Petition for Rehearing — King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America
Supreme Court brief1948
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x soma cour OF THE mira STATS
- OCTOBER — 14”
Sa
i
: No. 171 | . ns
pats BELL KING, seer.
‘i vs. }
THE ORDER OF UNITED COMMERCIAL -
TRAVELERS OF AMERICA © ere
‘ PETITION FOR REHEARING
3 Ss \] |
ey, AS W. Born, .
Harvey W. “JOHNSON,
‘Counsel for Petitioner.
FOuNSON, Jounson & Foster,
'y partanburg, Seuth Carolina,
e
| Of Counsel. ;
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
OCIUSER TERM, 1947
‘No. 171
_ MARY BELL KING, Patilaner,
vs.
THE ORDER OF UNITED COMMERCIAL
TRAVELERS OF AMERICA
* PETITION FOR REHEARING
Since certiorari was granted’ in . order— to determing
whether the Cireuit Court of Appeals’ refusal to follow
‘the only South Carolina decision directly in point, the de-
__eision. of a Court of Common Pleas, was consistent with
the Rules of Decision Act as applied in Erie R. Co. v. Tomp- -
. kins; 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and subsequent cases, the petition”
_ will be limited to that question, /
We respectfully submit that the Court has fallen into
error by being’ influenced by extranéous ‘judicial events that
have oecurred entirely ‘since the Court allow ed a writ of
» certiorari on October 13, 1947,
‘The District Court decided the issue on May 24, 1946,
applying » South Carolina statute and seven decisions of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina as declaring the law °
applicable to: the case. Two months later, the Court of
Common Pleas for Spartanburg County likewise ruled in
favor of Mrs. King in a suit against a different insuper on
.
2
a $2,500 poliey which contained an almost identical avia-
tion exclusion clause. The Judge followed the same reason-
‘ig asthe District Court had and relied, at least in part,
on that Court’s decision. Under South Carolina statutes,
the insurer in this se¢ond case had the right to appeal to
_ the State Supreme Court, but did net do so.
The Court may assume in that case that the insurance
company was represented by the ablest counsel obtainable,
as an insurance company always is. And yet the Court
may assume that able counsel concluded: that the decision
correctly decided the case, or surely they would have
availed themselves of such right.. The amount ‘involved
was exactly one-half the amount involved ib this case, and
the cost of appeal far less. At any rate,.the petitioner's
counsel (by whom the opinion was written as is generally
done by prevailing counsel in Common Pleas Court) filed
the opinion with the Cireuit Court of Appeals, as-the law
_of.that case, and entitled to high persuasive consideration
in this one.
However, the C irenit ( ‘ourt of Appeals j in dealing with —
this decision simply said- that it was net binding on other
‘South Carolina Courts, was not binding on it and that they.
‘could not treat it as a final expression of South Carolina
‘law. It was final as far as that case was eoincerned’ and
the best law available fin‘ the: facts involved. Unless these
‘unappealed decisions are to be followed in Federal Courts,
then there is no precedent of Taw established against a
foreign insurahce conipany that elects to go into the Fed-
“eral Court which it has a right to do, but only én diversity
of citizenship. Onée in the Federal Court, they are not —
bound by unappealed unfavorable decisions, and the slate
is clean to find other iw, from other. states, and varying -
factual conditions, unless a miracle happened to produce:
the identical facts.
That is really the exact difficulty that makes the second
Common Pleas decision inapplicable. The facts are not
the same, or anywhere near the same, as’ the instant case,
_ ae
and w hile the decision may appear to muddy the water
as far as the law is concerned, it need not do so. At this
point, we should go back and examine the respondent’s
brief contra ‘petition for writ of certiorari, and while it
attempts to minimize the jnrisdiction of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas and its-decisions, it does not at this stage of the
litigation have the benefit of the second Common Pleas
decision which seems to‘have finally determined the deci-_ °
sion of this case; and’ we respectfully submit erroneously
so, although unanimous.
To show the lack of factual similarity between the two
Common Pleas decisions, we simply quote from the second
opinion, the Greenville decision.
