Transcript of Record — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota

Supreme Court brief1944

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SUPREME COURT OF THE. UNITED STATES

. “OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

No.

ak roe Dla

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER,

. vs.

THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

+

d - ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME Cras

OF = STATE OF ‘MINNESOTA

ty Original ‘ Print

f Record from Distriet Conrt of Ranisey County, Minnesota... © 1°. 1,

} Citation 2... ..2.cseceessssetecneeeeenss are entice 1 ->

Answer ...... ‘Seecnced Weaghesuess oeeO8Scaekesasnadees eS a 2

' . Amended stipulation of facts... .........ccceesccecees ar 5

— of fact, condtasions of Jaw and order for judg-

k ot, EBRD , 9868444660006 FOSS CU1.9 09694 S SASH SOSEHEEE SES heee. 19. ' 10

Jetguiat. onde besnncqacadencpaccsdaseest eaneacseees *s0 016

; Stipulation waiving bond ...... or in printing) .. 32

E Notice of appeal........++++sseseseeeeweceeeeenetones 33 17

:. Proceedings in Supreme Court of Minnesota. vacdacicodecocs 84 17-

% Opinion of the Court, Pirsig, J............eecceeeeseccnces a 18

i Dissenting opinion of Loring, J. .......+-.+.sseeeeeeeeeeee 49 80.

Concurring opinion of Streiseguth, Bropbdccsacnocesdocesiss, -Oe 37

» Jua@amemt *.cscccccccccccccsccscccecs pesenecedsascpsacent 60 39

; . Stipulation as to record..........eseceeeccececcceceeceess , = 40

Clerk’s certificate ..........+-ee00- (omitted in printing). . 62 ‘

Order extending time within which to file petition for writ of .

he certiorari occ cecenecessceceees see Seccsececccesccccees - 8 41

: ; >

Order allowing certiorari ..........+- 9 0000050 ces0egese Sesvetscdes a 41

—ATT

[fol ay. |

IN DISTRICT COURT OF RAMSEY COUNTY

; Pan Sratre OF Minnesota, Plaintiff,

— | - ‘ Ve. 3 ; baal .

ppsszaats ‘Amines, Inc., a aE Defendant

| 2 - CrraTion | |

The State of Minnesota to the Defendant iniwe Sasnel

Whereas, The County ° Auditor of said County has, on

‘the 16th Day of July, A. D..1940, filed with the Clerk of said *

Court a copy.of tle duly revised list of delinquent taxes

upon personal property, for the year 1939, according to the -

provisions of the statutes in such cases’ made and provided.

And Whereas, The sum of $22,498.56 including penalty

provided by law, appears upon said copy of the revised list.

as'the taxes duly assessed against you, for personal prop-

[fol. 2] erty, for the year 1939, and that the same are due

and delinquent, you are hereby cited to. be and appear’ be-

fore the District Court aforesaid, at the next general term

of said Court, commencing on the 7th day of October, A. D.

1940, at 10 0 rlock i in the forenoon of that day, at the Court .

House in ‘the City: of St. Paul, in said County,.then and

- there to show cause, if any there be, why you should not pay

such taxes and penalty, and if you shall fail to pay. said

taxes,. penalty and all the accrued costs thereon to the

Sheriff of said Ramsey County, before the first day of said

term of Court, or upon said first day of said term fail to

show: sufficient cause for said non-payment of said taxes,

and all costs as aforesaid, judgment will be entered against

’ you for said amount of said taxes, together with Costs as

aforesaid and disbursements...

Witness, the Honorable Hugo O. Hanft, J udge of said

Court, and the seal of said Court, at St. Paul, i in, said County

this 25th day ‘of July, 1940.

N. C. Robinson, Clerk, by C. E. Ralphy Deputy Clerk.

—_ remittances to T. J. ne Sheriff.

1—5477

2

[fol. 3] Ins Disraicr Cover or Ramery Country

s , © 2 ane 7 .

Comes now Northwest Airlines, Inc., defendant above

named, and for its answer to the citation hitherto issued in -

the above entitled proceedings respectfully shows to the

Court that;

I al

The defendant is a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal

place of business at Saint Paul Municipal Airport, Saint

Paul, Minnesota. ,

The citation of Thomas J. Gibbons, Sheriff. of Ramsey

County, Minnesota, dated May 15, 1940, and bearing number

. 6550, was served upon- the defendant on May ms 1940. -

Pie

The sum demanded i is Twenty. three Thousand Six Hun-

"dred Twenty-three and 74/100 Dollars ($23,623.74) as taxes

and penalty for the year 1939 upon personal property of the

defendant claimed jo be located at the Municipal Airport

[fol. 4] in the City of Saint Paul, County of Ramsey and

State of Minnesota.

IV

Defendant is informed and verily believes said assess- 4

ment was based in part at least upon the full value of de--

fendant’s entire fleet of aircraft, even though not physically

. present in Ramsey County on May‘l, 1939, upon the theory

that all of said aircraft are taxable in full at Sait Paul as

their home port.

7.

Defendant is engaged in the business of carrying mail,

passengers and freight for hire in interstate commerce, and

operates aircraft on regular schedules between Chicago,

Tilinois, and Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon,

via Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin, Rochester, Saint ~

Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota, Fargo and Biamarck-

Mandan, North Dakota, Miles City, Billings, Butte, Helena . ,

and Missoula, Montana, and Spokane, Wenatchee and Yak-

ima, Washington. Defendant also operates regular sched-

“pled-flights between Fargo, North Dakota, and Winnipeg,

MY

ae?

(fol. 5) fendant has been, operating aircraft on. ‘regular ~

Manitoba. On May 1, ‘1939, si iit siesta

scheduled stops at Saint Panl. Since“June 1, 1940, the de-

schedules een cree | and Daum, Minnesota.

Defendant maintains an overhaul base at Saint Paul,

Minnesota, and operates maintenance bases at Chicago, Illi-

nois, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Fargo, North Dakota, Bil-

lings, Montana, and Spokane and Seattle, Washington; at

which points important service and maintenance work and

minor and emergency repairs are made. At these points

aircraft are kept for originating flights or for changing

ships on through flights. The defendant also maintains

ground crews at various points 4Jéng its lines, and leases

+ owns hangers at various points. . 2

VII’

Au of defendant’s said aircraft are integral parts of its .

said interstate operations; and are necessary instrumentali-- }

-ties thereof; all of said aircraft are continuously

in flying from state to state in the course of defendant’s

said operations, except for brief stops at airports in the

course of scheduled flights and ‘except for occasional lay-

ups for repairs or overhauling. The said aircraft have no

fixed situs, and their location is constantly shifting from

[fol. 6] one county to another and from one state to another,

_On May 1, 1939, there were present during part or all of the

-day in Ramsey County only one Electra, one Zephyr and —

-

.

rene nt - o> ‘ . a eee

= Pry :

one Stinson airplane belonging to the Gcfendent.

VIII -

For the year 1939 the defendant paid taxes on said air-.

craft, or on a proportionate valuation thereof, in the States

of Illinois, Minnesofa, North Dakota, Montana, Oregon. and *

Washington.

Ix

Defendant alleges that the levy and assessment of a per-

sonal property tax against said aircraft, or any paPt

thereof, would be in violation of the following sections ae

the Constitution of the State of Minnesota:

1. Article 1, Section in reapect of thé provision thereof

that ‘‘no member of state shall be ° ° ° deprived

~~

: sn ee ee ” . - . '

| ae 4 | ) +

ee es

7 of any of the rights c or. ‘privileges: secured to any citizen

‘. thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of

_*, his peers”; —

‘ 2. Article 1, Section q, in eigen of ‘the provision thereof

that -‘‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or dae

erty ‘without due process of law’’;

i [fol.7] 3. Article 4, Section 34, in sieneik of the provision

_-—"- thereof that all general laws ‘shall be uniform in their

‘operation throughout the state’’; and

4, Article 9; Section 1, in respect of the provision thereof

that ‘‘taxes shall be uniform apes the same class of sub-

sere ad

x

Defendant further alleges that the levy. and assessment of

. personal property. taxes against said aircraft, or any of the.

same, are in violation of Article I, Section 8, of the Con-.

_ stitution of the United States in respect of the provision

that ‘‘the Congress shall have power * * * to reg-

ulate commerce with foreign. nations, and among the -sey-

eral states,’’ and also in violation of Article XIV, Section ~.

1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States i in respect of the provision that ‘‘no state shall make -

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-'

munities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any

state deprive any person of life, liberty or property with-

out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’

~ [fol. 8] xi

. | Deteudant alleges that the City of Saint Paul, the County

y . Of Ramsey and the State of Minnesota are each and all with-

| | out jurisdiction to levy a personal property tax upon said -

TL _. aircraft, or any part of the same, and that the levy of said

‘tax upon said aircraft or any part of the same constitutes

an unlawful burden upon the interstate commerce conducted

- by the defendant. | |

; XIT

. Defendant further alleges that even if said aircraft were

‘taxable in part by said County of Ramsey as of May 1, 1939, |

the valuation placed upon said aircraft and the proportion-

e al a

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:* Paul, Minnesota.

5

ate basis upon which they were taxed v were wholly excessive

and grossly senetenty,

Wherefore, defendant prays ; that it have judgment that

| it owes plaintiff nothing upon the assessment above set —

forth, and that defendant have its costs and disbursements

herein.

Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan & Mitchell; Attor-—

_neys for defendant, E-1006 First Natl. Bk. Bldg.,

Saint Paul, Minnesota.

