Brief on Behalf of Appellee — Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone

Supreme Court brief1952

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et a | NOV 26 195]

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© ties L Renters

No. 253

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

_ THE UNITED STATES |

_ OCTOBER TERM, 1951

MEMPHIS STEAM LAUNDRY CLEANER, INC.

. Appellant

Vp :

A.H.STONE, CHAIRMAN .: . * Appeilee

STATE TAX-COMMISSION: = =: ’

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI *<.. .° «|.

| BRIEF: ¢ ON BEHALF UF APPELLEE

! HAL! ;

2 H. SUMRALL, Attorney for Appellee |

; aapenion. Mississippi eatin :

, ‘GENERAL INDEX. " "Page

STATEMENT. OF THE CASE. Cae eas ee

Te eA a oe

DISCUSSION oF AUTHORITIES « CITED: BY APPEL-' -

sot NT Soo Oe ETS

: ARGUMENT. eoeha Disa BS ee 6 et seq

- CONCLUSION ____ Lit alcnaaleenasiy ore Be RCE 29

ae aig aie eicccneneectiecmehener | am

: wes hae .TABLE OF, STATUTES AND. CASES CITED "-

-- Netgrass Drug Co. @, State Ex. Rel. Rice, Attorney Gen- / /

“ACTS OF MISSISSIPPI

; - Sub-sections (t) and Ad Sec. 45, eee 138, Mis-

sissippi Laws of 1984.2. 6

“American Bakeries Co. v. Huntsville (1936) 232 Ala. 612,

i Oe. 8 fe ee ee

Califgrnia Co. v. State Oil & Gas Board, 27 So. 2d. 542° o,

200°Miss. 824, followed in 27 So. 2d. 548, 200 Miss.

849, suggestion of error’ overruled 28 So. 2d. ‘120, 200 .

Te ge ae RTL Ser cee ee oe Pate oa Os : 20.

AD

: poe

. Campbell Cleaning & ae Works v. Porter, 183 SW od Sa aoe

249 _ 5. ates TAG EE ate I DENCE ae Fock Mem ere eas 21

Caskey Baking Go. Vv: Virginia 313, Us’ 117_ oe Re be 12

~ Cook v. Marshali County 196 US 261, 25 9. ct 233, 49 L.

ee I ee ee : Je

v Gabriel v,, Brame, ss So. 2d. 581, 200 Migs. 767... ee

Hugelns ¥ v. Home Mut. Fire Ins. ch 65 So. 646, 197 Miss.

"650 . oth gy TRC EE DST —% [st ag 3 fy <

* Jewel Tea Co- v. Troy (1935) C. C. A. ‘Ith 80F 2d. 366... : $8. .

> Miller v. Lamar Life Ins-Co, 131iS0. 282, 158 Miss. 735... i218

Miss. State Tax Com. v. Flora a Drug Co. 148 So. 373, 167

‘Miss. 1 been saay Bile SO F MEDIA eh a -.12-18

Oo.

ee, ATS Miss. 358 ea bet te Gers ea Ie . A

‘eu

v

= a : oe

* asl Sew Coen ¥: Russell, 182 So. 102, 182 2 Miss, 385,

ee

<.

Qe

‘setting aside 178 So. 815, 182 Miss. 385_.. Sinan,

Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 us 114, 30 St. ct. 496, |

4 State v. Rosell, So. 2d, 867, 192 Miss. 873...

Stone, v. General Elec. Conte. Corp. 7 So. ‘24, 811, 193

4 ‘Miss. 317 followed in Stone v.dJ niversal Credit Co.,

Q

pow

State Board of ‘Tax Commissioners of tdiane Vv. eas

498, 54 L. Ed. 688 oe idl

7.So. 2d, 820, [93 Miss. affirmed Univ. Credit Co. v.

Stone, 63 S. Ct. 66, 317 US 591, 87 L. Ed. 484 followed

in Stone v. Yellow Mgf. Accept. Corp. 7 So. 2d, 820,

193 Miss., 338, affirmed Yellow Mfg. Ac. Cor. v:—

_ Stone, 63S. Ct..66, 317-US 591, 87 US L. Ed. 484, re-..

hearing denied 63 §. Ct. 157, 317 Us. 708, 87 L. Ed.

Freee | ne oe de

fayette A. Jackson, 283 US 527, 5k S. Ct. 540, 643, 75

<e Ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 1464.

State v. Gulf M. & N.R. R. Co. 104 So. 195, 154 Miss. 185, |

oe hoe in Lowery water Gh ¢ Greenville, 122 Se-" -.

te a FOB er TI Se sammernincas + ic

St. Helena v. Butterworth 2920) 198 Cai. 330 244 P. 357.

«, Williams v. Bowling Green (1994) 254. Ry: il, 20 S. laa

| ea 507 _.......4 |

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_IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1951,

No. 253 7 - cee: Bs

~v. MEMPHIS STEAM. LAUNDRY CLEANER, INC. *

) Sag oe “Appelt

“, ef eee RODE ee nh .

“AH. STONE, CHAIRMAN aa Appellee :

“STATE TAX COMMISSION 9 0 >) * 5. &

a pee OF MISSISSIPPI

j

BRIEF ON BEWALF OF area ©

= Sat Agee

‘STATEMENT OF THE. case’. |e

This ease comes to this Court by direct cal from -

the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the appeal being taken

. from the‘ decision pk the Supreme, Court of ‘Mississippi, |.

rendered on June 11,1951, said decision of the court

_ reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court’of the First

District of Hinds County, Mississippi, wRich judgment —

was render d by the Cirenit Court of the First: District —

of Hinds County, being in favor of re Pisintitf the ap-

as ‘pellant herein.

“The @ase was begun ty. tke filing off eclaration i in the |

Cirenit Court of, Hinds County, ‘to ‘which declaration an

answer was filed and the Gase was submitted to the Judge,

.., without. a jury, and the Judge- rendered his opinion / ind

which he held that the representatives” of the plaintiff

i | , ‘

erred at 4

*

ay

‘who sdlicited wearing arparel from citizens of Mississip-

pi to be laundered and cleaned, were not transiént ven-

dors. And, omthis’ holding, a judgment was entered in

favor of the plaintiff i in the. meer court:for. the: amourt -

sued for. S |

Ye An appeal was w peclocted by A. H. Sins, as the Com-

missioner, represeriting the State 6f Mississippi, and on : ; |

appeal to the Supreme Court of “Mississi sippi, the judg-

ment, of the lower: -court was reverged . and judgmént was - .

