Petitioners Reply Brief — Gardner v. Panama Railroad
Supreme Court brief1951
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LIBRARY ~ ‘>. OCE-42 1951. |
' i CouURT US. : ae a Ea
a) sie INTHE LS
‘Supreme Court of the Wnited ‘States
“OCTOBER TERM, 1951. . - Seen
No. 22.
“EVELYN N C. GARDNER, yea Teepe Ses
’ Petitioner, .
¥, se
PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
e *
+ bee Loe Respondent. To
“On \ RIT OF Ceitiiniie TO THE, Unitep States Cov RT OF
: ABPRALS FOR THE Fiera Circuit.
.
oon nt . — eas —
PETITIONER’S REPLY ‘BRIEF.
baa hea : sae eciah Pee E NT om "
EUGENE. EISENMANN,
‘es _ ‘Counsel for Petitioner.
Van Sic LEN, "Risa & DE CastRo, >
Proctors for Petitioner, —, |
6 Tivoli Avenue,
Ancon, Canal Zone,
. ; 2
Evoene EisenMann, =
* Wooprow dE CastRO, . star ge
Of Counsel. )
} , ; .. Tas Coury Parss, N.Y. C.
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. ore Lee ee Zs rhe: , PAGE Q.
As RA nb Leceeltededees Sh Pp ene yes ee ree oan Pes
sf ee 4 ; ; #4, ; Bais each We :
2. “Jurisdiction”. cover er ae ips Whew bea riz.
Conclusion .. .....5...: Ma Ate OA ae i: Biba he us SCORERS Lae ais
a Cyrations: ee
‘Cases:
Connett v. C ity of Jerseyville, 96 F KF. rE 392 at 400 b
(C.'C. A. 7, 4938) ren eee ee 3,4
Peres. Unite States, 340 U: S. 135 at 140, ut
fe) SSRN Ra eee cs < SRAP A tartpRes, OC Ue EE er
eifer & Keife ry. ‘Reconstruction. Finance Cor rp. "
806. -U~ S.. 381 (1939) oe eA Se Pace Ure Viveea a
Ken ndrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 at 482 2n
Standard Accident Insurance Co. ¥. Miller, 170 F.
2d 495 at 498 (C, C, A*7, 1948). Fieger bus fae
Apia iltse v: > Unite d States, 74 F. Supp: 786 at 187. On
Statutes: wns Stinsee Ea eae ee:
_ Federal’ Tort. Claims ‘Act, Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 3
- reenacted as 28 U.S. C. 1346(b), 2671 and 2679 2
Public Law 172, July 16, 1948, Sist Congress; ch.
340; 63 Stat. mee; 28 U. 5. €. er pe ters 2, 4
Congre sriowal oo pone Siiakt aes »
Ds Bs Code Congressional Servi ice, 81st ( ongress,
Ist Session, 194, vol. : 2, pp. 1589- 158 en OG ioe
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ai: IN THE
Supreme Comet af the- uted States
"OCTOBER TERM, 1951.
{. No. 22.
Si . a -
cy r= . _Evetyy Cy Garpyer, * Mice Grr be
Die oft . Petitioner,
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Panama Rartroap Compaxy, a corporation, .
_Reevondent,
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iS eee wyatt its : f ce yale
: On Warr or Cerriorant to tHe Unirep Srates Court oF
APPEALS FOR THE Pirrn Circuir In APPEAL No. 13299
IN Apairacry. a ars + e
+ . - - —~+ “ar ‘ Eo
. PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF.
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Respondent's « cases state that advni iralty draws 7
the analogy of the statute of. limita Gly -in the
absence of exceptional circumstances explaining or
_ excusing the delay. The undisputed facts establish
the exceptional circumstance of a supervening statu-
: tory amendment and this: -petitiqne,’s diligence—she
‘did everything she could have done to vindicate her
tights by action. Nor is there any basis for the argu-"
ment that the District Court: exercised a justifiable
**diseretion’’, |
(a) There was.no factual basis for a conclusion
that, laches—lack of diligence—here existed.
