Transcript of Record — Burns v. Wilson

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SUPREME COURT.U.S.° -

“TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD.»

v

¢

Supreme Court of the United States }

OCTOBER TERM, 1952

"9

No. 422, 7 ¢ eer

‘SoM Ww. BURNS § AND HERM AN B/DENGIS, JR.

, - PETITIONERS,

¢ *, “ < . 8. e -

‘ROBERT | A. LOVETT, § SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 7 8

ETAL. | :

i

| ~~,

ON WRIT UF CE RTIORgRI TO THEY NITED STATES COURT Or AP PE Als S

‘FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLU MBIA CIRCUIT

&

"PETITION: obama FILED OcroBER : 29, 1952

ee CERTIORARI GRAN D: DECEMBER 15, 1952 : ®

fae , te aaa:

SUPREME COURT OF ‘THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER a 1952

Se

: No.:

ROBERT W. BU RNS AND HERM AXP. DENNIS, -:

PE STITH IN ERS,

; “ee - * : ©

ROBERT ALL OVI ETT, SEC RET ARY'OF DEF Bi SE,

¢ ; . _ET AL.

“on PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT.OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

@ ° .

| INDEX | =

: : Original Print °

tecord from U.S.D.C., District of Columbia | yt oe a

a Petition for Wiit of. Habeas Corpus for Appellant. :

Robert W. Burns — - . a , i ae

Motion to Dischargeyghe Rule to Show Cruse and Dis- i

miss thé Petition for Writ of H: abeas Corpus o 5

Petition for Writ cf Habeas Corpus. for Appellant

Herman P. Dennis, Jr. ° 10 9 £

Metion to Discharge the ‘Rule te Show Cause and Dis-

miss the Petition for Writ ef Habeas Corpus 17° 15 ..

Memorandum Opinion in the Case of RObert W. Burgys.

{Note :, Memorandum Opinion involying Appeliant .

Herman P, Dennis was not invluded since the two

Opsnions are identical.) : 21 “18

Jupp & Derweiter (INC.), Printers, Wasnincron, D.., Sept. §, 1952.

—3687 ~

©

il : INDEX

- Original

Reeord, from U.S.D.C., District of Coliumbia—-Continned —

Order dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus

- of Robert W. Burns (Note: Order of the Court in

the Case of Appellant Herman .P. Dennis was not

included sinve the two Orders are identical.) 23:

Proceedings in U\S.C.A. , District of Columbia Circuit — 24

. Minute entry of argument and _saOmission (omitted in

printing) ERR GY gee 24

Opinion, Prettyman, J. . ey ee : 2%

Dissenting opinion, Bazelon, a , ae ee lee ME 48

Judgment... being RT iy 61

Order amending judgment 7 ee SORE .. © 6la

Designation of record Pe ... (omitted in printing) 62

Clerk’s certificate | ... (omitted in printing) .- 64

. Og me

65

Order allowing certiorar

°

. é ° .

“. . . ba : ‘

a,

°

Print |

[ fol. 1] v3 1 :

IN “THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. FOR

; THE DISTRICT. OF COLUMBIA’ re

ie ne i eee

+7 Rosert W. Burns, Petitioner,

v.

6 Ronerr A. Loverr, Secretary of . Defense; THomas . K.

Finterrey, Secretary of tle Air Ferce; General Hoyt 8.

“Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force | 2

‘ . ®

Prrition FOR Whit oF Hane AS Corpus, oa °

. To the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia: "5,

Comes now the petitioner, Robert W. Burns, by his, at-

torneys, Frank D..Reeyes, Thurgood Marshall and Robert

L. Carter, and respectfully shows that:

1. He | isa Negro, a citizen of the United States and a.

member of the United States Air Force, AF 39 341 855.

At ‘the time of ‘his court-martial.econviction, which.is.as-

satléd herein, he was stationed on the island of Guam, an

insular possession of the United States, as a Staff Sergeant

inthe 12th Air Ammunition Squadron, APO 264.

2 He is unjustly and unlawfully detained and imprisoned

> under color of authority of the United States, in the-custody

of Headquarters, Japan Logistical Command, APO 503.

Said Command is under the authority offand responsible to,

Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense; Thomas K. Fin-

letter, Seeretary of the Air Force; and General Hoyt. S.

Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air. Foree, all of

i are within the jurisdiction of this Court.

The cause or pretext of such detention is by. virtue

sah ?| of ‘A trial by genera] court-martial for dae and

rape in.violation of Artiele of War 92 on May 27-30, 1949, at

Headquarters, 19th Bombardment Wing (Medium), APO

304, resulting in. petitioner’s conviction and sentence of

death. The court. martial proceedings were approved by

H

.

‘ , 7 : ,

2 % o

:

the reviewing authority, and the record forw -arded. to W ashi-

ington for appellate review in the office’ of the Sudge Advo-

cate General, United States Air Force. On March 14,1950,

a Board of Revi iew, and on 18 August; 1950, the Judicial:

Council, 4 Court Martial Reports (AF) 907, found the con-

viction and seftence legally sufficient and recommended con-

firmation. The Judge: ‘Advocate General concurred in these

conclusions, “and-on August 3, 1951, the conviction and

seaifence were confirmed and ordered executed by the Presi-

dent pursuant to Article of War38. Petitioner made ap-

plication. to the Judge Advocate General for a new, trial,

pursuant to Section 12, Act.of May 5, 1950 (formerly Artiéle

of War 53), and on January 28, 1952, his petition for a new

‘trial was denied. Petitioner has now exhausted all avail-

wble remedies provided by fhe military, and his’ only re-

course is to seek redress in this Court by way of shis-peti-

tion. — .. .

4, All of said actions resulting tn the contifining re-

straint and imprisonment of your petitioner are illegal and

in violation of the Artictes of War and the Fifth Amend-

‘ment. to the Constitution of the United States in that the

original conviction and sentence by court martial was be-

yond the jurisdiction of the U nited States Air Force and

Was secured in a manner violative of péetitioner’s tights asa

citizen of the United States, as a member of the United

States Air Force and as a person subject to laws and regula-

tions of an insular possession of the United States.

5. On December 11, 1948? Ruth. Farnworth, a white

civilian worker on Guam, was found missing under cireum-

stances les ding to the belief tnat a crime had been com-

mitted. On about December 13, she was found in a wooded

area near the place where she worked. She was’ unconscious

and ina critical condition.. As a result of medical examina-

{fol. 3] tion, it was concluded that she had. been raped and -

Beaten, She was taken to a hospital and on December 14.

- died without regov ering consciousness,

. On January. 7, 1949, military authorities turned peti-

Sonse over to civil authorities on the island of Guam, who

placed him under arrest and held him-in detention. These

officials were officers: and men of the United States Navy

and subject to the orders of the President of .the United

States and his appointees. For the next several weeks,

3

3 e

petitioner was held incommunicado in a death cell at Agana

p jail without process, subjected to continuous questioning,

heaten, denicd-steep and edible food. “(Affidavit of FE. 4.

Grimmett filed herewith as Exhibit A) “He was not allowed

to consult counsel during the entire period he was held in

custody by the authorities-of Guam, and in fact petitioner

was not furnished counsel nor allowed to obtain the advice

of counsel until one day before his trial by general court

martial which began, as heretofore alleged, on May 27, 1949.

(Exhibit A) On or about January 360, 1949, petitioner was

returned by the authorities of Guam to the custody of

Headquarters, 19th Bombardment Wing (Medium), U nited

States Air Force. On February 20, 1949, be, was officially

charged with rape and murder and after investigatfon by

military authorities, trial by general court martial was or-

dered, and petitioner was tr ied and conv icted as heretofore

ier

Petitioner ‘was apveaied, detained, interrogated ane

intimidated ’ in violation of the Penal Code of Guam in force

in January 1949, namely Sections 686, TSO and 825 thereof,

and.the Bill of Rights of Guam (set forth in Appendix

hereto) and the Constitution of..the United States. As a

result of these unlawful tactics, Herman Dennis and Calvin

{fol 4] Dennis, who were arrested: af the same time and

subjected to the same treatment, signed coerced confessions

and implicated petitioner in the crime for which he was

finally charged and convicted: The fruits of these unlawful

activities were ysed by the U nited States Air Force neainst

petitioner in his trial by ge ‘neral-eourt martial i in violation

of the Con: titution of the U nited States and the. Articles-of |

War. Further, upon petitioner’s being taken tn custody by

the United States Air Force, continued pressure dnd intimj-

dation were used to gethim to*confess: implication In the

ay ime. (Exhibit A’ Affidyi its of Edward Daly, filed herewith

as Exhibits C, Dand B) Failing in this, ihe military author-

ities used threats and promises in an attempt to get Calvin

Dennis (Affidavit ef Calvin Dennis, fileasherewith as Ex-.

hibits G and H) and: Herman P. Dennis, Jr. (f#xhibit A

and Affidavit. of Herman -P. Dennis, Jr. filed herewith as -

Exhibit B) to testifv against petitioner at his court-martial

trinl, Both the police authorities of Guam and the military

authorities of the Uyited States Air Forée contrived a con-

.

4

. . ” "¢ : . . . . .

viction through the pretense of 4 trial and the presentation

of testimony known to be perjured in violation of the Arti-_

cles of War and the Fifth Amendment to the (' onstitution of

the United States.

8, Although petitioner was tried by general court martial

for a‘eapital offense, counsel furnished him had only one

day to prepare his defefise, thereby deprivin® petitioner of

his right to effective counsel. (Exhibit A) Important_evi-

dence tending to show his innocence. was Suppressed. (Ex-

hibits C, Dand FE) The testimony of Calvin Dennis against

him at this trial resulted from threats and promises of ~

special consideration if Calvin Dennis agreed to testify

against your petitioner. (Exhibits A,C,D,@GandH) This

testimony, Calvin Dennis, how by his voluntary sWorn

[fol. 5] affidavit hereto attached, admits was pe rehired and

that any and all statements he made intending to establish

the guilt of petitioner were false, all-of which is in viola-

tion of petitioner's rights.of due-process as secured by fhe; -

(C‘onstitution arid laws of the United States and the Ar ticles |

of = ar.

The entire trial was conducted in an atmosphere af

terror, hysteria and vengeance (Exhibits A, C,D, and affi- -

davit of Mary L. Hill; filed herewith as F shibit F) thereby

preventing petitioner from being afforded due process gs

euaranteed by the Corfstitution of the United States and

rendering his trial, conviction and sentence wholly uncon-

_ stitutional and void. - : ee ss

10. Except for testimony of Calvin .Dennis, which the

- jitter now admits Was perjured, no te;fimony in the record

in any way directly connects this petitioner with the ¢rime —

‘for whieh he was charged‘ and convicted. Petitioner then

and now, professes that he is completely innacent of the

crime for whieh he stands convicted and condemned to

death.

11. The enmulative effect.of all of the above-stated con-—

diti as was to make petitiotier’s trial a mgsk for the denial

of petitioner's constitutional rights. Petitioner contends

tliat he ts entitled as an American citizen and an airnian in

the United States Air Force to a fair and impartial trial in’ -

accordance with the guarantees of the C oustitution of the -

United States and the Articles of War, and in that he was

~ oe

denied these fundamental rights, he is entitled to release

from custody of respondents, a

Wherefore, your petitioner prays:

1. That a writ of habeas corpus issue out of this Court

directed to Robert A: Lovet tt, Secretary of Defense; Thowias

K: Finletter, Secretary -of he Air. Force; General. Hoyt

Ss. V andenberg, ( ‘hief of Staff, United States Air Force; or

-[fol. 6] some person and persons acting in their place and

stead, requiring ihe to order He: idquarters, Japan Lowisti-

cal Command to produce the hody of your petitioner before |

this Court at sonle time gonvenient to he designated, to

abide hy what shall be awarded by the Court in’ premises,

to discharge petitioner from ; said imprise apmeat, and for

am: general and equitable relief.

2. That in the alternative, a rule to show cause why such

writ should not issue directed to said respondents he

granted herein. 3 : we

3. That a hearing be had before this Court fo i inquire into

and determine the legality of said’ detention. and that pend-

ing said liearing, shid respondents, and each of them, bé sre.

quired to stay execution of the sentence of death agi inst the |

petitioner pending final determination of thispetition.

4. That upon final hearng, petitioner may be discharged

from said custody.

5. For‘other and further relief as to the Court may seem -

meet and proper, _ yh

Fr ‘iat D. Reeves, 1901 lith Street, N. W.; W ashing-

n, D. C.; Thurgood Marshall, Robert L. Carter,

Pa West 40th Street, New York 18, New York, At-

torneys for Petitioner. ©

[ fol. al In’ THE Unirep States District Cov RT =

&° “+

[Title omitted]

a : ~ fs a , J

Mortos to DiscHarce THE RULE to SHow Causk anp Dis-

MISS THE PETITION For Writ or Hapeas Corpis

Gomes now the respondents, roRert A, Lovett; Seeretar v

of Detense 37 Thoms IX. Finletter, Secretary of the “Air

ih i | i | D7

i?

