Appendix — In Re Oliver
Supreme Court brief1948
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i ees __APPENDIX A
The Michigan “One-Man Grand ‘Sury” Statute
Whenever ‘by reason of ‘the- filing ‘of any. “complaint, .
_.' which may be’ upon information and belief, any justice of
_ the peace, police judge or judge of a court of record shall.
have probable cause to suspect that any crime, : offense, © -
| misdemeanor or violation of any city ordinatice: shall have | :
been committed within his jurisdiction, and that any per-"
. son may be able to give any ‘material evidence respecting Soto
~ sueh: offense, such justice or judge in his discretion -may,
a and ‘upon_the application of the prosecuting attorney,. or
co - city attorney ‘in. the-case of suspected vivlation of ordi-
- nances, shall require such person to attend before him as”
- a witness and answer, such - questions ° as’ such justice or
Judge may’ require concerning .any violation of law about
os which he may be questioned ; ‘and ‘the ‘proceedings. to sum-
"-mon such witness and to: ‘compel hint ‘to testify shal,. as _
. far as possible, be the same as proceedings to’ summon ‘wit:
nesses and compel their attendance-and testimony, and such ee
Witnesses shall be entitled to the’ same compensation as. —
‘i in other. erjminal proceedings. (C. L. 1929,. ‘§ 172173. Mich.
Stats. Ai § 28048) : Me ci garners pened
oe upon such inquiry the justice or ‘judge shall be_satis-
fied that any’ offense has been committed and. that there
is probable cause to. suspect any person or persons to be
. guilty thereof, he may~eause the apprehension of such per-—
son or persons by proper. process and, upon the return of
". .Sueh process served or executed, the justice or judge shall
proceed with ‘the case, matter or- proceeding in like manner *
as upon forma} complaint. _And if upon such inquiry the
justice, or: jndge ‘shall find, from the evidence that there :
cee appointive and subject to removal by: law, has been
. cal
is probable cause to believe that any inhi officer, . slective
‘guilty af misfeasance. or malfeasance of oftice or wilful
heglect of. duty or of any other offense prescribed as. a
ground of’ removal, the said justice or judge shall make:
\Sf written finding setting up the offénse so found and shall:
serve said finding upon the public officer;, public board or
“body having jurisdiction under the law to conduct removal
proceedings against said officer. And said finding shal! be a
sufficient complaint as a basis for removal of said ‘officer and, *
the public officer, public board or public body having %,.
jurisdiction . of . removal proceedings against said officer
shall proceed in the method prescribed | by law ‘ual a hear-.
ing and determination of-said’ charges. And! in respect ©
of communicating or divulging any statement made by
such Witnesses during the course of such inquiry, the Jus-
-~ tice, judge, prosecuting attorney and other person or per-
- sons who may at the: discretion of such justice, be ad-:
mitted to such inquiry, shall be governed by the provisions
of law relitive to grand jurors (C. L. 1929 ¢. 17 218;. Mich.
Stats. Ann..§ 28.944).
a” % ;
_ Any witness neglecting or refusing to appear in response
to such summons or to answer any .questions which such
justice or judge may ‘require material to such inquiry, shall .
be deemed guilty of contempt arid shall be punished by a
~ fine not exceeding one hundred (100) dotlars oF imprison-
“merit in the county jail net exe ceding sixty (60) days or '
_betir at. the discretion of the vourt: Provided, That if-such
witness after being so seritenced shall appear and answer.
such question, the, justice or judge may in his discretion’
commute or suspend the further execution of such sentence.
(C. L. 1929, § 172195-Mich. Stats. Ann. ¢ 28.945). -
™~
. a
‘ ; ¢ .
No person shall: upon such inquiry be required to answer
any questions: the answers of which might tend to incrimi-
nate him except upon motion in writing by the prosecuting
attorney which shall be granted by. such justice or judge,
‘and any such questions and. answers ‘shall be reduced to
writing and entered upon the docket or journal of such —
justice or judge, and‘no person required to’ answer such
questions upon such motion’ shall thereafter be prosecuted
for any offense concerning which such answers may Have
tended to incriminate him (C. L..1929, 4 17220; Mich. Stats.
Ann. 6 28.946) 3’
.
a
_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _
No. 215.—Ocroser Term, 1947.
Tn -re William Oliver, On Writ’ of Certivcari to the
Petitioner. Supreme Court of Michigan.
(March 8, 1948.] _
Mr. Justice Back delivered the ‘opinion of the Court.
A Michigan circuit judge summarily sent the petitioner
to jail for contempt of court. We must. determine
whether he was denied the procedural due process guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. rae
In obedience to a subpoena the petitioner appeared as
& witness before a Michigan circuit judge who was then
conducting, ‘in accordance with Michigan law, a “one-
man grand jury” investigation into alleged gambling and
official corruption. ‘The investigation presumably: took
place in the judge’s chambers, though that is not certain.
-Two other -circuit. judges were present/in an advisory
capacity.’ A prosecutor may have been present: A
stenographer was most likely there. The record does not
show what other members, if.any, of the judge’s investiga-
torial staff participated in the proceedings. ‘It is cer-
tain, however, that’ the public was excluded—the ques-
‘Uoning was secret in accordance with the traditional grand °
jury method. ‘ oe NE
After petitioner had given certain testimony, the ju
grand jury, still in secret session, told petitioner ‘that
neither he nor his advisors believed. petitioner’s story—
that it did not “jell.” This. belief of the judge-grand |
jury was not based entirely on what the petitioner had
testified. As will later be seen, it rested in part on beliefs
or suspicions of the judge-jury derived from the testimony.
of at least one other witness who had previously given
-_hoH
.
se . / ; ; :
* Under oui circumstances Michigan Jaw permits cireuit judges *
. -to sit with.other circuit judges in an advisory capacity. Mich. Stak
Ann. § 27.188 (Hendersan 1938) ; Mich: Conip. Laws 1929-§ 13666.
Lad
eae pounded to him by this Court :-... .” »
~ “In re WILLIAM OLIVER.
_. evidence in secret. Petitioner had not been present when -—
that witness testified and so far as appears was not even °
aware that he had testified. Based on. its beliefs thus -
formed—that petitioner's story did not “Sell” —the judge-
grand jury immediately charged him with: contempt,
. -immediately convicted him, and immediately sentenced ~ _
him -to sixty days. in jail. Under these circumstances |
- of haste and secrecy, petitioner, of course, had no chance }
to enjoy’ the benefits of counsel, no chance to prepare
._ _' his defense,-and no opportunity either to .cross. examine
the other. grand jury witness orto summon. witnesses
to refute the charge against him.’ ae CT ton
Three days later a lawyer filed on petitioner's behalf ,
“in the Michigan Supreme Court: the petition for habeas © |
corpus now under consideration. It alleged among other a
things.that the petitioner’s attorney had not been allowed =
_ to confer with him and that, to the best of the attorne.’s
_ knowledge, the petitioner was not held in’ jail under ‘any
judgment, decree or.execution, and was “not confined by .
' virtue of any legal commitment directed to the sheriff ©
as required by law.” An order was then entered signed by °
the circuit jute that he had while “sitting as a One-Man
Grand Jury” convicted the petitioner of contempt of court
because petitioner had testified “evasively” and had given
“contradictory answers” to questions, “The order directed
' that petitioner “be confined in the county jail. . fora |
period of sixty days . . . or until such time’as he... |
_____ shall appear and’ answer the questions heretofore pro-
.