Duly sworn to by Eul. Whyatt. Jurat omitted in printing, —

[fol. 9] In Disrexcr Court or Ramsey County

AME} ED STIPULATION OF Facts

Iti is hereby stipulated by and between the parties hereto

and their respective counsel that the following facts may be — |

taken as true for purposes of the above entitled case:

am: 8 UY

The defendant is a corporation organized and existing

‘under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal ~

place of business at Saint Paul Municipal Airport, Saint

II

The defendant is engaged in the business of carrying...

persons, property and mail for hire in interstate commerce

and operates aircraft on regular schedulesgpetween’ the City

of Chicago in the State of Illinois and the City of Seattle in ©

‘the State of Washington and the Oity of Portland in the

State of Oregon via the Cities of Milwaukee and Madison.

in the State of Wisconsin ; the Cities of Rochester, St. Paul -

and Minneapolis in the State of. Minnesota; the Cities of

Fargo and Bismarck-Mandan in the State of North. Dakota; _

the Cities of Miles City, Billings, Butte, Helena and Mis-

soula in the State of Montana and the Cities of Spokane,

Wenatchee and Yakima in the State of Washington. The

defendant also operates regular scheduled flights between

the City of Fargo, North Dakota and the City of Winnipeg

. in the Province of Manitoba, connecting with its transeon-

2—5477 -

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aa ee ee

POR Bry FRE e -O* re OO”

hem re

tinental flights. The defendant also operates regular sched-

uled flights between the City of Minneapolis in the State

(fol. 11] ‘of Minnesota and the City,of Chicago in the State

. of Illinois. On May 1, 1939, the defendant was making no

scheduled — in the City of St. Paul.

Ill

On May 1, 1939, the defendant maintained its airplane .

and engine overhaul base at St. Paul,.Minnesota, at which

. principal repairs to its engines and planes were made; ‘and

also maintained a hangar at said airport. .

IV J

On May 1, 1939, the defendant maintained and operated

maintenance bases ‘at Chicago, Illinois, Minneapolis, Min-.

nesota, Fargo, North Dakota, Billings, Montana, and Spo-. :

kane and Seattle, Washington, at which points service and

maintenance work were performed. These: service and

maintenance stations each included a hangar, a crew of li-

censed mechanics, each in charge of a foreman, a complete

set of maintenance tools, such as drill presses, hoists, fuel

supply equipment, welding equipment, trucks, tractors,

battery carts and cleaning equipment and.a complete stock:

_room of parts and supplies. All work on defendant’s air-

craft, with the exception of rebuilding and overhauling the

same, was performed at these maintenance:stations. °

[fol.12] At all its stops, including its maintenance bases,

the defendant did on May 1, 1939, maintain a radio opera- -

tor and a station manager, except that there was no radio

operator or dispatcher at-St. Paul. Ai a number of its

stops the defendant—also maintained baggage handlers,

| ticket sellers and information clerks, dispatchers and other

employees.

_At all its stops the defendant either owned or leased build-

ings for housing whatever operations it conducted at that

particular point.

The defendant waned hangars at Chicago, Illinois, and

Fargo, North Dakota. The defendant ‘leased hangars at.

Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, Billings and Miles .

, City, Montana, Spokane and Seattle, Washington. At Mil-

’ waukee and Madison, Wisconsin, Rochester and Duluth, Min-

nesota, Bismarck, North Dakota, Butte, Missoula and Hel-

ena, Montana, and Yakima and‘ Wenatchee, Washington,

¢

the defendant owned or saint offices and other space at the -

respective airports for its activities.

The defendant’s flight crews, including pilots, copilots y |

and stewardesses, had their bases, that is to say they began

and ended their runs for the defendant, at the —

points: © .

Chicago-Billings cun—MMinncapetii, Minnesota.

Fargo- Winnipeg run—Fargo, North Daktoa.. (No stew- 7

ardesses on this run.)

[fol. 13] Billings-Seattle run—Seattle, Washington.

___ Spokane-Portland run—Portland, Oregon and Spokane,

Washington.

Qn May 1, 1939, none of the defendant’ 8 Peactig crews had

their base at St. Paul. as.

bh

The defendant’s routes from Chicago to Seattle and Port-—

land and from Fargo to Winnipeg were fixed and followed

along their entire length a series of radio range courses

which were operated day and night by the Civil Aeronautics: .

Authority, these ranges being placed at regular intervals -

along the routes and being so situated as to mark a con-

tinuous course of travel. .Along defendant’s entire route |

there were also emergency landing fields at regular in-

tervals which were maintained by the Civil Aeronautics

Authority. Whenever tlie occasion requires due to weather ©

conditions, it may be necessary to abandon the regular route

of travel and follow another course for short intervals. —

a a

a.

The airplanes owned and operated by defendant were

constantly changing from place to place along defendant’s

routes. All of said aircraft were continuously engaged in

' [fol. 14] flying from state to state in the course of defend-

_ant’s operations, except for brief stops at the airports in

the course of scheduled flights and except for occasional

layups for repairs or overhauling. The location of said.

‘aircraft was constantly shifting from one county to an-

other and from one state to another.

"yr

All of detendant ’s airplanes were in Wiknnnite: from

time to time during the year 1939 carrying ee,

8 Paty i

. : ; 7”

*. “property - - the mails and for the purpose of periodical

overhauling. On May 1, 1939, there were present in.the

State of Minnesota for at least part of the day the following:

_-isted airplanes belonging to the defendant and constituting

° a part of its entire fleet, the time of arrival, time of depar-

ture, and total time present at the respective airports being

as follows : ;

[fol. 15] . _ MINNEAPOLIS :

Total Time

No. of Ship . Time In Time Out at Port

NC 17387 Zephyr 14H 12:03 A. M. 6:55 A. M.

| 3:36 P. M. weve. * 15:hrs. 76 min.

_NC 18994 “ ° ae 12:30 A. M. oe

ee 8:35 P.M. 8:55 P. M. 50 min.

NC 14907 Lockheed 10A . 6:35A.M.. 3:55 P. M. 9 hrs. 20 min.

NC 17392 Zephyr 14H: 8:15 A. M. 6:00 P. M. 9 hrs. 45 min. .

NC 14263 eed 10A 8:19 A. M. 8:39 A. M. ; 20 min.

NC 21713 Douglas DC-3° ied 11:21A.M. —11. hrs. 21 min.

. NC 21711 * 10:10 A. M. 1:30 P. M.

, 8:45 P. M. 9:14 P. M. 3 hrs. 49 min.

NC 21712 “ . }0:55 A. M. 2:38 P. M. »

8:25 P. M. dén's 7 hrs. 18 min. -

~ NC 14170 Stinson Reliant fiee oS! eee, 24 hrs.

NC 17385 Zephyr 14H re arrre 24 hrs.

NC 14900 “ae hes 24 hrs.

NC 14261 “* - oe ~ gadis <a ae

. NC 14244 * ¥ i ai eee pas 24 hrs.

: ia ROCHESTER Praha eocadkacnena

NC 21711, Douglas DC-3 9:20 A. M. —9:36A-M. :

? #0 P.M. 2:15 P. M. | 20 min.

NC 18994 Zephyr 14H 9:32 P.M. . 9:43 P. M. 10 min. ©

ST. PAUL : a.

—_._NC 14262 Lockheed 10A aan aver or hee |

NC 17386 Zephyr 14H aan ee 24 hrs.

i On May 1, 1939, the defendant’s flight operations were

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Civil Aero-

nautics Authority and its flights were all made pursuant

to certificates of public convenience and necessity issued

“py the Civil Aeronautics Board. Its airplanes were all

registered with the Authority with St. Paul as _— home .

. port.°

- [fol. 16] : Ix

"The defendant filed its return for 1939 and included therein

dirplanes of its fleet of the total true and full value of $77,-

000.00. Thereafter the Assessor of said Ramsey County

duly made an additional assessment of omitted property.

consisting of planes then owned by the defendant.as of May

1, 1939,-at a true and full value A $630, 000. - exnapt mast

“2

it is agreed that the actual vila and full value of said omit-

ted property on said last mentioned date was the sum of

$511,500.00 ;.and except further that the defendant contends

that such property is taxable in Ramsey County, Minnesota,

only to the extent of 13% of the true and full value of the

defendant’s entire fleet of airplanes which was of the agreed

value of $588,500.00 as more fully appears from Paragraph

XII hereof. That said additional assessment was ‘duly

.. entered by the County Auditor on the assessment and tax 7

‘books for the year 1939 but was not paid; that thereafter ;