_., rendered in fagor of the appellant, the Commissionef, ©

which amountg) to a dismissal of. the original cause of -

costae at the cost of the plaintiff. a : ie ot

aS “THE FACTS ae

ef The o capellant the Memphis Steam Laundry ‘Clatiae.

Inc., is a foreign corporation having its prineipal. place. :

of. business i in the eity of. Moms: § State of Tennessee. |

es “In enlee to procure the, patrondige of citizens of ‘Mis- :

- sissippi, appellant sends its trucks i ia charge fie on? ft

- - ployees info the State. of MissfSsippi for the f

urpose’ of

soliciting articles of clothing to be laundered and cleaned.

' - And since this acfiyity of soliciting such | articles falls

clearly: vwithin ¢ ethe.. plain language of the Mississippi A

“privilege tax statute, which imposes a tax of $50.00 on *

the us¢ of each vehicle used in the solicitation and pro-'\. .

curing of. articles to be. launfleréd, and cleaned, and‘ the

statute further providing that the tax of $50.00 shall be

paid on each vehicle used in the conduct, of its business i in

each county, and the undisputed fact showing that one

* truck. was sent into ea¢h of six counties in Mississippi,

‘two trucks were sent into. two other: eounties: of the. —

state , making a total of ten: trucks: ‘used on which a tax.

of $50.00 was imposed on the use of-each-such truck.

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“The statute in . Missigsippi. imposing- -the tax having

«,. been set outat: length in the brief of the appellant and i in

the opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, appear-

ing on page 11 of the printed record, the statutes are not

here restated. é oe . Sie ty

*.

It will be noted from the declaration filed: a the ap:

‘pellant in the Circuit, Court of Hinds County, Mississip-

-pi, the plaintiff relied on three separate contentions in

- demanding ‘judgrfent for a refund . of .the taxes. paid

2 were, first; that the plaintiff was not-a transient vendor

or dealer under the provisions of the act imposing the.

tax. Second; that the business.conducted by the plaintift :

vas interstate commerct not subject to tax by the State

of MisSissippi, and Third; that becatise under Section

110, Chapter 137, Laws of Mississippi of 1944, being a” -

logal privilege tax, laundries licensed in’ Mississippi

_ 488 of the Mississippi Laws of 1944, the law by .which

the tax collected was imposed, imposed a: tax of $50.00

_ in ‘favor of the State, then such difference in the amount

” of taxes demanded by. the two laws ‘Amounted to-an un-’

- OT he Suprefne ‘Court of. Mississippi held te 1) that

thepe was no merit it the.contention that the appellant

was not liable for the tax- For the eRe that its drivers %

could send their trucks in municipalities other than, thaté>,

F _ in whi ich the laundry was conducted by, the payment of.

a tax of $8.00 on each truck, whereas, under Chapter

3 constitutional discrimination., J ANE ee ey 26

were not, transient. vendors. or dealers. The Mississip}ii e

(Court. likewise” held: thet there ‘was no discrimination,

between the two sections of the law, because the is

lature in making this classificatio.:,.which is reason ‘Able,

~ nb doubt took into. consideration the fact that local laun- |

0.

dries wer re required t to pay ‘ad valorem taxes, privilege

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hicks: and miany other taxes. And’ the Court further ;

held that the tax invofed was nota tax on interstate

commerce, but a tax on a pérson soliciting business. for"

a laundry not. licensed in the state, a local activity which

applies te nonresidents alike. ;

ARGUMENT

- This’ case invol¥ es the construction of sub-sections (t). £

and (y) of Section 45, Chapter 138, _Mississippi. Laws of >

» “1944, aid Section 45 being what is commonly known as’

‘a a ‘Transient Vendors Priv llege Tax Law”’. The perti-.

nent parts of the gen-ral prov: isiovs of said statufe are

that theres imposed.

‘Supon each person. doing ‘busitiess as a transient

vendor or dealer, as @efined in this section, upon

which a privilege tax is not specifically imposed by

| another section of this Act; a tax ‘for each county.

according to the following schedule:” © >

Teevs form of mer chandise,which may become the oe |

ete ject of transieng salés is divided into classes apd a sep-

arate and specifig 2 amount of*tax is imposed*for the priv- 3

ilége-of selling su commodities, the tak being: fixed or

\ ‘graduated. according fo the conception of the Legisla-

ture % as te'the value of the privilege of selling | such articles

ase transient vendors, or upop certain services w rhich

night be: rendered / by a transient person,

The original privilege tax upon “peddlers” i ee one. of

the ‘oldest provisions of the Privilege Tax Law. Its pri-

mary purpose is held by the court in some of’ our earliest

decisions to be not only ‘forthe. protection of persons wito - .

_ might be taken advantage of by zinprincipled ‘%slick’’.

_ salesmen by. misrepreseiiting the value of articles .of-

_ fered for sale and heing nonresidents who might never _ .

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for the failure of such articles or service to

to its represented quality might not be enforced.

_ from such fraudulent representations of sales or Service,

the Legislature i in the early history of the State undertook |

Site: suppress this ‘‘nefarious practice’? by imposing: a

high privilege tax on each person engaged in. the busi- ,

ness of ‘‘peddler,’’ , See ae

‘Indeed, in the early eases reperted in’ ‘the Mississippi

Reports, there will be found that in addition to the ad-

*valorém or: property tax, privilege taxes were the only ,

-other source of: public revenue,

° For the dual purpose of revenue and pivtection of the ©

citizens of Mississippi, a privilege tax on ‘“peddlers’” or -

‘transient vendors’’ has always been a matter. of-eon-

-eern and strict attention by. the, Legi@tature, “and jas al-_

ways been one of the revenue measures strictly. enforced.

The early statutes, on the subject of privilege: taxes im- .

posed much more severe penaltiés than : are now w imposed ;

> by similar laws. / . /

In the early history ‘of the: Prix ilege Tax Law of Mis-

sa sissippi, a person: who engaged in busingss witheut thé —

procurement of a privilege’ tax license was liable. for 100

per ‘cent penalty, subject ‘to ériminal prosecution, and

upon conviction shigght be subject to a larg fine, as well

at imprisonment, and in addition tothe eivil penalties

«and criminal Prosecution, all contract madé were held |

| ito be. vofd. %

—_

- While thie penalties, ifposed upon persons engaging ai

in any business without the payment of proper privilege

tax have been modified to some extent, the proy eas

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again visit: the scene, of sith sale, so that reepénsibiity

easure up.

‘In: order to prevent ‘the uninformed, ‘gullible people”

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: ates no plant in

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.

- of the Privilege Tax Law are Very positive as to the im- :

’ position of a penalty for engaging in any business for

which a privilege tax ‘has hot been ‘paid.