PI
The Supreme Coyrt of Michigan, on. grounds detailed
in the companioncase of In re Hartley, 317 Mich. 441,
27 .N. W. 2d 48; rejected petitioner’s contention that the
*In giving reasons in .its Hartley opinion for rejecting this’ peti-
tioner’s constitutional contentions, the State Supreme Court ‘said it ="
would have been an “idle gesture’ to require such adjournment of -
the grand jury and its reconvening as a circuit court. The circuit
¢,
‘* ‘J
IN re WILLIAM OLIVER. .-... 3
- SUMMary manner in which he had been sentenced_to jail: Py
_» in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had deprived / |
him of his liberty without affording him the kind of -
_ notice, opportunity to defend himself, and ‘trial’ which
the due. process clause of-the Fourteenth Amendment
requires.’ In re Oliver, 318 Mich..7, 27 N: W. 2d 323.
We granted certiorari to consider these procedural due
process quéstions: == =. ss oe. ;
The case requires a brief explanation of Michigan’s
~~ unique one-man grand jury system. That ‘state’s: first
constitution (1835), like the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, required that most criminal prose-. .
cutions be begun. by presentment or indictment:of a grand
judge, while acting as a one-man grand: jury may, in appropriate
cases, summarily adjudge a witness testifying before him guilty of
contempt and impose'sentence forthwith. |
“Plaintiff's contempt, if any, was committed in,.the face of the
court and required no-extraneous proofs as to its occurrence. It
was direct and there was, therefore, no necessity for filing of charges,
notice to accused and hearing as provided in 3 Comp. Laws of 1929, .
_*13912 (Stat. Ann. *27.513). It was properly dealt with summarily. °
3 Comp. Laws 1929, **13910-11 (Stat. Ann. **27.511-27.512).”" 317.
Mich. at 444-445, 27 N. W. 2d at 50. bed ia tit
* By a four to four vote the court also held that there was “evidence
to support the finding” of the judge-grand jury that petitioner had
testified falsely. -Petitioner.has argued here ‘that there was‘ not a
_ shred of evidence which under any circumstances could have ‘“on- —
- ceivably supported this finding and thus thathe was deprived of |
his liberty without due’ process of law. .In the view that we take ~
of this case we find it unnecessary to consider this constitutional’ ©
contention, =. oe HS
* The laws authorizing the system are‘found in Michigan Comp.
~ Laws 1929, § 17217, et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.943 et seq. (Hen-
_derson 1938). A summary. of the ten states’ statutes which have
some similarities to Michigan’s ap rsin-Winters, The Michigan
One-Man Grand Jiry, 28 J. Am. Ju ., Soe. 137. Se’, e. g.; Conn.
Gen-Stat. § 889f (Supp. 1941) ; McCarthy v, Clancey, 110 Conn. 482,
148 A. 551; Okla. Stat. “Ann. tit. 37, § 83; fit. 21 § 95r (1937); Ez
‘parte Ballew, 20 Okla. Cr. 105, 201 P. 525. dea
4g pe tee wt OLIVER.
jury. Art. I, § ll .This compulsory provision was left
.., : Out of the 1850 constitution and from the present consti- ..
tution (1908). However, Michigan judges may still in
- their discretion summon grand juries, but we are told by
the attorney general that this discretion is rarely exer-
cised and that the “One-Man Grand Jury” has taken the
place of the old Michigan 16 to 23-member. grand jury,
“a particularly in probes of alleged misconduct of public. —
officials.
“The one-man grand j jury law was aia in 1917 follow-
ing arecommendation of the State Bar Association that, in
the interest of more rigorous law enforcement, greater em-
_ phasis should be put upon the “investigative procedure”
' for “probing” and for “detecting” crime.*’ With this need
uppermost in its thinking | the Bar ‘Aibidatiain recom- .
amended a bill which provid hat justices of the peace
be vested with the inquisitorial powers traditionally. .
~ conferred only on coroners. and grand juries. The bill .
as passed imposed the recommended investigatory: powers.
not only on justices of the peace, but on police judges
and judges of courts of record as well. Mich. Laws 1917,
‘Act 196.
Whenever this ‘idee Sveand jury may summon a wit- .
— ness. to. ppear, it is his duty to go and to answer -all
- material questions that do not incriminate him. Should
he fail to appear, fail to answer material questions, or
should the judge-grand jury believe his evidence false and
_ évasive, or deliberately contradictory, he may be found” pa
_ guilty of contempt. This offense may be punishable . 1
@ fine of not more than.one hundred dollars, or imprison-
ment in | the ‘county jail not exceeding si ty days, or both, .
- at thediscretion of the’judge-grand jury. If after hay- .
ing - ‘been 80 sentenced he appears and satisfactorily |
ee
. ® Proceedings of the. T wenty-sixth Annual Mecting of. the ican
_ State Bar Association 101- 105 (1916). $
‘
“In rE WILLIAM OLIVER. =~ 5
_ answers. the questions propounded by the. judgeé-jury,
his sentence may, within the judge-jury’s discretion,. be
commuted or suspended. At the end of his first sentence
he can be resummoned and subjected to the same inquir- -
- jes. Should the judge-jury again believe his answers
‘> false and evasive, or contratiictory, he can be sentenced to.
serve sixty days more unless he reappears before the
judge-jury during the second 60-day period and satis-
factorily answers the questions, and the judge-jury within
its discretion then decides -to commute or suspend his
sentence? / . °. | : kee
In carrying out this authority a judge-grand jury is
authorized to appoint its own"prosecutors, detectives and
aides at public expense,’ all or any of whom may, at the
- diseretion of the justice of the peace or judge, be admitted:
to the inquiry. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.944 (Henderson -
1938). A witness may. be asked questions on all subjects
and need not be advised of his privilege against self-
incrimination, even though the questioning is in secret.*
And these secrét interrogations can be carried on day or.
night, in a public place or a “hideout,” a courthouse, an
éffice building, a hotel-room, a home, or a place of. busi- -
ness; so well is this ambulatory power understood in -
Michigan that the one-man grand jury is also popularly .
referred to as the “portable grand jury.”* ~
- ©In re Ward, 205 Mich. 742, 747, 295 N..W. 483, 485, (First
60-day conviction May 31, 1940,-followed by second 60-day con-
viction July. 29, 1940. A $100 fine was also imposed in each
instance.) =. % ag ia hy Sana oh -
‘In re Investigation of Recount, 270 Mich. 328, 331, 258 N.
776, 777; In ré Slattery, 310 Mich. 458,479, 17 N. W.2d 251, 259.
- § People v. Wolfson, 264 Mich. 409, 413, 250 N. W. 260,.262; Jn‘re
- Watsci, 293 Mich. 263, 269, 201 N. W. 652, 655; People v. Butler, ~
921 Mich. 626, 631-632, 192 N. W. 683, 687, 3
.- ® Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J. Am. Jud. Soe.
' ~ 137, 143;/Unprecedented Success in Criminal Courts, 26 J. Am.
| ee a a ro aisha
\
*
< BEFFA 2 ae
yo et Pe
_ ee IN RE WILLIAM OLFFER.—
_ It was a Grout court judge-grand jury before which |
petitioner testified: That judge-jury filed in the State —
Supreme Court an answer to.this petition. for habeas
corpus. The answer contained fragments of what was
apparently a stenographic transcript of petitioner’s testi-
_.mony given before the grand jury. It was these frag-
ments of testimony, so the answer stated, that the “Grand ee:
Jury”. had concluded to be. “false and evasive.” The-
-- petitioner then filed a ‘yerified motion with the State
Supreme Court seeking to hae the complete transcript .
of his testimony before the judge-jury-produced for the
habeas corpus hearing. He alleged that a full report of
- his testimony would disclose that he had freely, promptly,
’ and to the best of his ability, answered all questions asked,
_. and that the full transcript would refute the charge that ~
he had testified evasively or falsely. ‘In his answer to the
motiort the circuit judge did not deny these allegations.
