Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari — Coray v. Southern Pacific Co.
Supreme Court brief1949
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- SUBJECT INDEX
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SUMMARY ati nate | 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... aes: a
ARGUMENT... ae ne
MRS. LUCUS WAS NOT ' DAMAGED BY THE DEATH ¢ OF -
FRANK LUCUS | Se ae
Cee gs ra Ree Ne AR,
o bs . 7 er e °
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
1
American Railroad Co. v. Didrickson, 57 L. Ed. 456, 227 ao 28 |
Bobango v. Erie R.. Co., 57°F. (2d) 667, (1982—C.C.A. Oia eas (12
Bohme v. Chicago M. & St. Ry. Co., 200 N.W. 804, oe ay
Court of Minnesota. Nov. 21, 1934) . Bek ee
Brady v. Southern R. R. Company, 320 U.S. 476, 88 L. Ed. 239 ce ae
Brady v. Terminal R.-Association of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10:
58 S. Ct. 426, 82 L. Ed. A ee wicccs 10
Deere v. Southern Pacific Company, 123 F F. (24) 4 438, Caiticonst
Denied, 314 U.S. 820, 86 fA RL CME «Sree
Johanna Frese, Admx., v. Chicago Burlington a ee
Railroad Company, 168 L. Ed. 131,'263 U.S. 1 ato ae
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 60 L. Ed. 732, 240 U.S. 444. basrendnis 20°
Helvering v- Gowran, 82 L. Ed. 224, 302 U.S. 238...%.0000 2... 30,
Anna Lang, Adm«x. v. New York Central Railroad Comp: ny,. .
° . 65 L. ‘Ed. ok ke ESOS Oe aCe ie cteeg: ae
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. ialase 243 U. S. 617, 37 papeetee
i LUC UY
10
- McCalmont v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 283 F. 739, (C.C.A. 6)... 23
' Michigan Central R. Company v. Vreeland, 57 L. Ed. 417, 227 U.S..59 29
. Morse v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 74 F. (24) 677, (C.C.A. 2). 22
Orton v. Pennsylvania. Railway Co., 7 F. (2d) 36, (C.C.A. 6) 1925 11
Peters v: Wabash Ry. Co., 42 S. w. an 588, (Supreine ¢ Court
of Missouri, 1931)... i 15-
Powell v. Waters, 190 S. E. 615.” 2 19 °
Reetz v. Chicago and E. R. Co., 46 F. (2d) 50, (CCA. 6). me hs
Reynolds v. New York 0. & 'W. Ry,Co., 42 F. (2nd) 164, (CCA. 2) 13
>’
SOUTHERN Paciric Company, a Corporation,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1947
¢
- CASE NO. 793
Howarp F. Coray, Ancillary Administrator of The Kstate
of William Frank Lucus,. Deceased, eee
Peti as
e i> r ;
7 3 TE. o
i]
Respondent. —
‘ . = ° . ® -
_ Brier ror ResponpDENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION |
FoR Writ or CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME CouURT
‘OF THE Untrep STaTEs ©
SUMMARY.
William Frank Lucus, an employee of Southern Paci-- —
fie Company, ‘died as the result of runniny: a small track
car into the rear end of a standing train. He was operating |
the car east and looking west on a straight, level track.
He waited by the side of the main line for the eastbound. *
freight train to pass him and then put the track car on —
the main line’ and followed the train east. A nut on a
valve in the air line became disconnected which applied
all the brakes in the train: The train was traveling 25 to
30 miles per hour and it traveled about 1350 to 1800 feet
after the brakes were_applied before it stopped.
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Lueus had no duties to perform which prevented him
from giving his entire attention to the operation of the
track car. The track car had a maximum speed of 25 to
30 miles per hour and would stop in 100 feet if the brakes
_ had been applied, which was not done at any time before
the collision. There is no doubt that Lucus had plenty of |
time to’ stop the track car if he had observed the train
stopping. He had plenty of time to stop the track car if |
he had looked ahead after the train. had stopped. He
knew he was following the freight train so closely that if
it should stop or slow down there would be’ a collision,
unless he also stopped: or slowed down. He did not expect
the train to stop so he risked his life on the assumption it
would not stop or slow down.
The Trial Court directed the verdict for defendant
after both sides had rested. The Supreme Court of Utah
affirmed. The decision below correctly applied the Fed-:
eral Law to the facts.
STATEMENT. OF THE CASE
- May 24, 1944, was a clear, calm, sunny day. (R. 50.) |
‘ At about 3:30 p. m: Lucus and Lynch put the motor car
- on the north siding and moved it to the east end of that
siding and waited there while the freight train pulled out —
of the south siding onto the main line and proceeded east.
(R. 48.) Lynch was going to replace Lucus as signal main-
_tainer at Lemay. The track was straight and level from.
Lemay to the place wherd the collision occured. (See the®
ee R. 131, 135.) After the freight train had
passed Lugus and Lynch, they pushed the track car 40- or
50 feet and put it on the main track, (R. 49.) Then Lucus ©
got on the nofth side, which was the operator’s side, and
Lynch pushed it’20 feet to start it. (R. 49.) They: followed
the train east.. Lynch sat on the south side of the track .
ear.. The car was constructed for one man operation (R.
. 49), and Lucus was the operator. When Lynch hopped on
the motor car afterstarting it, the rear end of the train
_, was then 300 to 400 yards east of. the motor car. (R. 50.)
' Lynch did not look east, but was watching the westbound —
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semaphore signal east of Lemay to familiarize himself
_with the territory which he was going to-take over. (R..
OI.) Lynch-did not see what Lucus was. doing after. they
-left Lemay (R: 54) and had no conversation with Lucus, |
(R. 52.) Lyneh was not sériously injured in the collision
‘and gave his deposition’ at the trial. He testified the motor
car was not traveling at an exce$sive speed. (R: 50) The
motor car has_a-one cylinder motor powered for maximuni
. speed of 25 to 30 m.p.h., and is equipped with’brakes which
would stop it within 100 feet at a maximum speed, and
- ‘the brakes immediately before the accident were in good
condition. (R..71.) A rule of the defendant company pro-
vided that when following moving trains, track caps must
remain not less than 400 feet to the rear of the same, (R.
72.) Lueus had no duties to. perform on the trip other than
' to operate the motor car. He was going -to deliver some .
pay checks to employees at stations east of Lemay. (R. 53) *
. The place of ‘the ‘collision was 3600 feet east of the
east switch points at Lemay in Box Elder County, Utah.
The deceased’ was a signal maintainer at Lemay. The
tracks at Lemay run east and west:and there are passing
tracks north and south of the main line. (R. 18, 22.)
The freight train inyolved was known as first 582,
consisting of 82 cars. At Lemay .t had taken the south
siding, and it pulled back on to the main line and pro-
ceeded east at about 3:30 p- m. (R. 21, 22, 50.) As it |
passed the east switch, Luews and Lynch, who. was with _
him on the motor car at the. time. of the accident, were
waiting with their car to place it on the main line and
follow it east as soon as the train had“passed. (R. 48.)
{ After the train had proceeded a very short distance,
the triplé union nut on ‘the triple union valve on the 60th
car from the head end of the train became disconnected,
and the brakes. were immediately applied in emergency.