* gi

;

6

Forse: an General Hoyt S. V: pn No x, Chief of Staff,

United States Air Force, and by their attorneys move to —

discharge the rule to show cause aud dismiss the: petition

filed herein. because the. petition fails to state,a claim upon

which relief can be granted as hereinafter more specifically

indicated. Piet fe ;

1.4? he petition raises no questions Peviewable by this

court inasmuch as it fails to allege that the court: martial

was improperly constitgted, tHat the court-martial” was

without, jurisdiction over the offenses and the petitioner or

that the sentence adjudged by the court. anartial Was mau:

thorized by law.' |

oy habeas corpus ‘the civil courts” may exercise no

supervisory or eorrecting power over the proceedings of a

court: martial. «The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdigtion.*

‘In this case, the court-martial was lawfully consti- °

tuted, had. jurisdiction of the petitioner and the offenses

charged, and acted withjn its lawful powers ‘in adjudging oa

“the sentence, The correction of anv errors it-may haye

‘committed: is for ‘the military authorities which are: alone

authorized to review its decision. :

Py fol. 8] °4.-The court-martial proceedings have been exten-

“sively reviewed in accordance with the Articles of War and

the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1949. The petitioner was.

tried on Maw 27, 28,. and 30, 1949, at. Headquarters, 19th

Jombardment Wing, Medium, APO 334,: by a general court-

martial lawfully appointed by the’ Commanding General,

Twentieth Air Force. The petitioner was charged with rape,

and murder of one Ruth Farnsworth, in violation of the

' Hiatt v. Brown, 339° U S108, 94 Led. ene eee |

rehearing- denied, 339 U.S. 980, 4 L. ed. 1356, 70 S. Ct. 672

(1950), |

* Hiatt v. Brown, supra, 339 0 ‘S.at 11; United’States v.

Grimley, 187 U.S. 147, 100, 34 I. ed. = 6387, 11 S..Ct. 54

(1890). :

.. * Matt v. Brown, supra; Re Yamashita, ; oat GU.S.-1, 8,

9, 90 LL. ed. 499, 505, D006 », O68 SG. Ct. B40 (1946); Swaim Vv.

: t hited Ptates ‘be, 160 U s. om Ye, 562, 4] L. ed, B23, ITs A nt &. 9 448

(1897).

‘ ws

62nd Article of War (10: USC 1564), found guilty of both’

offenses and seritencedl to.death. The record of trial, a’

copy of which has been. filed with the petition for writ of

habeas corpus “in this action, was reviewed by the Staif

Judge Advocate, Twentieth Air Force, in accordance with

the: provisions of Article of War 47: (10 USC 1518), and,

after said review the sentencé was approved by the réeceiv-

ing authority, the, Conimanding General, Twentieth: Air.

Force. A copy of the review of the Staff Judge Advocate.

and the approving action of the reviewing authority are at-

tached hereto as Exhibits ‘‘A’’ and “BY respectively and

these Exhibits. as well as Exhibits “(C’’; “Dy EB’,

“E*) and ‘*G"" hereinafter referred to are by reference

made a part hereof as fully as though rewritten herein.

The, record of trial was then forwarded to the Office of

The-Fadge Advocate General, United States Air Force, for

review hy a Board of Review pursuant to the provisions of »

Article 9f War 50. (10 USC 1521). After comprehensive

Sctisidvdation of the record of trial by the Board-of Re-

View, whieh.review ineluded submission of brief and argu.

ment by the ‘attorney for petitioner before the Board, the

Board of. Reyiew on March 14, 1950, held the record-of trial

legally ‘sufficient to support the findines of guilty and the

sentence tnd to warrant the confirmation, thereof. ~ (A

copy of the opinion of the Board of Review is attached

hereto, marked Exhibit i Sead | The record of trial Was teen

rev fewed by the Judicial Council, Office of The Jude Ad-

vocate General, United States Air F orce, pursuant ta the

provisions of Article of War 48 (10 USC 1519) and 507710

USC 1521) which review included submission of brief and’

oral argument by the attorney for petitioners The Judicial

[fol. 9] Council, on August 18, 1950, held the record. of trial

legally sufficient to-support. the findings of guilty and the

sentence, and. to. warrant confirmation thereof, pit subi-

mitted its opinion, (a copy of which is appended as Exhibit.

“D™) to The Judge Advocate General, United States Air

Force. On November 14, 1950, pursuant to the provisions > ‘

of Article of War 50 (10 USC 1521) the reeord of trial, the

opinions of the Board of Review and of the -Fudicial Coun

ei, and the reécomme dations of The Judge Advocite Gen.

eral, United States Air Foree, (a copy of the latter is at-

.

= ° ‘ Pa mes ° : ? .- "

‘tached hereto gs Exhibit ‘‘F’’) were @ransmittg@l to the .

Secretary, of the Air Foree for the action of the”’President.-

On August- J 1951, the death sentence was cqnfirmed by the’

. President pursuant ‘to the provisions of Article of War 48

(10 USC 1519) and. ordered ‘to be carried into execution.

‘A vopy.of the Action hy the President is appended herefias

Exhibit “F’’:. By petition of August 31, 1951, to The Judge

. Advocate General, United States Air Foree, the petitioner

requested any and all relief afforded by Article of War 53

(10 USC 1525}°(Now Section 12, Act of 5+ ‘May 1950). In

support of such petition were raised allegations similar to

those presented in the petition for habeas corpus. The

Judge Advocate General appointed a ‘board of officers to

hear argument by counsel for petitioner, consider all evi-

dence, and make recommendations. After -re-examination

by The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Foree,

of the entire record of trial and the independent investiga-

tions conducted ‘at his request in the ligkt of the grounds |

set forth in the petition, The Judge Advocate General,

United States Air Force, denied‘the application :for relief

on January 28,-1952.° A copy of his action and: the Memo-

randum of C pinion relative to the denial of such relief is

appended hereto as Exhibit ‘*G’’..

Charles M. Irelan, United States Attorney, Wash-

ington, D. C.; B. M. Landé&man, Assistant 4/nited

States Attorney, Washington, D. €., Attorneys

for Re ‘spondents. ;

- Of, Counsel, Walter Kiechel, te ea Colonel,

USAR,.

USAF, Office of The Judge Advocate General,

Washington, D. C. ;

~

,

ee

(fol. 10] In tue-Untrep Staves District Court

No. — a

« Herman P. Dennis, Jr., Petitioner,

ay naga g

ee |

Rosen “A. Lovet, Seeretary of. Defense; THomas K. Fiy-

- LETTER, Secretary of the’ Air Force; Genegat Hoy S.

VANDENBERG, Chief of Statf,. United States ‘Air Force

-Pertrion FOR W RIT OF Hase AS Corprs

To: the United St tates District Court ‘for the District of

Columbia | ;

Comes now petitioner, Heyman P. Dennis, Ie: by-his at-

torneys, Frank D. Reeves, Thurgood Marshall and Robert

L. ¢ ‘arter, and respectfully shows that:

1. He is a Negro, a citizen of the U nited States and a

member of the United States Atr Force, AF 18 101 483. At

the time 6f his court-martial conviction, which is assailed

herein, he was stationed on the island of Guam, an insular

possession of the United States, as a private in the 12th

Air-Ammunitién Squadron, APO 264.

2. Tle is unjustly and unlawfully detained and imprisoned

by color of authority of the U nited States, in the: custody

of Headquarters of the Japan Logistical Command, APO

503. Said Command is under the authority of, and respon-

sible to, Robegt a. ‘Lovett, Secretary of Defe nse; Thomas

‘K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force; and General Hoyt

S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States. Air Force, all

of whem are within the jurisdiction of the Uuited States

-Distrivt Court for the Qystrict of € ‘olumbia, ‘

[fol. 114 3. The cause or pretext of such detention is by

virtue of a trial by general court-martial ori May 9-16, 1949,

at Headquarters, 20th Air Force APO 234, where the peti-

tioner was charged with murder and rape in, violation of

Article of War 92. This trial resulted in.the petitioner’s ’

conviction and sentence of death. The court-martial pro-

ceedings were approved by the reviewing authority, and the

ee 2

0 . “ , 4 iA

“record forwarded to Wi ashington for appellate review in the

office of thé Judge Advocate. Generak: United States: Air

Faree. On November 29, 1949, a Board of Review, and on

July 15, 1950, the Judicial Council, 4. Court-Martial Reports |

(AF )872, found the conviction and sentence legally sufficient

and recommended confirmation. The Judge Advocaté Gen-

eral concurred an these cone usignss and on August ! 3, 1951,

the conviction and sentence was confirmed: and Sieve

‘executed hy the President, pursuant to Article of War 38.

_Petitioner made application t6 the Judee Advocate. General

“for a-new tri ial, pyrsuant. to Section 12, Act of May 5, 1950

(formerly Article of War55), andon January 28, 1952, this

petition was denied. Petitioner has e shausted all available

_ remedies in the guilitary establishment, and .his only re-

course is now to seek redress i in ‘this € ourt by way of this -

—_— me A a

All of said actions iavaliies ir the continuing restraint

ee iiprisonment of your petitioner are illegal and in viola-

tion of the Constitution of the United States and the Fifth

Amendment thereof, in that the original alleged conviction

and sentence by court-martial’ was beyond the ‘jurisdiction

and lawful authority of the United States Air ‘Force and

seeured in a manner violative of petitioner’s rights as -a_

citizen of tlie United States, as a‘member of the United

States Air Foree and asa person subject to Ho tid regula-

tions of an insular possession of the United’ States and. are *

without authority andesvoid.. ,

5. On December ) 1948). Ruth: Fransworth, a white

civilian-worker on Guam, was found missing under cire um-

“stances leading to the. belief that @A cringe had hetn’ com-

tfol. 12] mitted. On December 13, she was found int

wooded area near the plree where she. worked, She was

uncanscious and ina eritie

iow: ri oe -Asa result of medi-

cal examination, it was con®fided that she had been raped

~ and beaten. She was taken to a hospiti il ane on December

14 she. died without” recover me CONSCIOUSNESS,

6. On January 7, 1949, petitioner was arrested without

“being informed of the chaeged against him (R. 218, 226)

and detained by police authorities on the island’ of Gian, a

United States posséssion under American sovereignty,

These police authorities were officers and men of the Unite id

11

States Navy and subject to the orders of the President of

the United States and his appointees, Petitioner was held

until January 17, 1949, before being arraigned by any

authority (R. 297), He--was held incommunicado without

process, (R. 193-4, 203-4, 214, 221, 244, Affidavit of. Haward

.Daly field, herewith as Exhibit C,>and Affidavit of BE. BE.

~ Grimmett filed herewith as Exhibit A) subjected a con.

rT . =>

of WE ee

‘tinuous questioning, (R. 197, 228, 240-2, Exhibit A, C and _

Affidavit of petitionér filed herewith as Exhibit B), beaten,

(Exhibits B, C, and: Affidavit of Mary. L-fiill filed herewith

as Exhibit F) denied sleep and food csi A) and placed

in'solitary confinement (R, 193-4, 203-4, 214, 22144, Exhi-

bits A and C). He was not allowed to ‘consult, counsel dey”

spite his requests durigg the entire time he wis héld in

custody by the authoritips of Guam (R. 232, Exhibits Ay ye

On or about January 29, 1949) petitioner was returned by

the authorities of Guam to the enstody :of. Headquarters,

20th Air Foree, APO 234 (R. 331). On February 1, 1949,

charges against the petitioner were fiked by the Air Foree.’

‘After an investigation by military authoritiés the ease was

referred’ for trial on March 21, 1949.) Amended charges

were filed on April 14, 1949. Defense attorneys were not

appointed-until April 8, 1949, and petitioner did not have

the opportunity to receive advice of counsel until shortly

before his trial convened. on May 9, 1949 (Exhibit C).

[fol 13] -7, During the period of his detention by the naval

eatin 's on Guam, petitioner withort being adequi itely

advised of his rights, (R. 218, 219-23) 227§7), 242-3 , 254,

279, Exhibits A, «> F) as required under’ Article of: WwW ar 24.

‘andthe Fifth Amendment te the Constitution of the United.

States, made four confessions to the poiice. authorities on

or about January 11, 12 and 13th. These confessions were

the result of physical duress, protracted interrogation, the

‘use of a le detector, threats that if he did. not confess, he

would receive the death sentence, promises of lenieney anil

°

special consideration if he did confess and the use of var 1OMS

ges rifuges (R. 188-198, 230 ff, 256-8, 239 ff, Exhibits A,

BF). I ee was also told what to say in his ei.

pasa (E. 191-2, 210, 245, Exhibit. B and Affidavit of peti

tioner filed herein “as Malibit G) anid: subse iyeytly both

hefoire and at his tri: ilall of his confessions were repudiated

v

<3

won? *

2°

(R.: 250- 1, 969-3). In addition, on or about January 8, 1949,

petitioner without being advised of his constitutional rights

against self-inerimini ation had taken from ed gi certain

pubie hairs which were subsequently used

against him (R. 161, Exhibit B).

8’ Prior to his trial petitioner’s requést for inane! of

as evidence

; bis choice: was denied and the counsel thet he sought’ w ~ |

“Not made available to him (R.3-5, Exhibits A, B, ©, B)-

though petitioner concedes that-diseretion exists on the oe

of court-martial authorities to control the chéice of: defense

counsel; petitioner alleges that this denial was a-serious

abuse of discretion (Exhibits A, B, C,-3).

9, Petitioner was arrested, detained, interrogated, i intimi-

dated’ and coerced éonfession were proc cured from him, in

violation of the Penal Code of Guam it force in January

1949, namely Seetj jon 686, 82) and 1473 thereof, and the Bill

of Rights of aa filed is-Kope ndix hereto and the Consti-

tution of the United States. The fruits of these Anlawful

activities were used by the United States Air Force against

petitioner in his trial by general.court-martial in violation:

of his rights under the ¢ ‘onstitution of the United Stgtes and

ffol. 14] the Articles of War. At the trial ‘of ° petitioner,

evidence was improperly introduced in the reeord, ‘state-

ments allegedly made voluntarily but aetually made under

severe mental and physical: duress and Yertain prejuilic ‘ial

statements were introduce «into the record that were irrele-

rant, infmaterial, esp uees and eale ulated to prejudice

petitioner’ s cause (R. 7 9).