However, he asserted that the fragments contained in the |
original answer showed “all of the Grand Jury testimony -
titioner’ 8 testimony would seriously retard
ivities.” - The State Supreme Court then
denied the pe itioner’s motion. Thus when that Court
i the petition for habeas corpus it had seen
only a copy of a portion of the record of the. testimony
given by the petitioner. 3 .
The petitioner does not here. challenge the constitu-
'_ “tional power of Michigan. to grant traditional inquisitorial
grand jury power to a single judge, and therefore we.
do not concern ,ourselves with that question. , It has
- long been recognized in this, country however that the —
traditional .12 to.23-member grand juries may examine
witnesses in secret sessions. ‘Oaths of secrecy are ordi- ©
narily taken both by the members of such grand juries
. and by witnesses before them. Many reasons have been
advanced. to supyort grand jury secrecy. Sée, e. g.,—
Hale v. Henkel, 1U:S 5. 43, 58-66; State v. Brauch, 68
the present proceeding” and that “the full —
‘ er
Ss *
Ix ne WILLIAM OLIVER. 7
N. C. 186. But those reasons have never been thought —
to justify secrecy in the trial of an accused charged with ©
violation.ef law for which he may be fined or sent to jail.
_ Grand juries investigate, and the usual end of their in-
vestigation is either'a report, a “no-bill” or an indictment.
They do not try and they do not convict. They render no
judgment. When their work is finished by the return of -
an indictment, it cannot be.used as evidence against the
person indicted. " Nor may he’be fined or sentenced to
jail until he has béen tried and convicted after having been _
afforded the procedural safeguards required by due process
of law. -Even wheri witnesges before grand juries refuse
to answer proper questions, the grand juries do not ad-
judge the witnesses guilty of contempt of court in secret or
~ in public or at all.”° Witnesses who refuse to testify before -
_ grand juries are tried on contempt charges before judges)
sitting in open court. And though the powers of a judge
even when acting as a one-man grand jury may be, as -
Michigan holds, judicial in-their nature," the due proce
clause may apply with one effect. on the judge’s gran
jury investigation, but with quite a different effect when
‘the judge-grand jury suddenly makes a witness before it.
a defendant inacontemptcase.
’ Here we are concerned, not with petitioner’s rights as
a witness in a secret grand jury session, but with his rights’ ~
as a defendant, in‘a contempt proceeding. The powers
of the judge-grand jury who tried and convieted him in“
secret and sentenced him, to jailon a charge of false and .
_ evasive swearing must likewise be measured, not by the
limitations applicable to grand jury proceedings, but by
10 See eases collected in 8 A. L. B. 1579-1580; Orfield, Criminal .
- Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 1 (1947). ; ;
- “4 In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458, 466-468, 17 N. W, 2d 251, 254-255;
” Kloka v. State Treasurer, 318 Mich. 87, 90,°27 N. W. 2d 507, 508; -
‘ef. Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 284; Interstate Commerce
- Commission y. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; 481,-489; United States v. —
; Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 44-48.
ty eae,
Br:
ak I eee
8.» In ne WILLIAM OLIVER. +
“the constitutional standards applicable to court proceed-
“3: ings in which an accused may be: sentenced to fine or
imprisonment or both. Thus our first question is this:
Can an accused be tried and convicted. for cecapeeey ch ae
* -- courtin grand jury secrecy?
First. Counsel have not cited and we have Been annie
to find a single instance of & criminal triaF conducted in.
camera in any federal,” state, or municipal court during |
the history of this count Nor have we found any
record of ‘even one such sec riminal trial ‘i ‘in England
since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641; and
whether that. court ever convicted people secretly is-in .
dispute. “Summary -trials for alleged misconduct called
contempt of court * have not been: regarded as an excep-
-tion to this universal rule against secret trials, unless some ; Be
. , other Michigan one-man grand jury,-case’ creak gn
_. such an exception. ©
This nation’s accepted practice of guaranteeing a public |
trial -to an ‘accused has its roots in our English common
- law heritage. The exact date of its origin is obscure, but.”
"it likely evolved long before the settlement of our land
as an accompaniment of the ancient ‘institution of jury
. - trial* In this country the guarantee to an accused of
a ; |
2 Cases within the jurisdiction of courts martial may be regarded
as an exception. Ez parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,43; King v. Governor
of Lewes Prisen, 61 Sol. J. 294, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 771. Whatever may
. be the classification of juvenile court proceedings, they are often
‘eonducted without admitting ail-the public. But it’ Has never been:
the practice whollg to exclude parents, pen, and friends, or
to refuse juveniles the benefit of counsel.
a8 Unider “Michigan law contempt proceedings “against a witness
before a one-man grand jury. are crimin4l in nature. Jn re Witkow-
ski, 270 Mich: 687, 259 N..W. 658 But this characterization is not
‘material in resolving this due process, question. 7: ‘Gompers v.
+ United Stat. s, 233 U, 8. 604, 610-611.
. “Radin, The Right: to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381-384.
‘Early commentators mention_that public trials were commonly held °
without attempting to trace their origin. ‘Sir Thomas Smith in 1565 -
“”
“Iw ne WILLIAM OLIVER. oe
the ai to‘a 5 pablic trial first appeared in a state consti-
tution in 1776. Following the ratification in 1791 of. .
the Federal Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, which com-
mands that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. to a speedy. and public’ trial . ...” most —
of the original states and those subsequently admitted a
the Union adopted ‘similar constitutional provisions.” .
| Foday almost without exception every state by ¢onsti- eae
if his De hesahlies Anglorum. bk. 2, pp. 79, 101 (Alston ed. 1906);
Sir Matthew Hale about. 1670 in his History of The Common Law of ©
England 843-345 (Runnington ed. 1820). In 1649, a few years
after the Long Parliament -abolished the Court of Star Chamber,
-an accused charged with high treason: before a Special ‘Commission -
. of Oyer and Terminer claimed the right to public trial and apparently
_ Was given such a trial.” Trial of John Lilburne, 4 How. St. ,Tr. 1270, -
1274. “By immemorial usage, wherever the common law rue ;
‘all trials are.in- open, court, to which spectators are admitted.”
Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 957 (2d ed. 1913).
45 Penn. Const., Declaration of Rights IX (1776); N. . Const.
Declaration of Rights IX (1776) (criminal convictions. oly by: jury im we
verdict in “open gourt”).° =
16 See, e. g., Vt- Const., ch. I, art. 11 (1787) ; Dela: Const. 87
+ (1792); Ky. Const. Art. XII, cl. 10 (1792) ; Tenn. Const. Art. “pce
(1796) ; Miss, Const. Art..I, § 10 (1817); Mich. ‘Const. Art. I 1 $10.
ine hot deemed necessary. - robes eas tes
(1835); Tex. Const. Art. I, § 8 (1845).
a Four states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia and
_ Wyoming, appear to have ‘neither statutory nor constitutional provi-
_ sions specificall requiring that criminal trials be held in public, -
although all hav: ‘t constitutions ee an accused: the right toa
"jury ‘trial. Mass. Const: Pt. I, Art. XII; N. H. Const. Pt. I, Arts.