' The disconnection” automatically ‘sets all brakes in the
train. (RB. 27, 40, 74.) The train was going about 25 miles
per hour, when the brakes were applied. The train rolled
to a smooth, ‘sudden, but easy stop. There weren’t any.
jerks. (R.. 28, 39.) It was, estimated by Brakeman Agricola,
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4 petcegs Ee
who was on the caboose, that the train ms between 30
and 40 car lengths after the brakes went into emergeney,
which was 1350 to 1800. feet. The engine Was working
steam while - stop was being made, and it wis made
with no jar whatsoever. (R. 43, 44.) The freight cars in -
the train were approximately 45 feet in length. (R..71.)
The purpose of the: air brakes is to stop the train, and the
same kind of stop which oecurred on this occasion would -
oceur if the engineer had oceasioh to set the, brakes in
emergency. (R. 32.) After the-train had come to a stop,
Jorgensen, who was the conductor on the caboose, ob-
Served that the air gauge on the eaboose showed the air 7
pressure had left’ the line..(R. 23.) After a few seconds,
Conductor Jorgensen observed the motor ear ‘about 500
feet- from the rear of the train and’ traveling about 35
m.p-h. (R. 24.) Both men on the motor-car were looking back
toward Lemay (west). (R: 23, 24, 31-)-.There’was no—
decrease in the speed of the motor ear between the time
Jorgensen first saw it and when it hit the eaboose. (R. 31.)
Anderson and Jorgensen on the caboose tried té stop the
men on the track car, but could not get them to turn their
heads. The collision oeeurred and Lucus was killed in.
stantly. (R. 23.) Brakeman Law on. the cabodse also ob- *
served that both Lucus and Lynch were traveling east and _
looking west at the time of the accident. (R. 36.) Emer.
geney stops. of trains frequently oceur. Engineers stop
the train by full application of the air (emergency or |
“big hole’’ application) very often if any emergency
arises. — ay tes .
ARGUMENT
_ Petitioner does not contend that Lueus was’ not hegli-
-. gent or that such negligence was not a proximate cause of
his death. No reasonable mind could find that Lueus was ‘
exercising any care for his own protection. His conduct
is important in the case not hecause his negligence is a
defense if the failure of the air line was the proximate
cause of his death, but because his faiture to look under
the cireumstanees was so highly extraordinary that it was
not to be anticipated by the Respondent. Because of the
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conduet of Lueus, the failure of the air line on the train =
is not the proximate cause of his death. + . ®
. Brakeman Agricola testified the train took from 1350
to 1800 feet to stop. Its speed was about. 25 miles per |
hour. Assuming a constant rate of deceleration of the .
train during the time it was, stopping, it would average
12% miles an hour which is 18.33 feet per second. At
. this rate it would take the train at least 73 seconds to
_ Stop. Some’ geconds elapsed before Jorgensen noticed the
_ track ear $00 feet away, approaching at 30 miles per hour, |
or 44 feet per second. The track car would take 11 see!
onds to travel the 500 feet and it seems fair to assume - -
15. seconds elapsed before Jorgenseir noticed the track ear.
This adds up to 99 seeonds from the time the brakes
went into_emergency until the collision, assuming - the
‘300 feet stopping distance instead of 1800 feet. That is
. not a long time under some circumstances, but it is a long
time to ride backwards immediately behind. a moving
freight train at 30 miles-an hour without looking ahead
‘or slowing or stopping the track car. oe
It does not in any way: justify the conduct of Lucus
to say it was only a matter of seconds between the time
the brakes were applied on the train until the collision oc-
curred. If the time was short the duty was that much :
niore imperative. If it had heen a fact known to Luetis -
.that there was no train on the track between. Lemay and
Newfoundland, the next station to the east, his failure sto
look might be understandable:- If instead of running into
the train he had run into a rock which had just rolled onto
the track or some other object he had no reason to antici-
pate would be on‘the track, when he thought he had a
clear track ahead, his conduct might be within the field
where the railroad should anticipate he might act as he
(lid. But Lueps knew he was following the train within
400 or 400 yards at 30 miles per hour. If he wanted for
some reason to look back at Lemay, this was not a job
_ Which was so exaeting upon either his time or attention
that it precluded him from turning his head occasionally
te see if there was a clear track ahead. If he wanted. to
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be free of the shligitien: to leak ahead often enough to
insure he would not run into the train if it stopped or
‘slowed down, he could easily have slowed or stopped his
motor cai. No train was following him. He had a choice: —
of. slowing his car or’ stopping, or. looking ahead to know |
how. much clear distance he had. It was highly. extra-
. ofdinary that he could resist the impulse to’ look where
. he was going. |
He knew the train was 300 to 400 yards ahead of him .
-when he left Lemay. He was in exclusive control of the
- track ear. If he had looked east while the train was travel- 3
_ ing the distance it took to stop after the brakes.went into
emergency, he could have observed the gap between his
ear and the end of the train was closing. The. Petitioner
makes no contention that Lucus was not negligent in
running into the rear end of a train stepped on a level
straight track on a clear sunny < y when he knew the
_ train. was traveling 300 or 400 yar ahead of him. 5
It would: not be contended by Petitioner that if-
Respondent had stopped its train for any one of ‘many
_ reasons other than the reason this tfain stopped and Lucus _
had run his track car into the train, he coyld recover.
Suppose the train had stopped by. emergency application
of the brakes because of another track ear or train or -
engine on the track. Liability to Lucus would not be
elaimed.. But Petitioner’ claims that merely because of
the reason or occasion of the stop, to wit, a disconnected
air line—there is liability.. Petitioner’s contention is not
based on the nature or any suddenness of the stop, -but
says that because it was occasioned by the diseonneetion -
of the air line there is liability.” Apparently, Petitioner's -
legal position would be the same’ if the train had been
stopped for an hour instead.of a few minutes.
No claith or suggestion is made by’ Petitioner that ;
Respondent did not have the unconditional right‘ to stop
its train at any time and place without owing the operator
of’a track ear ‘following the train the duty of any warning
or lookout. When the train stops, it must necessarily re-
main on. the track until moved again. There is no analogy —
7 :
between a freight train on the track aud a motor vehicle
which is parked on the traveled portion)of a highway. If
the train had slowed down to 10 or 15-miles per hour and
Lucus haq continued: going east miles per hour while
looking wat, the collision would have happened. when he
overtook the train. Lucus had ‘no duties to perform whijch
required him to look backward. His only (duty was to
- deliver some checks to employees. — |
It is the contention of Respondent that there was no
causal connection between. the disconnection of the air
line and the death of Lucus.
* “This Court had occasion to discuss and apply the
fules of proximate ¢ause in Brady v. Southern Railway
_ Company, 320 U.S. 476, 88 L. Ed. 239.” The deceased: rail-
way employee was killed in a switching movement when
a car-on. which he was riding ran over a derailer and
threw him under the wheels. Plaintiff relied ‘upon negli-
_~ genee in not putting a light on the derailer and that some
employee other than deceased ‘closed the derailer. The.