:

10, The proseeution avas so intent ‘rpon securing a convie-

‘tion of vour petitioner despite that knowledge of his lack of |

gailt that they suppressed important evidence tending: to

show his’ innocence, (Eixhibits A, Affidavit of Edward ‘Daly

filed as Exhibit D, and F) sought*to procure witnessés to _

-perjure themseives (Exhibits A, €, F) and intimidated and 7

threatened those who sought to help your petittencre(Ex-

hibit"A, -C, FP). This’was in violation of the duty of the

-Triai Judge Advocate to see that petitioner was dealt with

fairly (Manual for €ourt Martials; Paragraph 41 d)..: De:

- fense bormsel was not, given or did not takesadequate time to

prepare and present petitioner's. ¢ase. The atmosphere

: P : ae - y ° c-.. is 13 ‘

, - _

é ‘ie x e

“i

surrounding the trial was one of hysteria and terror created

by the nav al authorities governing ‘Guam and.the Authorities \

commanding the United Stateg Air Fdrees (R. 207, Bxhibits

A, C, F). Petitiogr. further alleges that specimens of his

pubic hair procured ‘from him Wee deliberately planted in

‘an-effort to create evidénce tending to show his ¢ euilt (Ex-

hibit B). This" allegation is corroborated by the’ prosecu-~

tion’s introduction of a snieck and serapings ‘allegeltty |

containing’ petitioner's pubic hairs takén almost a month .

later from the t®ack allegedly use@ the night of the crime :

(R: 207 ff). This evidence is introduced despite. testimony

that the tfuck was washed and cleaned regularly in the

interim (F. 3-3 ff).° Inasiguch: ‘as Witnesses clearly placed

petitioner elsewhere at the time of lis alleged crime (R. 287

- ff) and in the face of the proseeution’s ease whieh relicd -

almost exclusively. upon a repudiated coerced confession 2.

and. circumstantial evidence Which: staggers ¢1 ‘édulity,. the

only eanclusion that pie be drawn is that petitioner's con- -

‘fol. 15] victioy was A denial of his constitutional ri®bt toas 3.

fundamentally fair trial, because of the bias, prejudice and

yindiétivencess f the: ergot and the eourt that tried

~and convicted him.

11. Fnasmuely as your petitiorier Was arrested and inter-

rogated in violation of the then Penal Codeé of Guam govern...

ing criminal procedure, namely Sections. 686, 730 andes

and fhe Bill*of, Rights of the Island of? Guam, aml since

Guam is an insular possession pf the United States, than”

governed under theaiuthority of the U nited ‘States govern-

—mrent by United States navad personnel, and since the legal-

protections afforded by the Guam Code weré applicable: to

. your petitioner, his original arrest anid detention were wn-

‘lawful by the Taws of Guam and vitlative' of the United

States Constitution: and he should then have been rele aved:

that any further proceedings against your petitioner by

anothér Aveney of the United States; the United States Air

Force, was illegal, unconstitutional and devoXl of Juris-

diction. :

12. Thé trial of. tour petitioner wasswithout jurisdic tion

in that it was in violation of the Statutes and Constitution

of the United States and in-contraventian of Articles of 4

a

os

0

- y

14- . ° ‘ i J

Ww ar li, Title 10, U nited States { ‘ode, Section 1488 Keo

‘of his c-ojce), 24, Title ‘1, C nited States Code, Section 1495

(compulsory self-inerimination prohibited), and 70, Title 10,

United States yore Section 1542 (undue confinement).

-13. The trial of your petitioner was in violation of his

constitutional rights as an American citizen in that it was

conducted with disregard to the Fifth and Sixth’ Amend-

- -pmentsetothe United States Consfitution. *s

hy

be .

14. Th&¢ ‘umulative effect of all of {Me above-stated viola.

tions was to, prevent petitioner. ‘from being afforded due

_proeess and a fair trial; thereby rendering his conviction

and senténce wholly uneo onstitutional and void. i

15.. The eeneral court-martial which’ tried petitioner

lacked, jurisdietion-to try, convict and sentence.him: . The’

actual trial and the atmosphere i in. which it was conducted

[ fol. 16] violated his rights to due process Of law as secured.

by the Constitution of the United States, and petitiorsr’s

conviction, sentence: and present. detention: are therefore

_unconstitutignal, null, voitl and of — effect. =e -

. Wherefore, your petitioner prays: oes Sil

1; That a writ ‘of habeas corpus issue out of this Court’

‘directed to Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense; ‘Thomas

K. Finlétter, Seeretary of ‘the. Air. Foree : General. Hovt S.

Vandenberg, Chief of ‘Staff, U nited States Ai® Borce: or

some perren“and persons actiag in their place and stead,

requiring - them to, order Headquarters, Japan Logistical

Comm to produce the body of your petitioner. before this

Court at some time convenient to be designated, to abide by

what shall be : Ww arded bv the Court in the pr emises;-to. dis:

charge yout petitioner front said impr tsonment, and for all

genera: and’ eqniitable ‘relief. © e's

“2, That in the alternative? a rule;to show cause Why sach

writ should not be issued direet od to said respondents he

tanted ‘herein. . é Jeet ie

That 2 hearing be had before this C ourt te inquire into

be determine the legality of Said-detention and that pend-

ing said. here, +i respondents,’ and each of them; be.

réanired to stay exec ution of the sentence of death against

be

’ or petitioner.

That upon final hearme, petitioner nmi Ney dise eas xd

fromfaia Cis stody. er

ats

: ‘

°’

>. For other and further relief‘as tothe ogee may seem °

. meet and proper.’

z

vo

Frank D. Reeves, i901 11th Street, NW. . Was hi.

~ ington, D.C. Thurgood Marshall, Robert L. Carter,

>. 90 West 40th Street, New Y - 18, New Y ork, At-

a torneys for Pgtitianer.

>

[fol.17] - Ix tar Unirep States Distnict Court

= eee . - ¢ : >

i cee oe oinitted | aie

Mortox To ) Dascrrance THE Row ro Suow Cause anp Dismiss

THe Petition.ror Writ, oF ‘Haweas: ‘Corpus-—F ebruary 8,

1952, as ‘ se, 3

2

oa ¢ omes now the resjibiidents, Robert A. Lovett, Secretary

of Defense; Thofnas K, Finletter, Sec retary. of the Air

Force; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Stadf,

Uyited States Air Foree, and by: their a¥torneya move to

discharge the rule to show cause aid dismiss the pefition

filed-herein becatise the petition fails to state a elaim upon

which relief can tie kot at as hereinafter more specifically .

incfeated : |

i

“

1. The petition raises no questions viewable by. this.

court inasmuch as it fails ‘to allege that the court- inartial

was Improperly constituted, that Yhe court-martial, was

' withont jurisdiction over the offenses and the petitioner ov:

that. the sentence oe by the court: martial Was ull-

authorized by a > @

2.. By habeas corpus “the: ‘givil courts: may exereise no

supervisoryeor correcting power over the proceedings of a

ffol. 18} court: martial: ‘The. single -inguiry, - ‘the, test, 4s

- jurisdiétion.* Pee

: Hiatt. Brown, 389 U.S. 108, 94 Leed. 691, 70S, Ct. 495,

rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 950, 94 L. gt. 1356, 70 S. Ct. 672 °

(19380) ae, 7 a -

Hiatt v. Brown, supra, 39 COS. at 117; United States v.

Grinlev,. 137 U. So IT, 130, 34 -L. ed. 636, 637; 11S. Ct.

D4 (1880), | as aia

ya“

A

fa)

1h ; i i ‘

In this case, the court: inartiaTw as lawfully constituted,

or jurisdiction ofthe petitioner and the offenses charged,

and acted within its lawful powers in adjudging the sen-

_tence. The correction of any eryors it may have committed

is for the military authorities which are alone % authorized

to he iew its decision. °

The qgurt- hiartial proceedings have been extensively

reviewed if accordance with the Articles of War and the

“*Manual for Courts-Martial, 1949. The petitioner was tried

on May 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, ‘and 16, 1949, at Headquarters,°

Twentieth Air Force, APO 234, hy a general court-martial

lawfdlly appointed by the ¢ ‘ommanding General, Twentieth

“Air Force. The petitioner was charged with rape ' and mtr-

der of One Ruth Farnsworth, in violation of the 92 Jud Article

of War (10 USC 1564), found guilty of both offensés and

sentenced to, death. Tlie record of trial, a copy. of which

has been aod with the petition for writ of habeas corpus © °

in this action, was rev iewed. by the Statf Judge Advocate,

Twe ntieth Air Foree in ‘aceordance with the provisions of .

Artiele of War 47 (10.USC 1518), and after said review the -

septerice was approv ed by the reviewing authority, the Com-

maWine General, Twentieth Air Force. A copy of the re-

view of the Staff Judge Advotate afd the approving action

of the reviewing authority are attached hereto as Exhibits —

eA” and *ti5"* respectively and these Exhibits as well as

Exhibits ‘‘C”*, ‘¢<D’’, “EB”, “EH? and **G’’ hereinafter re-

ferred to. are by reference made a part hereow as fully as -

though rewritten her in. The record of.trial was then for- |

warded to the Office of The Judge Advocate General, United

(fol. 19] States Air Foree, for -review by a Board of Review

Aas to the provisions of .Article of War 50 (10 USC

1521). After comprehensive consideration of the record

of trial by the Board of Review, which review ineluded

submission: of brief and oral argument: by the attorney for

petitioner before the Board, the Board of Review on Novem-

ber 21, 1949, held the récord of trial legally sufficient to’

: ag 8

r

Hiatt v. Brown, supra; Re Yamashita, 8327 U.S. 1, 8, 9,

G0 4. ed.-499, 505,506, 46S. Ct. 240 (1946) ; Swaim v. £/nited

States, 165 U.S. 553, 562, 41 L. ed. $237.17 S. Ct. 448 (1897).

ey . 3

* . 3 - : : : : 5 1i

support the findings of guilty and the sentence, (A copy of

. the opinion of the Board of Review ‘is: attached hereto,

marked Exhibit **C’’), -The-record of frial was then re-—

“viewed by the Judicial Council, Office of The Judge Advo-

‘ate General, United States Air Force, pursuant to the pro-

visions of Articles of War. 48 (18 USC 1519) and 50 (10

~ USC. 1521) which review included subniission of brief and

oral argument by, the attorney for petitioner. Tho Judicial

Council, on July, 18, 1950, held the record of trial legally

sufficient to support the findings of ‘guilty and the sentence

and to warrant, confirmation thereof and submitted its

opinion (a copy of which is appended us Exhibit “D?*) to.

The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force.

“On November 14,1950, pursuant to the provisions of Article

-of War 50 (10 USC 1521) the record of trial, the opinions

of the Board of Review and of the Judicialogneil and the

reconnmmendations of Rig’ Judge Advocate Pa United

States Air Foree (a copy of the latter is attached hereto

as Exhibit ‘¢ f°’) were transmitted to the Secretary of the

Air Foree for the action of the President. On Angust : 3

1951, the deathggentence was confirmed by the President

pursuant to the provisions ot Article of War 48 (106 USC

1519),and: ordered to be carried info exce ution, A copy of

the Action by the President is appended. hereto as’ Exhibit

“E' By petition of August 31; 1951, to The Judge Advo-

‘ate General, United States Air Force, the petitioner re-

quested any and all relief afforded by Article of War 53 (10

USC 1525) (Now Section 12, Aet of 5 May 1950). In sup-

port of such.petition were Faised allegations -similar to

those presented in the petition for habeas. corpas.. The

Judee Advocate Gene ral appointed a board of offieers to

.[fol.20] hear argument by counsel for petitioner, consider

all evidence, and make recommendations. ‘After re-exami-°

nation by The Judge “Advoeaté General, United States: Air’

‘Force, of the entire record of trial ané the independent in-

vestigations conducted at his requestbin. the light of the

grounds set forth in the petition, The. udge Advoeate Gen-

eral, United States Air Foree, denied the application. for.

relief on January 28, 1952. A copy'of his Action and the

ae

v4

a

18°

L

Memor andum of Oniniowrelative to the denial of such alt

is AD} vended here to as Mxnibit “*G’’,

Charles M. “Trelan, United States Attorney, Wash--

ington, D. C.; B. M. Landesman,’ Assistant United

States Attorney, W ashington, BD. C., .. Attorneys for

Respondents,

of Counsel: Walter Kiechel, Jr. Lieutenant Colonel,

USAF, Office of The Judge Advocate General, USAF, -

Washington, D.C.

+

e °

[fol.21]) Is auk Unrrep States District Court

{Title omitted]

j

MrmoranxpuM Opinton——April 10, 1952

Monrls, J... \ =

This petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed, seek-

ine the release of the petitioner, who is held under author- -

itv of the respondents the Japan Logistical Command,

uwalting execution of senterce.of death pursuant to a con-

viction by a general court martial for the rape and murder

of one Ruth F arnsworth, in violation of the 92nd Article

“of War; in Guain, on or ‘gbout the 11th day of Deceniber -

194s, . The petitioner at the times’ relevant to these pro-

ceedings was a Staff Sergeaut of the 12ta Air Ammunition

Squadron. The’ general egurt martial, before which he

was tried, was lawfully” appointed by the’ Commanding

General, 20th Air Force. It is, therefore, not controverted

that the general court martial trying this petitioner had

jurisdiction of the petitioner and of the offense, and it is

clear that the sentence imposed was such as is authorized

hy the Articles of War. . It is contended. by the petitioner,

however, that gross irregularities ahd improper and un-

lawful practices rendered the trial and convietion invalid,

and that this Court, on a writ of habeas: corpus, should

review the proceedings, determine the invalidity thereof,

and release the petitioner from custody. , |

As stated Incthe memoratdum opinion in. the case of

TK rman PL Dennis, dre, * Robert A, Loveti, ef al., Habeas

-

aoa 9

Corpus No. 3872, decided this date, the conclusions of this

Court are:

>

It is for this C ourt, on a petition for a wld of habeas

corpus, only to inquire into and determine whether |

or not fhe court martial before which a petitioner is

tried. was lawfully,constituted; had jurisdiction of the

person and offense, and imposed a sentence-authorized |

[fol. 22] by law.* Beyond that the civil.courts should

not and cannot go. “The-Corgress has censtituted the

system by which military law shall be administered,

and it is not given to the civil courts, beyond the juris- -

diction of a military court, to inquire into the regu-

larity ‘of its. proceedings for the correction of errors

committed therein. . Tiatt ¥ » Brown, 339 U.S, 103, de-

efded Mareh 13, 1950. The proceedings of the court

nartial in this case.was considered and approved by

the reviewing authority, which was’ accomplished by.

a full analysis of the proceedings by the Staff Judge

Advocate of the Headquarters of° the 20th Air. Foree.