XV, XVI; Va. Const.. Art. I, §.8; Wyo. Suu Art. I, §-10. Massa-
chusetts by implication has recognized that an accused has a right to
a public tral as
spectators in only : a limited category. of cases. Mass. Gen. Laws c. |
278, % 164 (1962). In New Hampshire and Wyoming no statute or
decision has been found in which the right of an accused: to a public
- trial is mentioned. In Virginia, although no decision has been discov-
ered, a statute provides: “In the trial of all criminal cases, whether
_ the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may in its dis- -
cretion, exclude from the trial any or all persons, whose ema is:
A statute of that state permits the exclusion of . <
ee & so Te ae | WILLIAM OLIVER.
tution, as statute, ® or judicial : “decision,” 1 ” réqhires that all
criminal trials be open to the public. on
. The traditional - Anglo-American’ distrust for secret trials... ae
ee Kea’ been variously -asctibed to the notorious use of this
| ~~ peactioe by ie Spanish Inquisition * to the excesses of .
0
18 Forty-one states: Ala. Onan: § 6; Asia: Cusiet 7 TL, 1 §245
Ark. Const.,. Art. Il, § 10; Cal. Censt., Art., I, § 13; Colo. Const.,
Art. II, § 16; Conn. Const. Art. I, §9; Dela. Const., Art. I, §7; |
: Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights, § 11; Ga. Const., Art. 1, § 2-105; e .
ta * Ydaho Const.; ‘Art. I, §13; Ill. Const:, Art. 2,§9; Ind. Const, Art.I,
§.13; Iowa Const.; Art. I, §10; Kan. Const.; Bill of Rights, §.10;
’ Ky. Const.}.§ 11;. La. Cofist., Art. I, §9; "Me. Const, Art. I, § 6; phos
.Mich. Const., Art. 2, -§ 19; Minn, Const., Art. I, § 6; ‘Mies. Const.,
§ 26; Mo. Const:, Art. 2, § 22; Mont. Const., Art. 3, §16; Neb. —
Const., Art. I, § 11; N. J. Const., Art. 1, §8; N. M. Const. SS a
$14; N. C. Const., Aft. 1, § 13 (no convictions for crime’ except by
jury verdict in “open court”); N. D. Const., Art. I, §.13; Ohio Const.,
Art. I, §10; Okla. Const., Art. 2, § 20; Ore. Const; Art! I, $11; -
Pa. Const., Art. I,°§9; RI. Const., Art. 1, §10; S.C. Const, Art.I, 9 <7
§ 18; §.'D. Const., Art. 6, §.7; ‘Tena. Const., Art. I, §9;.Tex. Const.,”
Art. I,.§ 10; Utéh Const.; Art. I, § 12) Vt. Const., ch. I, Art. 10;
Wash. Const., Art. 4, § 22; W. Va. Const, Art. Ill, $145 ™ Const.,
Art. I, §7. “ih
1% Two: states: Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. § 10654 ‘ans; N.* Y.
Tete Civil Rights Law § 12. ;
® The Mary land Corirt of Appeals has apparently interpreted the.
state constitution as prohibiting secret trials. Dutton ¥. State, oy
Md. 373, 386-388, 91 A. 417, 422-423. Ret a
. Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.. L. Q. 381, 389.
The criminal] procedure of. the civil iaw countries long reaenibled that -
"of the Inquisition in that the preliminary examination of the accused;
the questioning. of. ‘witnesses, and the, trial of the accused: were con-
ducted in sectet. ‘Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Pro-
_ cedure. 183-382° (1913); Ploscowe, Development of Inquisitorial and
» ., Accusatorial Elements in French Procedure, 23 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 372-386. The ecclesiastical courts of Great Britain, which |
intermittenily exerciseu a limited civil and” ¢riminal “jurisdiction, . a
adopted 4 procedure described as “in name as well’a’ in fact an
‘Inquisition, differing from the Spanish Inquisition i in the circumstances
that. it did not at amy time as far as we are aware employ torture,
and that the bulk.of the business of the courts was of-a comparatively
» See
Ix ne WILLIAM OLIVER. a ae
the English Court of Star: Chamber,” and.to the French . ..
monarchy’s abuse’ of the‘lettre de cachet." All of these
_ institutions obviously symbolized.a menace to libetty. mn.
thé hands of despotic ‘groups each of them had become an:
unimportant kind .... .” 2 ‘Stephen, History of the'Criminal Law
of England 402. (1883). The secrecy of. the ecclesiastical courts and
the ‘civil law courts was often pointed out by commentators who.
- praised the publicity. of the common law courts. See ¢. g., 3 Black-
stone, Commentaries’ *373;- 1 Bentham Rationale ‘of Judicial : Evi-
dence, 594-595, 603 (1827). The English common law courts which
‘succeeded to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts have renounced
all claim to hold secret sessions in cases formerly within the. écclesi-
» astical jurisdiction, even in civil suits. See, e. gs Scott v. \Seatt,
1913).A.C.417.. ‘7 .
- 8 Davis v: United States, “947 F. 304, 305; “Keddington v. Beate,
_ ” 19 Ariz. 457, 459, 172 P. 273; Williamson’v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 82-83,
_ 29°A. 943, 944; Dutton v. State, 123“Md. 373, 387, 91 A. 417, =
i * Jenks, The Book. of English Law 91 (3d ed. 1932). - Some aut
have said that trials.in the Star Chamber were public, but t eM ;
“nesses against the accused were examined privately with no oppor-
~ tunity for him to discredit them. Apparently all authorities agree
‘that the accused himself was grilled in secret, often tortured, in an
effort to in a confession and: thai- the most objectionable of the
‘ oes practices was its asserted prerogative to disregard the
a common law ‘rules of criminal procedure when the occasion. demanded. -
5 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 163, 165, 180-497 (2d ed.
1937).; Radi, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q.381, 386-
388 ; Washburn, The Court of Star Chamber, 12. Am. L. Rev. 4h,
- 25-31.
3 Radin, The Right | to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q.: 381, 388.
.
The lettre de cachet was an order of the king that o one of his subjects ae zs
- be forthwith imprisoned or exiled without a Arial of an opportunity
to defend himself. In the eighteenth century they were often issued
“in blank to local police. Louis XV is. supposed to have issued more
than 150,000 lettres de cachet during his reign. This.device was the
principal méans enmiployed to prosecute crimes of opinion, although
_ it was‘also used by the roy alty as a convenient method of preventing
the public airing of intra-family dcandals. ‘Voltaire, Mirabeau and”
Montesquieu, among others, denounced-the use of the lettre de cachet,
‘and it was abolished after the French Revolution, though later tem-
porarily revived by er. 13 Encye. Brit. 971; 3 Eneye. Soc.
_ Sei. 187.
~!
ee
: ae Other a atéributed to publicity have been: (1) Public
aa
12 fe IN re WILLIAM OLIVER. ;
‘giatrument-for the suppression of political and religious _
heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused ER
-. to a fair trial. Whatever other benefits the guarantee to.
an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer
upon our society,* the guarantee has always been recog-
as a saf -@hy attempt to‘ employ our
struments of persecution. The knowledge
criminal trial is subject to. contemporaneous
the forum of public opinion is an effective re-
possible abuse of judicial power.” One need
Jeremy Ben am over 120 years ago to appreciate the fear
e to. the ateation of key witnesses unknown to the parties
’ ore, Evidence § 1834 (3d éd. 1940) ;
Funksley v. !/nited States, 145 F. 2d 58;59. _°
(2) The spectators learn about their government ‘and’ acquire
confidence in their judicial remedies: 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834
(3d ed. 1940); 1. Bentham, Rationale. of Judicial Evidence 525
(1827); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 R. 1080; 20 Harv. L. Rev.
* Jenks, The Book of English Law 91 (1932) ; Auld, Comparative
Jurisprudence of Criminal Process, 1 U. of Toronto L. J. 82, 99;
Radin, The Right tu a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381; Criminal -
Procedure in Scotland and England, 108 Edinburgh Rev. 174, 181-
182; Holmes, J. in Cowiey v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394; State v.
Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 295-297, 103 P. 62, 64-66. People x. Murray,
89 Mich..276, 286, 80 N..W. 995, 998: “It is for the protection of
all persons accused of crime—the innocently accused, that they may —
not hecome the victim of an unjust prosecution, as well as the guilty,
-that they may be awarded.a fair trial—that one rule [as to public
* trials} must be observed and applied to all.” -Frequently quoted is
the statement in 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927)
at 647: “Yhe requirement of a-public trial is for the benefit of the
accused; .that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not
- unjustly. condemned, and that the.presence of interested spectators |
may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility.and”
.to the importance of their functions. . . .”
*
L
hee “WILLIAM avn .- “s-
of sceret trials felt by him, his predecessors iil conteon-
‘poraries. Bentham said: “.-. . suppose the proceedings
to be completely secret, wid the court, on. the occasion, to
consist of no more than a single judge, —that judge wil! be
at once indolent and arbitrary: how corrupt soever oS
inclination may be, it will find no check, at any rate no.
tolerably efficient check, te oppose it. . Without publicity, a
all other-checks are insufficient: in comparison of pub- :
licity, all other checks are-of small account. Recordation,
appeal, whatever. other institutions ‘might present them-
selves in the character of checks, would be found to oper-
" ate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in Teality, ag
checks only in appearance.” *. -
In giving content to the constitutional si statutory
commands that an accused be given a publie¢ trial, the
state and federal’ courts have differed over what groups ‘
of spectators, if any, could properly be excluded from a
criminal trial.” But, unless in Michigan and in one-man —
grand jury coritempt cases, no qourt in this country has
_ever before held, so far as we can find, that an accused can
be tried, convicted, and sent to: ‘jail, when everybody else:
is denied entrance’ to the court, except the judge and his -
attaches.* “And without exception all courts have: held
that an accused is at the very. least entitled to have his.
*¢] Bentham, mhsienale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827). ° :
= Compare People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N. W. 995; and:
People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N. W. 491, with. Retgan v.
’ United States, 202 F. 488. ° For collection and analysis of the cases,
see 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834" (3d ed. 1940); Orfield, Criminal
Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 385-387 (1947) ; Radin, The Right —
to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q.'381, 389-391; Note, 35 BS Mich, Ju Rev. ;
474; 8 U. of Det. L. J. 129; 456 A. L. R. 265. +5
*“For the purposes ‘contemplated by the provision: of WE Con-
stitution, the presence of the officers of. the court, men wi, it is
safe to say, were under the infltence of the court, made the trial
no more public than if they too had been excluded.” - People . ae
Hartman, 108 Cal. 242, 244, 37 P. 153, 154.
E% i
* ¥'s — .
ere : o . ,
14 ~~ In. re WILLIAM OLIVER.
_ friends, relatives and counsel present, no mat with what
offense he may be charged.” In Gaines ‘v. Washington,
- 277 U.S. 81, 85-86, this Court assumed that a-criminal -
"» ~ trial conducted in secret would ‘violate the procedural re-
= quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
Clause, although its actual holding there was that no viola-
‘tion had in fact occurred, since the trial; court’s order
barring the general public had not been enforced. Cer-
tain proceedings in a judge’s chambers, including convic-
, tions for contempt. of ‘court, have occasionally been.
countenanced by state courts,” but there has never been
any intimation that all of the \public, including the 7
acoused’s relatives, friends, dnd counsel, were barred from _* |
_ thetrialchamber, =| ee eye a |
“In the. ease before us, the petitioner ‘was called as a
witness to testify in secret before a one-man grand jury
conducting a grand jury investigation. In the midst of
, Petitioner's ‘testimony the proceedings abruptly changed.
The investigation became a “trial,” the grand jury became
a judge, and the witness became an accused charged with —
contempt. of court—all in secret. Following a charge, —_,
conviction and sentence, the petitioner was led away to
‘prison—still without any break in the secrecy. ‘ Even in
4
Be aa — *See, e. g., State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P. 2d 461 (error
‘ to. exclude friends and -relatives of accused) ; ‘Benedict v. People, 23. __
Colo, 126, 46 P. 637 (exclusion of all except witnesses, members of | - \
bar and law students upheld); People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57,64
.N. Y. 8. 433 (exclusion: of general .public upheld where accused .
permitted to designate friends who. remained). “No court has gone
' 80 far as affirmatively to exclude the press.” Note, 35 Mich. L. Rev. |
_ 474, 476: Even those who deplore the sensationalism of criminal —
trials and advocate the exclusion of the general public from the court-
room would preserve the rights of the accused by requiring the admis-__-
sion of the press, friends of the accused, and selected members of the | _
_ community. Radin, The Right to a Public: Trial, 6 Temp. L..Q.
381, 394-395; 20 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 139. ek
* Cases are collected in 27 Ann. Cas. 35.
“fics WILLIAM. OLIVER. ° 18:
jail, asnniinn to undenied allegations, his ame was
denied an opportunity to see and confer with him. And
that was not the end of secrecy. ‘His Jawyer filed in the ©
‘State Supreme’ Court this habeas corpus proceeding.
Even there, the mantle of secrecy enveloped the transac-
tion and the State Supreme Court ordered him sent back --
to jail without ever having seen a record of-his testimony.
and without knowing all that took.place in the secrecy fire
of the judge’s chambers. In view of this nation’ =
distrust of secret. proceedings, their inherent dan
- .freedom, and the universal requirement of our fed =a “
governments that criminal trials be public, the
~ Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no one shall be |
deprived of his liberty without dte.process of law means
at least that an accused | cannot be thus sentenced to :
‘prison. -
- Second. We further hold that failure to afford the peti-
tioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself qgainst :
the charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of
_ due process of law. A person ’s right to reasonable notice
of a charge against him, arid an opportunity to be heard
_ in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in. |
_ our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, |
~ to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.”
_ Michigan, not denying. the. existence of these rights in
_ _ .¢rirainal cases generally, apparently concedes that the
summary conviction here would have been & denial of.
| procedural due process, but for the nature of the charge,
4» The following decisions of this Court iniciee various kinds of
. proceedings are among the multitude that support the above state-_
‘ment: Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116; Powell v. Alabama,
. 287 U.S: 45, 68-70; Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U. S. 409, 418; “Holden v.
' Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390-391 ; Morgan Vv. United fetes, 308 U. 8. 1,
14-15, dnd cases there cited...
‘
_ summarily’ to punish certain conduct committed _i
fender at once, without: notice and without hearing,
. Offense.. This Court, reached its: conclusion because it
believed that a court’s business could not be conducted .
unless it could suppress disturbances within the courtroom
'_ due procéss was capable of grave abusés, and for that . -
281. And see Jn re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227.
4 namely, a contempt of court, ‘committed, the State urges,
inthe caurt’s-actual presence.
‘parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, was such acase. There Terry
réfaoving a heckler from the courtroom. The “violenee* 2"
and misconduct” of both the heckler and the marshal’s
" ._ assailant occurred within the “personal view” of the judge,
spelled out with emphatic language i in Cooke v. United
16. In re WILLIAM OLIVER.
It is true that courts have long ccateleb’ & power |
open Court rt without notice,testimony or hearing. Ex
committed: assault.on the marshal who was at the moment
“under his own eye,” and actually interrupted the trial
of @ cause then under way. This Court held that under
such circumstances a judge has power to punish an of-
although his conduct. niay also be punishable as a criminal
by immediate punishment. However; this Court recog- :
nized that such departure from the accepted standards of
reason gave no. encouragement to its expansion. beyond ;
the suppression and punishment of the court-disrupting
misconduct which alone justified’ its exercise. Indeed in
the Terry case the Court cited with approval its decision in
Anderson v. Dunn, 6, Wheat. 204, which had marked the
limits of contempt authority in general as being “the least
possible powér adequate to. the end proposed.” Td. at
That the holding in the Terry case is not to be con-
sidered as an unlimited abandonment of the basic due
process procedural safeguards, even in contempt cases, was
States, 267 U.S. 517, a contempt case arising in’ a federal
district court. There it was pointed out that for a
court to exercise the entraarGunary but narrowly limited ,
‘
—
—_—
In ne WILLIAM OLIVER. ©. 17
power ,to punish for conter:pt without adequate notice
and ‘opportunity ‘to be heasd, the court-disturbing mis- :
_ conduct must-not Only occur -in the court’s immediate
presence, but that the judge must have personal know!-_.
