenience and

necessity. Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics

Act directs the Board, in fixing mail pay subsidy,

to “take into consideration * * * the need of each

such air carrier for compensation * * * sufficient

* * * together with all other revenue of the aiz

carrier, to enable such air carrier * * * to main-

tain and continue the development * * *” of a

national air transportation system. The questions

presented are:!

’ We do not discuss the other questions raised by petitioner

Western in No. 225 that the Board awarded it insufficient

subsidy by erroneously offsetting certain other portions of

its revenue. These issues, which the Court of Appeals

decided against Western, are discussed in petitioner Board’s

brief, pp. 13-20. We support the position there taken that

those other items of revenue properly were used to reduce

the carrier’s mail pay need.

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1. Whether Section 406 (b) of the Act empowers

the Board to award a subsidy in the form of ‘‘need”’

mail pay which exceeds the carrier’s actual ‘‘need.”

2. Whether Section 406 (b) requires the Board, in

determining # carrier’s “need” for subsidy, to offset

| “all other revenue of the air carrier,’’ or whether the

Board may, in its discretion, offset only a part of

such other revenue.

3. Whether the carrier ‘“‘needed’”’ the additional

; $447,000 subsidy which it received as a result of the

) Board’s refusal to offset the profit on the sale of the

| certificate.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973,

as amended, 49 U. 8. C. 401, et seg., provides in

pertinent part as follows:

Section 401 (h) The [Board], upon peti-

tion or complaint or upon its own initia-

tive, after notice and hearing, may alter,

amend, modify, or suspend any such certifi-

cate, in whole or in part, if the public con-

venience and neeessity so require, or may

revoke any such certificate, in whole or in

part, for intentional failure to comply with

any provision of this title or any order, rule,

or regulation issued hereunder or any term,

condition, or limitation of such certificate:

** * [49 U.S. C. 481 (h).]

* *x * * x

Section 401 (j) No certificate shall confer

any proprietary, property, or exclusive right

in the use of any air space, civil airway, land-

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ing area, or air-navigation facility. [49

U. S. C. 481 (j).]

* * * * *

Section 406 (a) The [Board] is em-

powered and directed, upon its own initiative

or upon petition of the Postmaster General

or an air carrier, (1) to fix and determine

from time to time, after notice and hearing,

the fair and reasonable rates of compensation

for the transportation of mail by air-

craft, * * * and the rates so fixed and de-

termined shall be paid by the Postmaster

General from appropriations for the trans-

portation of mail by aircraft. [49 U. S. C.

486 (a).]

Section 406 (b) In fixing and determining

fair and reasonable rates of compensation

under this section, the [Board], con-

sidering the conditions peculiar to transporta-

tion by aircraft and to the particular air

carrier or class of air carriers, may fix dif-

ferent rates for different air carriers or classes

of air carriers, and different classes of service.

In determining the rate in each case, the

[Board] shall take into consideration,

among other factors, the condition that such

air carriers may hold and operate under cer-

tificates authorizing the carriage of mail only

by providing necessary and adequate facili-

ties and service for the transportation of mail;

such standards respecting the character and

quality of service to be rendered by air car-

riers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to

law; and the need of each such air carrier

for compensation for the transportation of

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mail sufficient to insure the performance of

such service, and, together with all other

revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air

carrier under honest, economical, and effi-

cient management, to maintain and continue

the development of air transportation to the

extent and of the character and quality re-

quired for the commerce of the United States,

the Postal Service, and the national defense.

[49 U. S. C. 486 (b).]

STATEMENT

Petitioners challenge the correctness of the Court

of Appeals’ decision that the Civil Aeronautics Board

awarded excessive mail pay subsidy to petitioner

Western Air Lines (‘“‘Western’’). The court held

that, in determining Western’s subsidy need, the

Board had departed from the applicable statutory

standard in failing to offset part of the profit made

by Western on the sale of one of its routes to United

Air Lines (‘“‘United’’). A brief description of the

certification and route transfer proceedings is neces-

sary for an understanding of the case.

THE CERTIFICATION AND ROUTE TRANSFER

PROCEEDINGS

On November 11, 1944, the Board issued a certi-

ficate of public convenience and necessity to Western

for a new route (route 68) between Denver, Colorado,

and Los Angeles, California. Western Air Lines,

Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C. A. B. 199, affirmed

subnom. United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board,

155 F. 2d 169 (C. A. D. C.). The Board selected

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Western over United, the principal other applicant,

because award of the route to United “would divert

so much traffic from Western as to seriously impair

that carrier’s ability to continue as a strong inde-

pendent air carrier in a position to compete for traffic

in the western section of the country,’ and would

make Western “dependent upon the Government for

substantial subsidies in the form of mail compensation

in order to provide the service contemplated in its

existing certificates.” 6 C. A. B. 210. The Board

concluded that maintenance of Western “as a strong

regional carrier in a position to compete effectively”

in its service area “outweighs any benefits which

might accrue from the establishment of [the] addi-

tional single-company service from Los Angeles to

the east via Denver” which United could provide.

Id. at 212.