Thereafter a subsequent Liagdao was had by the Board

"of Review, and thereafter 1 further review avas had

‘by the Judicial Council, . Biba a review was

bad by the Judge Advoeate General, United States Air

Force, who,-because of the extreme eravity of both the

sentence adjudged and the allegations made, in his ca-

_ pacity as supervisor.of the administration of jnilitary

justice generally, caused the Office of Special. Tnves-

tigations, Office of the Inspectog, General, -to make a

-eomplete investigation of such matters. As the ‘ap-

‘ proval of the President of the U nited States was neces-

sory to carry such sentence intospffect, that-action was

also-had. Thereafter, upon thé application of peti-

tioner for relief provided by Section. 12, Act of May

12,.1950 (formerly Article of War 53), ‘tie Judew Advo-

cate General, United States Air .Foree, cansed a board

of officers to be. appointed to provide for a hearing,

which was afforded to counsel for petitioner, Alot

this extensive Machinery for review was leteuided to

* afford adequate opportunity for the correction of anw

errors prejudicial to the petitioner committed in the -

trial of his ease. The record here shows that extensive

e e

NAY

, consider ‘ation was given to each of the matters apsertex

in support of the relief sought in these proceedings

_and the various military authorities who were charge 7

with the responsibility of review determined such mat-

«ters to be. factually vroundless. “In these ‘eireum-

stances, this Court is without idrindiction to inquife

into the matters and things asserted by the petitioner

to be’ grounds for the relief sought, and, therefore, the

petition does not state facts upon which the relief -

sought can be granted. . ’ i

For the reasons stated, as sought. by the respondents in

‘response to a rule to show cause issned herein, the rule to

show. cause is discharged and the petition for’a writ of

habeas corpus is dismissed, ‘

a ee, Judge.

[fol. 23} - Is Usirep SraTes Dystrict Court

[Title omitted] |

” OrverR

id

_ This cause coming on ‘for consideration on a petition for

writ of habeas corpus, and the Court having considered the -

petition and memorandum of points.gind authorities. in sup-

port thereof, the -rate. Hrecting. the respondents. to show

cause why a writ shouid not issue, the respondents’ motion

to discharge. the rule to slow cause and dismiss the peti-

tion for writ of habeas corpus and memorandum of an:

thorities in support thereof, and the oral argument had

by counsel before the Court-on the respondents” motion to

discharge the rule to show cause and dismiss the petition

for writ of habeas corpus, and it appearing to the Court

that the petition does not state faéts upon whieh the relief

_songht ean be granted, it is this — day of April, 1952,

Ordered, that the respondents’ motion be. granted, the.

rile to show eanse be discharged, and the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be, and hevebyni dis _ dismissed,

pnnaiggtt: ee. ae Ye | ee,

(fol. 24} Minute - Entry of Areume nt and Submission,

Jnne 18, 1952. omitted in printing. Aes

1)

‘)

Fw

| Mnited States Court of Appeals ~.e

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

? ‘

No. 11419

-Rosert W. Buys, APPELLANT

v.

Rosert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, et al., APPELLEES

eee |

No. 11420

‘Herman P. Dennis, JE., APPELLANT

o Sam -y, ; |

Rosexr A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, et al., APPELLEES

oun from. the United States District ign :

hee the sare Columbia |

Decided July ol, 1952 oC ‘

Mr. Robert L. Carter, pro haa vice, by special leave of

Court, and Mr. Frank D. Reeves.for appellants. ,

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kiechel, Jr., Office of the

Judge Advocate Géneral,. United States. Ads Force, and

Nr. Joseph M. How ard, Assistant United States Attor-

ney, with whom Mr. Charles M. Irelan, United States At- -

torney, and Mr. B. M.Landesman, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on the brief, for appellees.

a

& 7 ¢ ‘

2

Before Pretrywax, Procror and Bazeton, Circuit

Judges. «°°

. Prerryman, Circuit: Judge: These are appeals from

denials by’ the District Court of petitions for writs: of

habeas gorpus. Appellants were members of American

armed forces .on the Island of Guam.’ They were -con- .

vieted by courts-martial of murder and rape and were

sentenced to death. The convictions and sentences having .

been approved by the reviewing authorities, including the

President, they: filed pé@titions for habeas corpus. The -

records of the trials. by the. courts. martial were filed by

| petitioners at the Same time with the court. “Attached to

the petitions*were several affidavits and extracts from the

‘enal code of Guam. The court® issued rules to show

eause, and the respondent off vials filed motions to dismiss

the petitions and to discharge the rules, attaching to those

motions copies of the’ findings and opinions gf the several.

reviewing authorities. The court held that the petitions -

did not recite facts upon which the relief sought could

be granted and therefore discharged the rules and dis-

missed the. petitions: In this court the cases were con-

- golidated for hearing and decision.., Appellants are pres-

ently confined in the custody of Headquarters - of the

Japan Logistical Command. |

A civilian girl Government es at a store on the

Island of Guam was brutally raped ‘and murdered. In .

the eourse .of the ensuing investigation lie detector tests

were given, upon their consent, to many members of the

Amerivan armed forces in the vicinity. What tranapined

at these testssis not reported in the papers before us, but ,

‘immediately thereafter certain physieal evidence was a

covered and three soldiers, these appellants,and one Cal-

vin Dennis, were taken into custody and delivered to the

_eivil authorities of Guam, who were American naval offi-

eers and men. Thev- were detained in this eustody from —

Jennfiry 7, 1949, to January 30, 1949, when they were

a

3

delivered to the. military authorities: They were tried

separately, the trials of appellants being May 9-16 and

May 26-30. Several alleged gonfessions of Herman Den-

nis were presented at his trial. Calvin Dennis was the

principal witness for the prosecution at the trial of Burns.

Other testimony and phy sical evide ce of various sorts

were presented. The convictions were reviewed by the

Board of Review in the Office of the Fudge Advocate. Gen-

eral, United States Air Force, and by the Jndicial Coun-

ceil, both of which rendered long, written opinions. The

records and extensive correspondence relating to the cases

were reviewed by the Judge Advocate General, United

States Air Forse, and he wrote memoranda of his. con-

clusions to the Secretary of the Air’ Foree. Thereafter

the President confirmed’ the sentences. The executions

‘were stayed pending these proceedings.

The controversy presents a problem of jurisdiction. The

question is whether the, allegations of the petitions, viewed

in the light of the aecompatiying data and of: the returns

to the rules,’ are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of |

‘the court and to require a hearing.on the merits.

Our first inquiry concerns the authority, of courts to

review courts-magtial. The Constitution, in» Article TI,

Section. 8, Clause 14, confers upon the Congress power.

“To make ‘rules for the government and regulation of

‘the land and naval forees’’? Congress has done sso.

Those rules relating to trials for offenses wére the Arti-

cles of War*® now sunerseded bv the TWmniform Code of

] Bie |

: Walker v. Johnston, 312. U.S. 275, 284, 85 L.Ed. 850,-61

S.Ct. 574 (1941); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 90 L-Ed.

499, 66 S.Ct. 340 (1946): Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 96

L.Ed. . , 72 S.Ct. 191. (1951) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 80 U.S. App.

D.C. 9, 148 ‘F.2d 857 (1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890, 89

L.Ed. 2008, 65 S.Ct. 1580 (1945). See Reviser’s Note to 28

U.S.C.A. .§ 2243; United ‘States v:.Havman, 342 U.S. 205,

222-223, 96 L.Ed. , 72 S.Ct: 263 (1952).

741 STAT. .787 (1920), 10 US.C.A. § 1471 ef seq.

av

. OA.

4 .

Military Justice.’ They provides for trial procedure and

_ review procedure.* This power of the Congress and the

judicial power, pot established by the Constitution, are

separate powérs.’ Based. upon the constitutional power.

of the Congress over the armed forces, the courts have

held uniformly, from the earliest time down to a decision

as jate as 1950, that the power of courts is limited to a-

consideration of the ‘‘jurisdiction’’ of courts-martial, and

they have no power of review.’ In the Yamashita case’

the Supreme Court said: ;

- £64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 551 e8 seq.

*41 Stat. 797 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1522; 64 STAT. 128

(1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 653. ;

> Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65, 15 L.Ed. 838

(1858) Carter v. Woodring, 67 App. D.C. 393, 92 F.2d 544

(1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 752, 82 L.Ed. 582,58 S.Ct.

283 (1937); United States v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754- (E.D.

N.Y. 1926), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 705, 65 L.Ed. 1180,

41 S.Ct. 535 (1921); Fz parte ht aece 63 si = 582 —

Wis. 1945).

¢Whelchel y. McDonald, 340 USS. 122, 95: L.Ed, 141, 71 |

S.Ct. 146 (1950); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 94 L.Ed. -

691, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950) ;°Dynes v. Hoover,.20 How. (61

U.S.) 65, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1858); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S,

109, 39 L.Ed. 914, 15 S.Ct. 773 (1895); Mullan v. United

States, 212 U.S. 516, 53 L.Ed. 632, 29 S.Ct. 330 (1909):

United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 34 L.Ed, 636, 11

S.Ct. 54 (1890); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 US. 49, 69,

46 L.Fd. 1049, 1057-1058, 22 S.Ct. 786 (1902); Ex parte

Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L.Ed. 538, 539 (1879); Carter v.

McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 392-401, 46 L.Ed. 236, 250-253,

22 S.Ct. 181 (1902); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, —

41 L.Ed. 823, 17 S.Ct. 448 (1897); Note, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.)

413. See also Ex parte=Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2, 18

L.Ed. 281 (1866).

_ *In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8, 90 Tay 499, 66 S.Ct.

340. (1946). : | |

/

a>

4)

“‘Yf the military ‘tribunals have lawful authority to

hear; decide-and condemn, their action is not subject

to judicial review’ merely because they have made a

wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their

errors of decision is not for the courts but for. the -

military authorities which are alone authorized to re-_

view their decisions.”’ |

And i in Hiatt v. Brown* the Court said:

“Tt is well settled that ‘by habeas corpus the civil |

eourts exercise no supervisory or ee power,

over the proceedings of a court-martia] . The .

- single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.’ In re°Grim-

- ley, 137 U. S. 147, 150 (1890). In. this case. the court-

- martial had jurisdiction of the persom.accused and

_ <. the offense charged. and acted within ite“lawful pow-

“ers. The correction of .any errors it may have com-

“mitted.is for the military authorities which are alone

‘ authorized to review its decision.”

> Appellants say that recent decisions of the. “Supreme

Coat have expanded the concept of “jurisdiction”? for

purposes of determining the right to habeas corpus. That |

is correct. In Whelchel-v. MeDonald® the Court clearly

intimated, if it did not expressly say, that a deniai to an

accused of an opportunity to tender an issue of insanity |

would go to the question. of the jurisdiction of a court-

martial. Habeas corpus has been held to lie.in criminal

eases in the courts where there’ has been a denial of

counsel,*® a coerced ee of guilty,” 3 deliberate ethan

a

* 339 U.S. 103, 111, 94 L.Ed. 691, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950).

° 340 U.S. 122, 95 L.Ed. 141, 71 S.Ct.. 146 (1950).

© Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct.

1019 (1938).

Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 85 L.Ed. 830, 61 S.Ct.

574 (1941): Von Moitke v. Gillies, 332 U.S..768, 92 L.Ed.

209, 68 S.Ct. 316 (1948). :

ty

6

sion of favorable evidence,” mob hy slered’* double jeop-

ardy."" We recently reviewed the problem in Smith v.

United States.”

The Supreme Court seemed, gn Hiatt v. Brown, supra,

‘to revert to earli¢r concepts of jurisdiction in considering

the power of courts ov er courts-martial. It’ cited In re

“Grimley. At the same time it used -the expression “acted -

within its lawful powers.” That expression seems: to

Imply a scope. of. review broader than a ‘technical “juris.

diction”. _

In its brief the Government contented itself ‘it sup-

port of ‘its ultimate conelusion, without attempting to es-

tablish premises, but in oral argument its’ counsel took

the position that persons in the armed forees are not

protected by the due. process .clanse\’ For that posttion

he relied: upon Johnson. y. Etsentrager.* It is true that

in ‘the opinion in that case the Supreme Court said,

American citizens conscripted into the military service

are thereby stripped of their Fifth Amendment rights

.’ Phere are also several expressions. in Ex parte :

' Quirin'* which. seem to imply that. the excepfion of “cases

2 Pyle v, Kansas, 317 U.S, 213, 87 L:Ed. 214, 63 S.Ct. 177.

(1942), agi

-433'Moore v- Dempsey, 2 261 U.S. 86, 67 L.Ed. 543, 43 S.Ct.

265 (1923). 3

“4 By parte Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 33 L. Ed. 118, 9 s. Ct. 672

¢ 889).

_ 4 88 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192 (1950), cert. denibd,

341 U.S. 927, 95 L.Ed. 1358, 71 S.Ct. 792 (1951). See also

Note, The Freedom: Writ-—-The Expanding Use of Federal

Habeas ener 61 HARV. i. REV. 657 (1948).

339 U.S. 763, 94 L.Ed, 1255, 70 S.Ct, 936 (1950).

17 Jd, 3839 U.S. at 788. 2) Cs

*317.U.S. 1, 87 L.Ed. 8, 63 S.Ct. 1 (1942).

?