2

With this background and history of the Privilege Tax |

‘Law of this state, it-is easier to ascertain the legislative

. intent which is always. a guide to the. courts in. construing

the ‘statute. , 5 : aN

This, suit was’ + filed for ee purpose of obtaining a re--

fund of taxes paid by the plaintiff which admittedly oper-

Re and which admittedly has

representatives in the. State of Mississippi soliciting

clothing to be laundered or cleaned, and paying no taxes .

of any kind to. the State, either on taxable property lo-—

cated in the state, or any other form of taxation for the

= ‘privilege of the business being conducted. It falls clearly .

' “within the plain provisions of Sub-section (t) of Chapter

_*, 45 of the Laws of 1944, which sub-section provides that: ~

Upon’ each } person soliciting business for a laun-

ion eR ary not licensed in this state.as such, | in each county,

. $50,00."? |

Sub-section (y) of said. Section 45 also provides:

nes ‘Provided, however, that where any person is ‘sub-

ject. to the payment. of the tax imposed in this -sec- .

tion, makes use of more than one vehicle in carrying —

on such. _ business, tlie tax herein imnposed shall .be -

_ * paid on: ae vehicle used ° in carrying on xe bus-:

—iness.’

. \

‘The plaintiff while admitting that the taxes. demanded

and paid were in strict accord with the provisions: of

_ said two sub-sections quoted, it, attacks, the constitution-

~. ality_of said seftions solely on the ground that by ‘See-

Nea tea Sie canine

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tion 110, Chashan: 137, Laws of 1944; ‘the pridunted ¢ tax

imposed on each person operating a laundry and con- -

tains a pro viso that: . 3 gui >

: “Upon each truck’ or other vehicle. for such Pees

. dryina municipality other than where the laundry %

‘is located, a tax of $8. 00, v

that the imposition of the ek tax by ieanicipalities on

the operation of trucks soliciting business ir municipali-

_ties is only $8.00, whergas the’ tax imposefl by the State

on trucks engaged i in’ similar business is $50, 00, It being

the contention of the plaintiff that the discrepancy in

the amount of taxes imposed on representatives of laun-

_. dries’ situated im the state, and livensedamunicipalities,

- and the amount of tax impdsed by the State for solicit:

ing business for laundries not situated within the State,

is an unreasonable classification and ‘therefore. “uncon. |

stitutional. Pith ns

Bi Se ae

In answer to ‘this ‘contention, it, is only necessary to:

briefly review the decisions of the courts, including our

own Mississippi Court. The cases cited are only typical .

of the uniform holding of the Mississippi Court on the

question of the. right of ‘the legislature ‘to classify the dif.

ferent occupations for the ‘purpose of taxation. And in

addition’ to this brief reference to the ‘uniform: Holding, .

of, our Coart, [ refer to some caseg s selected at random,

showing: the holdiag of* the courts of other states of the:

United States in, similar rases.

_-

Tn Jewel: “Tea Co. v. tier. (19: 35): *C.. : A. 7th 80F.:

. (2d) 366, it was held that a fieense tax ordinance which |

imposed an “annual ‘fee for all vehicles used for the stor-

‘age or owrrying of cértain specified food products. for

the’ purpose of delivering them.to any place in the eity,>._.

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and exempted therefrom any vehicles ‘u. +d. to deliver

© foodstuffs ‘from any establishment licensed as a food

dealing establishment in the city, did not éstablish an

- unreesonable- classification and was consequenély not |

‘violative of the. equal protection clause of. the Federal :

: Constitution, the court saying: ae occ Bek

| “We are satisfied that vehicle owners delivering

foodstuffs ia the cite and having no habitat therein

are, for’ the purpose of such ordinances, in a-ciass

‘. Separate and apart from those who nave therein

, permanent places of business.’ me

“And in Williams v. Bowling Breas (1984) 254 Ky. See

70. S..W. (2d) 967, where it appeared that plaintiff who. .

brought suit to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance of

. defendant municipality, was engaged in the dry elean-. | if

.drig ‘business in the city but contracted | for the .actual

work to be done by a firm maintaining a plant in another fa

city, it was held that the ordinance, which exacted a li-

eense fee of $25.00 from persons operating .a cleaning

and dyeing business -within the city, and a fee of $200. 00

from persons engaged in the cleaning ‘and. dyeing: busi-

ness, without operating a plant in the city, did not create

an unreasonable classification, on the theory that plain-

tiff’s business of soliciting orders, assembling the clotlies, >

. and transporting them to the plant .at which the work.

Sat was done, was -different from the business ° of actually

, maintaining a plant for cleaning and dyeing operations.

‘In St. Helena.v. Butterworth (1926) 198 Cal. 230, 244

P. 357, an ordinance providing: . | 7

' OSKy ery “traveling salecinns <, .. carryi in¢g his sae

in a wagon, automobile, iaks or other vehicle .

. and-who does notmai ntain a. fixed ‘place of biasiniess sr

within the said town . . shall pay’ a license tax”’,

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and. i imposing ¢ a tax ‘different i in amount. ‘upon: sia ad |

© Maintaining a. place of business ‘within the ‘ey, was up-

-heHl, the court saying:

6

The manner’ in ‘wideh one imay ccndtaet aly ‘busi:

> negs, by: which h¢ avoids the payment of rent, pro- .

perty tax, and other looal burdens, makes it egsen-’.

tially. different business from that conducted by reg-

ular merchants having a fixed place of _business;

and ts a good reason for discrimjnation in the mat-_

. ter of fixing the amount of the license tax.’’ : -

In’ American . Bakeries. Co. v. Huntsville (1936) 939

“Ala. 612, 168 So. 880, an “ordinance imposing a license

tax upon itinerant sellers of bakery products and a smal-

ler tax upon dealers in bakery woducts having a busi-

« mess establishment within the city was held" not discrimi-

natory, at least as against an itinerant ret the Court

saying: s<. =: | a aes

.

“The provisions of tne orilinazice imposing a les: |

ser license-tax or fee against bakoriés having a: plaee

of business regulagy opened to the-public in ne wise |

‘discriminates against, the’: ‘appellants. Confessedly, |

they do not fall within this latter class, They have.

no more just ground of complaint than has an or-

dinary itinerant dealer, who has paid his license to

hawk his articles about the ¢éity, the right to com- ae

plain that the city had imposed a different. and less- ;

er licetise tak upon. a local merchant of the city,

who, sold and delivered his goods and wares’ to his :

customers throughout the city. The appellants do.

not fall Within vy aera of bakers who have a ‘plant

within the. city/b

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but within the class terms ‘itiner> ° -

-ants.’ Within the purview of this ordinance, the ap-

“pellants were’ ‘and are itisferant dealers. ‘ua eae

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Siate v. Gulf M. & N. R. R.£0. 104 So. “195, 154 Mics.