Western did not inaugurate service over route 68

until April 1, 1946 (R. 59). Less than a year later

Western and United entered into an agreement,

subject to approval by the Board, for the sale of the

certificate and route, together with aircraft and

equipment used thereon, to United for $3,750,000.

The purchase price represented a substantial profit

to Western over the cost of the tangible property

to be transferred.?

On August 25, 1947, the Board approved the sale

as “consistent with the public interest.” United

? Route 68 was the only one on which Western made a

profit during 1946. During the nine months of that year

when the route was in operation, it earned approximately

$640,000. 8 C. A. B. 298, 301.

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Air Lines-Western Air Lines, Acquisition of Air

Carrier Property, 8 C. A. B. 298, 324. The Board

pointed out that Western’s president had testified

that in his view Western’s ‘dual role” as a regional

and a transcontinental carrier was ‘‘one of the pri-

mary causes” of the carrier’s financial difficulties; *

that Western should withdraw from the transconti-

nental field and ‘‘concentrate on a regional service’’; *

and that United’s routes made it the logical carrier

to take over route 68 (id. at 303). The Board noted

that the purchase price exceeded Western’s depre-

ciated original cost of the tangible property trans-

ferred by $2,000,000, of which $1,500,000 represented

the value of the route. Jd. at 312.5 It found, how-

ever, that sale of the route at a profit would not be |

“adverse to the public interest’ (id. at 324), since |

prohibition of certificate transfers ‘‘at a commercial |

profit” would eliminate the carriers’ “incentive’’ to

transfer routes to other carriers ‘‘who would be in a

3 Western had ‘major obligations” of several million dol-

lars coming due in February, 1947, which, if not extended

or met, “could have resulted in receivership or bankruptcy”.

Market conditions in January, 1947, precluded the carrying

out of a previously planned financing program for the

company. Western’s balance sheet as of February 28,

1947, showed current assets of approximately $3,800,000

and current liabilities in excess of $10,000,000, 8 C. A. B. 302.

4 He stated that effective development of Route 68 would

have required Western to undertake full transcontinental

operations at an estimated capital outlay of $85,000,000.

8C. A. B. at 302.

’The Board found that the $3,750,000 purchase price

was a fair one reached through arms-length bargaining.

8C. A. B. at 314-315.

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position to operate them with greater advantage to

the public interest,” and would “ ‘freeze’ the air

pattern of the Nation to its present design * * *”

(td. at 323). But, in order to prevent “inflation of

the investment rate base” and “potentially higher

charges to the public,” the Board required United

to make an immediate charge to surplus of the

$2,000,000 item of intangibles (id. at 318-319).

Chairman Landis, dissenting, disapproved the

transaction unless the purchase price were reduced by

the $1,500,000 representing the value of the route.

He stated that the parties should not be permitted to

“traffic in air certificates,” since Congress had stated

that there is “no private proprietary right in air

transportation that can be made the subject of barter

and sale—the subject of an additional claim against

the public” (id. at 344). He added that Western

“actually” would be “giving up very little” in re-

linquishing the $1,500,000, since under “any theory” |

that sum is ‘“‘profit to Western and as such is revenue

under section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act

which the Board must take into consideration in

fixing any need rate.” ‘The Board,” he concluded,

“thus must in the last analysis charge the subsidy

that Western will get and upon which it must depend

with that amount, so that in the end Western’s

acquisition of $1,500,000 becomes only a temporary

advance against future subsidy payments” (Jd. at

344-345).

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ee Sr een

THE MAIL PAY PROCEEDINGS

On April 26, 1944, Western petitioned the Board to

increase its mail pay (R. 15).° A temporary higher

rate was fixed by the Board in April 1947 (R. 44-48).

On December 31, 1948, the Board issued Tentative

Findings and Conclusions (R. 54) proposing total

subsidy mail pay of $4,252,000 for the period May 1,

1944, to December 31, 1948, together with an order

to show cause why the proposed mail pay award

should not be made final (R. 124-125).? In caleu-

lating this subsidy, the Board treated the entire

profit from the sale of route 68 as “other revenue of

the air carrier’ which, under Section 406 (b) of the

Act, would “serve to reduce Western’s ‘need’ for

mail compensation” (R. 68), and accordingly offset

the total profit in ascertaining the carrier’s need.

1. The Board’s First Decision.—After full admin-

istrative proceedings,? the Board issued its first

decision (R. 183-253). The Board again held that

Western’s entire net profit on the sale—which it

calculated at $1,099,000 (R. 196)*—constituted

6 Western was then on a so-called service or compensatory

rate, which the Board had fixed in November 1943. Western

Air Lines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 441.

7The Board also proposed a prospective mail pay rate to

become effective January 1, 1949 (R. 91-104). This rate

became final on May 6, 1949. Western Air Lines, Mai

Rates, 10 C. A. B. 285.

* Exceptions were filed to the tentative findings (R. 127),

hearings were held, briefs were filed, and the Board heard

oral argument (R. 185).

* Western’s book profit of $2,124,000 was reduced by a

number of offsets against such profit (R. 70, 82, 196-197,

212-220, 264).