. a < ’ 3
:
-» (6b) The DistrietCourt’s opinion tegatives -‘*dis-
eretion”’, for it erroneously held that, regardless of—
circumstances, the mere passage of one year created
a bar, stating unequivocally “tno, facts or cireum- °
stances-in her favor ean prevent the running of the
statutory limitation of one year’’ (R. 23). Nee
eee ar nian: rare
a y “Jurisdiction.” |
Abstract ‘discussion 3 as to ithe the Tort Claims:
Act created a new cause-of action against the United
States or merely gave a remedy is irrelev ant.* “Here
no question of a new cause of action.can arise, as there.
has always been an actionable eause of action for torts
committed -by: the Panama Railroad Company, a cor;
poration.
¢
The only effect here of the Tort Clainis Aet (imtil
its amendinent by Publie Law 172) was tp substitute
for-the remedy @f direct action against: the Company,
a remedy against the United States, made exclusive
as to ‘‘claims which are cognizable”’ against the United °
States (28 U.S. Code 2679). The 1949 amendment
simply removed this bar to the enforcement of -the
pre-existing remedy, by. making such claims no longer,
“cognizable” against the United States. :
Respondent concedes that Raves had no intention
to destroy all rights of persons injured in the mean-
while ‘tin Wew of the legislative. purpose of Publie
Law V2"’ (Mespondent’s brief, P 19), but misists that
ne
- * This Court has recently held that it merely was intended to .
provide a. remedy.;Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 140,-
141 (1950). See atso Witte v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 786, 787;
Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430, 432.
|
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this unfortunate result is compélled in order ‘to to avoid
yon problem of retroactivity
ist involved ; there. is only a i of effectuating
the-C ‘ongressional intent that its ins nmentality shall
continue subject to suit.
?
| 6
{
“As stated by. ‘Minton. a: in Hieuhiod Accident In-
_surance Co. Vv! Miller, 170 F.. 2d. ue 498 ee A. Be
: 1948) : joe —— Sere cors p42 :
‘the rule peculiarly applicable to: remedial stat- =
utes, however, is that a.statute must be so eon-
-stried as to make it effect-the evident purpose
for which it was enacted; and if the reason of |
the statute extends to past transactions, aswel] —
as to those in the future, then it will be so ap-
plied, although the statute does not, in terms, so
direct, unless fo do so would impair some vested
7 right, or violate -some constitutional meets
In Connett v. City of Toes yville, 96 F, 24 399, Too
oS A. 7, 1938), defendant contended. that a statu
tory amendment, which withdrew previous remedies,
should not be given retrospective effect as to the
new remedies provided. The Court overruled this
contention, arid, after pointing out that ‘‘a curative °—
or remedial enaétment which merely affects the reni- |
edy or procedure will be given a rettoactive effect’,
continued (Sparks, J.):
> “Tt would be unfair to the legistature = assume
that it intended to strike>down’ the remedy pro-
‘vided in thé original Act, with no’ saving clause,
‘without extending the relief. afforded by the
amendment to the existing cértifieate holders.
_ There is no-apparent reason why this should be
done. To do so would be utterly inconsistent
- . : . bad ; ad
. ;
4°
a ‘
with. the expressed, intention of. the legistature |
a oe 5 ¢ WU hte seme ae
So here, respondent’s contention not ‘only disregards
the. established Congr essional policy of liability for
~ Forts. of. government ‘corporations even when there
'- Js no statutory provision (Keifer & Keifer v. Recon-
struction Finance Corp., 306. U. S. 381), but would |
gi seg subvert the expressed. purpose of. Public
Law -172 to ‘‘eontinue inimpaired *.* * the amena-.
bility of the C ompany to suit in the ordinary course’’
(U.S. Code ooo apa paths 8ist Congress, Ist
ee [Session 1949, vol. . PP. 589-1593). >. :
bias CONCLUSION. ase :
‘The ‘eaikimaied of the Courts Salil should be i
versed with costs, and the case remanded for trial —
on the-merits. ” Ao Sebi ieee ag! :
Formas,
Respectfully submitted,
; : EUGEN EB EISENMANN,
Counsel for Petitioner.
y.° ; oe
Van Sictex, Ramirez & pe Casrno,
-Proctors for Petitioner, a a , a
6 Tivoli Avenue, nee
Ancon,:Canal Zone. —
s
*
Ant eae, ‘ghee
Evoenk Eisexmann, ‘ x ttn
Woopr 1OW “DE Castro, “ha 3 ENS
Of Counsel.
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