155, followed in Lowery v. City of Greenville, 122° So@98:

Const. U. 8,-Amend. 14, does not prohibit reason-

- able classification of property. for purposes of tax-

. ation 80 long as clagsification rests on difference hav-

ing reasonable relation to subject of legislation, 80

that ail persons similarly situated are treated alike.’

_ Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co. 131 So. 282, 158 Miss. 753: __

ae ‘Classification for purposes of taxation, if not:

, Wholly unreasonable ‘and arbitrary, and statute is

uniform in operation, does not deny equal protection

~ of laws guaranteed by Federal Constitution - -(Const.

‘US. Amend. 14).’”. .* *.. :

- Mississippi State Tax Com. . Flora Drug Oe: 148 So, *

,. 373, 167 Miss. 1:

“Equal Grotestions elguses of Federal Constitation |

- does not prevent state from ‘adjusting its system .of

_\. taxation in ‘reasonable‘niatiner, nor compe? state to-

adopt ironclad nile of equal) taxation, _ (Const. U. S::

Amend 14);??.

‘state taxation are nét forbidden by Federal _Con-,

stitution (Const. U. S. Amend 14).” As

- Sinée the contention of the plaintiff i in thie lower.court °

‘involves ‘a constitutional question, and the United States 3

- Constitution, and the constyuction thereof beim the rule -

by which. ali constitutional questions are ‘controlled, T eall

‘the attention of the Court to the case of Caskey Baking -

Co. v.. Virginia, 313° US 117," decided by the Supreme.

‘<Mere: inequalities ° or Be ial ‘in matter of.

“Court of the United States, which is conclusive,, in my

ie opinion, of the,solé question involved. the Jangyage of”

* . thé Court is as: foHows:: ee

* ‘The appellant, a corporation of West Virginia,

; has its principal office and place of business 1 in Mar--

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——tinnbiongs that state. Asa fnvstas ¢orporation. re-

‘gistered in ‘Virginia, it. has paid the latter Staié an

». annual registration fee and an ing ome fax on its net

. Profits allocable to its Virginie “business. It makes

bread which it sells to grocers and other retailers i in

‘territory: adjagent to. Martinsburg, including Win-

chester’ and other places in Virginia. Appellant’s

trucks carry the bread into Virginia where they se?ve

: regular routes_at regular interv als. The drivers call

Oe Mt only on refular customers, i inquire of each how much

bread he needs and, in response to his order, take it.

from the truck and deliver it to the customer, Thus;

each such transaction in. Virginia i is a sale and de- - >.

” livery inrthat state toa regular customer,

ting

“The company has no. property permanently hag

cated i in Virginia and no place of business in'the -

state, except that, as required by the statute respect- .

ing registerd foreign corporations, it maintains an

_ office in. the state where claims against it may be

| audited, settled, and paid... ‘

‘<The appellant, was vonvicted for making a sale in:

Virginia without having procured a license pursuant‘

- to See. 192b1 of the Tax Code of Vitginia and a fine -

" was imposed. The Supreme Court of Appeals af.

-firmed:the convictign.’ 4 ;

ee far as material the statute provides: ‘There i is

ry ete hereby imposed an annual State license taxon ev ery ¢

person, firm and corporation (other than. , ..a man-

" ufaeturer taxable on capital by this State, | or a’ dis- |

_ tributor of manufactured goods. paying a State li

-cense tax on his purchases ) who or which shall ped- |.

die goods, wares, or. aschvadioe by gelling ard ce-

liv ering the same at the s same time to licensed deal-

; a ‘

s ‘

; “a i : ; ks 14 RS Tae : ot

._ ers‘or retailers at other thah a definite place of bus= eee ES

iness operated by the seller. Provided, howev er, this |

act shall not be construed to apply: to wholesale deal-—

. ers regularly licensed by this State, and who shall at

‘the same time sell and deliver merehandise to retail _ |

_ thercbants.’ The annual iow! is } $100 for each vehicle

used in the business.

“ris admitted that appellant was. not a manufec::

turer taxable on its capital stock, nor.a ‘distributor

of manufactured products paying a state license tax

on its purchases, nor a licensed wholesale déaler, and

‘ did not, therefore, gome within. any of. the classes eX-

‘empted by the Act. ° oe 3

“in the state. courts, and here, the jock chal-

~: lenged the statute as contray ning the commerce

clause and the equal protection @huse of the Federal ——

Constitation. Its position is that it is doing either AS

an interstate business which the State may not bur--

den by. imposing a license tax, or an, intrastate bus- :

iness as to which the exaction works a forbidden dis-

. .erimination, We hold both contentions untenable. '

fray ao While the transportati n of bread across the. .

eS state line is interstate commaree, that is not the ac-

'. tivity which is licensed or taxed. The -purely: local

- business of peddling is what the Act hits, and this

irrespeetive of the source of the goods sold. It is set-

tled%that such a statute imposes no burden upon in-.

terstate commerce which the Constitution interdicts.

The appellant, however, urges that the Act discrim-

inates ‘against interstate commerce by exempting .

s from, its operation the privilege of sales by man- =e Bh

‘-ufacturers paying tax on their capital employ ed in

manufacture i in Virginia. It is said that if its bakery.

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were situate in Virginia the appellant would have the

benefit of this: exemption afd, since it is not, the

marketing of appellant’s goods shipped into the

+ State i is the target of a hastile discrimination, But —

the argument overlooks fhe fact that ‘peddlers re-.

-sident i in Virginia who buy their goods within the :

; State, or buy: or. produce them. from-extra-state™ °

<e sources, are alike subject to the. Act. ‘The contention

-that the Act discriminates against interstate. com-

merce by virtue ‘of the —— iv question’ i is Soted

@ _-atived by our decisions. : ale

- —

+3. Examination “of the Tax Code of Virginia dis:

- closes that the Aét in. question, is but one portion of a =

| coniprehensive scheme of taxation. Manufacturers

| “who sell their own products pay a tax on capital,

| which the State deems sufficient. to cover all their .

| activities, ineluding*the vending of the goods. Whole-

| ale merchants who, have a fixed place of business

A a license tax measured by a. percentage of all

¥ their purchases; awd if they are also licensed ‘by the °

-' town or city in which they have their place of bus-

ie iness or, in ‘lieu thereof, are taxed by such town or

aM, city on the capital employed in, the. business, they»

may se'l and deliver at the: same time and place any-

where in the State without. payment of any addition-

al license tax. Every distributing- house, whether 7

. operated by a manufacturer or wholesaler, for dis-

tributing goods amongst the owner’s retail, Stores, -

mst -be.licensed and pay the same tax as if it were

a wholesaler. Retail merchants and peddlers at re-)

tail must be licensed and pay license taxes, — the

former a pereer tage of the value of the purchases

and the latter a fixed annual fee. Those who have no .