~ edge of it acquired by his own observation of the contemp-
tuous conduct. This Court said that knowledge acquired -
from the testimony of others, or everr from the confession _
of the accused, would not justify conviction without atrial
in-which there was an opporttinity for defense. -Further- ave
more, the Court explained the Terry rule as reaching only
such conduct as-created “an open threat to thé orderly
procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the
person and presence of the judge before the public” that,
if “not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization
“of the court’s authority will follow.” Jd. at 536:
Except for a narrowly limited category of. contempts,
due process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires
that one charged with contempt of court be ‘advised of"
the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity
to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the
right to be represented by counsel, and have‘a chance to
_ testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way
f defense or explanation. The narrow exception to these’:
due process requirements includes only charges of miscon-
. duct, in open court, in the presence of the judgejwhich —
” disturbs the court’s business, where «ll of the ‘essential. -
‘elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the.
> court, are actually. observed by the court, and where. -
immediate punishment is.essential fo prevent “demorali-_
‘gation of the court’s authority before ‘the public.” If .
some essential elements of the offense are not personally . ,.
observed. by the judge, ‘so that“he must depend upon
statements made by others for his knowledge about these
“essential elements, due’process requires, according to the ‘ v
Cooke case, that the accused be accorded t notice and a ‘fair
hearing as above setout. - .
ee mn
eg
wre worere’
a narrow category of cases that can be punis! as contempt -*
: bought or had in their possession certain s6-called bonds
\/
18: es a In RE wiLLiaM-6i OLIVER.
The facts shown by this record put this etiials the .
without notice, hearing and_ counsel AS Since the peti-.
*. tioner’s alleged misconduct all oce in secret, there.
"-_.could be no possibility of a dem ization’ of the court's”
- authority before the public: . Fur
‘the judge-grand jury to the pé tition for habeas corpus
_ showed that his conclusion shat the petitioner had testi-
fied falsely was based, at lefst in part, upon the testimony
given: before him by one or more witnesses other than :
- petitioner. Petitioner and one Hartley both testified the *
- same day ; both were pin-ball machine operators; both had
purchased érom one Mitchell; both were sent to jail for - —
contempt the same day. In re Hartley, 317 Mich. 441,27-
- N. W. 2d 48. The judge-grand jury pressed both peti- a
_. tioner and Hartley to state why they bought bonds'which
‘were patently worthless. The petitioner was also re-
peatedly asked what he had done with the -worthless .
_ bonds. . He answered ‘every question asked him, accord: -
ing to the fragmentary portions of his testimony re- -
ported: to the Michigan Supreme Court, most of which.
is included in that court's opinion. He’ steadfastly de-_
nied that he knew preciseiy what he had done with the .
worthless bonds, but’ made several. different statements
as to how he might have disposed of them, such as that
he might have thrown them into the wastebasket, or
trash can, or might have burned them. . :
In upholding the judge-grand jury’s conclusion that :
_ petitioner had testified falsely and evasively, the majority
ofthe Michigan Supreme Court gave as one réason a
statement in the judge-grand: jury’s answer “That'the ..
Grand Jury, after investigation, is satisfied that the bonds
sold by the said Carman \A. Mitchell to the said William
‘D. Oliver are the same as those sold by the said Carman A.
Mitchell-to Leo 0 Thomas Hartley. : Nothing i in the.peti-
)
°
a In RE ‘WILLIAM OLIVER.
- tioner’s' testimony as reported. could have jemotely justi-
- fied the judge-jury in drawing. such a conclusion. The.
judge-jury was obviously appraising the truth of Oliver’s-
* testimony in light of testintony given’ the same day. in
petitioner’s absence by Hartley and possibly by other wit-
nesses.. The J'erry case’ and others like it provide no
support: for sustaining petitioner’ 8 conviction of contempt —
- of court upon. testimony given in petitioner’s absence..
This case would be like the Terry case only if the ‘judge
* there had not personally witnessed Terry’s assault. upon
the marshal but had: nevertheless sent him to jail for |
contempt of court after hearing. the testimony of wit-
SS. - esses against Terry in Terry's absence. It may be con- |
, ceivable,.‘as is here urged, that a judge can- under some
circumstances correctly detect falsity and’ evasiveness
_ from simply listening to'a witness testify. But this is
plainly not a case in which. the finding of falsity rested
on an exercise of this. alteged power. For this reason we
need not pass on the question argued in the briefs whether
a judge can, consistently ‘with provedural: due . -precess;
convict a witness of testifying falsely and evasively solely .
on the judge’s ability to detect it from merely rns |
& witness and hearing him testify. |
Nor i is there any reason suggested why. « demoralisation
of the court’s authority” would have resulted from giving
the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to appear and
offer a defense in open court to a charge of perjury or to.
the charge of contempt. The .traditional grarid juries
‘have never punished éontempts." ‘The practice that has
_ always been followed with recalcitrant grand jury wit-
‘ nesses is to take them into open court; and that practice,
consistent with due process, has not demoralized the au-
thority of courts. Reported cases reveal no instances .in
which witnesses believe by grand juries on the basis of ioe
dl
i iatoehi dali x thre Sapte ees es
tee ° . ‘ . /
. . . e -
* mage
- > . 4
4 ’ ‘ 2 e .
‘19°:
°
> ae es RE WILLIAM OLIVER.
other testimony to be perjurers, have been. simeviinnt for. .
- eontempt, or for perjury, without notice. of the specific ~
charges against them, and opportunity ‘to ‘prepare | a-de- .
fense, to ob counsel, -to cross-examine the witnesses
against them ‘and to offer evidence in their own defense. .
The right to be heard in open court. -befere one is con-.
demned is too valuable to be whittled. away under the --
- guise of “demoralization: of the court’ s authority. Bes i”
It is: “the ldw of the land” that ‘no man’s life, liberty :
or property be ‘forfeited &S a. punishment until there has
been a charge fairly made. and- fairly tried in a public ~
tribunal. See-Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 236- :
237. The petitioner was convieted without that kind of
trial.
Pa ER ERS
not: inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded
t~
. Gd ;
- The judgment. of the Supreme Court of Michigan’ is.
reversed and the cause is remanded to it it for disposition ne
—— nn.
_SUPRE ME COURT oF THE UNITED STATES
No. 215 = Obronen’ Tena, 1947.
In re ‘William Oliver;)
S
Petitioner, ° Supreme Court of the State
of ee
paren, 1948.]
Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concurring.
I join in the Court’s opinion: and decis¥on. — But there, :
-is mare which needs to be said. any |
Michigan’s one-man grand j jury, as enimolihed in this :
. record, combines in a single official: the historically sepa-
rate powers of grand j jury, committing magistrate, prose-
cutor, trial judge: and petit jury. .This aggregated au-
.. thority denies tothe accused not only the right.to a public —
, but also those other basic protections secured by
the Sixth Amendment, namely, the rights “to be informed’
of the nature and cause of the aéeusation ; ' to be con-
oh fronted with the witnesses against: him; ? to have com-
| pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in’ his favor, and
. to have the Assistance of -Counsel for his defence.” It
takes away the security against being twice put im jeop- —~
ardy for the same offense ® and denies the equal protection fe
1 The requirement, of course, ‘eositernplates that the aceused. be Pa
inforined’ sufficiently in advance of trial*or sentence to enable him
to determine the ‘nature of the plea to be. entered and to prepare his
. defense if one is to be made. Cf. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764;
Rowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S..45.