Court held the evidence on these contentions was ‘not suf-
ficient to take the case to the jury: 3 a
The plaintiff also relied upon testimony that the rails
opposite the derailer was defective and permitted the de--
railing of the car when that would not have occurred but
for the defect. The Court holds the defendant was not
required in the exercise of due care to anticipate that the
crew would .improperly back the train over the closed
derailer. <
‘*We now turn to the third instance of alleged negli-
gence. This is the existence to the knowledge of the
-, earrier of a rail, opposite the derailer, so worn on
top and sides that in the opinion of qualified experts
it permitted the thrust of the east wheels of the ear,
as they rose over the ‘wrong end’ of the derailer, to
force the flange on the west wheels over the defective
rail and so to derail the cars, when no such derail-
ment would have occurred, ‘nine .times out of ten, if
the best type’ rail was in use. There is no evidence °
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of the unsuitability of the rail for ordinary use.”
“Such evidence, we assume, would justify a finding
' for petitioners, if the defective rail was the proxi-
mate cause of the derailment and the backing of the
train improperly over the closed derailer-a danger -
reasonably. to be- anticipated. As to the likeliliood
of cars passing over the wrong end ‘of derailers, one
witness with ten years’ experience as a brakeman
testified that he recalled three or four instances.
- Another, the Superintendent of the railroad with 22
years’ experience said, ‘It happens very frequently.
I would say yes, I have seen'it 25 to 50 times.’ The
rule as to when a directed verdict is proper, hereto-
fore referred to, is #pplicable to questions of proxi-
. “mate cause, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Toops,~
-281:U. S. 351, 74 L. Ed..896, 50 S Ct. 281; St. Louis-
» San Francisco R. Co. v. Mills, 271 U.S. 344, 348, 70
_L. Ed. 979, 983, 46 S. Ct. 520; New York C. R. Co.
v. Ambrose, 280 U. S. 486, 74.[° Ed. 562, 50 S. Ct.
198; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Tindall (CCA 7th)
47 F..(2d) 19; Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Portland
Gas Light Co. (CAA Ist) 57 F. (2d) 801. Cf. Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Co., 282.U.
S. 555, 566, 75 L. Ed. 544, 550, 51 S. Ct. 248.
‘“‘The Supreme Court of North Carolina was of the:
view that striking a derailer from the unexpected
direction ‘was so unusual, so contrary to the pur-
posé’ of the'derailer that provision to guard against
such a happening was beyond the requirement. of
due care. With this we agree. Bare possibility “is
hot sufficient. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S. 469, at 475, 24 L. Ed. 256, at 259: ;
‘**But it is generally held, that, in order to warrant
a.finding that negligence, or an act not amounting
to. wanton wrong, is the proximate cause of an in- -
jury, it must appear that the injury was the natural
and. probable consequence of the negligence or -
wrongful act, and that it ought to have been fore-
seen in the light of the attending circumstances.’
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‘*Events too remote to require reasonable prevision
need not be anticipated. * * *”’
The test of a danger, ‘‘reasonably to be anticipated”’
as stated in the Brady case is a rule announced by. all of.
the cases which analyze the doctrine of proximate cause.
Petitioner at page 21 of his brief states :
‘“** * * Unless the distance separating the track car
and the rear of the train was sufficient for Lucus..
to stop the track car, a collision was made inevitable
by the stop, and even if the distance was sufficient
the danger was ever present that he would not dis- -
_ cover the stalled. train in time.’’
_ » There is no evidence that the distance separating the. ~
. track car and the rear of the train was not sufficient for
Lucus to stop the track ear if he had looked. The evidence
is uncontradicted that the track car could be stopped in 100°
feet going at maximum speed. The brakés were in good
_ condition. The train moved at least 1360 feet after the ©
brakes were: applied. The evidence is uncontradicfed that
after the train had stopped Lucus still had more than five
times the distance nécessary to stop the track ¢ar if he
had not insisted on riding backwards. The evidence is
without dispute that Lucus could have stopped if he had
looked where he was going and that he did not turn his
head. The inquiry. here narrows to the question under the
rule of ‘‘reasonably to be anticipated’’: Was the defend-
ant required to anticipate that Lucus would not keep any
fookout ahead? We respectfully submit that no case Felied
on by: Petitioner answers this question in his favor.
, os = :
At page 19, of Petitioner’s brief it is stated: 3
‘The Utah court’s resurrection of ‘the absolute
defense of contributory negligence -by calling such
- conduct ‘the ‘legal cause’ is contrary to every Fed-—
eral authority petitioner has been able to discover. °
The phrases ‘legal cause’ and ‘proximate cause’ are
foreign to the Federal Acts in question ;: neither
phrase is used in any section of the acts, They are
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used’ and employed by the Utah court to obscure
"3 “veason and justify a result not otherwise obtain- .
able’? 3
But Petitioner’s brief quetes from opinions of this .
' Court which usethe phrase ‘‘proximate cause of ,injury’’
"in cases under*the Safety rig ie Act. The criticized
phrase is found at the -bottom *
page 15 of Petitioner’s .
brief in the quotation from Louisville & Nashville R. Co..
v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 37 S. Ct. 456, 61 L. Ed. 931: .
_ + {*This effect can be given to the acts and their wise
| - and humane purposes. can be acéomplished only by
“* holding, as we do, that carriers are liable to em-
'- " “" ployees in. damages whenever the failure\ to obey
these Saféty Appliance Laws is the proximate cause
_ of the injury to them when engaged in the discharge
‘of duty.’’ (Italics ours.) ~~ | ;
.. And Petitioner’s brief at pages 16 and 17 quot s froin
- Brady v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Lowis, 303 U. S.
_ Ss Ct, 426, 82 L. Ed. 614, in part: - fi f
“t** * © The Statute has been liberally construed so
as to give a right of recovery for every injary the
proximate cause of which was'a failure“to comply °
_ with a requirement of thé act. * * * One can recover
‘< If.the failure to comply with the requirements of
a is ‘the act is a proximate cause of the act resulting in ss
- injury to him while in, the discharge of his duty, —
‘although not engaged in an operation in which the
safety appliances are -specifically designed ‘to fur-
nish him protection.’’ (Italies ours.) a
10, 58
aS _The Utah court did not hold that contributory negli- ,
gence of Lucus was an absolute defense. It held that the.
failure of the air line which stopped the train was not a_
_vproximate cause of the death of Lucus. The cases from this.
_ court upon which Petitioner relies hold the ‘test of liability’
is the test of proximate ‘cause. Weé agree that such is the
law. It is our position that the failure of the air line was
not a proximate catise of the death. The Restatement of .
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the Law quoted. by: the Utah court is the source of the
phrase ‘‘legal cause”? which obviously mearis the same as
€ ‘proximate cause.’ SaaS
A clear and logical discussion of the rile of proximate
cause is found in Orton v Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 F. (2d)
i 36, (C.C.A. 6) 1925.. Ohio had & statute making it a mis-
aOR sot
demeanor for a Pailroad cgmpany unnecessarily to obstruct .
va public highway by permitting cars to remain across ‘it
for more: than five minutes.. There was evidence showing
ait chad ‘obstructed the country crossing in question for 20
to. 30-minutes. Plaintiff was a guest in a car driven 25 or |
30 miles an hour along the highway and into the side of’
the train. The road was straight and the accident happened
“about 9:00 o’clock at night. The court assumed the railroad’
was negligent and held such negligence was merely an‘in- |
cident and not a concurring ism cause of the accident.
, «6 * © A ease in n point’ is Giinian v. Central Vermont:
Ry., 93 Vt. 340,.107 A. 122, 16 A.‘L. R. 1102, in which -
it was held that the action of a failroad in obstruct-
ing a crossing for 4n unlawful length of time, in—
_. violation of a statute, ny agate ‘a condition and
-not the proximate cause n injury resulting from
a eollision with the cars. See, al§e, Gage v. Boston
& Maine Railroad, 77 N. H. 289, 90 A. 855, L. R. A.