_the list of all personal property taxes remaining delinquent-

on the first day of April, 1940, which included said addi-

tional assessment, was duly certified to and filed with the

Clerk of the above named district court; that thereafter,

said additional assessment still remaining delinquent, all

proceedings required by law were duly taken, including the

“di issuance of a citation to the above named defendant: and

[fol.17] that in. response ~— said defendant filed its

answer. 5 | eres

x WES

‘Pursuant. to-Section 2018 Mason’s Minnesota hiaiiine |

~~~ 1927, on the 18th day of March, 1940, the Commissioner of

* Taxation of the State of Minnesota duly made an order

' determining that the proper place of listing and assessment

for taxation as of May 1, 1939, of certain of the defendant’s

airplanes which had been actually present in Hennepin. .

County on ‘May 1,..1939, was in Ramsey County.

‘ a XT. |

The defendant paid personal property taxes upon its air-

plane fleet in some proportion of its full value in the States

of Illinois, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Montana, Oregon and

" Washington for the year 1939. a

XII

The total Leiagth of the routes over which defendant was

running seheduled flights on May 1, 1939, was 2,466 miles.

The total length of the defendant ’s routes over which sched- . -

uled flights were maintained in the State of Minnesota on ;

May 1, 1939, was 320.2 miles. The scheduled route mileage -

[fol. 18] i in Minnesota on May 1, 1939, was 14% of the total

scheduled route ‘mileage. ‘The scheduled plane mileage of

_— over san its . routes on. May 1, 1939, was 14,414 ;

¥

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Pcie ens at = . a Nr ETT maT

10

miles and the scheduled plane miles in Minnesota on. May 1,

1939, was 2,348.4 miles. The proportion of the scheduled

plane miles.in Minnesota on May 1, 1939, to scheduled plane

miles everywhere was 16%.

James F. Lynch and Andrew R. Bratter, jineain

for Plaintiff.. Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan

& Mitchell, ‘Attorneys. for Defendant.

- e. . e * e- 2

(fol. 19] Ix Distatcr Court. or Ramsey County

| Fuvprxos OF. Facz,€oi Sa Ne or Law aNnD ORDER FOR

ee me ~~~. Jupement—October 4, 1941

The above-eiititled matter came on regularly to be tried

“before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-

named Court, on the.8th day of July, 1941, upon the agree-

‘ment of counsel for the parties hereto to submit the case

- upon an agreed stipulation of facts. The State of Minne-

sota was represented by James F. Lynch, County Attorney

of said Ramsey County, and Andrew R. Bratter, Assistant — |

(fol. 20]-County Attorney; and the defendant appeared by

its attorneys Messrs..: my, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan &

Mitchell. —

The action involves a tas levied and assessed by the

‘County Auditor of. said Ramsey. County for the year 1939

upon the fleet of airplanes operated by the defendant.

The parties haying filed an agreed stipulation of facts,

the matter having been argued orally. before the Court and

briefs stares been filed, the Court makes the —

Frmprios OF Fact

2

The defendant is a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal

place of. business at Saint Paul Municipal Airport, Saint

; Paul, Minnesota. «

II : Phy

The defendant is engaged in the business of carrying

persons, property and mail for hire in interstate commerce

and operates aircraft on regular schedules between the

City of Chicago in the State of illinois and the City of

?

. ; 11

Seattle in the State of Washington and the City of Port-

[fol..21] land in the State of Oregon via the Cities of Mil-

waukee and Madison in the State of Wisconsin; the Cities

* of Rochester, St. Paul-and Minneapolis in the State of

_ Minnesota; the Cities of Fargo and Bismarck-Mandan in

the State of North Dakota; the Cities of Mites City, Bil-

'. lings, Butte, Helena and Missoula in the State of Montana

< we and the Cities of Spokane, Wenatchee and Yakima in the

State. of Washington.. The defendant also operates reg-

‘ular scheduled flights between the City of Fargo, North

Dakota and the City of Winnipeg in the province of. Mani-

toba, connecting with its transcontinental flights. The de-

fendant also operates regular scheduled flightg between the

' City of Minneapolis in the State@f Minnesota and the City

of Chicago in the State of Illinois. On May 1, 1939, the de- -

fendant was making no scheduled stops in the City of St.

Paul. | 3

Ill

On May 1, 1939, the defendant maintained its airplane

and engine overhaul base at St. Paul, Minnesota, at which

principal repairs to its engines and planes were made; and :

_ also maintained a hangar at said airport. ; ; .

[fol. 22] | IV

On May 1, 1939, the defendant maintained and operated

maintenance bases at Chicago, Illinois, Minneapolis, Minne-

-sota, Fargo, North Dakota, Billings, Montana, and’ Spo-

_ kane and Seattle, Washington, at which points it maintained

a crew of mechanics and tools and equipment for service

' and maintenance work. All the work on the defendant’s

aircraft, with the exception of rebuilding and overhauling

the same, was performed at these maintenance stations.

_ At all its stops, including its maintenance bases, the de-

» fendant did on May 1, 1939, maintain a radio operator and

a station manager, except that there was mo radio operator

‘ or dispatcher at St. Paul.’ At a number of its stops the de-

‘fendant also maintained baggage handlers, ticket sellers

and information clerks, dispatchers and other employees.

At all its stops the defendant either Swned or leased

_ buildings for honsing whatever operations it conducted at

_ that particular point. rhea

‘The defendant owned or leased hangars and office space

at the several ports at which its planes landed.

7 al

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ME Pte nce . " — ‘ —— ~<«

- a ¥

- 12

The defendant’s flight crews, including pilots, co-pilots

and stewardesses, had their bases, that is to say they began

and ended their runs for the defendant, at the following

points: —

{fol. 23] Chicago-Billings run—Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Fargo-Winnipeg run—Fargo, North Dakota. (No |

stewardesses on: this run)

| . Billings-Seattle run—Seattle, Washington:

Spokane-Portland run—Portland, Oregon and: Spokane, )

Washington.

On May 1, 1939, none of the defendant’s _ crews had .

their base at St. Paul.

— V

The defendant’ s routes from Chicago to Seattle and

Portland. and from Fargo to Winnipeg were fixed and fol-

lowed along their entire length a series of radio range .

- courses which were operated day and night by the Civil

Aeronautics Authority, these ranges being placed at regular

-intervals along the routes and being so situated as to mark

- a continuous course of travel. Along defendant’s entire

route there were also emergency landing fields at regular

_ intervals which were maintained by the Civil. Aeronautics

Authority. Whenever the occasion requires due to weather

conditions, it may be.necessary to abandon the regular

route of travel and follow another course for short intervals.

[fol. 24) red a VI

The airplanes owned and operated by ‘Qefendant were

constantly changing from place to place along defendant’s »

routes. All of said aircraft were continuously engaged in

flying from state to state in the course of defendant’s opera-.

tions, except for brief stops at the airports in the-course of

scheduled flights and except for occasional layups for re-

pairs. or overhauling. The location of kaid aircraft was

constantly shifting from one county to another and from

one state to another. _

.. All of defendant’s éirplanse were in Minnesota from

\ time to time during the year 1939 carrying passengers,

\property and the mails and for the purpose of periodical

-. overhauling. On-May 1, 1939, there were present in the

ante of Minnesota for: at least part of the day the following

-

hae , . - ‘ ry

Rae te eet ences apelgn bern GRRE ate oe RIN eH

\

\

me

13,2

listed airplanes pelenghig to the defendant and 4 evnttéating

a part of its éntire fleet, the time of arrival, time of depar-

ture, and total time — at the respective airports being

as follows: pee \J

' fol. 25] ad ag MINNEAPOLIS REST,

2 ; ' Total Time {

- 37 eval Time In . Time Out~ : at Port

NC. 17387 Ze 14H 12:03 A. M. 6:55 A. M.

aie 3:36 P. M: --e. . . 15 hrs. 76 min.

NC 18994. “ ° eee 12:330A.M. ¢ Fe

2 ‘ 8:35 P. M. 8:55P.M. 50 min.

NC 14907 Lockheed 10A 6:35 A. M.. 3:55 P. M. 9 hrs. 20 min.

NC 17392 Zephyr 14H 8:15 A. M. 6:00 P. M. 9 hrs. 45 min. .

NC 14263 prs be 10A ©8:19A.M. ° 8:39 A.M. 20 min.

NC 21713 — DC-3 "malig 11:21 A. M. 11 hrs. 21 min.

.NC 21711 10:10A.M. . 1:30 P.M. “;

. - 8:45 P.M. 9:14 P. M. 3 hrs. 49 min. —

NC 21712 - . 10:55 A. M. 2:38 P. M. ,

cence ; ae 8:25 P. M. seen > Te 7 hre. 18 min.

NC 14170 Stinson Reliant. *.... Ste * 24 brs.

‘NC 17385 Zephyr 14H see eas 24 hrs.

NC: 14900 ead 10A re eae eo es 24hrs. |

NC 14261 * E> ee “brs. .

NC 14244 “- ae on 24 hrs.

Fo. a4 ROCHESTER

NC 21711 Douglas DC-3 9:20 A. M. 9:35 A. M. 20 min.

2:10 P. M. 2:15 P. M.

NC 18994 Zephyr 14H = M’ 9:42 P. M. 10 min. |

. PAUL ; A

NC 14262 Lockheed 110A .. ern - 24 hre.:

NC 17886 Zephyr 14H Ries Se 24 brs.

VIII |

On May 1, 1939, the defendant’s flight operations were ©

subject to the jurisdiction of the United Statés Civil Aero-

_ Nauties Authority and its flights were all made pursuant to —

certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by

the Civil-Aeronautics Board. Its airplanes were all re “

tered with the Authority with St. Paul as their home pork eek

*[fol. 26] ~ a a

The defendant filed its: return for the year 1939 and in- -

cluded therein airplanes of its fleet of the total true and full. :

value of $77,000.00. That thereafter an additional assess-

ment. of opitted property -consisting of .the remainder of

airplanes then owned by the defendant as of May 1, 1939,

was added to the tax rolls at a true and full value of $630,- .

000; it was agreed, however, that the actual true and:full

value of said omitted property on said last-mentioned date

_ was the sum of $511,500.00. That said additional assess-

ment was duly entered by the County Auditor on the assess- ~

- 8+8477

14

* |

ment and tax books for the year 1989 but was not paid; that

thereafter the list-of allpersonal property taxes remaining

delinquent on the first day of April, 1940, which included

said additional assessment, was duly certified to and filed

with the Clerk of the above-named district court; that there-

after, said additional assessment still remaining delinquent,

all proceedings req uired by law were duly taken, including

the. issuance of a ‘<a to the above-named defendant;

and that in response thereto said defendant filed #ts an- .

swer. t the assessed value of said omitted property,

figured ‘oh the basis of 3314% of the true and ful] value,

’ was $170,500.00; that.the tax rate for the year 1939 was

99.2 mills on the dollar; that the correct amount of taxes

{fol. 27] leviéd and assessed against this defendant, based

upon said valuations and said rate, is $16,913.60.

x ' : 7

Pursuant to Section 2018 Mason’s Minnesotg Statutes,

1927, on the 18th day of March, 1940, the Commissioner. of

Taxation of the State of Minnesota’ ‘duly made an order

determining that the proper place of listing and assessment