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“other revenue” which should be offset in determin-

ing Western’s need for mail pay subsidy. The Board

stated that it was “clear that to the extent that

there was a profit [on the sale], Western’s need for

mail pay support was reduced accordingly” (R. 195).

Pointing out that the profit arose from the sale of

“air carrier property,” the Board refused to differ-

entiate between the tangible and the intangible

elements of the sale. It stated that these elements

“go together to make up one transaction”; that the

profit from the intangibles was no “less valid” a

source of other revenue than that from the tangibles,

since both were received “by virtue of benefits

accruing to Western from its certificate of public

convenience and necessity, which it received from

the Government”; that it would be “contrary to

the public interest’’ to use public funds to “subsi-

dize a need which had already been covered by profits

accruing from benefits under the certificate’; and

that offsetting the profit on the sale of the intangibles

“in no sense’ curtailed the carrier’s rights under its

certificate, which include the right to subsidy mail

pay “based upon need,” but merely offset against

these rights “all special benefits in the form of

profits realized by virtue of having been awarded

the certificate’ (R. 197-198).

The Board specifically rejected Western’s conten-

tion that inclusion of the total profit as “other

revenue’ would ‘adversely affect the incentive for

air carriers to accomplish necessary route adjust-

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ments through voluntary route transfers and merg-

ers or consolidations” (R. 198). The Board pointed

out that

The incentive of a carrier wishing to dispose

of a route or to merge is to correct a situation

which is inimical to its best interests, such as

the operation of an uneconomical route that

will mitigate against its over [ever] reaching

self-sufficiency. The incentive to divest itself

of such a route should be reinforced by the

realization that subsidy mail pay will not be

forthcoming to perpetuate an uneconomic route

pattern {ibid., emphasis added].

The Board further noted that the record did not

indicate that Western would not have sold the route

had it known that the profit would be treated as

“other revenue” for subsidy purposes (R. 198-199);

that Western had ‘‘no basis for believing otherwise”

(R. 199); and that the fact that the ‘outstanding

example” of an airline merger since the sale—the

purchase of American Overseas Airlines, Inc. by

Pan American Airways, Inc.—had been consum-

mated at book value indicated that the “profit

motive” is not such a ‘‘necessary consideration for

the accomplishment of route transfers or mergers as

Western would have us believe’’ (zbid.)?°.

The Board accordingly offset Western’s entire

profit of $1,099,000 in calculating that the carrier’s

The Board pointed out that in approving the sale of

route 68 it had not been ‘‘concerned with the issue of the

treatment of any profit realized by Western in relation to

its need for mail pay” (R. 196; see R. 262).

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break-even need was $2,087,000 (R. 229)." To this

the Board added $134,686 representing the carrier’s

estimated tax liability, and $1,358,840 representing

a 7% return for each of the years involved on the

carrier’s adjusted investment base ® (zbid.). Total

subsidy mail pay was thus fixed at $3,580,526, or

$671,474 less than the $4,252,000 temporary mail

pay that Western already had received (ibid.).

2. The Board’s Second Decision.—Exceptions to

the Board’s decision were filed by the Postmaster

General and by the carrier (R. 254-257), and the

Board heard oral argument (R. 258)." The Board’s

decision on the exceptions (R. 258-281) reversed its

prior holding, and refused to offset the $447,000

profit (R. 264) on the sale of the route in fixing

Western’s subsidy.

" The Board also offset other non-flight revenue, including

restaurant and concession income (R. 191-195). And, in

determining Western’s break-even point, the Board dis-

allowed certain expenses which did not meet the statutory

standard of “honest, economical, and efficient management.”

Thus, excessive maintenance costs were reduced (R. 207),

excess general and administrative expenses were scaled down

(R. 212), and depreciation on unneeded aircraft was dis-

allowed (R. 223).

% In determining Western’s investment ase, the Board

excluded certain items—such as excess aircraft—which did

not reflect “economical and efficient management”’ (R. 247).

8 The Air Transport Association of America, a trade asso-

ciation of air carriers, filed a brief amicus curiae supporting,

inter alia, Western’s contention that the profit from the sale

of the route was not “other revenue” (R. 258-259).

* In its second decision the Board for the first time referred

to its prior decision as a “tentative” one (R. 258). In its

first decision the Board had stated that the matter was then

before it “for our decision” (R. 185).

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The Board reaffirmed its prior holding that the

entire profit on the transaction—tangibles as well as

intangibles—constituted “other revenue”’ within Sec-

tion 406 (b) (R. 261).%° However, the Board distin-

guished between the two elements, and held that it

was “appropriate” to allow Western to ‘keep the net

profit from the sale of the intangibles” (R. 264).