.. ; SIGA, 363 ‘Trask v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 219
* Mass. 410, 106 N. FE. 1022. These cases, we think,
- illustrate the distinction between actionable negli-
gence and a fortuitous circumstance too remote to
be regarded -as a-concurring proximate cause of an
injugy. That the collision would not have occurred
-had the cars not have been permitted to remain
across the highway is beside the question of easual
_ connection. Lang:v. Railroad, 255. U: S. 455, 41 S.
Ct. 381, 65 L. Ed. 729; McCalmont v. Pennsylvania
» R. Co, (6 C.C.A.) 283 F 736. The most that can be
. said for plaintiff is that defendant created a situa-
~ tion in which Inman’s negligence operated to bring
about the collision, which would have been true if.
»” @e train had occupied the crossing only while pass. -
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12
ing over it. Defendant’s act was merely a condition _
and in no sense a concurring peeanninte cause of the
injury.”
‘In Bobango v. Erie R. Co., 57 F. 2d 667, (1932 -C. CAL
6) the court sustained a directed verdict for defendant.
Plaintiff was a surveyor ‘employed by the railroad and a «
member of his crew had left his rod upon the track. Plain-
tiff-discovered its lécation as a train was approaching and
in attempting to remove it he was struck by the train and °
. injyred. It is not claiméd that the train crew was at fault.
The contention is that the employee who left the rod on
the track was negligent, and that whether his negligence _
was the proximate cate of the injury was a. “question for
the jury. The court took the view that thé. injury was
not proximately caused by the negligent act of the em- .
-ployee. ‘‘It could not reasonably have been expected that
plaintiff, in the situation in which he found himself, would °
undertake to remove it.’’. “The suit was brought under the
Federal Employers’ ‘Liability Act. Contributory negli-
"gence was no defense extept to. amaaian the damage.
gu ndtaba’ “While the rule of proximate cause does not.
require an anticipation ofthe precise injuries re-.
ceived,. it is generally held that before there can
be. a finding of such cause it must be made: to -
appear that the injury was a‘natural and direct’:
. consequence of the negligent act or, as dele ee
stated, a consequenee that ouglit to have been fore-
seen in the light of all the attending circum |
stances. ° ° *’”. - 3 4
- It bould not reasonably have been expected that Latens
would operate his track car blindly into the standing train.
There is nothing in the record to show that there was
anything in the nature of either duty or interest to divert
his attention from his task of operating the car. It would.
seem that the impulse - or instinct to: look where he ‘was
going would cause’ the expenditure. of the slight time and;
effort required to turn his head and glance along the track. .
In oad v. New York O. & W. Ry. Co., 42 F. (24)
164, (C.C.A.. 2), a collision occurred between a passenger
train which tas’ backing up on a curved track through
embankments and a track motor car carrying four section
men. The train had: passed a flag station ‘and was backing
~ wp a short distance to let off a passenger at the station. -
agfhe track car finally reached a speed of 20 miles an hour
and the men on it did not see the train because their backs
- were turned toward the direction’from which the train was
-. coming. Eastwood was operating ‘the ‘track car and the |
plaintiff’s intestate was Reynolds. The train was either -
stopped or moving very slowly, when the collision occurred.
The flagman ori the train did not go back when the train
- stopped’ (before backing) and the violation of the rule
relating to fagging | a. stopped train was the | negligence
alleged. . or
‘The court held the hapoins rule does not relate te a
track ear and is not intended .for the protection of. its
occupants. “It is not a train. It could be stopped in 30 feet °
_ when going at a high speed.. There was no duty to warn
the men: on. the track car and negligence was not shown -
by failure to warn. aqgaent ‘for plaintiff was reversed.
| ae Anna Lang, admz. v. ‘New Yy ork Central Railroad
. Company, 65 L. Ed. 729, 255 U. S. 455, the action was ynder -
the Safety Appliance Act. The defendant had a defective
ear loaded with iron on the siding at the station in Silver -
Creek, New York. The drawbar, the draft timbér, and
the-coupling apparatus on the we erly end of this car
were gone. This condition was h.own to the plaintiff’s
intestate prior to the accident. During a switehing move- —
ment involving connecting three cars on the track where -
the crippled car stood, plaintiff’s intestate was on one of
these three cars for the purpose of setting the brakes and
so placing them on this siding as not to come into contact
with the crippled ear? He went to the east ‘end of the
: - easterly car (on top) and his foot was resting on a small —
: platform at the end of the ear which is below the brake
wheel. * For some reason he did not stop the three cars
moving on this track before coming into canes oa the
ot
a 7
7 =:
‘ 14 ss id Gere
crippled car. The cars collided and owing to the absence .
of coupler attached on the crippled car, intestate’s leg was “
caught between the ends of. the two cars and he was so
injured that he died.’ It was not the intention of any of
the crew to disturb or couple or to move the crippled ear. -
The defendant railroad.contended and the Court held, that
‘ the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the
deceased to stop the cars before they. came into collision
with the defective car, and that the absence of the coupler
and drawbar was not a proximate cause or a concurring
eau se. fe . fe . ; ‘
‘It. was the duty of the crew, we repeat, and im- —
mediately the duty of Lang, to stop the colliding
- ear ,and to set the brakes upon it ‘so as-not\to come
into contact with the crippled car,’ to quote again
from the trial court. That duty he failed to per- -
form, and if it may be said that notwithstanding -
-he would not. have been injured if the car collided
with had been equipped with drawbar and coupler,
_ we answer, as the court of appeals answered: ‘Still
the collision was not the preximate result of the
_ defect.’ Or, in other words, and as expressed in
effect in the Conarty Case, that the collision under
the evidence cannot be. attributable to a violation
of- the provisions of the law, ‘but only had they
-~ been complied with, if: (the collision) would not
have resulted in the injury to the deceased.’ ’’
_. In St. Lowis & San Francisco Railroad Company v.
Fannie M. Conarty, admz., 59 L. Ed. 1290, 238 U. S. 242,
‘it appeared that the deceased was killed in a collision be-
tween a switch engine and a loaded freight.car having no
coupling or drawbar at one end, these having been pulled
out while the car was in transit. The car was about to be —
placed on an isolated track for répair. The deceased and
two companions were standing on the footboard on the
front of the swifch engine, and when the car was observed, ——
his companions stepped. to the ground on either -side of
the track, while-he remained on the footboard and was |
' ¢aught between the engine and the car at the end from
“15
* Which the coupler and draw bar was missing. These appli-
“ances had they been in place would have kept the engine
and the body of the car sufficiently apart to have pre-
vented the i injury. The deceased-and his companions were
not intending to and did not attempt to couple the defec..
, tive car Ao the engine or handle it in any way. The court
said that the principal question in the case was whether
at the time he was injured the deceased was within the
class of persons: for whose benefit the Safety Appliance
.. Act required automatic couplers and drawbars. The court.