for taxation as of May 1, 1939, of certain of the defendant’s .

airplanes which had been actually present in Hénnepin

County on May 1, 1939, was in Ramsey County. -

ay XI

The defendant paid personal property taxes upon its

airplane fleet in some proportion of its full value in the

States of Illinois, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Montana, Ore- .

gon and Washington for the year 1939. |

. ‘ XTI 7a . 7

The total length of the routes over which defendant was

| ing scheduled flights on. May 1, 1939, was 2,466 miles.

The total length of the defendant’s routes over which sched-

uled flights were maintained in the State of Minnesota on -

{fol. 28] May 1, 1939,.was 320.2 miles. The scheduled

route mileage in Minnesota on May 1, 1939, was 14% of the

total scheduled route mileage. The scheduled plane mile-

age of defendant over all its routes on May 1, 1939, was

14,414 miles and the scheduled plane miles in Minnesota

on May 1, 1989, were 2,348.4 miles. The Len ae of the

a

‘ . - © ~~

\ 3 15

scheduled plane miles in Minnesdta on ie 1, 1939, to

scheduled ‘plane miles everywhere was 16%.

From the foregoing Findings of Facts, the Court makes

the following

| Coficiusiows or Law

ry . I

i ae

That the domicil of the defendant herein on May 1, 1939,

was in said a. County. -

I S

That the proper place for the listing and Sidcssment of

its property which was taxable in the State of Minnesota,

was in said Ramsey County.. ©

Il

That the property of the defendant which is in question

in this case and which was added to the assessment and tax

[fol. 29] rolls as omitted proptrty by the County Auditor ~

of said Ramsey County had a situs for taxation in the

State of Minnesota and not elsewhere.

|

IV.

‘Phat said property was duly and regularty in all respects

. assessed by the proper authorities of said Ramsey County.

Vv

That the true and full value of said hainidite on May 1,

1939, was the sum of $511,500.00; that the assessed value

thereof was the sum of $170,500.00; that the rate of taxa-

tion for the year 1939 on such property was 99,2 mills

‘upon the. assessed value thereof.

VI

' That the plaintiff herein is erititled to judgment against

the defendant herein for ‘such taxes in the sum of $16,-

913.60 together with the penalty thereon which is 8% of.

the said tax r the sum of $1,353.08; being © tofel amount of

tax and penalty of $18,266.68. :

16 em Fe |

[fol. 30] Let Judgment Be Entered Accordingly. 3 |!

_ Dated St. Paul, Minnesota, October 4, 1941.

Kenneth G. Brill, J udge of the District Court.

The okey of Judgment is hereby stayed for 40 days. |

Kenneth G. Brill, Judge of the District Court.

In District Court or Ramsey County

J vpemEwt—January 2, 1942

“The hbove entitled matter having hook regularly tried

before the above named court, the Court having made and

filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for

judgment; and the parties having stipulated that judgment

may be entered without costs to either pafty. ’

Now Therefore,

It Is Adjudged that the true and full value of the de-

fendant’s property, to-wit: its fleet of airplanes described

in the findings of fact: filed herein, as of May 1, 1939, was

the sum of $511,500.00; that the assessed value thereof was

the sum of $170, 500.00; that the rate of taxation for the

year 1939 on such property was 99.2 mills upon the assessed

[fol. 31] value thereof and that the amount of taxes due to

the plaintiff from the defendant for the year 1939 is the

: gum of $16,913.60, together with the penalty thereon at the

rate of 8% or the sum of $1,353.08 and that the total amount

of the judgment hereby found in favor of. the plaintiff and

against the defendant is the sum of $18,266.68.

Dated at St. Paul, Minnesota, this 2nd day of January, |

1942,

By the Court.

SAS. Fitzgerald, Clerk of the District Court by A.-B.

. White, Deputy. -

prone as to Form: 15-42. ‘Rina G. Bril), J udge

of the District Court.

. . ‘

| fol. 32] Stipulation waiving bond omitted in printing.

|

[fol 33] In District Court or Ramsey Counry

Notice, or APPEAL—J january 5, 1942.

To the above-named plaintiff and to James F. Loneh pe"

. Andrew R. Bratter, its attorneys, and to < J. vicewinin' ty

_ Clerk of the above-named Court:

You Will Please Take Notice, that the shiiiacinniait de-

- fendant appeals to the Supreme Court of > State of Minne- —

sota from that certain judgment of the a -named Court

’ filed herein on January. 5, 1942.

Dated January 5, 1942.

_ Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan & Mitchell, At-

‘torneys for Defendant, E-1006 First Natl. Bk.

Bldg., Saint Paul, Minnesota. |

[fol.34] [File endorsement omitted]

| In Supreme Courr or Minwesora 7

Pirsig, J.

Concur: Streissguth, J. ;

Dissent: ' Loring, J., Gallagher, C. J., J. J. Olson, J.

33176

State or Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

‘Norruwesr. AIRLINES, Inc., Appellant

.Sy_tasus—Filed December 18, 1942 .-

_ A tax by.a state without jurisdiction to impose it is”

unconstitutional as a violation of due process.

2. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United -

States will be followed in the interpretation of the meaning.’

of due process under the federal constitution. Although

our state constitution contains a similar provision, it was

not intended to be more restrictive than aaa of the federal ©

constitution.

90 ae a.

Defendant filed its tax return ter the year 1939 in which |

it included a portion of ‘its airplanes at the full value of -

[fol. 37] $77,000.. This valuation was based on planes in

the state on May 1, 1939. Later, an additional assessment .

was made by the county auditor in which he included the

remaining airplanes owned by the defenflant at the full

value of $511,500.

From the foregoing facts the lower court concluded that

all of the planes ‘‘had a situs for taxation in the state of .

Minnesota and not. elsewhere’’ and accordingly directed ©

judgment to be entered for the taxes upon all of the planes

in the sum of $16,913.60, together with penalty thereon, .

making a total of $18, 266. 68.

The question before us is whather this state may impose

a tax upon all of defendant’s planes. The right to do so is

attacked on the grounds that it is-a violation of the due

process ‘clauses of the! state‘and federal constitutions and

that it is an interference with interstate commerce.

Taking up first the claim that the tax is a violation of haa

process, the general rule is that a tax by a state which has

no jurisdiction to impose it violates the constitutional pro-

hibition against taking property without due process of

law. For present purposes it is unnecessary to consider

separately the due process clauses of the state and federal

constitutions. If under this clause of the federal constitu-

tion this: state may impose a tax upon all of the planes

owned by defendant, it may also do so under the state con-

_ stitution. The state provision was not intended to be more

restrictive than that of the federal constitution. State v.

_ Weyerhauser, 72 Minn. 519, 75 N. W. 718; W. J. Armstrong

Co. v.N. Y. C.& HE. R. Co:, 129 Minn.-104, 151 N. W. 917.

In In re Estate of Taylor, 175 Minn. 310, 315, 219 N. W. 153,

221 N. W. 64, 65, this court said:

“Ht is our aim to follow the decisions of the Supreme

‘Court of the United States, since we are construing a provi-

sion of the federal constitution, although our own state con-

stitution contains a similar. provision.’

If, therefore, the tax may be imposed under. the due proc-

ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it may also be

' imposed under our constitution. |

[fol. 38} The airplane has raised many unique legal ques-

tions in other fields. We do not, however, consider it of

such a nature that it niust be placed in a new and inde-

i eee eens a | lls

21

pendent category so far as. taxation is concerned. It is but

personal property used for the transportation of persons

and goods. Its distinction lies in that it leaves the ground

and travels through the air. But this is not of significance

here. The sovereign power and jurisdiction of a state is not

limited-to the ground. An airplane in the air over the terri- |

tory of a state is within the state and subject to its sovereign

power. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

has said in Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. Inc., 270

Mass. 511; 521, 170 N. E. 385, 389, 69 A. L. R. 300,308: - .

“Tt is esséntial to the safety of sovereign States that

: they possess jurisdiction to control the airspace above their

territories. It seems to us to rest on ‘the obvious practical

necessityof self-protection.’’ See also People v. Katz, 249

N. Y. S. 719, 140 Misc. 46.

The enaatlen we have, then, is the broader one of when

and under what conditions the state of the owner’s domicile

loses jurisdiction-to tax tangible personal property moving

about from state to state? May the state of domicile tax

the whole thereof? —

. Two classes of cases have particular: bearing on this

question. The first deals with ships upon the high seas. It

has been held in those cases that where a ship sails from its

‘home port and into the port of a foreign state and s

there but temporarily for the purpose of loading or AE

ing it cannot be taxed by the latter state. Hays v. Pacific

Mail S. S. Co.,-58 U. S. (How.) 596; Morgan v. Parham; 83

U. S. (Wall.) 471; Southern Pacific Co. v, Kentucky, 222

U.S. 63. |The rule has been applied to ships plying naviga-

ble streams. St.: Louis v.. The Ferry Company, 78 U®S.

(Wall.) 423; Gloucester bisa Co. v. rates ibienated nia

U. 8.196. | ,

In some of these cases the court relied: upon the maxim

‘Mobilia sequuntur -personam; immobilia situm. Mobilia

non habent sequelam. Another reason given was that the

[fol. 39] property had not ‘‘ become incorporated with other

personal a the state’’ seeking to impose the tax.

Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 58 U. S. (How.) 596; Morgan

v. Parham, 83 U. S. (Wall.) 471; and see Old Dominion

. §. 8. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. 8. 299... The more basic reason

was given in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S.°

63, 68: ‘‘The ancient maxim which assigns to tangibles, as

aoe

ae

well as intangibles, the situs of the owner for purposts of

taxation has its foundation in the protection which thé

owner receives from the government of his residence.”’

_ If the ship has obtained an actual situs in a state other.

. than: that of the home port, that state might’ validly

subject the ship ‘to the ordinary property taxes of. that.

state. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S.. 299..

In that event, it has been said that the situs of the domicile.

yields tq the actual situs and — dominion of another — a4

‘government.

The second class of cases relating ts the ‘question. here

involved deals with the taxation of rolling stock of railroad

companies. For the purpose of determining whether such ~

property has acquired a situs in a state foreign to that of

the. domicile of the company, Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v.

Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, introduced a new principle.

_ -In that case Pennsylvania ‘imposed what was in substance a

property, tax upon the cars of an Illinois corporation within

the borders of Pennsylvania. A certain proportion of the