The Board reasoned that the statutory requirement

that it ‘‘take into consideration” the ‘‘need’’ of the

carrier, together with all its other revenue, did not

require it to reduce the carrier’s mail pay “need”

with any part of such other revenue; that this was a

matter for its discretion; and that it might ‘take in”

such other revenue “in whole, in part, or not at all’’

(R. 262). The Board stated that it had approved

the sale of route 68 at a profit “because it would

provide the necessary incentive for Western to dispose

of the properties to another carrier which was in a

position to operate them with greater advantage” ;

that it was the Board’s “serious concern”’ in so doing

that unless Western were allowed a ‘‘commercial

profit,” the Board would be “thwarting the improve-

ment of the air pattern through voluntary action by

the carriers’ (R. 262-263); that if the Board were to

16 The Board stated that it could see “no distinction * * *

between the net revenues derived from the sale of tangibles

such as operating property and equipment, and the net

revenues received from the intangible elements of the sale

such as the earning power of the route. Both kinds of

revenue originated in the same transaction and augmented

the carrier’s net income. Both must be considered in

relation to the carrier’s ‘need’ ”’ (R. 261).

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“safeguard the incentive for voluntary route trans-

fers,”’ it could not refuse Western the right ‘‘to retain

at least some portion” of the profit (R. 264) ; and that,

although the tangible and intangible elements to-

gether “‘made up the single transaction,” they could

be separated to determine “whether, and to what

extent,” the other revenue should be offset against

Western’s ‘‘need”’ (zbid.).

The effect of the Board’s ruling on this issue was to

increase Western’s subsidy by $447,000 over the

amount allowed in the first decision."

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

On the Postmaster General’s petition to review, the

Court of Appeals unanimously held that the Board

had erred in failing to offset the $447,000 profit on the

sale of the route.” The court pointed out that the

Board had not found that “Western itself’? needed

the additional $447,000 subsidy, but only that the

additional amount was given “in order to encourage

The Board, after making further adjustments in the

carrier’s expenditures and tax allowance (R. 333-337),

awarded Western total subsidy mail pay of $3,917,361 (R.

337). Since Western previously had received temporary

mail pay of $4,252,000, the carrier was found to have

received an overpayment of $334,639 (ibid.).

The Postmaster General’s petition for reconsideration,

which challenged the refusal to offset the $447,000, was

denied by the Board without discussion of the issue (R.

333, 337).

” The carrier filed a separate petition to review, alleging

that the Board had awarded it insufficient subsidy. The

court rejected the carrier’s contentions (R. 345-348, 350-351)

See supra, p. 2,n. 1.

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other carriers (not Western) to follow a given course

of action” (R. 348-349). The court held that the

Act does not authorize the Board “to provide in-

centives to the industry generally’ for the develop-

ment of air transportation, but restricts subsidy

payments ‘to the need of each individual carrier to

maintain and continue a development program of its

own” (R. 349-350).

The court stated that it was erroneous to speak of

“offset[ting],” “‘deduct{ing],” or “recaptur[ing)’

profit by including it in revenue, since the need

contemplated by the Act was a “net figure’ which

appears ‘necessary over and above that which the

carrier has,” and not a gross figure from which offsets

or reductions were made (R. 351). The court added

that (R. 351-352):

* * * the passenger revenue, etc., is not

“offset” against or “deducted” from the need

of the carrier. None of the earned revenue is

recaptured. The bare, uncomplicated situa-

tion is that when the carrier has substantial

revenues from non-mail sources the margin of

its need for mail pay is less.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Our statutory arguments under Points I and II

are fully set forth in our brief in Nos. 222 and 223,

this Term, and are merely summarized here.

I. Mail pay is fixed by the Civil Aeronautics

Board either on a “‘service” rate, which constitutes

fair compensation for carrying the mail, or on a

“need” rate, which is an outright subsidy to enable

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the carrier to earn a stated return on its investment.

Section 406 (b) of the Act imposes a clear duty. on

the Board to limit subsidy to such amount as will

meet the carrier’s need as therein defined. In the

instant case, the carrier received subsidy designed to

give it an ample 7 percent return after taxes.

II. The Board declined to offset Western’s profit

on the sale of the route—admittedly ‘other revenue”

of the carrier—on the theory that the Act gives it

“discretion” to ‘take in ‘other revenue’ in whole, in

part, or not at all.” The Act, however, requires the

Board to offset all of the carrier’s other revenue, and

the Board has no discretion to offset only some of it.

Western’s profit from the sale of the route reduced

its need for subsidy from the public treasury just as

much as the prefits from the sale of equipment used

on that route, or from restaurant and slot machine

concessions. By failing to offset the profit on the

certificate, the Board gave Western $447,000 more

subsidy than it needed.

III. There is no issue here as to Western’s right

to ‘‘retain” any portion of the profits on the sale of

the route. Western retains every penny of that

profit. The only issue is how much additional money

Western is to receive as a subsidy from the public

treasury.

The extra subsidy was mot needed to induce

Western itself to sell the route. Indeed, the Board’s

decision makes it clear that Western was given the

additional subsidy in order to encourage other car-

riers to effect route transfers. The Act, however,

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17

makes the need of the individual air carrier the basis

for subsidy, and does not authorize the Board to

award subsidy to provide incentives to the industry

generally.

There is no basis for the Board’s only justification

for its refusal to offset, that other carriers would

refrain from making route adjustments if profits on

such transfers were not to be duplicated with subsidy.