The only “witness” in this’ case was -the grand jury judge who, oS:
Se) fates the record discloses, did not submif, to cross-examination.
. 3% As the Court's opinion notes, the state supreme court has held
.. that the witness miy be: reexamined and recommitted for a further “3
60-day period after serving ‘the first sentence of that length, unless‘ :
he reappears .and answers the same questions to the satisfaction of .
’ the gne-man grand j jury.. In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 747.
On’ Writ of Certiorari to re
gees © Iw re WILLIAM OLIVER,
Mr. Justice Biacx at 68.
>
~
of the laws by: leaving ‘to the comniitting funetionary’s ee
, Sole discretion the scope’and contents of the record on- -
. appeal. -U: S. Const. Amend.Vand XIV. --
_ This aggregation of powers and‘inherently concomi- | -
__ tant denial of historic freedoms were unknown to the'com-..
. mon law at: the time our institutions erystallized.in the
Constitution... They are altogether at variance with our
_tradition and gystem of government. » They cannot stand chee
‘the test of constitutionality for purposes of depriving any
_- Pergon of life, liberty or property.’ There is no semblance
-of*due p
_ those ends.' °
of law in the scheme when it is used for.
‘The tase demonstrates how far this Court departed
from our constitutional plan when, after. the Fourtéenth
’. Amendment’s adoption, it permitted selective departure
. by the states from the scheme of ordered personal liberty’ -
established by the Bill of Rights.*. In.the guise of per-'
mitting the states to experiment with improving the ad- . -
ministration of: justicé, the Court left them free to. ©:
_. substitute, “in spite of the absolutism of continental gov- -
ernments,” their. “ideas and processes of civil justice” in-
place of the time-tried “principles and institutions of .the
3
“common: law” * perpetuated for us in the Bill of Rights.
Only by an exer
Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U: S. 255. far as appears, only
in Michigan to this attenuated appellate p
persons committed or fined by ‘a one-man Cae are subjected
* The immediate shift of the proceeding from inquisitorial to puni-:
_ tive function converts it from a grand jury investigation toa pro-.
¢ . | ° .
ceeding in criminal contempt. eae ee Sa oe Os
*Cf. Adamson -v. California, 332 Y: S. 46, dissenting opinion of
| "See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. 8.516, 531. -
boy VR ata fs
Pitot aN aes aN
ik Dahl ee ee
ee to ol A 4
olf y
et.
rey f .
| cise of this freedom has! Michigan, been ae
_ enabled to adopt and apply her sche} } as was done in
ure.. Others con- -
victed of erime, including criminal contempt, apparently are afforded -
‘Tights to coniplete and nondiscretionary records on appeal... ~ io
5 ie , WILLIAM OLIVER. \ ° 3
this ¢ case. ‘ It is the immediate offspring of Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, and later like cases.®
; So long as they stand, so long as the Bill of Rights-is
. Yegarded here’ as a strait jacket of Eighteenth Century —
, procedures rather than a basic charter of personal liberty,,
like ‘experimientations ‘may be expected from the states.
_ And the only.cheok against their effectiveness will be the °
, agreement of a majority of this-Court that the experi-.
ment yoolates fundamental notions of justice in civilized
Society.
I do not conceive that the Bill ot Rights, apart from 2
the dué process clatise of the Fifth Amendment, incorpo- .~
rates all such ideas.: But as far-as its provisions go, I
; know of no better substitutes. “A few ‘may be-incon- -
“ yvenierit. But restrictions upon authority for securing .
"personal liberty, as well as fairness in trial to deprive -
one of it, are always inconvenient—to the authority so |
_ pestricted: And in like these I: do ‘not think sub-
tinental ones, offer mromise on/the whole of more im-
stitutions imported. rom other ystems; including ¢on-
vement than hata; either f
the caus¢ of perfecting
the administration ‘Of justice or for that of securing and
f our society as it i is of our Constitution. °.
na tour ciety individual freédom, which, is the main end ee ie
oO
ne cannot attribijte: the collapse of liberty. i in eee ie
and elsewhere during receht years solely to. the “ideas
‘and processes of. civil justice” prevailing in the nations
_ which have suff that loss.. Neither can one rat
significance of the contrast between their success in
Z taining systé ordered liberty and that of other
: ‘tions@vhich in the main havé adhered more closely to the ae
scheme of personal, freedoms the Bill of Rights secures.:
This experience a onstrates, I think, that it is both wiser -
> 9%. 0- Tenn y. Ni Jersey, 211 U. 8. 78; Aidamson V. r Coliente,
332 U. 8.46,
:
4° I re WILLIAM OLIVER.
and safer. to <put up with whatever inconveniences that. |
_ charter creates than to run the risk of losing its hard-won ©
guaranties by dubious; if also more convenient substitu-
tions imported from alien traditions.*
The states have survived with the nation through great
vicissitudes, ‘for the greater part of our history, without
wide departures or numerous ones from the plan of the
. Bill of Rights. They. accepted that plan for the nation’
when. they ratified those:amendments. - They accepted it
for themselves, in my. opinion, when ‘they ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment.. Adamson v. California, 332
. U.S. 46, dissenting opinions, at 68,123. It was good
-enough for our fathers. < I'think it should be good eriough
for this Court and for the states. a : ves
Room enough there-is beyond the specific limitations
of the Bill f Rights for the’states to experjment toward
_. improving the administration of justice. Within those
_ limitations ‘there should be no laboratory excursions, un-
*I do not think it can be demonstrated that state systems, freed
'. of the Bill of Rights’ “imconveniences,” have been: more. fair, just, |
or efficient than the federal system of administering criminal justice,
’ which has never been clear of their restraints: eae
Notwithstanding Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, and its progeny,
I ‘cannot imagine that state denial of the‘right to counsel beyond that
permissible in the federal courts or indeed of any other guaranty of
‘the Sixth Amendment could bring ari improvement in. the administra-
.. tion of justice. patie th ; :
' _ The guaranties seemingly considered ‘niost obstructive fe that proc-
ess are those of the Fifth Amendment. requiring presentment or ~~
indictment of a grand jury and securing the privilege against self-
incrimination; the rights‘to jury trial and to the assistance of counsel
secured hy the Sixth Amendment; and the requirements relating to
Suits at common law of the Seventh Amendment. Whatever incon-
veniences these or any of them may be thought to involve are far out-
weighed by the aggregate of security to.the individual afforded by.
_the Bill of Rights. That aggregaie cant be secured, indeed it may
be largely defeated, so long as the states nre left free to make broadly _
: selective application of its protections,
a
‘Iw ne WILLIAM OLIVER. eS 6
" less or until the people have authorized: them by the con- -
stitutionally provided method. This is no time to ex-_
.. periment.with established liberties. That process carries
the dangers of dilution and denial .with the chances of
: enforcing and strengthening. ae
It remains only to say that, jo ‘the face of so broad a
departure from so many specific constitutional guaranties
' or, if the other view is. to control, from their aggregate
. summarized in the concept of due process as representing
fundamental! ideas of fair play and justice in civilized
society, such as the record in this case presents, this Court’s
eyes need not remain closed nor its hand idle until the
case is returned to. the state supreme court for reaffirma-
tion of its position or confirmation of our views expressed | |
in the Court’s opinion. Neither Rescue Army v. M unici-
pal Court, 331 U. S. 549, nor Muster v. Utah, 333 U.S. —,
‘presented a situation like the one tendered here, whether
in relation to the disentanglement of constitutional issues
from questioris of state law or, consequently, in respect to
the breadth and clarity of the state’s departure from fed- —
eral constitutional ‘commands, Neither case therefore —
_ requires or justifies the disposition of this cause according
to. the procedure there followed. This case is neither
unripe for decision nor wanting of ‘sufficient basis i in the
record for exercise of that. function..""