company’s cars-was constantly and continuously present

there. For that reason, the right of Pennsylvania to im-

pose the tax was sustained, notwithstanding the fact that

. individual: ears miaking up the avérage in the state were

constantly changing and were there but temporarily. The-

court looked not at the individual cars but‘at the average,

and that average was.permanently located in Pennsylvania.

See also Marye vy. B. & O. R. Co. 127 U. 8.117. The Pull-

man Car case, 141 U. S. 18, was followed in, among other -

decisions, American R. T. Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, and

Union. R. T. Co. v. Lyrich, 177 U. 8. 149. The principle

[fol. 40] of the case-has its limitations. The foreign state

. May not tax more than the average number of cars present,

‘even though all the cars of the company might at some time

during the tax period be actually, but temporarily, present .

within the state. A.tax on all the cars is invalid. Johnson

Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, ‘290 U. S. 158.

It is necessary also that an average number of cars appear

to be permanently present. This court has held that where

the railroad cars of a foreign corporation are but tem-

porarily here the right to tax does not exist. State v. Union

Tank Line Co. 94 Minn. 320, 102 I. W. 721. .

_--Defendant contends that the principle of the Pullman

Car. decision, 141 U. 8. 18, is applicable in this case, and

that other states through which its planes are routed are

23

* entitled to tax the average number of planes constantly

present in those states even though any individual plane

may be there but temporarily. The state,on the contrary, -

takes the position that no situs has been acquired in otber ~

states, and, by ‘analogy to the ship cases, this state, being

the domicile of defendant, may tax them all. Neither the °

stipulation nor the findings are as clear as one could’ wish

__—~on whether such an average number of planes was so con-

stantly and permanently in any one ‘state as to acquire a |

situs there. But we shall not puréue the question, for. .—iy.

undet the view we adopt it is not a material factor. We

concede that the principle of the Pullman Car case is as

applicable to planes as it is to railroad cars and that the

findings lead to the conclusion that. some proportion of

. defendant’s planes acquired a situs in other states‘and to

that extent may be taxed there. on -

That leaves the further question whether the acquisition

of a situs in.a foreign state removes the jurisdiction of

the state of the owner’s domicile to tax. The cases so far

discussed do not, except by incidental comment, bear upon

that problem. They deal only with the right of the foreign

state to tax. So far as a specific item of tangible personal -

- property is concerned, the question was decided in Union

[fol. 41] Refrigerator Transit Co.-v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. ne

194. It was there held that if such property has acquired .

a tax situs in another state it cannot be taxed inthe state

_ of its owner’s domicile. The principle so laid down has

since been uniformly followed. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268

U. S. 473, 489, 45 S, Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316;

Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 92, 93,

. 508. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180, 67 A. L. R. 386; Sancho v.:Huma-

cao Shipping Corp. (1 Cir.) 108 F. (2d) 157.” ip

It is the claim of defendant that the Transit‘ Company

case, 199 U. S. 194, established with.equal force that the :

result is the same when the situs-is acquired in the foreign . G

state by the application of the doctrine of the~Pullman

Car case, 141 U.S. 18. Hence, since some proportion of

defendant’s: planes may, as conceded, be taxed in other.

States, it'is claimed that this state has lost its power to

_» tax to a corresponding degree. es ey

A careful examination of the Transit Company case will

disclose that it doesnot go to the‘length so claimed for it. . :

It appears that there Kentucky sought to impose what was al

treated as a property tax upon all the railroad cars owned

“

Rae See a — e

NS INL See Pa Ene

ff

,

wale Ag ARN eR

88 0 trememcns eben mene an. tee ecmeenteante

v 2

darn ene

w fy Od ve oe Ag oe

*p

eee Ne Mme .

Rea epee a A nett tet ne ND aia ty mee nt

~— ant Sie FAN Cn ee

REP me

ee er A Re ental Baleares

oe ee

by the transit company, which was incorporated in.Ken-

tucky. The headquarters for its cars were located at Mil-

' - waukee, Wisconsin, at which ‘point they . were rented to

shippers who used them for the carrying of freight in the

~~ United States,-Canada, and Mexico. The court held that

Kentucky had no, jurisdiction to tax all the cars of the

company: The record in the case reveals further that some

of the cars were in fact constantly coming into and going

out of Kentucky, and that the state trial court had found .

_ that a definite average number of cars was in the state

during the year for which the taxes were imposed. But it

is also evident that there were larger numbers of the com- .

pany’s-cars which- were never within the state at any time

during the tax period. The opinion of the court makes it

clear that it was this last fact which the court deemed

(fol. 42] controlling. The court states the question before |

it to be. (199 U. 8. 201) ‘‘whether a corporation organized

under the laws of Kentucky is subject to taxation upon its

tangible personal property, permanently located in other

States, and employed there in the prosecution of its busi-

ness.’’ It states further (P.-204) that“property which is

wholly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of another

State, receives none of the protection for which. the tax is

supposed to be the compensation,’ and that such property

does not and cannot receive protection under its laws,

pm. . [P. 206] it is taxable in the State where it is

= permanently located and employed and where it receives

its entire protection.’’ (All italics supplie4). .

In defining -the basis re apg me court denied the

right to tax, it-said (199 U.S . 202):

‘*The power of taxation, indispensable to the qxistenes

of. every civilized government, is exercised upon the as- _

sumption of an equivalent.rendered to the taxpayer in the

protection of his person and. property, in adéing to the

. value of such property, or-in the creation and waintenance

of public conveniences in which he shares, such, for in-

stance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools

for the education of his children. If the taxing power be

in no position to render these services, or otherwise to

benefjt the person or property taxed, and stich property be

wholly within the taxing power. of another State, to which

it may be said’to owe an allegiagce and to which it looks for

- protection, the taxation of such property within the domi-

cile of the owner partakes rather ad the nature of an

° : . . ‘ .

+ ‘ = og!

re ‘ fe ° s

. - :

yee EURED APL DT GET AI —— a . . — ’ “ -

a ~ _

25

extortion than a tax, and has hots repeatedly held by this

court to be beyond the power of the legislature and a taking

of property without due process of law.’’ .

It is plain that the court in denying the right of Kentucky

to tax was speaking about those cars which were perma-

nently in other states and did not reach Kentucky at all. The

facts did not raise the question, and there is nothing to

indicate that the court: intended to hold, that cars going

from Kentucky and from time to time returning to it could

not be taxed by that state because they had contributed to

an average which had acquired a situs in another state. The

only question before the court was the validity of the tax

on all of the: company ’s cars, some of which were perma-

[fol. 43] netnly in other states. It is noteworthy that the

court cites and states the holding of the Pullman Car case

without suggesting that it had any direct application to the

facts before it. We conclude, therefore, that the case does

hot sustain the claim of defendant that this state has lost

the right to tax all its planes because an average of them

had obtained a situs in other states.

‘The only other cases’ requiring consideration upon this

point are New York ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller, .

202 U.,8. 584, and Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 290

U.S. 158. In ‘the New York Central case, the state of domi-

cile of a railroad company was permitted to tax all the cars

_ of the company despite the fact that an average number of

cars was constantly outside the state. The court distin-

guished the Pullman Car case, 141 U. S. 18, on the gropnd

that it appeared in that case that (202 U. S. 597) “‘The

same. vars were continuously receiving and protection of the

State and, therefore, it was just that the State should tax

a proportion of them.’’ ‘The court expressly reserved the

- question whether there was “any necessary parallelism be- _—

tween liability elsewhere and immunity at home.’’ ‘That

' reservation in itself indicates that the court did not con-

sider the question settled by its previous decision in the

Transit Company case, 199 U. S. 194.

, In the Johnson (il Ref. case, 290 U. S. 158, the owner of

the cars was an Tiinois corporation with its principal place

'. Of business at Chicago. Oklahoma sought to tax all the

cars of the corporation on the ground that they were from

time to time-during the year within the state. The court.

held that the power of Oklahoma to tax the cars was limited

to the average number of cars in the state and that a ic on

‘all was invalid. Broad language was used by court in its

opinion, and, as ably shown by the dissenting opinion of

_ Mr. Justice Loring, it is reasonably susceptible of more ~

‘than one interpretation. We believe that it should be read

[fol. 44] in the light of the facts before the court. It was

_ dealing with a situation where the only basis of taxation

appearing was the average number of cars present in the

, State. The decisiongnd the opinion are not inconsistent

’. with permitting a state to tax additional or all the cars if

additional and constitutionally recognized grounds for ‘the

tax exist. If we find, teefor that an adequate basis ex-

isted in this state for ing all the planes,.the Johnson

case ‘does not deny the right to tax merely because other

states also have the power to do so.

We are left, therefore, thout any controlling aathority ;

f guide us, and in its absence we must resort to tlie basic

constitutional principles upon which the right or juris-

diction of a state to tax depends. In so doing, we cannot —

rest upon any logical application of some legalistic concept

or situs. . When we say that property has a situs within a

state for the purposes of taxation we mean only that-it is

proper and consistent with due precess that that state may.

; impose the tax. There is no constitutional justification for

giving the concept a controlling power of its own.

For a time, under the decisions of the United,States Su- —

preme Court, this was not true. An attempt was ‘made to

use the concept of situs with respect to both tangible and

intangible property for the purpose of limiting the power

to tax to a single state. See Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Min-