‘The evidence showed that the insured at the time of
his death was a 2nd Lieutenant in ‘the ‘Army Air Corps
“attached to the Troop Carrier Command in the Far Pacific
Area. From-stich’ evidence, it appears that on October 12,
- 1945, thé insured, on a troop ferrying mission, left. Naha
Airfield on Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands as 4 member -
‘of the crew of a C-46 type military plane bourid for Iwo
Jima in the Volcano Islands. The plane reported by radio
‘from the vicinity of the Benin Islands, but was never
thereafter heard from. Extensive search was. conducted
of the ‘area in which the plane might have gone down, both
of the sea area and of islands in the area, but no trace
could be found of the plane, its crew or its passengers."’
In that case, there was a war clause which is absent in
the instant ease, and which the Court econstrues definite-
-ly in favor of the insurance company in the following
language :
‘‘The Court can see no other reasonable conclusién than
that the insured’s death did result from an act of war or
an act incident thereto- within the meaning of the language
_ of the policy. The insured was an officer in the army, pro-
ceeding on a military mission as a member of the crew
' of ‘a military plane.’’
In other words, the Court had ‘siunisthy decided i in favor
=
oe
of
7
.
>
of the insurance company under the war clause that death.
occurred under the war clause and on the admitted facts;
namely, the total disappearance of the plane and its crew.
However, the construction of the aviation clause is ‘based -
upon” various. unknown hypotheses as to-how death did.
oceir. And even then the Court says that the clause ap-
plied ‘*without an efficient intervening cause.”? There was
P pe evidence what the cause was then{ but in the instant
* ease, there was no crash, no bodily injury, complete dis-
~ engagetuent practically uninjured, survival for several
hours, and finally death from exposure and drowning. —.
When this Court granted the writ 6f certiorari in this
‘ase, the petitioner. renewed hope, but counsel for the de-
fendant had no answer to the’ Common Pleas decision, di-
rectly i in point. The decision being on practically the same
facts was practically indestructible, so they decided to
pull down the whole system of Common Pleas Courts and
bury the decision under it. .Regardless ef the picture of.
‘ineffectnality that -had- been painted, the Common Pleas
Courts are the backbone of the judicial system and the
Court in which.the average lawyer spends most of his life,
day after day.
Great: stress is laid or the fact that its’ decisions are
not . published; but somehow or other their rulings get
around as fast or faster than advance sheets of published :
‘reports are received in the lawyers’ -office. They are re-
ported in the press, discussed by the judiciary among
themselves as it travels on circuit, and likewise by members
_ of the bar, not to mention the publicity given by the gen-
eral public. [It is’a pr etty safe statement that if a lawyer
loses a case in the Piedmont, he is very likely to be. coti-
fronted with the adverse ruling a hundred or two hundred .
‘miles away in.a similar case very quickly. In other words,
the news travels,.and it doesn’t have to go to a publishing
house and come back digested, with syllabi and a key num-
ber to give it currency. ois :
The corfusion pictured by respondents’ counsel duos
oo
9)
not exist. Iti it did, though, we think it would be better for"
lawyers. to be confused than litigants.. As matters now
stand, that is the position of the petitioner.
Petitioner files two suits.in the State Court against two
defendants on two-identical causes of action, one for more
than $3,000. QO and one for less ‘than $3,000.00, The suit
for the larger amount is transferred to a Federal Court.
She receives a favorable decision in both cases upon frial,
one by the Circuit Judge and the’ other by the District
Judge in South ( ‘arolina. .
‘The State ‘ourt and the F itera: ‘Court buildings in->
Spartanburg, South Carolina, face each other on opposite _—
sides of Magnolia Street. It is certainly confusing to the
litigant to prevail’in the action in the State Court. and to
he defeated in practically the same action across the street
in the Federal Court less than one hundred feet away.
For the reasons’stated; therefore, we most respectfully
petition that the Court aliow a rehearing in, this cause.
' Respectfully submitted, —
JESSE W. Boyp, *
Jounson, Jounson & Foster,
_ Attorneys for the Petitioner.
ie hereby certify that the within Petition i is in my opinion
meritorious and not filed for purposes of delay.
| E Harvey _W. JOHNSON.
see eee ee os 2
*
SUPREME COURT OF THE p UNITED: STATES
No. 171 ilies ome, 1947.
oN too )On Writ of Certiorari
- Mary Bell Petitioner, to the United States
he Cireuit Court of Ap-
The Order of United Commercial - peals for the Fourth
Travelers of America. Circuit. :
[March 8, 1948.)