7

arising in the land or naval forces’’ applies to the whole.

of both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments. There is

also the sweeping statement, “We conclude that the Fifth

and ‘Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority.

was conferred by the Constitution to try ‘offenses against

the law of war.by military commission...” In the

‘opinion ef Chief Justice. Chase in Ex parte Milligan ® is -

the statement, “We think, therefore, that the power of

° Congress in the government of*the land and naval forces

and of the militia, is not at. all affected. by the fifth or

any other amendment.” Again there is a sweeping state-

ment hy the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that °

“The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are, of course, inap-

plicable to a court- martial. | Ex’ parte Quirin et al.,

supra. 921°

But we think those expressions must be read if con.

‘text. The Eisentrager case concerned enemy aliens. Tn-

the éxpression quoted, the Court cited Wade v, Hunter,”

which, concerned double ‘jeopardy, itself a Fifth Amend-

- ment. protection, in court-martial procéedings. In that

case (Wade ¥. Hunter) the Court recited the rule of the

Perez case,” applicable to federal ‘courts upon the dis-

continuing of criminal trials once begun,,and then said:

“We see no reason why ‘the same broad test should z

‘not he applied in deciding whether court-martial ac-,

ticn ryns- counter to the Fifth. Amendment’s provi;

_ sion, against double sqoEmray: Measured by the Perez

"Id., 317 U.S. at tie 3 ¥

20"4 Wall, (71 U.S.) 2, 198, 18 T.Fa. 281, 301 (1866).

"Innes v. Crystal, 131 F.2d 576, 577,-n. 2 (2d Cir. 1943),

cert, denied as moot, 319 U:S. sth 87° L Ea. 1708, .63 S.Ct.

1164 (1943).

20 B36 US . 684, 93 LL. Rd. 974, 69 S.Ct. 834 (1949),

23 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 579. @.L.Ed.

165 (1824). |

i?

_ruale to which we adhet, petitioner’ S second © ‘court-

martial trial was, not the kind of double jeopardy =

' within the intent Op the Fifth. Amendment.”?*”

In the Quirin case, supra, the Court was discussing the

right of trial by jury and indictment by grand jury. ‘The

indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment contains a.

specific exception of ‘cases arising in, the land or naval

forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time .

of war or public danger”. And, as to trial by jury, the

Court held, -in an éxtended disenssion, that the Sixth

4,

Amendment protection of this right does not extend to.

‘eases not subject to such trials at the common law: It

_ seems to us that the language and thought in Quirin was

directed to whether the rights there Involved’ (indictment

and trial by jury) were discretionary under the power

conferred upon the Congress by Article T or were within

‘the requirements of .the Fifth and’ Sixth Amendments.

We do not read the case as holding that all the rights

covered by the Amendments, including the right of due.

process of law, were abrogated by the clause empowering .

Congress to make rules for the armed forces.

In Ex parte Milligan, supra; the Court’ was dealing

-with-a civilian, and the: quoted observation of the Chief

Justice was directly related to the’ meaning of the: ex-

‘preged exception in the Fifth Amendment. The lan- .

gute quoted from Innes v. Crystal®® was used in a foot-

note to a ease which dealt «with errors not going to the

jufisdiection of the court-martial. We do not-read it as

intended .to be -a blanket denial of all Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights. When the Supreme Court declared

the case moot and the petition was.presented to the Third

Cireuit,: that. court unequivocally d&lared petitioner’s

! right. te due ices ee | é

a |

24 Supra note 22, 336 U, = at 699.

7* Supra‘ note 21.

* United’ States v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).

4

9

Upon elementary reasoning, upon. the language and. .

‘ructure of the Constitution, and upon authority, we

hink men_ accused before courts-martial are entitled to

os process of law. It is an elementary precept in-our

concept of law and government that a human being has

' an inherent right to due process of law.” The power of

the Congress to make rules for the armed: forces is one~

of a long list (eighteen, to be exact) of powers conferred

in Section 8 of Arficle I upon the Congress. We find: no

intimation in-the Constitution itself that Clause 14 of

Section’ 8 of Article I. and roceedings pursuant thereto

are exempt from the requi ements and prohibitions of: the

Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ‘We think those Amend:

ments apply to each and all of the. powers ofthe Congress,

to the 14th Clause of Section 8 as well-as fo the other

seventeen clauses, and to.all acts of executive officials _

under Article IL and to judicial proceedings. under the

_ ‘power conferred by Article TTI, except when an exception .

is stated in the Consticution itself. Moreover, the text of |

the Fifth Amendment supports thiseview. Tt reads:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, -

or. otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment

or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising

in the land or naval forces, or-in the militia, when

in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor

shall any person be subject for the same offense to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled:in-any crimifial, case to be a witness against.

himself, nor be ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private. prop- ,

erty’ be taker for public. use’ without an compensa-

tion.”” : —

It seems to us to be clear upon the face of the text that

the specific exception of cases arising in the land or naval

forces from the first clause, relating to indictment hefore

prosecution, conclusively shows that the exception does not

apply to the other clauses. As we have already pointed —

?

a

‘oe

eS eee ae

3 10 -

out, the Supreme Court has definitely: indicated hak the

double jeopardy clause. applies to courts-martial.

There is-a wealth of: authofity. té- suppert the. view

, that due‘process applies to ecourts-martial. The Supreme

Court So indieated in Hiatt v. BYown when it said:

“We. think the court was in error in extending its

review, for_-the purpose of determining compliance. .

with the. due process clause, to such matters as the

propositions of law set forth in the staff judge advo-

eate’s report. ».”?" (Emphasis supplied.)

We cite a few te eases in the footnote,” all clearly

- ba&ed upon the view that due process of law is a right of

persons accused Before courts-martial. a

‘ Of course, due process of law is not a fixed formula of

unchanging and unchangeable elements. Due process: of

law in the armed forces has always been in some re--

spéects different from due process: under civil authority.

“To those in the military or naval service of the United

States the military law is due process.’’* But the éssen-

tials of ‘a fair proceeding are requisites under all. condi-

af Supre, 339 U. S. at 110.

* Shapiro v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 205 (CECI. 1947) ;

->Sehita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 .(8th Cir. 1943).:cert. denied, |

322 U.S. 761, 88 .IyEd. 1589, 64 S.Ct. 1273 (1944); United

States:v. Hiatt, supra note 26; United States v. Swenson, 165

F.2d 756: (24 Cir. 1948); Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512

(10th Cir. 1948); Henry v. Hodges, 171 F.2d 401. (2d Cir.

1948); cert: denied, 336 U.S. 968, 93. L.Ed. 1119, 69_S.Ct.

937 (1949); Becker v. Webster, 171 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1949), -

cert, denied, 336 U.S. 968, 95 L.Ed. 1120, 69 S.Ct. 988

{1949); Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 949),

cert genied, 338 U.S: 874, 94 L.Ed. 536, 70 S.Ct..135 (1949),

** Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304, 55 L.Ed. 225,

228, 31 S.C.. 230° (1911). See also French v. Weeks, 259

‘U.S. 326, 335, 66 L.Ed. 965, 42 S.Ct. 505 (1922); United

States v. Hiatt, supra note 26, at 666. aa

-

e alee a 11

tions. The cases cited in note 28, supra, so show. Those

essentials are fairly well identified and established in tlie

. Cases. | ' '

ee We ‘proceed, then’ akon the premise that the sail:

tions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to courts-

‘martial, exeept for the specific exception in» the Fifth

and the historie meanings at eommon law of the terms

used in both Amendments. But this premise does mot

solve our present problem, The mere presence ‘of Con-

stitutional questions, the assertion of. constitutional rights,

doés not always give rise to a right of habeas corgnus.

Phis writ is an extraordinary remedy. As a‘usual rule.

it eannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or as a

means for securing review of questions determined by te

‘authorities duly empowered by Constitution and’ statute

to ‘determine them. This matter was exhaustively exam-

ined in respect to: federal court proceedings by. the Su-

preme Court in Swial v. Large’. and it was there laid

down as the governing rule that only in exceptional cir-

cumstances wil# habeas corpus be granted where appel-

‘late procedure.is‘ available for. correction of the error. |

A detailed study of prior cases is included in the dissent

of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Court “put to one side”

in that case the problem of habeas corpus in proceedings

begun in state courts and referred that question to sev-

“eral eases, of which the latest was Ex parte Hawk."

There it was held (1) that a person must exhaust. his

state remedies and (2) that.a federal court will not ordi-

~. narily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus questions

adjudicated ‘by. state courts, but will do so where resort

to those courts fails to afford a full and fair adjudication

of the federal contentions raised.”

yoo

2% 339 US. 174, 91 L.Ed. 1982, 67 S.Ct. 1588 (1947).

- 391 U.S. 114. 116-117, 88 L.Fa. 572. 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).

‘? See Frank v. Mangum, 287 U.S. 309, 59 L.Ed. 969, 35

S.Ct. 532 (1915); Moore vy. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 67 LF.

f

aa e

‘The problem befvre 1 us involves neither a federal court

nor a state court. It involves a trial and appellate proc-

ess, including process for new trial,’ established by the

federal Congress: undér a specific grant of power by the

Constitution. It. seems. to ug that_in such a proceeding,

under. the general’ dorirines: we have’ described, habeas

corpus: will not lie to review questions raised and deter-

mined, or raisable avd determinable, in the established

Hee nilitary process, unless there has been such gross viola-

tion of constitutional rights as to deny the substance of

a fair’ trial ‘and, because of -some exceptional circum-

.stance, the petit#oner has not been able to obtain ade-

quate; protection ef that right in the military processes.

The rule as we have phrased it includes three. proposi- ,

tions. (1) An accused before a court-martial is entitled

to a fair trial within due process of law concepts. (2)

The ‘responsibijity for insuring such fairness,and for de-

‘termining debatable points is upon the military authori-

ties, and their determinations nre not reviews able by the

courts, except (3) that, in the exeeptional case when a

‘denial of a constitutional right is so flagrant as to affect

the “i»risdiction’’ (7.e., the basic. power) of the. tribunal

to render judgment, the courts will review upon petition

for habeas corpus. To support issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus the cirewmstances shown by the: papers

before the court must so seriously affect the fundamental

fairness. of the trial and the validity of the appellate and

later determinations as fo deprive the military authorities

of jurisdiction, Le., of power to act.

548, 43 S.

79 LE

Ws (1923): Moonev v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,

US. App. D.C. 9, 23.95, 148 F.2d-857; 871-873 (1945), cert.

denied, 325 17.S. 890, o L.Ed. 2003, 65 S.Ct. 1580 (1945);

~Sanderiin v. Smvth, 38 F.2d 729 (Ath Cir. 1943) ; Morton

_v. Henderson, 123 F. is 48 (5th Cir. 1941):

°° 64 STAT. 147 (1950), 50 U.S.A, § 740,

A791, 55 S.Ct. M0 (1935); Jennings v. Tinois, 342,

‘TS, 104, 96 L Fa. , 72 S.Ct. 1283 (1951): Dorsey v. Gill, 80

“4

*.

t

13

We have discussed the applicability of ‘the Constitu-

tion, but we note that the Articles of War, as enacted by

- the Congress and effective at the time of thesé trials, re-

quired the appointment of defense counsel,** provided for

other ccunsel of accused’s selection, if ‘‘reasonably avail-

‘able’’,’ prohibited compulsory self-incrimination,”* and .

provided that the accused should have copies of the record

of trial.” —

This brings us to consideration of the | records inf the .

cases before us. _ -°

We note, as a preliminary, that no allegation is made

in these petitions as to the appointments of the courts- -

martial or of their jurisdiction over the accused or the

alleged offenses: Jad

By way -of further preliminary we not that the two

‘courts-martial.in these cages were composed of different

Officers. The record in one case recites that these officers

were detailed frorn areas far from Guam, and the orders

@n the other case. indicate the same thing. The convic-

tions were reviewed by different Boards of Review. They

were then reviewed by the Judicial Council. Motions for

new trials were made purguant to Section 740 of Title 50

of the United States Code, which provides -that ‘‘The

Judge Advocate. General . . . is authorizéd . . . upon |

good cause shown, in-his discretion to grant a new trial’’.

The Judge Advocate General, after’a special investiga-

tion ordered by him, denied the motions. Thus it appears

that all the steps provided by Congress have been taken,

and no irregularity in those respects is alleged.

41 StAP. 789. (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1482 (1927).

41 STaT: 790 (1920), 10 I.S.C.A.-.§ 4488 (1927).

“41 StaT. 792 (1920). 10 U.S.C.A. § 1494 41927).

741 STAT. 809 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. §.1583 €1927).

** Supra note 33.

°

|

.

14

- We look first -at the, Dennis netition and: the papers

relating to it. In sae it contains the following alle-

gations:

1. Dennis was -held aes arraignment by the civil

authorities of Guam from January-7 to January 17, 1949.

During this period he was held incommunicado in soli-

tary confinement, subjected to continuons questioning,

beaten, .and denied sleep and food. Four confessions

were obtained from him as a result of duress, protracted

interrogation, use of a lie detector, threats, promises, and

‘trickery, and certain hairs were taken from his person,

and these were introduced in evidence against him. He

-was not advised of his right against self-incrimination,

in violation of the Fifth Amghdment and of the 24th

Article of War,®® or warned that his statements would be

used against him. | }

2. He was denied opportunity to consult with counsel

during -the entire ‘period of his detention by the Guam

authorities, from January 7th to-on or about January

29th when he was returned to Air Force authorities. He

was denied eounsel of his choice; counsel -was not ap-

pointed for him until April 8th; and he did not have

opportimity to receive advice .6f counsel. until ‘shortly

before’’ his trial hegan on May 9, 1949. Defense counsel

was not given, or did not take, adequate time to prepare

and present his ease. “s

3. Important evidence tending to prove his innocence

was suppressed: efforts were made by the investigating

and prosecuting authorities to procure perjured testimony

against him; irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial awd in-

flammatory evidence was received against him: and evi-

dence was taken from him, “planted’’, and presented at

‘the trial. In the light of defense -testimony placing him

elsewhere at ‘the time of the crime, of his repudiation of

—

a)

” Supra note 36.

seeeniiiiemestinadibhasienenisiassnammmnme ainean:aaieateeniia cacti eee eeniae — ssaneteattieencndnenntnelinhesdh th ieeieees

15

court- noha which convicted hime was-biased, _preju

and vindictive toward him. ;

4. The atmosphere surrounding the trial was one of

hysteria and terror. | :

We consider these allegations i in the light of the papers:

before the District Court and under the principles we

have enunciated.