, points out that the purpose of the act relating to drawbars
and automatic couplers: is to enable the car to be’ coupled __
or uncoupled ‘without the necessity of men going: between .
the ends of the ears.’ | —-
: ee Nothing in’ either provision gives any war-
rant for saying that they are intended to provide
a place of safety between colliding cars. On the
contrary, they affirmatively show that a: prineipal
purpose in their enactment was to obviate ‘the
necessity for men going between the ends of the
ears.’ 6
‘*We aré of the opinion that the deceased, who was
not (251) endeavoring to couple or uneouple the
car or to handle it in any way, but was riding on
the: colliding engine, was not in‘a situation where
the absence of the prescribed coupler and drawbar
operated as a breach of a duty imposed for. his”
benefit, and that the Supreme Court of the state
erred in concluding that the safety oki la acts
required it-to hold otherwise.’’ - .
“In Peters v. Wabash Ry. Co., 42 S. W. (24) 588, (Su.
preme Cpurt of Missouri, -1931) the action was under the
Safety ppliance Act alleging the defendant used cars in °
intersta i cup not -equipped with ‘automatic couplers,
which. would couple upon impact: It was admitted that
there w4# sufficient showing of the violation of the act.
ged that the violation of the
imate cause of Petérs’ death. It ap-°
éters had made two attempts by giving the
_ peared. that
“necessary signal during the switching operation to hone
‘the cars.involved coupled by ‘impact. The accident hap-
16. ae Sane ne
"pened at 11:00 at night and signals’ were being given by ~—
Jantern. Finally on a.third attempt, and after the unsuc-
cessful attempts had moved the cars so that they were
adjacent to a loading dock, the third attempt to o~gouple
the cars was successful. ‘Immediately after the cars‘ came
- together, Peters was on the ‘ground either at the end or
_ between those two cars giving a ‘‘kick’’ signal which was
“relayed to the engineer who then- pushed the whole string
of cars 50 or 60 feet. further south: About ten minutes. .
later Peters was found dead, crushed between the plat-
form and the side of a car. There. was evidence that he .
had been dragged or pushed along the sitle of the plat-
form. The court held that the defect in the coupler was
not the proximate-eause of the death and did riot con-
' tribute to cause the movement of the ears that killed him:
“He was not killed while cnasaed in the coupling
movement. It does not appear whether or not, prior
to giving the third back up signal, he had gone’
between the ends of the cars to adjust the coupling,
but we do not regard it as material whether he had .
or not. In: either event, the coupling had been
effected, that movement completed, and he was still
uninjured, and but for his-ewn-aet which brought.
about the further, and to him fatal, movement of
the train would have been in. safety. Tad he, when
the coupling was completed, climbed upon the plat-
form, which .was free of obstruction, or otherwise —
extricated himself from his then position before
giving the kick signal he would not have been hurt.
The movement of the engine and cars was under -
his control, and he was experienced in such work,
and familiar with the environnient. Keating testi-
fied. that. it was customary in such work to relay
without question whatever signals were given by
the switehman in charge of the movement if he was |
an experienced man, as Peters was. Ciearly Peters’
own negligent act constituted an efficient independ.
i Meee a. ie
{
4
- ent cause intervening between defendant’ $ nagii-
gence and the injury complained of, “put for which .
‘6 the ac¢ident would not have Ca and was the ©
proximate cause of his death.’’ .
) Deere v. Southern Pacific Company, 1 123 F. (24) 438,
Certiorari denied 315 U. S. 820, 86. L. Ed. a was an:
action under the Federal Liability Act for the death of-a
~ signalman who was killed when a train collided with his
inspection car which he was attempting to remove from
. the track. A judgment directing a verdict for defendant é
was affirmed on appeal. The court held that the. signalman |
had the duty of removing the car from the traék so ‘that
the approaching train might pass, and that he. gould not
expect the trains to stop for him. The duty follows from
the nature. of such employment. Self-preservation has to
_rest on them because no adequate protection other than
self-protection can be afforded them. One alleged ground:
of negligence was the failure of the. éompany to furnish »
sufficient help on the maintenance car to- permit it toe be:
, removed quickly: from the track. Upon this point \the -
_' court held that even.-if' the failure to provide additional
help was negligent, it was ‘not the proximate cause of t.
Re
‘eee
“‘But if it be conceded, arguendo, that defendant
A.
did not provide sufficient help, yet there is no show-_ .
ing whatever of a direct causal connection between
that omission and the death of plaintiff’s decedent.
- His death was not owing “directly ‘to the act of re-
5 -moving the theeder, but was due proximately ta his-
‘failure to step. aside from the path of the train, the
_ approach. of which was fully known. to him, as is
evidenced by the fact that he had begun to remove
- the speeder from the way of the train. He was
free to handle his own movements; there was no,
superior’s order requiring: him to stay with the car ©
at the risk of his life. Under these circumstances
reasonable men must agree that the accident was
not brought about through any failure to furnish.
i
r ww
4
18
sufficient help, and there is therefore no question
for thes jury on this point. os ;
- Bohme-t. Chicago M. & St? Ry. Co. 200 N. W..804, .
(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Noy. 21, 1924): Plaintiff
_ was a.rear brakéman and as the train was moving slowly,
he heard the brakes squealing. on the second car in front
of the caboose and‘ knew that they were sticking. It was
in the night and dark and. eloudy: ‘He started down the
ladder on the side of the front end of the car for the pur-
pose of bleeding the brake. He looked down and saw a
dark bank which he took to be the ground. Without lower-
.ing his lantern to see what was be neath him, he stepped
off the ladder and fell through a bridge. over which’ the
‘train. was ‘passing and was serjously injured., The action
was under the. Safety—Applance Act. ‘The sole question —
presented was whether the defective brake was the proxi-
mate cause of the i injury within the purview of the federal
act. The court reviews many cases and concludes that the -
action of the frial court in rendering judgment for defend- -
ant notwithstanding verdict for plaintiff was correct.
>
‘‘Applying to the present case the test announced
. and applied in the cases cited makes it clear that
~——<=the defect in the brake was not ‘the proximate cause
of the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury.
He had not entered i upon the work’ of remedying
the defect. While the defect furnished the occasion.
for him to go along the top of the éars, it did not”
produce the- condition, nor bring into operation a.
* foree, which caused him to fall. It caused no move-
‘ ment of the train, no jar or jerk. If ‘plaintiff had
lighted-in the same manner at the same place for
-the purpose of boarding the caboose as it passed,
dr for any other purpose, the result would have been
the same. The condition of the brake had no direct
sal connection with the fact that he ‘stepped out
mas he termed it, instead of on the ground.
As pointed out in the above cases the statute does
not make the’ company an insurer of the safety of
its employees against all accidents, but only against
~
‘Y
.
19
those resulting proximately from a failure to com-
ply with its requirements. Where an employee,
. . -,While on his way to adjust.a defective appliance, or
-. while returning from making such an adjustment,
’ --meets with -an accident from another independent _
cause, the Safety Appliance Act has no application.
, ‘It follows that the learned trial court reached
the correct conclusion, and that the judgment must
7 be, and is, allie ust
In Powell v. Waters, 190 S. E. 615, the action was
brought under the F.E.L.A. and the Safety Appliance.
Law. The deceased was an engineer on a train in Georgia,
and on a hot afternoon the air pump which was part of
the brake system became. stuck-beeause of its. faulty. con- -
—dition, thus rendering the system of air brakes useless.