« ®y

6

| fixed place of business, who. peddle thet wares only: Fe

to. licensed dealers or retailers at the places of bus-.

"_iness of the latter, fall into none of the described clas-.

5 ses. As the court below. _ out, were it-not for

© See. 192b, b, such peddlers would d be fon only vendors in -

~~ Virginia to escape some form of taxation.

Ane

as | “Peddiers. at wholesale’ fe not entitled’ to be li-

L oe censed and taxed on the same: basis as other vendors,

» as respects’ either form or amount. As we have re-

_* peatedly held, the equal protection - clause 6f- the. 3%

5. Fourteenth. Amendment does. not prevent a State

aes f rom classifying for taxation or impose any iron rule .

. of equality. Some occupations may be taxed though ei

‘ others are not. Some may be taxed at one rate,

others at a different rate. Classification is not dis-

crimination. Itis enough that those in the same class ‘

are treated with equality. That is true here.”

fo the case of. Notgrass Drug Co. v. State Ex Rel Rice,

> Attorney Geral, reported in 175.Miss. at page 358, the

constitutionality of the present, Sales Tax Law was at. |

. - tacked on the ground, among other things, that there had —

been an unconstitutional diserepancy between the amount. |

of tax imposed on. different persons. And. in answer. to

this criticism, this Court used the following language:

“Our duty is to sustain ‘the classification adopted

by the Legislature if there are substantial differ:

ences between: the oceupations separately classified. a

Such diffe rences need not be great. ¥e |

oS

State Board of Tax Commissioners of Tadiana v.. La-

efayette A. Jackson, 283 US 527; 51 S. Ct. 540, 543, 75. L.

Ed. 1248, 73 A L. Be. 1464:

| “In ‘aimee the tax bets under ‘consideration,

| the Legislature has the right to classify persons and

.. //- Commodities subject . thereto. <In its discretion it

| may tax all, or it may tax one or some, taking care

—\bo accord to’all in the same class equality | of rights.’

It may tax dealers who sell -at wholesale, and not

+ those who sell fhe same commodities at retail, or it

_ may tax ‘dealgrs who séll the same commodities, and.

. not tax those —_— other and different. ‘commod- :

: ities. : |

3 Southwestern’ Oil Co. Vv. ‘Wexaa} 21 US 114, 30 S. Ct a

496, 498, 54 L. Ed. 688; and Cook v. Marshalf County, 196 i

US 261, 25 S. Ct. 233, 49 L. Ed. The 5 ‘

Ba may be that the Zifference_ between wholé-

salers and\ retailers, an this connection, is. not great,

- and is not apparent on the surface ; nevertheless that

court which jultimately determines the power ‘of the

Legislature in this connection has said that the clas- -~ |

* sificiation can be made, and our legislative history .

ye discloses that - it is tay custom of Legislatures . to :

make. such.’’ | x o .

Since. the principal attack iad on the statute involved

® -by the plaintiff in the lower coprt is the unconstitutional-

ity of said statute by reason of the. discrimination claim- >

ed, I respectfully call the Court’ s attention to the fol-

lowing Mississippi cases, which. appear on this subject:

‘The legislature has a wide discretion in making _

the classification. for legislative purposes. Huggins: a

v: Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 65 So. 646, 107 Miss. 650..

- «@onst. Amend. U. S. 14, does not prohibit reason-—

fre, able classification of: propert? for purposes of taxa-

- tion so leng as classification’ rests.on difference hav-

, peer a “ing reasonable*telation to subject of legislation, so |

that all persons similarly situated are ‘espied alike. ~

ge” 0 State v. Guif MN. RB. Co, 104 So. 689, 138 Miss. 70. rela

oe “Classification for purposes of. taxation: if not

. wholly upreasonable and arbitrary, and statute is

uniform in operation, does not deny equal protection

of laws guaranteed by Federal Constitution (Const.

US Amend; 14). Miller v. Lamar Taf Ins, re 131. Seer Se

ne So. 282 158 Miss. 753. a Tha (eo

bas

a

litg “Equal protection dies of Federal Constitution :

, does not preyent, state from adjusting its system a:

_. taxation in reasénable manner, nor: cor” el state to. - -

~ adopt ironelad rule of equal taxation. (Const. Us, FO ae

. Amerid. 14), Mississipp1 State Tax Com. v. Flora *

ue Drug Co, 148 So, 373, 167 Miss. 1.

‘*Mere ‘inequalities or ‘@zemptions. jn matter “of

state taxation are not. forbidden by Federal Con-

stitution (Const. US ‘Amend. 14) _— Miss. State Tax.

Com. v. Flora Drug Co. 148 So. 373, 167 Miss. 1

«The question of classification is primarily for

_ Legisltaure and can never become a judicial question ee raaares gO.

- except for the purpose ¢ of determining whether legis- |

lative. action: is clearly unreasonable, and when clas-

sification is called in question, if any. state of. facts

reasonably cau. be conceived that would sustain Jit,

‘existence of that state of facts at time.law was enact:

ed must .be ‘assumed and courts*eannot. require the

Legislature to specify’! its reasons for classification,

but will always prestime that Legislature acted on .

legitimate grounds of distinction, if, such giounds ;

exist. Russell . Inv. Corp. v. Rugsell, 189 So, 102,182 .. ‘* .

*. Miss. 385, setting er * 1is: So. 815, sana Miss, 385. .

Aga eo. 7" . a

a Ras Sook ‘ % BR ag

eae

**One ‘we assails classification in a . statute must :

,-earry the burden of showing that it does not rest on

any reasonable basis. a

| -“It is presumed that ‘Weislature in inaling dis-.

_ eritninations in classifications in statutes, bases them ©

_ on are a. U. ~ C. A Const. Amend. 4 os

. See.

*. Tn determining wiatlast statutes, sacked re Leg-

~islatyre ‘transcend limits, imposed ‘by: Federal and }

- State, Constitutions, courts should proceed:. with

: greatest. possible caution. and, should. never dqqlare a

statute void unless its invalidity is shown Bayona.

asa YE doubt. c

-aCoarts should wicph 6 CO stru wees of tks that 3

will bring it into harmony Constitution by. re-

-stricting its application to iegitimate field of legisla-

ee ‘tion, Whenever necessary in ordér to uphold its con-

oes stitutionality and carry its provisions into effect.

ee.

ae

oe “Every ‘intendment in faver of ocustitutionality”

: “unless repugnancy ‘of statute to Constitution clearly

. appears or -is made to appear beyond, reasortable be

e

aw

ae determining couatitutignality: of statute, ‘it

will be presumed. that. Legislature hag considered ef-

feet of statute on constitutional rights of the citizen

- and that Legislature acted ‘from patriotic and just

motiv es and with a desire to preniéte public geod.