. First we consider the point eencerning the confessions. °

ing

There were four of them, two holographic ‘and two dic-

tated. AppeHant urges a number of grounds for the

exclusion of these confessions. He urges that detention

without arraignment renders inadmissible the subsequent

confessions, under the ‘McNabb: rule.” But ‘military pro-

cedure does not provide for arraignment until the court-

martial is convened, and moreover the McNabb rule is

not a-statement of constitutional requirement but, is a

rule of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court in its

supervisory capacity over the federal courts.

Appellant says that the confessions were the ny of

_ eoercion, lack of sleep,_cantinnous questioning, ete. The

alleged cireamstances whid§ comprisetl the coercion were,

of course, alleged facts. Testimony concerning them was

taken at the trial. Herman Dennis himself testified. He

did not deseribe continuous questiening for any appre-

ciable length of time,,did not mention lack of sleep or

food, and ‘specifieally denied that he had been béaten.,

His testimony was to the effect. that an officer insisted

that his connection with the crime was known and that

unless he confessed he would hang. The offieers involved

testified and related a different story of the eyents. They

denied pressure, threats or promises. The admissibility

and the worth of the confessions were argued vigorously

* McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 87 L.Ed. 819,

63 S.Ct BOR (1948). | .

a La

aw,

oe

16

by defense counsel at the conclusion of the evidence. Thus

the admissibility of the confessions was determined by

the resolution of a disputed issue of fact, thoroughly ex-

plored at the trial and ¢xamined upon both of the sue-

cessive reviews by the military authdrities.. The accused’s

right was to haye the disputed issue of coercion examined

‘and determined by the. properly constituted authority.

That was done. He does not claim that it was not done.

The. issue to be presented to the court,.as clearly demon-

strated .by the material before it, would not be a flagrant

disregard of the aeccused’s rights, but would be an alleged

erroneous finding upon an issue of fact. Upon the face

of the papers presented by the petitioner the issue was,

in the light most favorable to him, clearly debatable, and

there was .substantial evidence in support of the con-

clusion. ,Under such circumstances courts certainly have

no. power to review the finding and decision.

Next we consider the point concerning counsel. The

Articles of War coman‘¢wo provisions respecting coun-

sel. One (10 U. S. Cl $1482, supra note 34) provides

that defense counsel shall be appointed by the puthority

which appoints the court and the trial judge “advocate.

The other (10 U. S. C. $1488, supra note 35) provides

that an aceused may have counsel of his own selection,

in place ®f’or in addition to appointed counsel, On

January 25, 1949, Dennis was advised by the authorities

that four officers tvere available to him p., defense coun-

sel. Dennis requested one of these officers, a Lieutenant

Colonel Daly, as individual defense counsel. On’ April

18th Commanding General advised-Dennis that Colonel

Daly was under charges,and under psychiatric examina.

tion and was therefore not available. Dennis then wrote

the Genvral, on the same dav, “In view of the contents

- of vour letter of 18 April 1949, I do not desire the .serv.

ices-of Lt Colonel Rdward FeDaly and T will accept. the

regularly appointed defense esunsel as counsel in my

.

. .

SO eI er ee

es ae

case.’’ Lientenant Colonel Adrian .W. Tolen had been

_ appointed defense counsel, and Captain Bernard. A. Katz

and First Lieufenant John J. Ensley assistant. defense

counsel, by an order of the Commanding General .on

March 21st. (Special Order No. 65, Headquarters Twen-

tieth Air Force, APO 234.) ,

_ ‘Appointment of counsel by the convening authority |

_ satisfies constitutional requirements.“ The Manual: for

Courts-Martial provides that the appointing’ authority

_ shall determine whether special counsel requested by an

accused is “available’’, When the trial .began Dennis him-

self again requested Colonel Daly to assist’ regularly |

appointed counsel. The matter was explored, but the

ruling of the appointing authority, affirmed, by telegram

-. from Washington, was deemed controiling. The charges,

which had been served on April 14th, were then read and

_ the accused was arraigned. A motion ‘for the severance

of. the trial of Herman Dennis from that of Calvin Dennis

- was made and granted. Herman Tennis then pleaded not

_ guilty. Colonel Tédlen indicated that he had been active

in the case as defensé counsel throughout the investiga-

_ tion and that Captain“Katz had been so for some thirty

days. :

"The factual material given the court by the -petitioner

disproves his claim as to Jack of counsel. Tt shows ‘that

the accused was not deprived of counsel; he had three, in

fact. They were officially appointed more than a month

before the trial. It also seems clear that the require-

ment that requested counsel be found ‘available’? by su-

perior authority is,a reasonable one in view of the exi-

gencies of military affairs. Upon the appeals to the

Board of Review and the Judicial Counsel, appellant | 3

was represented by the same counsel who so ably pre-

« Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1945): Ro-

mero v. Squier, 133. F.2d 528 (9th Cir. Benya h cert. denied,

318 U.S. 785, 87 L.Ed. 1152, 63 S.Ct. 982 (19148).

. oe

sented this appeal. Certainly these events did. not de-

prive the court-martial of jurisdiction.

In support of his allegations concerning the suppression

of evidence, Dennis cites three exhibits attached to his ©

complaint. One is an affidavit of a Chaplain, Captain -

E. E. Grimmett, one an affidavit.of Lieutenant Colonel

Edward Daly, and one an affidavit of a Miss Mary L. Hill.

We can find in the affidavit of Chaplain Grimmett no

reference to suppressed evidence. In the affidavit of

Colonel Daly it is asserted that. during the investigation

and while affiant. was engaged in ‘preparation of ‘the

‘defense, ‘‘affiant Jearned that a set of Filipitio~dog-tags.

had been loeatéd in the immediate | vicinity ’ of the “place %

where the bodv was found and that,.on the following ~~

morning a Navy offcer’s uniform saturated with blood

was discovered”; that these items were’ in possession

of the Guam Police Department; that in preparation of

the defense affiant gathered statements and affidavits

: concerning those items; that affiant’s brief and material

on this matter were taken from his desk while he was &

being ‘hospitalized ; and that none of this evidence was

presented at the trial. | °

Colonel Daly was a witness at the trial, testifying

twice, called once as a witness for the prosecution and

' onee as a witness for the defense. He also appeared

as a witness called by the prosecution in the Burns case.

Upon these oecasions he made no‘mention of the dog-tags

or the Navy uniform. His present affidavit does not

show that the proseentors knew of such items or that

Colonel Daly ever called them to the attention of. counsel

ta for the prosecution or for the defense.

fiss Hill in-her affidavit says that she assisted Colonel

Daly.-in the preparation .of the defense ‘‘and thaf he

. Was-in possession. of material evidence in their behalf

which was not presented to the court’? and that while he

was confined-many of the papers, files and other evidence

“

4

19 ?.

were stolen from his office and quarters Affiant does not

say what the evidence was.

This matter of the dog-tags and the ‘Neoy: uniform was

presented to the Judge Advocate General upon the peti-

tion for a new trial. He held, after an investigation

made at his direction, that the charge that this evidence

was withheld from the court, as alleged-in an affidavit

‘of Colonel Daly, was baseless. Thus the official charged

by Congress, under its constitutional power, to make this

_ determination has made it. Congress provided no review

of that determination. Petitioner’s showing on the papers

hefore us, which we have deservbed, does not indicate any

cireumstances which could be regarded as a premise for

Nee ctioistion that the Jndge Advocate General was arbi-

rer outside the boundaries of reasonable conclusion.

—_—..

- That being. so, the matter is not reviewable upon habeas

corpus. Without attempting to state exhaustively the .

reasons for this conelusion on our part, we refer to the

disenssions of the, Second Cireuit Court of Appeals.in

Schechtman vy. Foster* and ‘Ofthe First Cireuit Court

of Appeals ° in Coqgins v. O’Brien (heth Judge Wood-

bury’s and Chief Judge Magruder’s opinions), of the

right to habeas corpus.in- a, federal court, when a new

trial has been denied in a state court. The full text of

those discussions #s helpful.“ The sum of them is that,”

where a petition for a new trial upon allegations of per-

‘jured testimony known to the prosecutor was denied by

_ the state corrective process, a federal district court has a

large measure of discretion to determine whether the

ease, upon the papers before it and without hearing, is

one of the exceptional cases.which requires federal author-

ity to inquire into state administration of justice. In the

matter before us there is Sate, to depict the exceptional .

. 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924,

94 L.Ed. 1346, 70 S.Ct. 613 (1950).

188 F.2d 130 (1st-Cir. 1951}.

‘+See also United States v. J@hnson, 327 U.S. 106, 99 L.Ed.

562, 66 S.Ct. 464 (1946). : ,

OTT NE RT EE = ee ree a nee

a” 20

; es a ; : . : ‘

ease which would require. the courts to inquire into the

treatment of this particular matter’ by the duly consti-

.tuted military authorities. There is nothing in this record

to indicate that the Judge Advocate General | based _

denial of fhe motion for new trial upon a denial of ac

colstitutional right.”

This court has received ‘a letter from one. “Wiens L.

Moylan, a witne:s at the trial, who says that he did see

these petitioners near the scene of the erime shortly

before the murder, as he testified, but’ that there were

two other men also there and that, while he tried to bring

this out, he’ was nof permitted. to do so. This letter is

-not part of the record and “is unsworn. Moreover the

record shows that Moylan was extensively eross-exem-

ined by the defense and was examined Also by the, court

but made no reference whatever to seeing other persons

and made no attempt to do so... ‘

' The matter of “planting” evidence concerned hairs

found on a smock and in a truck. This was ‘the sybject

of testimony and argument, at; the trial. . Defense counsel

in summation explicitly queried whether the smock had not |

been planted in the truck-by aa investigator. The matter

was considered upon the reviews. It is covered: by what

we have already said. \

No fact shown in the record jason the general alle-

gation of hysteria and terror, and every relevant fact is

to the contrary. The members of the eourts-martial were, -_

-as we have said, officers in the Air Foree and were de-

tailed from distant points. The members of the court

frequently and intensively questioned witnesses for the

prosecution. \

od

“Cf, Phyle y. Duffy, 334 U.S. 481, 444, 92 L.Ed. 1494, 68

S:Ct. 1181 (1948); Young v.. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238, 93°

L.Ed. 1333, 69 S.Ct. 1073 (1949) :-Woods v. Nierstheimer, |

328 U.S. 211, 216, 99 L.Ed. 1177, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946) ; Wool-

oe v. Best; 299 U.S: 1, 2, 81 L.Ed. 3, 57.S.Ct. .2 (1986) ;

Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806, 807, 92 L.Ed.

1739, 68 S.Ct. 1185 (1948). :

21

It is clear that the other allegations of the petition do

not go to the jurisdiction of the court-martial, even under

the expanded concept of “ Hanon” which we have

used in this case.

The Burns petition contains the following allegations :

1. Burns was held without arraignment by the Guam

authorities from “January 7 to January 17, 1949. During

this period he was held ‘incommunicado, subjected to con-.

tinuous questioning, beaten, and denied sleep and edible

food. Burns did not confess, but he allegés that the-eon-

fessions-of Herman Dennis and Calvin Dennis, the-alleged

‘third participant in the offense charged, signed coer reed

confessions implicating him. °. , are

2. He was denied opportunity to consult with ‘counsel

during his detention by the Guam authorities. He was

not allowed to obtain the advice of counsel until one day

before his court-martial began on May 27, 1949. :

E Tmportant evidence t tending to prove his innocence

was suppressed. ‘Testiniony given against him at the

trial by Caivin Dennis was the result of, coeycion, threats

and promises and is now shown to have been perjured

by the affidavit -of Calvin Mennis attached to the petition.

4. The trial was conducted in an‘atmosphere of terror,

hysteria and vengeance.

Several of. the foregoing allegations are the same as or

similar to ‘those of the Dennis petition. What. we have

already said will suffice for those points. The situations

with respect to counsel and ae confessions differ’ some-_

what. from’ the cireumstances in- the Dennis » Case, Sule

therefore discuss those “cay

efense counsel for Burns were appointed, by the

“proper authorities by formal order on March 21st. They

were the same as those appointed in the Dennis case,

Lieutenant ‘Colonel Tolen, Captain Katz, and Lieutenant

Ensley. Burns was. brought to trial. May 27th: The mem-

bers of the court’ were net the same officers. who sat in

the’ Dennis case. The record shows the following:

, we,

¢ 99

“prosEcUTION: The accused is present together

with the regularly appointed .defense counsel and

assistant defense counsel. By whom does the accused

desire to be defended?

“DEFENSE : The accused: desires to introduce as in-

“dividual counsel Captain Martin S Drueker, Head-

quarters, Marianas Bonins Command, and desires the

regularly appointed defense counsel, Lieutenant Col-

- onel Adrian W. Tolen, and assistant defense counsel,

First Lieutenant John J Ensley, to act as associate

counsel. Let the record show that Captain Drucker is

a member of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps,

Department of the Army, and is a qualified lawver.

Let the record also show that Captain Bernard A Katz

- who was appointed ws assistant. defense counsel in

. this ease. has been excused by the accused and his

name has been deleted from the court by an order

which will be appended to the record.

“prosecution: ITs. the ‘aceused satisfied then with

counsel indicated by eae at this time?