The deceased worked on the pump in the heat for about.
an hour and then assisted in bleeding the air out’of the.
train in order to continue and then ran the train into —
Savannah at a low rate of speed because there were no
brakes. On arrival at Savannah,. his condition was critical |
and fhe defefidant’s doctor was called. -but the deceased >
died at 7:00 that evening. The court held the defective air
_ bump.was-not the cause, but a mere condition, and held that
the lower court erred in overruling the general demurrer
to the. petition. The following syllabus is by the court:
“1. In an action against a rafiroad. company for:
injury to one of its employees based on the defend-
-ant’s violation of a federal statute, in order to
render the company liable there must necessarily
be, as in other cases, a causal connection between -
such violation and the injury. (a) ‘The most gen-
erally accepted theory of causation is that of natural
and probableconsequences (Mayor, etc. pf Macon v.
Dykes, 103 Ga. 847, 848, 31 S. E: 443); and i in order
to hold the defendant liable the petition must show
either that the act-complained of was the sole occa-
sion of the injury, or that it put in operation other
causal forces, such as were the direat, natural, and
— consequences of the original act, wf that
@
P 20 -
the intervening agency could have reasonably been
anticipated or foreseen by the original wrongdoer,’
Rome Railway, ete. Co. v. Jones, 33 Ga. App. 617,
618, 127.S. E. 786.
‘“(b) An employee of a railroad company cannot
recover under the Safety. Appliance Act, 45 U. S.
C. Av See. 1 et seq., if the failure to comply with
its requirements is not the. proximate cause of the ©
‘ accident which results in his injury, but -merely~
_ ereates an incidental condition or situation, in which
- the accident, otherwise eased, results mn such in-
ee
“The following ieadisitas: from Reet: v. Chicage & E.
R. Co., 46 F. (2d) 50 (C.C.A. 6) reflect the facts involved.
and the holding of the coyrt: ; :
“Railroad held not liable for freight eohdnctor’s
death for failure ‘to provide footpath ont: guard .
7 railings along bridge abutment. )
“Deceased fell from bridge while endeavoring ‘to
locate place in. train where breaking of couplers
and drawbars had broken air line and brought train |
_. to stop. However, record did not show railway
+ negligent in’method of constructing bridge or in
main{aining it, and there was no evidence that
guard rgilings or footpaths: were used in open
_country Tior that their absence was proximate cause °
of injury. : ;
‘*Railway soirdiien-4 train with defective onnaies
and drawbars held not liable under statute for.
freight conductor’s death, which was not proximate
ne result thereof (Safety Appliance nat, (S USCA “3
Sees. 1-16. ee
This Court in Great Northern Ry. Co, v. Wiles, 60 L.
Ed. 732, 240 U. S, 444, held there could be no recovery for
the death of asbrakeman. on the\caboose of a-train which °
broke in two because the drawbar pulled out and stopped
the: train instantly. Another train following ran into the
al
.
ae
caboose hecadhe the <dleceased failed to pe rform hig duty
to immediately put o@t signals to protect the stopped train
as required by Tule. .The Minnesota court held thie doe-
trine of res ipsa loquitur applied’ from the pulling out of
the drawbar and submitted -the case: to* the + jury- onthe a
theory of permeate negligence pee aasek
ae oat
“There js no ream Yor the applitation of the orule —
“of comparative negligence established by the em,
ployers’ liability act of April 22, 1908, (35 Stat. at.
~ L. 65,. Chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1913, See, 8657), '
where the re ar btiawe << of a parted freight train, |
disregarding ‘his duty to protect the rear of his’
train by going back a short distance ‘and giving the.
warning signals which the earrier’s rules’ required,
remained in the caboose and. was killed there when
_a’ passenger train, which he knew was elogely fol-
geek ~ lowing, ran into the standing train, since ‘his was
the causal negligence, even if neglige nee’ could: be
——- to the carrier from.the pulling out of the
rawbar which caused the train to break in two,
th 1ere beg. no claim that the .p passenger train was |
negligently run:”’
| This Court, in Johanna Frese, adme.-v. ‘Chiéage Bur-
lington and Quincy Railroad Company, 68 L. Ed. 131, 263
U.S..1, held plaintiff ‘could not recover for an injury due
primarily”? to the failure of the deceased to aet. Frese.
waft the engineer on a Burlington train which collided with
«x Wabash train at a crossing of the: tracks on the same |
level: -A statute of Tlinsis made it the duty of the engineer - -
to. stop within 800 feet and positively ascertain that the
«way is clear. The Wabash train was approaching iter. ©
both trains had stopped for the crossing) from the Burling- .
ton fireman’s side of the engine and the plaintiff alleged~
negligence of the fireman.’ The court pointed out the stat-
ute made it the personal ‘duty of the engineer to ascertain’
ass it was safe to resume the course. .
ay
“The plaintiff contends that there. was eviderice
of contributory negligence on the part of the fire-- _
_ Jee
_
_
many, - ‘Siviae, and’ therefore, éyen ‘if Frese. was
—~ - negligent, that woyld not-be a bar to the action:
*. under the Employers’ Liability Act. But the only
‘evidence as to the fireman came. from a man who:
was standing on the ground as the, engine passed
him, He says that it looked to him that the firernan |
— then. was looking through the:front w indow at that.
_time, and that he continued in-that position up to |
say 50 or 60 feet from the /eressing of the tracks.
‘The fireman was on the left, on* ‘the side of the other
approaching train; thé engineer on the right, where
- he could not see so well. But of course the witness, |
‘ eould not testify which way the fireman turned his
eyes after he saw only his back, and it is a mere.
“ “speculation. to argue that Savage did not do all
‘that he eould. Moreover, the statute makes it the
personal duty of the engineer positively to ascertain
that: the train can safely resume its course. What-
ever.may. have been the practice, he eould not-escape
this duty, and it would he a ie ersion of the Em- ~
. ployers’ Liability. Act (April: 22, 190 chap. - 149,
Sec: 3, 35 Stat. at L. 65, 66, Comp. Stat. Sec. 8659,
.8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1339) to hold that he_
‘could recover for an injury primarily due to his
- failure ‘to act as required on the ground that pos- - —
_ sibly the injury might have been prevented if his
eRe _ subordinate had done more: See Great Northern. R.-
* - + “a. v. Wiles, 240 (4) U. S. 444, 448, 60 L. Ed. 732,
734, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406. *.* *” |
‘While thé court did not give a name to the legal rule
- it applied, we submit the court, applying common sense
to the facts, was of the opinion the negligence of the engi- |
neer was the proximate cause since he had the primary
duty. In the phrase of that case, it would be a perversion
of the Federal Act to hold. that:Lucus could recover for .;
an injury primarily, dre to his failure to act. : is
Morse v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 74 F. (24) 677, (OCA.
2), reports a decision in a F. E. L. A. case by Augustus
N. Hand, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff was a signal main-.
tainer riding along the track on the track car. It became
7
stalled on a highway crossing by cinders in: flangeways: of
the rails just as a motorist named. Jenseti approached the
crossing. As the two vehicles struck, plaintiff ‘jumped and
broke his leg, The court held the cinders in the flangeways
were a condition rather than a cause of the accident:
“Jensen not only should have &cén. the track car
, long before he did, but should have had such con-
trol over his automobile, even when so short a dis.
tance away fronf the track car ‘as 16 feet, that he
could avoid a collisian. We can see nothing that pre-
vented him from exercising such ¢ontrol, even up
_ , to the last moment, and we hold that his negligence
_ in runnjng the Ford coupe into the plaintiff’s car: -
“was the proximate cause of the latter’s injaries. ~
Instead of waiting for. the track car to get beyond
and to the south of the highway, Jensen relied on
passing over the rails the moment the track car
would naturally, in view of apparent probabilities,
have got beyond the crossing. He would have been
#.+ fully as justified in taking his chanees if the plain-
tiff had deliberately stopped the’ track car at the
crossing in order to do some work there as he was
when it’suddenly became stalled. The stopping of :
\ a car‘on a-railroad track, whether voluntary or in- °
voluntary, cannot be regarded as ‘an act of negli- ’
\ gence. © “us .