The Board has adequate authority to encourage

route transfers through its other powers under the

Act. Retention of a route not economically adapted

to the carrier’s operations constitutes a failure of

“economical and efficient management” which should

result in reduction of subsidy. Needed changes in

the route pattern can also be effected by the Board

through its power under Section 401 (h) of the Act

to “alter, amend, modify, or suspend” any certificate,

in whole or in part. Moreover, mergers and consol-

idations can accomplish route alterations.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION

In setting aside the Board’s order, the Court of

Appeals held that the Board had erred 'n awarding

Western an additional $447,000 subsidy “‘in order to

encourage other carriers (not Western) to follow a

given course of action” (R. 348-349). The Court

stated that the Act does not authorize the Board

“to provide incentives to the industry generally”’ for

the development of air transportation, but restricts

subsidy payments ‘“‘to the need of each individual

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carrier to maintain and continue a development pro-

gram of its own” (R. 349-350). While we believe

that the court was correct in this conclusion, we do

not rely solely on this basis to support the decision

below, but also rest on the broader ground that

under the Act the Board cannot award subsidy in

excess of a carrier’s need, and that in determining

such need the Board is required to offset all—and

not just a part—of the carrier’s other revenue.

Thus, even if the Board were correct in its contention

(Br. 26-27) that the incentive in this case was for

Western itself, and not for the industry generally—

which we dispute (see infra, pp. 23-26)—that fact

would not validate its refusal to offset the $447,000.

These same general statutory questions as to the

Board’s duty to offset all other revenue also are in-

volved in Nos. 222 and 223, which have been con-

solidated with the instant case for argument. We

have fully set forth our arguments on those issues

in our brief in that case, and will not repeat them

at length here. In sections I and II of this brief

we will merely summarize our position, and refer

the Court to the portions of our brief in Nos. 222

and 223 which discuss those issues in detail.

I.

SUBSIDIES IN THE FORM OF MAIL PAY CANNOT EXCEED

THE ‘“‘NEED’’ OF THE CARRIER

Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act re-

quires the Board, in fixing “fair and reasonable”

rates of compensation for the transportation of mail

by aircraft, to “take into consideration,” inter alia,

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19

* * * the need of each such air carrier for

compensation for the transportation of mail

sufficient to insure the performance of such

service, and, together with all other revenue

of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier

under honest, economical, and efficient man-

agement, to maintain and continue the de-

velopment of air transportation to the extent

and of the character and quality required for

the commerce of the United States, the

Postal Service, and the national defense.

In fixing mail pay, the Board has recognized the

distinction which the Act thus makes between com-

pensation sufficient (1) to insure the transportation

of mail, and (2) to enable the carrier ‘‘to maintain

and continue the development” of a national air

transportation system. Mail pay for economically

self-sufficient carriers is fixed on a so-called ‘service

rate.” This constitutes fair compensation for carry-

ing the mail, is based on mail miles flown, actual or

prospective, and supposedly contains no element of

subsidy. If, on the other hand, the carrier is not

operating profitably, then it is given what the Board

calls a “need rate.”’ This bears no relation to car-

riage of mail at all, but is an outright subsidy de-

signed to enable the carrier to meet its expenses, pay

its taxes, and earn a stated return on its recognized

investment base. (Brief, Nos. 222 and 223, pp.

17-18.) Western received ‘‘need’”’ mail pay in the

instant case designed to give it the 7 percent return

after taxes which the Board customarily allows for

past periods (R. 226).

i hiiainncaretecnstesiianteipinin

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Section 406 (b) imposes a clear duty on the Board

to limit subsidy to such amount as will meet the

carrier’s “need”’ as defined in that section. Although

“need” is not the only factor which the Act requires

the Board to consider, it plainly is a limiting one,

i. e., the Board cannot award subsidy in excess of

what the carrier actually needs. Congress could

hardly have intended, after providing the “carefully

worded ‘need’ formula which the Act sets for the

Board’s guidance in fixing the air mail ‘compensa-

tion’,”’ American Airlines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B.

323, 335, to permit the Board to disregard this

standard by determining and “considering” such

need, and then awarding a subsidy in excess thereof.

Plainly, the Act sets the carrier’s ‘‘need’’ as the

ceiling on subsidy mail payments. See Brief, Nos.

222 and 223, pp. 16-22.

Il.

SECTION 406 (B) REQUIRES THE BOARD, IN DETERMIN-

ING A CARRIER’S SUBSIDY NEED, TO OFFSET ALL—

NOT JUST SOME—OTHER REVENUE OF THE CARRIER

In fixing Western’s mail pay subsidy, the Board in

its initial decision first determined the carrier’s

break-even need by calculating the difference between

the carrier’s nonmail revenues and total allowable

expenses.'* These nonmail revenues included res-

taurant and concession income (R. 191-195) and the

entire profit on the sale of route 68 (R. 195-200), as

well as flight income. In holding that the restaurant

The Board disallowed certain expenses which did not

meet the statutory standard of “honest, economical, and

efficient management” (see supra, p. 12, n. 11).

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21

and concession income was “‘other revenue” for de-

termining mail pay need (R. 191), the Board relied

upon the “broad statutory language referring to all

other revenues,” and the “desirability of reducing

government support where the carrier has net income

available to it from other sources to support its certif-

icated operations * * *” (R. 193, italics in original).