nesota, 280 U. S. 204; First Nat. Bank v* Maine, 284 U. S.

312. In the latter case, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was a

member of the majority of the court which adopted this

view. See also his concurrence in, the dissenting opinions

in Wisconsin y. J’ C. Penney Co., 311 U. 8. 435, and Curry

v. McCanless, 307 U. 8. 357. Much of his opinion in John-

son Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U. 8.

158, can be explained on this basis. On-this ‘ground, Black-

stone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, was overruled. Farmers —

L..& T. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 209. By this means

the court sought to bring about what it thought to be a

- [fol. 45] desirable policy—the avoidance of double taxation.

See cases cited supra; also Union Refrigerator Transit Co. .

199 U. S. 194. But in more recent cocielons

re

this attempt to read into the due process clause any such

limitation has been definitely rejected as an improper judi-

- gial attempt to compel the application of views as. to wise

: legislative poli¢y through the process of. constitutional in-

terpretation. The possibility of taxation of the same prop-

erty by more than one state is no longer a constitutional

objection. Recently, First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. 8.

312, where the contrary view had been adopted was over-

ruled, and the case of Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189,

restored to good favor. State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich; 316

_ U.S. 174, 62'S. Ct.1008. cai

We look, therefore, not to whether anather state is en-

titled to tax, but rather to whether the power to do so exists —

in this state. Property may have a situs, if-we wish to .-

use that term, in more than one state, depending upon

whether the basic considerations are — which give a.

state the right to tax under the requirements of due process.

These considerations. have repeatedly been stated gto be .

first, the sovereign power of thé state over the person or

property, and, sécond, the rendering in return of a substan-

tial benefit or protection to the person or property taxed. a il

. Thus, in the recent leading case of Carry \ v. McCanless, Re a

U. S. 357, 364, the court said: 7 if

i

~ “The power of government and its agencies to possess - Hi

and to exclude ‘others from possessing tangibles, and thus io

to exclude them from enjoying rights in tangibles located

' within its territory, affords‘adequate basis for an exclusive

taxing jurisdiction. When we speak of the Jurisdiction

to tax land or chattels as being exclusively. in’ the state

where they are. physically located, we mean no more/than _..

that the benefit and protection of laws enabling the y sce ,

| to enjoy the fruits of his ownership and the power to reach

effectively the interests protected, for the purpose of sub-

jecting\them to payment of a tax, are so narrowly restricted

to the state ; in whose territory-the physical property is -

located as\to set pr. ctical limits to taxation by others. Other

states have been said to be without jurisdiction and so with-

[fol. 46] out ‘constitutional ‘pewer to tax tangibles if, be- -

cause of ‘their. location elsewhere, those states can afford .

‘no ‘substantial protection to the rights taxed and cannot

effectively lay holdof any interest i in the satis in order

to compel payment of ee tax.’’

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Again, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435,

_ the court said: .

‘*A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unem-

barrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation

of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation té oppor-

tunities which it has given, to protection which it has af- _

- forded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of be-—

ing an orderly, civilized society * *~* [The] test is

whether property was taken without due process of law,

or, if paraphrase we must, whether. the taxing power ex-

erted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, oppor-.

tunities and benefits given by the state. The simple buf

-* controlling question is whether the state has given any-

:. thing for which it can ask return.’’

See also quotation, supra, from Transit Company case, 199

4 S. 202, See Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. 8S.

We need not consider whether all the cases can be logi-

cally reconciled with the principles thus laid down. It is

sufficient that, particularly in the recent cases, they have

been insisted upon and made the criteria for the constitu-. -

— basis of the power to tax. It is our duty to follow

Applying these principles in this case, we have no diffi-

culty in sustaining the tax of this state upon all the planes

owned by defendant. The power of this state over defend-

ant and the property taxed was present. Defendant was

incorporated here. . Its principal place of business is located

in this state, and all the planes at some time or another

come within its borders. The benefits conferred upon de-,

fendant g government and laws of this state in relation —

to all of defe *s planes is equally clear. The policies

and decisions made by defendant in connection with the

operations of its planes were made here and under the pro-

tection and benefit of the laws of this state. The manner

and extent of their operations were determined and directed °

from this state. Particularly significant is the fact that -

when planes were in need of major repairs and overhauling |

(fol. 47] theecessary repairing and overhauling were done

here. These benefits did not ceaSe the moment the planes

crossed the border into another state. . They continued and

contributed to the successful operation of the planes

throughout the course and ‘scope of their operations.

There is, therefore, no violation of due process in the

_ taxation by this state of all the planes.. There was a fair

basis in the power of this state over defendant and its

planes and in the benefits conférred with respect to this

property upon which the tax may rest. We hold, therefore,

that the tax here in question on all the planes was a valid

one:

Our decision does not rest upon any applicatiow& of the

discredited maxim ‘‘Mobilia sequuntur personam}; immo-

bilia situm. Mobilia non habent sequelam,’’ nor upon the

bare fact that defendant was incorporated here. _A more-

substantial reason for the tax exists. The state is giving a

real and substantial return for the tax it seeks to impose.

Neither do we.question the principle that a specific item of

_ personal property, pérmanently located in another state,

cannot be taxed here. That is not the case before us, We

hold only that there is a fair basis upon which this state

‘ may impose the tax in question and that any right of an-

other state to impose’a similar tax upon some portion of

- the planes does not adversely affect that basis. It may

well be that defendant will be required to pay taxes in other

' states upon some portign of its planes. If so, it is because,

_ under the principles stated, a'fair basis for the tax exists

in those states also. In any event, on the facts as they

appear before us and under the principles already stated,

tes other than this one would not appear entitled to tax

to any greater extent than the average number of planes

within its borders during the tax period. As stated in the

concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in State Tax

Comm.-¥. Aldrich, 316) U. S. 174, 183, 62 §& Ct. 1008, 1013: /

‘*Modern enterprise often brings different parts of an

. organic commercial transaction within the taxing power of

more than one State, as well as of the Nation. It does so

[fol. 48] because the transaction in its entirety may receive

_ the benefits of more than one government.’’

Whether or not it is economically wise or fair.to i impose

the tax herein sustained we are not entitled to consider

under the principles already stated. ‘That question is more

properly addressed to the legislature, whose prerogative

and responsibility it-is to énter into such considerations.

The power to make a good law of necessity carries with it ~

the power to make an unwise one. ‘‘A tax within the law-

. ful power of a state’’ may not “‘be judicially stricken down «

a

- 30 ;

under the due process clause simply. because its enforcement

_ may or will result in restrictyge or even destroying par-

ticular occupations or businesses.’* Magnano Co. v.. Ham-

ilton, 292 U. S. 40, 45 (citing cases).

Defendant’s second objection to the tax is equally ~with-

out foundation. That the planes were engaged largely in

interstate commerce does not deprive this state of the right’

to impose the tax. Property engaged in the transporta-

tion of interstate commerce may be subjected by a state to

the usual nondiscriminatory property taxes if jurisdiction

to tax otherwise exists. Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Penn-

sylvania, 141 U. S. 18. See also Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v.

Oklahoma ex rel: Mitchell, 290 U. 8. 158, and cases therein

eited.

The provisigns of the satin vith to taxation of

personal property are sufficiently broad to include all the

planes of defendant. All nonéxempt personal property

owned by a resident is taxed. See Minn. St. 1941, § 272.01

(Mason St. 1927, § 1974), and Id. § 272.03, subd. 3 (4 1979).

The statutes do not in express terms exclude such property

when located outside the state, and the language of § 272.01

' (§ 1974) makes Plain enough that the intention was to

include. it.

_ The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. .

' es BE. Pirsig.

[fol. 49] eed. Justice (dissenting) :

“I find my views at variance with the au arrived

‘ at by the majority. I agree with them that, insofar as

tangible personal property is concerned, the doctrine of

- mobilia sequuntur is outworn and discarded. See Union

Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,.199 U. S. 194, It

follows, of course, as they say, that the place of incorpora- —

tion of the taxpayer does.not control as to such property.

This leaves their opinion resting upon the facts that all the

planes of defendant at regular times come within the pro-

tection of this state, that major repairs are made here, and

that the company’s offices are here.. Does an opinion so

‘grounded harmonize with the principles of due process as

developed and announced by the United States Supreme

Court? '

I think the incahenihts are misled by failing to distinguish .

- between ‘what that court has said in cases involving in-

?

a

31

tangibles and what it has held in those involving tangible —

_ property. If the broad expressions used with reference to

intangible property such as those used in State Tax Comm.

v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 62 8. Ct. 1008, cited by the major-

ity, should be applied to tangible property, which was not

there under consideration, we should find that the doctrine

of mobilia sequuntur, which the majority agree is now dis-

_ carded as to tangible property, would be restored in great

measure and made applicable to tangible property as well

as to intangibles. It certainly applies only to tangible

property wher that property‘ has acquired no situs what-

ever for taxation elsewhere. ‘‘The arguments in favor of