“When a classification in a. statate is questioned,

-eourts will presume that Legislature acted on legit-

_.. imate grounds of distinction, if any stete of facts

reasonably can be conceival that would sustain ‘elas-

a = 4 »

* ‘

z ithe

Se

: a. “at ; .

. :

= ° " : a) Pome

Ch

CS *

oe

ie

sifications, even nif reasons are > not obvious: Ston

General Elec. Contr. Corp. 7 So.,24, 811,193 Mfiss,

"317 followed in Stone ¥. Universal Credit. Co., 7So0, °

, 2d; 820, 193 Miss. affirmed Universal Credit Ca. v.

Stone, 63.8. Ct. 66, 317'US 691,87 L Ed. 484, follaw-

ed in Stone v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance. Corp. 7 So2d,

820, 193 Migs.; 338, affirmed.Yellow Mfg. Ac. Cor. v.

Stone, 63 S. Ct 66, 317 US 591, 87 US L. Ed. 484,

: rehearing denied 63 S. Ct. 157, 387 US 708, 87 Le Ed.*

+a% 565. . K hocks a Say: t 8 :

: g ’

eS “Beery" scdsonable doubt ani be resdived in

~ favor ‘of constitntion@lity ef a statute. — State v.

ms Rosell, So. 2d, 867, 192 Miss. 873.

aeths aN statute should be.eonstrued if ccieinly pos-

sible so ‘as to avoid rendereing it unconstitutional or

seriously endangering ‘its ‘vopstitutionality. 7s

oo

S

Ms

= “Where a statute is capable of two aciecodbons. °

.. one of whieh’ would render it invalid ‘and the other 3

* valid, the eonstruction which upholds i its validity

must be adopted. | aes : 5

“AML presuniptions <hdald be indulged i in fy for.of ©.

validity of:a statute, and sucha construction § ould.

be given. to: it, if possible, as will ‘uphold - it, and its-

Sy unconstitutionality niust appear bey on@a reasonable —

ai doubt before it ‘willbe held to be invalid. California

- Go. ¥! State Oil MGas Board, 27 So. 2d. 543, 300 Miss; .

824, followed i in 27 So, 2d. 548, 200 Miss. 849, sugges-

tion of ° error overriffd 28 So. 2d. ssi 200 Mist. 824.

; és statute will not be hétd unconstitutional unless

clearly so. — Gabriel-v. Brame, 28 So. 2d. 581, 200

Miss. 7167. ek

2 c)

ee.

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, . ‘ : Pa 2 . * xt ae ; *2y

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: a, a ‘ 8 ° B 2 "

ERVICE REN DERED BY A LAUNDRY OR CLEAN. €

3R.IS DIFFERENT'IN ITS NATURE FR ROM MANY -

FF THE ACTIVITIES TAXED BY SO-CALLED el

‘TRANSIENT VENDOR” SECTION OF THE PRIV- . +

LEGE TAX LAW. ah

is e x a) Po

In the case rot Campbell Clesing & Dye’ W orks.v. eal : i

Tt, reported in 183 SW 2d 249,'the Court of Civil Appeals ~

of Texas defined the term “laundry?” as follows : SAI a a ae

oa “Whatever may be the etymological derivation of

the. Sa in the social, and domestic life of today’

the popular and ordinary meaning df the term ee

af: dry,? used in connection with the word ‘publi,’ i

that ‘of a place td which the public are invited ‘a =

‘deliver soiled ¢lothes’to be w ashed, dried, starched,

ironed,‘ and ‘subjected to the. “processes ordinarily”

employed to. render , sojled clothes: suitable for fur--

; ther use- = ee oe ee Rutan Mek Fer

cow ebster defines ‘Dry -clean’ to mean To cleanse." |

“Gs garment). with goline, benzine or the tike. !

8 “We think, under the proof, the findings of | the,

: court. and the definitions, the work ‘performed: “was in’

co

a laundry and hence within the. statute. ‘Tt need not be--

détermined, and We do: not determine, the place was -

-We are of the opinfon it cannot be said it ismot a...

: daundry. F urthermore, we rezard it’a matter of com-°

mon knowledge that modern lgundries, as. a rule, 7. eda

dry Senne and préssing as a. part of their laundry >

. service.’ Ae et £8) NNN am 4. ey sored

~ ft is also x matter of common x knowledge. that modern.’

q

laundries have adopted the common pr ractice of having

their solicitors or representatives collect at the place of

4

. ¢

2 ; *: rs) os ae _ ;

ar . bd * . . .

a:

od

exclusively,; ap dry cleayjng or dy eing establishinent: = a

-e° : “and pick up pore the articles to be ‘daa or dana’: :

urn such articles when cleaned. to the -

ce:

.,

es ness of the owner. and feturns the cleaned articles tothe Se

o 4M

ba

» place Fre fice and colleet*tfie charge made for. me

service ‘retidered. - :

os

‘~ - The: -patrons, or owners of: Bre artides’ are riot con- es

cerned ‘with, nor informed, as to where the agtual, clean- ee

inig or ‘laundering i is performed: The owner or customer.

of such articles only knows that the agent or Tepresenta-

+ tive éalting “on” “the customer. receiv@ the articles ‘towbe —

laundered dr cleaned at the residence of place Of. busi-

" sme place.” oe Pitt ANE Boar ASB AS :

»

Tf, as in some’ instances, thereds operated what j is com- :

, monly called a ‘‘Cash and Carry”’ place of busitiéss, thie”

owner of the- articles’ to be cleaned czrries such. articles :

a"@

to some“designated, office” or ‘‘recelving station’. -and ey

_¢alls for the articles at-a designated time and receives

“game “after the service_. has been rendered’ ahereon. : The

owner of the articles’ does not know or care whether the .

articles tabe washed or cleaned are serviced at the place ;

where suc articles are delivered by. him, or whether they

. are sent. to a plant located 1 im,another part of the cify, or.

-sént éut. ofthe state, to bé cleaned B laundered. Indeed,

poe is. tHe. service of ‘eltaning, or washing the article’ thint

the owner. pays, ‘for, without reference to where the at.

_ ticles are, actually ‘Washed: of cleaned.