And, in holding that the entire profit on the sale of

route 68 should be offset, the Board stated that it

“would be contrary to the public interest to use pub-

lic funds to subsidize a need which had already been

covered by profits accruing from benefits under the

certificate” (R. 198).

In its second decision, the Board again held that

the entire profit on the sale of route 68 was ‘other

revenue” within Section 406(b) (R. 261). However,

the Board for the first time distinguished between

the profit on the tangibles (equipment) and the

intangibles (certificate), holding that the former but

not the latter should be offset in calculating

break-even need. It did so on the novel theory that

Section 406(b) gives the Board “discretion” to “take

in ‘other revenue’ in whole, in part, or not at all”

(R. 262). We submit that this construction of the

Act is unwarranted, and that under the Act the Board

is required to include all other revenue, and has no

discretion to take it in “in whole, in part, or not at

all.”’

Section 406(b) defines the carrier’s need for subsidy

as an amount which, “together with all other revenue

of the air carrier,” is sufficient to enable the carrier

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to meet the statutory objectives. In other words,

the Board is directed to award subsidy in an amount

which, when added to all the carrier’s other, 7. e.,

non-mail pay, revenue, will provide it with funds to

enable it to “maintain and continue the development

of air transportation.” The “bare uncomplicated

situation is,” as the Court of Appeals stated, “that

when the carrier has substantial revenues from non-

mail sources the margin of its need for mail pay is

less” (R. 351-352). It was this “desirability of

reducing government support where the carrier has

net income available to it from other sources” that

presumably led Congress to require the Board to

offset all other revenue in determining subsidy need. |

The source of such other revenue is immaterial:

the significant fact is its amount. Western’s need

for subsidy was not increased because a portion of

its revenues in 1947 was derived from the sale of a

Government franchise. This revenue reduced the

carrier's need for subsidy from the public treasure

just as much as the revenue from the sale of the |

equipment used in operating under such franchise,”

22

'® In its second decision the Board, in offsetting the profit

on the tangibles, stated that it saw no reason “why the

carrier’s need should be duplicated” therewith (R. 264). The

Board consistently has offset profits on the sale of aircraft

and equipment to reduce a carrier’s subsidy need. Chicago

and Southern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 161, 172

(1941); Colonial Airlines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 71, 77

(1942); Continental Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 825,

843 (1947) ; American Overseas Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B.

695, 706 (1948). In Delta Air Lines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B.

645, 654 (1948), the Board offset net income derived from

an insurance settlement of the crash of one of the carrier’s

aircraft.

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a, —_ee en RO EE

or from the operations of airport restaurant and

slot machine concessions. When Congress used the

words ‘‘all other revenue’”’ in Section 406 (b), it

did not mean “all or some part of such other revenue.”’

(Brief in Nos. 222 and 223, pp. 30-45.)

The result of permitting the Board to ignore

portions of a carrier’s other revenue—for whatever

reason—is to give the carrier a subsidy in excess of its

needs. In the instant case the Board’s holding in

its first decision, not modified in its second decision

(R. 268), was that Western “needed” subsidy which,

together with all its other revenue, 7. e., the entire

profit on the sale of route 68, would give it a 7

percent return for the years 1944 through 1948,

and the Board awarded subsidy on that basis. By

subsequently refusing to offset the profit on the

intangibles, the Board in effect gave the carrier an

additional subsidy of $447,000. This results in a

return of 14.76 percent for 1947, the year in which

Western received the profit on the sale of route 68.

The Board, however, had already determined that

Western needed only a 7 percent return in that year.

By thus giving Western a subsidy $447,000 greater

than it needed, the Board departed from the statu-

tory requirement (see Point I, supra) that, subsidy

cannot exceed the need of the carrier.

III.

WESTERN DID NOT “NEED” THE $447,000 ADDI-

TIONAL SUBSIDY MAIL PAY, AND THE AWARD THERE-

OF WAS NOT MADE ON THE BASIS OF WESTERN’S

NEED

In refusing to offset the profit on the sale of the

certificate, the Board did not find that Western

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“needed” an additional subsidy of $447,000, or that

it ‘‘needed” a return of 14.76 percent in 1947 (see

supra, p. 23). On the contrary, the Board merely

stated that ‘“‘* * * if we are to safeguard the in-

centive for voluntary route transfers, we cannot now

refuse Western the right to retain at least some por-

tion of the net profit from the sale of Route No. 68”

(R. 264). But the Board’s policy of encouraging

voluntary route transfers does not establish the

‘need’ of the transferring carrier to receive extra

subsidy, and it is clear that Western did not need the

additional subsidy awarded in this case.

In the first place, the Board’s theory is predicated

on an erroneous assumption. ‘There is no question

here as to Western’s right to “‘retain’”’ any portion of

the proceeds of the sale of route 68.29 As the Court

of Appeals recognized, under a subsidy system

“{njone of the [carrier’s] earned revenue is recaptured”

(R. 351). Contrary to the Board’s suggestion (R.