Mr. Cuer Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of
_ the Court. a
- This-is a suit to obtain payment of the proceeds of a
$5,000. insurance policy. Federal jurisdiction is founded
on diversity of citizenship, and, for present purposes,
South Carolina law is controlling.’ We granted certio-
"rari? in order to determine whether the Circuit Court of
Appeals’ refusal to follow the only South Carolina deci-
sion directly in point, the decision of a Court of Common
Pleas, was ¢aysistent with the Rules of Decision Act’
as applied in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 v. S. 64 (1938),
and subsequent cases.
The petitioner, Mrs. King, is the beneficiary of the
policy; her husband; Lieutenant King, was the insured;
and the respondent Order of United Travelers of Amer-
ica is. the insurer. The policy insured against King’s
accidental death, but contained a elause exempting the
‘' Both courts below re) held, and until the case was briefed for
this Court, neither party took issue with this holding or raised any
full faith and credit question. Hence it is-unnecessary for us to con-
sider whether or not United Commercial Travelers of Americe ve
Wolfe, 331 U.S-586 (1947), is apptientle.’ e5, |
* 332 U.S. 754.
Mets cared Act of 1789, § 34, R: 5 cae 28 U.S.C. 4725.
fice %
?
/
/
/
2 KING v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS. |
respondent from liability for “death’ resulting from per- -,
ticipation. . . in aviation.” ‘It is this aviation exclusion —
_ clause which gave rise to the litigation now before us. !
King lost his life one day in the winter of. 1943 when |
a land-based Civil Air ‘Patrol plane in which he was oY
- flight observer made an emergency landing thirty miles _
off the coast of North Carolina. The plane sank, but
King was ‘not seriously hurt and managed to’ get’ out of
the plane and don his life jacket. He was still alive
two and a half hours later, when an accompanying plane
was forced to leave the scene. When picked up about . .
four and a half hours after the landing, however, he was
dead. The medical diagnosis was “drowning as a result
ae exposure i in the water.”
‘The respondent took the position that pare while
“accidental,” resulted from “participation . . = in avia-
tion.” Accordingly, it refused to pay Mrs. King the pro-
- ceeds of the policy.: A resident of South Carolina, she
_ then-sued the respondent in a court of that State, con- |
-. tending that drowning rather than the airplane flight was
the cause of death within the meaning of the policy.
The respondent, an Ohio corporation, exercised its statu-
tory right to remove’ the cause to the federal District ‘fs
* Court for the Western District of South Carolina. :
The. parties agreed. that South Carolina law was con-
trelling, but up to the time of the District Court's decision
neither of them had located any decision on aviation —
exclusion clauses by any South Carolina court. The Dis-
trict Court therefore fell back on what it deemed to be
general principles’ of South Carolina insurance law; as
enunciated by the State supreme court: that, ambiguities
in an insurance contract are ‘to be resolved in favor of thé
beneficiary, and that the cause of death, within the mean-
ing of accident insurance > policies, is the immediate, not the —
BU.BCEN. voi mee
KING v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS. 3.
remote cause.* Applying. these principles, the court held
that King’s death resulted from drowning, not from par-
ticipation in aviation, and that Mrs. King was entitled to -
recover.*
Two months hae a South Carolina court. the Court
of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County, likewise ruled .
in favor of Mrs. King in a suit against'a different i insurer
-on & $2,500 policy which contained an almost identical
aviation exclusion clause. The judge followed the same _-
' . reasoning as the District Court had and relied, at least
in part, on that fey 's decision." Under South Carolina |
statutes the insurer in this secorid casé had the right to
_appeal to the State’ supreme court,’ but did not do 80:
On appeal of the present case, the. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court’s judgment for Mrs.
King.* The court. acknowledged that under South Caro-
_ lina law ambiguities in insurance policies are to be con-
strued against the Ua but?it found no ambiguity i in
the aviation exclu
on clausé insofar as its application
to the facts of this ¢ase. was concerned. On the contrary,
King’s death was fhought clearly to: have resiilted from
- 8 For ‘this proposi on the court cited Goethe v. Shei York Life
Ins. Co., 183 S. C. 99, 190 S. E. 451 (1937). ‘In that.case the in-
time. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
ation that heatstroke caused death, and then,
onthe most disputed point in the case, ruled that heatstroke’ was
“bodily injury’ within the meaning of : an accident, insurance . *
sar = —!