2.

“Iti isa matter of egmtmon knowledge that m many persons

offering cleaning and laundry service to the public have

no plimnt or. place of business, except. a truck or other ve-

“*hidle | into which the articles are: received, and by which

( ‘delivered to the owner after the service ©

‘such articles ar

of cleaning ¢ wakhing has beén tee

e

‘oe | . “ :

; e Se *% : a ;

eee rote

t f ae : eee. . a. ne

" 23 ae reas & 4 :

vi o ‘ z : 4 5 ae ¢$ Y-¢ ‘ : ¢

“Tris fle sates of conimion knowledge, and therefore well es

__ known to, the general « publi¢ thag there is at least one

-Jaundry in the City: of Jackson, Mississippi, .whieh al. ee a

though long establis ed, lost all. of its machinery from | |

its plant, but has a to give séervige to its former . .

_ eustomers through th medium of sending its. trucks to

pat ‘the places where the, articles are, owned, ‘picking up such Fe :

e _attiéles and: ‘delivering same to the owner after, the uetual eee

* eléaning of launderjng hasbeen sasgeaes to be done’ * ae ae

Pye somie other plant i in the city. 3 * i ‘ es Pash

“It. will be noted that the provision of “the law ‘under: .. |

» | Which. the ax involved was: denianttottig part of. See- as |

a tod 45, Chapter. 138, Laws of 1944; and the several taxes ©

| def ined and imposed: ‘by said section apply only- to activi- |

ties ‘on which i a priviledge tax is not sheila ‘imposed

by another section of the aét”’. ”

~ Section 110 of Chapter 137 of the Laws of, 1944, Seine

the general privilage tax law which is now cleat only —

by ‘municipalities and counties imposes: a gra waited tax

on each-person operating a ‘laundry, the tax being: grad-

uated according to the size of the municipality i in whieh, 2

~ the laundry is operated. It, will be ngted that there is no. ~

reference made to a plant of any kind, the tax being grad-

uated according to the potential business indicated by.

the size of the mannii palty in tet the zescprs pain is con< is

9 *dueted. pee, Sat ae ae ss

06224

It will ‘da S noted that the. language of é the ginb.se6- ee Set

* tion imposing the tax on the, solicitor fora laundry, limits . |

* the appfication of ‘the tax to soliciting business ‘‘for a:

. laundry not licensed in this state as such’, And the con-. +

_ struction of said subsection in connection with the pro-

‘ visions of Section 110, Chapter 137, Laws ‘of. 1944 has’ :).:

uniformly been - ‘that:'¥ wher®a honregident operator of a-

7)

hinds

Ae fiee tte) ok SA,

, ‘ ee. 3 : 8 Pay

‘laundry or cleaner ‘establishes an office or ‘receiving - |

. station’’ within the state, and ‘pays the local laundry

_ license according to the graduated tax imposed. in ac- -

3 “cordance with the size of the municipality i in which such

~

office: or receiving station is operated, that such nonres- ~ . 3

ident owner of such place of business would not be re- :

qfired to pay the $59.00 on each truck imposed on solici-

- tors: of. laundry and cleaning for laundries not: licensed

‘in the state, | ‘and would only be required to pay the tax

“of $8.00. for each municipality in which the cleaning and

“jaundry! ing was solicited, other than the one in wae the

laundry was licensed. enone z

ee therefore sincerely urge that beanie as the Courts

have uniformly held that persons engaged in any tran-

_. ‘sient/basiness would be the ones liable for the tax imposedl. -

- under the Transient Vendor section; and said section

\ further providing that ‘‘Provided further, that the Com-

ay sioner, ‘shall issue ‘transient vendor licenses in the

name of the agent whe operates the vehicle from which the

i herchandise i is_sold. ‘and delivered’, and “Every vehicle

used by an individial (except a pergon specifically ex- -

: the representativ es of the company because of its opera- --

2

empted) subject to’ the provisions 0 this section, must

S$ iave conspicuously displayed thereon the name of the

, person using same and his business address’’, it is ap-

‘pal. was properly: demanded in connection only with -

‘tion Ww ‘thi

| the, state in rendering. service to the owners

x code into two amavis .

daaiss The. privileges fsnated as ‘‘State Taxes’’

a rw . \

e

sarent that the license demanded on which the tax was b

@”- _- «

e 25.

previously collected by the sherif fs of the evvieelc counties -

for the ‘benfit of thé state, were included i in Chapter 137

of the Laws ‘of 1944, and the state surrendered its right

to have any of said taxes collectdd for its benefit. It al-

: lowed by said act any municipality or- county which,

as - adopted an ordindwice or an order adopting stich chapter

‘ asits privilege tax code, to have the exclusive’ right to. >)

collect suc taxes on. the privileges therein enumerated. fe

- Those vaieilaius which had been designated i in the gen-

- etal privilege tax code previously as. “SM@Mewide. Taxes’?

were included in Chapter 138 of the Laws of 1944, and.

3 the authority to collect taxes on the privileges therein.

- enumerated was confined to the State Tax Commissioner 7

_ or. the Insurance Ne Wome

In puies to emphasize the complete ‘separation of the

two ¢lasses of privileges taxed and confine the right of

collection of each class to the respective. authorities, See-

tion 3 of Chapter 137, Laws of 1944 requires persons.

desiring to exercise afy privilege taxed by said-chapter °

to procure from.the tax collector of the county or munici-

“pality, as the case may be, a license for the several priv-

Gleges enumerated in said chapter; and Section 227 of.

Said chapter provides’ as. follows :\ : eee

‘‘The privileges taxed by this. act shall not +o

~-subject to taxation for a: ‘greater extent than is per-

mitted by the sections of this act, either by, the board ©

of supervisors of any’ county ¢ or by an municipality, a

arid.no manicipality or county shall levy any, taxon —

= any privilegé wee has heen daly licensed for state- ..

wide purposes.’ :

2 Banton 70 ‘of Chapter 138, awk of Mississippi for

"1944, the chapter covering “{State- Wide Taxeh, ”? in. which _

2

4

Section 45, the transient vendor section is included,

provides as follows:

- . “See. 70. The pavilegse texed ee this ‘act shall

pot be taxed by the board -of supervisors of any

county; nor by we municipalities except as may be

_ herein provided.’* aaa ey oe

: tt will thus be seen “that the two classes. of privilage ;

7 > taxes which attornéys for the appellant: ‘compare in their

argument as unconstitutjonal discrimination, are separ- —

ate and distinct. And do tiot apply to the same activity.:

The language of Section 70 just quoted expressly” pro-

hibits municipalities and counties from taxing any, activ-

ity .covered by Chapter 138 of the law;. and the tax of.