263), Western “keeps” every penny of the $3,750,000

it received from the sale of route 68, including the

$1,099,000 profit. The sole question here is how

® The correctness of the Board’s permitting Western to

sell its certificate at a profit is questionable. Section 401(j)

of the Act, which provides that no certificate shall confer any

“proprietary” or “property” right on the holder, seemingly

precludes such trafficking in certificates. Notes, 48 Co-

lumbia Law Review 88(1948), 61 Harvard Law Review 523

(1948); see dissent of Chairman Landis in the route transfer

case, 8 C. A. B. at 333-334, 341-345.

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25

much additional money Western is to receive as a

subsidy from the public treasury. Or, putting it

differently, the question is whether the Government

js to duplicate through subsidy a portion of the profit

previously realized by the carrier on the sale of its

government franchise.

There is no showing that the extra subsidy was

necessary to induce Western to make the transfer

of route 68. Indeed, in its first decision the Board

flatly found that (R. 198-199)—

There is no indication in the record that

had Western been certain that the profit it

would realize on the sale would be considered

“other revenue” it would not have sold the

route. In fact, it had no basis for believing

otherwise when it negotiated the sale.

That finding has not been repudiated, and clearly is

correct. As the Board itself recognized in its de-

cision in the route transfer case (8 C. A. B. at 302-

303) and concedes before this Court (Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, No. 224, p. 11), it was Western’s

critical financial situation and its desire to dispose

of a route not adapted to its long-term development

as a regional carrier which prompted the sale.

Moreover, Western could hardly have anticipated

that the Board would exclude the profit from con-

sideration for mail pay purposes. The clear warn-

ing in Chairman Landis’ dissent in the transfer case

that the transfer profit would reduce need mail pay

ieee

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26

went unanswered in the majority opinion.” The

only Board decision that had dealt with the question

up to that time included profits on the sale of a route

in determining the carrier’s need. Inland Air Lines,

Mail Rates, 1 C. A. A. 155, 162-163 (1939). Thus

it cannot fairly be said that Western ‘‘needed”’ this

extra subsidy even in the special sense that, without

it, the carrier would not have sold the route.

Nor is exclusion of such profits justified as a means

of encouraging route transfers generally. For, as the

Court of Appeals correctly held, the Act does not

authorize the Board “to provide incentives to the

industry generally,’ but restricts subsidy payments

“to the need of each individual carrier to maintain

and continue a development program of its own”

(R. 349-350). And it is clear that the Board awarded

Western additional subsidy “in order to encourage

other carriers (not Western)”’ to effect route trans-

fers.

In its second decision, the Board (R. 265)—

emphasized that our decision not to include

the net profit from the sale of intangibles was

reached solely because we are thus seeking to

encourage improvement of the air route pat-

*1Chairman Landis pointed out in his dissenting opinion

that “under any theory” the $1,500,000 was “revenue under

section 4(6(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act which the Board

must take into consideration in fixing any need rate. The

Board thus must in the last analysis charge the subsidy that

Western will get and upon which it must depend with that

amount, so that in the end Western’s acquisition of $1,500,000

becomes only a temporary advance against future subsidy

payments.” 8C. A. B. 344-345.

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COPY BOUND C

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27

tern through voluntary route transfers by

other air carriers [emphasis added].

The Board also stated that it had permitted West-

ern a “commercial profit” in selling route 68 to pre-

vent “thwarting the improvement of the air pattern

through voluntary action by the carriers,” and that

the incentive of profit from a route sale should be

“preserved here’’ in order “to continue to encourage

voluntary action by the carriers” (R. 263). In other

words, the Board gave Western additional subsidy of

$447,000 in order to preserve the incentive for other

carriers to sell their routes at some future date.”

The Act, however, makes the ‘“‘need of each such air

carrier’ (emphasis added) the basis for awarding

subsidy. Plainly, Western cannot be said to have

needed the additional subsidy because other carriers

might otherwise be discouraged from effecting future

route transfers.

Furthermore, there is no basis for the Board’s

assumption that other carriers would refrain from

making route adjustments if profits on such transfers

were not to be duplicated with additional subsidy.

As the Board noted in its first opinion (R. 199), the

only major airline acquisition during the period 1947-

1951—the purchase of American Overseas Airlines

by Pan American Airways—was consummated on

the basis of approximate book value, and raised no

issue as to profit on intangibles. North Atlantic

® Indeed, the Board recognized in its second decision that

in approving the sale of route 68 it had not been “concerned

* * * with the ultimate treatment of the profit which was ‘

to be realized by Western * * *” (R. 262; see R. 196).

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a

28

Route Transfer Case, 11 C. A. B. 676, petitions to

review dismissed for want of jurisdiction, sub nom.

Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 184

F. 2d 66 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 340 U. S. 941.

This fact, the Board stated, indicated that “there

were sufficient incentives to negotiate this transaction

on the part of both parties which outweighed the

consideration of a profit,” and that ‘the profit motive

is [not] such a necessary consideration for the accom-

plishment of route transfers or mergers as Western

would have us believe” (R. 199).