,‘‘Any defect in the crossing, due, to the presence
of too large a mass of fine cinders or to the failure
to clean out the flangeways so that they would not .
become clogged. and endanger traffic, we regard as
a condifion rather than a cause of the accident.’’
“In view of Petitioner’s reliance upon the Gotschall case
(244 U. S. 66) and athe Layton case (243 U. S. 617) and
Respondent’s reliance upon the Conarty, Lang and Wiles
cases (supra) it is interesting for this-court to examine |
= whore fi v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 283 F: 739, (C.C.A. 6)
I
’ where
of these cases are discussed and shown to not be
<— °
- @
.
——)
/
am
in conflict: ‘MeCalmont was ‘injured while shortening #&
chain on a -car with a defective: coupler, standing with
others on a dead track used to assemble cars in need of”
repairs. While thus engaged, he failed to set out a blue
_ flag (required by rule) to indicate to others that he .was
working under or about the .car and to prevent it being
coupled or moved. Another car was kicked onto the same
track, hit the car on which MeCalmont was working and: .
he was kified. The action was under the Safety Appliance
Act. Thé defense was that the defective coupler was not -
the proximate cause o¥ the death. The action of the trial -
court directing a verdict for defendant. was. affirmed.
‘“‘If, however, there were otherwise doubt about
_ the conclusion that,the defective cdéupler was not
the proximate cause of MeCalmont’s death, it would
be removed by observing and applying the ruling
of the Supreme Court in the Wiles Case, 240 U. S.
444, 36 Sup. Ct. 406, 60 L. Ed. 732. This opinion
points out that even in the presence of negligence
by defendant which set in motion the train of events
and without which the injury would not have hap-
pened, yet. the plaintiff’s own conduct and negli- _
gence may be such as. to become the intervening -
and sole proximate cause, leaving the defendant’s
as they are assumed by the Supreme Court, we
gannot distinguish that case from this. It is trie
that the right to recover was not -planted upon the
Safety Appliance Act, but upon negligence under
the’ Employers’ Liability Act, and that any con-
tributory- negligence on the plaintiff ’s part would
| have diminished the recovery under the Employers’ -
- Liability Act (Comp—St:” Sees. 8657-8665) rather
than have been kas immaterial under the Safety
Appliance Act; but the court was not deciding the
effect of contributory negligence, but only whether .
+" the plaintiff’s conduct was contributory negligence —
2.
--. or was the sole proximate cause. It could make no
_ difference. whether the defendant’s negligence ih -
9 vw
‘negligence as a remote cause only. Upon its fucts - i ;
a
a ae
» ny
ak permitting the train to break apart ‘and _ bring
~ Wiles into a place where he was in dange ‘raad was
killed, Was"a disputed inference which a jury might.
draw under the one act, or a presumption of law
which must be indulged under the other aet, The
Supreme Court assumed (240:U. 8. 448, 36 Sup. Ct.
408, 60 L. Ed. 732) that there mi ‘wht be pecligence,
-aefionable under the Employers’ Liability Act,
which thus brought Wiles into the position where *
he .was exposes «l_ to. the danger of an unintended
collision, just as the absence’ of the nee essary coupler
_ brought MeCalmont into a similar position. Wiles
a knew, as.MeCalmont did, that in. the regular and
ordinary operation of the road sucl a ¢ollision as
4 did take place was lable to occur at any moment.
It was Wiles’ clear duty, as it was Me ‘almont’s,
to take a certain prescribed step Which, if taken,
> weuld prevent the collision. In each ¢ase there was
neither negligence in bringing about the collision ~
hor cause forthe collision, except,the failure of the -
man hurt to take that step which it was his duty to |
take to protect himself and dthers. If Wiles had ~
gone back with his flag, as his duty required, that
collision probably ‘might havé been avoided. If Me-
Calmont had set out his-flag as his duty required,
it is even more probable that there would have been
no collision. Our affirmance of the judgment, below
could safely be rested on the. Wiles Case alone.’’
Plaintiff relies upon Spokane and Inland Empire Rait-
road. Company v. Edgar E. Campbell, 60 L..Ed. 1125, 241
U.S. 497. Theré Campbell moved the electric train west-
bound ftom Coer d’Alene when he discovered an eastbound -
_train approaching on the same track. The airbrakes on
Campbell’s train failed to work properly and a collision.
resuited. Of course, it could be reasonably foreseen that-
' if the air brakes were deféctive that might cause a collision
with anything on the track including an approaching train.
The Campbell case would suport a claim that if the brakes
on the track car failed to operate (if Lucus applied them,
we he did not) and a collision resulted for ‘this reason
—ES
926
there would be causa conncetion between the faulty brakes
and the collision, The case gives no support. to the con-
_ tentiém that there. is any causal connection under the en.
tirely different faets in ‘the case at bar. ;
“The Respondent. would not be liable if ‘the stop had
been cansed by the engineer applying the air because it
is not re ‘asonably tobe anticipated that the operator of |
the track ear would fail to see the train stopped on the
track. It is for the same reason that the disconnection
of the air line is not the pr&ximate cause of the Year end
collision.
Mrs. Lucus W AS Nor DAMAGED BY FHE De \TH
OF W ILLIAM FRANK Luet Ss.
"‘Upos the trial of this case it was undisputed that the
deceased and his wife weré not living together at the time
of the death and had not lived together for approximately —
two yearseprior thereto. (R. 57-59) During this period, he
had turnished’ her no.support whatever. (R. 58-59, 109) —
She had been employed ever since they were married on —
December 26, 1936. (R. 55) There were no children, and
~ as-shown by defendant’s Exhibit: 4,-on March 18, 1943,
when Frank Lucus applied for employment, he stated in
his application ‘‘Am supporting no one.’’ (R. 142-B)
There was also introduced in the trial court as defendant’s |
_> Exhibit 1, a transcript of divoro~ proceedings in the Su-
perior Court of California in and for the County of Los
’ Angeles in tht case entitled .Wm. Frank Lueus vs. Edith °
_N. Lueus. That record shows that on August 27, 1942, the
deceased - filed ‘an action . against his wife for divorce, A
alleging a ay
S “That since the date of said marriage, ne defend-
ant has treated plaintiff in a cruel ‘and inhuman
mariner, and has wrongfully inflicted upon him
grievous suffering, pain and anguish; that all of
said acts and conduct of said defendant were with-
out exeuse, cause or provocation, and caused plain-
__ tiff to suffer shanie, embarrassment and humiliation,
/
}
}
si
impaired his health and happiness.’’ (R. 105)
Mrs.-Lucus, thereafter on September 15, 1942, filed a
cross complaint .for separate maintenance, in which she
.stated under,oath: «+>. ©.