7 pad ;
‘SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 215 :—OcToBER Term, 1947.
In re William. Oliver, On Writ of Certiorari. to the
Petitioner. _ Supreme Court of Michigan. .
[March 8, 1948. Pe
Mr. JUSTICE en KFURTER:
Under the Fourteenth (at a State may surely
adopt as its own a procedure which was the established
method for prosecuting crime in nearly half the States _
which ratified that amendment. And so, it may abolish
the grand jury,’ or it may reduce the size of the grand
jury, and even to a single member. A State has great
leeway in devising its judicial instruments for probing
into conduct as ‘a basis for charging the commission of
aie
: 4In sustaining this power of the States, the Court enunelasint
a _prineiple-the-force_of which has not lessened with time: “The
i Constitution of the Uni tes was ordained, it is. true, by
~ descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of English
5 law and history; but it was made for an undefined and expanding
> ——~future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered from many
|
~ nations and of many tongues. And while we take just: pride in
the principles and institutions ‘of thé common law, we-are not to
forget that in lands where other systems of .jurisprudence prevail,
_ process of law, in spite of the absolutism of continental governments,
is not -alien to that code which survived the -Roman Empire as the
foundation of modern civilization in Europe, and which has given
us that fundamental maxim of distributive justice—suum. cuique
tribuere. There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as
a broad charter of public right and law,-which ‘ought to exclude the
best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the charac-
teristic principle of. the common law to draw its inspiration froin
every fountair of justice, we are not to assume that the sources
of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should
expect that the new and various éxperiences of our own situation
the ideas and processes of civil justice aré also not unknown. Due —
. and system will mold and shape it into new and not less useful forms.”
eee 8. oe
’ .
2 +. - fy Re WILEIAM OLIVER,
crime. . It may, at the same time, surround such pre-
~~ liminary inquiry with ‘safeguards, not only that crime
may be detected and criminals punished, but also that
charges may be sifted. in secret so as not to injure or |
embarrass the innocent. © igs Valois
Flouting of’ such a judicial investigatory system-may
he prevented by the hitherto constitutionally valid power
to punish for contempt. There must; however, be such
recalcitrance, where the basis of punishment is testimony
given or withheld, that the administration-of justice is
"actively blocked... See"Ex parte Hudgings, 249.U. S. 378. .
' And the procedural safeguards of “due. process” must be
observed. * Due notice of the charge and a fair opportu-
nity to meet it, are indispensable. - This invelves an op-
portunity to canvass the: charge’ in the o mp iT)
behind: closed doors. So. long as .4°man- has ample
~ Opportunity to demonstrate his innocence before he is
hustled off to jail, he cannot complain that a State has
seen fit ‘to devise a new procedure for satisfying that op- .
portunity. - Just as it is not violative of due process for
a State‘to take- private property for public use and
leave to a later stage tha ronstitutional vindication of
the right to compensation, it does not seem to me that
_ it would be violative of due process to allow the judge-
grand juror of Michigan to find criminal contempt for’
__ conduct in his proceedings without the familiar elements
of an open trial, provided’ that the State furnishes the
accused a public tribunal before which he has full oppor- ©
tunity to be quit of the finding. ses
But an opportunity to meet a charge of criminal con-
tempt must’be a fair opportunity. -It would not be fair, -
if in the court in which ‘the accused can contest for the
first time the validity of the charge against him, he comes.
_ handicapped with a finding against him which he did: not
_ have an adequate opportunity of resisting. ,
rt,
a
IN RE WILLIAM OLIV ER. | 3
: We are here. dealing. with the attempt of a State having -
the seventh largest population in the Union: to curb or:
_ mitigate the commission. of, crimes by effective prosecu- .
tion. This procedure has been:in operation for over thirty
years. It was not heedlessly entered into nor has it been
sporadically pursued. -In a series of cases it has had the
sanction of the highest court of Michigan. While there ’ ;
-are indications in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Michigan. from.which we could infer the constitutional |
inadequacy of the procedure pursued . in this case, we
the Michigan system. offends the Constitution of. th
. United States, without a clearer formulation of wha
is that actually happens under this system,‘or did hap ,
“here, than thé case before us reveals. -
. It is to me significant: that the. precise issués on which
this Court decides this case have never been explicitly
challenged before, or passed on, by the Supreme Court
of Michigan in the series of tases in which that.court had
adjudicated controversies arising under the Michigan
_ grand jury system. Ifa State has denied the due process —
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is more con-!
sonant with the delicate relations between the United
_ States and the courts of the United States, and the States
. and the courts of the States, that the courts of the States
be given the fullest opportunity, by proper presentation
of the issues, to make such a finding of unconstitution-
ality. |
I do ‘not: think that we have had that.in this case. For_
instance, while I could regard it inadmissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment to have only a partial and muti-
lated record of. che proceedings before the grand juror- .
judge. when the contemnor for the first time has the.
* opportunity to. meet the accusation against him publicly, — —-.-
. the petitioner as in this case seems to repel the
-
‘it ae
6
4° In re WILLIAM OLIVER.
_ Suggestion that that is his complaint.* Certainly, as Mr.
~ Justice JACKSON pointe out, the first ground of the Court's «
opinion was not made the basis for inviting our review
here. I agree with him in concluding that in the light
of our decision the other day in Musser v. Utah, 333°U. S:
—, in.conjunction with Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, :
331 U.S. 549, the cause should be returned’to the Supreme
Court of Michigan to enable that court to pass upon these
issues. oe aaa
- * “Neither in our brief nor in our argument before the court have
we-urged this court to reverse this convietion merely becatise the
partial return of the witness’s testimony to the Supreme Court -con-
stituted-a denial of due ‘process. . > - The questions we present are
much more basic,—the denial of due process in the original commit-
ment. ... [To] us si -is.much more shocking that an accused
- charged with conterhpt not committed in open court be denied any
“trial in the lower court than that he be given a trial only upon an
incomplete record in the appellate court.” Petitioner's “Brief in.
ipre to Brief of State Bar of Michtgan;* pp-13-44..
ee wild
°e
. ‘ 7 °
—_ —_—_—— ~ .
va
‘
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 215.—Ocroser Teri, 1947,
- . ae ee : é
:*~* ee
In te William Oliver, On Writ of Certiorari to the °
_. Petitioner. - | Supreme Court of Michigan.”
[March 8, 1948.]
Mr: Justice Jackson, with whom Mr: Ju STICE FRAN K-
FURTER agrees, dissenting. ;
The principal ground assigned for reversal of the ihe os
ment of conviction is the alleged secrecy of the contempt
procedure. That ground was not assi or review in
the petition for certiorari .to this Court. Nor was it
raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
state courts. Therefore, it has not been litigated and
the record has not been made with reference to it. On..
the other hand, the principal question raised by the peti-
tion to this Court and argued = the State is not decided
by the Court’s opinion. . :
When a case here from a state court involves a qdeation
not litigated below, not raised by petitioner. -here and
which the state court has had no opportunity to pass .
_ «upon, we should remand the case for its further considera- -
tion, a8 was just done in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. —.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.