O us, as it apparently did’ to the Circuit Court
of Appeals, qu
for which it was cited, at fe ag
* 65 F. Supp. 740 (4946): ¥ ;
718. C. Code.Ann. $8 26 and 780.
* 161 F.2d 108 (1947)...
vigorous effarts to put out a fire. There was
onable whether this case —_— the pamcigle.
Vy]
‘4 KING v. . COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS.
“participation 5 as ae aviation.” Nothing i in South Car-
olina Supreme Court. decisions, it: was said, was incon-
~ sistent with this view, whereas that court’s. accepted
theories of proximate cause in tort cases supported it.’
‘ Under these circumstances, the Circuit Court of Appeals ~
- expressed its disbelief that the Supreme Court of South
Carolina would have ruled for Mrs. King, had her case.
been before it, “in the face of reason and the very con-
siderable authority” “From ‘other jurisdictions.” The
Common Pleas decision in Mrs, King’s favor, it was .
- thought, was not binding on the Circuit Court.of Appeals
as a-final expression of South Carolina law since it was
not binding on other South Carolina courts and since
the court-rendering it had.relied on the District Court’ ~
- ruling in the present case. 4
After we granted. certiorari, a new factor was inter-
/ jected in the. case. Another South Carolina Court. of
Common Pleas, the one for Greenville County, handed
down an opinion which, so far. as relevant here, expressly
rejected the reasoning of the Spartanburg Court of Com-.
mon .Pleas and espoused that of the Circuit Court: of —
- Appeals.
What effect, if any, we ‘should give to this second Cotti- ;
mon Pleas ‘decision becomes an appropriate subject for
inquiry only if it is first: determined that the Circuit Court
_of Appeals'erred in not following the Spartanburg deci-
sior, which was the only one outstanding at the time of
its \action." We therefore — cyrpeiven first to that
questien. ie | eae: ) cay
2 3
*The court cited Horne v. Atlantic Coast Line i. oo! Per C.
_ 461, 181 S. E: 642 (1935).
10 Among the gases cited were Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New.
York; 131 F, 2d 159 (C.C. A. 2,,1942), and Green v. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 144 F. 2455 (C. ©. A. 1,-1944).
u Although the decision by. the Spartanburg Court of ‘Common
Pleas was rendered after the District,Court decision, it-was proper for ~
‘the Circuit Court of Appeals, to considef it. See Vandenbark v.
Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941). ;
ee ‘ ; .
ae
“KING v. COMMERCIAL: TRAVELERS. 8
“The Rules of Decision Act ‘commands federal courts \.
‘to regard as “rules ‘of decision” the substantive “laws”
of the appropriate state, except only where the Consti-
tution, treaties, or statutes of the United States provide ..
otherwise. \And the Erie R. Co. case decided that “laws,”
in this context, include not only state statufes, but also
- the unwritten law of a state as pronounced by its courts.
- The ideal aimed at by the Act is; of course, uniformity .
of decision within: each state. ‘So long as it doés not —
impinge on federal ‘interests, a state may shape its own
law in any direction it sees fit, and it is inadmissible that
/’ cases dependent on that law.should be decided differently
according to-whether they are beforé federal or state
~ eourts,.. This is: particularly true where accidental factors
such as diversity of citizenship and the amount in con- .
troversy enable one of the parties to choose whether the —
case is tried in a federal or a state court.
' Effectuation of that. policy is comparatively easy ilies
the i issue confronting a. federal.court has previously been
decided by the highest court in the appropriate state;.
' the Erie R. Co, case decided that decisions and opinions.
‘of that court are binding on federal.courts: . The Erie R. -
Co. case left open, however, the more difficult question
of the effect to be given to decisions by lower state courts
- on points never passed on by the highest state court.