”
o
‘*That plaintiff deserted and cniadoasl defendant
‘more than a year prior to the commencement of his
action and lived separate and apart from the de-
- fendant against-the will and wishes ‘of the defend-
_ ant; that during all of said time.said plaintiff did
not contribute anything to the support of defendant
and did not supply her with the necessities of life;
that during the entire married life of the parties the
defendant has been’ forced to work and earn her .
livelihood and neéessities of life; that, plaintiff has °
always earned more than enough money to support
defendant but has failed, neglected and refused. so
to-do;-all of- which has. been do to no fault of. the
defendant.
‘**That plaintiff squanders his money on liquor, in
bars and on friends and acquaintances with whom
he associates with at public pares) places, con-
stantly drinking to excess.
°
‘‘That defendant has pleaded and SO, plaintiff
_ to give up his disreputable friends, to cease patron-
izing public bars and to return home and live with
defendant; that plaintiff has. persistently refused.
- todo so; that due to his excessive drinking, plaintiff
‘has Yecome, in the past, involved*in several griev-
ous difficulties, from which defendant was .able to
extricate him only after great and costly effort;
that due to plaintiff ’s conduct, defendant worries
about him and is in constant dread+hat he will again.
become involved in difficulties;,that/ her worry has
heen so great that it has affected her health and.she
cannot sleep or rest properly, has lost her appetite
and is almost physically éxhausted; that she is in’
need of medical attention and cannot afford to — -
| and causedhim to bioneae ili in mind and body, and
-
aha etre to return any judgment
pay for .it; ‘that she fears that’ she may have. to _
quit her job because of her health; that unless she
‘receives financial aid from plaintiff she will suffer
to a great. extent. *? (R. 109) ‘
It further appears from the record that among other
proceedings resulting from this divorce litigation Frank
Lucus was ordered. on January 6, 1943, to pay his wife .
$10.00 per week for her support commencing February 1,
1943. (R. 127) Shortly after this order was entered, frank
Lucus, left Los Angeles without paying anything to. his
wife on account of the order or otherwise, and on March -
18, of that year started to work for the Southern Pacific -
Company in the State of Utah. (R. 59, 142-B) The
testimony in the record shows that there was nothing left
‘of the marriage relation between Frank Lucus and Edith
'Luteus except the bare technicality that the divorce had not _
been granted: He left the State’ of California obviously
for the purpose of defeating her intention of making him
pay her support money. He was 39 when he died and she
was. 49. (R. 54-55) Her only hope of future support was
legal duress of a spouse who was determined not to pay.
She had alleged under oath that his society and association .
was destroying her health. To permit g jury: under these
+: the wife would
result in a verdict based on pure.speculation and conjec-
ture. If a jury had found that based on the bare possibility |
that in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary
at some time in the future there might have been a recon-
'- eiliation of. these parties, such a finding would not be
supported by any testimony, but: would be based on pure.
guess work, and contrary to all the. evidence.
The rule. of damages in cases under the act has been
clearly announced, by the Supreme Court. In American |
- Railroad Co. v. Didrickson, 57 L. Ed. 456, 227 U. S. 145,
tie court said:
“The datnages recoverable are limited to stich loss
as results to them because they have been deprived
of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits by
~f.
. 29
the wrongful death of the injured employee. The
damage is limited strictly to the financial loss thus
sustained.’’ — .
Michigan Central "R. Co: Lp. Vreeland, 57 L.. Ed. -417,
227 U.S. 59, involved ‘a Wdow’s action for the death of
her husband. The court held:
“The financial benefit which might reasonably be
expected from her husband in a pecuniary way is
the measure of damages in ap action brought against
an interstate railroad “arrier under the employers
liability act of April 2 ‘orthe benefit of the
widew of an employee i ngaged in inter-
state commerce.”’ ;
Mere status of husband and wife followed by: the death
of the husband dees not show pecuniary loss. In addition
__ to the status there must be a reasonable expectation of
- future support and maintenance. This essential was totally
absent in this ease. om
. The reeprd made im the trial court would seem to re-
quire the conclusion that Lucus died not at all because the
train. came to a stop, but only because Lucus,. knowing
the train was ahead of him, persisted in riding backwards
with no thought or care for his own safety, until he pro-
’ pelled the. little track car at unchecked speed into the
‘caboose. Likewise, the conclusion seems to be required: by
- the record as a matter of law that Lueus’ death resulted
in no ‘pecuniary loss to Mrs. Lucus. By her sworn state-
ment in the California divorce case, Lucus contributed
7 nothing to her support while they lived together. By her
testimony upon the trial below, Lucus ‘made no contribu-
tion to her while he lived in Utah and worked for Respond. .
ent. So clear was it in the mind of Mrs. Lueus, that she
had no fair hope of recovering financial help from:Lueus,. .
she did not even make a good faith effort to discover his
whereabouts or communicate with him Poe the fourteen’
months he worked for Respondent. .
The result i in the trial court and in the Supreme Court .
of Utah was clearly correct and resulted i in justice between
~ 30
‘ the'parties. Petitioner has been unable to point to any fact
- which would justify a finding of any causal connection be-
tween the stopping of the train and the death of Lucus.
Neither has he been able to point out any basis for a find-
ing that Mrs. Lucus suffered any pecuniary loss by Lucus
death. No claim was ever- made by the administrator that
anyone other than Mrs. Lueus was dependent upon fucus.
?
Petitioner complains bere of the language employed
by the Supreme Court of Utah.. We submit that not only
did the Supreme Court of Utah correctly decidé the case,
but that the reasons assigned for its decision are sound.
But,“the case having been properly decided; the ‘reasons
for the decision are immaterial upon review and cannot
’” be the basis for reversal.
This Court las stated the cule applicable here in Hel-
vering v. Gowran, 82 L. Ed. 224, 302 U.S. 238:
‘(In the. review of judicial proéeedings the ‘rule is
settled that if the decision below is correct, it must
be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a
wrong ground or gave.a wrong reason. Frey. & Son |
_y. Cudahy. Packing Co. 256 U. S. 208, 65 L. Ed. 892,
41 S. Ct. 451; United States v. American R. Exp.
Co. 265 U. S. 425, 68 L. Ed. 1087, 44 S. Ct. 560;.
-- United States ‘v. Holt: State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 56,
- 70'L. Ed. 465, 469, 46 S. Ct. 197; Langnes v..Green, .
282 U.S. 531, 75 L. Ed. 520, 51 S. Ct. 243; Stelos Co. :
v. Hosiery Motor-Mend Corp. 295 U. S. 237, 239,79 .
_ L. Ed..1414, 1416, 55 S. Ct. 746; ef. United States v. |
Williams, 278 U. S. 255, 73 L. Ed. 314, 49 S. Ct.
97.°* ° eo? |
-Conciusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of Utah seesiitle |
holds, in harmony with the decisions of this Court, that
the death of Lucus was not proximately caused by the
safety appliance failure. The decision is correct also be-
ee ie a5" —
' é .
31
b
cause the testimony shows without dispute that the widow
of Lucus did not suffer any pecuniary loss as the result
of his death.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that the
| ponies for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
® .
| so : Pau H. Ray |
A. H. NEBEKER - | S. J. Quinney ?
Of Counsel” : Counsel for Respondent
921 Kearns Building, |
Salt Lake City, Utah
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.