The Board has adequate authority to encourage

route transfers through its other powers under the

Act without having to resort to subsidies from the

public treasury to accomplish this end. The Act

requires carriers claiming subsidy to meet the stand-

ard of “honest, economical and efficient manage-

ment.”” Retention of a route not economically

adapted to the carrier’s operations constitutes a

failure of ‘economical and efficient management”

just as much as operation of an excessive number of

* Whatever significance the granting of additional subsidy

once may have had as a means of encouraging route transfers,

it appears to be of diminishing importance today. For more

and more of the major domestic carriers have, as they

achieved economic self-sufficiency, shifted from a need to a

service basis. Civil Aeronautics Board, Administrative

Separation of Subsidy from Total Mail Payments to United

States Air Carriers, September 1953 Revision, p.3. Subsidy,

of course, can be used to encourage route transfers only as

long as the carrier is on a need rate.

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29

flights,“ payment of excessive salaries,” retention of

unnecessary aircraft,”* or unduly high maintenance

charges,” The Board hasreduced subsidy payments to

take account of the foregoing management inefficien-

cies. There is no reason why similar adjustments in

subsidy mail pay cannot and should not be made with

| respect to uneconomical routes‘that a carrier refuses

torelinquish. Since Western had taken the position

| in the route transfer case that it no longer could operate

Route 68 effectively unless it went into the trans-

| continental field and acquired substantial additional

equipment which it then was not in a position to

acquire, retention of the route under those circum-

stances would itself have constituted a failure of

“economical and efficient”? management.

We think the complete answer was given by the

Board itself in its first decision. In reply to West-

ern’s argument that inclusion of the profit as ‘‘other

revenue” would adversely affect carriers’ incentives

voluntarily to adjust route patterns, the Board

stated:

* Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C. A. B. 705, 708-712.

*5 Pioneer Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 175, 185; Trans-

Texas Airways, Mail Rates, 12 C. A. B. 101, 110.

** In the instant case, Western “moved quickly” to reduce

the size of its fleet of DC-4 aircraft following a “rapid drop

in traffic volume”’ in the fall and winter of 1946-1947 (R.

63-64).

” Northeast Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 291, 296-304.

In the instant case the Board disallowed certain excessive

maintenance expenditures by Western (R. 212).

Sele

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The incentive of a carrier wishing to dispose

of a route or to merge is to correct a situation

which is inimical to its best interests, such as

the operation of an uneconomical route that

will mitigate against its over reaching self-

sufficiency. The incentive to divest itself of

such a [uneconomical] route should be rein-

forced by the realization that subsidy mail pay

will not be forthcoming to perpetuate an uneco-

nomic route pattern [R. 198, emphasis added].

Indeed, the Board’s settled policy to “reduce the

extent of their [carriers’] dependence upon compensa-

tion from the Government,” ** which the Board

reasserted in its first decision (R. 193), requires such

a result.

The Board also can effect desirable changes in the

route pattern through its power under Section 401

(h) (supra, p. 3) to “alter, amend, modify, or sus-

pend” any certificate, in whole or in part, “if the

public convenience and necessity so require.” Pur-

suant thereto the Board recently suspended the

authority of two trunkline carriers to serve particular

points authorized under their certificates in order to

allow local carriers to serve the same places. Western

Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 196 F. 2d 933

(C. A. 9), certiorari denied, 344 U. S. 875; United

Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 198 F. 2d 100

*% Pan American-Grace Airways, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B.

550, 589 (1942).

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31

(C. A. 7). Furthermore, appropriate mergers and

consolidations, which the Board has not hesitated to

suggest in the past,” afford another method of

accomplishing route alterations without any drain

on the public purse.

We submit that the Board had no basis, eviden-

tiary or otherwise, for a conclusion that Western

needed the additional subsidy of $447,000. In its

first opinion the Board clearly recognized that fact.

But in the second opinion the Board shifted from the

statutory test of need to the erroneous policy concept

that having allowed Western a ‘‘commercial profit’’

in the route transfer case, it should permit the

carrier to “retain’’ some of such profit. The Act,

however, requires that all other revenue be taken

into account in determining need, and confers no

discretion upon the Board to offset such other

revenue “in whole, in part, or not at all’ (R. 262).

In awarding Western an additional $447,000 subsidy

to encourage changes in the route pattern, the

Board exceeded its statutory authority.

* See the Board’s show cause order suggesting the com-

bination of Continental Air Lines and Mid-Continent Air-

lines. Order No. E-5803, Docket No. 5173, October 23,

1951. The proceeding was dismissed following the proposed

voluntary merger of Mid-Continent and Braniff Airways.

Order E-6107.

A recent comment suggests a possible merger program for

the airlines. 60 Yale L. J. 1196, 1213-1217 (1951).

eee ene

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32

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert L. STERN,

Acting Solicitor General.

. Srantey N. BaARNEs,

J Assistant Attorney General.

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,

v Murray L. Scuwartz,

Special Assistants to the Attorney General.

Ross RIz.ey,

Solicitor.

FREDERICK E. BatRvs,

Associate Solicitor.

EuGENE J. BRAHM,

Assistant Solicitor,

Post Office Department.

Vv

DECEMBER 1953.

U &. OVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1983

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