Two years later, a series of four cases "presented j some
aspects of that question. In three of the cases this Court
of held that federal courts are bourtd by decisions of a state’s
intermediate appellate courts unless there is persuasive
evidence that-the highest state court ‘would tule other-
wise. Six Companies v. Highway District, 311 U.S. 180
(1940) ; West. v. American 7. & 7. Co:; 311 U. S. 223
(1940); and. Stoner v. New York Life ‘Ins. Co., 311 U.S.
464 (1940). oe the fourth case, Fidelity Union Trust
. 12 See note 3, supra.
In all three cases the stgte s supreme court had refused to review
the intermediate appellate /eourt decision; in the West and Stoner
6 KING ». COMMERCIAL "TRAVELERS.
- Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940), the Court went farther’
and held that a federal court had to follow two decisions |
announced four years earlier by the New Jersey Court
of Chancery, a court of original jurisdiction.
_ The Fidelity Union Trust Co. case did not, however,
~ lay dowa any general rule as to the respect to be accorded
state trial. court decisions. This Court took pains to ©
point out that the status of the New Jersey Court of
Chancery was not that of the usual nisi prius court: It
had state-wide jurisdiction. Its standing on the equity . 3
side was comparable to that of New Jersey’s intermediate
appellate courts on the law side. A uniform ruling by
_ the Court of Chancery over a course of years was seldom,. —
set aside by the state’s highest court. . And charicery de- —
crees, were ordinarily treated as binding 1 in later cases in
chancery. ..
“. .The present case involves no attack on the ii of
the Rules of Décision Act, the principle of the Erie R. Co.
case, or the soundness of the other cases referred to above. .
_ It involves the practical administration of the Act;.and
the question it raises is whether, in the long run, it would —
promote uniformity in the application of South Carolina
‘law if federal courts confronted with questions under that‘
law were obliged to folign the ruling . a Court ‘of Com-
‘mon Pleas. .
The Courts of cca Pleas make up » South Carolina’s -
, basic system of trial courts for civil actions."*;; There are :
| cases, the ‘euensiiels appellate court’s decision had edieel ‘the:
- same parties engaged in the subsequent case before'the federal courts; -
and in the Siz Companies case, the intermediate appellate, court’s
decision had remained on the books for over twenty years without
disapproval: ~ These factors were mentioned in ouf opinions, but were
not necessarily determinative. See. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,’
311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940). - ,
4S. C. Const.-Art. 5, § 15. .These courts se have limited on
ae late jurisdiction, varying ! someWuai: from county to county. The
No
-
~®
cae
KING v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS. oe
fourteen judges for these courts, one for each of the judi--
cial circuits into which the state’s forty-six counties are~- 7
- grouped.” A circuit judge hears civil cases at specified
times in-each county comprising the circuit to which -
he is then assigned, and at such. times his court is ealled
the Court of Common Pleas for that particular county.”
- . In addition, he presides over a parallel set of criminal
"-. eourts, the Courts of General: Sessions. South Carolina
. has no tier of intermediate appellate courts, and appeal
- from Common Pleas decisions is directly, and es tense
. of right, to the State supreme court.” ;
While the Courts of Common Pleas are denominated _
courts of record, their decisions are not published or —
‘ digested in -any form whatsoever. . They are filed only .
in the. counties in which. the cases are tried, and even
a there the sole index is by the parties’ ‘names.” Perhaps
because these facts preclude ready- availability ‘to bench.
' . and bar, the;Common Pleas decisions seem to be accorded -
little weight as precedents in South,Carolina’s own courts.
In this connection, respondent has submitted a certificate -
from the Chief. Justice of the —— Court of South -
Court of Camas Pleas for. Spartanburg p ae ietiie ere
from the county’s probate court, I S. C: Code Ann. § 228, its court
of domestic relations, 1 id. §§ 256-24 and 256-44, anc its magistrates =...
courts. The latter have civil jurisdiction concurrent with the courts of .
Common only in suits involving less than $100, 1 id. § 257. .
The county court for- Spartanburg County has concurrent juris- -
diction in civil’ suits involving less than $3,000, but appeal from its
‘decisions is directly ; to ats Court of South Carolina, 1 id.
§§ 184 and 190. |
6S. C. Const. Att. 5, § 13; 1 8.-C. Code Ann. § 50. There is
. provision for periodic interchange « judges among the. circuits.