the’ taxation of intangible property at the domicil of the

owner have no application to tangible property.’’. Union

Refrigerator Transit Co.v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 206.

The Supreme Court has drawn a clear distinction be-

tween tangible personal property and intangible property

.’ [fol. 50] in the application of due process. In Curry v. °

McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 365, involving intangibles, Mr.

Justice Stone (now Chief J ustice), speaking for the court,

‘after discussing the situs of tangibles: in relation to the

taxing power, said: :

‘‘Very different considerations, both theoretical and

practical, apply to the taxation of intangibles, that is, rights

which aré not related to-physical things. Such rights are -

but relationships between persons, natural or corporate,

which the law recognizes by attaching to them certain sanc-

tioris enforceable in courts. The power of government over

them and the protection which it gives theni cannot be

exerted through control of a physical thing. They can be

made effective only through control over and protection

afforded to those persons whose relationships are the origin - |

of the rights. [Citing cases.] Obviously, as sources of ~

actual or potential wealth—which is an appropriate meas- |

ure of. any tax imposed on ownership or its exercise—they

canno -be dissociated from the persons from whose rela-

nships they are derived. These are not in any sense fic-

i tions. They are indisputable realities.’’

Therefore, the broad expressions with reference to the

power and jurisdiction to tax contained in cases relative to

'. intangibles, such as State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 316 U. 8.

174, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. ed. 911 (Advance Sheets), and

Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, are not applicable to due '

32 : ms

process as applied to the taxation of tangible property. In

the ‘‘intangible’’ cases, the protection of the rights of

transfer of the evidence of ownership may result, as in State

Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, supra, in what appears to be Gouhle

_ or multiple taxation. —

It appears to me that it would be very sidisiiiiie to

extend to tangible property throries which have been ap-

plied to intangibles only. The Supreme Court has not done

' so. Should the habitual use and flight of airplanes over

the various jurisdictions be held to subject all the taxpay-

er’s planes—not only a proper proportionate share of them

—to double or multiple taxation on their full value, it

would not only be unjust but would create a situation so

burdensome to the airlines as materially to handicap their

development and extension, so vital to the national interest.

It would likewise be unfortunate for those states imposing -

[fol. 51] -the tax on the full value and would doubtless in

the end result in congressional authorization of the in-

corporation of airlines under national law and control of -

taxation. See Mr. Justice Jackson’s dissent, concurred in

by Mr. Justice Roberts, in State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 316

-U. S. 174, 185, 202; supra.

The problem of taxation of airplanes engaged i in sched-

uled aerial transportation i is one of first i impression. Air-. .

planes span the continent in a few hours, passing over many

jurisdictions in the course of a day’s flight. A plane may

be in any one state but one or two hours out of the 24, or

even only part of an hour. In its very nature, aerial trans-

port is largely interstate. If the operations of an airline

were confined to the protection of any single state and to

the benefits and opportunities conferred by the laws of that

state, such a line would be of little importance in the vast

field of air transport. If defendant’s operations were. con-

. fined to the state of Minnesota, doubtless two or three planes

would answer its needs. Its ownership of the large number

of planes here sought to be -taxed is necessitated by its

operations in interstate commerce, where it habitually and

regularly subjects itself to the protection of other juris-

dictions and receives the benefits afforded by the laws of -

‘other states, to whose sovereignty it become subject, except

as it falls within the control of the federal government. -

In that regard there is no distinction between the benefit

and protection afforded by Minnesota and that afforded by

33°

Illinois, Whssoviatia, North. Dakota, ‘ini: Idaho, or

Washington. If the protection and benefit extended by state

_sovereignty to these aircraft, justifies a tax on the full value

of all of them because they Be continually traversing the —

air across this state and because at times they all come

within its boundaries, then every state traversed by the

air route may tax the whole number that flies over such state

on the full value. If the tax imposed by Minnesota on the

full value of-all the planes used by defendant is sustained,

it becomes not only a tax imposed for the protection afforded

[fol. 52] by Minnesota but a tax burdening the entire service

of these planes throughout their route. In reality it assesses

their owner as if its protection covered the planes through-

out their route. Thus, it assesses for protection it does not

furnish and which it has no power to furnish.

‘*The power of taxation, indispensible to the existence of

every civilized government, is exercised upon the assump-

tion of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in protection

‘ of his person and property.’’ Union Refrigerator Transit’

Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202. -

I am in full accord with the view that the law as applied

to steamships where the sovereignty of the flag follows the

ship throughout the voyage does not apply to airplanes fly-

ing scheduled flights over land. Logically, planes are more

like fleets of railroad cars being operated in interstate

traffic. ;

Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290

U. S. 158, was a case where Pawnee county, Oklahoma,

_ under a state statute, sought to tax the entire fleet of the

Johnson company’s tank cars, which were used mainly in

transporting oil from its refinery in Oklahoma to other |

states. The Johnson company was an Illinois corporation,

but its refinery, trackage, and repair facilities: were in

Oklahoma. Like defendant’s planes, the cars were in almost

continuous movement and the major share of the time were _..

‘beyond the boundaries of the state, though they were all

marked to be returned to the refinery i in Oklahoma, where’

was located the control and supervision of the cars. Thus

we have a‘situation much like that presented to us in the.

case at bar. except that the Johnson company was incor- |

porated in Illinois instead of Oklahoma, a matter which the.

United States Supreme Court and the majority here seem to

34

regard as immaterial insofar as tangible property is con-

_ cerned. A stronger feature for the company in the case at

bar is that its planes are beyond the state boundaries on

regular uniform schedules and routes defined by the Civil

Aeronautics Authority. Oklahoma’s right to tax all the

[fol.53] cars was challenged as a violation of the due proc-

- ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relating to the

_ jurisdiction to tax, the court in that case, speaking through

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, said (290 U. S. 162):

.» “The basis of the jurisdiction is the habitual employment

of the property within the State. By virtue of that employ-

ment the property should bear its fair share of the burdens

of taxation to which other property within the State is sub-

ject. When a fleet of cars is habitually employed 1 in several

States—the individual cars constantly running in and out

of each State—it cannot be said that any one of the States

is entitled. to tax the entire number of cars regardless of

their use im the other States.’’ (Italics supplied. )

True, the Chief J ica speaking for the court, also said

(290 U: S. 161):

“ Appellant had its doviietle in Mincis, and that State

had jurisdiction to tax appellant’s personal property which

had not acquired an actual situs elsewhere. ‘The State of

origin remains the permanent situs of the property not-

- withstanding its occasional excursions to foreign parts.’ ’”

True enough, assuming that the property had acquired a

sttus in the domiciliary state, but the statemen' was obvi-

ously not intended to apply if it had not. Union Refrig-

erator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, supra. But

the situation.in the Johnson Oil Co. case, 290 U. S. 158, as

‘here, was that the tangible personal property had acquired

situs for proportionate taxation elsewhere. In the-case at

bar, the flights on regular daily schedules. throughout the

year were not mere (290 U. S. 161) ‘‘occasional excursions’’

into other’ jurisdictions, but the property (290 U. S. 162)

-*Shabitually. used and employed’’ on such flights within ©

other states acquired a situs for oe taxation in

those states.

As illustrated by the Johnson Oil Co. case, the situs in

the other states for tax purposes may be proportionate

only. It need not be such a situs 4s would confer jurisdic-

tion to tax the full value of all cars which come into the

‘ state even when they come in habitual use. It may bea |

jurisdiction to tax a fair proportion as determined by aver- °

[fol. 54] age presence or other fair method of apportioning

the tax.. It might, in the case of aircraft, be based upon

miles or hours flown in the state in proportion to those

flown elsewhere. ea eee ee .

~ Teannot find that the Johnson Oil Co. case‘has been over-

‘ruled or qualified insofar as tangible property is concerned,

nor do I think it is in conflict with tie previous case of

Peoplé ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. -v. Miller, 202 U. S. ©

584, 597, where New York’s franchise tax, measured by

property, was sustaizied as applied to all the cars of the

-railroad company. There the court said, speaking of the

problem before it: ©

‘In the present case, however, it does not appear that any _

specific oars or any average of cars was so continuously in

any other State as to be taxable there. The absences relied

on were not in. the course of travel upon fixéd routes but.

., random excursions of casually chosen cars, determined by

the varying orders of particular shippers and the arbitrary

convenience of other roads.’’ (Italics supplied.) |

Whatever the actual facts as to car routings may have .

been, the court-in that case viewed the record as showing -

only ‘‘random excursions of casually chosen cars’’ offjmide

the state. The case was decided on that assumption. at

situation is not present in the case at bar. Here we have

air transport planes continyously and habitually used on

scheduled flights over fixed routes, much more extensive.

than through Minnesota, over at. least six other states, .

where they have acquired a situs for proportionate taxa-

tion by virtue of thé protection and benefit of those juris-

dictions, which subjects them to taxation in those states.

American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70,

82; Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma:ex rel. Mitchell, 290

U. S. 158, supra; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch,