‘“accusep: Yes, sir.’ 7

Appellant refers to. the affidavit of Chaplain Gumi

as support for the allegation. respecting the one-day’

preparation of counsel. The affidavit. says “That the

Captain who. finally represented” Sergeant Burns. [had]

only one dav to prepare his case”. The reference must

be to Captain. Drucker, who'was “individual counsel”,

i.e., counsel selected fv the aecused, and not the ap-—

pointed connsel. That the-accused may not have engaged

or selected individual eounsel unfil one ‘day before trial

. (there is no direct statement in this record to that effect)

is not ground for complaint. Appointed counsel had been

designated long prior to trial. No request for a con-

_ tinuance. was made, nor was anv hint oifered that Cap tain

_ Drueker was unprepared. ;

- The only assertions relating té other counsel songht by

Rarns concern an effort hy Chaplain Grimmett te engage -

a°-civilian. lawyer in Guam who -required .a/ $15,000. fee,

of whieh $10,000 was to be a cash retainer in advance,

ws

¢

The accused having no such funds, the ee undér-

took a- contribution campaign among the military per-

sonnel throughout the islands. The military authorities

advised him that collections of such sums would have to

be under supervision of -the. authorities. He alleges that.

he was informed by unnamed persons that they had been

; intimidated by ‘their commanding. officers. into not con-

tributing. Nothing further. seems to have come of it.

Obviously . such circumstances ‘do not constitute a denial —

of: assistance by co; angel. .

We turn next to the matter of the alleged deliberate »

use of coerced and perjured testimony of Calvin Dennis.

_ No confessions ‘alleged to have, been made by Burns were

offered at his trial, and he did “ot take the stand. Calvin

, Dennis testified for the prosecution and gave eye-witness

testimony to the guilt of Furns. Calvin Dennis now

alleges that his former testimony was coerced and was

false. It was vigorously maintained hy defense counsel

at the trial that Calvin Dennis’s testiniony .was perjured:

The decision of the court represents a finding upon. a

disputed question of fact. Both military reviewing

authorities considered the point. Calvin Dennis’s sub-

sequent repudiation of this testimony was presented to

. the Judge Advocate General on the application for new.

trial. What we said in respect to the, suppressed evi-

dence allegatien in.the’ Herman Dennis case applies to

the present point.

As is.our frequent’ practice in cayntal eases, we have

examined the whole of both of these long records. <Ac-

euséd were vigorously defended at all-points. Actions

of the. military authorities appear to have conformed

meticulously to the rules of proceedure, and the reviews

were exhaustive. We conclude, in agreenient with the.

‘District Court, that the facts alleged. in the petitions,

viewed in the light of the return to the rule, do not

supply grounds upon which’ the reiief sought can ‘he

granted... The judgments will he affirmed. .

*

’

__» &

tion for writ of certiorari, if they are so minded, and to ©

—*

ae

a

24

_ The executions ‘will be further stayed for a period of

sixty days to enable counsel for appellants to file peti-

apply to a Justice of the Supreme: Court for a further

stay pending disposition of such a petition.

i Affirmed.

BazELon, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority. of

7 this eourt points wut, and | agree, that the writ of habeas

corpus has ‘been the instrument by which allegations of

jurisdictional infirmity 1 in-courts-martial.have been tested. —

. For this purpose, jurisdiction has long left: its technical .

meaning behind and become, instead, the vehicle through -

which an expanding conception of due ptocess has heen —

. applied to matters arising out of military as well as civil -

law. Through the years, those constitutional considera-

tions which constitute the fundamentals of due process

_ have been incorporated into the “jurisdiction” coneept so

J Pp

that their denial has. heen said to ea a court-martial

of jurisdiction. | :

T cannot? i agree, However, that we should narrow our

scrutiny of courts-martial by singling out the. individual

allegations to determine just how “flagrant” the allegedly

unconstitutional ‘actions are. Such an’ “approach could’

whittle down the “freedom writ” and virtually withdraw

e

the military from its reach. The fairness of a trial must

be ‘determined by appraisal of the whole: rather than’ by

. picking and choosing among its component parts. A

total configuration of the allegations in these cases dis-

closes something. which the separate parts do not. The

totality, if proved, would constitute the very antithesis’

of fairness. :

Although the cases recognize the unnavailability of —

certain constitutional guarantees in courts.tnartial,?, ey.

'E.g., iy by jury, see Whelchel: v. McDonald, 340 U.S.

122, 127 | 950), and cases cited therein.

e

25

have not foreclosed others which go.to the question of.

fair trial. Violation of guarantees embodied in the Con-

stitution and affecting the basic fairness of a trial makes

gic martial void—not only in my view but in that of ©

le cases.” Similarly, although violation’ of certain Ar-

ticlés' of War by the military in the course of a court-

martial may not be challengeable by habeas corpus, other

violations which involve denial of a fair trial would

result in issuanee of the writ.’ :

These principles are clearly illustrated by the recent

tases of Whelchel v. McDonald, and Hiatt v. Brown, Hiatt

involved a provision, of the Articles of War which-gave

the appointing commander discretion in naming the law — .

officer of.the court-martial. Although the writ did not.

issue, the Court made it clear that one would issue if there

had been a “gross abuse of .that discretion,” for. that-

“would have given rise to a defect in the jurisdiction of

the court-martial.” ** Similarly, ‘in Whelchel, the Court

thought it “plain from: the law governing court-martial,

procedure that there inust be afforded a defendant -at

some point of time an opportunity to tender the issue of

insanity. * * * a denial of _ opportunity * * * goes to

the question of jurisdiction.”

If-the abuse of a’statutory Giacrstion which affects the

fairness of the trial would eonstitute a jurisdictional de-

fect, so also would violation of constitutional safeguards

2 Some. of these cases are collected in Sunal v. Laree, 332

U.S. 174, 184 (1947), dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frank- —

furter; Smith. v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187

F.2d 192 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951); United

States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944);

see note 39, infra; Note, 61 Harv. L. REv: 657 (1948).

’ Compare Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 apie with

Hiatt v, Brown, 339 U.S,.103 (1950).

‘ Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 109 (1959).

* Whelcliel v. “McDonald, 340 US: 122, T24 (1950).

f

Mf, .

designed tq assure a fair trial. Obviously, the Constitu-

tion furnishes no lesser a guide to the mijJitary than does

a a‘statute.® In either case, that which goes to the essence

’ of a fair trial must be accorded an accused and failure

to do so gives rise to a jurisdictional dofect.

Appellants contend, that they have been denied rights

whieh bear vitally on the fairnegs -of their trials and

hence w writ of habeas corpus should issue. -I will take

_ up the more serious allegations in turn.

Unlawful Detention

According to. the affidavits attached to the petition for

the writ, appellants Herman Dennis and Burns were ap,’

prehende ‘d by the military authorities on Guam ‘on Janu-

ary 7, 1949.5 They were turned over to the civil author-

itv governing the island and held “incommunicado.”* By

January 13, after six days of repeated questioning with-

out benefit of counsel, Dennis had signed four separate

. confessions, which vary considerably in detail and cen-

tent... The detention of both Dennis and Burns continued

without “arraignment” until January 17, 1949.° At ho

* Cf: Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).

4% 7 Transcript of H. .Dennis Record, p. 10; ———e of

Burns’ Record, p. 21.

§ Le., in virtual solitary confinement, Transcript of H. Den-

nis Recocd, pp. 3-137; Record of H. Dennis Trial by General

Court-Martial, p. 221; Transcript of Burns Record, p. 16.

* Transcript of H. Denis Record, pp. 61-3. The latter two,

unlike the first two, contained: statements that they were

voluntary ‘and that Dennis had- been advised that they could

be used against him. Dennis tries to raise here the voluntary

nature of these confessions, but-he also testified at the trial

that they were voluntary and alleges no grounds why he

should be allowed to repudiate that testimony.

10 Transeript of, H. Dennis Record, p. 3; Transcript of H.

Dennis Trial by General Court- Martial, p. 29 ; Transcript

of Burns Record, p. 16.

27

_ time up to that point was either appellant furnished with .

or penented to summon, counsel,’ despite a specific re-

quest of Dennis for counsel made at about the time of the

second confggsion.? On January 25, the Commanding

General of te@ ‘Twentieth Air Force ‘forwarded a ietter

to the aceused stating that [named counsel] were avail-

able.” ’* Appellants were returned to the custody of the |

military on or about January 29, 1949, without, they

allege, having been . permitted to consult counsel up to

that time.** :

Appellees contend that this detention violated none of

appellants’ rights since “there is no provision —

preliminary hearing or arraignment in military lew” and

no applicable section’ of the Guin civil regulations was

. violated. What the military or (mam laws require are of .

small moment. We are coneerned here svith “fundamental

principles of liberty and justice.” * Although. the —

point at which appellants were free to consult with eounsel

is not clear from the record, it appears that, they did not

recéive assistance until after a long period of incommuni-

mere is Preniarint of H. Dennis Record, p. 4; ee of

Burns Record, p. 16.

1? Record of H. Dennis Trial by General Court-Martial, p.

232. ee

18° Transcript of H. “Dennis Record, p. 23; ee | of

Burns Record, p. 34.

‘Transcript of H. Dennis Record, p. 4; “Ppanserint of

Burns Record, p. 16. The record does not indicate what as-

sistance, if any, appellants had between their delivery to mili-

tary authorities about January 29, and March 21. On that’

date, the three counsel who represented them at the court--

-martial were named. As described in the majority opinion,

one of these three was subsequently replaced with respect to

appellant Burns. :

4° Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 Us 312, 316 (1926).

- rT

28

cado detention with repeated questioning, and. until after -

‘Dennis had confessed.’ In my view, this detention suggests

“all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons ©

accused of crime.” I put aside all arguments based on -

the emergencies of the battlefield and tite impracticality

of reasonable promptness. in furnishing defense counsei

under such ejreumstances, Whatever validity these argu-

ments have where the detention occurs in a combat zone,

they‘ could have no application to.the Island of Guam-—

which was under a civil administration—in the relatively.

peaceful year of 1949.

Interference with Counsel -

_ About January 25, appellants were permitted to consult

with two chaplains, one of whom made unsuccessful at-

tempts to raise a large amount of money for the: retention

_ of local civilian counsel. One of the supporting affidavits

asserts the affiant’s personal knowledge of interferences

with the chaplain’s mail,‘ ete. which: were ‘designed to

thwart attempts.to raise these-funds.’7 Appellants also

asked for the assistance of Lt. Colonel Daly, Staff Judge

Advocate of the Marianas Air Material Command. Daly

was first permitted to act as counsel, but later was with-

drawn by the ‘‘ommanding General.as “not available.” '

‘While it is clear that the Commanding General’s determi- -

- nation concerning the availability of counsel may_not be

reviewed by habeas corpus: in the absence ofa gross

' McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1948).

Transcript of H. Dennis Record, pp. 11-18, 24; Tran- -

script of Burns Record, pp. 22-4, 35. Chaplain Grimmett

was not called to testify. Affiant Daly testified for the de-

fense but was not questioned concerning these facts which

he acknowledges he knew beforé the trial.

rR, a

_ 18 Transcript of H. Dennis Record, :p. 17; Transcript of

Burns Record, p. 28. Thé notice of withdrawal was dated

April 18, 1949.

29

¥ Rage : a

abuse of discretion, it is equally clear that whenever suc?

abuse is presént, the determination may be reviewed by

hubeas corpus.” Daly’s affidavit attached to the petition

alleges that the charges ori the basis of which he was made

unavailable” were “all totally. without foundation. and

** * were contrived by the Commanding Generals * * *.” *°

This, of course, is a mere conclusionary statement, and.

standing alone, would be entitled to slight consideration.

But it does not stand alone. For he alleges that the officer

assigned to investigate him was told by the Commanding

_ General that “‘he must ‘die something up to-pin’” on Daly: .

£ fon) } p t e 9

and. that a witness who testified for the prosecution at ap-

pellants’ trial admitted to Daly that the investigator had

promised him his ‘‘stripes” back ‘‘if he would make a

statement against [Daly]}.”*" Moreover, one affiant, Mrs,

Hill, affirmed that an attempt was made to induce: her to

give false testimony at the trial upon the promise that it

would be helpful to Daly ‘“‘who was then tn serious. diffi-

- culties because of his attempts to defend the accused and

bring the true, facts before the court.” = Like the alleged.

interference with the fund- -raising campaign, these alle-

gations touch on “matters - outside the court- martial rec-

ord. = j F 2 7

1% Cf. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).

“Transcript of H. Dennis Record, p. 27; Transcript of

Burns Record, Pp. 38.

a Transcript of H. Denis Record, 27; Transcript of

Burns Record, p. 38.- Mrs. Hill, one 7 the elie affi-

ants, was present and witnessed this. /d. at 44.

22 Transcript of H. Dennis Record, pp. 32-3: Transcript of

Burns Record, pp. 43-4. See note 31, infra.

28 Daly and Mrs. Hill were called as defense witnesses but’

were not questioned concerning these matters. Both knew of

them before trial, but the record does not disclose whether

or not this knowledge w as communicated to defense counsel

before trial.