$8.00 imposed and to be. collected by municipalities is

' imposed orify on persons. representing - local laundries _

taxed and licensed under the provisions of Section 110,

_ Chapter 137 of the Laws of 1944, and such,activity ¢ eould

not he taxed by Section 45, Chapter 138, Laws of 1944.

becausé of the provision therein: ‘‘upon which a privilege .

' tax is not specifically imposed by another. section of this

agt.”? ae pane : _ . ee

+

THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY ANTORNEYS

FOR THE APPELLANT. .

Ihave no quarrel with the authorities cited i in the brief

: of the atténeys for the appellant with. reference to the

fact that a state may not tax interstate commerce. But,

‘J respectfully submit that the’ activities engaged in by .

the appellant were not in interstate commerce. The ac-

tivity for which the tax in question was imposed is*strict-

ly local, in that the soliciting of wearing apparel to be .

laundered - ‘and cleaned, which apparel is procuredsfrom

_ the owner within the state, and the return of. said. articles

e. ®.

2

a

.

‘ e

?

cs ops, : ah

- contention is sought to be sustained by the citation of the

b

7.

97

As ~~ when lainidered. and sleanga $s the. owner, ‘is merely: a :

local service “rendered by the drivers of the vehicles in

accepting articles to-be laundered’ and cleaned and return-

ing same to the owner at the exact easits where sucli ar-

. . {ticles were - reeeived,

The three cases: cited by ‘the iturnets for the sated :

on the question of, whether or not the soliciting of articles

of wearing apparel to be laundered and cleaned consti- _

- tutes the operation of a laundry, aire not in: support of the

conte sntion made by-the attorney s for the appellant, which

Cases mentioned.

e

In the case of Kansas'Wity v. Seaman, 160 Pace. 1139, popes

an ordinance of the municipality imposed a tax on laynd-

ries and tbe court held that the mere fact that clothing

. was ‘gathered up to be launderedand distributed, did

not amount to. conducting a laundry in, the city in. con-

templation of the law i imposing the tax on the operation

ofa laundry. The Court further. holding that the only - a

part of the activity which amounted. to interstate. com-

merce was the transmission of the articles. ‘across state

lines, which aateity was not A cryiies by the provisions of

_, the law. .: : a

Another case, Ciaanorihalth v. » Pearl Sanciaey Com-

“pany, 105 Ky. 259, is'a case where a municipal ordinance _

imposed a tax on the operation ofa laundry and the Court.

» held that the mere gathering up of clothing to -be laund- |

ered did not constitute the operation of a laundry in con- oon

templation of. the ordinance imposing’a tax on the opera-. —

tion of a laundry. ,

I therefore respectfully submit indt the meye faet that

the local ‘solicitors may have fransmittéd the articles of .

its clothing across the state line to have same laundered and

|.

jue

4

. . a 5 = ° % 7

° . . & ot ‘

5 . RR. leersoresnrererntetelete tagedeiohafera . . ,

ey < : ,

= of : °

| 7 28 (aa 2.

a Becks f f : ? ; <7

elenned: was not a part. of the activity jane: by the law .

in question. A solicitor of wearing apparel to be laun-

dered and cleaned, who did not salicit such work for a

Jaundty licensed in: Mississippi, would be liable for the

.tax, without referénce t6 the residence of, suth person.

_ The activity being taxed i is uniform:in that all persons -

: engaged i in a similar ‘activity are taxed on the same basis.

. The same contention was made in the brief of the appel-

: Jant before the Stpreme Court of Mississippi. And the

Supreme Court of Mississippi, in its opinion, used the

- following language which appears on page 14 of. the

record: ee

ok “<This tax does not violate the Fourteenth Amend-"

ment of the Constitution of. the United States or the ¢

- . Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the

State of Mississippi.”?

The further contention of the appellant which was i

“made before the Supreme Court of Mississippi was an- -

swered by said court in the following language, as ap- |

‘pears on page 12 of the record: |

ee “We are of. the opinion that thate i is.no merit in-

the contention that the appellee i is not li able forthe

‘tax for the yeason that its drivers’ are not transient

vendors. but dealers. dies s

I thefefore respectfully sobeuit that ander the holding :

~ of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, ‘all of the questions -

raised by the appeMant in its’ brief have been answered: |

by the Supreme Court of Mississippi contrary to the eon-

: tention of the attorneys for the appellant, and as held:

+ by this Court in the case of General Trading Co. v. States

Tax’ Commission of Iowa, 322.US 335;

- $*The application by that Court of its local laws

and the facts on. which it founded its + judgment are of

. course controlling here.’” Te Be a

eo’

y ee ert ss 9’

: The same . principle has been. announced by this Court

in many other cases, and the fact ‘that ,the Mississippi

Court has definitely decided under the facts and thajaw 3

of Mississippi that interstate commerce is not involved, }

_ neither dé the provisions of said act violate the corn nae

merce clause or any other provision of the Constitution “ -

of the Unitéd States, nor of the Constitution, of the State

of. Mississippi, this Court will recvgnize: the paramount :

right of the Supreme Court of. Mississippi, to constrie .

its own laws under the facts and conditions which were

-fully presented. and considered by said Court, but an- ~°

swered Soutrary to the euntention of the appellant.

CONCLUSION aca Pee @ : ae?

os therefore specifically submit: B.

sf That the taxes syed for were collected in strict com.

Pete with the law imposing the tax.

Vv

- Phat there is no unceastitutional discrimination i in-

jelved under the facts 1 in this case, singe the necessary

‘status of the appellant, not being licensed within the state,

‘will prohibit the application of .the law as imposed un- -

3 . der the. provisions of Section 110,. Chapter 137.

4. Section 45 Chapter 138, eo of 1944, specifically

‘pepsabd the tax. collected, because said taxpayer had not

" qualified under the provisions of said, Section: 110, Chap- :

ter 137, Laws of 1944. “ : oe

It is’ ‘therefore urged that the Naetkion of the. pugebes

Court of: Mississippi i in this Case was eminently correct

and that said judgment should be affirmed by this Court.

' * Respectfully Submitted : i

Skt

ral

we

a Fe elites

‘ CERTIFICATE: s

a i. Sumrall, ‘attortiey of record for the appellee, »

do hereby gsertify: that I have this day forwardedaby.-

- United: States Mail, postage prepaid, to Messrs, Watkins. ay

_ & Eager, Jackson, Mississ¥ppi, ahd Mr. C: EB. Clifton, |.

Memphis, Tennessee, SHeraeys for er true Copies

of this brief.

"This thE. day of : November, 1951

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