177U.8149. ° .« t. aoa tn got

While neither state nor national constitution contains a

specific prohibition against double‘or multiple taxation ‘as

such, obviously the imposition of such a tax may under -

certaii circumstances offend some provision of the funda-

mental law. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N. W.

102. It is to be avoided if reasonably possible. Bemis Bro.

[fol. 55] Bag Co. v. Wallace, 197 Minn. 216, 228, 266 N. W.

690.. ‘‘Protection against’ * * * wunjust.and oppres-

sive taxation is matter of the greatest moment.’’ Farmers .

L. & T.. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 212. Here, quite

obviously, it is not only: oppressive but burdens interstate

commerce. It would not do so if it were confined to Minne-

sota’s proportionate share. -

There is no question but that Minnesota may ie its pro-

portionate share ofthe airplanes here involved; but, as

said in Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. ‘Mitchell,

290 U..S. 162, the jurisdiction ‘‘to tax property of this de-.

scription must be determined on a basis which is consistent.

with the like jurisdiction of other States.’’’ It is the power

. of other states to’tax due to habitual use and employment — ,

of the planes within their boundaries which. affects, the

situs of the planes and the right. of Minnesota to tax more

‘than its proportionate share. As said in Farmers L: &°

T.-Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 211, ‘‘the right of. one »

State to tax. may depend somewhat upon the power of an-

other to do so.”’ Certainly that rule has not been changed

as to tangibles as witness the Johnson Oil Co. case, supra.

It is the existence of the power to tax, not the exercise of

it, that affects the situs. Sancho v. Humacao Shipping

Corp. (1 Cir.) 108 F. (2d) 157, 160, though in the case at

bar all states on defendant’s scheduled routes except Idaho ©

have. exercised it.

Whether a proportionate tax should be imposed on the

theory of miles or hours flown within the state as compared

to the total mileage or hours flown, or upon the basis of

average number of planes present in the state under normal ~

operating conditions, having in mind that during most of

the time, as was the case with the cars in the Johnson Oil

Co. case, most of the planes are outside the state, is prob-

ably not a problem for this court to determine. It should

not, however, distinguish this ¢ase from the Johnson Oil

Co. case. That the planes come into the state every day or

nearly every day does not distinguish it. They are ont of

‘ [fol. 56] the state on flights over other jurisdictions a large

proportion of the time. The only difference from the John-

son Oil Co. case is that planes move faster and more fre- .

quently than cars. .The principle is the same. What this

court should say is that the tax may only be imposed by.

Minnesota upon its proportionate share _ on some

e . 37 | ‘

reasonable basis which, aw the taxing authorities a

should first determine.

To summarize: |

‘1, We\have a case of a specific tax on tangible pereonal

property, viz., aircraft. :

' 2. Such property is not subject to the rules applied to

- intangibles.

3. By habituaf; ase and employment on fixed schedules in

flights over. other states, the aircraft have acquired a situs

for proportionnate taxation in those states. :

~ 4, That situs must be taken into cimbideration in deter-

mining Minnesota’s constitutional power to tax, regardless

of the comicile 4 or — place of business of the. tax-

payer. ;

5. Minnesota “may tax only proportionate part of. the

value of the propérty arrived at on some reasonable basis

primarily to be fixed by the taxing authorities.

__ I think the judgment. should be reversed. =

arr * ; ‘Goring, J.

GantacuEn, Chief Justice (dissenting) :

-

I concar in the dissent of Mr. Justice Loring.

Gallagher, C. J.

Juigus J. Oxsox, : Justice (dissenting) :

i concur in the views of Mr. Justice Loring.

: Julius J. Olson, J.

(fol. 57] Sresnidevin, Justice (concurring specially).

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Loring is based

principally upon his interpretation of Johnson Oil Co. v.

Oklahoma ex rel, MitcheH, 290 U. S. 158.° He insists that

that case is indistinguishable from the case at bar, notwith-

standing that there the state, seeking to tax an entire fleet

of floating tank ‘cars, was not the state of the eee :

owner’s domicile. :. To quote from his dissent: .

~ “Thus we have a.situation much like that: presented to us

.. in the case at bar except that the Johnson company was in-

‘ corporated in Illinois instead of Oklahoma, a matter which

the United States ‘Supreme_ Court and the majority here

BB

38

séem to regard as iniiinntantal insofar as tangible property

is concerned.’’

But an ‘eaciiiiieas of the. opinion of Mr. Chief J ustice

Hughes establishes the contrary. To quote (290 U. S. 161):

‘Appellant’ had its domicile in Illinois and that State had

jurisdiction to.tax appellanit’s personal property which had

not acquired an actual situs elsewhere. ‘The State of origin .

remains the permanent situs of the property notwithstand-

ing its occasional excursions to foreign parts.’ ”’

In support of this statement, the Chief Justice cites New

York ‘ex rel: N. Y. C. & H. BR. BR. Co. v. Miller, 202 U: S. 584,

26 S. Ct. 714, 50 L. ed. 1155; Southern Pacific Co. v. Ken-

- tacky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 S. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed. 96. “These cited

cases and not the Johnson Oil Co. case are controlling here,

as clearly pointed out by-Mr. Justice Pirsig in his opinion.

Granted that domicile of the corporate owner,standing alone

will not yest in the domiciliary state the power to tax an

entire fleet of airplanes, yet the additional facts that the

eorporation’s principat place of business is in the state,

that all of its airplanes come within its borders during the

tax year on scheduled trips and for repairs, ‘and that the ~

manner and extent of. their operation is determined and di-'

rected from the state, supply the additional elements neces-

sary to invest the state with power to tax such planes. .

[fol. 58] I not only fully but emphatically agree with Mr.

J ustice Loring that ‘‘to subject all the taxpayer’s planes

° -to double or multiple taxation * * * would

not ae be. unjust but would create a situation so burden-

some to the airlines as materially to handicap their devel- —

_ opment and extension, so vital to the national interest.’’

As a court we cannot, however, concern ourselves with °

policy, a purely legislative question. Our only inquiry is

power. It is an uncontroverted doctrine that courts will

not consider the justice, wisdom, expediency, propriety, ne-

_ cessity, or policy of tax laws or other legislation. -That

-eardinal principle is the basis of the circumspect avoidance

by the judiciary of encroachment upon the exclusive domain

of the legislature, a coequal branch of the government. 11

Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, pp. 802-3-4, 900, §§ 136-138,

198; 1 Cooley, Const. Limitations (8 ed.) 346; State v. Fair-

mont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A. L.

R. 548; Champion v. Ames (lottery case) 188 U. 8. 321, 363,

| 39

93 §. Ct. 321, 47 L. ed. 492, 504; McCrary ¥. ae States,

195 U.S. 27, "24 8. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas, 561. .

. As recently as November 9, 1942, in ‘the case of. Wickard

v. Filburn, — U. S. —, Mr. J ustice Jackson sara this,

rule in the following language:

“The validity of an Act of Congress i is not to be refuscd

wi

application by the courts as arbitfary and capricious and.

forbidden by the Due Process.Clause merely because it -

is deemed in a particular case to work on sa canara re-.

sult. -

. Mr. Justice Pirsig has convincingly desmeciateaten that this

state’s power to tax defendant’s entire fleet of airplanes

' exists so long'as no part of it is permanently located in

another state. I therefore concur in his conclusion, though

reluctantly and not without suggesting that, for reasons so

forcibly pointed out by Mr. Justice’ Loring, remedial legis-

(fol. 59] lation to correct any possible unfairness to defend-,

ant and other companies similarly situated be enacted with-

out delay. lest congress: assert its undisputed power and

authorize ‘‘the incorporation of airlines under national law

and control of taxation.

: ‘Streissguth, J.

“ « ie :

[fol.60] In Supreme Covrr or Minwesota

¥::

‘In the Matter of the Proceedings to. Enforce Payment of : 3

Delinquent Personal bebcuteaed Taxes for the Sirol 1939

- 33176

State oF ecentinid: Respondent, —

_ a a | .

Norrawest Arauinzs, Inc., a Corporation, Appellant ©

J upement—December 31, 1942

Paciaian to an order of Court heretofore duly made and

entered in this cause it is determined and adjudged that

the judgment of the Court below, herein appealed from, to-

wit, of the District Court within and for the County of

_ Ramsey be.and the same hereby is in all things affirmed.

Men ee en re Donnan

4)

v

40

[fol.61] I~ Supaeme Covar on Mrswasora

| [Title omitted]

SripvLation as to Reconp—March 17, 1943

Upon the proposed petition of the appellant to the Su-

/ preme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari to

the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it is stipulated that ‘the

record to be certified to the Supreme Court of the United

‘States by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Minnesota’

shall consist of:

1. The record filed by appellant of the —_—oa7 in the,

District Court of Ramsey Counfy, Minnesota, excepting and

deleting therefrom the ‘‘Amended Stipulation of Facts’’

found on pages nine to seventeen, inclusive, of said record.

2. Amended Stipulation of Facts appended to respond-

ent’s supplemental brief and found on pages three to

twelve, inclusive, thereof.

3. The opinions (majority and minority) of the Supreme

_ Court of Minnesota.

4. The judgment of ‘the Supreme Court of Minnesota.

5. This stipulation. 73

Dated March 17, 1943:

M. J. Doherty, W. E. Rumble, Attorneys for Appel-

lant. James F. Lynch, . Andrew R. Bratter, Attor-

néys for Renpenions—" tits

ae #

A

(fol 62] Clerk ’s Certificate to uncaiiaiee transcript omit-

ted in printing.

~

~*~ , | “41

[fol.63] Supreme Court or THE Usrrep States, | Ocveian

Term, 1942

No, —

Norruwest AIRLINES, Pe

‘Oi. ae |

4) Tae Staze-on Mnewnsora

Onver Exrenpinc Trae Wrtais Wuicn to Fine Pertriox

FoR CERTIORARI

Upon Consideration of the application of counsel fee the

- petitioner, :

Yt Is Ordered that the time for filing petition for cer-

tiorari in the ibove-entitled cause be, and the same ‘is .

hereby, exte ed to and including April 5th, 1943. ,;

Wiley Rutledge,’ Associate Justice of the —

Court of the United States.

Dated this 31st day of March, 1943.

\"

s

[fol.64] Supreme Court or om Unrrep STaTEs

Over Attowine Certiorant—Filed May 10, 1943

The petition herein for a writ of. certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota is granted.

And it is further ordered that the duly certified copy of

the transcript of the proceedings below which accompanied _

the petition shall be treated as though filed in response to

such writ.

(7077), ,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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