1 S.C. Code Ann. § | inte )
1° S.C. Corist. Art. 5) § 16; 18. C, Code Ann. §§ 51-64, ;
11 See note 7 supra. + ey
8. C- Circuit ews Rule 39. “There j is a Clerk of the Court ” oe
Common Pleas. for each county.’ ‘8. = ‘Const. Art. $,§27... -
fe BT KING y COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS,
. AB ce the effect.that “under the practice in thib State
an unappesled decision of the Court of Common Pleas is
'. binding. solely upon the parties who are before the Court
-in-that'particilar case and would not constitute a prece-
*. ._, dent in any other case in that Court « or in ‘any-gther 6 court .
» (_..--\-jthie State of South Carolina.” ;
: Consideration of these facts leads | us. to the cokelusion
a ( that the Cireuit Court of Appeals did not commityerror.
+ While that court roperly attributed. some weight % the
Spartanburg Corhmon Pleas decision, we believe that, it
was justified in holding the. decision, not controlling and |
“in " proegeding to make its own ‘determination of what the :
nes Supreme. Court ‘of | South Carolina: ise probably rule>_
in asimilar case. \
Ir the first place, a. Court of Comraon Pleas does not |
ager: appear to have such. importance and‘competence within \
_--.. South Carolina’s éwn, judicial system ‘that its decisions |
"4, - should be taken as authoritative expositions of that State’s
~ “law.” In future cases between different parties, as indi- —
cated above, a Common Pleas decision does not exert .
Save conformity. from either :the Same court. or lesser courts
_. -:*- within its territorial jurisdiction ; and it ‘may apparently
ZL. beignored by other- Courts of Common Pleas without
_ the ecompunctions which courts often experience in reach- -
ing tesults divergent from those reached’ by another
court of coordinate jurisdiction. ‘Thus a Common Pleas -
.. » decision does not, so far as we have been informed, of
". itself evidence one of the “rules’ of decisign' commonly
* aevepted and acted’ upon by the bar and inferior courts.” »
Furthermore, as we have but recently had occasion to
+ remark, a-federal court adjudicating a matter of state
_ law in a. diversity suit is, “in effect, only another court
— anal
! j 97, wi; county sain eicciaiaes courts, probate courts, ay, ‘courts
'. of domestic. relations: See note 14 supra.
# West v. American'T. & T.Co., 311 U. 8. 223, 236 hae
eae KING v?: COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS. 9
— of, that State”; * it:would be incongruous indeed to hold
the federal court’ bound by a decision whieh would not
——pe binding on any state caurt.
Secondly, the difficulty of locating Comshon- Pleas deci-
sions is a. matter of great practical significance. . Litigants
ould find all the decisions: on any- given subject only
by laboriously searching the judgment rolls in all of
‘South Carolina’s forty-six counties. To hold that federal
courts must abide by Common Pleas decisions might well
_ put a premium on the financial ability required for. ex-
haustive screening of the judgrient’ rolls or for the main-
‘tenance of private records. In cases ‘where the parties
could not afford such practices, the result would often
be to make their rights dependent on chance; for every
decision cited: by counsel there might be a dozen adverse.
_ decisions outstanding but undiscovered.” - 0
In affirming the decision below, we are deciding only
that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not have to follow
‘the decision of the Court of Common Pleas for Spartan-
_ burg County. We do not.purport to determine the:cor
rectness of its ruling-on the merits. Nor is our decision
to be taken as promulgating a general rule that federal .
courts need never abide by determinations of state law’
4 state trial courts. “As indicated by t Fidelity Union
. Trust Co. case, other situations in other states’ may well,
call for a different result.
It may also be well to add that even if the Circuit Court
of Appeals had been in-error at the time-of its decision, |
reversal of its judgment would not necessarily be appro-
a in view of the second Compan Pleas decision.”
; 2 Guaranty ivul Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). .
' 2%n the present ease, the Spartanburg: decision came to light
-because petitioner had been a party to it, the Greegville decision
_ _ beeduse respondent's counsel had been a party to it.
23 See Vandenbark v. Copntitnms Co., 311 U. S. 538 ¢1941). -
10 KING v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS.
But we prefer to regard that second decision as an ius:
tration of-the perils of interpreting a Common Pleas
decision as a definitive -expression of “South Carolina
law,” not asa controlling factor i in our decision.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.