°

Suppressed Evidence

The petition asserts ‘that ey 3 the prosecution was so

intent upon securing a’ con iction of your petitioner de-

spite that knowledge of unt ‘of guilt that they sup-

pressed important -evidence ‘tending to show his ‘inno-

cence *-* *.”** Daly’s affidavit pins this down by alleging,

on the basic of personal knowledge, ‘‘that a set of Fili-

‘pino dog-tags had heen located in the- immediate vicinity

of the place where the body was found and that on the

‘following morning a Navy officers [sie] uniform saturated

with blood was discovered.” > This allegation raises mat- —

ters not contained in the court-martial record.** We are

not told either in the affidavit er in the petition how these

items of evidence tie in with appellants’ defense but we

would be diffienlt to show until the uniform had. bee

ean assume with respect to'the uniform that a ery

examined for hairs, the blood stains analyzed, ete. With

- respect to the dog-tags, an independent search of the

Herman Dennis court-martial record discloses that one

prosecution witness testified that he had observed two

fustomers inside the store talking with the victim shortly .

before the crime. One of the two he identified as resemb-

ling appellant.Herman Dennis. ** On cross-examination,

this witness admitted testifying during the course of pre-

¢

26 Transcript of H. Dennis Record, p. 5:

** Id. at 29. Transcript of Burns Record, p. 40.

7° Daly does not allege that the prosecution, as @istin-

guishéd. from the Guam ‘police, was aware of the existence of

shis evidence. I think it unrealistic to suppose that they.

were not. In my view, Daly’s shortcoming, if ony,-in not

testifying as to these matters at trial can hardly be at-

tributed to the defendant-appellants.

** Record of H. Dennis sion by Gosieral Court-Martial, pp.

103-5.

liminary investigz itions that ihe’ customers “appeared to be

Filipino ‘soldiers.” **

~

Attempts to Suborne Perjury and Intimidate Witnesses

Appellants alleged that the prosecution “sought: to pro-

cure wiinesses to perjure themselves * * * and intimidated

and threatened ‘those who sought to help your petitioner

** e728" In support of this allegation, Chaplain Grim-

indtt's affidavit charges that the Trial Judge Advocate.

‘‘went to eath of the defense witnesses. and intimidated

them with threats of ‘perjury unless they clianged their

statements,” and. that this could pe substantiated by

specifically named people—ineluding defense counsel—

“and any of the defense witnesses.” * The affidavit does

not state whether or not defense counsel knew: of this

before trial. There was no inquiry of any of the wit-

nesses, except Calvin Dennis whom [ shali discuss’ in a

moment, concerning intimidation or any matter touching

on attempts,to suborne perjury. This allegation, like

many others, therefore raises*matters outside the court-

martial record.

** Id, at 105; see also Record of Burns Trial by General.

Court-Martial, p. 140. In this connection, it should be noted

that the-Clerk of the court has received an unsworn fetter,

dated April 16, 1952, from one of the Government’s witnesses

to the effect that although he observed appellants near the

scene of the murder, he also observed two other persons. ..

This letter reads in part: “However, as my employees ‘and

l left, a few minutes -before Miss Ruth Farnsworth. was

killed, there were two men Who went. into the shop. Their

car was parked to the right of my Jeep and to the left was

a military truck. The description of these two men was

given—yet at the trial, this evidence was not brought up.

When I tried to bring it up severa! times it seemed I was

talking to the prosecutor and his subordinates ; therefore,

these men did not: receive a fair trial.” ;

” Transcript of H. Dennis Recérd, pp. -5-6.

* Transcript of H. Dennis Record, p. 15; Transcript of

Burns Record, p. 26. . |

32

The allegatian of attempts to suborne -perjury is given

specific context by witness Mary L. Hilk Her supporting ~

affidavit affifms that in the presence of two other named

_ persons one of the prosecution’s chief investigators “tried

to prevail upon [her] to make a false statement before

the court” coneerning the voluntariness of appellant

Herman Denis’ confessions. The Judge Advocate Gen-

eral of the Air Force acknowledged in a memorandum to

_-the Secretary of the Air Force that there was’ ‘‘sub-

stantial evidence” that Mrs. Hill had been prevailed upon

by the prosecution’s investigators to make a falge affidavit

but he dismissed the. matter as immaterial since Ma Hill

resisted these pressures and: testified truthfully at the

court-martial? Lt. Colonel .Daly, the deposed defense

counsel, also swere that Sergeant Wright, who was in-

terrogated in the pre-trial investigations, told him that

he had been threatened by an investigator for the prose-

cution avith a perjury prosecution “if jhe testified at the

trial to what he himself, in his own mind, was thoroughly

eonvineed had happeneé * * *,” and that he had comrauni-

eated these threats to the Staff Judge Advocate of the _

Twentieth Air Force.’ Sergednt Wright was not called © -

to testifv at the trial. ; ’

Coerced Confe.sion of Calvin Dennis

One other point remains with respect to Robert W.

Burns. Three persons were charged with the perpetra-

tion of these crimes——Burns, and Herman Dennis, appel-

lants here, and Calvin Dennis. They were tried sepa- |

rately. At the Burns trial, Calvin Dennis, the: ‘only a. 4

$1 Transcript of H. Dennis Record, .p. 33; Transcript of

-Burus Record, p. 44. See note 22, supra.

3? Transcript of H. Dennis Record, Pp. 126.

*% Transcript of H. Dennis Record, P °25; Transcript af

Burns Record, p. 36. :

33

leged eye-witness he the crimes, ‘‘confessed;” implicating

Burns. Burns alleges that except for this confession, “no

testimony in the record in ariy way directly connects this

petitioner with the crime”;* that such implication was —

- false; and that such testimony at the trial constituted |

perjury which had been suborned by the prosecution upon

a promise of.reward therefor in the form of a lesser

punishinent for himself. This allegation is supported by

+ ay . “ . * . . : *

an affidavit from“Calvin Dennis in which he confesses his

perjury and the fact that it was induced by the: proseeu-

tion by physical coercion, by threats that the investigators

were “going to pin murder and rape and kidnapping on

me,” * and by offers of “part of the $4,000 dollars/{sic] |

reward if I sign a statement:”* Calvin Dennis further

“affirms that the Trial Judge Advoeate “promise [sie] me

_-if I wonld. testify against Burns he would see that my

sentence would be disapprove - [sie] in Washington at the |

-reviewing board.”’ *’ . ;

It is true that Calvin Siete was questioned at the

court-martial and testified to ‘the voluntary nature of his

confession. Ordinarily, as the, majority points out, tHis -

issue would be deemed settled, for habeas corpus will not

lie to review the fact finder’s acceptanee of one version

of events rather than another. But this case gces be-

yond the limits of that well-accepted doctrine. . ‘Calvin |

oe

Dennis’ affidavit is clearly new evidence of q vital nature

which calls for a reappraisal of the voluntariness of his

¢

confession.*®

—

¢** Transcript of Burns Record, p. 18.

** Transcript of Burns Record, p. 47.

36 Thid. . 3

"Ibid. See also Daly’s affidavit. Id. at 36-7.

** Cf. United States ex rel..MeCann v. Adams, 320 U.S.

29) (1943) ; Mooney v.: Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).

a on *

Conclusions

[ do not assume that due process. is the same in a

military setting as it is in a civil setting. For

“Many of the procedural! safeguards which have al-

ways been observed for the benefit of defendants in ~

the civil courts are not granted by the military law.

In this rospect the military law provides its own

distinctive procedure to which the members of the

armed forces must submit. But the due process

(clause guarantees: to them that this military pro- -

cedure will. be applied to them.in a fundamentally

fair way. '* * * it is open for a eivil court in a

habeas corpus proceeding to consider whether the

circunstances of a court-martial proceeding and the

manner in. which it was eonducted ran afoul of the

basic standard of fairness which is involved in the.

constitutional concept of due’ process of iaw % * %7%—

—

“United States ex re/. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666

(3d Cir. 1944). The court illustrated what it meant by a

denial of fundamental fairness: defendant induced to testify

against self by use of threats or promises in presence of

court and jury, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) z.

use of fraud, collusion, trickery and subornation of perjury

on part of state prosecution, Mooney vy. Holohan, 294 U.S.

103 (1935); domination of trial by mob violence in court-

room, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

Cf. Wheichel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950) (oppor-

tunity to present defense of insanity); see Hiatt v. Brown, ° .

. 889: U.S. 108 (1950) abuse of discretion in appointing law

‘member of court-martial) ; Wade v. Hunter, 336 US. - 684,

688-90, (1919) % double jeopardy); Powers v. Hunter, 178

F.2d. 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 389 U.S.-986

(1950) (court can review severity of court-martial sentence -.

to see if it violates prohibition against cruel and. unusual! pun-

‘ ishment) ; Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943), cert.

denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1944) (denial of counsel of choice,

denial of: right to call witnesses, testimony against petitioner

given out.of his presence at trial, witnesses testified against

defendant without being sworn, petitioner and his witnesses

intimidated, ete.).

,

35

Appellants’ allegations, supported by affidavits, -raise.

serious doubt’ whether ‘‘the whole course of events’’”

from apprehension to conyiction did not amount to a seri-

ous denial of fundamental fairness. If proved, they .

-would paint a portrait,of inquisitorial zeal rather than |

of a fair'triat in the Anglo-American sense.

The allegations concerning detention without ‘counsel

are supported by the record and are not in dispute.

Those tonching interference with counsel, suppressed evi-

dence, attempts to suborne perjury and intimidate wit--

nesses, and the repudiated confession of Calvin ,Dennis

rely og matters outside the record, which therefore were

not considered by the ‘convicting tribunal. Appellees ‘do

not think this important, however, since, allegations simi-

lar to those. made herein have been the subject of special

independent investigation by high military authorities.

.These reveiw and investigatory procedures are wisely de-

signed to minimize possible injustices at the court-martial

level and the apparently thorough study which these cases

have received cannot be disregarded. . But ‘‘perfection

in the machinery for correction * * * does not seem to

[me] sufficient to, allow a Judge of the United States to —

escape the duty of examining the facts on orageiieon

if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely veid.” *_

Moreover, the Supreme Court recently pointed out’ of

the availability of military review and investigating pro-

cedures which appellants, used in these cases does not pre-

clude erage review by way of petition for writ of habeas

corpus. The: basis for the Judge Advocate General’s

denial of a new trial in these eases is not clear with re-

spect to all of appellants’ allegations. To the extent that

t,

a

——

* Smith v. Uinted States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d

192 (1959),+cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951).

“ Moore Vv. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-2 (1923)

« Gusik'v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 182-8 (1950).

itt

36

- he found them insufficient, if trie, to grant the relief —

. sought, he abused. his discretion.“ | =

* In: view of the serious nature of the allegations and-~

supporting affidavits, I would remand to the District

Court for a hearing on the allegatians of. the petition. |

a ‘

: 7

a- 2

& #

- - e oe °

- .© Even though, the denial of a new trial was based to some

extent.on disbelief of the allegations, 1 think the exceptional

circumstances of these cases require a hearing in the District

Court. Cf. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118. (1944) ; Cog-

gins v. O’Brien, 188 F.2d 136, 183 (1st Cir. 1951); but ef.

Schechtman vy. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.- 1949), cert.

denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950). |

x

t

>

Tfol. 61]. [File endorsement —: \

Unirep Srates ‘ourr OF APPEALS FOR THE a T OF \

CoLUMPIA eh ca Aprnit Term, 1952 et ees 3

No. i419 (i.

Ronen W. Burs, Appellant,”

af,

*Rosert A Lovett, ‘Secret tary of Defense, et al., Appellees

No. 14, 420. April Term, 1952 ..

hike P. Dennis, Jn, Appelant;

Rosert. A, Lovert, Secretary of Defense, et al., Appellees

Appeals: from the United States. District Court for the

District of c ‘olumbia .

Before: Prettyman, Proctor and Bazelon, Circuit Judges

Jup6Ment—Filed July 21, Ade2

These appeals came on to be heard on the ivasserinte of

the records from the Unifed States District Court for the

Distriet of Columbia, and were.argued by counsel, rT:

*. On eonsideration whereof, It is ordered and adjudged .

by this Court that the judgments of the said District Court

appealed from 1 in these cases be, and the same are hereby,

affirmeck ° ‘*

. It is further ordered by the Court “that execution of the

death sentences in these cases be, and the same is here by,

stayed to and including September 30, 1952, to enable coun-

_- sel for appellants to file petition for writ of certiorari, if

they are so minded, and to apply to a Justice of the Su-

preme Ceurt for a ‘further stay pending disposition of such .

“a petition. . :

| Per Cirenit Judge Prettyman.

Dated: July 31,.1952. " ‘ | ont

Separate dissenting opinion by {* ircuit Judge Bazelon.

.

-

~ G07 ¢ .

3.

e

{fol.6la} ~ ~—- | File endorsement omitted]

; . . . . - e

| Titie omitted |

7 Usirep Stares Court or Aprrals

ORDER AMEX NDING, JU DOME s1—Filed sree dual 20, 1952.

Before: Pr een Piscter and Razelon, Cireuit Judges ”

It is Ofdered by the Court that the judgment of this Court , .

entered herein July 31, 1952 be, and it is hereby, amended

by striking the date ‘‘August 30°’ in the third line of the

last paragraph and insertitig in lieu thereof the date ‘‘Sep-

terfiber 30°’, so that the last paragraph of said judgment,

us amended, will read as follows: +

“Tt is further ordered by the Court that execution |

of the death sentences in these cases be, .and the same

is hereby, stayed to and including September 36, 1952,

to enable cauisel for appellants to file petition for w rit.

of certiorari, if they are so minded, and to apply to a *

Justice of the Supreme Court for a further stay pend-

ing dis sposition of such a petition.’

Per Curiam. ,

Dated: Aug. 25,1952. 9 2

[fols. 62-63] Designation or Recorp—Omitted in Printing

[fo]. 64] CTerk's -Certifieate’ to | foregoing transcript

omitted in printing. . see

fol. Ho) Surnewe Courr or THe Uxiren STATES, Ocroner

: Term, 1952

. ) .° No. 422

Revers W. Bouxs and Hera P. Dexis, Je., Petitioners,

. , " Vs:

5 _—— Eee N ° 4 f

open AL Loves by Seeretary of Defense, et al. ge

Orore ALLowIne Crertionant—Filed December 15, 1952 : : Nik

The petition herem for a writ of certiorart to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Distric t of Columbia C iveuit

ix granted, 7 |

And it is further orde sad that “the duly ebitified copy of

- trans eript of the proceedings below whieh accompanied

» petition shall be treated as though filed in response to

sue dh writ. | 2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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